The Old New Carissa: a Study in Patience
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THE OLD NEW CARISSA: A STUDY IN PATIENCE John J. Gallagher Gallagher Marine Systems, Inc. 836 Slaters Lane, Suite 210 Alexandria, Virginia 22314-1177 Howard B. Hile Judith A. Miller Marispond, Inc. Brendan Environmental 437 Chestnut Street P.O. Box 1533 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 Valdez, Alaska 99686 ABSTRACT: The events surrounding the stranding of the wood Bay North Spit, 2.7 miles north of the entrance to the bay (Figure Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/2001/1/85/1747643/2169-3358-2001-1-85.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 chip carrier M/V New Carissa off Coos Bay, Oregon in February 1). She was empty of cargo but had an estimated 359,000 gallons 1999 drew the attention of the world, principally because of the of IFO and 37,400 gallons diesel oil on board when she stranded. unique methods employed to mitigate the threat of pollution and At that point, the master began to broadcast mayday calls report- the dramatic method employed to dispose of her forebody. As a ing his predicament. After initially refusing offers by the U.S. major oil spiller, she is hardly a blip on the screen, but as an Coast Guard to remove the crew from the vessel, he eventually attention-getter in the United States and as perhaps presenting agreed, and most crewmembers were removed by helicopter lifts the most persistent response problems ever encountered, she was with aircraft from the nearby Coast Guard Air Station at North undoubtedly at the top of the charts. As of this wnting, IV2 years Bend. after her grounding, her stern is still aground off the beach. The vessel's owners contracted with Smit Americas to conduct Despite her relative insignificance as an oil spill incident, New operations to remove New Canssa from her strand. Gallagher Carissa was signally important in the world of the Oil Pollution Marine Systems, Inc. (GMS) was mobilized to provide oil spill Act of 1990 (ΟΡΑ 90) compliance matters in two areas. First, the management services should they be ,needed and Marine Spill complex nature of the salvage-/wreck-removal operations and the Response Corporation (MSRC) was mobilized to furnish oil spill interrelation of those efforts to the conventional Unified response resources, again, should they be needed. Salvage plans Command responsibilities significantly complicated the opera- and efforts were initiated by Smit personnel. Implementation of tion. Secondly, her unusually long life as an ongoing response those plans included subcontracting the Portland-based salvage operation imposed unique pressures on the Unified Command vessel Salvage Chief to attempt removal of New Carissa from her structure. Both factors imposed significant emphasis on the strand as soon as possible. Salvage Chief, however, was unable to interpretation and implementation of the laws and regulations cross the Columbia River bar because of the same sea that kept governing ΟΡΑ 90 spill responses. In spite of the difficulties, the New Carissa from Coos Bay. By February 5, salvage personnel two most important objectives were achieved: safety of life and and cleanup resources were on-scene. Under continuing north- protection of the environment. In extremely dangerous opera- west storm winds, the ship had driven further aground, subjected tions, there was no senous injury and, at the end of the day, the to continuous pounding on the high-energy lee shore. She was fragile environment involved suffered little damage. upright, partially broached, and hard aground, 300 meters from In this paper, the authors look at some of the significant events the shore. that generated stresses and strains in relationships following the On February 8, reports of structural damage to the vessel and major activities involved in disposing of the vessel's forebody. the first report of oil discharge from the vessel were received. From onboard soundings on the following day, three of the five double bottom fuel oil tanks and the diesel double bottom tank Background were determined to be holed and tidal. Oil was reported on the water in two cargo holds as well as two of the port and starboard On the evening of February 3, 1999, the wood chip carrier M/V double bottom ballast water tanks. On this day, Salvage Chief had New Canssa, bound for the Port of Coos Bay, Oregon to load out been able to deploy to Coos Bay, but she was still unable to posi- a cargo of wood chips for Japan, arrived off that port. The tion herself to attempt to pull New Carissa from her strand. weather at the time was stormy with south and southwest winds By February 9, a transverse crack 10 to 15 feet long was found and, as a result of unfavorable conditions at the entrance bar to to have formed in the starboard hull in way of cargo hold number Coos Bay, Coos Bay pilots instructed the vessel to delay entry 5. Steering room flooding because of rudder-post displacement over the bar until the following morning. also was reported. Shortly thereafter, the engine room suddenly Accordingly, the vessel delayed entry into Coos Bay and flooded, effectively rendering removal of the vessel from her elected to anchor for the night off of the North Spit of Coos Bay strand as an intact structure impossible. At that point, the vessel's to await a pilot for entry the following morning. On the morning hull underwriters declared New Carissa a constructive total loss of February 4, the vessel—experiencing winds gusting to Force 8 Smit continued to work for owners under the Lloyds Open Form with very high breaking waves—was driven aground on the Coos (LOF). 85 86 2001 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE Sutton Creek FLORENCE Siltcoos Rive PACIFIC OCEAN Tahkenitch Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/2001/1/85/1747643/2169-3358-2001-1-85.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 Umpqua River Tenmile Creek NEW CARISSA North Spit Figure 1. The stranding site and adjacent Oregon coast showing snowy plover habitats. The response Unified Command was faced with the potential for imminent breakup of New Canssa with the discharge of her remaining oil By February 9, GMS-directed oil spill cleanup crews had be- on the beaches. gun recovering oil on the beach and initiated protection of sensi- To make the situation worse, the area immediately astern of the tive resources in the area. Mobilization of personnel was pro- stranding site was a habitat for the environmentally threatened jected at 200 to 300 workers by the end of the day. An Incident western snowy plover. Since the inception of their nesting season Command System (ICS) Unified Command structure and spill was imminent, any amount of oil or other intrusion into this management team initially were established at U.S. Coast Guard habitat was anathema to the environmentalists and The Nature Air Station at North Bend to direct the response operations. This Conservancy concerned with these creatures. command center was subsequently moved to and established in On February 12, the burn was initiated (Figure 3). The burn the Coos Bay National Guard Armory later that week. achieved spectacular and substantial success, removing most of By February 10, with all hope gone for removing the vessel the bunkers remaining in the double bottom tanks under cargo from her strand as a unitary structure and in view of the continu- holds number 2 and 3. Since hydrostatic lift displaced the con- ing breakup of the hull under pounding seas, the Unified Com- tents of the double bottoms into the cargo holds, almost complete mand developed plans to minimize the potential for oil pollution combustion was realized in the tanks that were breached during by initiating a controlled burn of the some 396,400 gallons of fuel the stranding. Although about 200,000 gallons of bunkers were and diesel oil remaining onboard. Burning plans included opening consumed successfully in the burn operation, it was estimated the double bottom fuel tank tops beneath the cargo holds with that 100,000 to 150,000 gallons of bunkers still remained in un- shaped charges to expose the bunkers and simultaneously igniting breached double bottoms since hydrostatic lift of oil from those the exposed fuel with explosives in drums of jellied gasoline tanks was unavailable. (NAPALM). Because of the sea conditions shown in Figure 2, the NEW CARISSA CASE STUDIES 87 Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/2001/1/85/1747643/2169-3358-2001-1-85.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 Figure 2. Typical sea conditions at the wreck following Figure 4. The morning after the burn. stranding. wreck, a special hawser of sufficient length and suitable strength was needed to make the hook up and tow. The only known haw- sers having the required characteristics were specially designed cables fabricated from "Dynema" fiber. One such cable was lo- cated in Europe and another in Australia. To implement the sal- vage-/wreck-removal plan, the salvor ordered 3,200 feet of 10- inch Dynema hawser (in 4 χ 800 ft segments) from the European source by chartered air cargo. In the meantime, heavy storm seas continued to impact the bow section, driving it further aground and closer to the beach. Pending the arrival of the tow hawser from Europe and because of the then greater accessibility of the bow section to the shore, it became possible to work the bow section of the wreck from the beach. The wreck continued to be pounded by the seas on a daily basis and continued breakup was ongoing, making the threat of further serious discharge of oil still threat. Because of this, the Unified Command concurred with a proposal by the U.S.