Steven E. Woodworth, ed.. The Chickamauga Campaign. Civil War Campaigns in the Heartland Series. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010. vii + 199 pp. $24.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8093-2980-9.

Reviewed by Jennifer Murray

Published on H-CivWar (February, 2011)

Commissioned by Martin P. Johnson (Miami University Hamilton)

Often overshadowed in light of the more pop‐ banks of the Chickamauga Creek, approximately ular battles of the Civil War’s eastern theater, the twelve miles south from Chattanooga. The battle battle of Chickamauga stands as the largest battle began on the following morning, September 19, of the western theater, and at approximately thir‐ and for the ensuing two days the armies struggled ty-fve thousand casualties also the bloodiest. It is for supremacy of the feld. The “high tide” of the also the only signifcant engagement Confederate battle occurred on September 20 when Confeder‐ forces won in the West. By the fall of 1863, Con‐ ate forces under the immediate command of Gen‐ federates forces in the West had endured a series eral John Bell Hood assaulted the Federal center, of strategic defeats, often resulting in the loss of thereby exploiting an unintentional gap in the vital territory and resources. Capitalizing on earli‐ Union line. As the Southern soldiers sought to er victories in Tennessee, General William Rose‐ gain the tactical advantage, Union General George crans, now commanding the Union’s Army of the Thomas rallied his troops to stave of complete Cumberland, sought a war of maneuver to force disaster and earned himself the title “the Rock of the Confederates out of Tennessee and northern Chickamauga.” Tactical victory came at a high Georgia. In early September General Braxton cost for the victory deprived Army of Tennessee, Bragg’s Army of Tennessee evacuated Chat‐ sustaining approximately nineteen thousand ca‐ tanooga. Situated in the Cumberland Mountains, sualties. Having gained possession of the battle‐ Chattanooga held strategic importance both as a feld, Bragg’s army moved to reclaim Chattanooga. vital railroad junction and as the gateway into the The Chickamauga Campaign, edited by heartland of Dixie. On the night of September 18, Steven E. Woodworth, distinguished Civil War Bragg, reinforced with units from the Army of scholar and history professor at Texas Christian Northern Virginia, under the command of Gener‐ University, is the second volume in the Civil War al James Longstreet, positioned his army along the Campaigns in the Heartland series. Seven of the H-Net Reviews eight essays examine and analyze the battle’s during the battle stand as an “aberration” to an leaders and lost opportunities, while the fnal es‐ otherwise solid career (p. 42). say explores elements of the “new military histo‐ Woodworth’s essay explores a “great military ry” by outlining the creation of Chickamauga Na‐ nonevent” at McLemore’s Cove when the Confed‐ tional Military Park. Contributors include Ethan S. erates had the opportunity to destroy portions of Rafuse, Woodworth, Alexander Mendoza, Lee the Federal army as they passed through the White, John R. Lundberg, William G. Robertson, mountain gaps around Chattanooga between Sep‐ David Powell, and Timothy B. Smith. tember 9 and 11. Major General Thomas Hind‐ The introductory essay, “In the Shadow of the man’s Confederates enjoyed numerical superiori‐ Rock,” by Rafuse, professor at the U.S. Army Com‐ ty, but their failure to capitalize on their advan‐ mand and General Staf College, ofers an evalua‐ tages remains, according to Woodworth, “one of tion of two neglected Union corps commanders, the most inexplicable missed opportunities” of the General Thomas Crittenden and General Alexan‐ war (p. 65). Woodworth attributes this missed op‐ der McCook, who indeed have stood in the shad‐ portunity to four factors. First, he applauds the ow of George Thomas. Rafuse explores Crittenden leadership of Union commanders, namely Major and McCook’s leadership prior to the engagement General James Negley, and their careful recon‐ at Chickamauga as an indictor of their perfor‐ naissance to accurately ascertain the enemy posi‐ mance during the battle and as a means of evalua‐ tion. Second, Unionist civilians played an integral tion independently from the success of George role in providing Union forces with accurate in‐ Thomas. By the fall of 1863, on the one hand, Mc‐ formation on the Confederate position. Negley’s Cook sufered from a damaged reputation in light forces evaded disaster at McLemore’s Cove, in of his poor performance at Perryville and Stones part, because of Hindman’s poor leadership. And River. On the other hand, Crittenden’s men were fnally, Woodworth concludes that the factious not engaged at Perryville and, unlike McCook, command within the Army of Tennessee under‐ Crittenden’s conduct at Stones River improved his mined Bragg’s authority and his subordinates’ reputation within the Army of the Cumberland. confdence in his abilities. Evaluating their leadership at Chickamauga and Expanding on evaluations of Union and Con‐ particularly their involvement in the execution of federate leadership, Mendoza’s essay considers the “fatal order” that removed General Thomas relations within the high command of the Army of Wood’s division from the Union line, thus creating Tennessee, focusing specifcally on corps com‐ the gap that Thomas flled, Rafuse fnds fallacies mander Daniel Harvey Hill. Following poor per‐ in both generals’ conduct. The War Department’s formance at Chickamauga, Bragg relieved Hill 1864 inquiry into the debacle at Chickamauga ex‐ from command and subsequently transferred him onerated both McCook and Crittenden; however, out of the Army of Tennessee. Hill sought to re‐ neither general saw service in the Army of the store his reputation and to return to active duty to Cumberland again. To this end, Rafuse concludes no avail and consequently returned to North Car‐ that such termination of McCook was justifed be‐ olina to witness the war’s fnal years as a civilian. cause the general “did not possess the personal or Hill neglected to execute Bragg’s orders to move intellectual qualities necessary to lead a corps ef‐ his corps to McLemore’s Cove in the hopes of trap‐ fectively on a Civil War battlefeld” (p. 41). Based ping advance elements of the Union army maneu‐ on his pre-Chickamauga performance Critten‐ vering through mountain gaps toward Chicka‐ den’s removal, however, was unjustifed. Rafuse mauga Creek. Following this Pyrrhic victory, sev‐ contends that Crittenden’s “lapses in judgment” eral of Bragg’s subordinates, including Longstreet

2 H-Net Reviews and Hill, orchestrated a cabal to relieve the divi‐ tives. Longstreet recognized his career limitations sive general from command of the army. Presi‐ as long as Lee remained in command of the Army dent Jeferson Davis, however, remained steadfast of Northern Virginia and believed that he could in his support for Bragg. Mendonza does not seek provide better generalship to the western forces to justify Hill’s involvement in the efort to re‐ than Bragg. During the battle, Robertson con‐ move Bragg from command, but he does argue cludes, Longstreet’s generalship was mediocre at that Hill’s removal was unfair, namely, because best. He failed to capitalize on the breakthrough other critics of Bragg, including Longstreet, of the Union position and allowed the initial suc‐ Leonidas Polk, and Hindman remained on active cess to degenerate into a series of costly and futile duty. frontal assaults against a strong position. Free of Two essays evaluate the performance of divi‐ Lee’s shadow, Robertson concludes that sion commanders within the Army of Tennessee. Longstreet’s performance was “far less exception‐ White’s essay ofers the one positive interpreta‐ al and far more average” than his supporters tion of leadership within the Army of Tennessee. maintain. Instead, Longstreet “employed no inno‐ White argues that newly appointed Major General vative methods and showed no tactical brilliance” Alexander P. Stewart exhibited strong command (p. 135). and control during the battle. In addition to a sol‐ In the fnal essay, Smith shifts the interpretive id battlefeld performance, Stewart successfully focus away from questions of battlefeld leader‐ straddled the factions within the high command, ship and addresses issues of the “new military” remaining on positive terms with Bragg and Polk, history by exploring the career of Henry Van Ness one of Bragg’s most vocal critics. Notwithstanding Boynton and his role in the preservation of this performance, Bragg reorganized his army in Chickamauga National Military Park. Boynton, a the wake of Chickamauga, which resulted in the veteran of the 35th Ohio, received the Medal of dismantling of Stewart’s division. Lundberg nar‐ Honor for his valor on Chattanooga, but upon be‐ rates yet another example of inadequate leader‐ ing wounded at Missionary Ridge spent the re‐ ship from Major General Patrick Cleburne. Lund‐ mainder of the war as a war correspondent for berg contends that had Cleburne assaulted the the Cincinnati Gazette. Boynton remained active Federal left, held by Thomas, as Bragg initially or‐ in postwar afairs as a member of the Society of dered on the morning of September 20, the Union the Army of the Cumberland and a dutiful shaper position would have collapsed. of the memory of the Civil War and particularly In the wake of defeat at Gettysburg, Davis ap‐ the fghting at Snodgrass Hill. In 1888, nearly proved the transfer of Longstreet and his First twenty-fve years after local residents of Gettys‐ Corps to join Bragg’s forces in Tennessee. In “Bull burg established the nation’s frst battlefeld of the Woods?” Robertson evaluates the leader‐ preservation organization, Boynton proposed the ship of the much-maligned Longstreet. Recent idea of creating a similar park at Chickamauga to scholars, led by Ezra Warner, William Piston, and fellow veterans of the Army of the Cumberland. Jefrey Wert, have sought to restore the reputa‐ The timing was appropriate. Boynton and other tion of Robert E. Lee’s “old warhorse.” Chickamau‐ like-minded preservationists capitalized on the in‐ ga provides historians with the opportunity to creasing patriotic sentiments of reconciliation to evaluate Longstreet’s abilities outside of the long- create battlefeld memorials that sought to honor casted shadow of Lee. Robertson contends that his soldiers’ valor and also to bind the nation’s war campaign for a transfer out of the Army of North‐ wounds. His work was without precedent; Boyn‐ ern Virginia was based largely on personal mo‐ ton drafted the legislation to introduce into Con‐ gress, termed the phrase “national military park,”

3 H-Net Reviews and recommended that each newly created park Ethan  be managed by a three-member commission. , Boynton’s eforts came to fruition on September Alexander  18, 1895, with the creation of Chickamauga Na‐ tional Military Park. In addition to introducing the James  legislation to preserve Chickamauga, Smith ar‐ Thomas  gues that Boynton willingly molded the interpre‐ of the  tation of Chickamauga by emphasizing the fght‐ Lee  ing at Snodgrass Hill, where Boynton and the 35th Ohio fought. Although at times downplaying earli‐ Leonidas  er preservation eforts by the Gettysburg Battle‐ John  feld Memorial Association, Smith fnds Boynton’s George  work pioneering and titles him the “father of the Jeferson  modern military park movement” (p. 183). General James  The essays in Woodworth’s The Chickamauga Campaign ofer a compelling study in command William  and leadership at the battle of Chickamauga. This a work is not intended to provide a general over‐ Robert E.  view of the campaign, but to explore specifc Braxton  events within the battle. Woodworth’s Civil War Campaigns in the Heartland works toward bring‐ that  ing due attention to the war’s western theater. Timothy B.  When complete, these seventeen volumes will s reenergize otherwise neglected campaigns and provide a more nuanced understanding of the de‐ cisiveness of the western engagements. In its en‐ tirety, this series will do for the western theater what Gary Gallagher’s edited campaign and battle series did for the war’s already popular eastern theater.

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Citation: Jennifer Murray. Review of Woodworth, Steven E.; ed. The Chickamauga Campaign. H-CivWar, H-Net Reviews. February, 2011.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=31904

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