Tuskegee Airmen

They did more than fight the enemy. They blew open the door to the Air Force for African-Americans. Tuskegee Airmen

By Col. Alan L. Gropman, USAF (Ret.)

HE Army Air Corps in Janu- T ary 1941 contained no African- Americans. One decade later, tens of thousands were serving in a racially integrated Air Force, working in every specialty. This revolution- ary reform was inspired by the success of America' s first black combat pilots, airmen who flew in World War II and in the immediate postwar era. The aviators were trained at Tuskegee AAF, Ala., and have al- Col. Benjamin 0. Davis (above) led the way. In an address to the Tuskegee ways been known as the Tuskegee Airmen Convention in 1995, Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF Chief of Staff, Airmen. recalled one mission on which Colonel Davis led fifty-four aviators on the first The Air Force was the first service Italian-based bomber-escort mission to Berlin: "You fought off waves of to integrate its ranks fully. It began German fighters and. . . made history because you shot down three German the process in 1949 because the jet fighters while losing only one friendly fighter. No bombers were lost." Tuskegee Airmen, despite suffering terrible discrimination in World War II, had demonstrated that they could fly and fight against Hitler' s best. This achievement undermined the foundation of segregation—the be- lief that blacks were inferior to whites. If blacks could arm, main- tain, and fly airplanes as well as whites could, no one could assert a legitimate basis for segregation. And on this last point, no question remained. During the last phase of World War II, the Tuskegee Airmen escort squadrons were employed as

52 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 1996 frequently as any other fighter squad- in the combat arms. Between 1924 in the area were opposed to the very rons in their theater, and they were and 1939, the Army War College in- existence of a black flying training uniquely successful in defending vestigated the underemployment of base and openly hostile to the train- AAF B-17s and B-24s against Ger- blacks on ten separate occasions. ees. Life off the post was often down- man attack. In the post—World War Each time, racism kept the students right dangerous for the airmen. II period, the service's lone black and faculty from reaching rational, Their first commander, Col. Fred- flying wing continued to be a com- fair-minded conclusions. erick V. H. Kimble, was a poor petent fighter organization, often It seems inane now, but these stud- choice for the job; he was at best winning major awards. ies asserted that blacks possessed indifferent and in all likelihood an- Many who have studied the sub- brains significantly smaller than tagonistic to their success. More- ject of armed forces integration credit those of white troops and were pre- over, the flying instructors at the President Harry S. Truman with this disposed to lack physical courage. airfield during World War II, with reform. The fact is, however, that The reports maintained that the Army the exception of Col. Noel F. Parrish, the Air Force's racial integration should increase opportunities for refused to socialize with the black announcement came in April 1948, blacks to help meet manpower re- pilots. All but Colonel Parrish re- months before the presidential de- quirements but claimed that they fused to join the Tuskegee AAF Of- cree. Only in July 1948 did the Presi- should always be commanded by ficers' Club. Once in the Mediterra- dent announce his Executive Order whites and should always serve in nean combat zone, Tuskegee Airmen 9981. At that, the order called only segregated units. were deliberately isolated in the 33d for equal opportunity and never men- The Air Corps at that time did not Fighter Group. tioned integration. employ blacks in any role. However, Because there was only one black The magnitude of the Air Force's President Franklin D. Roosevelt in fighting outfit, promotion in the or- decision to integrate is increased by 1940 directed the Air Corps to build ganization was severely limited. There the record of US military studies in an all-black flying unit. The presi- was only one colonel, and because he the 1920s and 1930s. dential order propelled the air orga- survived his combat missions, no nization to create the 99th Pursuit others reached that rank. The same Ten Times Wrong Squadron. To develop the required was true of squadron commanders in Shortly after the end of World War pilot force, the Air Corps opened a the four fighter units. If they man- I, the War Department asked the new training base in central Ala- aged to endure, nobody else could Army War College to study the pos- bama, near Tuskegee. move up to their rank, and nobody sible military role of blacks, with an Central Alabama was a terrible did. A Tuskegee Airman could not eye to expanding their participation place to train black pilots. The whites fill a vacancy in any other fighter

AIR FORCE Magazine/March 1996 53 Air Force's first deputy chief of staff for Personnel.

Dead - End Policies General Edwards believed that segregation was a defective personnel practice. The services were forced to place educated and high-aptitude blacks in all-black units, and almost all of these were support units. Thus, blacks who had sufficient education and aptitude to rise in rank and con- tribute in combat areas were pre- vented from doing so. After the war, the number of highly skilled black officers and enlisted men exceeded the needs of the 332d Fighter Wing (which had succeeded the 332d Fighter Group), then based at Lockbourne AAB, Ohio. Despite Above is Col. Noel F. Parrish, the Brig. Gen. ldwal Edwards, a person- their skills, they could not fill short- only instructor at Tuskegee AAF, nel specialist, saw segregation as an ages elsewhere because no other Ala., who would socialize with the inefficient and defective policy and flying organization used skilled and black pilots during World War sought to eliminate it. trained blacks. Conversely, vacan- cies in the units of the 332d could unit. Few Tuskegee Airmen rose above fighter squadrons and four medium not be filled by personnel in the rest the rank of lieutenant from 1942 bomb squadrons. About half the pilot of the Air Force because these units through the end of the war, despite trainees flew in combat. had to remain segregated. the fact that many flew three times These men flew more than 10,000 General Edwards knew this prac- the number of combat missions re- sorties. During 200 escort missions tice was wasteful, but he could do quired of fighter pilots before depart- to heavily defended targets in Ger- nothing about it so long as the Air ing the combat zone. many and Romania, the Tuskegee Force was segregated. When the Air Airmen never lost a friendly bomber Force became independent in 1947, Threat to Morale to an enemy fighter. In 1944 and 1945, General Edwards directed Lt. Col. All of these elements harmed mo- they shot down more than 100 enemy Jack F. Marr, a subordinate staff of- rale, and the spirit of the 332d Fighter aircraft in air-to-air combat and de- ficer, to study racial segregation to Group (which, by 1944, had united stroyed many more on the ground. see if abandoning it was advisable. Tuskegee Airmen from the 99th, They also sank a destroyer with ma- At Lockbourne, the all-black fight- 100th, 301st, and 302d Fighter Squad- chine guns (another unique accom- er wing's aircraft were flown and rons) was somewhat damaged by plishment) and destroyed many lo- successfully maintained by blacks. segregation and the discrimination comotives and other transportation Colonel Marr also found that com- that accompanied it. However, the assets. petent blacks worked alongside com- 332d' s attitude and esprit were posi- Because of the success of the 332d petent whites (though the two groups tive compared to that of the other Fighter Group and several other much never messed or billeted together) in Tuskegee Airmen flying unit, the smaller units, the War Department a friction-free atmosphere at other 477th Bomb Group (Medium). The again reexamined the role of blacks bases, despite official segregation. bomber group never got into combat in the armed forces. This massive The Colonel concluded that USAF as a result of its white commander' s study, "Participation of Negro Troops could desegregate safely and that bigoted personnel policies. The com- in the Post-War Military Establish- sound management called for dis- mander was eventually fired because ment," concluded that blacks with continuing the separation of the races. he had sabotaged his unit but not the same training and aptitude as Colonel Marr' s study confirmed before he did great damage to the whites performed satisfactorily. General Edwards' s thinking. In the spirit of his troops. One of the general officers who spring of 1948, the personnel chief Given the daily indignities faced supervised this study was USAAF convinced Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, the by the Tuskegee Airmen, it is some- Brig. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, who first Air Force Chief of Staff, and thing of a miracle that they accom- was fully aware of the accomplish- Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the vice plished all they did. ments (and trials) of the Tuskegee chief, that sound personnel manage- In the spring of 1941, the first Airmen. General Edwards had inves- ment practices demanded racial in- African-American enlisted men be- tigated racial problems affecting the tegration. These general officers had gan training to become maintainers Army and the Army Air Forces be- no trouble selling this idea to their and the first thirteen pilot candidates tween 1944 and 1947 and believed seg- civilian leaders, Secretary Stuart entered training. From that time until regation was inefficient and, worse, Symington and Assistant Secretary the end of the war, Tuskegee AAF incited racial disharmony and often Eugene M. Zuckert, because both graduated 950 pilots and formed four provoked riots. He later became the abhorred racial segregation. The Air

54 AIR FORCE Magazine! March 1996 Force, furthermore, was in harmony with the thinking of Defense Sec- retary James V. Forrestal, who also favored integration. Secretary Zuckert and General Spaatz announced in April 1948 that USAF would soon integrate because it accepted no doctrine of racial su- periority or inferiority. The Air Force was the first service to announce this dramatic change. At the time that the Air Force was declaring its intent to integrate, Sec- retary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall was asserting that the Army had no intention whatsoever of racially in- tegrating. He also formally com- plained to the Secretary of Defense that the Air Force was breaking the united front and demanded that Sec- retary Forrestal stop Air Force inte- Colonel Davis put to rest the myth that whites would not work for black officers. gration. General Fogleman credited Davis's men with proving "to people with unbiased With hindsight, it is easy to see eyes that the Tuskegee Airmen could fly and fight with the best of them." how Secretary Royall and the Army acted as they did; they had no experience comparable to the Air Force's Selling the Policy Some senior Air Force officers success with the Tuskegee Airmen. It took General Edwards about a claimed that the country was not During World War II, all-black Army year to carry out his policy because ready for military integration, or that units, except the 92d and 93d Divi- some senior officers had to be sold on the military ought to wait for civil- sions, were tiny, and all of them, integration. However, there was wide- ian integration, or that they and the including the two infantry divisions, spread support. In addition to the Chief troops would not cooperate. had white leaders at the top and in and vice chief of staff, supporters in- A persistent contention was that many other supervisory positions. In cluded Gen. Nathan F. Twining, who whites would never tolerate black the postwar military, there were no commanded the World War II Tuskegee supervision, but even that objection Army (or Navy or Marine) units like Airmen as Fifteenth Air Force com- was buried by Col. Benjamin 0. Lockbourne's 332d Fighter Wing, an mander, and Lt. Gen. Elwood R. "Pete" Davis, Jr., commander of the Tuske- outfit with a complex and highly de- Quesada, who commanded the post- gee Airmen at Lockbourne from 1946 manding mission that every day gave war Tactical Air Command, which in- to 1949 and base commander. the lie to the basis for segregation. cluded the 332d FW at Lockbourne. It was Colonel Davis who led the 332d in combat in both ground- attack and escort roles, and it was he who demanded a level of profes- sionalism and discipline that earned the praise of Gen. Ira C. Eaker him- self. In the postwar period, therefore, Colonel Davis deliberately planned to overcome the old saw that whites would never work for blacks. Although the 332d Fighter Wing at Lockbourne was all black, the tenant units at the base were white, and these outfits had to work with their black hosts for support. More significantly, the civilians employed by the 332d and Lockbourne were white and had black supervisors. Every inspector general inspection conducted by Tac- tical Air Command in this period de- termined that Colonel Davis and his post had smooth and harmonious personnel relations. Whites would in- Once in Europe, General Fogleman noted, the Tuskegee Airmen in "a series of 200 bomber-escort missions over Germany. . . became known as the Red Tail deed work for blacks. Devils" and compiled an enviable combat record, which would not have been Colonel Davis and his men thus possible without top-notch maintainers like these. had destroyed another myth.

AIR FORCE Magazine / March 1996 55

black service unit was dissolved and the Air Force was officially integrated. Colonel Davis departed Lock- bourne for the Air War College and General Fogleman from there to the Pentagon and from closed by summing up there to command of a fighter wing the combat record: "By in Korea, eventually reaching the war's end, the Tuskegee Airmen had shot down rank of lieutenant general. After 111 enemy aircraft and General Davis retired, another Tus- destroyed another 150 kegee Airman, Daniel "Chappie" on the ground. They James, became a four-star general disabled more than 600 and commander in chief of North boxcars, locomotives, and rolling stock and American Air Defense Command. sank one German Unquestionably, the Air Force destroyer and forty other benefitted from employing people boats and barges. . and of all races based solely on ability, never lost a bomber to enemy fighters." In the and so did the United States. This process, they paved the essential reform began with the Tus- way for Lt. Gen. Ben- kegee Airmen and their demonstra- jamin Davis (right); the tion of discipline, skill, and courage. US military's first black This reality was made explicit by four-star general, Gen. Daniel "Chappie" James; Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald and thousands of others. R. Fogleman at the Tuskegee Air- men Convention last August in At- lanta, Ga. "In the end," said General Fogle- man, "the men and the women of the Tuskegee experience broke forever the myths that allowed segregation, inequity, and injustice to exist with a thin veil of legitimacy. The Air Force pressed on with that commanders give this new policy "You engaged one of the most for- integration. General Edwards briefed their wholehearted support and un- midable military establishments in the uniformed leadership in April divided attention, for without their the world—the Luftwaffe. ... When 1949, telling the senior commanders backing and care it would not work. you engaged this force in combat that the "Air Force [had] adopted a General Edwards then promulgated and came away victorious, you car- policy of integration under which several documents—the regulation ried not only your own pride and Negro officers and airmen may be calling for integration and a classi- your personal accomplishments but assigned to any duty in any Air Force fied supplement to the regulation that also the idea that never again would unit or activity in accordance with insisted the men be assigned accord- anybody deny a man or woman the the qualifications of the individual ing to their specialties (barring com- opportunity to serve our country in [and the need] of the service." This manders from employing engine me- any capacity because of the color of was done, he said, out of a need for chanics as janitors and so forth) and his or her skin." efficiency, economy, and effective that told commanders that they were General Fogleman concluded, "We airpower. personally responsible for making look back with pride on your out- The 332d was to be broken up, and the new policy work. standing accomplishments—your skill its pilots and mechanics were to be By the end of 1949, 7,402 African- in combat, your strength of character sent to formerly all-white units based Americans still were serving in all- in the face of prejudice and racism. on the needs of the Air Force. Ac- black units. But 11,456 were serving Despite the bigotry, you would not be cording to General Edwards, blacks in mixed-race units, and 7,033 were denied the opportunity to serve your entering the Air Force would be asked in transit to units that had formerly country in desperate times. 'Service to meet the "same standards as any- been all white. Blacks at that point before self' is a key concept of our one else and will be classified, as- made up seven percent of the en- modern-day Air Force. 'Service be- signed, promoted, or eliminated in listed force and twelve percent of fore self' was more than just a phrase accordance with standards that will the troops in Air Force basic train- to the Tuskegee Airmen. It was a way apply equally to all personnel." ing. By the end of 1951, the last all- of life." •

A Single Criterion General Edwards put no limits on Col. Alan L. Gropman, USAF (Ret.), an instructor at National Defense Univer- the number of blacks who could sity, has published widely on the topic of the Tuskegee Airmen. His most qualify for integrated positions, and recent article for Air Force Magazine, a book review of Eagle Against the Sun: he insisted that the only criterion for The American War with Japan, by Ronald H. Spector, appeared in the June employment was ability. He directed 1986 issue.

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