Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice: a Critique Of

CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Coercion, Responsibility and theScopeof Justice: A critique of Nagel’s anti-cosmopolitan account A critiqueofNagel’santi-cosmopolitan Supervisor: Professor Zoltán Miklósi Zoltán Professor Supervisor: Central European University European Central Department of of Philosophy Department Attila Gergely Mráz Budapest, Hungary Submitted to Submitted 2010 By CEU eTD Collection conclude that there is conclude justice there realize aduty that globally.to egalitarian should hisaccount interpretation of a consistent nature, of thestate concerning assumptions premises arefalse, buttheir truth wouldyield not his desired conclusion andeither; his dueto principles would apply hison account.Thus,is it shown Nagel’sthat centralnormative which egalitarian to authority coercive aglobal establishing for serve as also reasons of nature state for leaving the anti- Nagel accepts reasons the and right, were of duties these scope cosmopolitan generation the of account the if even that argue I Finally, restricted. is scope their entail that not would for generation their accountgiven the suggests, as Nagel duties arose even show that ifegalitarian egalitarian for existenceduties. I of Second, the condition robust be asufficient cannot institutions political of required existencethe the of kind argue that I First, account. ofNagel’s criticism I offertwofold a scope-debate, the of contextualization After abrief is justice global account. not this scope of on the conditions, these this authority can be attributed coercedto those by it. As is there noglobal fulfillingauthority by andthe imposed effectsapply duties can a coercivethese authority coercively to, political Thomas Nagel. This position holds that duties of egalitarian justice existif and only if there is forward influential by This anti-cosmopolitan put offers of acritique the position thesis Abstract CEU eTD Collection worth living. (In the end, it was all the fault of Global Justice—but that’s no complaint.) anything elseeventually,madebut who life periodduring of the writing much more definitely writeit, nor me make for itexactly A.who dideasier to K., not this to thesis I dedicate friendship. Ihope I will grow up to be their colleague one day. did tohelp mebecome a of student philosophy, moreimportantly,for much and their while I was working on my thesis. My gratitude they professional for thesupport mematters ininand otherwise gave Réz, order, alphabetical to them can hardly be overstated forlike would topics also opportunity Reich discussed here. I take the to to thankand Orsi Anna all they the on had we conversations inspiring the all and objections suggestions, comments, helpful FirstI would andforemost, like my tothankProfessor Zoltán supervisor, forMiklósi, his Acknowledgements i CEU eTD Collection References...... 52 ...... 49 Conclusion 3. Nagel’s States of Nature and the ...... 34 Scope of Justice 2. Legitimacy, Responsibility and the ...... 17 Scope of Justice 1. The Scope of Justice: Contextualizing the Debate...... 5 Introduction...... 1 3.3. Conclusion...... 48 3.2. The second-order state of nature...... 37 3.1. Nagel’s conception of the state of nature...... 34 ...... 34 3.0. Introduction 2.3. Conclusion...... 33 2.2. Justice, responsibility ...... 20 and legitimacy 2.1. Reconstructing the argument, preliminary remarks on Nagel’s dualism...... 17 ...... 17 2.0. Introduction 1.4. Conclusion...... 15 1.3. Coercion and the scope ...... 11 of justice 1.2. Pervasive impact and the scope of justice...... 8 1.1. Social cooperation,interaction and the scope ...... 6 of justice ...... 5 1.0. Introduction Table ofContents ii CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice egalitarian duties. First,In I criticizeparticular, the normative premises specific to his account of theI generationquestion and scope criticism.grounds notof line tackledon byeither two by of extant account Nagel’s criticizing the relevance of citizens’ responsibilitysiding Nagelsimply Blake’swith, e.g., [2001]account). for criticism of stateline (this justice of duties generating or in triggering theory, in Nagel’s element specific has butnotimportant questioned normative relevance ordenied coercion, of the an empirical presuppositions. Onthe hand,other astrand of morecriticism theoretical infocus Nagel’s of the correctness concerns mainly This lineof criticism largely untouched). argumentation theoretical Nagel’s of parts substantial leave who [2006] &Sabel Cohen empirically as restricted a scope as he intended (see e.g., Ypi, Goodin & Barry [2009], or even yield not does correct, normatively if even account, his that argued been has it hand, moral tostay state of of the out nature. concerning reasons egalitarian justice would emergeonhis account is given hisunfounded, own assumptions of duties where community establish political a global aduty to of Nagel’s rejection that I show nature, of of state the a Nagel’s conception of scrutiny detailed bymeansof Second, for support Nagel’s and account of generation the scope of ofegalitarianjustice. duties provide sufficient cannot considerations Iarguethat these scope; for arestricted argument action andstate for thatresponsibility citizens’ of oftheory implicit the politicalinto investigate I First, theory. Nagel’s legitimacy, as conceived of specific aspects two critique addresses My isnational. justice scope of right egalitarian by Nagel, and the rolethe establish failsit that to Iarguethat justice: distributive of egalitarian of scope the account they play in his provide Thomas(2005) anti-cosmopolitan Nagel’s acritique is of to The thesis this aim of My aim is to further the debate about the right scope of justice in favor of a global scope of a global favor justice in of scope right about the further debate the My aimisto one the On major respects. intwo criticism ample received recently has account Nagel’s Introduction 1 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice their scope. My argumentation, as declared above, will concern exclusively normative exclusively concern will above, asdeclared My argumentation, their scope. forinsufficientboth generationthe dutiesjustice,egalitarian of forof restriction and the of is responsibility-condition Nagel’s fulfills which authority political coercive legitimate a of existence the that show to is my aim Second, policies. enforced coercively for, responsibility or of, authorship citizens’ condition requires This his account. on egalitarian duties the analysis on emphasis special with justice, of scope national the for argument Nagel’s of interpretation of his acharitable toprovide is,first, chapter this action. aim of The state for responsibility responsibility-condition, citizens’ of account implicit in his figuring responsibility of concept the and legitimacy assumptions. fundamental its important some of least a necessary at share which theories those and theory Nagel’s between differences emphasize the to rather conditionnot to provide an exhaustive inventory of all the possible anti-cosmopolitan positions, but is chapter inthis aim My account. Nagel’s and theories these between differences interesting of the emergence normatively highlightthe as to so andcoercion, impact, pervasive interaction, or cooperation ofanti-cosmopolitan forarguments determining scope justice the of ongrounds of social Providing an avowedly justice. of scope on the debate the of presentation critical brief,selective bya account biased overview, I will analyze and criticize todate. presented some of the prevalentknowledge, criticism on these hasbeengrounds relatively systematically,sparsely, and not my best the of To premises. of his empirical truth-value the of regardless premises, normative his of interpretations coherent under follow not do conclusions Nagel’s that showing by Nagel’s account I reject duties. Second, of these andscope generation tothe action In focusI will inNagel’s Chapter 2, hisanalyzing on theory, of concept political Nagelian the I will contextualize 1, Chapter In is asfollows. ofmy thesis The structure 2 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection no establishduty institutions,i.e.,to these toleave this level state the of Theof nature. aim of we have Third, nature. of state the level of leaving a second institutions, coercive legitimate same the under them arerealized bybringing states only between of justicedifferent citizens justice. of standards higher of Second, humanitarian standards and to realize quasi-libertarian Nagel holds three claims. First, we have a duty of justice to leave the state of nature, but only account. with as contrasted Nagel’s nature, (1992,2008)andPogge’s A. J.Julius’s views (2008)related supranational the on of state W. of Th. analysis the to be given will attention particular discussion, of course the apply. In nohave establish duty which aglobal to egalitarianpolity principlesto would eventually Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice our duty to stay out of the state of nature, they would still not entail, generationthe of and scope egalitarian in stood, duties hisconjunction with for justification concerning normative assumptions even Nagel’s if as that show so to argument, the sake of generating them.states thenation of be polity limited the not to would duties scopeof these the justice, egalitarian of duties generate could conditions if Nagelian the iseven that chapter of this second upshot The one. first liethe with my sympathies that here merely indicate I disjuncts, any these of internationally or domestically. As I will have no room for presenting a positive argument for applicable not exist,either andhenceare not they do offeredbyNagel, than or those other reasons some for existence into come standards these or globally, them realize duty to a have we and independently, exist already either they justice, of standards higher generate obtain. to fail or obtain conditions Nagelian the inwhich circumstances empirical the depend on not i.e., does itssoundness matters, With regard to our possible duties to stay out of stay of levels of ourpossibledifferentnature, With to out duties state the regard to of In Chapter 3, I will nonetheless assume the truth of Nagel’s normative premises, for the for premises, normative ofNagel’s truth the assume nonetheless will I 3, Chapter In The upshot of this chapter is twofold. First, since the Nagelian conditions do not 3 contra Attila GergelyMráz Nagel, that we CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice position. begging defense cosmopolitanisminfluentialyet againstoneof particular, anti-cosmopolitan normative premisesbutreject his andempirical a provides presuppositions, non-question- Nagel’s which accept undermines accounts atonce Thus thecritique presented premises. withNagelian andafirm emphasis coercion normativeresponsibility-based accounts, on their diminishes. argument his of relevance cosmopolitan whichglobal to polity egalitarian view,principles would practical anti- applyonhisthe a since,is establish weshould Nagel’s nature.on that Theupshot even state assumptions, of supranational of second-order, the and that state nature of first-order the of objectionability Nagel’s assumptions, it is not possible to maintain a given discontinuity third: the of betweennegation the the moral entails claims these of first the that show is to chapter this The contribution of my thesis to the scope-debate is a systematic criticism of the 4 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice instance, I will not consider anti-cosmopolitan arguments whose proponents accept the prima in Nagel’s theory ensuingchapters. the of discussion more critical detailed the for pave theway as to so accounts, coercion-based structure. Third,finally, will generalup the I sketch andchallengescharacteristics of Second, Iwill criticize impactbasic anti-cosmopolitanism arguingfrom of pervasivethe the ofjustice. of scope national accounts the interaction-based and will cooperation- address I face.First, atleast the previous objections be ones isimmune some presumedto to account each in least sensethat the at plausibility, in ofincreasing willan beorder discussed accounts anti-cosmopolitan The rebuttals. cosmopolitan relevant some outlining by difficulties cosmopolitanism false,isi.e., scope the of justice is pointrestricted—and out theirmajor that thesis anti-cosmopolitanism—the of versions major three distinguish will I classification, cosmopolitanism—thetoward thesis thethat scope justiceof isglobal. bias with admitted an debate the present I Accordingly, positions. these of interpretation absence an the of stance wouldreflect lack a any evaluative of that think Ialso outlined, and thepositions aclear take toward stance if does thechapter inadebate crucial positions read and interestingboth isitto writeaims achapterto mapping muchmore that the at out to provide a detailed assessment of each and every position. Nevertheless, Iam convinced that place right the not is chapter contextualizing a and complex, and extensive is itself debate The scope of concerningtherightpositions mostprevalent justice. the in debate distributive the Nagel’s (2005)accountof national the scope of justice byproviding abrief of outline some of is The involvedcontextualize chapter aim in toargumentsandstakes presentof the the 1.0. Introduction It is to be noted that my presentation of the debate is far from comprehensive. For Abizadeh’s (2007) is chiefly on follows. Relying chapter of the The structure as 1. The Scope of Justice: Contextualizing the Debate 5 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection these sharedare by cosmopolitan positions, concern)— too moral (seeof Pogge 1992, pp. object 48–49). appropriate an is person every that thesis (the universality and persons) are concern 1 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice apply to the so-called basic structure of a given society, which is which definedas society, of a given structure basic so-called apply to the matter. asits subject enterprise acooperative within interactions particular regards other the (site)while justice, of matter major of versions argument: of one regardsthebasicthis structure society as thesubject two Iwill distinguish nation-state. tothe islimited cooperation becausesocio-economic state, nation- a is of justice, citizenry the duties of byeachother and areowed whoowe persons argued along these lines aims to by produced Anti-cosmopolitanisma community insocio-economic cooperation.engaged show that the right scope of justice,John (1971),distributiveRawls justice thedistribution concerns cooperativethe of surplus i.e., the right range of According to one of the most influential strands of theories of justice, originally attributable to ofjustice andthescope interaction cooperation, 1.1. Social on offer. of scope accounts cosmopolitan anti- among the more precisely latter the situate to helps hence discussion and whose account, with Nagel’s framework abroad theoretical or assumptions fundamental someleast share at and alsoDavidMiller My interest [1999]). lies here with anti-cosmopolitan theories which meanings of justice within (following each (local) site-cum-scope Walzer Michael [1983], relevant the determine contexts and practices social specific that given content, theoretical pre- significant is of devoid itself justice of global concept the the claim that substantiate to premises value-relativist from arguing anti-cosmopolitanism discuss I will Nor [2005]). Miller justifying partiality fellow-citizens vein toward (in the of Hurka[1997];seeThomas also facie ofjustice, global scope attempt butto justify all-things-consideredthe national scope by Among these fundamental assumptions are also individualism (the thesis that the ultimate units of moral According to the first variant of the anti-cosmopolitan argument, principles of justice 1 6 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice Rawlsian theory justice. theory of Rawlsian misconceptions assumptions and role of the in wrong normative of basic structure the the empirically both for national, is justice of scope the that show cannot arguably structure basic the regarding on considerations based argument of anti-cosmopolitan variantfirstthe the 340f);if not by or its the by justice—ifof not establishmentthe of a basic structure, means by then other (ibid., pp. interpretation, is not the establishment of the basic structure itself, but the optimal realization objections mutual advantage, on thisto account, justice requires us establishto abasic structure.its Feasibility establishmentforis wherever alreadycooperation there Therefore, 328–329). background (pp. conditions just of realization the to instrumental is optimally it that sense in the justice of a precondition are also largely justice is latter existencethe demandsandnotpresupposes the of basicenterprise, a structure: off the argues, once Abizadeh individuals(2007) of a group engage insome mutually advantageous mark, as (for discussion, basic global 1979).Secondandas the structure important, seeBeitz more aim, in Abizadeh’s assigningresources, to rights them on territorial basis, canvery well (part qualify as of) a natural of thedistribution norms regulating international instance, for false: is arguably isfor purposes) (asdefined basicstructure a global lack of the concerning empirical premise societies. national within structures only basic are thatthere given national, only is there Therefore,justice, noglobal is basic structure. there noglobal However, basic structure. is a if only there justice arises thequestion of basicstructure, tothe applies The first variant of the anti-cosmopolitan argument, then, goes as follows. Since justice The basic structure account faces, nonetheless, the following objections. First, its First, objections. following the nonetheless, faces, account structure The basic from social cooperation over time. (Rawls 2001, p. 10) basic assign they way the and cooperation, social rightsof system one into together fit society of and institutions social and political main the duties inwhich way the and regulate the division of advantages that arises full establishment, then by the second best feasible alternative. Thus, feasible alternative. best second thenby the establishment, 7 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice and only those persons on whose life, “aims, aspiration, and character” (Rawls 2001, p. 10) a 2001,p. 10) (Rawls character” and “aims, aspiration, life, whose personson those andonly includes all ofjusticescope rightthe establish that aimsto justice of impact theorist pervasive the of departure, asitspoint approaches cooperation-based of Taking underinclusiveness the 1.2. Pervasive impact and the scopeof justice another way, either, lacking in inclusiveness. in scope kindfor right of the fully account theycannot scope, anti-cosmopolitan establish an convincingly ofjustice accounts cannot whilecooperation-based that, suggest considerations These interaction. economic forms of incertain participate to impact its under those incapacitate may itself system an socio-economic that unjust intuitive seems pre-theoretically capablesome due not to Moreover, it ofhandicap e.g., 683). that, congenital (Goodin 1988, p. in they because are principle economic interaction, or venture of any cooperative participants whoare not persons to regard arise with also justice of concerns that intuition pre-theoretical premises of either version of the cooperative theory of scope is that they fail accountto for the scope thesis. national hard the maintaining time has a cooperation-theorist, asmuch interactionist, asthebasicstructure-dependent Thus, the itthen is most tonation(see Beitz probably butcertainly 1983). restricted not states global, for interaction advantage, or If should by bedetermined domain of cooperation, the scope the false. is anti-cosmopolitanism cooperation-based of kind this of premise empirical the hence, states; nation among economic cooperation and iswide pervasive there that true is empirically support herargument:it weakfor anti-cosmopolitan to too the thisseems necessary condition quo, status the toward biased implausibly and misconceived was structure) basic global the condition of duties of justice.it, regulating asanexistence a basic structure to asopposed mutual advantage, for interaction However, whereas the previous requirement (the existence of Empirical considerations notwithstanding, a crucial objection normative the against acrucial notwithstanding, objection Empirical considerations The second version of the cooperative account of national scope requires mere requires economic scope national of account version of cooperative the The second 8 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice objection:it notoffer indoes itselfdetermine any way to thebaseline against which pervasive light of the empirical facts. of the given country. Consequently, the anti-cosmopolitan scope thesis is hardly sustainable in policies immigration the by influenced severely are life prospects whose those on or country, given interactions with dependentthe on facto is homeinstance, for de country whose those, impacton has pervasive a given country of The national basic structure impact. pervasive of in terms externalities have not do societies national of structure basic the that economy in world false is present-day it the justice,site is empirically of right of a society the structure basic the that granting First, position. anti-cosmopolitan the of justification normative justice whichis required, butnotpresupposed, by principles justice.of of aninstrumental condition or element serves asa constitutive it where cooperation theories, social to itself)—as opposed impact of itispervasive source the (since justice condition of seems,structure justification legitimately on tobeoutlined, existence the regarded asan basic The justice. global no is there structure: basic society’s given the of jurisdiction principlesjustice of apply isonly where there impact, apply pervasive they not do outside the structure has pervasive impact on those livewho in the given society,but noton others. Since basic structure—thus sharing an assumption with their cooperation counterparts. theorist insistingpervasiveimpact justice is this justification, right theories siterely the on of the that pervasive impact of the requisite kind. Anti-cosmopolitans who argue in the spirit of its justice site of isexactly of anappropriate a society as structure considering basic the justification of pervasive theories,impactAccording underlying the 96). to 1971, p. given,non-voluntarily establishmenthas“profoundchosen a pervasive and impact”(Rawls Second, the normative basis of pervasive impact theories is open to the following is the opento theories pervasiveimpact basis normative of the Second, Cosmopolitan objections,may again, address both empiricalthe assumption and the basic A society’s follows. as argues impacttheorist pervasive The anti-cosmopolitan 9 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection has no theoretical import. theoretical no has Rawlsian assumption, do belong to the basic structure. Withinthe present discussion, this terminological point 2 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice instrumental instrumental in is therealization justice, andit of condition,inthis its with conjunction Oneobjections, could totheassumption basic too.) the is return that structure optimally cosmopolitan relying on basicthe asa structure restrictedmust site answer serious empirical institution or practiceof the site by arguing that pervasive impact is a necessary, but nota sufficient conditionto for an qualify as a site of justice.false. (Although,structure basic the on rely not does who theorist impact as pervasive the of we assumption haveempirical seen, the anti- rendering requisite across the borders, again national the impact occur of practices pervasive attemptputforward impossible,to ananti-cosmopolitanto scopethesis— again, even itseems in argument, basic the the reliancewithoutstructure on But theorist. impact pervasive justicethe for of condition a necessary existence not is arguably of structure existence a basic forth family,the (see Cohen andsochurches,1997). universities, belongingpractices not basic tothe also structure qualify sites asappropriate ofjustice; e.g., for qualifying asasubject justice,matter of most then of establishedthe institutions and social condition sufficient in itself,and, isanecessary above of kindimpact the described pervasive justice: as if having of only the subject establishbasic structure nolongerthe seems to impact, justification, this pervasive anti-cosmopolitan reason against For conclusion. on relying an but not sufficient, for duties of justice to emerge. best necessary, impact at pervasive justice, ofrendering a) theory of (component independent baseline is normatively normativedefined, the theory providing be this definition will an the however, If, arbitrary. morally entirely seems baseline a as moment historical right the of choice the state of actual affairs), earlier, is(an is historical If baseline measured. impact the Alternatively, the same substantive point canbe made by claiming that these institutions, contrary to the So as to resist the cosmopolitan conclusion, itis certainly possible to block the extension a provide will itself site the as structure basic the of justification normative the Moreover, 10 2 In other words, the words, other In Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice awaits further detailed discussion in chapters.two nextthe discussion detailed further awaits version TheNagelian respectively. and accounts, (2005) Nagel’s (2001) reasoning: Blake’s of line this of variants dominant two of features distinguishing the as well as shared the theoretically significant ways. Accordingly, my aim in this subsection is, in part, to emphasize insome diverge accounts coercion-based However, justice. of of condition principles be is asasite an existence to structure assumed basic imposed acoercively impact theories, pervasive to then, similarly accounts, these justice. On of byconsiderations counterbalanced are thus which adverseeffects severemorally yetwith aims, significant morally by itin toprovide is justification. necessary order considered this as Coercion a means to coerced those / or and authority the coercive to apply justice of principles justification; moral specific in kind. Theorists strandconceivethis coercion of requisiteof the kindasinneed of scope should be restricted to individuals subject to one particular coercive authority of some Coercion-based ofjustice thescope and 1.3. Coercion accounts of the scope of distributivejustice. justice are designedbasic to structureshow that the of imposition from coercive the argument the while its owndifficulties, with account, the leads usa cooperation interaction-based instrumentality returns from argument/ to scope: the optimal on to the discussion(Scheffler 2006). Nevertheless,most of these directions point toward different accounts of the justice distributive of site the as uniqueness its of ofjustification in the arole plays impact coercion-basedits pervasive to subjected on those imposed is coercively structure basic the fact that the that accounts consideration) previous the necessarilyof independently itcan be impact, or (not presumed of the scopehaving pervasive change entities all of is to most difficult the basic the structure argued that of mayit be of justice. Alternatively, site establishes itas theproper that impact, pervasive 11 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection straightforwardlypremise empirical false.theorist’s coercion the making arguably authority, coercive global a exists already there sense, a in Hence, non-compliance. sanction to option the have do often parties other the treaties, of these enforcement the assuring agency coercive central no is there Although agreements). such in participating states the 2008, esp. p. 6). (Think, e.g., of extraditiontreaties that distribute the coercive enforcement of state laws among state’s coercivelygiven of a imposed enforcement policies by the by realized other states on mechanisms the coercion basis of indecentralized bilateral orconsists multilateralwhich impact, treatiespervasive (see Christiano 4 it seems hence moreand fruitful account, to of Nagel’s discuss it in interpretation the coursea standard of from one a partly distinct most contrastive bethe to itseems contextualizationas interpretation ofthis the chosen latter.I have Nonetheless, interpretation. plausible, even or possible, only the is this that however, suggest, 3 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice impact on too. non-citizens, impact on pervasive immigration has coercively inenforced obviously policy) of coercion terms (e.g., isisstate premise the false: still relevant, coercion having impact pervasive considered state manner,only more restrictive in If,a theoretically false. isblatantly premise the coercion, This is reasoning. Blake’s (2001)normative essence of the justice.— distributive of considerations by isprovided justification special This justification. special absent anyone, of limit autonomy the not should coercion life. However, autonomous the provision of certain moral goods, or circumstances lifeof which, in turn, are necessary for for is necessary of kinds coercion, to other coercion, asopposed State thesis. scope restricted are not morally relevant in generating duties of justice. Since the first route seems very seems route first the Since justice. of duties in generating relevant morally not are a certain kind of state coercion has no externalities, or it shouldjustify why these externalities may beit inis ways: toexplaincoercion. two provided either This specification expected why maintained unlessfurther specification is provided with regard tothe relevantkind state of coercion state regards lack of externalities the concerning it can be judged whether itis in fact devoid of externalities. If the empirical premise interpretation what countsas of a “relevantkind of coercion”: depending its on interpretation, Therefore, so argument the goes, concerns ofjustice donotapply non-citizens. to non-citizens. coerce doesnot coercion kind(state) of relevant the that assumes cosmopolitan An even more severe objection would maintain that As it is thereclear from my reconstruction,I offer acompensatoryis, interpretation of Blake’sin account. I do notfact, wish to a global coercive structure with global The anti-cosmopolitan coercion-theorist can argue along the following lines for the The empirical plausibility of Blake’s version of anti-cosmopolitanism depends on the on depends anti-cosmopolitanism of version Blake’s of plausibility empirical The 4 Therefore, the anti-cosmopolitan conclusion can hardly be 12 simpliciter 3 Empirically, the anti- the Empirically, as the relevant kind of Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection in the form of justice is due to the coerced at all, especially so as to justify coercion itself. coercion justify to as so especially all, at coerced the to due is of justice form the in compensation further that straightforward is not it coerced, of the interest the in done is it moreover, necessary, problem of the coercion-compensatory account of justice is that once it is conceded that coercionis morally difficult to determine the baseline in accounts relying purely onpervasive impact. Anotherstrictly normative generation of duties of justice, itis difficult to determine the baseline of compensation in the same way as it is 5 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice assumptions. must face theirnormative concerning andempirical anti-cosmopolitans impact-based basic thisthe lineof face would structure—but the same reasoning pervasive objections can justice.of tothepervasiveimpactas theground beof It provided, byreference though, has been shown, this justification cannot be provided by reference to social cooperation either, requires independent justification not provided byreference thefact to of itself.coercion Asit however, assumption, This justice. of principles of condition existence is an inclusive, legal thebasicregulation structure, assumes probably,because one system?—Most legal relevant kinds of coercion: why would one restrict the scope of justice to the jurisdiction of a state. nation tothe justiceisrestricted of scope the kind coercion, of) relevant is of (the justice that of scope the And, since externalities. relevant no are really there be relevant, to externalities 4 ifabove.) is fornote sucha Hencecoercive (Although required consider system coercion regulatesthat non-citizenspresent state against (seeAbizadeh2007,p.350). at system legal coercive international no is there true: largely beconsidered may assumption empirical the kindcoercion’, of ‘relevant of the interpretation Underthis regulated. legally is justice isthatwhich of forduties of thegeneration coercion relevant only the state of kind alternative. second for the withoutdifficultserious take to aditishocery, surprising not Blake thatboth andopt Nagel Specifically, as far as normative assumptions are concerned, on a coercion-compensatory account of the account coercion-compensatory a on concerned, are assumptions normative as far as Specifically, Nevertheless, in the first place, it is hard to justify the restriction of the normatively the of restriction the justify to hard is it place, first in the Nevertheless, that by assuming coercion of externalities of the irrelevance moral for the argues Blake 5 13 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice significant effects of the basic structure, while they do not mitigate whilenot buthefindseffects of effects, these basicdo structure, significant they the theory Nagel justice, of finds it if morally unjust are people certain for responsible there individualof canbeAdopting siteonthoseaffected this ascribeda strictly agents. to deontic theeffects how determining relations complex because of but site, by affected this andthose justice between regarding arelation notonly sitethe of generated because of considerations justice are of duties is that assumption normative central Nagel’s autonomy. personal isitself, because itsexistence imposition of pervasiveimpact or andlimits the coercive, action. for state areresponsible citizens (subjects) that ensures which coercion, state legitimate of in case the is met legitimacy, political of account Nagel’s on condition, This befor imposed of coercively beimpact. justice pervasive subjects duties responsible of imposed pervasiveimpact attributed. That is, the existence condition coercion has livesstate be can properly others’ impact morally on the pervasive arbitrary, of these duties is not state coercion, towhom if only therearesubjects generated justice are In his of view,duties account. Nagel’s or coercively state coercion, which in turn generates duties of justice. libertarian of existence the humanitarian and duties—require Nagel’scase, considerations—in reconstruct in the next chapter. Also, Nagel shares Blake’s view that independent moral which I will account, of this in support legitimacy implicitoffered of theory elaborate havemore a seemsto Nagel is lawful coercion—although justice of scope the determines that coercion kindof specific the that claims his account respect, in another Blake’s akin to Still somewhat ofjustice. principles of is condition existence an structure, as the basic taken In other words, according to Nagel, duties of justice are not generated because of the becauseof generated not are justice of Nagel, duties to according words, In other On otherthe hand, value the of autonomy not playdoes justificatory any explicit role in On the one hand, Nagel’s (2005) theory also assumes that a shared authority, coercive that assumes also theory (2005) Nagel’s hand, On one the simpliciter —similarly Blake. —similarly Whatisto requiredis thatthe would- 14 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice chapters, I will take Nagel’s account under close scrutiny so as to showit fails that provideso asto willunder scrutiny to take Nagel’s I chapters, close account highlighted pervasive itsand Inthe impact some following connections to accounts. of scope, of theories coercion-based the Blake’s among to in contrast account Nagel’s situated thesehave analogies kinds of three anti-cosmopolitanism. andsharedassumptions I of structural significant few a emphasized and coercion, state of specificity moral the on reliance andby impact, onthebasis of pervasive account, interaction-based on a cooperation or crucial empirical and normative considerations counting againstanti-cosmopolitanism argued them while emphasizing on stance acritical take to attempting justice debate, of scope their inthe positions cosmopolitan distinct ways of argumentation.In this I havechapter presented1.4. Conclusion some I of havethe provided respectively. length chapters, in two nextthe at discussed a selective be will difficulties These globally. justice realizing for suitable more circumstances empirical outlineof establishment the requiring justice of duty no is there that and circumstances, empirical of some of thedifficulties in establishing the that both scope of justice isnational even given presentthe most importantinstead of an instrumental or constitutive condition, Nagel alsofaces (as I hope show,to fatal) anti-limited scope, and why basicthe structure should be taken as an existence condition justiceof its entails justice of site limited the why showing in difficulties has cooperation-theorist as the to which principles of justice could apply, there is no global justice, either. However, as much structure basic global isappropriate no toBlake’s sincethere or theory: cooperation-account, Relying nextthe chapter). on assumption,this Nagel argues alonglines the similar to in be discussed sense to therelevant (in areresponsible individuals acts for whose coercion place. takes mitigation these,andno for responsible isno-one there innothing unjust of wherelike (evenstates affairs effects obtain,of basicstructure) the but By way of empirical assumption, Nagel assumes that there is no legitimate global legitimate no is there that assumes Nagel assumption, empirical of way By 15 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice to justify the claim that we have no duty to establish some kind of a global basic structure. a justification of the generation of duties of justice and their restricted scope, as well as failing 16 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection weight. its with of normsacceptance interests rightful every by citizen’s equal accommodating is no inharm thisusage. Nagelian conditions paradigmatically, though as I will argue, not exclusively, obtain in democratic polities, there 6 P3: coerced. of the lifethe impact prospects on pervasive morally arbitrary, have a P2: Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice P1: other.the I propose following,the fairly neutral reconstruction of Nagel’s argument: joint authorship of coercively decisionsenforced made byalegitimate political authority, on argument in question centers around the role of coercion, on the one hand, and the role of the justice, andprovide some initial be analysis to exploited inits further discussion. The of scope arestricted for account tobeNagel’s what Itake lay out I succinctly section In this 2.1. Reconstructing the argument, of said scope duties. the on restriction for thenecessary are they if even that argue to second, existence and justice; distributive egalitarian of duties generate to insufficient are entails it ofresponsibility collective of suchascription the and legitimacy duties, political of account Nagel’s that show to first, is twofold: aim My justice. distributive they are nonetheless of duties of existence the action, and for state responsibility citizens’ legitimacy, political between therelation concerning Nagel’s claims criticize InSectionwill 2, I this chapter. insufficient inmy interpretation of remainder the guiding along remarks account, with some preliminary to justify InSection his nationjustice 1, Iwill to of distributive states. a critical reconstruction provide the nationalIn this IaddressThomas chapter Nagel’s (2005)argumentfor restricting of scope the 2.0. Introduction I will use “citizen” and “subject” interchangeably, albeit aware of the wider extension of the latter. Since the Since latter. ofthe extension wider ofthe aware albeit interchangeably, “subject” and “citizen” use will I preliminary remarks onNagel’s dualism Coercion thesis Legitimacy ofLegitimacy coercionimpliesacceptability Moral arbitrariness of coercively imposed consequences coercivelyMoral arbitrariness imposed of 2. Legitimacy, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice 6 : Policies decided by a political authority : Policies authority decidedby are coercively enforced. a political 17 : If a political authority itseeks is legitimate, : If authority a political : Coercively enforced policies Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection absolute conditions of individuals. notbut the interpersonal (ibid.), comparison concern under conditions only account, relative latter, his on for the ofjustice, as duties tothese duties explicitly refer not justice.does Nagel some notion conceive “humanitarian” reasons realizing of asalso these of good duties to are there notes, p. 256) As Miller131). (2007, 127, apply duties (pp. undertaken contractual voluntarily with compliance and religion, of freedom expression, of freedom integrity, bodily to right suchasthe rights negative of set limited a Locke’s, where to is closer nature abovebe) is(andwasintended this, ambiguous about to Nagel’sconception of state the of Although nature. argument the of in sketch of the state the absence of authority, a political in other each owe would people duties noprepolitical are there that thesis Hobbesian strong the endorse not Nagel does However, state. reaching the or outside existing justice distributive legitimacy, and these duties are owed by and tofellow-citizens subject to this authority. Duties of justicedistributive arise ifand onlyif is there a political authority aspiring to C (from C3 and P6): coerced. lifeof the the prospects on coercion if justice is aregenerated mitigate the amorally impact of there political to duty arbitrary See, 1974 Feinberg e.g., and Montague 1980forfurtherdiscussion. Parfit(1998) also argues for the existence of “no justice without comparison” thesis is highly controversial, with numerous theorists rejecting this position. do suggest that the duties in question are duties of justice. Here I merely indicate that Nagel’sconclusive endorsement arguments ofagainst thisthe position, Iwill offersome considerations in the following paragraphs which 7 P6: citizen. lifeof on every other the prospects impact arbitrary morally policies’ Only if legitimateisa political authority docitizens toitsubject mitigate its haveaduty to C3: (from C2 and P5) One has a duty mitigateto morally arbitrary effects only if isone responsible for them. Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice P5: its of citizen. every life policiesother of the on prospects impact pervasive arbitrary, morally for the isresponsible citizen every legitimate, is authority If a political C2: (from P1, P2 and C1) decisions. its for responsible is citizen every islegitimate, authority a political If C1: (from P3 and P4) every for is thedecisions responsible procedures, these deliver.citizen in decision-making weight equal with interests rightful citizen’s every accommodates P4: That is, Nagel endorses the thesis that justice is always comparative. While I have no space here to provide to here space no Ihave While comparative. always is justice that thesis the endorses Nagel is, That As it is straightforward from the reconstruction, on Nagel’s account, there are no duties of duties no are there account, Nagel’s on reconstruction, the from straightforward is it As Sufficiency of political coercion for theexistenceofdutiesjustice: political coercion ofSufficiency for Necessity of responsibility for the existence of duties of justice duties of of Necessity theexistence ofresponsibility for Acceptability of coercion implies citizens’ responsibility: ofcoercion citizens’ Acceptability implies 7 18 If a political authority apolitical If (Deontic justice thesis): Duties of distributive of Duties Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection libertarian duties which include exclusively negative duties. negative exclusively include which duties libertarian causal responsibility for the adverse state of affairs) that are standardly not considered members of the setof Humanitarianduties, forinstance, involve minimal positive duties (e.g., relief of suffering evenwithout any presentation, I do not mean to imply that libertarian duties entail humanitarian ones, or the otherway round. duties9 forit is considered far less controversial as applied to rights.expositoryjustice may be especially noncomparative problematicof as applied to deserts concept (see this also Montague [1980],While pp.132f, for300f). discussion), (pp. deserts or rights their with accordance in due, their is what 8 ease,deprivation (Parfit 1998, p. 13). withegalitarianism is in fact akind of noncomparative justice based on facts of absolute, rather than relative, a noncomparative justice; moreover, heshowsNagel’s that early (1979) analysisview ofwhat takeshe to be to contrasting them with egalitarian duties. By this manner of Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice the stateof the nature is finda duty to ways of andspecifying realizing leave to Accordingly, duty the libertarianism. of some conception modified conceived under as stateless), the (or countries citizens of other to justice dutiesof owe citizens do that nature is usually betaken to oneofjustice (Nagel 2005, p.133). of state leave the to such a duty them—and discharge in to position not the we are but case), in Nagel’s duties, humanitarian (namely, duties havecertain wealready wherein nature of Moreover, Nagel accepts a version of the Kantian thesis that we have sort. some of justice a of duty duties also are to they leave that suggests strongly thewhich statecomparatively, not though even be treated, to ought persons human way the on constraints enforceable justicehumanitarian and account. onNagel’s duties, norms apply to different types of entities, Christiano’s interpretation seems correct in correct seems interpretation Christiano’s entities, of types different to apply norms Thus, while Nagel maybe considered a insofarpluralist as he upholds thatdifferentmoral realization. or specification aim attheir not did nature of state leave the duty to the therefore political institutions are in place: they did not exist beforehand asimperfect duties, either, and when realized or specified merely not are They existence. into come justice distributive egalitarian of norms moral additional isestablished, authority political legitimate a and Inthe ensuing discussion, Iwill mostly referto the duties posited by Nagel inthe state of nature as libertarian give them that a way in betreated individuals that requires justice noncomparative argues, (1974) Feinberg As It is plausible to interpret Nagel, as Thomas Christiano (2008, p. observes, 9) asclaiming (2008, Nagel,interpret Christiano asThomas It isplausibleto However, the set of duties Nagel refers to as merely “humanitarian” concern in concern part as “humanitarian” merely to Nagel refers setof duties the However, 19 9 Once the state of nature is left, though, left, is nature of state the Once libertarian Attila GergelyMráz duties of 8 CEU eTD Collection should be governed by samethe principles (see, e.g., Murphy 1999). ofa society, structure specifically), basic (the onthe one hand, institutions and to to individual applying conduct,standards on the other, moral of or these sets realms of separate are moral life there whether question 10 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice suggesting that he is at once a dualist with regard to justice. regardto with adualist heonce isat suggesting that explicit form. position, his partly on criticize and relying earlier work, to them inaccordingly theirmore myunfold for Nagel’s topossible is29), arguments aim esp. n.at p. 2010, pp.28–29, 44 Cavallero justice (see of of, aconception interpretive merely rather but for, argumentative extent which justice. isAlthough Nagel’s an metaphorical brief of these points discussion andto often causedarguing ofjustifyingview fallshort these of to the that political duties egalitarian distributive some a with other, the on them, over authority with institution political of toacts the for responsible believeare citizens in which sense the and hand, one the on legitimacy, political of account Nagel’s that he doesby In thissection,Ireconstruct andmaintained,acoercive authority. and established norms not intend made, decisions the theconsequencesof for responsibility subjects’ coerced tothe is related in turn, which, legitimacy related political of concept an implicit to reference with duties egalitarian of justification discussionis the justice distributive of scope the of account Nagel’s to specific is What legitimacy and responsibility 2.2. Justice, to be section. are such Itis 2008, p.11). principles will thisin(Christiano question I that address the next there presumes Nagel once principles, moral prepolitical existing of basis the on exclusively aduty ground establishto them. and principles institutions, egalitarian political itapply former although to is only that the I do not mean to use the term ‘dualism’ in the sense used in the monism-dualism debate concerning the It is not immediately clear, nevertheless, why political institutions should not be evaluated not should institutions political why nevertheless, clear, immediately not is It 20 10 Interestingly, both libertarian both Interestingly, Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection is to criticize the aim my argument onit—however, stronger a strengthen, reconstruction.than rather weaken, would it argument, Nagel’s to any relevance it has if since 12 141. p. 1966, Feinberg See party. responsible of the discretion the at left means appropriate of the finding and choice the unspecified, extent some to 11 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice coercively enforced action is offered as the only plausible moral fact which sets apart justice- apart which sets fact moral plausible theonly is as offered action enforced coercively for responsibility joint Crucially, hand. at responsibility of notion the to, identical not are butjustified by, Duties arein us (seeP5above). part beto attributable can action them on incurring duties of egalitarian justice: we owe these duties to people only if the effects of state us asagents. to justifiably attributed attributability. If someone can act “in ourresponsible for them in name”,the relevant sense. I will discuss these issues one by one. this means that mustwhich one be operates, to authority a political according thenorms concerning their acts justification moral for ask to a standing inhave to (iii) question practices; inpolitical participation are of that or membership political of voluntariness imply it does nor process; making decision- political the to part citizens’ the on input causal direct any or authority, political in the sense of “duty”; C1above): polity (see in (legitimate) membership the forSubjects’ hisview, policies thecoercively enforced is, coextensive with responsibility on Attributability is complicated by a structure of delegated agency, which I neglects here for expository ease, expository for here I neglects which agency, ofdelegated structure by a complicated is Attributability More precisely, responsibility in this sense would be a kind of duty to achieve an aim which leaves the means First, the required sense of responsibility is not that related to duty, but the one related to duty,but related one related the to that not is responsibility of the required sense First, meant not clearly is responsibility (i) issues: following the raises above passage short The Let usbegin with of responsibility analysis the notion inof the account. Nagel’s used to askwhy we shouldthem. accept (Nagel 2005, p.129) standing have therefore we and them, for responsible us, to handed simply been has responsibility the though even are, we inequalities, arbitrary admit institutions as those Insofar and distributed. arecreated disadvantages supportingthereby throughwhich the institutions advantagesand holds us responsible for obeying its laws and conforming to its norms,and on inwhich, a democracy, wemay havesomeeven influence; and it its acts,which in name for makes us are taken our The society responsible 11 (ii) responsibility for society’s acts does not imply a democratic 12 On Nagel’s account this is a necessary condition of condition necessary is a this OnNagel’saccount 21 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice society to be governed in the name of its members”, are also considered authorities for whose for also authorities are considered beits in members”, governed to society name of the itis for a what of interpretation on a “broad which, authorities arealso coercive occupation military and regimes Colonial polities. in non-democratic even action fulfilled are for state on Nagel’s view, the necessary and sufficient conditions of ascribing responsibility citizensto argue below. position, but he can be interpretedneither holds Nagel voluntary. in as decisions offering the of enforcement the to something contribution or met, akin to the first alternative, as I will usually justified onlyif either certain constraints on procedural political decision-making are required, citizens are forresponsibledecisions political content-independently, is which not If they are is more action ambiguous. for state for responsibility though, their unnecessity particular state actions or the endorsement of the principles on which they rest are concerned, to contribute to agency.intentions As farof control the state asexplicit beyond circumstances reliably not foreseeable nexusof consequenceson a complex aredependent which action, be would havefar-reaching responsiblefor any hardly state aspolitical decisions individuals wererequired, this kind itsof awareness If consequences. awareness possible of in conjunction rests endorsement noraction, the uponwhichaction with of any principles enforced coercively toanyparticular contribute intention to require an not action does state for responsibility individual’s An decisions. its with disagreement in even authority political legitimate a obey to duty facie a prima least at owe we right: intuitively seems this legitimacy, in question.necessary for any individual citizen agreeto with oractively support in person the state action Since responsibilityway (Nagel 140–142). 2005, pp. generatingjustice-generating and not enterprisesin collective anormatively non-arbitrary for state action is a necessary condition of political As regards the second point of discussion concerning the relevant notion of responsibility, relevant concerning the discussion pointof secondAs regards the However, to be individually responsible for state action in the required sense, it is not 22 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice Subjects’ interests are given consideration in aregiven since interests decisions enforced are Subjects’ they consideration coercively p. 129). (2005,n.14.at interests” serve subjects’] law to system [the the is“intended of in the clause in Nagel’s claim cited above which is neglected by Sangiovanni; namely, that is justification above.provided required to The mere factreferred bydescriptive justified the to the overall success of the argument” (ibid.). little “surprisingly, all:it at contributes role normative any plays hardly authorship-condition compliance. for Sangiovanni this concludes, very that reason, responsibility-the or circumstances specification the is of of itself further questionable, absent highly trivially) (and moral in the coercively of practicesweight norms, compliance enforced, the anddecisions with it” (p.16).Although is this itof means—descriptively—towhatclearly part “uphold” in name for“we its acting condition isthat actively our comply only sufficient and necessary a “norm-generative systemis,by state the definition, interprets passageasclaiming that this Andrea(2007) Sangiovanni of societal rules which expects our compliance with it”, and the oroccupyingcolonial power non-democratic, even a that Nagel argues to. are subjected they regimes non-democratic viewthe coercedmade thatthe decisions can by for beresponsible content-independently supporting argumentation normative the on concentrate will I being, time the for legitimacy, for aspire do regimes that assumption the granting Nonetheless, decide. to historiography to The foregoingisp. 129).isan 2005, n.14at up one,whosetruth-value assumption empirical rule (Nagel force not to alone” by it purports apopulation, over claimsauthority political “if a power that oroccupying colonial assuming for, areresponsible the coerced actions Nonetheless, the alleged normative weight of compliance, I contend, is not meant to bemeantto is not Icontend, of compliance, weight normative alleged the Nonetheless, name. (ibid.) name. is is engagement isin there inbeinga sensewhichit required, imposed their normative Since their its legislators. not are if they even interests toupholdexpected serve andwhichisintended asparticipants, totheir is providing and enforcing a system of law that those subject to it are 23 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection to citizens,be inlight should evaluated existing already the of moral (p.11). principles action, ascribednow by state caused life citizens’ prospects on other effects morally arbitrary the that argues, (2008) Christiano moremuch it as plausible, seems action. Instead, for state shared responsibility by factof generated the justiceare distributive egalitarian principles of moral newwhy the question stillunanswered leaves however, in this citizens abovesense, the norms. moral beconsidered imposed byindependent arereasons arewithin to constraints the which of tracking entail the thethat information inputwill yield the policy output itdetermines. Legitimacy not does may whilenoprocedural sensitivity-criterion, instance, the meet offering guarantee equally for ruler, informed absolute asufficiently former: for the not necessary are strictly latter the sensitivity is usually tobe)guaranteed(intended by democratic decision-making processes, outcome runscounterto interests particularthe of some citizens. Although this kindof definite sense in which all citizens jointexercise authorship overthese decisions, evenif the a is there equally, weighted interests citizen’s each andevery to aresensitive decisions that further, different.Assuming, interests werecitizens’ would bedifferent, latter the decisions, into the inputcausal haveno if Even citizens interests of all coerced. the tothe sensitive are because decisions content, ortheirultimate yielding them decision-procedure of either the factthe of coercion. of citizens have—independently reasons if it only to appeals compliance above) In p. 130). (ibid., words,the other coercively political imposed authority should expect reasonably rejectable by any subject (ibid., p. 36). system” (p.35). Here, Nagel endorses a contractualist account of legitimacy whose basis is that it is not theirpoint of view, no and one is morally justified inwithholding his cooperationfrom the functioning of the legitimate, those living under ithave no grounds for complaint against the way its basic structure accommodates 13 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice expected to actively comply with them not them with comply actively to expected This interpretation is close to Nagel’s (1991) earlier, more explicit views onlegitimacy: “if a system is Supposing that coercively enforced decisions and ensuing state action are attributable to action areattributable state ensuing and coercively decisions enforced Supposing that irrespectively made decisionsareOn interpretation,enforced inourname, coercively this 13 all kinds of interests and reasons, though: only those interests and interests those only though: reasons, and interests of kinds simpliciter 24 , but because of accepting them (see P4 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice come into existence because some norms, to whichexistencecomesome norms, to into because apply they would state which realizes a establish a to duty (and,generate possibly, state by enforced the coercively norms apply to argue foris thefollowing: either some principles of distributive justice exist,and hence they to seems he dilemma The duties. of sense in the responsibilities new generate to insufficient is attributability of sense some in responsibility subjects’ the of fact the that claims Christiano libertarianism: of in terms justified are that it with comply to reasons our track will authority political legitimate a libertarianism, of form some is justice of standard is,Thatif independentinstandard. because thesemeetthis case, Nagel’s prepolitical the norms coerced the for, responsibility take and with, comply citizens could that justice, so somestandard of appealsindependent accordingbewhich to legitimate should to state the reasons and interests The justice. of principles prepolitical the by bedetermined simply may criteria the ofmoral arbitrariness imposed morally coercively for,consequences, arbitrary responsibility negative incurnot any to i.e., allow, to carenot take should Although citizens to Gwithin the established circumstances / relations C. First, this structure of duties may arise establishment of circumstancesThe themselves. C among / relationsrelations, into enter or C, circumstances, in establish turn, to individuals generates a set B of duties which apply Gof agroup A ofduties kindsobliges Nageltwo hypothesizes isthe Set following. of duties governing generationthe moral applicability and of The principles. structure of abstract the byastate. enforced coercively The dilemma as outlined above, however, does not stand as a general metaprinciple asageneral stand not does however, above, asoutlined The dilemma any basis that is notcommon to all. (Christiano 2008, p. 11) on with interfered is andnoone areprotected rights everyone’s that extent the to citizen equal an as treated is Everyone here. criticism for basis no be will there distribution of inequality with wrong nothing is if there And on. is acting state morality the of conception the if accept we dispelled befully can arbitrariness of appearance morality. The minimal with the accordance in is state acting the that fact beyond the needemerge new principles No those principles of exist, andjustice), not principlesorthese of donot principles will 25 if Attila GergelyMráz they are they existed, CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice distribution of burdens. Consequently, they have a new duty which arises in their novel in their arises which duty new a have they Consequently, burdens. of distribution discharge their save duty to the childcooperative without within venture their an egalitarian JaneTherefore,not shore the Jane bring(and andJackcould viceversa). child the to help to end the by left energy physical sufficient have not will Jack process, the of duration if that physicalthe burdens of saving the notchild equally are duringdistributed thewhole such people involved are of two the etc. stamina capacities, version, physical the In thefirst diverge. thought-experiment the of versions let the Here, C). relation or (circumstance person other the with someestablishing cooperation without part either be dischargedon cannot Ainhim Due (duty to the thelimited structure). both of force physical of them, duty this duty both,forJack, Jane,or tosave imperfect thereby or suffocate, an beginsgenerating to expected by the reader, but not by the lovers, the child suddenly loses balance in the water and romantic walkalong theof shore a pondwherecarefreechildis around. As playing along,take Jack, who Janeand people, Imagine two structure. application given the of in libertarian todischargecoercive authority)originally duties. established order egalitarianof emergence the to applied be duties cannot structure same the why objection, fromChristiano’s the circumstancesamendbeas so shown, to remains itto in theabstract—hence handplausible seem (i.e., those of the instrumental discharging to A.ways duties Both of polity emergenceof the structure the of duties at governedbeing Cwithout circumstances in apply which duties generates by fulfillment, its in a legitimateinstrumental merely A, fulfillingit or very was the aim of C,whether circumstances of establishment the because may arise discussed structure the alternatively, Second, sameaim. to the instrumental fulfillment discharging Bwillalso of beinstrumental A,and the duties to duties merely itself Cwas of circumstances establishment the case, C. In this circumstances because the fulfillment of duties B is necessary for the fulfillment of duties A within An example for both alternatives will help to clarify the specific problem with Nagel’s with problem specific the clarify to help will alternatives both for example An 26 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice than necessary for the maintenance of these (libertarian) institutions. To justify, e.g., an justify, e.g., To institutions. (libertarian) of these maintenance for the necessary than widely more apply should principles egalitarian why show to insufficient still is itself, in this, but basis, egalitarian an on shared be might army, the or police the as such rights, libertarian justice would apply.Although burdensthe ofmaintaining coercive institutions thatprotect assumption: even ifwith it were the true, establishment it couldlarger onlypolities, modern, of majority justify overwhelming the least at in claim of empirical and an as wrong blatantly seems hencea a verypolity. it limitedfails to But justifysite maintenance Although costs. isthere nothing logically inconsistentthere aboutthis itassumption, where the generation egalitarianis also of and roughly be fulfilled their equally establishment cannot wecontribute unless to a egalitarianmore important duties libertarian duties for we fulfillment of the which ought toestablish institutions coercive concurrently problem original, thatthe mightbeit assumed alternative, first As the for toeither subcase. recourse with this by state the within norms egalitarian applied of widely the justify emergence the cannot instrumental in discharging duty A. distribution be non-arbitrary burdens B): this seemsto onlymorally the childsaving the of (duty equally of burdens.share the to cooperation, of circumstances in the emerging aduty, have still may case, they In this scenario,physical strengththe fulfillment of either they cooperate,evenare willingif to is contribution the oneof marginal,butthe them of them would ofbe, induty itself,if savethechildpeopleJane such and easily Jackcould two andthe are between that stamina B insufficientis, by assumption,to save the child. In this notpeople. two of the /relations newcircumstances tothe was conducive is inequally. instrumental this fulfillment the of that of original fulfillmentthe The duty duty cooperation the of burdens the share they that requires and B), (duty cooperation of situation Whereas the structure of duties is plausible in both isin Nagel examples, of Whereas that isplausible theproblem both thestructure duties In the secondversion of distribution thought-experiment,the the of capacities physical 27 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice the norms of egalitarian distributive justice. Nevertheless, both the necessity thesis (P5) and (P5) thesis necessity the both Nevertheless, justice. distributive egalitarian of norms the generate to sufficient nor necessary neither is name” “in our made are decisions coercive that fact the that result the yield yet as not does conclusion, Christiano’s with in conjunction taken myeitherisabove:of (see argument This,the P5 reconstruction even anunarguedpremise). for the argument offer independent any appear to emergence pp.egalitarian As of principles. 29–30)observes, Cavallero(2010, Nagel not does coercively enforced decisions—the responsibility-condition is not sufficient for the generate or trigger egalitarian ofjusticeprinciples in addition citizens’to responsibility for Nagel calls for under the label “socio-economicof justice” (2005,p.114). justify in with egalitarianism of together casethey kind broad the state, the which cannot existence they terms, into come only or action inegalitarian isexist, andstate evaluated already either principles hold: egalitarian to seems discussed dilemma the Consequently, deriveNagel cannot intends be to from presumably this derivedstructure it. from institutions be thatare sharedto of equally,widely kind the applying egalitarian that duties libertarian maintaining of burdens the only is itIf force. full with here applies also alternative first the for problem normative the Nonetheless, way. non-arbitrary morally a in distributed burdens of providing protection theof violation against all shouldnegative rights subjects’ be libertarianour duties beshould among fairly distributed the subjects of coercion, because the of fulfillment the for required institutions coercive the of costs maintenance and establishment humanitarian. merely were or libertarian instrumental model of ofnew emergence the sufficient, is duties not the once original duties redistribution of resources—measures customarily justified by justice—theegalitarian substantial the to income conducive taxes or system, social security care or health extensive If dilemma abovethe some outlined holds, further necessary condition is to required the is that assumption relevant the however, alternative, second the of spirit the In 28 necessity of of the responsibility-condition, Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice consideration inconsideration itself notlimit does possible the this effects, morally its beararbitrary mitigating action burdensof the in to order for state ifthe even words, In other acts. same coercive the scope of these duties should be restricted to those who also bear responsibility for the why it remains unclear justice, distributive of of duties existence of the condition necessary by areinstantiated properties associative outside state. andbeyond the various relations fornecessary justice, ofdistributive determiningthese scope and sufficient butarguesthat the are acts, forthe coercive coerced the to ascribable and responsibility involuntariness, and Goodin (2009). This lineof criticism not questiondoes atwhether coercion,least or criticisms of the Nagelianargumentation. This crucial theoretical point is less emphasized in atleast account, one strand of extant representedfurther beg for justice) of principles underif egalitarian interpreted sufficiency (P6, the thesis by Cohen and Sabel (2007) and Ypi, Barry normative consideration proper (p. 185). As he puts it, one non-citizens of is demanded” acceptance “no that assumption the observes, (2006) Julius as Nonetheless, is an empirical claim here about the present stateconsequences imposed on them. Immigration policies are offered as a paradigmatic example: of affairs,morally arbitrary enforced, coercively the justification for askfor to do nothaveastanding rather whodo action.share for not state thatthose responsibility assumes this Nagel responsibility than a However, even assuming that responsibility for coercively enforced state action is a policymakers are not claiming acceptability to we wantfor What them. claimingacceptability not are policymakers foreign that accept them or to andnot states foreign of policies cannot simply report that people are disposed only to conform to the consideration. 129–130) (Nagel 2005, pp. discriminatory why haveinterests beengiven policies, or equal their justification is requiredexplains that why such they should accept nothem, of demanded is noacceptance laws.Since those and uphold accept in are nor they lawsname, imposed asked to arenot theirthe states; other of nationals the against enforced simply are policies Immigration 29 subjects objects of these duties have to be responsible to have duties these of of these duties to those who share who those to duties of these Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice above) might best be interpreted as ultimately motivated by concerns about the content of content the about byconcerns motivated asultimately interpreted bebest might above) (P5 responsibility-condition necessity the the of 122), duties (p. justice-related of content egalitarian treatment. foreigners are not responsible for the arbitrariness does not, in itself, make a case against their fact that case,the in domestic if the are egalitarian way round, they the other cases—or are quasi-libertarian, moral of arbitrariness And if of types cases. two standards these the between moral difference mitigation,further borders, the justification they withoutso within andwithout are the of as Nagel seems objects of areproper on lifeprospects morally one’s incurredeffects arbitrary involuntarily to suggestnot130).Yetdo violateagain, [foreigners’] if (2005,p. human prepolitical rights” in the foreignclaim policies the to justification that is sufficient is “[i]t treatment foreigners’ concerned, of case, they are so inin ofjustice. one terms non-evaluable than morally of a rather affairs, state an unjust bothbe to seems This parties. effected the to, justified they are nor by, undertaken voluntarily not they are morally objectionable: effects renders these factthat this is anditprecisely effects, is (pp.351–352).For pointthe coerced the thatforeigners of acceptance the to noteven aspiring coercion aspure isit coercion once proclaimed apply to not justice does assume that to in his words, is morally perverse, it of perversity”: “problem the Abizadeh this calls of justice. (2007) by notbe needduties mitigated these effects themselves, effects these for responsible not are foreigners since claim that to counterintuitive morally Yet life enforced,foreigners’ it impacton prospects. pervasive arbitrary seems hugely of coercively relevance the however, Hedenies, on citizens are so. effects as its as much just Nagel does not deny that some effects of state coercion on foreigners are morally arbitrary Although Nagel’s (2005)accountof scopethe ofjustice isindependent of accounts of the justification moral as farthe might bethat objection foregoing the to response Nagel’s the imposed-on the know is whether acceptability is something that imposers is that is something know acceptability whether should demand. (ibid.) 30 cannot should be responsible for these for beresponsible Attila GergelyMráz claim and claim CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice consequences of institutions,social possibly in established response such to differences (2001, directly inare which but interpersonal natural the properties, are not differences due to contends, mitigated, soNagel be should moral of arbitrariness effects only restricted: those negative responsibility for such effects seems consistent with this earlier position of Nagel’s. of state’s the non-citizens, tothelife acknowledgement with consequences of regard prospects However, as it is empirically true that state actionconsequences: doesfor same the action allows which andstate life prospects, people’s on particular consequences allow action aims at which between state distinction is significant nomorally there prerogatives, for morally thus,absentagent-centered p. 101), its members”(1991, life of collective arranges the arbitrary it way from the lead,apart its to of own’ no‘life “has a society that principle the to attention gradually more explicit, from his become onthem leastor restrictions innumber, viewdecrease byjustice on Nagel’s mitigated short discussion of concerns of content and scope in Nagel’s later seminal works on justice. place of some considerations in the theory under discussion. Thus, in whatfollows, I offer a content in Nagel’s theory, a brief digression into thesethese matters willduties. help to further Evenclarify theif there is no room here for a full treatment of the relation of scope and (2001) to “The Problem of In “The (2005). Justice” (2001) to Global of Problem In his “Justice and Nature”, Nagel’s position on the content of justice is more explicitly justice of content on the Nagel’s position Nature”, “Justice and In his As far as the content of justice is concerned, the kinds moralof arbitrariness that should be different. And if the society is responsible, they are responsible through it, itforis theiragent. (Nagel 1991, pp.99–100) through responsible are they isresponsible, society if the And different. are, iffeasible different policies wouldand institutions resultin theirbeing the society that should beregardedbyits members as forresponsible how things is essential it things, other perhaps and education, health, position, what and does state the what between lifeprospects, people’s which controls is merelymorally fundamental distinction, in regard to the socioeconomic pursuitthe equality frameworkrequires of abandonmentthe of isa ideathatthe there allows. […] [W]ith regard to income, wealth, social Equality andPartiality 31 Equality andPartiality (1991) to his “Justice Nature” and (1991)to Attila GergelyMráz , Nagelcalls CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice responsibility for similar effects on citizens’ life prospects is for oncitizens’ similarresponsibility life granted. effects prospects begs life onforeigners’ negative further for arbitrary justification, prospects once effects for the lackormoral insignificance ofnegative respectively),foreigners, and responsibility and citizens on (viz., effect morally arbitrary cases of in both is established responsibility one the hand, andinequalities for which itis notresponsible, on other. the The fact of in for whichgrounded betweeninequalities distinction isthe a society responsible,given on the national scope limitation seems unfounded even given a restricted content, forit cannotbe seems to be continuous withrights Nagel’s or deserts project of basis the on assigned itis nor of voluntary, not is of polity any in agiven restricting membership as kind.justice, While thethe contentrestriction of objects aspossible foreigners and of citizens between distinction arbitrary largely a seems egalitarian of the global justice, scope of institutions. This coercive under same operating the members society affectthe of justice that justice to national objects areproper of of (egalitarian) duties only the inequalities, those socially caused within even that thesis the of explicitness the by is represented justice of content the of formulations goods. certain of distribution the determine differences natural ways the into isnon-intervention duty justice and humanitarian Asprinciples. faras natural inequalities are concerned,ourprimary libertarian ofsomeprinciples of kind to as)subject beinterpreted can plausibly are(or others dichotomy: some morally arbitrary effects are subject to principles of egalitarian justice, while of (p.126).This affected the as maybe an interpreted instance of earlier familiara, bynow, for welfare” concern the by mitigated a “humanitarian should be this institutions, on account, Morallyp. 121,130). frominequalities natural arbitrary arising causes by unmediated social In “The Problem of Global Justice” (2005), a crucial further move from these earlier 32 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice which egalitarian justicewhich would egalitarian apply his account. on reasons for staying out of the state of nature serve as reasons for establishing a global polity to Iwillgrounds: even if argue that hold, conclusions of present didthe chapter not the Nagel’s however, I willsufficient set asidenecessary reasonthese conclusions toegalitarianfor generate new limitinggenerate to sufficient not are responsibility-condition the and coercion-condition the forprinciples principlesa thewhile scope Nagel’s accountof political legitimacy inlight andof this concept of responsibility. Iarguedthat of criticizejusticeofof justicejustice. of interpretation an andIoffered decisions, enforced its coercively of consequences the of Nagelthe to Furthermore, required nation-states.on examined sense in the whichsubjectsof a political can set-up institutional be for responsible different kind, I on Nagel's dualistaccount, remarks and some clarifying argumentthe reconstruction of I theyargued Inwould thethatformal ofjustice. a After duties action in for egalitarian state generating responsibility notnext even citizens’ of provide relevance the for argument Nagel’s chapter, analyzed and ifreconstructed I chapter, this In these conditions2.3. Conclusion are 33 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection obligations, including humanbeings, states etc. import. Second, the term ‘individual’ is meant to designate here any entity that is a propersubject of rights and individuals’other on part, my obligations choice of generate the obligation-basedto any, are there definition that given seems to ofnature, bear no state theoretical inthe burden rights Itake of Since great be discussed. reference to rights, rather than obligations, the givendefinition will be more simply applicable to the problems to 14 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice may be coextensional). subset a members of the owedto enforce obligations to hasaright which such coerciveauthority a set chapter: this throughout By way of definition, discussion. for following the devices provide analytic the so asto views withinnature related of state the of account Nagel’s and contextualize I reconstruct critically I will section In this intend to nature of the state of conception 3.1. Nagel’s use the term ‘state ofestablish eventually aglobal apply.polity principles egalitarian where nature’ inprinciples werethe right, we would still havefollowing a duty to leave the supranational state of natureConsequently, and sensenon-existence. its with inconsistent and aduty, such of existence the with be consistent I will would justice of of scope duties and argueof generation the account Nagel’s chapter, previous the of findings that the of light in the that, show to is aim My nature. of state global or evensupranational if Nagel’sSection account 2, I of In state the of among theiraccounts in views nature. will place demarcating clearly question, of thecriticize generationegalitarian distributive InSection justice. 1, Iwill acritical provide reconstruction of the Nagel’s of of scope for arestricted inhis argument play andtherolethese counterpart supranational egalitarianargument against andits nature of state viewof the (2005) Nagel’s Thomas Icriticize In thischapter the existence3.0. Introduction of a duty to leave the Two caveats are in place. First, although it might be more customary to define the state of nature with 3. Nagel’s States of Nature and the Scope of Justice S’ of said individuals bymembers of a subset 14 S of individuals are in a state of nature if and only if there is no is ifthere only and if nature of state a in are individuals of 34 S’’ said individuals(where of Attila GergelyMráz S’ and S’’ CEU eTD Collection and will be further discussed below, this terminological choice will not affect my arguments. humanitarianduties. and Since the libertarian substantive between content of relation subset theprepoliticala even or dutiesoverlap Nagel an is posits there has been that made explicitimplying without ease, expository 15 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice terminology, merely “humanitarian”) duties of justice, of duties “humanitarian”) merely terminology, Nagel’s (in libertarian dischargeguarantee of the essentially of isto thisnature state respectleavingof for staying these out correspond.or reason persons’sideother rights The to Hobbesian, butLockean inkind: havetowhich negative persons rights obligations on the of Nagel’sAs already in state isnot previousnature national chapter, emphasized the ofnature: state national reasons. these of content substantive the on depending too, nature, of state supranational the leaving for reasons facie) prima least as(at serve logically, may not, may of or nature state the national leaving moral for The of reasons nature. state supranational enforcing rights and obligations authority by whichisof acoercive absence the stateof constituted nature second-order borne by or owed to states—Imaya exist there them, over is established authority acoercive i.e., political nature, of state will refer to this level as the to this level as the national state of nature. Even when a set of individuals leave this first-order individualauthority and agivencommunity—I enforcingrefer within will obligations rights coercive state-level of absence by the is characterized nature of state first-order levels. The As made I it clearin the previous chapter, Iwill mostly referto the duties in question as libertarian for Nagel explicitly endorses the thesis that we have an obligation to leave the first-order, States of nature are usually supposed to exist, actually or hypothetically, on two different two hypothetically, or on exist, actually to supposed of areusually nature States more less or locally.p. 133) (2005, equality,but on imperativethe securing which basic rights, of can be done itself. offers community with legal whatever a and order, of conditions peace […] the create to obligation an is merely it boundaries; it has noclear fact Thisin all persons, to other an obligation is not It nature. of state of the stay out requirement leave create anda state some of all humanssupport haveto kind—to and is based not on a comprehensive value of 35 15 by providing appropriate assurance appropriate byproviding Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection “institutional approach” to human rights and related duties.) reform adequately. them conception (This would lines proposed bealongthe by Pogge [1992]in his reasonably effectivepreventing in rights-violation, or asufficiently large numberof the members are willing to subset of a given large community,butsufficiently not a if all ofeven its members, discharged maintain are to andcomply rise give withrights institutions such whichduties are imperfect the construal, this On etc. institutional scheme which is reasonably effective in assuring the low risks of the violation of non-interferenceinstance, the rights giving rise to these duties may be interpreted as comprising only a right to live inan 16 Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice that any that ofcooperation mechanismsterms andproposed political decision-making of would to the extreme diversity of rightful interests representeddue by legitimacy, the world’s political of population, account itis likely contractualist astrong on state: a global of establishment hand,inhisOn Nagel also the raises earlier afeasibility other the work, to objection recapitulatingin Nagel 1991,pp.175–176). effect (Nagel 145–147, coercive2005, pp. power substantial moral wrongs on the way, in the course of accumulating and involve competingnecessarily over would sovereignty a global of establishment the that insists he hand, byfurtheroverridden considerations.On forward. Such claims, though, arealso one the put prima faciemoral establishisstate obligation of some aglobal to kind,it or outweighed As the passage above goes to show, Nagel does not merely claim that although there is a his In words, states. to by aliens toaliens, by or tostates, states or bystates authority would obligationsenforce owed which coercive independent establish an to it, leave i.e., to similar obligation we haveno that is it, of far stay heholds of nature as obligation concerned, to state out asthesupranational sufficiently specifying the supposedly imperfect duties (in a Kantian spirit). a sufficient individuals that number willcomply of with them (following Hobbes), The duties discussed, depending on their conceptualization, may be fulfilled without full compliance. For compliance. full without fulfilled be may conceptualization, their on depending discussed, duties The While as regards the national state of nature, Nagel clearly holds that we have an that holds Nagel clearly nature, of state national the While asregards against one’s fellow citizens. (Nagel 2005, p.132) itcreates those secondary to members aredistinctly theirand societies one lives in governed.Any bejustly claims creates this against other society the that right justiceis the to right The with justeveryone. society a live rightthe inajust to not havebutlive society, in wedo an obligation to call for the institutions of global socioeconomic justice. a and suchinstitutions for call linethe between Everyone […] remains a clear there may have even if is [there a tendency increasing]of global governance for thefuture, 36 Attila GergelyMráz 16 and by CEU eTD Collection certainly arises at present at the global level. world at least there are establishment of aglobal coercive authority. Itis merely mattera ofempirical contingency that in the present the feasibility objectioncan be as convincingly put against the establishment of nation states as against necessarythe sufficientand conditionsthe of about right political is legitimacy—which (1991) Nagel if even I Thus, have no space society. to of the argue foror against member by any here— rejected be reasonably cannot societies, it may be (and oftenis, Isubmit) equally difficult to offerterms and decision-making procedures that amply draw upon Thomas W. (1992 and Pogge’s 2008) and A. J.Julius’s (2008)related work. In addressing issueleavewe have of no Iwill nature. this state to obligation supranational the state, my aim inthissection is rejectlibertarian claimthat given to the our justice, of duties nation of obtain outside do ofjustice principles libertarian that arguing justice, of account interpretationthe in offered which previousthe chapter theory regards Nagel’s a as dualist on apply moralglobally. Relying standardsthat are heacknowledges that there nation state, Even judgmentsthough Nagel holds arenot that applicableof justice thescopeof outside the ofnature state second-order 3.2. The state in canhypothesizes of second-order fulfilled.nature the be maintained on a careful analysis of how the negative rights and corresponding duties Nagel In following, any willthe this that or I viewcanbe state. arbitrary) question geographically 17 the of corollary normative isasheer Egalitarianism goes. argument the state—so global establish a to we arerequired that caseeither the isit everyone, not toward haveduties is egalitarian we arerequiredit case to the since that not even required. facie prima not is it that claims feasibility—Nagel of problems faces is that or ill-advised, considered, is, things all state a global of establishment the case that isit only the not different: Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice would-be global coercion would-be coercion global (Nagel 1991, pp.174–175). least by somebebe rejectable at of individuals subsetthe subjected reasonably to to the This problem does not seem to be specific to the establishment of a Although the existence of the state implies the existence of duties of egalitarian justice, implies of egalitarian of duties theexistence state of the Although existence the some societies where the problem discussed may not arise with such force, whereas it whereas force, such with arise not may discussed problem the where societies 37 libertarian 17 Nonetheless, Nagel’s claim here is here claim Nagel’s Nonetheless, global duty to establish a (say, local, state, though. In sharply divided sharply In though. state, Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice of of personal inviolability andimmunity coercively to imposed restrictions on self-governance rights for negative respect (1) requirements: moral of classes independent) not (certainly three Nagel’s assumptions. on own justice aregenerated, of egalitarian establish in which principles conditions the we arerequired to claiming that butalso infirst-order, state only of nature. of This amounts, to second-order the the turn, nature, these providesufficientnot Nagel’saccount, of will,reason for own on staying out state dutiesjustice beinglibertarian Nagel of about there is inthefirst-order only of right are notany “short of sovereignty”. In others words,my argument aims at showing that even if libertarian obligations fulfill need to our global institutions weplausibly the will argue that I however, andof contentduties, mappingthese After nature 131). the p. sovereignty” (2005, minimaleven moral tootherswithout institutions our theduties helpof of some kindshortof hardly feasible todischarge these duties of ours toward aliens:may “it be fulfill impossible to Interestingly, himself Nagel emphasizes appropriate without that global institutions, it seems he writes: Further, nation states: of by establishment the prepolitically existing every duty toward human being, is which notoverridden outweighed or As far as the content of internationally applying norms are concerned, Nagel sets up a is negative rights respectfor persons’ adequate that states clearly Nagel (2005) circumstances.p. 127) (ibid., particular society’s each of light in politically be determined to have will law through protection of methods and boundaries precise their though even we donot give themup as a condition membershipof in apolitical society, individual and any group, or deny other to to such rights individual group or independent is formspower, special of for any of association. wrong It Those rights […] set universal and prepolitical limits tothe legitimate use of do sowithoutserious sacrifice ownends. of our p. 131) (ibid., relieve them from extreme threats and obstacles tosuch freedom if we can endsleaveour withinpursue boundaries that freeto theirs,them andto not requiremake usto their our itown, require but ends pursue does usto This minimal […] morality governs our relation to all other persons. It does 38 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection a version earlier thanNagel’s paperdiscussed herein. is that of 2008,whereas Nagel’spaperdates back to 2005, the by paper Poggeis the revised citedhere reprint of 18 treaty and bargaining international state’s every on constraints imposing borders, the outside be) established as(to justice (egalitarian) of inthe name sacrifices hugeeconomic possibly entailing concession remarkable a seems already this regimes, unjust of support economic our inprovide by counterincentives to egalitarian states’ other discharging obligations, or their impede not to if aduty have However, we act. right they in whose subjects their action than of courses intheir evenmore morally constrained available they are prerogatives, centered Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice bound by the same principles (2008, pp. 126f).boundby principles same (2008, the agent has the right to violate moral principles as long as it acts on behalf of subjects who are “secondarymatter of againstoffense justice”143). (Nagel 2005, p. and justice this negative itssubjects’ duties responsibility gives to—even as a though of rise for itsexternalities, state of the responsibility negative the Nagel acknowledges this respect, is onceit In established. state, justice another within of duties violation of to the egalitarian contributing for responsible also are we interestingly, Second, policies. foreign and economic aboutby brought national institutional viathe weindirectly state’s support scheme our for violation the kinds. potentially violations libertarian two for of First, responsible duties of responsible for the outcomes these relations bring about orhelp tosustain. In this case, we are are also we citizens, its as weareresponsible forwhoseacts state, byour maintained and forged are cooperation of relations if economic justice: international ofinternal the principles relations that are beneficial to them (ibid.). (3) withdrawal economicof support from internally unjust states, and suspension of economic listedthose in as applicable(1)) tointernational bargaining (Nagel 2005, p.143),and finally, norms (presumably moderate (2) above), quoted excerpts (seethe coerced the to unacceptable Although this statement might look anachronistic, given that the edition of Pogge’s collectionof papers I use The above concession incorporates into Nagel’s account Pogge’s insight that no state The third norm above, crucially, rests on the same condition of responsibility as 39 18 Moreover, as states do not have agent- donot as states Moreover, Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection imposed imposed policies) onaliens’Although lives. interpreting as Nagel proposing the complete coercively of means (by impact pervasive of kinds certain least avoidat as to so be directed pursue theirs” (Nagel 2005, p.131), it is a rather robust requirement. State action should, then, freeto leave [foreigners] that boundaries ends pursue our within to require us if “itdoes broadly: rather is interpreted Non-interference treaties. international on bargaining and impose these duties constraints andtheconcurrent non-interferencepersons, with of duties nature: state of in and second-order the aliens, as states well as between betweenstates cooperation with requirements of global non-interference and moral bargaining, to be discussed below. for this will be analogous reasons of provide assurancea global authority—the the andcoordination coercive to without to why global assuranceinstitutional However, Isubmit,arrangements. requisite the issupport hardly kindof possible and coordinationsupport forjustice the already of established polities theexistingwithin international are needed to comply indirect of someit kinds it,of only ofnature; face requires on state the leave second-order the humanitarian needs. humanitarian one that is at cases, least extreme ablein to supply mean, the populationmay with economy” goods “strong sufficient a for702)—where survivalp. or(ibid., the satisfactionof distributed” is minimal wealth how determine between being choose to may have ablegovernment “a economy: to functioning attracta minimally sustain to need and by the sustainaffected severely enough capital investment to Accordinghave to the a insightsstrong of dependency economytheory, the choice and distribution and of being economic incentives able might be towhich have apervasive impact on theaggregate levelgoods state of inthe (Buchanan 2000,pp.702, 708). mostly are, constrained intheir choice among possible internal distributions by external economic relations empirical assumption plausible that ofthe nationstates account take to are notfails always “distributionally nevertheless, objection, autonomous”, This state. i.e., they affected the can be, in and goods of level aggregate egalitarianism is about comparative levels of goods, sothe objectiongoes, itcanbe realized no matter the internal distributive injustice by economic means, once egalitarianism provides the norms of justice: as 20 principles of justice, egalitarian onNagel’s account.violates that general in regime any but regimes, tyrannical of oppressive, support the concern 19 143). regimes2005, p. (Nagel Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice is muchis more demanding a than duty simply orperpetuation refrain regime”from an of Remarkably, unjust support to “active the duty this contracting. just of conditions humanitarian and libertarian the beyond well go that policies Itmight seem mistakento talk about astate undermining the internal justice of anotherstate orsupporting its They go beyond humanitarian considerations since, as you will recall, the obligation inquestion does notonly Let us return, then, to the other two sets ofmoral governing otherinternational the requirements then,Let usreturn, two to 20 Still, the duty Still,mightappear toentail in duty not question the a duty to 40 not to undermine the justice of already just already of justice the undermine to Attila GergelyMráz 19 CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice cooperating to forge multilateral agreements, he fails to notice that what makes this objection notice thatwhat to he fails multilateral forgeagreements, to cooperating instead of for argumentation relying countries on this criticizes Even though Pogge (p. 127): “suckerexemption”the argument he (2008)callsargumentation, calls which of thedangers kind Pogge a similar of to attention Z. of citizens of circumstances improved in the result to likely not is loss this loss, a suffer A of citizens while Z. Thus, of citizens the on effects same maintaining the its place, take not B will that noassurance Z, Ahas of country of lives citizens on the impact adverse pervasive, have from that a for thefollowingA activities country countries, refrains If other reason. to refrain from morally the exerting influence they questionable exert do on citizensthe of have aduty better-off assumecountries it that to is implausible forthem, feasible alternative is a it if even Yet, scene. economic international the on play they role the from withdraw parties to latter the for alternative unfeasible may it bean equally well states, better-off imposed on by them cooperation terms ofinternational accepting the to atpresent alternatives feasible no countrieshave much aspoor as point, the more to aliens. Second, case of resident in the option is hardly ita realizable First, objections. face of feasibility number seems to a requirement. non-interference the of fulfillment the for condition necessary but demanding, be ahighly seem does aliens to impact on of pervasive vague)extent (albeitrather immigration hepolicies—which find doesnot morally objectionable—avoidance of a large beavoidance in ofsuchimpact wouldhis seem to with explicittension restrictive position on Refraining from pervasive impact on non-citizens lives to the required extent, however, required extent, lives tothe on non-citizens from impact Refraining pervasive compliers. (ibid.) compliers. doinglead sowould hisbeing victimized to asucker”)bynon-(“made exemption”:invokes a“sucker This thought practicing self-restraint. are not similar an agentconcern isfor nota no one minimallyshould ask us to subordinate morally our pursuit of our national interestjust to a international required orderto complyso long as otherwith countriesrules when 41 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice plausible is the lack of independent international is independent plausible lackof the necessary, to impose the same limitations and action-guidance on Z. In such cases, Ahasno cases, such onZ.In andaction-guidance samelimitations the impose to necessary, without alternatives, appropriate B buteitherbenot would Aor while individuallysufficient, leave Z of that A B’s actions effect and joint isitthe frequently areobserved. Rather, rights country Z, provided thatcountry B doesnotintervene, Z’s country (andits citizens) negative influence on from objectionable ifA exerting is invariably casethat country refrains It not the citizens by external coercion or unavoidable cooperation often does not have a single source. state supranational of and second-order, nature. of the out staying be describedrequirement onlyby underthelabel of “sucker exemption” can rejected leaving citizens’) their (and states’ other with interference wrongful by fulfilled be should requirements moral projects some assumption that minimal and the core share andJulius Nagel,Pogge whereas Nevertheless, choices, none of them realizes that the kind of objection to thisandJulius guidance of action unjust, doesnot object to this intuitivejudgment: call limitation to such reluctant is, counterintuitively, very Nagel while with them. However, and guidance of actions, herein,ofarguing for amoral requirementnon-citizens, torefrain from the coercivelimitation ofthe choices, even if we do not form a justificatorynature itself. community Another aspect of the same problem is that the impact exerted on a given state and its isinterpreted latter Nagel’s,the as to similar a position articulates Julius A.(2008) J. p. 8, original emphasis) 8, original p. jointlyalreadylive on we’renot (ibid., to together trying acceptable terms. others’ action, sinceIcan youwrong bymanipulating your action if even can verdict that However community. justificatory up a make already live there it can’t objection unless draws the that call peoplea society unjust the who justificatory meet facedbymembers community to obligations of a the failure people’s to exclusively injustice of complaint the traces that A theory be sustained by identifying injustice with the wrongful direction of direction wrongful the with injustice identifying by sustained be 42 assurance , i.e., the second-order state of Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection considerations. Since appropriate assurance of all parties’ compliance (including third parties, third (including compliance parties’ of assurance all Since appropriate considerations. by moral be tempered should leastthem, of at some or such contracts, viewthat own Nagel’s institutions guaranteeinginternational thebackground justice of contracting isintension with Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice normative claim.Why for its isasa acceptance offered justification no claim, as stands an statement empirical international Again, justice treaties. whileguaranteed backgroundwith Nagel’s regard to no is there that fact empirical the of registration mere Nagel’s of oddity the appreciating fully air irony of (“Afternothing all, guarantees justicethe n. of anything”; 36atp.171),without concerning thelack neglect with statement an Cohen of and Sabel Nagel’s guarantees (2006) position concerning their moral evaluability: into reserved a much more he retreats conceived, broadly themselves, treaties international of morality of the discussion tothe itcomes when interestingly, But, treaties. trade and economic negotiating in constraints some for call be a to seems which observation an 143]), p. [2005, should bargaining between betemperedself-interested states by ofhumanity” considerations as treaty policy.finds morally Nagel international bargainingunrestricted problematic (“even international bargaining aswell alsoof coordination, evolution hindersthe a morerestricted (and viceversa). reason to withdraw from the cooperation with Z without assurance that B would follow suit The lack of second-order assurance, as well as the absence of appropriate international appropriate of absence asthe well assurance, as second-order of The lack instruments for thecommon of pursuit(ibid.,self-interest. pp. 141–142) thinner: much something instead become relations commercial and out filtered justice are therequirements of […] background societal boundaries, transcend they as Insofar […] results. their of justice the guarantees nothing and contracts, They are“pure” background: have states nosuch sovereign property lawand tax inwhich they are embedded.Butcontracts between imposed collectively of background because the of system socioeconomic just may of a be part Thelatter state. asovereign within parties interested between self- from contracts moral character different havea quite trade, international treaties or conventions, such as those that set up the rules of should there not be such guarantees? Moreover, the absence of absence the Moreover, guarantees? such be not there 43 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection centralization world-wide. Such centralization governmentwould its Such distribute powers a federalworld world-wide. as much decentralization involves probably as whose establishment structure power reasons to arenumerous there argues, (1992) asPogge seem preferwarranted: not does initial the assumption a federalbenefits of staying out of the state of nature (which may obtain only in thevery long run). But cosmopolitan mightthe well outweigh government of world a central establishment for the necessary authority, by power accumulating imposed of burdens because process the obligation immediate the withit underitnot clearis discussion exists, whether survivesasanall-things-considered a multilayered, On withworld powers. state highly this evenif concentrated assumption, primathe duty facie highly onlythe stay state way to of is out of second-order the nature by a single of establishment the devolvedduty to leave the supranational state of nature seems to rely onand isvoid, all considered.things the implicit assumption that if institution even global international isas an agency a duty such outweighed,of assurance, Consequently, I submit, Nagelis establishunjustified inrejecting aprima facieduty to a internationally. applying principles egalitarian of assumption any without even realization, for their coordination some and assurance require non-interference—all with accordance institutions states,non-interference, of other andbargaining andtreaty-formation in which apply internationally, as putforwardbyNagel of just(2005)—indirect national support assurance. requisite the provide to as so way some in nature of state supranational the of out stay and leave Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice requirements itare inforce,requirements beconcluded, should these and broadly, more treaty-formation international or bargaining, international to pertaining moral of requirements fulfillment the of is condition a necessary as Iarguedabove) Nagel’sfor argument all-things-consideredthe relevance primagranted) ofa (not facie sum independentforgoing, moral To minimal three,not up the the setsof obligations 44 contra Nagel, that there is an obligation to Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice such that by aiming for that institution people are directing others’ action in a way that those ina that way action others’ directing are institution people for that by aiming such that havenot been fulfilled. instead Julius identifies injustice the institutionof withan “its being deontic analysis of injustice as a predicate applying to states of affairs where duties of justiceclose Nagel’sto theory of the scope of justice. In contrast to Nagel,nonetheless, he rejects the themselves. principles egalitarian for thesakeof justice, ifnot even of principles egalitarian of existence conditions sufficient interpretation of Nagel’s plausible assumptions, weare required toestablish the necessary and every humancase that the negative duties of justice andbeing humanitarian duties we owe, according toNagel, to requireshared coercive authority (i.e., itis an existence-condition of egalitarian duties), it remains the us to a justice presupposes egalitarian distributive that argument, sakeof forthe the we assume, establishif aliens Even significance. much ofits loses duties we havenopractical toward egalitarian this globalglobal authority authority. to leave and stay out of the supranational Thatstate of nature, Nagel’sis,all “the pathfromthat justiceanarchy to must gothrough injustice” (Nagel 147).2005, p. claim thaton a coherent itis necessary not at stand: not may moved does beoutweighed, this well hence reasonsfor historical wrongs usually involved in the establishment of new states in place of old ones, and ofthe expense can at the beleft nature only state of second-order the that argumentNagel’s Thus of departure. a feasible point he provide argues, circumstances, so which present the fulfillment of duties justiceof discussed above. and humanfor theprotection of rights needed and coordination assurance,the specification provide lives,on theirhave and to impact world inapervasive the exerting to asay decisions all wouldover butpeople local alsoenable variousthe and levelsof authorities, across global Julius (2008) reaches similar normative conclusions on his own account, which isvery his ownaccount, on conclusions normative similar reaches Julius (2008) some create indeed,form a dutyto is, of is there centralized Once it that conceded Crucially, the establishment of a federal system Pogge describes is a gradual process,for 45 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection justification for the requirement to stay for therequirementto stay nature:justification out state of of supranational the would require us to leave the second-order he itis), I argued does assume ofjusticeoutside norof thepolity duties the existence which state of nature. (which However, unfeasible empirically or impossible helogically iseither offersauthority or community global the following nowhere implies that merely refraining from the violation of negative rights without forming a entirelyThe motivation “bring isnot to ustogether” clear within account,ashe Julius’s state leaveof nature: to account, supranational the aglobal create hence no his duty,community, and on duties to justificatory whatsoever negativethose duties. fellow-citizensobligations toward mayinclude duties not strictly further todischargerequired aliens by arethus toward Nagel’s spirit,exhausted whereas obligations duties, negative citizens‘ actions, while the first disjunct applies to the direction of aliens’ actions. Much in formedby nation states; therefore, the second disjunct applies to the direction of fellow- communities justificatory in arise only (contingent) that duties justice asassociative duties of i.e., to make the institutions directing their actions just. Similarly Nagel,to Julius conceives of or refrain from the actions, or avoid the omissions, resulting in the direction of others’ actions, to bring it about that Y perform an actionB (2008, p. 6). 21 injustice, sustaining or in creating involved is if one duty: disjunctive Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice people have no good reason to accept” (ibid., accept” p. 7). reason to good no havepeople On Julius’s account, X directs the action of Y if and only if X performs an action A with the intention to help one ought to direct others’ actions in such a way that they have good reason to accept it, As opposed to Nagel, though, Julius intends to resist the conclusion that we have no universal one.Sowhatcould bring ustogether? (Julius 2008,p.11) None is responsible for making newlet communities, alone ushering inthe belongs. already she which to communities in the out worked standards The trouble is that each of us is now responsible only for living up to the 46 21 Thismove him allows hypothesizeto a either Attila GergelyMráz one ought to ought one CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice community is established as soon as someone as soon is established community Unfortunately,his above, asformulated position, justificatory amounts tothe claim a that egalitarian justice by leaving andstaying out of second-orderthe state of nature. Nagel’s account also fails however, ofjustice.AsIhave showninthischapter, scope as of a justification national the to justify the absence alreadyexistent state in the first-order justificationnature, of andof whythis should alsoserve a duty to establish not ifthey are the statehood, of (legitimate) conditions bythe are generated justice distributive circumstancesof principles egalitarian ofwhy justify to be able as to so amendment of need in is justice global one. first the ignoring in wrong are they have that explicitlyfor Ihopeto secondassumption, have the While established argued not I stateofnature. toleavereasons second-order left the without equally Nagel and Juliusare duties assumption pre-existcoerciveauthorities, that ofjustice (going beyondlibertarianism) a globalbe the withoutomnipresent discharged cannot negativecoercive or authority, duties the same one that prompts Nagel positto such a duty: in absence of either the assumption that is failure, Icontend, for this ofnature.reason The state supranational leaving the forreasons esp. p. 29). Hence Julius fails to accountbe)(considered established to 2005,p.185;seealso of previousthe (Julius this chapter thesis, for his pre-theoretical intuition of instead have normative the providing that it when for been criteria established, there are moral to community justificatory a considers one when for criterion empirical an names he paper: commits exactly the same mistake for which he criticizes Nagel’s (2005) accountin an earlier justification from a given (set of) person(s). By providing this formulation, however, Julius In light of the conclusions of the previous chapter, the Nagelian account of lack of the theNagelian accountof chapter, of previous In lightof the conclusions the lotwith a just world society. (Julius 2008, p.11) bycasting meet only her that eachof us can withinposition it, achallenge for institutions finding world the the challengeof authorizable from every doing have this they will madeauniversal willhave community.set They impositionwe can hope,byinsisting onacceptable answerthat ones.By The people on whom the world’s unacceptable institutions are imposed will, 47 believes she has a rightful claim to demand Attila GergelyMráz should be CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice whatever scope itscope takes. whatever chapter show, thisbe isaquestion decided independentlyto upon factthe of of coercion, following on more Nagel, demanding or As egalitarian thefindings grounds. previousthe of establishit humanitarian establish—whetherlibertarian on andought to grounds, weoughtto question the ashere settle aim to not to did I whatnotwithstanding, claim conditional This principles apply. would justice of justice actuallyjustice, as we should still establish on his account aglobal institutional order where egalitarianapply to the of egalitarian thescope inrestricting significance global limitedbe practical very it of wouldright, coercive authorityglobally. ifof Nagel’s even generationthe account Thus and scopeof egalitarian were duties we justice egalitarian of beexistence conditions the to takes Nagel establish what required to we are also account, of Nagel’s acoherentinterpretation on state of nature second-order the are impossible within the supranational that coordination and assurance all require cooperation, economic and treaties international state of nature. on place these requirements the and justice, of However,support indirect non-interference, of terms if we have a duty to leavefulfillment of the minimal moral obligations we have toward our fellow human beings in The nature. of state leave second-order the to have aduty we also that reject consistently leave state ofnature, he cannot first-order to the for on aduty that groundsNagel the posits relying work) (in nature,Pogge’s Iargued on part of states (supranational)and second-order (national) first-order of Nagel’s the conception after Icritically reconstructed In this chapter, 3.3. Conclusion 48 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice discussion of this issue is that on his very own assumptions about the state issueNagel state of about is the discussion this nature, his very on of assumptions that own coordination,probably though with a high level of devolution Theof power. upshot of my just supranational institutionsprovidepolitical with coercive privileges to assurance and duty gobeyondto system the Westphalian nation state by and establishmentthe supportof state the nature by of just establishmentthe support of and political institutions, butalso a not Nagel leave only generate isrelevance. rights prepolitical This becausethe to posits a duty limitedhave atlength, very practical Iargued which against of correctness their theoretical assumptions concerning the prepolitical rights persons have, his other assumptions, regardless outside the borders) for the position he explicitly wants to endorse. basicrestricted structure), (intoo broad or scope, asthereis noreasonwhyitapply not should a very onlyto applies itlimitedsite, as of is terms for (in too either theory account can account. Thus, one major isconclusion inherited problem of national—this is the egalitarianism of from scope presentthe that conclusion the yield to pervasiveinsufficient thesis is that impact the egalitarianism initself, be, it would wereright, duties these of theories, generation the of if account even Second, the Nagel’s elements coercion-basedaccounts. Thisisbasis state. normative peculiar the to aproblem concerning of which are presentkind of egalitarianismrobust Nagel pre-theoretically sees justified atleastwithin the nation in Nagel’s own though not inconsistentin itself, does not offer sufficient conditions for the emergence of the generation of of duties justiceegalitarian underlying hisanti-cosmopolitan scope thesis, his model Ihave that the First, argued of reasons. for various fails, ultimately scope national argue for a his to have attempt hope established that justice,to and egalitarian scope of of variousforegoing Ihave Nagel’saccountthe discussed aspectsof Thomas In chapters the The other major tenet of my discussion of the Nagelian account is that given the given is that account Nagelian the of mydiscussion of tenet major other The Conclusion 49 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice duties toleave states and the of first- second-order respectively,isit nature, tobe added that live necessary for andspecification usto egalitarianassurance, up coordination, to norms. existencethe establish political of a duty support to institutions providing and global egalitarian of duties—toexistence prepolitical be the correct,above—viz., inmention someoption first form the orbelieve I other.that This option, in turn, is normallyhere simply egalitarianism, for assert assessing I arguments any or appearance of rehearsing taken to entail even the Without clear. make mysympathies to is a place this for, space leave logical still cosmopolitan, butfull-blown egalitarianism onsome different grounds from Nagel’s. argue for anti-attempt too.Alternatively,to she might state, limitedthe applicability within extremely accepttheir or duties, egalitarian of non-existence the insist on can either contrast, and yet argueAnother way go,to still on this side,is assumeto egalitarian duties beto forpolitically generated, theirregard political institutions as constitutive of, aswell instrumental the as to, egalitarian ideal. global merely and duties, egalitarian scope.prepolitical of existence assume is the to possibility side, one The alternativeadversary position, applicability of theof same normsa wider to scope, too. Yet, Ileft open the questionthe as to which cosmopolitan facie prima the least at against reasons sufficient offer fails to account his scope, restricted in norms isa of theconceded wideapplication egalitarian substantial—once theoretically egalitarian,egalitarian justice in My this againstNagel thesis. claim ismore limited in but regard, this in no of defense havebe herethatI provided isit emphasized to duties, egalitarian andscope of vein. cosmopolitan eventually in an apply—ironically, could principles egalitarian which to structure coercive a global forof establishmentin the arguing would more consistent be As a clarificatory remark to my second focus of discussion, viz., the continuity between continuity viz., the discussion, my of focus second to remark As a clarificatory here presented arguments the that positions alternative of number the Notwithstanding generation the viz., of discussion, focus my first to regard with of clarification As apoint contra Nagel’s conclusion, shouldbe On endorsed. cosmopolitan the 50 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Coercion, Responsibility and the Scope of Justice burden burden of proof on anti-cosmopolitans arguingfrom coercion-based premises. Nonetheless, justice this hasto scope. thesis contributed scopeof the by debate shifting the apply aglobal butwith they are political or prepolitical, egalitarian areeither duties that controversy. It is egalitarianism acknowledged vs. anti-cosmopolitan cosmopolitan the to central considerations normative here thatimportant proponents anti-cosmopolitan position. In addition, it highlights some underemphasized of cosmopolitanismreject particular, it to one serves but egalitarianism, defend cosmopolitan help directly to have yet to show way. possible in best realizehand the norms at tothe alternatives second-best strive practicable for face problems offeasibility in some ways dischargeto this duty, we still have an obligation to state of nature in order to be instrumental in the realization of certain moral norms, even if we leave of to supranational we areobliged stay the out and that Provided be underestimated. be not, maintained or practicalthe relevanceof even a prima facieduty of kindshouldthis not feasibility duty can whether objectionsagainst its beingan of standard all-things-considered a my facie Yet, accordingprima acceptonly toduty. is forcedNagel argumentation—is to reasons demanding less the or favor, I reasons egalitarian initially the either institutions—for leave of duty the nature by creation supranational thestate of supranational coercive to the The critique of Nagelian anti-cosmopolitanism I have provided in this thesis does not 51 Attila GergelyMráz CEU eTD Collection Nagel, (1991). 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