76-24,574 CADY, Priscilla Scott, 1925- HORATIO WALPOLE AND THE MAKING OF THE TREATY OF SEVILLE, 1728-1730. The^Ohio State Univeristy, Ph.D. History, modern Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor. Michigan 4sio6 Copyri^t by Priscilla Scott Cady 1976 HORATIO WALPOLE AND THE MAKING OF THE TREATY OF SEVILLE, 1728-1730 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Priscilla Scott Cady, B.S., M.A. The Ohio State University 1976 Reading Committee; Approved By John C, Rule R. Clayton Roberts Phillip P. Poirier Adviser Department of History ACKNOIŒDŒ'IENTS This study would not have been completed had it not been for the assistance and encouragement of many people. It was John C, Rule who suggested this investigation of Horatio Walpole's embassy in Prance and provided guidance during the writing of the dissertation. Eagnhild Hatton was supportive in regard to focusing attention on a significant period of Walpole's embassy. Graham Gibbs' suggestion regarding the Norwich Public Record Office was fruitful in bringing to li^t a collec­ tion of Townshend-Walpole correspondence for 1728. Clayton Roberts was generous in helping a neophyte at the British iîuseum and the London Public Record Office. Last, and far from least, my husband, Henry, and our children have always been ready with a word of encouragement whenever energy flagged. To each I extend sincere appreciation and gratitude. June 24 1 1923 •••••••••• B o m — Malden f Massachusetts 1967* •••••••••••••• B«S.I Sununa Cum Laude, The Ohio State University I Columhus, Ohio 1967-I9Ô8 •••••••••••• English TeacherI Grade 12, Worthington High School, Worthington, Ohio 1968-1970 •••••••••••• M.A,, The Ohio State University, Columhus, Ohio 1968-1973 ••••• ........... Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columhus, Ohio 1974» ....... ......... Instructor, Department of History, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, Fall Quarter FUBLICATIOH Book review of Dickinson’s Walnole and the VIhig Sunremacy in the Philological Quarterly, 53, 4, Fall, 1974* PIEIDS OP STUDY Major Field: European History Studies in European Histoiy, 164&-1815« Professor John C. Rule Studies in the History of Tudor-Stuart England, Professor R. Clayton Roberts Studies in Renaissance and Reformation History, 13OO-I648. Professors Harold J, Grimm and Pranklin J« Pegues Studies in the History of the Middle Ages including English History to 1485# Professor Franklin J. Pegues TABLE OP CONTENTS Page ACKHDWLEDŒIEMS ............................................ il VITA. iii Chapter I. HORATIO WALPOLE AHD THE MAKING OP THE TREATY OP SEVILLE .................................. 1 II. WALPOLE» S DIPLOMATIC APPRENTICESHIP: 1706-1724......... 15 III. POLARIZATION OP EUROPE: 1725-1727 ................ » . 52 IV. CONGRESS OP SOISSONS: AN UNSUPPORTED PROMISE........... 91 V. CONGRESS OP SOISSONS: THE HOLLOW PERPORI/iANCE........... 121 VI. THE PROVISIONAL TREATY CONSIDERED: SEVEN MONTHS IN LIMBO .......................... 162 VII. SPAIN'S RESPONSE TO THE PROVISIONAL TREATY............ 200 VIII. THE TREATY OF SEVILLE............................... 235 IX. HORATIO WALPOLE AND THE TREATY OP SEVILLE: CONCLUSION . 271 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................. 28$ HORATIO WALPOLE AMD THE I^AKING OP THE TREATY OP SE7ILLE The Treaty of Seville, concluded in 1729i has received relatively little attention by historians. Those who have written on the subject differ considerably in their evaluation of the treaty and of the key figures involved. Arthur Wilson, in his work on Pleury’s foreign policy, believes the treaty was a victory for Pleury. %)t only did the cardinal restrain his allies from going to war, but he used various expedients to achieve his ends and those of his allies.^ J. H. Plumb, on the other hand, sees the treaty as Robert Walpole's first diplomatic triumph. Plumb also gives credit to the duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the South, and William Stanhope, British diplomat and ambassador to Spain. Newcastle sent Stanhope to the Spanish court for the specific purpose of concluding the negotiation.^ Plumb's view is similar to Lord Hervey's. The latter, who was a courtier and closely associated with the adminis­ tration, claimed in his memoirs that Robert Walpole was the author of the plan which William Stanhope successfully negotiated with Spain.^ ^Arthur M. Wilson, French Poreim Policy of Cardinal Pleury 1726- 1743. Harvard Historical Studies, no. 40 Ccambridge, 1936), p. 210. ^J. H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole, 2 vols. (London, 1956-60), II, 198. ^Lord John Hervey, Memoirs of the Reign of George the Second, ed. John Wilson Croker, 3 vols. (London, I884), I, 131-32. 2 Frederick Oliver, a popularizer, yet considered reputable by historians, believes a major share of the credit belongs to Stanhope. According to Oliver, Stanhope was particularly skillful in his special mission to Spain and his efforts were benevolently supported by Pleury.”* Sir Richard Lodge agrees with Wilson, in that he considers Pleury the real author of the treaty, but he also gives great credit to Stanhope for helping to frame it in Paris, and to Benjamin Keene, the British repre­ sentative at the Spanish court, who did so much to establish good relations with the Spanish minister, Patino.^ Only a few historians, such as Paul Vaucher, William Coze and the comte de Bâillon find any significance in the fact that Robert Wal­ pole *s brother, Horatio, was then ambassador to the court of Prance, and as minister and plenipotentiary was officially engaged in negotiating the treaty. Though Plumb also recognizes Horatio's connections in both courts, his comments are generally disparaging. Moreover, as will be seen in later chapters, he ignores considerable evidence of Horatio's contributions not only to the negotiations but also to the defense of the ministry's foreign policy. This discounting by historians of Horatio Walpole is curious. Not only did he enjoy a singularly close relationship with the ministers in Hagland and Prance, but he brought considerable diplomatic experience, if not expertise, to his embassy. In his Apology, written a number of years after 1729, Walpole looked back on his role in the negotiations as ”*PFrederick Scott Oliver, The Endless Adventure, 3 vols. (London, 1930-35), II, 129. ^Sir Richard Lodge, "The Treaty of Seville (1729),” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, XVI (1933), 41. 3 one of his great diplomatic triumphs. He asserted that he was the one who hrou^t Cardinal Pleury around to approve the British version of the treaty, after contriving to meet him in private for many hours. He also made note of the queen’s satisfaction with "his diligence, fidelity, & success in negotiations of so much perplexity and trouble, and [that she] was . pleased to give him distinguishing marks of her favor and ion."^ In view of Walpole’s remarks, the question arises about the part he actually played in the negotiations. Did he have a significant role, as he, himself, believed, or are the historians correct in their apparent dismissal of his efforts and influence? This, then, is the question and the focus of the following study. Historiographical Background Opinions of writers and historians about the quality and impor­ tance of the treaty itself differ. Basil Williams, at one end of the scale, considers it "the logical outcome of the treaty of Utrecht."^ Oliver’s views are mixed. The treaty itself was clear and without unnec­ essary loose ends. However, in Oliver’s opinion, if the negotiators had been able to encompass more than they did, some of the great disasters that followed might possibly have been averted.^ D. B. Ik>m believes that the Treaty of Seville was due more to the insufficiency of the Spanish- Imperial alliance than to Pleury’s diplomacy. The treaty was inherently Apol o g y , B.M., Add. MSS. 9132, fols. 90v-93. ^Basil Williams, "The Poreign Policy of England un English Historical Review, XV, X7I (I9OO-I9OI), XVI, 326. we a k ‘because Britain and Prance had no prior agreement on how they would execute their promises to Spain.^ Schoell, at the opposite end of the scale, describes the treaty as an extraordinary, if not deplorable, monument to the instability of European politics.^ Whether or not Schoell*s description of the treaty is apt, his reference to the instability of European politics is significant, for herein may lie one explanation of the divergent views of the treaty and the men involved. There were so many conflicting interests, not only between the negotiating powers but also within the individual delega­ tions , that it is remarkable any kind of an agreement was reached. The slow communications contributed to the difficulties, and as Plumb observes, this too was a weapon of diplomacy. The prevarications and delays, the decisions taken only to be disavowed, the knowledge that the whole strategy of a diplo­ matic campaign might be changed by the changed opinion of one prince, inflated the respect in which diplomacy was held and led also to complications almost for their own sake, so that often the left hand of a prime minister scarcely knew what his right hand was doing.^ Lodge, who considers himself **a fairly hardened explorer of diplomatic mazes,” finds the tortuous negotiations, extending from the summer of ^David Boyne Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, I967), p. 5I. ^Friedrich Schoell, Histoire abrégée de paix entre les puis­ sances de 1 *Earoçe, d e m i s la oaix de Westohalie; par feu M. de Ihch. Ouvrage entièrement refondu> augmenté et continué jusqu'au con/rrès de Vienne et aux traites de Paris de l8l5; par Ë.' Schoell, 15 vols. (Paris, 1817-18), II, 216-17. ^Plumb, Sir Robert Wal-polei II, 14. 5 Some historians appear to accept Schoell's and Lodge's assess­ ment of the unsettled and intricate conditions prevailing in Europe, Baudrillartf for one, considered it necessary to restrict his own in­ vestigation at the risk of distortion, even while recognizing that the period 1724-1729 was a fertile one for treaties thronghout Europe.