DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF PUBLIC TOILET PROVISION IN DISTRICT/COMMUNITIES IN

Patrick Tandoh-Offin* GIMPA School of Public Service and Governance, Ghana *Corresponding Author: [email protected]

Vivian Osei GIMPA Business School, Ghana

Samuel Ofori Oduro GIMPA School of Public Services and Governance, Ghana

Lord Cephas Mawuko-Yevugah GIMPA School of Public Service and Governance, Ghana

Sponsored by the European Union under the NSG's Public Service Training & Capacity Building Programme

Disclaimer: 'This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union'

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DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF PUBLIC TOILET PROVISION IN DISTRICT/COMMUNITIES IN GHANA

Patrick Tandoh-Offin* GIMPA School of Public Service and Governance, Ghana *Corresponding Author: [email protected]

Vivian Osei GIMPA Business School, Ghana

Samuel Ofori Oduro GIMPA School of Public Services and Governance, Ghana

Lord Cephas Mawuko-Yevugah GIMPA School of Public Service and Governance, Ghana

ABSTRACT The issue of public toilet provision in Ghana, as is being championed under the Ministry for Special Development Initiatives (SDI), remains a concern for democratic governance and its imperatives for development. Much as such a policy addresses a major environmental challenge of open defecation and its attendant health effects, in terms of governance and democratic development it creates a debate on whether centralisation or decentralisation serves as a better medium for enhancing democratic governance and development, especially in the developing and emerging democracies. The key issue to be addressed in this study is how democratic governance and development can be improved. The theoretical foundations in this study relate to the subsidiarity principle, which is employed here to explain the deployment of functions and responsibilities for effective democratic governance at the local level. The study utilised programme documents and reports, key informant interviews and focus group discussions with citizens and governance practitioners to determine the appropriate levels for optimal service provision in democratic governance and its implications for decentralised development administration. Since the programme is being implemented in only a number of selected communities and districts, a survey was conducted with purposeful but representatively sampled communities to understand citizens’ views on what they consider to be the most appropriate and effective approaches to public policy and governance in local services planning and delivery.

Keywords Governance; Democracy; Impact; Public Administration; Political-Administrative Interface; Transformation, Complex; Key Issues; Social Justice, Program Management Plan

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, many countries in the Global South and Eastern Europe, with the support of the Bretton Woods Institutions, began to move away from autocratic and dictatorial rule towards a multi-party rule and democratic governance as part of Huntington’s (1991) Third Wave Democratization. The process in Ghana commenced with the re-introduction of the local government administration in 1988, after years of military and civilian interruptions in governance, following the 1966 coup d’état that removed the first post-Independence democratically elected government. For most of the period between 1966 and 1992, the young independent state suffered serious political unrest which also had implications for the economic growth and development of the country.

2 The Fourth Republican Constitution, adopted in 1992, had provisions that further strengthened the democratisation process by affirming the decentralisation and local governance programmes that were re-introduced in 1988. Specific legislations such as the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462); The National Development Planning Commission Act, 1994 (Act 479); The National Development Planning (System) Act, 1994 (Act 480) and many other enactments and institutions were established during the First Parliament of Ghana under the Fourth Republic between1992 and 1996. All these enactments were made to give life and meaning to democratic governance, especially from the perspective of local government administration and decentralisation. There was also a particular emphasis on participation and citizens being in control of their defined jurisdictions and destinies.

Ghana presently has 260 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), each with jurisdictional powers in planning, oversight, and delivery functions as first enshrined in the 1992 Constitution, and further detailed in several relevant enactments and regulatory instruments (Institute of Local Government Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Ghana 2016). However, most programmes that affect local communities are still being planned and decided on by national government (at the centre), thereby creating a disjuncture between what is needed and what is implemented. The mandate that is left for the decentralised level actors is mainly to implement relevant projects and programmes that are needed at local levels, thereby failing to bring the characterisation of local governments as ‘laboratories for democracy’1 to life. Meanwhile, even the Local Governance Act, 2016 (936), has relevant sections that require local governments to play the democratic laboratories’ functions in fulfilling their mandates in the democratic development of the country.

The issue of mechanised public toilet provision in Ghana, as championed under the Ministry for Special Development Initiatives (MSDI), remains a concern for democratic governance and its imperatives for development. Moreover, a sanitation function previously adequately relegated and addressed through the local government setting is now addressed through a centralised public agency. Much as the policy addresses a major environmental challenge of open defecation and its attendant health effects, in terms of the governance and democratic development, it questions whether centralisation or decentralisation serves as a better medium for enhancing democratic governance and development, especially in developing and emerging democracies. The key issue to be addressed in this study, therefore, is how democratic governance and development can be improved. As far as theoretical foundations are concerned, in this study the ‘subsidiarity principle’, which calls for social and political concerns to be addressed in their closest locus, was employed to explain the deployment of functions and responsibilities for effective democratic governance, particularly at the local level.

The study analysed programme design and implementation documents and reports as the main source of information. Additionally, there were discussions with citizens and governance practitioners to determine the appropriate levels for optimal service provision in democratic governance and its implications for decentralised development administration. Furthermore, discussions with citizens also centred on what they considered to be the most appropriate and effective approaches to public policy and governance in local service planning and delivery.

In the sections that follow, the subsidiarity principle (Stoa 2014; Vischer 2001) is reviewed to identify the variables that were relevant for addressing the core argument in this study, namely that democratic governance arrangements that permit localised solutions to local

1 U.S. Supreme Court Associate Judge, Justice Louise Brandeis first used this expression in 1932 in the case, New State Ice co vs. Liebmann, to describe the powers that localities had to innovate with social and economic experiments that should not have any consequences for the rest of the country.

3 challenges are also necessary for development. The review of theoretical perspectives also focused on the implications of good governance and subsidiarity on democratic developments.

SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNANCE AND THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE Governance, as a concept, is as old as human history (Farazmand 2013:349) and incorporates with it the very long history of governing, rule, authority structures, and domination (Tiihonen 2014). Governance can be described as the system of values, policies, and institutions by which society organises collective decision-making and actions related to political, economic, social, cultural and environmental affairs through interaction of the state, civil society, and the private sector (Kettl 2015; Koppell and Auer 2012; Lateef 2017; Mugabi 2004). Rosenau (1992) also defines ‘governance’ as the creation, execution, and implementation of activities backed by the shared goals of citizens and organisations who may or may not have formal authority or policing power. Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003) also see governance as the interaction among structures, processes, and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are made, and how citizens and other stakeholders have their say. Asaduzzman and Virtanen (2016) thus conclude from the postulations of Graham et al. (2003) that governance is about power, relationships, and accountability (Abel 2014; Lateef 2017), and it addresses questions like who has the influence, who makes the decisions, and how decision-makers are held accountable (Kettl 2015). In the way of theorising governance, Rhodes (2001) identified six perspectives or categories of governance, namely the minimal state; corporate governance; new public management; good governance; socio-cybernetic system; and self-organising network. The perspective most relevant to this study is good governance.

Björk and Johansson (2001) emphasise that good governance is used in discussions about governing structures in developing countries. As a theory, good governance develops from a set of principles or policies first introduced by the World Bank in relation to and assisting developing or third-world countries (Ekundayo 2017; Rhodes 2001). It is also imperative to highlight that good governance is predominantly a normative governance theory or perspective, thus loaded with normative values specifying what is good, what is bad, and for whom, generally defined by global power politics (Asaduzzman and Virtanen 2016). The fundamental principles of good governance, therefore, are highlighted in respect of the rule of law and human rights, political openness, participation and inclusivity, equality and non- discrimination, effective and efficient processes and institutions, transparency and accountability.

The United Nations’ Commission for Human Right (OHCHR) also identified four main attributes of good governance, namely transparency, responsibility, accountability, and participation, as they apply to all citizens (OHCHR, 2007). Adetoye and Omilusi (2016) consider good governance as a phenomenon that has to do with the accomplishment of the requirements for governance, in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, with due regard for rule of law. The World Bank – referred to when good governance is mentioned – requires mainly democracy and forms of new public management as requirements from the recipient government when it comes to government reforms. Good governance is married with new public management to advocate liberal democracies (Rhodes 1996). Im (2005) concurs, and states emphatically that the conditions for good governance depend on the presence and consolidation of democratic characteristics. Democracy provides a platform for good governance and promotes systematic stability as long as there is an outlet to legitimately access power by the political contenders through the people’s vote at elections (Mimiko 2007:303). Asaduzzman and Virtanen (2016) also highlight that in general, good governance is associated with efficient and effective administration in a democratic framework, thereby further highlighting the importance of democracy for good governance.

4 The requirement for democracies when instituting ‘good governance’ thus brings the concept of democratic good governance to the fore. Democracy can be considered as a system of government in which power is vested in the people and exercised through representatives chosen in free and fair elections (Powley and Naraghi 2003). Badru (2005) further illustrates democracy to represent an increase in citizens’ political equality and equity in terms of their popular participation in society. Thus, democratic governance can be concluded as a democratic system where majority rule is emphasised as opposed to authoritarian rule by the few.

Centralism and decentralism are two opposing normative democratic governance theories in the world today (Gerring et al. 2005). According to the centralists, good government arises within a democratic framework wherever power is effectively centralised in the hands of a single party, establishing a system of effective accountability at all levels of government. Writers under the centralist theory highlight that the secret of good governance is to be found in the centralisation of political power but within a framework of democratic elections. This is usually understood in terms of unitary government rather than federalism, parliamentary rather than presidential systems, a first-past-the-post electoral system, strong parties, two-party dominance, a hierarchical bureaucracy, an unwritten constitution, and a restrained judiciary; all of which are hallmarks of the Westminster model (Gerring et al. 2005). The decentralist, on the other hand, posits that good government arises from institutions that are diffused and decentralised. Therefore, multiple veto points check the accrual of power in any single source (Gerring et al. 2005). Most theories of democratic governance are decentralist in nature, thus persisting as a reigning paradigm in the twenty- first century. The theoretical components of decentralism include separation of power – about the divisions at the national level – and federalism – pertaining to divisions between national and sub-national levels. Institutional fragmentation at both levels is intended to set barriers against the abuse of power by minorities, against the overweening ambitions of individual leaders, democratic tyrannies instituted by the majority, and against hasty and ill- considered public policies (Gerring et al. 2005). A decentralist government is essentially a limited government.

Primarily, the African approach to democratic governance takes much resemblance from the dictates of the decentralists, with most states within the region practicing one form of vertical division of power; either decentralisation or federalism. This calls for the next factor to be considered, namely democratic decentralisation, since it relates closely to the case study at hand.

Decentralisation can be defined as any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Ribot 2001). The underlying aim is to enhance the level of participation of civic actors in local governance and development processes. Martinez-Vasquez and McNab (1997) state emphatically that the economic essence of sub-national governments is the provision of public goods and services. Individuals taking advantage of the democratic governance institutions therefore express their preferences for the level of public good through voting to elect a representative as well as tax-public packages. Ryan and Woods (2015) highlight four dimensions of decentralisation, including fiscal, administrative, political, and market. Fiscal decentralisation is said to exist when sub-national governments have the decision-making power to raise revenues and perform spending activities (Kim 2008:7). Finzgar and Oplotnik (2013:654) also claim fiscal decentralisation represents the transfer of competencies, responsibilities, and financial resources from the central level to the lower levels of government.

Political decentralisation focuses on the ways in which political activities in a territorial state are conducted at the local, as opposed to the national, level (Ryan and Woods 2015). Prud’homme (2002) claim that the decentralisation of policies, which is made eminent under

5 political decentralisation, creates political efficiency; this, in turn, results in local participation in political decision-making, local governments being an effective training ground for politicians, and decentred power providing additional protection against authoritarianism from the centre. Market decentralisation also refers to issues relating to deregulation and privatisation, therefore moving beyond government to the involvement of the non- government sector (Halaskova and Halaskova 2014). Under privatisation or deregulation, governments divest themselves of their functional responsibilities “either by transferring them to voluntary organisations, or by allowing them to be performed by private enterprises” (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986:8).

Administrative decentralisation also focuses on granting the responsibility for planning, financing, and ordering of specific public functions to sub-central governments (Schneider, 2006:348). Rondinelli and Nellis (1986), and Rondinelli et al. (1989) have suggested three major types of administrative decentralisation, namely deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Deconcentration refers to a central government dispersing responsibility for a policy to its field offices or regional branch offices (Schneider 2006). It implies the shifting of the workload from centrally located officials to staff or offices outside the national capital. Delegation reflects that local governments or agencies conduct certain functions on behalf of the centre (Chattopadhyay 2013:423). Ultimate responsibility, however, is maintained by the central authority.

Devolution also implies the creation or strengthening (financially or legally) of sub-national units of government who undertake activities substantially outside the direct control of the central government (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). Both the implementation and the authority to decide what is done is shifted to local bodies, who are accountable to the central government (Shneider 2006). Moreover, White (2011) views devolution as the purest and most extensive form of decentralisation. Devolution thus stands as a prominent form of decentralisation identified to enhance democracy. Devolution is the most befitting to enhance local democracy through the transfer of both responsibilities and resources to the local-level democratic institutions, who are also accountable to their electorates.

Democratic decentralisation, a widely considered strategy of governance, is inherently intended to transfer power and resources to a level of government that is closer, better understood, and more easily influenced (Wekwete 2004). From a good governance perspective, decentralisation is also seen as the restructuring of authority to create a system of co-responsibility between and among institutions of governance at the central, regional, and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels (Mugabi 2004; UNDP 1997). This goes to prove how necessary the principle of subsidiarity is for ensuring good governance, democratic good governance, and democratic decentralisation. Ranjault (1992) emphasises that the concept of subsidiarity is essential to a definition of not only federalism but any decentralised political organisation. As such, the theoretical foundations in this study revolve around this normative principle.

Subsidiarity, as a principle, has its roots in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church (Ranjault 1992), created as a tenet of the Church by Pope Pius XI to describe an approach to the problems of modern society (Vischer 2001). Vischer (2001) further highlights that the principle of subsidiarity was developed explicitly as an anti-Communist principle which seeks to provide an alternative principle to those of solidarity and collectivism by promoting a problem-solving technique grounded in the lowest level of government. Today, it is adopted in Europe and beyond (Morel 2007; Tikly 1994); according to Elshtain (2000), the principle of subsidiarity stands as the founding principle of the European Union and has been cited as a factor in the Eastern European freedom movements of the 1980s (Morel 2007).

6 In the past few decades, the principle has also been incorporated into the political, economic, and public administration understanding of decentralisation (Ryan and Woods 2015). Originating from a legal perspective, Stoa (2014) claims that the principle of subsidiarity suggests regulation and law-making as two concepts which should take place at the lowest appropriate governance level. Inherently, the principle will seek to promote efficiency and local ownership over policies and regulation while checking the centralised government and possible consolidation of authority at the highest level of government. Stoa (2014) continues that the principle of subsidiarity has emerged as a critical cornerstone for advocates of a limited government, identified here as decentralists. Kim (2008) and Fenna and Hollander (2013) also fused the subsidiarity principle with existing decentralisation theory and synthesised it as federalism.

Vischer (2001:128-142) suggests four key issues be considered when focusing on subsidiarity as a principle of governance. The most relevant for this study is the fact that subsidiarity mandates the localisation of societal problem-solving, including the obligation to ensure that individuals are equipped to participate fully in collective decision-making regarding issues that affect them in their communities. This is mainly backed by the allocative efficiency identified to be exhibited by the local levels towards the resolution of identified problems. Martinez-Vasquez and McNab (2003), for instance, state that the same amount of funds spent at the sub-national level – rather than the national level – can result in increased individual welfare. Kim (2008) argues that taxing spending and regulatory functions should be exercised by the lower levels of government unless the higher levels can make a convincing case why the alternative is preferable. Ryan and Woods (2015) highlight that, in making a convincing case, subsidiarity draws attention to the condition of comparative advantage. Focusing on the views of Follesdal (1998:193), if the central government is to maintain given functions, including service delivery, it needs to justify its decision by proving that it would better secure the desired outcomes than the sub-national units. The “onus would be placed on the central government to provide the grounds for its justification on to hold on to power” (Ryan and Woods 2015:9).

Today, governance is considered as the fundamental component that has to be incorporated in the development policy of both developed and developing nations (Hye 2000). Thus, it occupies the central stage of most development discourses (Asaduzzman and Virtanen 2016). Adetoye and Omilusi (2016) state that the cause of development failure is extensively due to an inability or unwillingness to apply public resources judiciously and effectively to generate public goods and services; a phenomenon they describe as a lack of good governance. They conclude that the countries who have failed to realise their development potential in the past half-century did so primarily due to the yawning deficits of good governance. It is therefore clear that if the outcome of government policies is not good, then the resultant effects on the citizens will not be good either.

From its lending experience in many developing countries, the World Bank (1997), for instance, has realised that good governance is central in creating and sustaining an environment that fosters strong and equitable development and its essential complements to sound economic policies. Kofi Annan (as cited in Adejumobi 2011:11) stressed that “Without good governance, without the rule of law, predictable administration, legitimate power, and responsive power, and responsive regulation, no amount of charity will set us on the path of prosperity”. Ayatse et al. (2013) concur and further claim that there can be no authority or stability without legitimacy in government borne out of a true democratic electoral process. Consequently, there would be no social or economic development. There is consensus about the potential role of democratic decentralisation concerning local development, and particularly, poverty reduction. When properly designed, decentralisation policies and programmes can positively impact the performance of local governance institutions, service delivery agencies, and ultimately, local economic growth and poverty eradication efforts.

7 Mugabi (2004) and UNDP (1997) also highlight that the principle of subsidiarity forms a crucial part in properly designing a decentralisation mechanism or policy.

In the United States, ‘subsidiarity conservatism’ has been invoked by members of Congress, specifically as a means to end poverty (Huffman 2000). Martinez-Vasquez and McNab (2003) also mentioned the positive effect of decentralisation on allocative efficiency and development. Allocative efficiency is a market situation where the limited resources of a country are allocated by following the wishes of consumers (Kim 2008). Thus, resources are efficiently allocated if they are spent on producing the right mix of goods for the right people at the right price. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) elaborate that since a decentralised system can be more responsive to the differences in demands among taxpayers and relating to basic needs, decentralisation should be the most effective governance approach towards achieving allocative efficiency.

The argument continues that the efficient level of output of a local public good is most likely to vary across jurisdictions due to the variance in their preferences and costs. As such, to maximise social welfare, local outputs should be varied (Robson 2006). This goes to prove that local governments are in a better position to more efficiently provide public goods since they possess knowledge of the local costs and benefits (Goel and Saunoris 2014). Martinez- Vazquez and McNab (2003), however, raise questions concerning the efficiency of local governments, especially in developing and transitional economies. The authors ask whether local governments operate on the same production frontier as the central government, especially since issues relating to productive efficiency are different in developing and transitional economies.

Ayatse et al. (2013) also posit that liberal democracy, good governance, and development are in crises, particularly among third-world countries and some developed economies. The authors highlight apathy, self-alienation, and cynicism in public discourse and among political leaders, decreased involvement of the people in social and political participation, and reduced confidence in government and the rule of law in these economies; these reflect that democracy, good governance and development are doing poorly in those societies. In Nigeria, for instance, Gberevbie (2014) claims one of the major problems responsible for the failure of democratic institutions is the lack of capacity on the part of the structure, system, and operators of the various institutions to achieve set goals. Moreover, Gberevbie (2014) argues this is not unconnected with the fact that many Nigerians, including citizens and politicians, lack proper democratic ethos to achieve sustainable democratic governance for development.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT: THE MSDI AND ITS MANDATE In 2015, nearly one-third of the global population lacked access to basic sanitation facilities (WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP), 2019), and one-third (13%) were identified to defecate openly. In Ghana, the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) for sanitation, to which a target of 54% coverage on improved sanitation was set, is identified to have been met at a modest 15% (UNICEF 2015), highlighting a stringent sanitation crisis within the country. In that same year, only 15-26% of Ghanaians were identified as having access to improved sanitation, with approximately 18.8% of them practising open defecation (UNICEF, 2015). Open defecation remains a significant threat to development with various impacts on health, education, gender equity, social, and economic development (Osumanu et al. 2019). According to Mansour and Esseku (2017), the coalition of NGOs in water, sanitation and hygiene, Ghana loses nearly US$ 290 million yearly due to poor sanitation and hygiene. This position is also supported by Appiah-Effah et al. (2019). In an attempt to address these sanitation issues and other related development projects, the government of Ghana established the MSDI to implement one of its flagship programmes. The peculiar nature of this Ministry and the employed method for implementation emphasises intricate governance and development perspectives.

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The MSDI was established by Executive Instrument (E. I. 28) on 28 February 2017 by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo under Section 11 of the Civil Service Act (P.N.D.C.L 327). The MSDI exists to accelerate socio-economic development through the three development authorities, namely the Northern Development Authority (NDA), Middle Belt Development Authority (MBA), and the Coastal Belt Development Authority (CDA). The socio-economic interventions being undertaken include: • One village, one dam; • The provision of ambulances; • Water for all projects; and • Sanitation projects.

These interventions are undertaken by the MSDI and the respective development authorities under the Infrastructure for Poverty Eradication Programme (IPEP) at the constituency level of governance. The IPEP is primarily aimed at eradicating poverty and minimising inequality through the provision of basic infrastructure, and has been implemented in various Ghanaian communities since 2017. The IPEP also aims to allocate the Ghana Cedi equivalent of US$1 million annually to each of the 275 constituencies in the country, to be invested in the priority development infrastructure needs of the communities in the constituencies and other government flagship programmes and initiatives (Government of Ghana (GoG), 2017). The programme is implemented under two sub-programmes: Economic Infrastructure Delivery and Management, and Social Services Infrastructure Delivery and Management. A total budget of over GHC1 billion is projected for the programme every year until 2020, with the Social Service Infrastructure Delivery and Management sub-programme annually taking over GHC800 million, and the Economic Infrastructure Delivery and Management sub- programme annually taking over GHC200 million (GoG, 2017).

One of the flagship programmes under the Social Services Infrastructure Delivery and Management sub-programme, specifically under sanitation, is the provision of 1 000 institutional water closets with mechanised boreholes to be constructed annually with funding from Ghana’s government and the Annual Budget Funding Amount. As highlighted earlier, the MSDI works through three established development authorities which exist primarily at the regional level and operate using a national level of governance authority. As such, institutional water closets are being implemented mainly through the established development authorities instead of the MMDAs, which are mandated by the Local Government Act 462 (amended) to provide municipal services and facilities for various communities, organisations and individuals within their respective areas of jurisdiction. This condition – as per the subsidiarity principle – should only be adopted if the national level of government can prove their ability to secure the desired outcomes much better than the sub- national units beyond any doubt (Follesdal 1998:193).

The government of Ghana, in fulfilment of the onus placed on them to provide grounds which justify them holding on to power (Rayen and Woods 2015:9), conducted a comparative analysis of the capabilities of MMDAs to handle the project; development authorities were found to be the best alternative to achieving the identified sanitation objectives. The MMDAs, as such, were employed as mediums for implementation based on the argument that IPEP required an agency parallel to the existing local government established for political expediency. According to the Constitution of Ghana, Ministries are established to engage only in policy development (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992). The idea was therefore to set up the development authorities, working with the MSDI, to serve as the implementing vehicles to facilitate and steer the so-called flagship and new initiatives of the government under the IPEP. The three development authorities, though not very different from the existing MMDAs, focus mainly on the provision of basic infrastructure as defined under the Legislative Instrument that established them. These authorities also

9 operate with lessons learned from the revised models of the Savanna Accelerated Development Authorities (SADA) and tend to bring the democratic laboratories’ characterisation of local authorities in the development process to life. The SADA was set up by an act of parliament – Savanah Accelerated Development Act (805) Authority Development Act, 2010 – as a public response to the widening gap between the Northern Savanah Ecological Belt and the rest of Ghana. As such, SADA was an autonomous Corporation charged with the responsibility of closing the development gap between the north and the rest of the country (SADA annual report 2012). From the perspective of citizens, the new development authorities created under the MSDI serve as additional decentralisation mediums to the MMDAs that are expected to expand access to and improve service delivery.

The implementation of the programme initially began with discussions with key stakeholders from the various constituencies to determine the specific needs and possible issues that could arise during implementation. Another stakeholder discussion was organised mainly for governmental and non-governmental institutions associated with the provision of mechanised public toilet facilities. The second stakeholder discussion led to the conclusion that the initial stakeholder interactions initiated in the constituencies were useful in identifying sanitation issues as one of the significant challenges within the communities. These consultations were necessary and important initial steps in the life of the programme for various reasons. For instance, the acquisition of space to construct the infrastructure for the identified sanitation issues, specifically, public toilets, was a major challenge identified through these processes, which the consultations greatly supported to resolve in a number of the communities.

The new provisions under the IPEP (where development authorities are the specific implementors of localised development projects previously placed under the specific prerogative of the MMDAs by the Local Government Act 462 (amended 2016)), has begun to pave the way for various issues, specifically in the implementation and maintenance of development projects. The implementation of the mechanised public toilets is primarily undertaken through the Waste Management Department (WMD) of the MMDAs who are charged with engaging with the private sector to ensure effective management and supervision of managers of the public toilet systems. Despite the clear-cut function, there have been a couple of issues, specifically with collaboration; public toilet facilities have consistently become sites of local conflicts despite strenuous efforts to franchising them and involving communities in their management (Osumanu and Kosoe 2013). The 2017 annual performance report of the Ghana Civil Service, for instance, also highlights weak collaborations between the MSDI and the MMDAs in the implementation of the infrastructure projects due to the nature of the Ministry and its agencies’ mandates.

The implemented sanitation policy of Ghana’s government considered as case studies, specifically for the mechanised public toilet, are major coastal communities where open defecation was most pervasive, thus creating a situation of poor sanitation. These communities included Accra; Volta; Cape Coast (National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), 2014), and two communities in the Upper Regions of Ghana.

Accra, Prampram, a coastal peri-urban community located geographically along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, was one of the selected communities. Prampram is the administrative capital of the Ningo-Prampram District and as of 2012 had a population of 7,800 people (Dodowa Health Research Centre (DHRC), 2012). In a study conducted by Obeng et al. (2015), it was identified that in this specific area, residents did not respond well to public latrines, and thus used them irregularly. Private latrines were preferred, yet these were scarce. The study therefore recommended the establishment of public toilets in difficult to reach areas, with attention paid to issues such as odour and heat emission, and unhygienic maintenance which were all identified through a focus group discussion. A further

10 recommendation was highlighted as the need to provide toilet facilities with wet technologies, water-seals and low water requirements to prevent hardening and sludge, all of which were challenges the District Assembly experienced.

The current study therefore explores mechanised public toilets in the area to determine if these localised issues were taken into consideration, as well as the specific nature of the implementation of the IPEP within the area. Interactions with the local authorities highlighted due consideration for most of the major issues within the area, especially with regards to their landscape in the construction of the mechanised toilets. In the various communities, local authorities identified that they were adequately engaged and involved in the establishment and management of the toilet facilities. They also highlighted that open defecation, especially along the beaches, had drastically reduced. The focus group discussions in the communities within the District revealed a heightened level of excitement among the citizens within the catchment area. They claimed that the facilities were extensively relevant and placed at specific vantage points, rendering services at very economical prices which suit their budgets.

The South District and Municipality were the two chosen areas of focus for the . According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census of Ghana, the population of Keta Municipality stood at 147,168 (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) 2012). The Municipality is located to the east of the Volta estuary, about 160km from Accra. It shares common borders with Akatsi South District to the north, Ketu North and South District to the east, South to the west and the Gulf of Guinea to the south. The was also established by Legislative Instrument (LI) 2165 in 2012. The Municipality has a total land area of 960.445 sq. km. Located to its south is Keta Municipality, and Ketu North District forms the eastern boundary; to the north is . At the western border are Adaklu Anyigbe District and the Republic of Togo. The population as of 2010 stood at 88,500 (GSS 2012). The communities within this area were satisfied with the collaboration between the development authority and the local authorities; most residents expressed this at the community focus group discussions. The development authority stated the local authorities were very cooperative, and the projects were therefore implemented with much ease and efficiency through the sharing of ideas, expertise, and perspectives.

For Cape Coast, the Shama District was the area of focus. The Shama District was established in 2007 through a Legislative Instrument (L.I. 1882). The District’s population, as reported by the 2010 Population and Housing Census, was 81,966 and bordered by Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis to the west, to the east by the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem District in the Central Region, to the north by the Mpohor Wassa East District, and to the south by the Gulf of Guinea. Within this District, the construction of most of the mechanised public toilets was delayed due to disagreements between the local administrative authorities and the development authority set up by the Ministry. The disagreements emerged largely due to the development authority’s inability to effectively engage with the leaders of the communities in the District. This was finally settled after intervention from the Chiefs and the Ministry towards improving cooperation between both authorities in the construction of the public toilets.

In the Northern parts of Ghana, open defecation is identified to be more pronounced. Akapule (2015), for instance, reported that 82% of the population defecate in the open in Upper East region, 79% Upper West Region, and 73% in the Northern Region. As such, the study also focused on how this issue was dealt with using the mechanised toilet facilities under the NDA.

Wa, the regional capital for the Upper West Region of Ghana, was one of the communities focused on for this study. The Wa Municipality is bordered to the north by Nadowli, to the south by both Wa East and West Districts, to the east and west by Wa West and East.

11 According to GSS (2012), Wa’s population was estimated to be 135,638 (female 65,887/Male 69,751) in the year 2010 with a growth rate of 2.7% per annum. In a study conducted by Osumanu and Kosoe (2013), this Municipality was identified as having an extensive level of open defecation which was mainly due to financial constraints, poor management of existing toilet facilities, and the presence of cultural and spiritual beliefs which inhibited individuals from using the available toilet facilities. These causes were further confirmed in a study by Osumanu et al. (2019).

Nadowli-Kaleo District of the Upper West Region of Ghana was also considered for the study. This District is bordered to the south by Wa Municipal, west by Burkina Faso, north by Jirapa and Lambussie-Karni Districts and to the east by the Daffiama-Bussie-Issa District. This District, like the Wa Municipality, was identified as engaging in open defecation despite the presence of public toilets due to economic, socio-cultural, agricultural, and access issues (Ameyaw and Odame 2017). Unlike the Greater Accra Region, local authorities identified that they were rarely engaged in the construction and management of the public toilets. Individual groups were thus engaged in the maintenance of the facilities, and they charged exorbitant prices which extensively discouraged most locals from using their services. The lack of involvement of the local authorities allowed the socio-cultural barriers to persist, as the community focus group discussions revealed most individuals avoided the public toilets because they held various spiritual and cultural beliefs against sharing such facilities with others. Surprisingly, the local authority had developed a distinctive plan to mitigate such beliefs where construction at specific vantage points would have grouped kinsmen together who were more comfortable to share toilet facilities with each other.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS To overcome the issues concerning disagreements with local authorities and existing institutions, stakeholder engagement is initiated at various levels to collate the views of individuals as well as that of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) and their technical persons. The IPEP ministerial committee also exists to ensure stakeholder engagement at the ministry and national levels, in an attempt to avoid duplication of efforts. Also, constituency needs assessment is conducted at the various constituencies to identify the specific needs of the area to inform decision-making. The highlighted problem of local authorities not being cooperative was identified to be quite elusive and untrue, since the assemblies collaborate effectively in the provision of land for the construction of the infrastructure. The identified reason for the possible lack of cooperation was determined to exist due to the fact that the local assemblies were not directly involved in procurement. However, the frequency of engagement as well as engagement of specific technical persons were highlighted as possible means for overcoming any level of resistance that could possibly pop up in the future.

An identified issue pertained to the management of the facilities after they were constructed by the development authorities. A document being developed by the Ministry – the Maintenance and Operations Manual (MOM) – deals with the issue of maintenance after the facilities are constructed. In effect, adequate effort seems to have been put in place to highlight the need to centralise the provision of solutions to a localised problem. Value for money and effective implementation would be most effectively achieved by adopting development authorities based on the decentralised and development agencies themselves. This decision was effectively backed by a comparative analysis which identified the specialised development authorities implementing specific basic infrastructure development policies as the best approach to attaining the objectives of good governance and development.

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