DOCSLIB.ORG

ACPI in Linux Architecture, Advances, and Challenges

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

ACPI in Linux Architecture, Advances, and Challenges Len Brown Anil Keshavamurthy David Shaohua Li Robert Moore Venkatesh Pallipadi Luming Yu Intel Open Source Technology Center {len.brown, anil.s.keshavamurthy, shaohua.li}@intel.com {robert.moore, venkatesh.pallipadi, luming.yu}@intel.com Abstract providing major portions of an ACPI imple- mentation in OS-independent ACPI modules ACPI (Advanced Configuration and Power In- that can be integrated into any operating sys- terface) is an open industry specification es- tem. tablishing industry-standard interfaces for OS- The ACPICA software can be hosted on any directed configuration and power management operating system by writing a small and rel- on laptops, desktops, and servers. atively simple OS Services Layer (OSL) be- ACPI enables new power management technol- tween the ACPI subsystem and the host oper- ogy to evolve independently in operating sys- ating system. tems and hardware while ensuring that they continue to work together. The ACPICA source code is dual-licensed such that Linux can share it with other operating sys- This paper starts with an overview of the tems, such as FreeBSD. ACPICA architecture. Next a section describes the implementation architecture in Linux. 1.1 ACPICA Overview Later sections detail recent advances and cur- rent challenges in Linux/ACPI processor power ACPICA defines and implements a group of management, CPU and memory hot-plug, software components that together create an legacy plug-and-play configuration, and hot- implementation of the ACPI specification. A keys. major goal of the architecture is to isolate all operating system dependencies to a relatively small translation or conversion layer (the OS 1 ACPI Component Architecture Services Layer) so that the bulk of the ACPICA code is independent of any individual operat- The purpose of ACPICA, the ACPI Component ing system. Therefore, hosting the ACPICA Architecture, is to simplify ACPI implementa- code on new operating systems requires no tions for operating system vendors (OSVs) by source code modifications within the CA code • 51 • 52 • ACPI in Linux itself. The components of the architecture in- clude (from the top down): Operating System • A user interface to the power management and configuration features. • A power management and power policy ACPI Subsystem component (OSPM). 1 OS Services Layer • A configuration management component. • ACPI-related device drivers (for example, ACPI Core Subsystem drivers for the Embedded Controller, SM- Bus, Smart Battery, and Control Method Battery). • An ACPI Core Subsystem component that provides the fundamental ACPI services (such as the AML2 interpreter and names- Figure 1: The ACPI Subsystem Architecture pace3 management). • An OS Services Layer for each host oper- The OS Services Layer is the only component ating system. of the ACPICA that contains code that is spe- cific to a host operating system. Figure 1 illus- 1.2 The ACPI Subsystem trates the ACPI Subsystem is composed of the OSL and the Core. The ACPI Subsystem implements the low level The ACPI Core Subsystem supplies the ma- or fundamental aspects of the ACPI specifica- jor building blocks or subcomponents that are tion. It includes an AML parser/interpreter, required for all ACPI implementations includ- ACPI namespace management, ACPI table and ing an AML interpreter, a namespace man- device support, and event handling. Since the ager, ACPI event and resource management, ACPICA core provides low-level system ser- and ACPI hardware support. vices, it also requires low-level operating sys- tem services such as memory management, One of the goals of the Core Subsystem is to synchronization, scheduling, and I/O. To allow provide an abstraction level high enough such the Core Subsystem to easily interface to any that the host OS does not need to understand operating system that provides such services, or know about the very low-level ACPI details. the OSL translates OS requests into the native For example, all AML code is hidden from the calls provided by the host operating system. OSL and host operating system. Also, the de- tails of the ACPI hardware are abstracted to 1 OSPM, Operating System directed Power Manage- higher-level software interfaces. ment. 2AML, ACPI Machine Language exported by the BIOS in ACPI tables, interpreted by the OS. The Core Subsystem implementation makes no 3The ACPI namespace tracks devices, objects, and assumptions about the host operating system methods accessed by the interpreter. or environment. The only way it can request 2005 Linux Symposium • 53 Resource Event Host Operating System Management Management Namespace ACPI Table ACPI H/W ACPI Subsystem Management Management Management OS Services Layer Host/OS ACPI/OS AML Interpreter Interface Interface Core Subsystem Figure 3: Internal Modules of the ACPI Core ACPI Interface Subsystem 1.4 AML Interpreter Figure 2: Interaction between the Architectural The AML interpreter is responsible for the Components parsing and execution of the AML byte code that is provided by the computer system ven- operating system services is via interfaces pro- dor. The services that the interpreter provides vided by the OSL. Figure 2 shows that the OSL include: component “calls up” to the host operating sys- tem whenever operating system services are re- • AML Control Method Execution quired, either for the OSL itself, or on behalf of the Core Subsystem component. All native • Evaluation of Namespace Objects calls directly to the host are confined to the OS Services Layer, allowing the core to remain OS 1.5 ACPI Table Management independent. This component manages the ACPI tables. The 1.3 ACPI Core Subsystem tables may be loaded from the firmware or di- rectly from a buffer provided by the host oper- ating system. Services include: The Core Subsystem is divided into several log- ical modules or sub-components. Each mod- • ACPI Table Parsing ule implements a service or group of related • ACPI Table Verification services. This section describes each sub- component and identifies the classes of external • ACPI Table installation and removal interfaces to the components, the mapping of these classes to the individual components, and the interface names. Figure 3 shows the inter- 1.6 Namespace Management nal modules of the ACPI Core Subsystem and their relationship to each other. The AML inter- The Namespace component provides ACPI preter forms the foundation of the component, namespace services on top of the AML inter- with additional services built upon this founda- preter. It builds and manages the internal ACPI tion. namespace. Services include: 54 • ACPI in Linux • Namespace Initialization from either the 1.9 Event Handling BIOS or a file • Device Enumeration The Event Handling component manages the ACPI System Control Interrupt (SCI). The sin- • Namespace Access gle SCI multiplexes the ACPI timer, Fixed • Access to ACPI data and tables Events, and General Purpose Events (GPEs). This component also manages dispatch of no- tification and Address Space/Operation Region 1.7 Resource Management events. Services include: The Resource component provides resource • ACPI mode enable/disable query and configuration services on top of the Namespace manager and AML interpreter. Ser- • ACPI event enable/disable vices include: • Fixed Event Handlers (Installation, re- moval, and dispatch) • Getting and Setting Current Resources • General Purpose Event (GPE) Handlers • Getting Possible Resources (Installation, removal, and dispatch) • Getting IRQ Routing Tables • Notify Handlers (Installation, removal, • Getting Power Dependencies and dispatch) • Address Space and Operation Region 1.8 ACPI Hardware Management Handlers (Installation, removal, and dis- patch) The hardware manager controls access to the ACPI registers, timers, and other ACPI–related hardware. Services include: 2 ACPICA OS Services Layer (OSL) • ACPI Status register and Enable register access The OS Services Layer component of the archi- • ACPI Register access (generic read and tecture enables the re-hosting or re-targeting of write) the other components to execute under different operating systems, or to even execute in envi- • Power Management Timer access ronments where there is no host operating sys- • Legacy Mode support tem. In other words, the OSL component pro- vides the glue that joins the other components • Global Lock support to a particular operating system and/or environ- ment. The OSL implements interfaces and ser- • Sleep Transitions support (S-states) vices using native calls to host OS. Therefore, • Processor Power State support (C-states) an OS Services Layer must be written for each target operating system. • Other hardware integration: Throttling, Processor Performance, etc. The OS Services Layer has several roles. 2005 Linux Symposium • 55 1. It acts as the front-end for some OS-to- 2.1.1 OS Boot-load-Time Services ACPI requests. It translates OS requests that are received in the native OS format Boot services are those functions that must be (such as a system call interface, an I/O re- executed very early in the OS load process, be- quest/result segment interface, or a device fore most of the rest of the OS initializes. These driver interface) into calls to Core Subsys- services include the ACPI subsystem initializa- tem interfaces. tion, ACPI hardware initialization, and execu- tion of the _INI control methods for various de- 2. It exposes a set of OS-specific application vices within the ACPI namespace. interfaces. These interfaces translate ap- plication requests to calls to the ACPI in- terfaces. 2.1.2 Device Driver Load-Time Services 3. The OSL component implements a stan- For the devices that appear in the ACPI names- dard set of interfaces that perform OS de- pace, the operating system must have a mecha- pendent functions (such as memory allo- nism to detect them and load device drivers for cation and hardware access) on behalf of them. The Device driver load services provide the Core Subsystem component. These this mechanism. The ACPI subsystem provides interfaces are themselves OS-independent services to assist with device and bus enumer- because they are constant across all OSL ation, resource detection, and setting device re- implementations.
Recommended publications
  • Dell Inspiron 7391 Setup and Specifications

    Dell Inspiron 7391 Setup and Specifications

    Inspiron 7391 2n1 Setup and Specifications Regulatory Model: P113G Regulatory Type: P113G001 Notes, cautions, and warnings NOTE: A NOTE indicates important information that helps you make better use of your product. CAUTION: A CAUTION indicates either potential damage to hardware or loss of data and tells you how to avoid the problem. WARNING: A WARNING indicates a potential for property damage, personal injury, or death. © 2018 - 2019 Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries. All rights reserved. Dell, EMC, and other trademarks are trademarks of Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries. Other trademarks may be trademarks of their respective owners. 2019 - 07 Rev. A00 Contents 1 Set up your Inspiron 7391 2n1.........................................................................................................4 2 Views of Inspiron 7391 2n1............................................................................................................ 6 Right........................................................................................................................................................................................6 Left.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Base......................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Display....................................................................................................................................................................................
  • BEA TUXEDO Reference Manual Section 5 - File Formats and Data Descriptions

    BEA TUXEDO Reference Manual Section 5 - File Formats and Data Descriptions

    BEA TUXEDO Reference Manual Section 5 - File Formats and Data Descriptions BEA TUXEDO Release 6.5 Document Edition 6.5 February 1999 Copyright Copyright © 1999 BEA Systems, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Restricted Rights Legend This software and documentation is subject to and made available only pursuant to the terms of the BEA Systems License Agreement and may be used or copied only in accordance with the terms of that agreement. It is against the law to copy the software except as specifically allowed in the agreement. This document may not, in whole or in part, be copied photocopied, reproduced, translated, or reduced to any electronic medium or machine readable form without prior consent, in writing, from BEA Systems, Inc. Use, duplication or disclosure by the U.S. Government is subject to restrictions set forth in the BEA Systems License Agreement and in subparagraph (c)(1) of the Commercial Computer Software-Restricted Rights Clause at FAR 52.227-19; subparagraph (c)(1)(ii) of the Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software clause at DFARS 252.227-7013, subparagraph (d) of the Commercial Computer Software--Licensing clause at NASA FAR supplement 16-52.227-86; or their equivalent. Information in this document is subject to change without notice and does not represent a commitment on the part of BEA Systems. THE SOFTWARE AND DOCUMENTATION ARE PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. FURTHER, BEA Systems DOES NOT WARRANT, GUARANTEE, OR MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING THE USE, OR THE RESULTS OF THE USE, OF THE SOFTWARE OR WRITTEN MATERIAL IN TERMS OF CORRECTNESS, ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, OR OTHERWISE.
  • INT 09H (9) Keyboard

    INT 09H (9) Keyboard

    INT 09h (9) Keyboard The keyboard generates an INT 9 every time a key is pushed or released. Notes: This is a hardware interrupt (IRQ 1) activated by the make or break of every keystroke. The default INT 9 handler in the ROM reads the make and break scan codes from the keyboard and converts them into actions or key codes as follows: ş For ASCII keys, when a make code is encountered, the ASCII code and the scan code for the key are placed in the 32-byte keyboard buffer, which is located at 0:41Eh. The ASCII code and scan code are placed in the buffer at the location addressed by the Keyboard Buffer Tail Pointer (0:041Ch). The Keyboard Buffer Tail Pointer is then incremented by 2, and if it points past the end of the buffer, it is adjusted so that it points to the beginning of the buffer. ş If Ctrl, Alt, or Shift has been pressed, the Shift Status (0:0417h) and Extended Shift Status (0:0418h) bytes are updated. ş If the Ctrl-Alt-Del combination has been pressed, the Reset Flag (0:0472h) is set to 1234h and control is given to the power-on self test (POST). Because the Reset Flag is 1234h, the POST routine bypasses the memory test. ş If the Pause key sequence has been entered, this interrupt enters an indefinite loop. The loop is broken as soon as a valid ASCII keystroke is entered. (The PC Convertible issues an INT 15h, Service 41h (Wait on External Event), to execute its pause loop.) ş If the Print Screen key sequence is entered, an INT 05h (Print Screen) is executed.
  • Networking Telnet

    Networking Telnet

    IBM i Version 7.2 Networking Telnet IBM Note Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in “Notices” on page 99. This edition applies to IBM i 7.2 (product number 5770-SS1) and to all subsequent releases and modifications until otherwise indicated in new editions. This version does not run on all reduced instruction set computer (RISC) models nor does it run on CISC models. This document may contain references to Licensed Internal Code. Licensed Internal Code is Machine Code and is licensed to you under the terms of the IBM License Agreement for Machine Code. © Copyright International Business Machines Corporation 1998, 2013. US Government Users Restricted Rights – Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp. Contents Telnet................................................................................................................... 1 What's new for IBM i 7.2..............................................................................................................................1 PDF file for Telnet........................................................................................................................................ 1 Telnet scenarios...........................................................................................................................................2 Telnet scenario: Telnet server configuration.........................................................................................2 Telnet scenario: Cascaded Telnet
  • Designing PCI Cards and Drivers for Power Macintosh Computers

    Designing PCI Cards and Drivers for Power Macintosh Computers

    Designing PCI Cards and Drivers for Power Macintosh Computers Revised Edition Revised 3/26/99 Technical Publications © Apple Computer, Inc. 1999 Apple Computer, Inc. Adobe, Acrobat, and PostScript are Even though Apple has reviewed this © 1995, 1996 , 1999 Apple Computer, trademarks of Adobe Systems manual, APPLE MAKES NO Inc. All rights reserved. Incorporated or its subsidiaries and WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH No part of this publication may be may be registered in certain RESPECT TO THIS MANUAL, ITS reproduced, stored in a retrieval jurisdictions. QUALITY, ACCURACY, system, or transmitted, in any form America Online is a service mark of MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS or by any means, mechanical, Quantum Computer Services, Inc. FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. AS A electronic, photocopying, recording, Code Warrior is a trademark of RESULT, THIS MANUAL IS SOLD “AS or otherwise, without prior written Metrowerks. IS,” AND YOU, THE PURCHASER, ARE permission of Apple Computer, Inc., CompuServe is a registered ASSUMING THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO except to make a backup copy of any trademark of CompuServe, Inc. ITS QUALITY AND ACCURACY. documentation provided on Ethernet is a registered trademark of CD-ROM. IN NO EVENT WILL APPLE BE LIABLE Xerox Corporation. The Apple logo is a trademark of FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, FrameMaker is a registered Apple Computer, Inc. INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL trademark of Frame Technology Use of the “keyboard” Apple logo DAMAGES RESULTING FROM ANY Corporation. (Option-Shift-K) for commercial DEFECT OR INACCURACY IN THIS purposes without the prior written Helvetica and Palatino are registered MANUAL, even if advised of the consent of Apple may constitute trademarks of Linotype-Hell AG possibility of such damages.
  • Security in Ordinary Operating Systems

    Security in Ordinary Operating Systems

    39 C H A P T E R 4 Security in Ordinary Operating Systems In considering the requirements of a secure operating system,it is worth considering how far ordinary operating systems are from achieving these requirements. In this chapter, we examine the UNIX and Windows operating systems and show why they are fundamentally not secure operating systems. We first examine the history these systems, briefly describe their protection systems, then we show, using the requirements of a secure operating system defined in Chapter 2, why ordinary operating systems are inherently insecure. Finally, we examine common vulnerabilities in these systems to show the need for secure operating systems and the types of threats that they will have to overcome. 4.1 SYSTEM HISTORIES 4.1.1 UNIX HISTORY UNIX is a multiuser operating system developed by Dennis Ritchie and Ken Thompson at AT&T Bell Labs [266]. UNIX started as a small project to build an operating system to play a game on an available PDP-7 computer. However, UNIX grew over the next 10 to 15 years into a system with considerable mindshare, such that a variety of commercial UNIX efforts were launched. The lack of coherence in these efforts may have limited the market penetration of UNIX, but many vendors, even Microsoft, had their own versions. UNIX remains a significant operating system today, embodied in many systems, such as Linux, Sun Solaris, IBM AIX, the various BSD systems, etc. Recall from Chapter 3 that Bell Labs was a member of the Multics consortium. However, Bell Labs dropped out of the Multics project in 1969, primarily due to delays in the project.
  • AXEL Platine Terminal Ethernet TCP/IP Models

    AXEL Platine Terminal Ethernet TCP/IP Models

    AXEL Platine Terminal Ethernet TCP/IP Models User's Guide May 1997 - Ref.: TCPUE105/701-2 The reproduction or the translation of this material, in part or whole, is strictly prohibited. For additional information, please contact: AXEL Zone d'activité d'Orsay-Courtabœuf 16 Avenue du Québec BP 728 91962 LES ULIS Cedex France Tel.: (33) 1 69 28 27 27 Fax: (33) 1 69 28 82 04 The information in this document is subject to change without notice. AXEL assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective holders. © - 1995-1997 - AXEL - All Rights Reserved. 1 - TCP/IP SET-UP ..........................................................................................1 2 - TERMINAL SET-UP ...................................................................................4 2.1 - GENERAL FEATURES.........................................................................5 2.1.1 - Enter Terminal Set-Up Mode ..........................................................5 2.1.2 - Set-Up Screens ..............................................................................6 2.1.3 - Predefined Set-Up..........................................................................6 2.1.4 - Local and Global Parameters .........................................................6 2.1.5 - Exit Set-Up.....................................................................................7 2.2 - SCREEN...............................................................................................8
  • The Gold Standard for Patent Brokerage™

    The Gold Standard for Patent Brokerage™

    The Gold Standard for Patent Brokerage™ A proven record of success with more than 2500 patents sold. Executive Summary for the Sale of Enterprise Malware Removal & Restoration patent portfolio by Google 29 Assets Total · Full Patent Brokerage · Strategic IP Advisory EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR THE SALE OF Enterprise Malware Removal & Restoration Solutions By GOOGLE 29 TOTAL ASSETS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR THE SALE OF Enterprise Malware Removal & Restoration Solutions 12 Families, 13 US Patents & their 16 family members in 8 other Jurisdictions Priority Issue Expiry Bwd/ Fwd Patent Number Patent Title Date Date Date Citations FAMILY 1 Discrete, background determination of the adequacy of Aug 19, Jun 8, Aug 18, US 6748544 10/41 security features of a computer system 1999 2004 2019 FAMILY 2 US 7114184 Oct 27, (This patent has been System and method for restoring computer systems damaged Mar 30, Sep 26, mapped against 2022 15/85 by a malicious computer program 2001 2006 representative (PTA 576) industry offerings) System and method for restoring computer systems damaged Mar 30, Aug 23, EP1374017 by a malicious computer program 2001 2006 System and method for restoring a computer system which has Mar 30, Jul 26, DE60214147 been damaged by a malicious computer program 2001 2007 System and method for restoring a computer system which as Mar 30, ZA 200306411 been damaged by a malicious computer program 2001 System And Method For Restoring Computer Systems Mar 30, Dec 3, IL157542 Damaged By A Malicious Computer Program 2001 2007 System And Method For Restoring Computer Systems Mar 30, IL157542D0 Damaged By A Malicious Computer Program 2001 FAMILY 3 Oct 26, Method and apparatus for multicast delivery of program Aug 25, Jan 4, US 7865723 2028(PTA1 6/17 information 2004 2011 172) Method and apparatus for multicast transmission of program Aug 25, Jan 26, DE102005039361 2/0 information 2004 2017 FAMILY 4 Sep 30, Sep 11, Sep 19, US 8266684 Tokenized resource access 18/35 2008 2012 2030 © 2018 Tangible IP, LLC.
  • Lenovo Ideapad 310 Ideapad 310-14ISK Ideapad 310-15ISK Ideapad 310 Touch-15ISK User Guide

    Lenovo Ideapad 310 Ideapad 310-14ISK Ideapad 310-15ISK Ideapad 310 Touch-15ISK User Guide

    Lenovo ideapad 310 ideapad 310-14ISK ideapad 310-15ISK ideapad 310 Touch-15ISK User Guide lmn ReadRead thethe s safetyafety notice noticess and and important important tip tipss in in the the includedincluded manual manualss before before u usingsing your your computer. computer. Notes • Before using the product, be sure to read Lenovo Safety and General Information Guide first. • The latest electronic compliance and environmental information are available from the Lenovo compliance information Web sites. - To view compliance information go to: http://www.lenovo.com/ compliance - To download environmental information go to: http://www.lenovo.com/ ecodeclaration • Some instructions in this guide may assume that you are using Windows® 10. If you are using another Windows operating system, some operations may be slightly different. If you are using other operating systems, some operations may not apply to you. • The features described in this guide are common to most models. Some features may not be available on your computer or your computer may include features that are not described in this user guide. • The illustrations used in this manual are for Lenovo ideapad 310-14ISK unless otherwise stated. • The illustrations in this manual may differ from the actual product. Please refer to the actual product. Regulatory Notice • For details, refer to Guides & Manuals at http://support.lenovo.com. First Edition (January 2016) © Copyright Lenovo 2016. LIMITED AND RESTRICTED RIGHTS NOTICE: If data or software is delivered pursuant to a General Services Administration “GSA” contract, use, reproduction, or disclosure is subject to restrictions set forth in Contract No. GS-35F-05925. Contents Chapter 1.
  • Power Macintosh 6100/ WS 6150

    Power Macintosh 6100/ WS 6150

    K Service Source Power Macintosh 6100/ WS 6150 Power Macintosh 6100/60, 6100/60AV, 6100/66, 6100/66AV, 6100/DOS Compatible, and Workgroup Server 6150 K Service Source Basics Power Macintosh 6100/WS 6150 Basics Power Macintosh System Overview - 1 Power Macintosh System Overview PowerPC microprocessors are a family of processors built on reduced instruction-set computing (RISC) technology. RISC processors streamline the internal workings of computers. Whereas traditional (complex instruction-set computing, or CISC) processors contain a wide variety of instructions to handle many different tasks, RISC processors contain only those instructions that are used most often. When a complex instruction is needed, a RISC processor builds it from a combination of basic instructions. RISC processors are designed to execute these basic instructions extremely quickly. The performance gains achieved by speeding up the most-used instructions more than compensate for the time spent creating less-used instructions. Basics Power Macintosh System Overview - 2 Previously, RISC technology had been used only in high-end workstations and commercial database servers. With the introduction of Macintosh PowerPC computers, Apple succeeded in bringing RISC technology to personal computing. Key Points Three key points to remember about a PowerPC processor- based Macintosh system: It's a Macintosh; it's compatible; it offers tremendous performance. Apple's PowerPC computers feature the same user interface as their 680x0-based predecessors. Users can mix RISC- based and 680x0-based Macintosh systems on the same net- work and exchange files and disks between them. In addition, users can run both 680x0 and native PowerPC applications on the same Power Macintosh system simultaneously.
  • Usbwall: a Novel Security Mechanism to Protect Against Maliciously Reprogrammed USB Devices

    Usbwall: a Novel Security Mechanism to Protect Against Maliciously Reprogrammed USB Devices

    USBWall: A Novel Security Mechanism to Protect Against Maliciously Reprogrammed USB Devices Myung-gu Kang M.S., Computer Science, University of Kansas, 2015 Submitted to the graduate degree program in Electrical Engineering & Computer Science and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science. Hossein Saiedian, Ph.D., Professor and Thesis Advisor Bo Luo, Ph.D., Professor Fengjun Li, Ph.D., Professor Date Defended The Thesis Committee for Myung-gu Kang certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: USBWall: A Novel Security Mechanism to Protect Against Maliciously Reprogrammed USB Devices Hossein Saiedian, Ph.D. Professor and Thesis Adviser Date Approved ii Abstract Universal Serial Bus (USB) is a popular choice of interfacing computer systems with peripherals. With the increasing support of modern operating systems, it is now truly plug-and-play for most USB devices. However, this great convenience comes with a risk which can allow a device to perform arbitrary actions at any time while it is connected. Researchers have confirmed that a simple USB device such as a mass storage device can be disguised to have an additional function such as a keyboard. An unauthorized keyboard attachment can compromise the security of the host by allowing arbitrary keystrokes to enter the host. This undetectable threat differs from traditional virus that spreads via USB devices due to the location it is stored and the way it behaves. Therefore, it is impossible for current file-level antivirus to be aware of such risk. Currently, there is no commercially available protection for USB devices other than mass storage devices.
  • Parallel Card

    Parallel Card

    PARALLEL CARD Single Port ISA EPP/ECP Parallel Card ISA1P Instruction Guide * Actual product may vary from photo Revised: December 5, 2002 The Professionals’ Source For Hard-to-Find Computer Parts 7 FCC COMPLIANCE STATEMENT This equipment has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class B digital device, pursuant to part 15 of the FCC Rules. These limits are designed to provide reasonable protection against harmful interference in a residential installation. This equipment generates, uses and can radiate radio frequency energy and, if not installed and used in accordance with the instructions, may cause harmful interference to radio communications. However, there is no guarantee that interference will not occur in a particular installation. If this equipment does cause harmful interference to radio or television reception, which can be determined by turning the equipment off and on, the user is encouraged to try to correct the interference by one or more of the following measures: • Reorient or relocate the receiving antenna. • Increase the separation between the equipment and receiver. • Connect the equipment into an outlet on a circuit different from that to which the receiver is connected. • Consult the dealer or an experienced radio/TV technician for help. 6 1 Technical Support Table of Contents The following technical resources are available for this StarTech.com product: Introduction . 2 On-line help: Installation . 3 We are constantly adding new information to the Tech Support section of our web site. To Setting Your Jumpers . 4 access this page, click the Tech Support link on our homepage, www.startech.com.