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Analysis

Th e Siloviki in Russian Politics: Political Strategy or a Product of the System? By Bettina Renz, King’s College, London Abstract Many observers have interpreted the rising number of siloviki in Russian politics as a conscious policy choice pursued by President Putin. In view of the Russian system of elite recruitment and the widely varying backgrounds of these fi gures, however, their role seems more modest than often asserted and the possibility of a coordinated “siloviki project” is unlikely.

Putin and the “Force Structures” tutionalized mechanism of elite recruitment. Treated ince ’s election in March 2000 as as a phenomenon in isolation, an increase in politicians Spresident of the Russian Federation, the appoint- with a background in the military and security servic- ment of politicians and high-ranking offi cials with a es will inevitably be evaluated as anti-democratic. Th is force-structure background – the so-called siloviki is the case particularly if approached from a Western as defi ned in the supplement to this article– has at- point of view holding that a “military beyond poli- tracted the attention of academic analysts and jour- tics” is fundamental to democratic governance. When nalists both in and in the West. One dominant Putin became acting president in December 1999 he interpretation of this phenomenon has been to evalu- was faced with a political system that has been termed ate such appointments as a conscious political strategy by the British political scientist Richard Sakwa as a and as an expression of a more authoritarian policy “regime system of rule.” direction pursued by Putin, himself a former KGB One characteristic of this system was that the for- offi cer. Some commentators, particularly political mation of government was only tenuously linked to scientists Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, the outcome of elections, the parliament or political even went as far as to assert that Putin’s ultimate goal parties represented in the latter. Instead, political ap- was the establishment of a “militocracy.” According pointments were highly personalized and determined to these experts, such a system dominated by siloviki by the president’s construction of tactical combina- would increasingly come to resemble the merely for- tions aimed at maintaining a balance focused on him- mal democracy of the . self. Within this context, personal links and loyalty Th e appointment of siloviki to political posts is were the predominant factor for political appoint- not unique to the Putin era and should not be over- ments under Yeltsin, whose regime centered on the emphasized as a characteristic of his leadership alone. so-called “Family” – a fl uid group of favored Kremlin According to a recalculation of Khrystanovskaya and insiders. Th ese included powerful oligarchs like White’s data by the American analyst Sharon Rivera, Boris Berezovskii and Roman Abramovich, but also the numbers of siloviki in political and offi cial posts have less prominent fi gures, such as the head of Yeltsin’s risen monotonically since perestroika and the practice presidential administration, Aleksandr Voloshin and was relatively common, particularly in the second half Yeltsin’s daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko. of ’s presidency. Th e noticeable rise in the When Putin became acting president in December numbers of such appointments since Putin’s election to 1999 he “inherited” this political system. No institu- the presidency cannot be overlooked. Th e signifi cance tionalized channels of elite recruitment were available of this, however, requires further investigation. In view to him and the political regime was highly personal- of the specifi c system of elite recruitment in contempo- ized. As such, this system both allowed him to and, rary Russia and considering the widely varying back- to an extent, left him no choice but to rely, at least in grounds of siloviki, a conscious political strategy for the part, on representatives of the force structures. Putin establishment of a “militocracy” is unlikely. had only fi ve months experience in federal politics and lacked a ready-made shadow government able to run Russian Patterns of Elite Recruitment the state machine. Th us, in addition to retaining key t is important to contextualise the rise in the num- fi gures of the Yeltsin era, Putin formed his govern- Ibers of siloviki within the framework of the post-So- ment by relying on trusted individuals he had previ- viet political system and, particularly, the under-insti- ously worked with. Several high-profi le posts went to 2 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 17/07 ddigestigest

his former colleagues from the Leningrad KGB and leagues, particularly in the early stages of his presi- to other FSB offi cers, some of whom had served under dency, as the obvious explanation for the increasing his directorship from July 1998 until 1999. Former numbers of siloviki in political and offi cial posts. Th e Russian Defense Minister and current First Deputy decisive factors for such appointments, in their opin- Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov and presidential aide ion, are personal links and loyalty typical of the per- Viktor Ivanov are prominent examples of high-profi le sonalization of the political system of post-Soviet Rus- offi cials of Putin’s early KGB years. However, a number sia, rather than these persons’ background in the force of important posts also went to “civilian” economists structures as such. Valerii Ostanin, a former Yabloko whom Putin had worked with in the St. Petersburg deputy, accurately summarized this view: “Th e mech- city administration of Mayor Anatolii Sobchak. anism of elite recruitment under Yeltsin and Putin is According to Rivera’s abovementioned study, the ex- the same. Th ey included people in their entourage who pansion under Putin of the role of individuals with a were personally devoted to them, who came from the business background and training in economics and same institution, from the same community. Th ere is law in the Russian elite is often underestimated. nothing new in this.” Critics of such a view might justifi ably suggest that Siloviki in Putin’s “Team” even if the rising numbers of siloviki under Putin were ne would expect a strategy of government based not the result of a strategic plan, this insight does not Oon force structure representatives to be evident change the fact that their presence might push Russia in important institutions, such as the presidential into a generally more authoritarian policy direction. administration and federal ministries. However, the Indeed, analysts including Kryshtanovskaya and numbers of siloviki appointed to key posts in these White have been concerned particularly with the an- institutions do not clearly support the idea that the ticipation of more undemocratic or authoritarian poli- appointment of force-structure representatives is a tics resulting from the military frame of mind setting conscious policy pursued by Putin. In 2004 Putin re- siloviki apart from their civilian counterparts. placed the head of his fi rst administration, Yeltsin ap- However, the signifi cance of a politician’s back- pointee Aleksandr Voloshin, with the civilian lawyer, ground in the military or security forces is not obvious. Dmitrii Medvedev. Medvedev in turn was replaced in Whilst the presumption of a link between the rise in November 2005 with the regional politician, Sergei the numbers of siloviki and the tightening of demo- Sobyanin. According to the biographical data of 46 cratic freedoms in some spheres might be intuitively leading offi cials in Putin’s administration published appealing, it is problematic to use an individual’s on the Kremlin website, eight have a force-structure previous career as a guide to current action. Due to background. None of these are in the top three posi- the varying institutional backgrounds, previous ranks tions of the administration (chairman and two deputy and roles of these fi gures, the presumption of a shared chairmen). Many of them are active in advisory roles political psychology is questionable. Simply speak- for military-related subjects directly relevant to their ing, the individuals concerned are too diff erent to be previous experience. Others are long-serving members treated as a political or analytical unity. of the administration who were appointed to their posts already during Yeltsin’s presidency. Heterogeneity and Blurred Delineations With regard to the federal ministries, clear evidence n view of the wide array of functions fulfi lled by of a consciously pursued strategy for the establishment of Isiloviki during active service in one of the Soviet or a “militocracy” is lacking. Five of 21 federal ministers are Russian force structures, their previous ranks and roles of a force-structure background. However, three of them are likely to aff ect the degree of their attachment to a are at the helm of ministries belonging to the force struc- military mind or military-style traditions. In assert- tures (the interior ministry, the defense ministry, and the ing that siloviki accounted for 15 to 70 percent of the ministry for emergency situations). Th e heading of such membership of a variety of elite groups, Kryshtanovs- ministries by siloviki, rather than by civilians, is tradi- kaya and White crucially did not indicate the degree tional in Russia and not a characteristic of the Putin era. of seniority of the military personnel included in these Yeltsin’s interior ministers, for example, were all siloviki comprehensive fi gures. However, taking into account with a background in the interior ministry. the factor of previous rank, the military mindset of a conscript is likely to diff er signifi cantly from that of a Militarizing Politics? high-ranking offi cer with a lifelong career in the force any commentators and politicians in Russia see structures. In terms of the specifi c roles carried out MPutin’s reliance on the loyalty of former col- by siloviki during their active service, diff erentiation 3 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 17/07 ddigestigest

is also important. Th ere are ten institutionally distinct 1998 he was a bureaucrat with seven years of experi- force structures in contemporary Russia, whose only ence in civilian posts, including two years of experi- common denominator is a loosely defi ned concern ence in Yeltsin’s administration. with the country’s defense and security. Th e array of activities carried out by siloviki in these institutions Conclusion is immense. It ranges from commanding armies and he portrayal of siloviki as a tool in the hands of divisions (prominent siloviki with such a background Ta president pursuing a more authoritarian policy are the former governors Aleksandr Lebed and Vladi- direction can at best provide a simplifi ed explanation mir Shamanov), to specializing in public relations of events and should not be taken too literally. In this and journalism (for example, Andrei Chernenko, the respect an observation made by the American political former head of the Federal Migration Service, and scientist Peter Reddaway – that the siloviki neither have Valerii Manilov, a former Federation Council senator), a leader, nor the means of coordinating their goals and and recruiting and analyzing sources of information plans – is important. Th e tightening under Putin of (President Putin). democratic freedoms in some spheres, for example the We cannot simply presume that the experience of media, cannot be disputed. However, explanations of siloviki in a command-oriented military organization political developments should focus on actual policies is of lasting importance for their conduct in a civilian rather than on the backgrounds of those implement- post, or that they will permanently act in line with ing them. Catch-all explanations do injustice to the the undemocratic modus operandi of their former em- intricacies of Russian politics and should be eschewed ployer. Many siloviki have long since retired from ac- in favor of assessments considering developments in tive service and have had the opportunity to adapt to all their complexities. In the words of the veteran the more compromise-based environment of “civilian” correspondent of the German public televi- politics. As a result, the delineation between silovik sion channel ARD, Gabriele Krone-Schmalz, “people and “civilian” politician is often blurred. Vladimir attempting to evaluate Putin and his policies unidi- Putin, for example, resigned from the KGB in August mensionally risk getting it wrong altogether.” 1991. When he was appointed director of the FSB in

About the author Dr Bettina Renz is Lecturer in Defense Studies at King’s College London / Royal Air Force College, Cranwell.

Further reading • Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post-Soviet Aff airs 19(4), 2003, pp. 289–306. • Bettina Renz, ‘“Putin’s Militocracy”? An Alternative Interpretation of the Role of Siloviki in Contemporary Russian Politics’, Europe-Asia Studies 18(6), 2006, pp. 903–924. • Sharon Werning Rivera and David W. Rivera, “Th e Russian Elite under Putin: Militocratic or Bourgeois?’ Post- Soviet Aff airs, 22(2), 2006, pp. 125–144. • Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice, London: Routledge, 2004.

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