Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 16 NO. 07 02 APRIL 2014 Contents

Analytical Articles

WHAT DOES RUSSIA'S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA MEAN FOR 'S

EFFORTS TO JOIN NATO? 3 John C.K. Daly

UKRAINE AND THE CIS PERSPECTIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL ASIA 7 Farkhod Tolipov

UKRAINE CRISIS AND PUTIN’S POST-CIS INTEGRATION PLANS 11 Richard Weitz

TAJIKISTAN’S GOVERNMENT ANXIOUS OVER CRIMEA 15 Oleg Salimov

Field Reports

TURKEY’S GÜLEN CONTROVERSY SPILLS OVER TO AZERBAIJAN 19 Mina Muradova

KYRGYZSTAN’S ATA MEKEN PARTY BREAKS UP PARLIAMENTARY COALITION TO DISMISS PRIME MINISTER 22 Jamil Payaz

GEORGIA’S FORMER PRESIDENT REFUSES TO BE INTERROGATED BY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE 24 Eka Janashia

PRESIDENT ATAMBAYEV VISITS KAZAKHSTAN 27 Arslan Sabyrbekov THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell

Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson

Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova

Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.

Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.

Those interested in joining The Analyst’s pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 3

WHAT DOES RUSSIA'S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA MEAN FOR GEORGIA'S EFFORTS TO JOIN NATO? John C.K. Daly

On March 19, Georgia's President Giorgi Margvelashvili said that Russia's annexation of Crimea represents “a problem for global security,” adding that the international community, including Georgia, should have done more to prevent the recurrence of such developments six years after the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict. Despite’s Georgia’s persistent efforts to join NATO, its sought after NATO Membership Action Plan has effectively become a casualty of worsening U.S.-Russian relations over Ukraine and Crimea.

BACKGROUND: Georgia's hesitation, on April 16 Russia's then- relationship with NATO dates back to President Dmitry Medvedev 1994 and its membership in the authorized direct official relations Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. between Moscow and secessionists in Georgian troops served alongside and . NATO troops in the peacekeeping On September 17, 2008 the Crimean operation in Kosovo (KFOR) from 1999 Parliament in Simferopol defied to 2008 and has participated in Ukraine's pro-Western leaders and NATO’s Planning and Review Process called on the Rada to follow Russia's since 1999, allowing the country to example and recognize the establish deployable units according to independence of Abkhazia and South NATO standards and interoperable Ossetia. The same month, NATO and with Allied forces. In 2004, Georgia Georgia established the NATO- was the first aspiring NATO member Georgia Commission to oversee to sign an Individual Partnership NATO’s assistance to Georgia Action Plan with the alliance. The following the conflict with Russia and following year NATO and Georgia to play a central role in supervising the signed a transit agreement allowing the process established at the Bucharest alliance and other International Summit. Three months later NATO Security Assistance Force nations to Foreign Ministers agreed that Georgia send supplies for their troops in should develop an Annual National Afghanistan via Georgia. Program under the auspices of the In April 2008, NATO members NATO-Georgia Commission to allow rejected Georgia’s request for a NATO to provide assistance for Membership Action Plan (MAP) Georgia’s democratic, institutional and during the alliance's annual summit in defense reform efforts. Bucharest despite strong U.S. support Georgia has been the largest non- for granting MAPs to both Georgia and NATO troop contributor to Ukraine. Sensing the alliance’s Afghanistan’s NATO-led ISAF since it Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 4

4, 2013, while attending a session of the Russia-NATO Council, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated his government’s explicit opposition to the further eastward expansion of NATO, remarking, "as to NATO's enlargement, regardless of Georgia, (Russia) is convinced that it constitutes an extension of the old and almost doubled its presence there to inertial logic of the Cold War era. Not more than 1,560 soldiers in autumn 2012. only does it preserve the division lines Twenty-seven Georgian soldiers have that all of us have committed to died in Afghanistan since first dismantle, but it amounts to sent troops there in 2004. Georgia transposition of those lines further into continues to serve as a transit country the East." for ISAF supplies and has also On March 6, the Georgian parliament indicated its willingness to participate adopted a resolution condemning in the post-2014 follow-on mission to Russia’s interference in Crimea. The train and assist Afghan security forces following day Russian military after the NATO drawdown is complete helicopters and drones flew into in late 2014. Georgia also supports Georgian airspace in Zugdidi district, Operation Active Endeavor, NATO’s adjacent to Abkhazia, and above the counter-terrorist maritime surveillance suburbs of Gori, which is close to South operation in the Mediterranean. In an Ossetia. additional gesture of support for NATO operations, Georgia has offered Georgia’s NATO membership now to participate in the NATO Response threatens to become a U.S. domestic Force and is expected to contribute to political issue. With upcoming the NRF in 2015. Congressional midterm elections, many conservative incumbents and NATO membership remains a high candidates may well embrace the issue priority for both the Georgian as proving that they are strong on government and population. In March American defense and resisting Russia. 2013, the Georgian parliament passed a As the street clashes escalated in Kiev, unanimous resolution reconfirming U.S. House of Representatives member Georgia's NATO and EU aspirations. Eliot L. Engel (D-NY) and Michael According to a June 2013 survey Turner (R-OH) wrote a bipartisan commissioned by the U.S. National letter to U.S. Secretary of State John Democratic Institute, 73 percent of Kerry on February 10, signed by an those polled supported Georgian additional 40 U.S. Congressmen NATO membership. noting, “We believe the United States IMPLICATIONS: Russia has been should continue its close partnerships consistently clear about its views on with the aspirant countries of Georgia, Georgia joining NATO. On December Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 5

Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia- mistake. This is my country’s Herzegovina … and to advocate position.” granting a (NATO) Membership Russia’s consistency stands in sharp Action Plan to Georgia.” The Georgian contrast to the mixed signals coming Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Obama administration. On subsequently posted it on its website. March 26 at a press conference at the On March 12, Republican U.S. Senator EU-U.S. Summit in Brussels, President John McCain called for the faster Obama threw cold water on Tbilisi’s integration of both Georgia and hopes to join NATO in the immediate Moldova into NATO amid the ongoing future. In response to a question about crisis in Ukraine's Crimean region. Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO While Georgia is hoping to receiving a Obama replied, “Well, I think that Membership Action Plan (MAP) to neither Ukraine or Georgia are join NATO during the alliance's currently on a path to NATO September summit in Wales, NATO membership and there has not been any Secretary General Anders Fogh immediate plans for expansion of Rasmussen, speaking in Brussels on NATO’s membership. I know that February 5 with visiting Georgian Russia, at least on background, has Prime Minister , said suggested that one of the reasons only that the alliance would continue to they’ve been concerned about Ukraine assess nations aspiring to become was potential NATO membership. On NATO members and that final the other hand, part of the reason that decisions would be made prior to the the Ukraine has not formally applied alliance's summit. In a slight for NATO membership is because of concession to Garibashvili’s its complex relationship with Russia. I aspirations, Rasmussen added that don’t think that’s going to change Georgia made substantial progress, anytime soon, obviously.” which would be “acknowledged and The next day Garibashvili commented, reflected appropriately at the summit.” “We should not have illusions, we Russia’s annexation of Crimea has only should always assess the existing hardened Russia’s position on Georgia situation realistically. What President joining NATO. On March 21 at the Obama said is quite sufficient and German Marshall Fund's annual that’s reality; NATO expansion is not Brussels Forum, Rasmussen asked planned at this stage.” Commenting Russia’s Ambassador to NATO upon Obama’s remarks Margvelashvili Aleksandr Grushko, “Will you accept diplomatically said, “I would not say it Georgia’s right to choose NATO was the statement I was looking membership if this is the Georgian forward to and I wanted to hear.” decision and if NATO accepts? Would CONCLUSIONS: The swiftly you accept that?” Grushko replied, moving events in Ukraine and Crimea “No. I was absolutely very clear; we are are having a seismic impact on against. We believe that this is a huge Western policies towards both Russia Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 6 and the issue of NATO expansion, producing contradictory signals from Washington. On March 12, the Russian journal Kommersant quoted an undisclosed source in the State Department saying, “If Russia announces the annexation of Crimea the issue of granting Georgia a MAP can be considered virtually a foregone conclusion.” Fourteen days later Obama told a press conference that Georgia was not “currently on a path to NATO membership.” On February 26, Kerry met with Gharibashvili, after which he announced the possibility of visiting Georgia before May. Georgia has yet again been left exposed to Russian wrath for declaring its NATO ambitions, only to have them abruptly rejected by Washington. For more than a decade, successive U.S. administrations sent positive signals to Tbilisi when Georgian support for NATO was to the U.S.’s advantage, swiftly revoking the invitation when it was no longer geopolitically convenient. It remains to be seen if this pattern will change when Kerry visits Georgia. The question in Tbilisi’s mind is whether Kerry will come with a message yet again sacrificing Georgia’s NATO aspirations to appease Putin. Russia policy has been consistent; Georgia’s NATO aspirations have been consistent: the wavering is coming from the U.S. and NATO. AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. John C.K. Daly is an international correspondent for UPI and Central Asia-Caucasus Institute non-resident Fellow. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 7

UKRAINE AND THE CIS PERSPECTIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL ASIA Farkhod Tolipov

The outbreak of Ukraine's "second color revolution" in February has shaken not only Ukraine itself but also the foundations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The drastic split of Ukraine as a state and a nation amounted to a moment of truth for the entire post-Soviet structure. The rise of anti-Russian nationalism in Ukraine and Russia's response to annex Crimea revealed not only a persistent Russian neo-imperial stance in the post-Soviet space but also triggered geopolitical concerns among former Soviet countries, including in Central Asia.

BACKGROUND: Ukraine has been a in 2002, Ukraine again stood aloof hesitant member of the CIS and even because it was a stronger integration of the late USSR. When the so-called framework than the CIS. Ukraine has Novo-Ogarevo process was launched also resisted membership in the Russia- on drafting the new Union treaty in initiated Custom Union and Eurasian September 1991 by eight former . Despite its role as a co-founder republics, Ukraine refrained from of the CIS, Kiev has since 1991 taking part in that process. And when remained reluctant towards deeper the then Presidents of Russia (Boris integration with Russia. Ironically, Yeltsin), Belarus (Stanislav Ukraine took on the CIS chairmanship Shushkevich), and Ukraine (Leonid this year and the overthrown President Kravchuk) met in Belovejskaya Pusha Yanukovych had been the CIS near Minsk on 7-8 December 1991 to chairman since January 2014. announce the break-up of the USSR The 2014 “Ukrainian spring” and the establishment of the CIS, highlighted, among other things, the Yeltsin justified the decision by stating cautious but persistent pro-European that the new Union could not be inclination of all Ukrainian created without Ukraine. Hence, governments since independence. Ukraine opted not to enter a reformed Meanwhile, the mass uprising and USSR, but instead became one of the overthrow of President Yanukovych in founders of the CIS. February, and the concomitant rise of For Ukraine, the CIS has since its dormant anti-Russian forces also inception remained a convenient revealed the fragility of Ukraine's framework for multilateral engagement statehood and national project on the with Russia and other member states one hand, and the fragile CIS and failed because it is a very loose and weak post-Soviet re-integration on the other. organization. But when six CIS For Central Asia, the events in Ukraine countries established the Collective can be interpreted as a "moment of Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) truth." Astana, Bishkek and Tashkent Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 8

ad-hoc nature of the international order in this part of the world. Russia has been unable to enlist definite and resolute support for its actions in Ukraine from the CIS states for at least three reasons: First, Moscow could not initially issued official statements on properly justify the annexation of the events in Ukraine in March and Crimea and provide persuasive claims spoke out for the country's territorial on the basis of international law; integrity and sovereignty. They second, Russia preferred to use hard expressed concern about the course of power in dealing with the Ukrainian events. Bishkek’s statement was more challenge instead of the widely cautious and Dushanbe’s position was popularized soft-power policy directed rather pro-Russian. These statements to its so-called "near abroad" that could be considered as a warning Russia itself has recently announced; message addressed not only towards and third, Russia demonstrated a cold- Ukraine by stressing the importance of war, anti-Western pattern of a peaceful resolution to the crisis, but international behavior and thereby also towards Russia. However, after increased the pressure on other former Crimea’s de facto secession and Soviet republics cooperating with the annexation to Russia, Astana and West. Bishkek slightly changed their It should be noticed that in such a positions, issuing statements cautiously context, separatism can become an expressing “understanding” and increasing tendency in some areas of “recognition” of the fait accompli. the post-Soviet independent states IMPLICATIONS: The Ukrainian inhabited by sizable Russian-speaking crisis revealed a strong divergence in communities and that fanning these the interpretation and application of processes has become a brand of international law on the part of great Russia’s foreign policy. The secession powers, regarding their own behavior of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from as well as their attitude towards smaller Georgia in 2008 has not so far led to states. Russian representatives these two splinter provinces of Georgia repeatedly mentioned the Kosovo joining the Russian Federation, but precedent to justify the annexation of secession of Crimea has. Russia has Crimea. Hence in the course of events, now acquired an additional unfriendly, Moscow not only retaliated against not to say hostile, neighbor (after Kiev but also made a point of Georgia and Moldova). After Crimea's legitimizing that retaliation in separation, Ukraine’s European drift exchanges with Washington. This is a will likely take a new and bolder problematic precedent for smaller impetus. countries in the post-Soviet space, In this perspective, one of the side- because it demonstrates the vague and effects of the Ukrainian drama is that Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 9 with all his recent statements related to the challenge of rebooting a regional the situation in Ukraine and the cooperation format, given the secession of Crimea, President Putin fundamental crisis of the CIS. In the has in fact delegitimized the CIS. He new circumstances, Tashkent could stated that Ukraine's secession from the take the lead in reinvigorating the 23- Soviet Union was illegal. However, year-old idea of regional integration. this would be valid for all former USSR CONCLUSIONS: Ukraine and Russia republics, including Russia – the USSR – two of the CIS' co-founders – are was ultimately cancelled due to a coup turning into two destroyers of the d’état led by former Russian President organization. The institutions of the Yeltsin. By extension, Putin’s CIS have been unable so far to statement would imply that the CIS is intervene in the Russia-Ukraine illegitimate as well. conflict and contribute somehow to CIS institutions including the CSTO peace-building. Moreover, the have been considerably marginalized separation of Crimea created a due to their diplomatic paralysis during troublesome precedent that could the ongoing Ukrainian crisis. This put potentially unleash a restructuring of Central Asian countries directly at odds the entire post-Soviet space. The with Russia and undermined Russian President, the State Duma and multilateral structures which could the Russian elite manifested themselves potentially interfere in such crises. It is not so much as defenders of Russians notable in this regard that Uzbekistan’s against Ukrainian nationalists as they decision to exit the CSTO and distance demonstrated their support for their itself from other Russia-led multilateral own nationalists. In fact, Russian structures, which has been criticized by nationalism that has been on the rise some experts, suddenly proved to be a recently, particularly regarding Central prudent strategy. Uzbekistan's foreign Asian labor migrants, was clearly ministry issued a second statement on demonstrated through the decisive Crimea's secession in late March in actions against Ukraine and thereby, which Tashkent confirmed its previous indirectly, against other post-Soviet position which, in contrast to other states. In other words, Russia provided Central Asian counterparts, proved to a clearly nationalistic response to the be relatively more principled and rise of Ukrainian nationalism. consistent. The Crimea crisis will have profound In the context of the Ukrainian drama, geopolitical implications for Central Central Asia is today facing a twofold Asia, where the events are understood challenge. Firstly, the challenge of as the expression of a new rise in continued partnership with NATO, Russia’s neo-imperialism. Over time, resistance to which has become a key Moscow can repair this image in the feature of Russia’s global posture in eyes of countries and peoples on general and its policies during the Russia’s perimeter, but one thing has Ukrainian crisis in particular. Secondly, once again become obvious: Central Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 10

Asians, while attempting to resolve regional issues and construct their common regional home should concentrate on finding regional solutions rather than seeking great power mediation. The CIS may be able to survive with only nine members but at least five of them – the states of Central Asia – now confront the existential question pertaining to the durability of their de jure sovereignty. The likelihood of future unilateral decisive actions by Moscow in the post-Soviet space, ignoring the interests of independent states on its perimeter, have strained Astana, Bishkek, Dushanbe, Tashkent and Ashgabat who have so far only expressed cautious positions. Recent developments should prompt them to restore their frozen regional integration structure and revitalize a region- building process. AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Education and Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 11

UKRAINE CRISIS AND PUTIN’S POST- CIS INTEGRATION PLANS Richard Weitz

Although Russia continues to participate in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the reluctance of Ukraine and other members to support deep integration within that framework has led the Russian government under Vladimir Putin to focus Moscow’s integration efforts on other institutions. Now Russia’s military moves against Crimea have presented both opportunities and challenges for Putin’s post-CIS integration agenda.

BACKGROUND: In his first decade in the CSTO have focused on overcoming power, Putin has focused on achieving NATO’s opposition to mutual deeper cooperation among a small cooperation, which is preventing the number of the most pro-Moscow CIS CIS from achieving its goal of enjoying members. For instance, in 2002, Russia equal status with NATO. joined with Armenia, Belarus, A similar pattern of narrower-but- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and deeper integration has been taking place Tajikistan to create a military alliance, in the economic realm. In 2000, after the Collective Security Treaty the CIS proved unable to achieve deep Organization (CSTO), to supplement economic integration or an effective the modest security cooperation within customs union, Russia joined with the CIS. Since then, the CSTO Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and members have been developing their Tajikistan to create a Eurasian laws, institutions, and capabilities. The Economic Community (EurAsEC), organization has adopted a with a more ambitious integration peacekeeping doctrine, created a rapid agenda than the CIS. The EurAsEC reaction force, and the means to has sought to align the economic and mobilize larger multinational armies trade policies of its members by under the CSTO’s command in reducing their tariffs, taxes, duties and wartime. The organization’s missions other barriers to economic exchanges. It have included fighting terrorists, aims to eventually create a free trade guerrillas and drug traffickers as well as zone, a common system of external deterring large-scale attacks against its tariffs, a common energy market, and a members. Cooperation has also customs union. Like the CSTO, the included Russia’s selling arms to its EurAsEC was controlled by Moscow, allies at discounted prices and an with Russia enjoying more votes than agreement that all countries must any other member. consent to any one member’s hosting foreign military bases on its territory. But it was only in 2007 that some of Russian diplomatic efforts related to EurAsEC’s members - Russia, Belarus, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 12

positive and negative measures to induce other countries to join these projects. Positive incentives have included pledges of loans and energy, while negative pressures have included natural gas cutoffs and the exploitation of frozen conflicts.

IMPLICATIONS: Although not normally classified as a “frozen and Kazakhstan – overcame their conflict,” Russia’s deft occupation and diverging economic policies and annexation of Crimea has achieved the alignments, committing to realize a same goal of warning other countries Customs Union (CU). In 2010, they against defying Moscow. Russian established a uniform external tariff policy makers had previously relied on and abolished most internal duties and targeted energy assistance and customs controls between their cultivating various elites to keep countries, creating the free movement Ukraine from moving toward the of goods. Citizens of one member can West. The failure of Russia’s soft- also enter another with only their power strategy in Ukraine became internal passports. In May 2011, the CU evident with the Maidan revolution members integrated the rules of the against the country’s Moscow-leaning World Trade Organization with those leadership. Even after annexing of the Customs Union. On January 1, Crimea, Russia has sought to keep open 2012, they created a Single Economic the threat of further military action in Space within the CU framework. By eastern Ukraine to deter Ukraine’s new 2015, CU members expect to see the free pro-Western leaders from seeking movement of goods, capital, services NATO membership or taking other and people across the three countries. actions that threaten Russia’s regional Most recently, Putin has been leading agenda. Sustaining the conflict also efforts to create a “Eurasian Union” exploits Europeans’ reluctance to offer among the former Soviet republics. The NATO or EU membership to a country essential idea is that the three members with an active territorial dispute. would coordinate their foreign, Moscow has pursued similar policies, economic, and other policies much with much success, toward Georgia, more extensively and deeply than in Azerbaijan, and Moldova. the CU or CIS. In addition to pursuing The Crimean conquest could intimidate deeper economic and political other Soviet republics to avoid overtly integration within the Eurasian Union, challenging Russia’s integration plans. Putin has sought wider membership for Although neither government the organization than in the trilateral welcomed Moscow’s move, the leaders Customs Union; to include countries of both Belarus and Kazakhstan have like Ukraine that had declined to enter declined to condemn Russia’s actions. the CU. Russia has employed both Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 13

In an emergency March 5 meeting, the dynamics have even kept traditionally three presidents agreed not to postpone reluctant Uzbekistan and their planned May 1 signing of a new Turkmenistan attentive to Moscow’s treaty launching the Eurasian Union regional concerns. next year. But Kyrgyzstan’s economic Meanwhile, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan development may be too weak to allow persist in expressing interest in joining it to join the Customs Union and the the Customs Union and eventually the Single Economic Space anytime soon. Eurasian Union. In September 2013, The Kyrgyz consider their integration under Russian pressure, Armenia roadmap unrealistically rapid and turned down an association agreement demand large subsidies and other with the European Union, opting benefits from Russia before joining. instead for the Customs Union with Conversely, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan because wealth mean it already receives of Armenia’s reliance on Russia in substantial foreign direct investment by many sectors, including energy, Western countries. The Kazakhs share security, and trade. The road map for with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey Armenia’s membership in the Customs an interest in ensuring that some Union and the Single Economic Space Caspian Sea energy resources reach was signed on December 24. Armenia’s European markets via the South deputy foreign minister has said that Caucasus. Kazakhstani leaders oppose Yerevan will be ready to join the giving the Eurasian Union many Customs Union by mid-April. At the political powers. None of these March 5 meeting, Putin said that the countries wants to encourage further three members were ready to start the Russian irredentism. The former Soviet preparations for Armenia’s joining the republics, even those whose leaders did Eurasian Union. not initially seek independence, The impoverished and isolated Kyrgyz jealously guard their sovereignty and Republic, having accepted Russian autonomy and have repeatedly demands to end the lease on Manas Air outmaneuvered empire builders in Base, needs whatever economic help Moscow. Russia can provide. Kyrgyzstan joins CONCLUSIONS: By choosing to with Kazakhstan in seeking to relax occupy and annex Crimea, Russia has restrictions on labor migration to accepted the burden of promoting the Russia (Tajikistan is also deeply region’s economic recovery even as the dependent on migrant remittances) and crisis and resulting Western sanctions in wanting to balance China’s growing have devalued the ruble, crashed the economic presence in Central Asia by stock market, and caused extensive strengthening their economic ties with capital flight. These economic blows Russia. Fears about how the Western against Russia invariably harm Belarus military withdrawal from Afghanistan and Kazakhstan. Even before the might adversely affect regional security Ukraine crisis, Kazakhstan’s central Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 14 bank had to devalue the national currency, the tenge, by more than twenty percent to match the declining value of the ruble, which the Russian authorities had managed. This will likely decrease Kazakhstan’s interest in establishing a currency union any time soon. Invading and occupying neighbors’ lands does not enhance Russia’s soft power, imposes enormous burdens on the economy of Russia and its partners, and distracts Russian elites from making the union a more attractive enterprise. AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 15

TAJIKISTAN’S GOVERNMENT ANXIOUS OVER CRIMEA Oleg Salimov

The events in Ukraine and Crimea are a wake-up call for most of Central Asia’s leaders. Although far away from Ukraine, Tajikistan is in the same zone of political and economic influence imposed by Russia. This implies that Tajikistan must consider the possibility of being subjected to a sequence of events similar to those in Crimea. The lack of a comprehensive reaction from Tajikistan’s president, usually supportive of President Putin, to the situation in Crimea can be interpreted as fear that Tajikistan could potentially be absorbed by Russia in part or as a whole. An evaluation of Tajikistan’s political and socioeconomic situation can provide clues to whether Tajikistan is susceptible to a Crimea scenario.

BACKGROUND: The disintegration agreements, acts, and unions. The of the Soviet Union culminated in the largest are the Shanghai Cooperation formal proclamation of independence Organization, the Eurasian Economic of all Soviet republics. However, for Community, and the Collective Tajikistan, independence brought about Security Treaty Organization. Russia insignificant changes regarding its deploys a military base in Tajikistan political and economic dependency since 1993 as part of the agreement on upon Russia. Economically, Tajikistan’s Collective Peacekeeping Forces. After a population survives largely through series of bargaining debates, the Tajik remittances sent by labor migrants in government signed a deal in 2012 that Russia. According to Tajikistan’s extended the presence of the base until Ministry of Labor, Russia is the final 2042. Among the Russian military destination for about 90 percent of installations in Tajikistan is the space Tajik labor migrants. According to monitoring station Window, which Russia’s trade mission in Tajikistan, protects the central part of Russia and Russia remains the main exporter of oil, Siberia and is critical for Russia’s gas, and heavy machinery to Tajikistan, defense system. Notably, one of the while Russia is a major consumer of reasons for Russia’s invasion of Crimea Tajik cotton and aluminum. The was the protection of Russia’s naval overall trade turnover between the two base in Sevastopol. countries reached US$ 1.2 billion in 2013. Additional conditions that connect Russia’s economic interests are heavily Tajikistan with Russia include, firstly, represented in Tajikistan’s energy that Tajikistan is a subject of the sector through the ownership of 75 Russian-Tajik dual citizenship percent of the Sangtuda-1 hydropower agreement signed in 1995. As known, plant, one of the largest in Tajikistan. the populations of South Ossetia and Political dependency is manifested in Abkhazia were issued Russian Tajikistan’s participation in Russia-led passports in large numbers prior to, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 16

have made any statements regarding Ukraine and the Crimea crisis. The silence on these important geopolitical developments can mainly be interpreted as an expression of uncertainty over Tajikistan’s own future. For the authoritarian Tajik

government, taking a clear stance on during, and after the Russia-Georgia the situation in Crimea would not military conflict of 2008, providing produce a favorable outcome. Russia with a reason to protect its Tajikistan’s government is restrained citizens abroad. from protesting Russia’s actions in Secondly, the strong push by President Crimea out of fear of losing an Rakhmon, starting in 2007, to change important partner. The government names in favor of Tajik stylistics over cannot support the pro-democracy Russian is not unequivocally supported upheaval in Ukraine because it opposed by the general Tajik population, mainly government repression of political due to the high labor migration to dissent. However, taking a stance in Russia. Russian-sounding names make defense of Russia’s actions would for easier accommodation in Russia as worsen relations with the West and explained by Tajikistan’s Ministry of endanger financial assistance. Also, Justice. Thirdly, the status of Russian such support would be a de facto as the language of international admission of Russia’s right to increase communication is officially secured in its influence in the post-Soviet region, Tajikistan’s Constitution. During a which can have far-reaching effects. meeting with Rakhmon last week, the For the Tajik regime, it could Chairman of Russia’s Federation ultimately imply a loss of power and Council, Valentina Matvienko, agreed possibly the end of Tajikistan’s to meet his request for 400 Russian independent statehood. language teachers as the demand for The prospect of a “Crimea scenario” in Russian in Tajikistan is increasing. Tajikistan must be considered from two Overall, regardless of occasional standpoints, including the interests of drawbacks in political relations outside players and the presence of between Russia and Tajikistan, Tajiks internal forces capable of initiating have developed positive perceptions of such a scenario. The post-Soviet Russia founded primarily on their experience demonstrates that multi-level dependency upon it. Tajikistan has the potential for IMPLICATIONS: Coverage of the disintegration; it contains two regions Crimea events in Tajikistan has a very which have previously expressed limited character due to the strict separatist intentions, although control of the media and a scrupulous unsuccessfully so. These are the filtering of information. Until now, no Badakhshan autonomous region in the Tajik officials, including the president, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 17 south, located in Pamir Mountains, and lack of support from within and outside the Sughd region in the north, located prevented Sughd’s separation. in the ethnically mixed Fergana valley. However, in terms of geographical, Badakhshan remains the most restless political, and economic conditions, the region in Tajikistan with the last anti- Sughd region is more susceptible to governmental actions taking place in separation than any other Tajik region. 2012. Pamiris take pride in their distinct Sughd is located in the Fergana valley culture, language, and religion where ethnic Tajiks frequently following the Ismaili Shiite branch of intermix with Uzbeks and differ from Islam, whereas other Tajiks are other Tajiks in culture and dialect. predominantly Sunnis. Politically, Located in the north, Sughd is attached Badakhshan is very distant from to the rest of Tajikistan only through a Dushanbe and Moscow and presents a narrow mountain route inaccessible constant challenge to central during most of the year. It can be government control. However, there is blocked relatively easy, isolating the no viable player powerful enough to region from the rest of the country. painlessly absorb Badakhshan, nor is Yet, possessing over 70 percent of all there any open support for its separatist Tajik production enterprises, Sughd is movement. China claimed and received the main industrial region in about one percent of Tajikistan’s land Tajikistan. Finally, located closer to the in Pamir in 2011-2013. However, center of transport connections with radicalized Pamiris are not welcomed other Central Asian republics, Sughd is by Beijing, which is struggling with its in a superior geopolitical and economic own Uighur population whose region is position compared to the rest of adjacent to Pamir. The hypothetical Tajikistan. combination of these two would be Still, Sughd and Badakhshan lack the very troublesome for China. It is also distinct and coordinated separatist questionable whether Pamiris would be movements, ideology, and resources interested in an association with China which were present in Crimea. or any other country. Tajikistan has also undergone an Rakhmon brutally suppressed the last intensive out-migration of ethnic anti-governmental uprising in Sughd in Russians. As of 2010, only 0.5 percent of 1998. The armed confrontation was Tajikistan’s population consisted of fueled by calls for secession by ethnic Russians – a drop from 7.6 Makhmud Khudoberdyev, the leader of percent in 1989, according to the armed opposition forces. Tajikistan’s State Statistics agency. Khudoberdyev relied on the support of This is a very low number compared to a large population of Uzbeks living in the 58 percent ethnic Russians Sughd and the possible involvement of composing Crimea’s population and other Uzbeks in the Fergana valley. insufficient for wide-spread pro- Calls were made for support from Russian demonstrations as the ones Uzbekistan but were not heard. The seen in Crimea. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 18

CONCLUSIONS: Tajikistan’s crumbling economy, a low sense of national pride among Tajiks, insignificant support from developed countries, and a distance from the world’s leading democracies could eventually contribute to the repetition of a “Crimea scenario” in Tajikistan. Without doubt, Russia has created a potentially dangerous precedent which can be applied in a number of post- Soviet republics. Those experiencing stagnation in their political and economic development, like Tajikistan, are more vulnerable to violations of their sovereignty and potentially loss of territory. AUTHOR'S BIO: Oleg Salimov holds a PhD in Interdisciplinary Studies (Public Administration, Political Science, Education, and Sociology) from the University of Montana. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 19

TURKEY’S GÜLEN CONTROVERSY SPILLS OVER TO AZERBAIJAN Mina Muradova

The conflict between Turkish Prime “The Turkish government is concerned Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and that the Hizmet movement is the Islamic Hizmet movement’s leader expanding in Azerbaijan through its Fethullah Gülen has spread to wide network of educational Azerbaijan. A scandal erupted in establishments and businesses, as well Turkey in December 2013, when police as by placing figures loyal to the arrested 52 suspects on various Hizmet movement in high-level posts corruption charges, including the sons in government,” the Musavat daily of three government ministers and the reported on February 28. general manager of the state-owned In Azerbaijan, Gülenists have been Halkbank. The operation detained presented as a moderate socio-religious people close to the Turkish Prime movement, but indifferent to politics. Minister. Local authorities had concerns about Erdogan termed it a plot by the Hizmet this but tolerated the movement thanks movement and its exiled leader Gülen to its high quality educational system, to overthrow the government. It was including 13 prep schools, 11 high considered a response to the schools, and the Qafqaz (Caucasus) government’s decision last November University that were considered as the to close in 2015 the dershane, a network main part of the Hizmet Movement. In of private tutoring centers, most of 1992, Azerbaijan became the first which are run by the Gülen movement. country outside of Turkey where the Educational centers reportedly provide movement opened its schools. Last enormous financial resources to the year, the education institutions were group but also help it recruit new transferred to the State Oil Company members and allies in government. of Azerbaijan, but preserved In late February, both government and curriculum, management and teacher opposition media reported that a staff with no changes. similar “parallel structure” existed in Most people cannot afford to pay the Azerbaijan. The diplomatic missions of fees, so it is mainly the children of both countries reportedly provided the businessmen and the elite who go there. government with a list of local Gülen This raises suspicions that the schools followers. In early March, emails are raising a new "golden" generation showing ties between Azerbaijani with Gülen’s values. officials and Gülen were leaked to the In early March, the names of officials media. One of them was related to linked with Gülen started appearing in Elnur Aslanov, an official of President the media. The news portal Minval Ilham Aliyev's Administration. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 20 called Aslanov a "patron of the conference in Baku on March 7, he Azerbaijani branch of Gülen followers." stated that some religious movements In an interview with APA News and missionary organizations are trying Agency on March 1, Aslanov said that to establish themselves in Azerbaijan “slanders against me and a number of and to create an extensive network in senior officials, who are always order to realize their interests. Hasanov committed to the statehood course of said that “the representatives of those the national leader Heydar Aliyev and trends should know that attempts to loyal to President Ilham Aliyev, the adapt the state policy to their interests attempts to link us with Nurcular sect will fail.” are the results of deformed imagination The issue has become highly and groundless." Aslanov stated that controversial in Azerbaijan. Some the period of “political myths” ended in political observers noted that Aslanov Azerbaijan long ago, and that society is and others implicated by the leaked able to differentiate between tales and emails probably had nothing to do with reality. Gülen. Aslanov was sacked on March 17 after a According to Arif Hajili, a high- decision by President Aliyev, but the ranking member of the opposition party document did not name a reason for his Musavat, "if a letter addressed to Gülen dismissal. He headed the political is a reason for firing, it is very strange analysis and information department in because before there were a lot of the President's administration since publications about governmental 2007, and is the son of Rabiyyat officials linked to Kurdish PKK that Aslanova, a ruling party MP, and created problems in relations with reportedly has ties to the influential Turkey, but no measures were taken. "grey cardinal" Ramiz Mekhtiyev, head Here, a person was sacked just based on of the President's Administration. He an email." was responsible for supervising the Arif Yunus, a political analyst and the Center for Strategic Studies, some author of a book on Islam in leading pro-governmental media Azerbaijan, termed the email "rubbish" outlets, and the pro-governmental because it was written with several youth organization Ireli. Two days Turkish grammar mistakes as well as later, Aslanov's department was closed errors from a religious point of view. "I and merged with the Department of don't believe that Aslanov is a Nurchu public-political issues. (a Gülen follower). It is a result of Some media reports have termed the razborka (battle in Russian slang). I developments Ali Hasanov’s victory mean it is a power struggle between over political rivals. Before Aslanov's groups inside the government … It is dismissal, Ali Hasanov, who heads the impossible to trust letters fabricated in Department for public- political issues a computer. I can't say what is the in the presidential office, called for reason for the struggle between public vigilance. At a religious affairs Aslanov and Hasanov, but the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 21 campaign against the Gülen movement has been used for fighting against political rivals," Yunus said in an interview to Meydan TV.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 22

KYRGYZSTAN’S ATA MEKEN PARTY BREAKS UP PARLIAMENTARY COALITION TO DISMISS PRIME MINISTER Jamil Payaz

Satybaldiev’s government. Eloquently On March 25, Kyrgyzstan’s Prime using populist rhetoric, he contended Minister Jantoro Satybaldiev resigned that Kyrgyzstan should own at least 67 following the dissolution of the percent of the shares held by the mine’s parliamentary coalition, which was operator Centerra, claiming that the triggered by the withdrawal of the Ata government took too soft a stance in Meken party on March 18. Ata Meken the negotiations and urged not to be accused Satybaldiev of, inter alia, afraid of renouncing the existing corruption issues while he headed a agreement. However, Ata Meken was state agency that reconstructed Osh and less enthusiastic about supporting Jalal-Abad after the ethnic clashes in Respublica, the party of Tekebaev’s 2010. Ata Meken’s leader boasted later rival former Prime Minister Omurbek that his party got rid of the government Babanov, when it tried for several with which the public was dissatisfied. months to gather MP signatures to call for a vote of no confidence in There are various speculations as to the Satybaldiev in relation to largely the motives of Ata-Meken’s decision. same issues. Many consider the action as an attempt by the party to resurface on the political It is not clear what Ata Meken gained scene ahead of the parliamentary from exiting the coalition in the long elections scheduled for 2015. The party run since President Atambaev, through won the lowest number of seats in his SDPK party, suggested that Vice parliament in 2011, despite the Prime Minister Joomart Otorbaev be popularity of its leader Omurbek appointed Prime Minister of the future Tekebaev, who authored the cabinet. Although nominally an Ata Constitution introducing what is Meken member, Otorbaev has considered the first semi-parliamentary abstained from political intrigues and system in Central Asia. Equally was firmly moving ahead with strategic important, the party has also been projects buttressed by the president, struggling to recover its reputation after including the creation of a Bishkek- its opponents branded it as a party of based parity enterprise with Centerra, “marauders,” claiming its members accession to the Russia-led Customs raided the properties of the former Union, the sale of KyrgyzGaz to president’s family. Gazprom, and the tentative decision to sell half the shares in Manas Over the last year, Tekebaev has International Airport to Russia’s aggressively exploited the issue of the Rosneft. Following his appointment as Kumtor gold mine to attack acting Prime Minister on March 26, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 23

Otorbaev reaffirmed his commitment shrunk. A dozen of its members have to the deal reached between his organized into MP groups, with some predecessor and Centerra, and no even revoking their party membership deviation is expected from the course and expressing interest in joining President Atambaev has taken. SDPK or other parties outside Therefore, it remains to be seen how parliament. Currently, it has 12 seats as Tekebaev will react to these opposed to the initial 23. controversial issues closer to the elections. They are likely to become In fact, all factions except for SDPK politicized further, especially due to have become smaller with the creation increasing fears among the public that of a number of MP groups, such as the transfer of state assets to Russian Onuguu (Progress), Democrats, Bir-Bol companies undermines Kyrgyzstan’s (Stay United), and Yntymak independence. (Harmony). The other opposition party, Ata Jurt, is facing internal Former Finance Minister Akylbek obstacles to join the coalition, since Japarov argues that the five factions three of its MPs were stripped of their with a relatively equal number of seats mandates after spending a year in in parliament will produce only a prison and two have been arrested on technocratic government, which will be charges of corruption. It thus seems further crippled by the need to respect that SDPK's attempt to form a broader the views of the coalition faction coalition is not likely to materialize, leaders and the president. Although and the future coalition will not be supported by the President, Satybaldiev immune to impulses of faction leaders had no united team, as the coalition like Tekebaev at least until the next factions have divided among elections in 2015. themselves the ministerial posts, as well as state agencies. President Edil Baisalov, a well-known public Atambaev has called on the factions to activist, argues that this system leaves stop this practice, which he said leads to the government and legislative “political corruption.” branches negligent to the actions they take. He says the government should be SDPK has invited all five factions to formed of MPs to ensure their enter a coalition, but MPs believe that accountability for decisions they make, the same factions, SDPK, Ar Namys, and cabinet members should return to and Ata Meken, are likely to form a parliament after their work ends to new coalition. Respublica make sure they are held accountable to unequivocally wants to bring back its their voters. leader Babanov to the post of Prime Minister, despite the fact that size of the party’s parliamentary faction has

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 24

GEORGIA’S FORMER PRESIDENT REFUSES TO BE INTERROGATED BY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE Eka Janashia

On March 22, Georgia’s prosecutor’s Margvelashvili’s decision to start using office announced its intention to the glass-dome presidential palace summon Georgia’s former President constructed during Saakashvili’s for questioning as presidency was one of the reasons for a witness in multiple criminal cases. the rift between the old friends. Saakashvili should have appeared According to Ivanishvili, before prosecutors on March 27 but he Margvelashvili had previously insisted refused to comply with the agency’s that the palace is a symbol of demand and even declined its later “violence, evil and indecency,” but offer to question him via Skype. then changed his mind and started Cases where the former president is holding official meetings there. wanted for questioning include, among The former PM’s statements gave rise others, the death in 2005 of former to speculations about a possible split Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania; the within the Georgian Dream (GD) halved prison terms through coalition. On the next day, however, presidential pardon in November, 2008, public attention was instead directed to of four convicts sentenced for the 2006 a YouTube video titled “Saakashvili Sandro Girgvliani murder; the killed Mr. Zurab Zhvania.” The previous government’s attempts to put footage uploaded by an anonymous Cartu Bank, founded by former Prime user allegedly depicts a number of Minister , in injuries on the bodies of Zhvania and bankruptcy in late 2011 and early 2012; Raul Usupov, a person who died the police raid on Tbilisi-based Imedi together with the ex-PM (see the TV station in November, 2007; and the October 10, 2013 issue of the CACI alleged misspending of GEL 8.83 Analyst). million from the Special State The opposition United National Protection Service (SSPS) funds Movement (UNM) claims that the between 2009 and 2012. video was published by the On March 17, in an interview aired at government itself to curtail its own Imedi TV, Ivanishvili said that he has incapacity and signs of internal been disappointed by President Giorgi divisions. It argues that the law Margvelashvili and no longer enforcers already has all the materials maintains “informal relations” with necessary to conclude the investigation him. “[Margvelashvili] has shown but it is lucrative for GD to raise new principally different features and questions from time to time. To end character after the [presidential] long-lasting speculations over the case, election,” he said and disclosed various the government should publish all differences between them. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 25 materials regarding Zhvania’s death, Putin to arrest me”, Saakashvili said. UNM insists. During a visit to Brussels in November Zhvania’s return to the spotlight was 2013, Saakashvili said he was told by shortly replaced by the news that the President of the European Saakashvili was summoned for Commission, José Manuel Barroso, interrogation. The international that his arrest would undermine reaction was quick. The U.S. Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration Department of State stated, “no one is and that he should leave the country in above the law, but launching multiple order to save Georgia’s Western path. simultaneous investigations involving While he considers his recent vocal a former president raises legitimate support for Ukraine to imply a risk of concerns about political retribution, moves against him by the Kremlin, particularly when legal and judicial he’s not going to make “Putin’s dreams institutions are still fragile.” Štefan come true,” Saakashvili said. Füle, EU Commissioner for When Saakashvili did not appear Enlargement and the European before the prosecutor’s office on March Neighborhood, also expressed concern 27, the agency announced that it would over Saakashvili’s subpoena. “No one offer the ex-president to answer is above law but European practice questions via Skype with no need to [and] standards must be followed travel to Tbilisi. scrupulously,” he wrote. After speaking with Saakashvili over Several civil society groups - the phone, his ally in the UNM and International Society for Fair Elections former mayor of Tbilisi, Gigi Ugulava, and Democracy (ISFED); said the former president is ready to Transparency International Georgia; testify as a witness via video link only and Georgian Democracy Initiative before the court but not before the and Civil Development Agency prosecutors alone. Such an (CIDA) – issued a joint statement interrogation will take place if any of saying that some circumstances related the cases that the prosecutor’s office is to the summoning of Saakashvili may investigating goes to trial, Ugulava damage the investigation’s objectivity said. and pleaded to the authorities not to Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili trigger suspicions that the process is termed Saakashvili’s refusal to comply politically motivated. a step of man afraid to answer tough In an interview with Rustavi 2 TV, questions. In response, UNM insisted Saakashvili termed his summoning by that the Prosecutor’s office is still the Prosecutor’s office part of an informally run by the former chief “Ivanishvili-Putin game” and unveiled prosecutor with criminal record, Otar details regarding his departure from Partskhaladze, which undermines the Georgia. agency’s credibility. “According to senior U.S. and EU It is becoming clear that the U.S. officials, there was a direct order from government’s recent advice for the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 26

Georgian government “to leave the the ongoing tensions may pose an past in the past,” has not been observed obstacle to concluding Georgia’s (see the 03/05/2014 issue of the CACI Association Agreement with the EU. Analyst). However, more alarmingly,

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 27

PRESIDENT ATAMBAYEV VISITS KAZAKHSTAN Arslan Sabyrbekov

On March 26, Kyrgyzstan’s President development and its tremendously Almazbek Atambayev paid a one day important contribution to ensuring visit to Kazakhstan. The sides used this regional peace and stability. meeting to discuss ways of further Local experts made different strengthening bilateral relations and assumptions after Atambayev’s visit to ways to cooperate in the framework of Kazakhstan. Some believe that the visit integration processes taking place in took place on the request of the Russian Eurasia. Federation with the objective of The meeting took place in Almaty, accelerating Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the Kazakhstan’s largest and financially Customs Union and encourage it to strongest city. The heads of the two fully join Kazakhstan in recognizing states discussed a number of issues of the recent referendum in the Crimean bilateral concern, including trade, peninsula as legitimate. investment, water and energy, as well According to Guljigit Isakov, Director as aspects of cultural and humanitarian of the Bishkek based NGO Fair cooperation. Both presidents put special Elections, “in terms of its foreign policy emphasis on the activities of the joint towards Kyrgyzstan, Russia delivers its Kazakh-Kyrgyz Investment Fund, messages through Astana, which for created in 2011 with the primary example remains to be the case objective of assisting Kyrgyzstan in its regarding Bishkek’s entry into the economic development. Kazakhstan’s Customs Union under preferable President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated terms.” Isakov added that the meeting that the “Kazakh-Kyrgyz Investment might have focused on Bishkek’s two Fund plays one of the leading roles in diverging positions on the situation in enhancing bilateral economic relations Ukraine, where it first officially and since its creation, Kazakhstan’s recognized the current Ukrainian trade with Kyrgyzstan has increased by political leadership and also recently 41 percent, therefore exceeding one made a surprising statement that the billion dollars.” President Nazarbayev referendum in Crimea was legal and also informed the delegates that over demonstrates the peoples’ democratic the course of Kyrgyzstan’s choice, unlike Astana which fully independence, Kazakh businessmen supports Moscow’s position over the invested over one billion dollars into Ukrainian crisis. Isakov stated that the economy of the neighboring state. Bishkek is on its way to losing In turn, President Atambayev thanked sovereignty and might turn into a his Kazakh colleague for his kind modern type colony. invitation, noting that Kazakhstan is a Alikbek Djekshenkulov, Kyrgyzstan’s leading country in the region in terms former Minister of Foreign Affairs and of its impressive socio-economic leader of the opposition political party Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 02 April 2014 28

Akyikat, has also strongly condemned Nazarbayev wants to find a common Bishkek’s ambivalent position on position with Kyrgyzstan since the Ukraine and called on the country’s next project of the Russian Federation leadership to pursue a stable and after the Customs Union is the predictable foreign policy. According to establishment of a free economic zone. Djekshenkulov, “in a globalized world This project is alarming to Kazakhstan and as a small country, Kyrgyzstan since it will severely undermine the should conduct a multi-vector foreign country’s economic independence.” policy and pursue its national According to Akeleev, Astana is interests.” Djekshenkulov justified looking for options to diminish Astana’s position on Ukraine as a Moscow’s influence and pressure and preventive measure for preserving its has recently discussed Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity and as yet another accession to the World Trade protection from Russian pressure, Organization with President Obama. which can take place in the future. Kazakhstan’s prospective WTO Other local experts believe that the membership was also raised at the last situation in Ukraine was not a major G20 Summit in Saint Petersburg, where subject discussed during the meeting President Nazarbayev personally between the two presidents in Almaty. appealed to the heads of states and Azamat Akeleev, a Bishkek based civil governments to support his country’s activist and economist, expressed an quick accession into the Organization. unexpected point of view by suggesting Bishkek has already developed and that during the meeting President submitted its terms to entry the Nazarbayev could have called on his Customs Union, which contains Kyrgyz counterpart to refrain from around four hundred preferences and is joining the Russia-led Customs Union. awaiting the next round of discussions. Akeleev believes that “President