Anno LVII. - n. 7-8 ORIENTE MODERNO LUGLIO--AGOSTO 1977

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 1960--1964: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND THE CYPRUS CRISIS *

Alliance with the West, especially the , has once again become con• troversial in which has caused confusion in foreign policy: to continue as before or make a new adjustment to international politics? Has not Turkey already been delayed in moving from one-sided and binding alliances towards stressing multi• lateral relationships to end her isolation in the world and to find new justification for her position in Cyprus? This question is not new. It can be traced back to the Revo• lution of 1960 during which a Military Junta took power. This paper will attempt to evaluate foreign policy and related events from this Revolution to the Cyprus Crisis in the mid-sixties. The Junta and the succeeding Inonu coalitions: - The May 27 Revolution of 1960 brought a reassertion of Turkish nationalism and a new attempt to return to Kema• Iism in particular. Such a mood was present in the revolutionary Junta which called itself the National Union Committee (NUC). Especially the young members of the Junta identified more fervently with Atatiirk and the " Kemalist tradition " in their attitudes towards national sovereignty and independence. They tried to give a " Ke• malist " character to the revolutionary regime and its overall policies. In regard to relations with outside world, they cherished the idea of developing a new program of action whereby foreign policy would be based more on self-orientation and express national aspirations 1. Ex-colonels Haydar Tun~kanat, Sami Kii~iik, Ahmet Ytld1z and Kamil Karavelioglu, who moved to a more leftist position in the sixties, were among those who shared these views with tenacity. They accepted the Turkish al• liance with the West, but were strongly disturbed about the aspects of this alliance which had placed special strains upon Turkish sovereignty and independence. They especially resented the bilateral treaties with the United States which accorded special status to American military personnel living in Turkey. Another ·source of resentment was the conditions attached to American economic assistance such as the obligation to spend the American credits on equipment and material from the United States with

• The Authors wish to thank the editors of the Turkish year-book of International Relations for permission to reprint this slightly adapted version of " Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy 1960-1964" published under the name of Dr. Ince in the 1975 edition. The interviews and interviewees quoted in this article were conducted by Dr. Ince. 1 George Harris, Troubled Alliance (Washington D. C.: American Enterprise Institute For Pu• blic Research, 1972), p. 87; see also Ismet Giritli, Fifty Years of Political Development, 1919-1969, (: Hukuk Fakilltesi Matbaasi, 1969), p. 103; ~vket Siireyya Aydemir, Ihti/alin Mantig1, Ustan• bul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973), pp. 396-98; "La Neo-Kemalism du Comite d'Unite ", L'Orient, Winter 1960, pp. 51-68; and Ergum Ozbudun, The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics (Boston: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1966), pp. 8-15.

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U.S. shipping rights 2. Fourteen other members of the Junta such as ex-colonel Alpar• slan Turke~ and his close associates, who made even more radical and extremist inter• pretations of « Kemalism », had similar reservations towards Turkey's association with the United States 3, Two of the fourteen, Muzaffer Ozdag and Orban Erkanh, went so far as "to raise the specter that Turkey had become an American colony" 4. Con• tested by such liberal commentators as Ahmet Emin Yalman in Vatan, these extremist• nationalist assertions did not represent a consensus of the Junta of 38 members. The radical 14 members were later purged (November 13, 1960) for their threat to the r~gime. Those members who moved further to the left after the Junta period remained within the Junta and complied with the Junta's overall moderate orientations. Several factors seemed important in shaping the general outlook of the Junta. Firstly, respect for rank and military rules of hierarchy were prevalent in the Junta's important decisions. The fact that General Cemal Giirsel was the leader of the Junta as well as the Premier and head of State was especially important. Giirsel was not a radical. He was an ardent believer in Turkey's close association with the West. The special influence of Inonii, a prestigious ex-commander and renowned statesman, over many of the individual Junta members was also significant 6, Inonii cherished the Turkish-Western alliance and believed. in a speedy transition to democracy under ci• vilian rule. The civilian Foreign Minister Selim Sarper (a career diplomat who had undertaken important assignments in the Turkish mission in during World War II) and the Foreign Office were not inclined towards making any changes in Tur• kish-Western relations 7. The Junta was often preoccupied with the problems of tran• sition to democracy s. The Foreign Office had an important responsibility in assuring the continuity in foreign policy. The National Revolution Declaration issued in two parts, the first of which ap• peared on September 6 and second on September 17, and the unfolding of Foreign Policy was a document couched in general terms, showing a Kemalist influence but excluding any eccentric statements. It reasserted the Kemalist principle « Peace at Home, Peace in the World» and indicated a desire to develop peaceful and friendly relations with all nations, especially neighbors. The Junta took special care in stating

2 These views were obtained in personal interviews with the said ex-Junta members, now sena• tors for life; Interview with Haydar Tun,kanat (: November 15, 1969); Interview with Sami Ku,iik (Ankara: May 15, 1968); and Interview with Ahmet Y1ld1z (Ankara: December 20, 1970). For a more general reference, see also Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 87-88. 3 George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle &st, (Washington, D. C.: American Enter• prise Institute for Public Research, 1972), p. 49. 4 Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 87-88. s Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961, The Brooking Inst., Washington, (1963), p. 132. Ci Aydemir, lhtilalin Mant1g1, pp. 245-S0. 7 Ibid., pp. 42&-30; Hikmet KMlcimli, 27 May1s ve " Yon" Hareketinin Simfsal Ele1tirlsi (Istan• bul: Ant Yayinevi, 1970), pp. 224-35. K1vilcimh, who was a Marxist, claimed that the Revolution deviated from its course in submission to international "finance-capital", that is the Western impe• rialism, due to " undue influence exerciz.ed by GUrsel, ln5nil ", and other figures such as the Chief of Staff, General Cevdet Sunay. s Haydar Tun~kanat particularly complained about Foreign Minister Selim Sarper's carrying on the traditional diplomacy and his insensitivity to the nationalistic inclinations of the Junta members; Interview with Haydar Tun~t.