Running Head: THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 1

The Influence of Talent Evaluation on the Annual N.B.A. Draft Process

Kevin Michael Butler

This Capstone Project is submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Certificate

In GM & Scouting

Sports Management Worldwide

Capstone Mentor: Dr. Lynn Lashbrook

Date of Submission: May 9, 2021 THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 2

Abstract

How is the process of talent evaluation influencing player selection by your team this season? on draft day in the N.B.A.? The participants for this study are male and female, of a single control group, which consists of professional management personnel within the NBA.

They are Presidents of Basketball Operations, General Managers, Directors of Scouting,

Directors of Player Personnel within both the NBA and WNBA. The research design employed within this empirical study utilizes a one-shot survey design approach. The rationale for this study examines the procedures utilized by NBA Basketball Operations staff to determine what players should be selected by their individual teams on draft day prior to the 2021-2022 season.

The purpose for this study is to examine how decision makers use collegiate player data collected, analyzed, and evaluated during the annual NBA draft process? The basic findings within this study suggest that NBA Basketball Operations personnel utilize a number of evaluation procedures to determine what players should be selected by their teams throughout the annual NBA draft process. Essentially a (CBA) collective bargaining agreement is a legal contract that exist between a professional sports league and an association—for example, a workers’ union--- that represents the players.

Keywords: NBA Draft, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Talent Evaluation

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 3

Introduction and Background

According to Arel and Tomas (2019) the NBA labor market is governed by the CBA between the NBA and the NBPA. Each year following the NBA finals, the NBA draft is held, consisting of two rounds, no more than 60 players selected where each NBA team is awarded one pick in each round to draft eligible players (NBPA, 2017). The rationale for this study examines the procedures utilized by Basketball Operations staff to determine what players should be selected by their individual teams on draft day this season. What are your current needs? What players have your determined that possess the potential to make an immediate impact? The NBA draft is an annual event dating back to 1947 in which the teams from the

National Basketball Association (NBA) can draft players who are eligible and wish to join the league. These are typically college basketball players, but international players are also eligible to be drafted. College players who have finished their four-year college eligibility are automatically eligible for selection, while the underclassmen have to declare their eligibility and give up their remaining college eligibility. International players who are at least 22 years old are automatically eligible for selection, while the players younger than 22 have to declare their eligibility. Players who are not automatically eligible but have declared their eligibility are often call :early-entrants” or “early-entry candidates”.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement

According to Stang (2017) essentially a (CBA) collective bargaining agreement is a legal contract that exist between a professional sports league and an association—for example, a workers’ union--- that represent the players. This legal contract establishes the rules by which the sports league operates. The collective bargaining agreement outlines trade rules, draft

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 4 processes, salary cap, methods for setting the cap, the league’s minimum and maximum salaries for players, and a long list of other items deemed necessary for the league to function properly and abide by state and federal labor laws and federal antitrust laws. Without getting too much into federal antitrust laws and causing the reader to fall asleep, it is important to note that when a professional sports league has a salary cap and a player draft it does violate antitrust laws.

However, no violation occurs if the cap and draft are mutually agreed upon through a collective bargaining agreement. This is one of the primary reasons the NBA has a CBA (Stang, 2017, p. 37-38).

According to Stang (2017) the NBA’s (CBA) history, like those of most professional sports leagues, is interesting and important to know, In 1954, one of the ’ and the NBA’s star players, Bob Cousy, started to organize the NBA players into a union. The NBA league

Officials and team owners initially refused to recognize the players’ union. However, by 1957 the league and its owners started to recognize the players’ union (Stang, 2017, p.38).

The General Manager

The NBA general manager must wear numerous hats. First, GM’s are responsible for overseeing all of the business and financial operations of the team. Most GM’s also have an important role in public relations as the public face of the team. NBA franchises are big operations. Every team in the league has more than 100 employees. Given the multi-hundred million dollar investment owners make in purchasing a team, they must have top quality management to run the business. While responsibilities will vary from franchise to franchise, the general manager of an NBA team is effectively the captain of the ship. Especially in terms of day-to-day business operations.

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 5

Statement of the Problem

The problem for this study is posed as the following questions? How is the process of talent evaluation influencing player selection by your team this season on draft day in the N.B.A.?

What statistical formulas are most utilized by your team during the player evaluation process?

How does your team assess its player personnel and salary cap issues this season?

Purpose of the Study

The purpose for this study is to examine how decision makers use collegiate player data collected, analyzed, and evaluated during the NBA draft process?

Justification of the Study

This study is being conducted to familiarize the reader on the components of the NBA Draft process and how this process works. The annual NBA draft process will be an opportunity for collegiate basketball players to see their dreams become reality if they are selected. This process is far more complex that meets the eye, so let’s examine the three main components to how it works: the draft lottery, the training process, and draft day.

At the conclusion of every regular season, a total of 16 teams make the playoffs, leaving the remaining 14 to plan their vacations. The silver lining of not making the playoffs for these 14 teams is that they are given the opportunity to earn one of the top picks in the following draft, via the lottery.

The Lottery: The lottery picks are decided when 14 Ping-Pong balls, numbered 1-14, are mixed in a glass jar. There are a total of 1,001 four-ball combinations that can be had from the

14 options in the jar, and the sequential combination of 11-12-13-14 is not used. This leaves

1,000 possible combinations, which are proportionally given out to the 14 teams based on their

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 6 regular-season records. Following the determination of the first three picks, the remaining 11 picks are given to the teams based on their records, effectively meaning that if the worst team’s

Ping-Pong ball combinations are not drawn, it is still guaranteed a top—4 pick in the draft.

Training: Workouts and Pro Days: The NCAA basketball season comes to a conclusion with March Madness tournament. Similar to NFL prospects, NBA hopefuls declare for the draft following their team’s final game, and they immediately begin rigorously training for the draft.

Two-month training costs often add up in excess of $20,000, which their agents end up incurring.

While there is no rule that agents have to front these fees, that is what the market demands, and to play you have to pay. Players will train at various locations based on preference and agent relationships with basketball trainers.

Draft Day: It is important to remember that there are a total of 450 active NBA players, and a total of 50 new players drafted annually. Just as first-round NFL draft picks have significantly larger contract value than seventh-rounder draft choices, (based on signing bonuses), the same applies between the first-and second-round NBA draftees.

Hypothesis

In examining how decision makers use collegiate player data collected, analyzed, and evaluated during the annual NBA draft process to determine what players should be selected to improve and enhance each teams overall success moving forward this season. Assuming a valid data-gathering process has been employed, and it has, it is hypothesized that a survey- questionnaire be disseminated to all NBA Basketball Operations decision makers. The research design employed within this empirical study utilizes a one-shot survey-questionnaire which is valid and reliable instrument of assessment.

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 7

Limitations

The scope of this study consist of limitations which are: One NBA basketball operations decision maker from within the league’s 30 teams responded to this survey-questionnaire in stead of a decision maker from each team surveyed. Most of the participants for this study did not respond to the survey-questionnaire disseminated and sent to them by U.S. Mail.

Assumptions

Prior to initiating this study, the following assumptions were made: The participants for this study were selected based on their decision making ability within the research design area. The participants for this study are qualified basketball operations practitioners within the (NBA)

National Basketball Association. The participants for this study were provided and asked to complete a survey-questionnaire that is a valid instrument of assessment to gather the appropriate information. The participants for this study will be given a timeframe of 1 to 4 weeks to answer all questions relating to talent evaluation and the NBA draft process and return the survey- questionnaire back to me via email at [email protected]. The writer will produce a final report that provides pertinent information as it relates to the scope, research design, and methods, with recommendations for further study and applied research.

Review of Literature

(Stang, 2017, p. 29) suggest the talent evaluation part of scouting takes place at all levels of basketball, but it has a more prominent role at the collegiate and professional levels. Typically, at the high school level, the athletic governing bodies have rules and regulations against recruiting players, and the same holds true for several youth basketball governing bodies.

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 8

According to Berri, Brook and Fenn (2011) research on the NBA draft has been relatively scarce. Kahn and Sherer (1988) failed to fine a statistical relationship between draft position and a players statistical performance in college. This model, though, included a measure of player compensation in the NBA and college performance data. The former was significant. And since compensation reflects player quality as the authors noted it may not be surprising the signal from other measures of player quality was muted (Berri, Brook and Fenn, 2011).

Berri, Brook and Fenn (2011) suggests there is an issue, though, with how performance is evaluated in basketball. Berri (2005) reviewed eleven studies; 6 examining the link in the NBA between a players race and decisions such as salary and employment. Although conclusions with respect to race varied across these studies, the story told with respect to the perceived value of player scoring was consistent. Specifically, these studies indicated that total points scored were the primary (Berri, Brook and Fenn, 2011).

According to Berri, Brook and Fenn (2011) these are not the only studies on the NBA draft.

Both the work of Taylor and Trogdon (2002) and Price et al. (2010) examined the tendency of teams to perform worse than expected towards the end of an NBA season. This tendency reflects the desire of teams to improve their their position in the NBA draft (Berri, Brook and Fenn,

2011).

Berri, Brook and Fenn (2011) found factors NBA teams considered in evaluating player talent. These studies offered fourteen empirical models, and in thirteen of these points scored was found to be both the expected sign and statistically significant. 7 of the other factors employed by researchers, only total rebounds 8 and blocked shots were statistically significant more often than not. The significance of assists was evenly split, 9 while field goal percentage

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 9 was significant in only four of the nine models where it was employed. Every other factor was not significant more than once. In sum, these studies indicate that player evaluation in the NBA appear to be driven by points scored (Berri, Brook and Fenn, 2011).

Berri, Brook and Fenn (2011) finds such research tells two stories. Scoring is consistently that factor that dominates the evaluation of playing talent in the NBA. One should note, though, that a players accumulation of points is dependent on the playing time the player received and the number of shots taken. Simply staying on the floor and taking a large number of field goal and free throw attempts can lead to the accumulation of lofty point totals. Clearly, efficiency in utilizing shot attempts would also be an indicator of a players’ worth to a basketball team.

Shooting efficiency, though, is not consistently found to impact the evaluation of player talent.

In other words, the evidence suggests that a player who scores points efficiently can still be rated highly with respect to salary and post-season awards. Free Agent salaries, The evidence presented suggests that scoring dominates both the allocation of salaries and voting for the All-

Star team. In an examination of 337 free agents from 2001 to 2008, player scoring was found to be the best predictor of the wages received (Berri, Brook and Fenn 2011).

According to Arel and Tomas (2019) the NBA labor market is governed by the CBA between the NBA and the NBPA. Each year following the NBA finals, the NBA draft is held, consisting of two rounds where each NBA team is awarded one pick in each round to draft eligible players NBPA, 2017). According to the CBA, each first round pick receives a guaranteed contract that covers two seasons, with an option in favor of the team for the third season and a second option in favor of the team for the fourth season. The contract salary must agree to the rookie salary scale set in the CBA for each draft pick position (NBPA, 2017).

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 10

Second round draft picks do not receive guaranteed contracts under the CBA and negotiate with the drafting team for a contract. Research has shown the rookie salary scale drives unraveling in the NBA labor market, as teams draft players earlier than necessary to prevent competitors from poaching them (Sen, 2013).

Arel and Tomas (2019) finds in the CBA (NBPA, 2017), players are eligible to be selected in the draft and sign a NBA contract if they are at least 19 years of age and, for U.S. players, one

NBA season has elapsed since their high school graduation date. These CBA draft eligibility requirements have created the “one-and-done” rule in which players are not free to enter the

NBA labor market after graduation but must instead spend one year playing in college or at a professional level below the NBA (i.e., the NBA development league or an international league)

(Barnewall, 2017). Forcing players to wait a year and the NCAA’s rule against compensating student-athletes have led to bribery and corruption scandals surrounding the recruiting process

(Arel and Tomas, 2019).

Arel and Tomas (2019) suggests in the fall of 2017, many top schools were charged with fraudulently paying players to commit to the nation’s top programs for their one-and-done year in college (Sherman, 2018). This corruption scandal led a Commission of College Basketball formed by the NCAA and chaired by Dr. Condoleezza Rice to recommend the NBA and NBPA lower the age minimum for the draft to 18 to reduce the influence of one-and-done on college basketball (NCAA, 2018). However, lowering the draft age will put even more pressure on elite players to truly understand their professional potential and their options in declaring for the draft

(Arel and Tomas, 2019).

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 11

According to Arel and Tomas (2019) the CBA stipulates that players who are four years out of high school are automatically entered in the draft pool, but early entry players (i.e., players between one years and three years beyond high school graduation) must declare themselves eligible to the NBA 60 days prior to the draft date (NBPA, 2017). This early declaration requirement puts pressure on players to gather important information about their draft status and carefully weigh their options to declare for the draft (Arel and Tomas, 2019).

Arel and Tomas (2019) suggests the NCAA has adopted a recent change to their rules regarding draft deadlines to better support the decision process of draft eligible players (NCAA,

2016). In prior years, the NCAA imposed an early-entry deadline that was typically in mid-

April, many weeks before the NBA draft combine, which provides NBA evaluations of a player’s draft status. This evaluation information helps players make an informed decision about whether to relinquish their college eligibility and enter the draft. Starting in 2016, the deadline for players to withdraw their early entry petition is now 10 days after the NBA draft combine

(NCAA, 2016). The later deadline allows players to participate in pre-draft interviews, one NBA team tryout, and combined to better inform their draft decision. This deadline is also after the

NBA draft lottery, which determines the draft order for teams, so players now have information about which team may draft them to consider in their early entry decision. With this rule change, many players test the waters of the draft to see where they stand (Arel and Tomas, 2019).

According to Arel and Tomas (2019) in 2017, 137 players from the collegiate ranks and 45 international players declared early for the draft, with 64 collegiate players removing their names before the NCAA deadline (NBA, 2017). While this rule change does help better inform the player’s decision process, it still requires players to appropriately weigh the decision

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 12 factors, such as value of staying in school (Arel and Tomas, 2019).

Arel and Tomas (2019) demonstrates another approach the NCAA has tried to encourage players to not leave early is to provide additional cost-of-attendance based payments to players while in school (Isidore, 2015). The NCAA amateurism rule prevents student athletes from being paid to play basketball for their school; however, a recent change has allowed players to receive some payments while in school. In 2015, Division I schools in the NCAA approved payments to student athletes to cover the difference between the amount included in an athletic scholarship and the actual cost of attending school, with payments ranging between $2,000 and

$8,000 depending on the school (NCAA, 2015). While helpful for student athletes, the payments total less than 1% of the amount the player can earn as either a first or second round draft pick and are ineffective in inducing players not to enter the draft early. These additional payments also put an additional financial burden on schools, many of which are already losing money on their athletic programs, if not their basketball teams (Rovell, 2015).

Arel and Tomas (2019) following the NBA has considered a different approach to keeping players in school longer. Due to the fact that unraveling in the labor market has led to players entering the league at a younger age (Li & Rosen, 1998), some owners in the NBA and until recently NBA Commissioner Adam Silver, want to raise the minimum draft eligible age from 19 to 20 (Ellentuck, 2016). Experts maintain that the age restriction has diluted the level of play in the NBA, as teams are forced to draft younger players based on potential instead of proven skills

(Goss, 2016).

According to Arel and Tomas (2019) NBA general managers would also rather have more information on draftees, including their relative performance against top collegiate basketball

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 13 talent or in the NBA development League instead of against just high school players (Maese,

2019). While Silver agrees raising the age requirement to 20 is in the best interest of the NBA, as it allows players to develop professionally in college or in the NBA Development League and increases the overall quality of play in the NBA, it also imposes constraints on all players and not

Just on the ones who are making poor early entry draft decisions, leading to recruiting scandals and possible injury for players who have to wait two years to enter the draft even if they are ready (Maese, 2019). Raising the age requirement to 20 does have the support of as many as half of the NBA owners, but Adam Silver’s view has recently been swayed by the recommendation of the Commission of College Basketball, and he now supports a reduced age limit to 18, as does the NBPA (Maese, 2019). This age requirement will be an important component of the next

CBA, but it will not affect the NBA draft until 2022 at the earliest (Arel and Tomas, 2019).

According to Skinner and Guy (2015) Numerical evaluation of basketball players has long been based on box score statistics. Such evaluations, by nature of the limited data set from which they draw, generally around a player’s contributions to the five position statistics- points, rebounds, assists, steals, and blocks—while neglecting more nuanced aspects of the player’s value, such as his/her ability to make high quality (non-assist) passes, or set good screens, or rotate effectively on defense. These less easily quantifiable aspects of the player’s performance are traditionally evaluated only qualitatively, informed by the intuition of a coach or analyst who has spent a significant amount of time watching the players perform (Skinner and

Guy, 2015).

Skinner and Guy (2015) finds this distinction between quantifiable and non-quantifiable player skills may be on the verge of disappearing. Beginning in the 2013-2014 season, all thirty

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 14 arenas of the National Basketball Association (NBA) contains a system of cameras and tracking software that allow the spatial coordinates of all players and the ball to be recorded and processed digitally. In this way essentially every aspect of the game is made accessible for quantitative analysis—every pass, screen, and defensive rotation can in principle be analyzed quantitatively by those with access to this “player tracking” date (Skinner and Guy, 2015).

Skinner and Guy (2015) demonstrates thus far, publicly-available studies using player tracking data have largely focused on augmenting or refining the use of conventional statistics.

For example, recent studies have examined the effect of a defender’s proximity on shooting percentage, broken down shooting percentage based on how many dribbles are taken before the shot, characterized the effect of defender proximity on shooting percentage, and examined the dependence of rebound rate on spatial location. These studies are certainly illuminating, and they suggest significant improvements that can be made to the conventional statistics by which players are evaluated. Recently, however, researchers have begun to consider that the usefulness of player tracking data may go well beyond creating or augmenting statistical descriptors of individual players, and may in fact catalyze a fundamental change in the way we think about the structure of basketball offense and defense. In this spirit, we consider here a similarly ambitious use for player tracking data (Skinner and Guy, 2015).

According to Skinner and Guy (2015) recent studies have proposed the idea that describing a basketball offense is essentially a network problem, in the sense that each possession progresses from a well-defined starting point toward a well-defined goal through a particular sequence of intermediary states. In this description, a “node” in the “offensive network” is a particular arrangement of the players and the ball within the offense, and a “link” in the network is the set

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 15 of ball and player movements that are necessary to bring the offense from one node to another.

This problem is optimizing the performance of the offense, then, can be seen as equivalent to optimizing the flow of possessions through the offensive network—the offense should move as efficiently as possible from the first node (the inbounds pass) to the last (a made shot) (Skinner and Guy, 2015).

Skinner and Guy (2015) finds the power of this network description becomes apparent when one imagines coupling it with the full player tracking data set. Indeed, player tracking data allows one to reconstruct directly how the offense progresses from the inbounds pass to a made basket. The success rate of each step along the way provides information about the effectiveness of links in the network, which in turn are a reflection of the skill levels of the players involved.

Thus, by “watching” the performance of the offense with player tracking data, it should be possible to learn the skill levels of the players involved, including any skills that affect the team’s offensive performance. Once these skills are known, one can predict quantitatively how the offense will perform when called upon to run different plays or to substitute different players whose skills are also known (Skinner and Guy, 2015).

Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) suggests the following chronicles how Dick

Haviland of Growth Management Strategies [GMS] and Paul Storfer of HR Technologies [HRT] assisted an NBA and a WNBA team by utilizing unique technology and a human resources profiling process to evaluate player draft choices, coaches, and front-office staff. You might ask, what in the world would cause an NBA franchise to turn to a management-consulting firm and s software-development firm when it needed to evaluate the top draft prospects, coaching candidates, and front-office positions? The answer is the franchise was looking for ways to

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 16 improve its selection and retention process (Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

(According to Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) as the owner of the franchise put it,

“If we’re going to pay multimillion-dollar signing bonuses and mega-buck salaries, I want to know the recruits have a good chance of succeeding.” The franchise also was not satisfied with the performance of the overall organization and could not identify the problems that were preventing the team from being more successful. The NBA team mentioned above had turnover in coaches and front-office staff, so there was some concern that there were issues that were being missed and therefore not being addressed. This approach was so successful that the teams required that confidentiality be maintained about their names because they believe the assessment process they used has given them a distinct competitive edge (Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) finds two important elements were needed to address the issues raised by the NBA team. First was a comprehensive assessment protocol to evaluate the correlation between performance effectiveness and individual attributes. Second was a methodology and comprehensive data collection and evaluation system for developing high-performance models and evaluating candidates for specific positions based on that model both before draft selections were made and on an ongoing developmental basis for all the staff and players (Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) suggests the assessment and evaluation part of the project was designed by Dick Haviland. He has significant assessment and organization development experience and, for business applications, typically uses up to seven different profiling instruments plus a behavior-based interview format developed from the Center for

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 17

Creative Leadership’s study described in The Lesson of Experience (Lexington Books), by

Morgan W. McCall Jr., Michael M. Lombardi, and Ann M. Morrison. The profiling instruments are user-friendly and easy to administer. The full battery, if used, would take no more than 3.5 hours to complete. For the NBA/WNBA project, Haviland used three instruments. There were some questions concerning subjecting potential player draft and others to lengthy profiling sessions, whether sufficient additional information would be obtained by using more than the basic three instruments for this application, and other considerations but the conclusion was that the three selected instruments would provide the required information (Macaleer, Shannon, and

Haviland, 2002).

According to Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) the instruments that were used included one that measures over 100 possible clusters of traits based on 16 core attributes; a second that provides information on thinking style and decision making; and, for some applications, one that provides “baseline” information on personality and temperament traits

(Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) finds the NBA teams, over the last 15 years, had been using a profiling method that measured only 13 traits for player draft prospects, with only about 55 percent predictive accuracy rate once the players were actually getting court time beyond their rookie year. GMS and HRT developed a profiling methodology that measures 30 psychological and behavioral traits. Also, the process was able to identify the type of coaching style that would be most effective with each draft prospect. The data was then combined with the scout’s rating of the physical skills of the prospect, and an overall numerical rating and ranking was assigned to each prospect in preparation for the draft. To validate and develop a

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 18 high-performance profile, the franchise arranged for GMS to travel around the country to interview and profile a number of NBA Hall-of-Fame players, NBA All-Stars, current players, and former players who are now coaches in the NBA. Over the next two years, GMS and HRT worked closely with the NBA franchise’s executives, coaches, and scouts in defining the behavior and psychological traits of a high-performing, long-career player. In addition, competency models were developed for the head coach, general manager, and several other front office positions (Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) demonstrates the consulting team knew that the requirements of the project indicated a need for an automated evaluation tool that could collect, track, and evaluate comprehensive data easily, quickly, and accurately. There was also a need to cross-link the results of the profiling to the competency models and the quantitative evaluation process. To do so be hand would be cumbersome, and important information could be missed.

Haviland, using a 1-to-10 rating scale, developed a methodology to make this link (Macaleer,

Shannon, and Havliand, 2002).

Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) finds as for an automated tool, Storfer, who worked on the design of prodigy, later developed a software program and process to create competency models and track extensive data around evaluating individuals against the model. It is an HR information system for selection, training and development, and much more. This sophisticated program can manage and track quantifiable data on each individual, team, business unit, and/or division to increase productivity across an entire enterprise. The program called

HRScope, provides the ability to quantitatively measure efforts of all key HR processes such as high-performance modeling, staffing and selection, performance management, succession

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 19 planning, training and development, self-directed career planning, and outplacement/deselection

(Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

According to Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) there were too many instances in which the talent and expectations of the draft players did not match the team’s culture and coaching style. It became apparent that the manner in which certain players were coached in high-profile college programs was not always going to be compatible with an NBA team’s structures and how it coached players. In fact, in some cases the mismatch led to disaster.

Players who were not used to playing through some pain, who wanted special treatment, or who wanted to be individual contributors in a program built on strong teamwork would not succeed.

For example, the NBA team participating in this project had drafted a player from one of the top college basketball schools in the country. Multimillions of dollars were paid to this draft player.

He was touted to eventually be in a league with former greats like Larry Bird, Wilt Chamberlin and other Hall of Famers. Unfortunately, this young player was a big disappointment and had to be traded. He has since become a very successful NBA player with another team and will some day probably be in the NBA Hall of Fame. It was a matter of finding the right culture that would make him feel comfortable and support his successful performance. The Significant financial loss from this experience was a wake-up call, resulting in the team seeking a better evaluation method (Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

According to Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) both the profiling and evaluation tools were used to help the NBA team select players. The results were so impressive that the process was used to successfully fill several staff and coaching positions for the NBA and

WNBA teams. Of the top 15 draft choices in the GMS/HRT profiling process, 14 were selected

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 20 in the draft in precisely the order the process had them ranked. Five of those selected were identified as high performers (potential All-Star). Three of them were named to the All-Rookie team at the end of the season. All five either became starters or saw significant playing time as rookies. Had the NBA team not used the HRScope methodology, they would have chosen a different draft player and the results would not have been favorable. Instead, they were able to make draft choices that did a much better job of meeting their objectives to build a solid, high- performance team (Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) demonstrates the key to success for the NBA and

WNBA teams was to find a methodology that could help find players that would fit into the organization’s culture, but what is culture, and why is it important? An organization’s culture is a set of norms that create almost indisputable precedents for acceptable behavior within the organization. These largely unwritten rules create expectations around acceptable risk, change- driven behaviors, creativity and innovation, group versus individual effort, customer orientation, extra effort, and more. Culture can work as either an engine to achieve market success or an anchor pulling the firm towards failure. Understanding your culture, determining what new behavioral elements may be required, and setting the course for successful change is a complicated process. Successful companies tend to be well run and have distinctive cultures that enable their organizations to create and implement strategies that identify them as market leaders. Some firms have legacy cultures that are no longer appropriate in the fast-hanging environment of the 21st century (Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) suggests the individual components of organizational culture can be identified, yet no one element will accurately describe the culture.

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 21

Organization culture is a pattern of interrelated factors. Most simply stated, culture is a set of important understandings that members of a group share in common—in their patterns of behavior, speech, and use of resources. The beliefs and expectations that are at the foundation of the culture produce norms that strongly shape the behavior of individuals and groups in the organization. A Business that is shifting its strategic direction may find its culture a source of strength or weakness (Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland, 2002).

Macaleer, Shannon, and Haviland (2002) finds one problem today is the mismatch between mature business cultures that do not recognize the expectations of the young adults coming into the work environment. These folks feel they are straddling two cultures moving in different directions. One is the dynamic culture of the business community, and the other is the organization’s culture fighting the pressure of change and adaptability (Macaleer, Shannon, and

Haviland, 2002).

According to Barry and Hoang (1995) sunk costs in the NBA using a design that paralles the resource utilization studies, this research test the sunk-cost effect in the context of professional basketball. We use the National Basketball Association (NBA) draft to determine the initial cost of players. We then examine whether this cost influences the amount players are utilized by teams and the length of time they are retained by NBA franchises (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) found probably the most important asset of any team in the NBA is its roster of players. Typically, players are selected from the college ranks via the NBA draft.

Because each team is assigned only one draft selection for each round of the draft (barring any prior trades or deals for additional draft choices), the order in which players are taken in the draft represents an expenditure teams make to attain the services of a particular player. Salary

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 22 contracts extended to players are roughly in line with their draft order, such that players drafted earlier expect to be paid substantially more than those taken later in the draft. Thus, the draft order of players represents an important and tangible cost to NBA teams. The draft order also represents a set of opportunities foregone, since choosing any particular player means passing over many other candidates who might also help the team (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) suggest drafting high in the NBA draft does not guarantee teams having the best talent on the court, however. Teams may pass up players that turn out to be all- stars and may draft players that never reach their basketball potential. As one commentator noted on the eve of the 1994 draft whether a team drafts in the top 5 or not until the second round, nothing in pro basketball is quite as chancy as the draft. This is where Portland in 1984 gambled that it was much wiser to take that the showboat , and where, in the same year, Dallas decided they would go with the sure thing in rather than chance a pick on that unusual kid from Auburn, Charles Barkley. One year later, the top pick was , followed by, in order, , , Xavier

McDaniel, and Joe Kline, leaving for the latecomers such picks as Chris Mullins

(No. 7), (18th) and A.C. Green (23rd), (Shirk, 1994), (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) suggests because of the vagaries of forecasting talent, teams may have invested more in some players than is merited by their performance on the basketball floor.

Therein lies the sunk-cost, dilemma. Do teams use players they have expended the most resources to attract, even if their performance does not warrant it? Likewise, do teams retain high-cost players, beyond the level warranted by their performance on the court? These questions are analogous to those posed by Arkes and Blumer in their resource utilization studies,

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 23 in which the use of an asset can depend more on its previous cost than its future utility (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) hypotheses all things being equal, one would expect teams to play their most productive players. One might also expect that those who were selected high in the draft would, in general, constitute teams’ most productive players. Thus, as a null hypothesis one might predict that, after controlling for productivity on the court, draft order will add little to the prediction of playing time in the NBA. If, however, sunk costs actually do influence utilization decisions, then draft order will be a significant predictor of playing time, even after the effects of on-court performance have been controlled (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang, 1995) finds analogously, one can also investigate the role of sunk costs in decisions to retain the services of NBA players. Logically, one might expect on-court performance to be the primary determinant of decisions to cut or trade players in the NBA, if sunk costs are influential, however, then it can be hypothesized that draft order will constitute a significant predictor of keeping players, even after controlling for players’ on-court performance

(Barry and Hoang, 1995).

According to Barry and Hoang (1995) we used three separate analyses to test the effects of sunk-costs on personnel decisions in professional basketball. The first examined the role of sunk costs in the decision to use players on the court (minutes played); the second assessed whether sunk costs can predict the number of seasons players survive in the NBA; the third examined the effect of sunk costs on whether players are traded from the team that originally drafted them

(Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) performs an analysis of playing time, methodology, the NBA draft

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 24 conducted at the end of the season, the draft is the principal mechanism for teams to secure new talent or rebuild after a losing season. The rules of the draft dictate the order in which professional teams get to select amateur college basketball players. Before 1985, the first pick in the draft was determined by coin toss between the teams from the Western and Eastern

Conference with the worst win-loss records. The rest of the teams in the league then selected players in the inverse order of their prior regular season records, with the best team picking last in each round. To reduce the incentive for some teams to underachieve deliberately so as to get one of the best picks, the draft lottery was inaugurated in 1985. The lottery allowed all teams that did not make the play-offs to have an equal chance of getting the number one draft pick (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) demonstrates the sample included all players selected in the first two rounds of the 1980-1986 drafts of the National Basketball Association. We restricted our sample to the first two rounds of these drafts because players selected beyond this point were rarely offered contracts. In 1989, the NBA itself narrowed the draft to two rounds. We also restricted our sample to players who received contracts and played at least two years in the

NBA, so that we could track their performance over time. Of those who were drafted in the first two rounds, 53 players never received a contract and one player left to play in Europe and returned to play only one year in the NBA Thus our sample included 241 players selected from

1980-1986 drafts who eventually received contracts and played at least two years in the NBA

(Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) presents dependent variables, the number of minutes each basketball player plays per game is a carefully recorded statistic in the NBA. In these analyses

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 25 we used readily available information on the number of minutes played during the entire regular season. The Official NBA Encyclopedia (Hollander and Sachare, 1989) and the Sports

Encyclopedia (Naft and Cohen, 1991) were the principal sources of data on the amount of court time each player received yearly. These volumes were also the sources of data on regular season performance statistics, trades and injury information, and positions played by NBA personnel in the sample (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

According to Barry and Hoang (1995) finds development of a performance index. A variety of fine-grained statistics are maintained on each player’s performance. To create an index for players performance, we used nine widely recorded player statistics: total number of points scored in a season, assists, steals, shots blocked, rebounds, personal fouls, free throw percentage, field-goal percentage, and 3-point field-goal percentage. Because players with more minutes will naturally have a greater number of points, assists, steals, fouls, shot blocks, and rebounds, we controlled for playing time by dividing these measures by the total number of minutes played during the season. The free-throw, field-goal, and 3-point percentages were calculated by dividing the number of shots made by the total number of shots attempted for each category.

Thus our measures of performance reflect the productivity of players while they are on the court rather than simply being s reflection of playing time or attempts at various shots (Barry and

Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) suggest we expect the underlying skills measured by the performance statistics to differ according to a player’s position. Big players who typically occupy the forward and center positions are more likely to have a high number of rebounds and blocked shots. Therefore one might expect that rebounds and blocked shots would emerge as a

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 26 performance factor for forwards and center, rather than guards. Conversely, one might expect steals and assists to constitute an important dimension of performance for guards, rather than forwards and centers since the guard position is staffed by smaller, quicker players who are responsible for ball handling (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

According to Barry and Hoang (1995) to reduce multicollinearity problems due to the intercorrelation of several performance measures, we factor analyzed the performance data to form broader, more independent were performance indices. To avoid confounding a players performance with his position, we conduct two separate factor analyses on the performance statistics: one for guards and another for those in the forward or center position. For each group of players the nine performance statistics were subjected to a principle components factor analysis with varimax rotation. Three factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 emerged for both subsamples, explaining 58 percent of the variance in the correlation matrix of performance statistics for guards and similar 58 percent of variance for the sample of centers and forwards

(Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) finds based on the factor analysis we constructed three indices of player performance: scoring, toughness, and quickness. For each of the factors, we standardized the component measures, summed them, and then divided by the total number of items in the factor, thus creating an index with the mean of zero and standard deviation of one. To ensure that performance on any of these dimensions was not biased by the position of a player and to facilitate comparisons of players’ performance, we standardized each of these performance indices by position, calculating the performance of each player relative to the performance of all other players in the sample at his particular position (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 27

According to Barry and Hoang (1995) additional control variables. Because a player’s performance may be affected by injuries or illness, we included such information in our analysis.

We coded whether players suffered from fourteen types of injuries or illness. We created a dummy variable, injury as a broad of indicator and coded for the presence of any type of injury or illness. Another possible influence on playing time is whether an individual has been traded, but the effect of being traded is difficult to predict. A trade could increase playing time if the player moves to a team that has a greater need for his services. But being traded can also signal that a player is no longer at the top of his game, thus leading to a reduction in playing time at the new team. A dummy variable, trade, was created to control for these possible effects. It was coded 1 if the player was traded before or during a particular season and coded 0 otherwise

(Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) demonstrates a player’s time on the court may also be determined by the overall performance of his team. Being drafted by a winning team, composed of other quality players, may make it more difficult for the incoming player to receive significant playing time. In contrast, being drafted by a weaker team may mean that the incoming player will be given more time on the court, Thus we coded the team record for each player (win) by taking the percentage of games won over the total number of games played during the season. Since playing time may differ by position, we also included a dummy variable, forward/center, in the regression equation that was coded 0 if the player was a guard and coded 1 if he was a forward or center (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

According to Barry and Hoang (1995) analysis of career length. We hypothesized that the decision to keep or cut players—like the decision to give players court time—is based on sunk

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 28 costs as well as performance criteria. Therefore, we investigate whether survival in the league could be explained by a player’s initial draft number, after controlling for his level of performance in the NBA (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Barry and Hoang (1995) suggest examining survival in the NBA poses several challenges to standard regression techniques. First, ordinary regression analyses cannot easily incorporate changes in the value of explanatory variables over time. Creating performance variables for every year (up to twelve years) spent in the league would not only be very cumbersome but would also introduce problems of multicollinearity. Second, there is no satisfactory way of handling right—censored cases, i.e., the players for which the event of being cut from the league is not observed within the time period of the study. Conducting a logistic regression on a categorical dependent variable that distinguishes those who were cut from those who were not cut would retain information on both groups. But logistic regression cannot incorporate the effect of duration or time spent in the state prior to the occurrence of the event. The effect of duration, measured by the length of tenure in the NBA, is particularly important because we would expect that a player’s risk of being cut will increase the longer he remains in the league

(Barry and Hoang, 1995).

According to Barry and Hoang (1995) to address each of these challenges, we used event history analysis to examine how draft order influenced the risk of being cut from the NBA.

A model of the survival process using this framework can explicitly include (1) explanatory variables that vary over time, such as on—court performance; (2) data on those who were and were not cut from the league; and (3) information on duration of time before leaving the league.

Morita, Lee and Mowday (1989) specifically recommended this technique for the analysis of

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 29 turnover data and provided detailed information on its use (Barry and Hoang, 1995).

Soebbing and Mason (2009) finds academic research regarding issues on amateur draft has focused its attention around the early research of Rottenberg (1956). Rottenberg’s (1956) research focused on two theories. The first was his invariance principle. The invariance principle states that players go to franchises who value them most. The second theory is the uncertainty of outcome (UOH), which states “no team can be successful unless its competitors also survive and prosper sufficiently so that the differences in the quality of play among teams are not ”too great” (Rottenberg, 1956). Studies have attempted to examine the link between the amateur draft and player movement (the invariance principle) and its effect on competitive balance. Fort and Quirk (1995) theorized the amateur draft would not have any impact on competitive balance. It would raise the profits of franchises due to restricting salaries to rookies.

Empirically, this theory has met mixed results (Soebbing and Mason, 2009).

Soebbing and Mason (2009) suggests in some draft years, one or more very promising amateur players may be available. In this instance, the acquisition of this player may result in the success of a team for many years to come. Often termed “franchise” players, these prospects can make teams into championship winners and alter the profits and popularity of the franchises they play for. These types of players are not available every draft year. Examples of recent franchise players include the NFL’s Peyton Manning, the NBA’s LeBron James and the NHL’s

Alex Ovechkin and Sidney Crosby, all of whom were chosen with the first overall pick in their respective drafts. All of these players have had a hand in turning around both the competitive and financial fortunes of their teams. As a result, individual clubs that are not competitively successful might have an incentive to play poorly enough that they are eligible to receive the first

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 30 pick in the draft, especially in years where a franchise player is available. This process is known as tanking, and can hurt the credibility of the leagues and teams that have teams that tank.

Tanking erodes consumers’ confidence that both teams are working hard to compete and win in a given contest. If the uncertainty of game outcomes is threatened, this undermines interest from the media that broadcast games, sponsors, and other stakeholders that leagues rely upon, creating greater uncertainty in the league’s organizational environment (Soebbing and Mason, 2009).

Soebbing and Mason (2009) finds the impact that tanking has on competitive balance has not been studied extensively in academic research. Theoretically, tanking should have a significant impact on competitive balance. When the incentive exists for teams to tank, it should widen the disparity of win percentages between the best and worst performing teams in the league, thus promoting competitive imbalance. The NBA has historically been the most competitively imbalanced league out of the world’s major sports leagues (Fort, 2003; Berri et al.,

2006). If fans are sensitive to competitive balance—meaning more fans attend a game within a more competitively balanced league—then it would be both in a team’s and league’s best interest to implement policies making the incentive to win the highest priority for teams. The effect of the draft policy within the context of Rottenberg’s (1956) UOH has also not been examined

(Soebbing and Mason, 2009).

According to Soebbing and Mason (2009) the NBA draft officially began in 1947. In those early years, teams selected in the reverse order format. Teams, however, would commonly forfeit their first pick in order to select what was called a “territorial players”. A territorial player was an amateur player from the team’s designated geographical area. Territorial picks were considered critical in developing a local fan base in the fledgling NBA, and remained part of the

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 31 draft until the 1966 NBA draft (Soebbing and Mason, 2009).

Soebbing and Mason (2009) suggests starting in 1966, a coin flip between the last-placed teams in each of the NBA’s two divisions determined which team received the first overall pick.

The draft order following the coin flip was a reverse-order format. This process remained in place until after the 1983-1984 season. The competitiveness—or lack thereof—of some NBA teams towards the end of the 1983-1984 season led some owners and league officials to complain that teams were intentionally losing games in order gain a better draft position.

A study by Taylor and Trogdon (2002) confirmed that eliminated teams in the NBA were tanking [2]. The prize of that year’s draft was University of Houston’s Akeem Olajuwon, inducted into the Basketball Hall of Fame in 2008 [3]. Discussing the rationale for changing the draft format, general manager, Jerry Colangelo, claimed that: “There was a strong feeling [that the NBA needed] to counteract some of the feelings of the prior season when one team in particular, and maybe a few others, were suspected of losing intentionally to improve their position” (Blinebury, 1985). Rogers (1986) commented: “the National Basketball

Association trumpeted the luck of the draw as a good way to help protect the sport’s integrity”.

By changing the draft format, the NBA was acknowledging that tanking posed a threat to the integrity of the game as well as to the NBA’s legitimacy. A new draft format was then introduced for the 1985 NBA draft; a lottery gave all non-playoff teams as equal chance of securing the number one overall selection (by winning the lottery). The decision to move to a lottery format used by all four major professional sports leagues. Returning to Oliver’s (1991) strategic responses to achieving stability and predictability, the change could be considered a defiant response. This was because the format challenged the socially accepted rule of the

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 32 reverse-order draft format that was uniformly employed in North American professional sports

(Soebbing and Mason, 2009).

According to Soebbing and Mason (2009) the new lottery now meant that each non-playoff team had an equal chance of securing the number one overall pick, and would ideally decrease the incentive individual clubs had to intentionally lose games since all teams have an equal opportunity of winning the lottery. Former executive, Pat Williams, noted that “There was a great alarm in the league [with regards to tanking]. That temptation [to lose games] was removed with this lottery (Aschburner, 1993). Independent research has confirmed that the incentive was removed: Taylor and Trogdon (2002) investigated the different lottery formats, and confirmed that following the movement to the new lottery format in 1985, teams did not show the same tanking behavior as in the previous season (Soebbing and Mason, 2009).

Soebbing and Mason (2009) finds however, not all executives favored the draft lottery format. Following the conclusion of the draft, the owner of the franchise began a movement to end the draft lottery. Golden State finished that year with the worst record in the NBA, which the previous season would have earned the team a 50 percent chance of obtaining the number one overall pick. Despite the team’s woeful record, the lottery determined that Golden State would receive the seventh overall selection (Rowe, 1985). The Dallas

Mavericks general manager at the time also did not agree with the concept of the lottery: “I don’t think the lottery eliminates the possibility of somebody purposely trying to lose, if that’s what we’re trying to eliminate” (Blinebury, 1985). Others were concerned with the objective of the draft. Some felt that, by giving all non-playoff teams a chance at winning the lottery, the goal of improving the quality of the very weakest teams would be compromised. In other words, teams

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 33 that barely missed qualifying for the playoffs but won the lottery could draft the best players, and further distance themselves competitively from the worst teams. This would contribute to the same teams losing for years on end, and ultimately undermine interest in the league as a whole.

To address this issue, the NBA modified the lottery process. Starting with the 1987 draft, the lottery only determined the order for the first three picks of the NBA draft. After the determination of the first three picks, the rest of the non-playoff teams picked in inverse order based on their previous season’s record. The intent was to still reduce the incentive to tank

(because all non-playoff teams could win the lottery), but to also increase the chances that the worst teams would still have a high draft pick—the team with the worst record had, at worst, the fourth overall pick in the draft. NBA Commissioner expressed support for the lottery procedure. In 1989, he stated: “I think the lottery represents an annual rite of renewal for the fans of teams that suffer through losing seasons. It helps focus upon the future and that interest gets heightened by the possibility that their team might get extremely lucky” (Cotton,

1989). However, Skeptics around the league still existed (Soebbing and Mason, 2009).

According to Coates and Oguntimein (2010) in their study of the NBA draft, staw and

Hoang (1995) assess the draft position of a player and that position’s relation to playing time and survival in the league. Their analysis is a test of whether and how people respond to sunk cost, in this case the use of a high draft pick and the money to sign that player to a contract. Their evidence is that franchises are more likely to stick with high draft choices longer than low draft choices, even after controlling for productivity, an activity described as escalation of commitment. One of their questions is specifically whether draft position determines career length. Their data set covers a subset of players from the 1980 through 1986 drafts and follow

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 34 them through the 1990-92 season. The players must have been drafted in one of the first two rounds and stayed in the league one year of more. When their data end in 1991, 91 players drafted in the first two rounds between 1980 and 1986 are still playing in the NBA (Coates and

Oguntimein, 2010).

Camere and Weber (1999) also address the issue of escalation of commitment. Their concern is that Staw and Hoang did not rule out alternative explanations for the apparent escalation of commitment to early draft choices. For example, Camerer and Weber suggest that the productivity of alternative players may be worse still than the drafted player, in which case it would be rational to stick with the draftee. Using a different sample, from more recent seasons, but following the Staw and Hoang methodology, Camerer and Weber replicate the Staw and

Hoang results. They then address other explanations for the persistence of draft position on playing time and productivity. They concluded that their test reduce the magnitude of the escalation but that escalation persists (Coates and Oguntimein, 2010).

Groothuis, Hill, and Perri (2007) study NBA performance for players between the 1987-88 and 2003-2004 season to evaluate the ability of teams to identify superstar players. They identify players whose NBA efficiency is more than three standard deviations above the mean efficiency for a given year. Few players ever achieve this and fewer still achieve it multiple times. In any given year, between 12 and 22 players have an efficiency greater than two standard deviations above then mean. Groothuis, Hill, and Perri estimates a random effects model in which a player’s efficiency is a function of his draft position, experience and experience squared, height and weight, years of college, and race. They find that draft position is negatively related to NBA efficiency in a given year. Among their explanatory variables, only

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 35 height and weight are not statistically significant (Coates and Oguntimein, 2010).

Berri, Brook, and Fenn (2008) is closest in spirit to the analysis here. Focusing on more recent draft classes for the NBA, they assess the ability of collegiate performance to predict draft position. They find scoring and shooting efficiency to be significant determinants of where a player is drafted (Coates and Oguntimein, 2010).

According to Coates and Oguntimein (2010) academic literature has also addressed the efficiency of the players labor market by relating compensation to performance. We do not review this vast literature but focus on those studies related to basketball and to our basic question. Staw and Hoang (1995) and Berri, Brook, and Schmidt (2007) found that points scored is the dominant factor in assessing NBA player productivity. Staw and Hoang reported that a one standard deviation increase in their scoring index (a combination of points per minute, field goal percentage, and free throw percentage) resulted in a 4.6 year increase in career length.

The scoring variable is statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.001. By contrast, a one standard deviation increase in the ”toughness” index (rebounds and blocked shots) has an effect less than half that of scoring and the variable had a p-value of less than 0.05. Assists and steals

(the quickness index) was not statistically significant (Coates and Oguntimein, 2010).

Berri, Brook, and Schmidt (2007) conclude, “Player evaluation in the NBA seems overly focused upon scoring. Negative actions, such as inaccurate shooting or accumulating turnovers, do not seem to result in corresponding declines in player compensation. “Berri, Brook, and

Schmidt (2006) say that points are so important to NBA compensation, and shooting accuracy unimportant, that a player interested in maximizing his salary should “focus solely on chucking up as many shots as a coach allows”. Interestingly, Kahn and Sherer (1988) found, for a sample

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 36 of 226 players drafted before the 1985-86 season, that draft position was significantly affected only by number of college seasons played, college games per season, number of times selected to

The Sporting News first or second team or winning College Player of the Year, and Whether the athlete left college early. Neither points nor shooting percentage or any other specific performance measure was found to affect draft position. Consequently, we ask whether draft position is or is not adversely affected by poor shooting and turnovers in college and whether or not it is improved by increasing points, rebounds, blocked shots, and assists (Coates and

Oguntimein, 2010).

Coates and Oguntimein (2010) suggest we also ask what relationship there is between college productivity and NBA productivity. Groothuis, Hill, and Perri (2007) relate efficiency to pay, but neither of the studies examined college performance as a determinant of draft position or as an indicator of NBA success. We use college performance to predict draft position and NBA success. If NBA talent evaluators are successful, then those college statistics which influence draft position should be correlated with those same statistics in the NBA (Coates and

Oguntimein, 2010).

Methods

Study Population

The population for this study includes NBA decision makers such as the Presidents of

Basketball Operations, Directors of Scouting, Directors of Player Personnel and General

Managers within the (N.B.A.) National Basketball Association which includes a data collection procedure that involve asking questions of its respondents. Only one participant responded. The

General Manager of the .

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 37

Study Population-NBA Decision Makers Mr. Tommy Sheppard, General Manager of the One Male Respondent Washington Wizards

Participants

The participants for this study were selected based on their ability to influence the decision making process for players selection on draft day within the N.B.A. The participants for this study were instructed to complete and return a valid and reliable instrument of assessment which is a survey-questionnaire.

The participating teams include: , Boston Celtics, , Charlotte

Hornets, , , , ,

Detroit Pistons, Golden State Warriors, , , ,

Los Angeles Lakers, Memphis Grizzlies, Miami Heat, ,

Minnesota Timberwolves, New Orleans Pelican, , Oklahoma City Thunder,

Orlando Magic, Philadelphia 76ers, Phoenix Suns, Portland Trailblazers, ,

San Antonio Spurs, , , and the Washington Wizards

Instrument

For the purpose of this study the instrument of assessment used is a survey-questionnaire.

This instrument, a survey-questionnaire is a carefully prescribed procedure to gather information from a group of individuals: President of Basketball Operation, Director of Scouting, Director of Player Personnel and/or General Manager within the (N.B.A.) National Basketball

Association.

Data Analysis

An observational protocol and recording sheet is a qualitative research procedure designed to list, analyze, collect, distribute, and utilized data by decision makers within the N.B.A. for THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 38 the purpose of this study. This observational protocol and recording sheet documents the study participants responses to the instrument of assessment.

Observational Protocol and Recording Sheet

Dates of observations: March 22, 2021 through May 31, 2021 Setting: An academic institution-Sports Management Worldwide. Participants: The Presidents of Basketball Operations, Directors of Scouting, Directors of Player Personnel and/or General Managers within a single design control group, the (NBA) National Basketball Association. Respondents: 1 Male. The General Manager of the Washington Wizards. Observer: A Basketball G.M. & Scouting Student conducting qualitative research disseminated in the form of a survey-questionnaire designed to list, analyze, collect, and evaluate the necessary data to support his Research Project. Research Questions: How is the process of talent evaluation influencing player selection by your team this season on draft day in the N.B.A.? What statistical formulas are most utilized by your team during the player evaluation process? How does your team assess its player personnel and salary cap issues this season? Sub-question: How decision makers use collegiate player data collected, analyzed, and evaluated in terms of their rationale to determine which players should be select this season by their teams on draft day within the NBA.

Observer’s Reflections: The Influence of Talent Evaluation on the Annual N.B.A. Draft process is an exhaustive procedure that assesses each teams needs on an annual basis that ultimately will determine what amateur players are selected.

Procedures

The procedure used in this study emphasizes descriptive research methods and are presented in the form of a survey-questionnaire. For the purpose of this study the President of

Basketball Operations, the Director of Scouting, the Director of Player Personnel, and/or the

General Manager of each team within the (N.B.A.) National Basketball Association were requested to complete the instrument of assessment returned it back to me via email at [email protected] as soon as possible.

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 39

Conclusion

In conclusion, According to Soebbing and Mason (2009) the NBA draft officially began in

1947. Teams commonly selected territorial player in the leagues early years. A territorial player was an amateur player from the team’s designated geographical area. Territorial picks were considered critical in developing a local fan base in the fledgling NBA, and remained part of the draft until the 1966 NBA draft. (Soebbing and Mason, 2009). Berri, Brook and Fenn (2011) finds research that suggest scoring is consistently that factor that dominates the evaluation of player talent in the NBA. To reduce the incentive for some teams to (Tank) underachieve deliberately so as to get one of the best picks, the draft lottery was inaugurated in 1985. The lottery allowed all teams that did not make the play-offs to have an equal chance of getting the number one draft pick (Barry and Hoang, 1995). Talent Evaluation is an on-going procedure that uses collegiate and amateur player performance to assessment the needs of NBA teams prior to its annual draft. Talent evaluation in the NBA seems overly focused upon scoring. If NBA talent evaluators are successful, then those college statistics which influence draft position should be correlated with those same statistics in the NBA (Coates and Oguntimein, 2010).

Recommendations for Further Study and Applied Research

Recommendations for further study and applied research must examine how decision makers use collegiate player data collected, analyzed, and evaluated during the annual NBA draft process to determine their needs. How improvements to this system will enhance each teams overall success in future years. What changes could be made to streamline the NBA draft process. How the Collective Bargaining Agreement must be reevaluated on a regular basis to ensure the integrity and sustainability of the annual NBA draft process.

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 40

References

Arel, B. & Tomas, M.J. (2019). Ratcheting Up: Adjusting the Incentives in the NBA Draft.

International Journal of Sport Finance: Morgantown 14, (4)

Barry, M. & Hoang, H. (1995). Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time

and Survival in Professional Basketball. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, (3)

Berri, D.J., Brook S.L., & Fenn. A.J. (2011). From college to the pros: predicting the NBA

amateur player draft. Journal of Productivity Analysis: Norwell, 35, (1)

Coates, D. & Oguntimein, B. (2010). The Length and Success of NBA Careers: Does College

Production Predict Professional Outcomes. International Journal of Sport Finance:

Morgantown 5, (1)

Macaleer, W.D., Shannon, J.B., & Haviland, R.M. (2002). How HR Technology Was Used to

Help the NBA and WNBA. Employment Relations Today; Hoboken, 29, (2)

Skinner, B. & Guy, S.J. (2015). A Method for Using Player Tracking Data in Basketball to

Learn Player Skills and Predict Team Performance: San Francisco, 10, (9)

Soebbing, B.P. & Mason, D.S. (2009). Managing Legitimacy and Uncertainty in Professional

Team Sport: the NBA’s Draft Lottery. Team Performance Management; Bradford, 15, (3/4)

Stang, E. (2017). Basketball scouting techniques: the art of finding usable information:

Charleston, SC

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 41

Appendix A

TO: All N.B.A. Basketball Operations Decision Makers: ______Date Good morning,

I am a student at Sports Management Worldwide pursuing the Basketball G.M. & Scouting

Certificate Program. Currently, I am preparing a Capstone Project entitled, “The

Influence of Talent Evaluation on the Annual N.B.A. Draft Process ”. This Capstone Project is submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Basketball GM & Scouting

Certificate through Sports Management Worldwide under the mentorship of Mr. Mark

Warkentien, Special Assignment Evaluator, Oklahoma City Thunder. I intend to conduct this study utilizing a survey-questionnaire sent to each teams Basketball Operations decision makes within the National Basketball Association (N.B.A.). The data will be collected by means of a survey-questionnaire which is the instrument of assessment selected to conduct this study in the area of talent evaluation. This research study should be completed in four to six weeks at which time I’d like to submit my findings. All information obtained within this study will be kept confidential. The results will be provided to each participant within this study. Enclosed please find a survey-questionnaire to be completed by a decision maker, a member of your Basketball

Operations staff, and returned to me by email: [email protected] as soon as possible. Your urgency in this matter is greatly appreciated. If you have any questions, I can be reached by cell phone at (704) 299-2043.

Thanking you kindly in advance for your consideration and timely reply.

Sincerely,

Kevin Butler, Ph.D. Enclosure

THE INFLUENCE OF TALENT EVALUATION 42

Appendix B

INSTRUMENT OF ASSESSMENT

TO: All NBA Basketball Operations Decision Makers:

Enclosed you will find an (Instrument of Assessment) in the form of a survey-questionnaire.

This document is a humble request to collect the necessary information to complete my Capstone Project, Final Project, entitled “The Influence of Talent Evaluation on The Annual N.B.A. Draft Process.

This document is disseminated to secure your response to the following questions designed to assist me in my pursuit of knowledge necessary to complete my academic research in the area of Talent Evaluation within the (N.B.A.) National Basketball Association.

Please complete the enclosed survey-questionnaire and return this document back to me via email at [email protected]. As soon as possible.

(1). As President of Basketball Operations, How does your team assess its player personnel and salary cap issues this season? ______

(2). As General Manager, What statistical formulas are most utilized by your team during the player evaluation process? ______

(3). As Director of Player Personnel, How decision makers use collegiate player data collected, analyzed, and evaluated in terms of their rationale to determine which players should be select this season by your team on draft day within the NBA. ______

(4). As Director of Scouting, How is the process of talent evaluation influencing player selection by your team this season on draft day in the N.B.A.? ______

Thanking you kindly for your response to this survey-questionnaire in the pursuit of knowledge. Kevin Butler, Ph.D. Student, Basketball G.M. & Scouting Certificate Sports Management Worldwide Email: [email protected]