They did more than fight the enemy. They blew open the door to the Air Force for African-Americans. Tuskegee Airmen By Col. Alan L. Gropman, USAF (Ret.) HE Army Air Corps in Janu- T ary 1941 contained no African- Americans. One decade later, tens of thousands were serving in a ra- cially integrated Air Force, working in every specialty. This revolution- ary reform was inspired by the suc- cess of America' s first black combat pilots, airmen who flew in World War II and in the immediate postwar era. The aviators were trained at Tuskegee AAF, Ala., and have al- Col. Benjamin 0. Davis (above) led the way. In an address to the Tuskegee ways been known as the Tuskegee Airmen Convention in 1995, Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF Chief of Staff, Airmen. recalled one mission on which Colonel Davis led fifty-four aviators on the first The Air Force was the first service Italian-based bomber-escort mission to Berlin: "You fought off waves of to integrate its ranks fully. It began German fighters and. made history because you shot down three German the process in 1949 because the jet fighters while losing only one friendly fighter. No bombers were lost." Tuskegee Airmen, despite suffering terrible discrimination in World War II, had demonstrated that they could fly and fight against Hitler' s best. This achievement undermined the foundation of segregation—the be- lief that blacks were inferior to whites. If blacks could arm, main- tain, and fly airplanes as well as whites could, no one could assert a legitimate basis for segregation. And on this last point, no question remained. During the last phase of World War II, the Tuskegee Airmen escort squadrons were employed as 52 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 1996 frequently as any other fighter squad- in the combat arms. Between 1924 in the area were opposed to the very rons in their theater, and they were and 1939, the Army War College in- existence of a black flying training uniquely successful in defending vestigated the underemployment of base and openly hostile to the train- AAF B-17s and B-24s against Ger- blacks on ten separate occasions. ees. Life off the post was often down- man attack. In the post—World War Each time, racism kept the students right dangerous for the airmen. II period, the service's lone black and faculty from reaching rational, Their first commander, Col. Fred- flying wing continued to be a com- fair-minded conclusions. erick V. H. Kimble, was a poor petent fighter organization, often It seems inane now, but these stud- choice for the job; he was at best winning major awards. ies asserted that blacks possessed indifferent and in all likelihood an- Many who have studied the sub- brains significantly smaller than tagonistic to their success. More- ject of armed forces integration credit those of white troops and were pre- over, the flying instructors at the President Harry S. Truman with this disposed to lack physical courage. airfield during World War II, with reform. The fact is, however, that The reports maintained that the Army the exception of Col. Noel F. Parrish, the Air Force's racial integration should increase opportunities for refused to socialize with the black announcement came in April 1948, blacks to help meet manpower re- pilots. All but Colonel Parrish re- months before the presidential de- quirements but claimed that they fused to join the Tuskegee AAF Of- cree. Only in July 1948 did the Presi- should always be commanded by ficers' Club. Once in the Mediterra- dent announce his Executive Order whites and should always serve in nean combat zone, Tuskegee Airmen 9981. At that, the order called only segregated units. were deliberately isolated in the 33d for equal opportunity and never men- The Air Corps at that time did not Fighter Group. tioned integration. employ blacks in any role. However, Because there was only one black The magnitude of the Air Force's President Franklin D. Roosevelt in fighting outfit, promotion in the or- decision to integrate is increased by 1940 directed the Air Corps to build ganization was severely limited. There the record of US military studies in an all-black flying unit. The presi- was only one colonel, and because he the 1920s and 1930s. dential order propelled the air orga- survived his combat missions, no nization to create the 99th Pursuit others reached that rank. The same Ten Times Wrong Squadron. To develop the required was true of squadron commanders in Shortly after the end of World War pilot force, the Air Corps opened a the four fighter units. If they man- I, the War Department asked the new training base in central Ala- aged to endure, nobody else could Army War College to study the pos- bama, near Tuskegee. move up to their rank, and nobody sible military role of blacks, with an Central Alabama was a terrible did. A Tuskegee Airman could not eye to expanding their participation place to train black pilots. The whites fill a vacancy in any other fighter AIR FORCE Magazine/March 1996 53 Air Force's first deputy chief of staff for Personnel. Dead - End Policies General Edwards believed that segregation was a defective person- nel practice. The services were forced to place educated and high-aptitude blacks in all-black units, and almost all of these were support units. Thus, blacks who had sufficient education and aptitude to rise in rank and con- tribute in combat areas were pre- vented from doing so. After the war, the number of highly skilled black officers and enlisted men exceeded the needs of the 332d Fighter Wing (which had succeeded the 332d Fighter Group), then based at Lockbourne AAB, Ohio. Despite Above is Col. Noel F. Parrish, the Brig. Gen. ldwal Edwards, a person- their skills, they could not fill short- only instructor at Tuskegee AAF, nel specialist, saw segregation as an ages elsewhere because no other Ala., who would socialize with the inefficient and defective policy and flying organization used skilled and black pilots during World War sought to eliminate it. trained blacks. Conversely, vacan- cies in the units of the 332d could unit. Few Tuskegee Airmen rose above fighter squadrons and four medium not be filled by personnel in the rest the rank of lieutenant from 1942 bomb squadrons. About half the pilot of the Air Force because these units through the end of the war, despite trainees flew in combat. had to remain segregated. the fact that many flew three times These men flew more than 10,000 General Edwards knew this prac- the number of combat missions re- sorties. During 200 escort missions tice was wasteful, but he could do quired of fighter pilots before depart- to heavily defended targets in Ger- nothing about it so long as the Air ing the combat zone. many and Romania, the Tuskegee Force was segregated. When the Air Airmen never lost a friendly bomber Force became independent in 1947, Threat to Morale to an enemy fighter. In 1944 and 1945, General Edwards directed Lt. Col. All of these elements harmed mo- they shot down more than 100 enemy Jack F. Marr, a subordinate staff of- rale, and the spirit of the 332d Fighter aircraft in air-to-air combat and de- ficer, to study racial segregation to Group (which, by 1944, had united stroyed many more on the ground. see if abandoning it was advisable. Tuskegee Airmen from the 99th, They also sank a destroyer with ma- At Lockbourne, the all-black fight- 100th, 301st, and 302d Fighter Squad- chine guns (another unique accom- er wing's aircraft were flown and rons) was somewhat damaged by plishment) and destroyed many lo- successfully maintained by blacks. segregation and the discrimination comotives and other transportation Colonel Marr also found that com- that accompanied it. However, the assets. petent blacks worked alongside com- 332d' s attitude and esprit were posi- Because of the success of the 332d petent whites (though the two groups tive compared to that of the other Fighter Group and several other much never messed or billeted together) in Tuskegee Airmen flying unit, the smaller units, the War Department a friction-free atmosphere at other 477th Bomb Group (Medium). The again reexamined the role of blacks bases, despite official segregation. bomber group never got into combat in the armed forces. This massive The Colonel concluded that USAF as a result of its white commander' s study, "Participation of Negro Troops could desegregate safely and that bigoted personnel policies. The com- in the Post-War Military Establish- sound management called for dis- mander was eventually fired because ment," concluded that blacks with continuing the separation of the races. he had sabotaged his unit but not the same training and aptitude as Colonel Marr' s study confirmed before he did great damage to the whites performed satisfactorily. General Edwards' s thinking. In the spirit of his troops. One of the general officers who spring of 1948, the personnel chief Given the daily indignities faced supervised this study was USAAF convinced Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, the by the Tuskegee Airmen, it is some- Brig. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, who first Air Force Chief of Staff, and thing of a miracle that they accom- was fully aware of the accomplish- Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the vice plished all they did. ments (and trials) of the Tuskegee chief, that sound personnel manage- In the spring of 1941, the first Airmen. General Edwards had inves- ment practices demanded racial in- African-American enlisted men be- tigated racial problems affecting the tegration.