BftlTISH INTERESTS IN THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES VALLEY:

1856 - 1888,

Thesis submitted for M.A. degree

by Winifred Bamforth. May 1948. ProQuest Number: 10097204

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ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction 1

Chapter I British relations with the Tigris- 18 Euphratos Valley before 1856

Chapter II The alternative route to India: the 33 Euphrates Valley railway, 1856-lr8^

Chapter III British attempts to secure the 56 alternative route to India, 1867-1888

Chapter IV Postal and telegraphic communications 85 with India through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, 1856-1888

Chapter V British commercial interests in the lo/f, Tigris-Euphrates Valley, 1856-1888

Chapter VI An outpost of India. British political and strategic interests in the Tigris- t Euphrates Valley.

Conclusion ¥

Appendix i&l

Bibliography 1st

Maps 1.

INTRODUCTION

"How is Babylon become a desolation among the nations! ... ^er cities are a desolation, a dry land, and a wilderness, a land wherein no man dwelleth neither doth any son of man pass thereby". *

Few countries have fallen from such a dazzling heights^ to

such abysmal squalor as the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys, The

wonders cf Nineveh and Babylon, and the fantastic splendours of

Haroun A1 Rashid, Caliph of Baghdad, had by the Sixteenth Centu #y

faded Into a legendary past.

"The country •* whatever its past, whatever treasures may yet await science and enlightened rule - lay now long ruined by callous oppression, wild, desolate, and disordered from the rock-fortress of Mardin to the Shatt ul Arab".

It was still in that condition by the Nineteenth Ccntui*y.

Little more was (^hardly^to be expected from a country which for / generations had served as a battle-ground for the forces of the

•Grand Signior* and the Shah of Persia, whilst fierce internal

faction contributed to the general confusion.

In 1638, Baghdad finally fell to the Turks whp thereafter maintained a precarious hold on the city and the surrounding country, in the face cf Persian attacks which continued until the early years of the Nineteenth Century. Nominally, the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley formed part of the Ottoman Empire, but until the fall of the Mamluk Pashas In 1831 it was in fact ruled by a

1« “Jeremiah”:Chapter 50, Verses 23 and 43 2, S.H-. Longrigg: Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, Oxford 1925. p.2. 2.

series of quasi-independent Governors who received a firman of

investiture from the Sultan hut were otherwise too far removed

from Constantinople to he under his effective control. Even more

independent then their Turkish predecessors were the Mamluk or

Slave Pashas, originally Georgian slaves attendant upon the Sultan

who had risen to the highest posts through his fahour. Once

established in their exalted positions, they showed a contempt for

the Sultan* s authority which finally brought about their ruin.

The first Mamluk Pasha of Baghdad was Suleiman who took office in

1749o For almost a century the Tigris-Euphrates Valley was

governed by these 'Slave Pashas *, whose rule was characterized by

luxury at court and by cruel and extortionate misgovernment of

the country. At length, their independence became intolerable

to the Sultan, particularly after the refusal of Buad Pasha to

make any contribution to the Imperial Treasury for the war against

Russia in 1829. The end came in 1831, when Duad capitulated to

the Sultan's army, after plague, flood and famine had ravished

Baghdad.^'

after the fall of the Mamluks, the province fell victim to the

centralization ordained by the Sultan Mahmud II, and became without

, question a province of the Sultan's Empire, governed by a Pasha

appointed in fact by the Sultan and holding office only at his

pleasure#

1. The best account of the events at Baghdad at this time is given by an English missionary there, A.N, Groves; Journal of a residence Baghdad during the years 1830 and 1831, London 1832 3.

"Unwilling contributions yearly left the 'Iraq Pashas for Stambul, Military and civil officers were all on the Imperial strength, none dared to resist the wishes of their superiors. All posts might be secured by the old means of purchase and favour; many were indistinguishable from the old tax-farm governorships; but none might be retained contrary to the Sovereign's wishes."#

The political limits of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley do not lend themselves easily to precise definition. In 1856, the whole of the

Valley from Mosul in the north, to Basra an MhabZ-el-Arab formed, roughly, the Pashalic of Baghdad, It is, therefore, convenient to take the limits of the Tigiis-Valley as being those of the

Pashalic of Baghdad in 1856, The limits' of the Pashalic were themselves not precisely defined. On the east, the Province was - bounded by the Persian frontier, which had not yet been delimited and provided a constant source of petty irritation to both Persians and Turks; to the north lay the mountains of Kurdistan, to the west and south-west the Syrian and Arabian deserts; and to the south, the Persian Gulf,

The broad Valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates might well have been developed into one of the richest and most fertile of the

Sultan's provinces. In the vast undulating plain of the Jezireh, to the north of Baghdad, the soil was originally good, but the total absence of irrigation led to the gradual encroachment of the scrub and desert, leaving small cultivated areas in the immediate neighbourhood of the rivers. South of Baghdad stretched the great

1. Longrigg; op. cit, p, 278 4.

alluvial plain of Irak, sloping vary gently from Baghdad down to the

Persian Gulf, This region contained the supposed site of the

Garden of Eden, and of the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, but apathy and constant tribal warfare had reduced it to mere boggy wasteland where dates and rice alone could be grown with certain success.

To the ftst of the Euphrates, the arid desert wastes provided very meagre pasturage for Arab flocks, whilst to the north and north-east, in the foothills of Kurdistan, grazing was richer and cultivation of the land was possible, although it was limited by the generally unsettled state of the country. River conservancy was totally unknown, and the Turks mads no effort to make or to keep the Tigris and Euphrates open for navigation* Both those rivers, and their confluence, the Shatt-el-Arab were shallow and winding, subject to sudden rises when swollen with the melted snows of the northei# mountains, and becoming sluggish marshy streams in the dry season.

In the whole of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley there were few towns.

Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra the only seanert, were the most important*

Their industries and amenities were of a primitive character, and they were garrison towns rather than urban centres. There were, too,

"market towns", settlements where the produce of the neighbourhood was collected together for sale# and the three holy cities of the

Shi ell Mohammedans, which were given over to the 'pilgrim trade'.

After his travels in tho Tigris-Euphrates Valley 1649 to 1851, A.H. Layard described the desolate state of the country.

"Nothing", he wrote, "marks more completely the results of the unjust and injurious system pursued by the ports in its Arabian territories than tho almost entire absence of permanent settlements and intercourse on the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris, Two of the finest rivers of Asia, reaching into the very heart of the Turkish dominions, spreading fertility through districts almost unequalled for the richness of their soil and for the varied natura of their produce, and navigable one for nearly 850 miles from the sea, the other for nearly 600 miles, are of no account whatever to the State upon which Nature has conferred such eminent advantages. ... Prom the most wanton and disgraceful neglect, the Tigris and Euphrates, in tho lower pont cf their course, are breaking from their natural beds, forming vast marshes, turning fertile districts into a wilderness, and becoming unnavigable to vessels of even the smallest burden".''

Throughout the Nineteenth Century travellers taking the 'direct

routs' between India and the Mediterranean, and the archaeologists

excavating the ruins of former civilisations, wrote, with few

X exceptions, in a similar strain. There was little or no improvement

in the condition of the country, and, ATiting in the early Twentieth

Century, Gertrude Bell and Chirol tell almost exactly the same story

of neglect and decay as W^llsted and bayard. Of the desolation of

1. AoH. bayard:- Discoveries in the ruins of Nineveh and Babylon, London 1853 p.467" ^ayard was the 'discoverer of Nineveh’ where he carried out excavations 1845-1847 and 1849-1851. After 1851, he entered politics and became Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs 1852, and 1861-66; and Chief Commissioner of Works December 1868-November 1869. He was Ambassador at Madrid 1869-1877 and Ambassador at Constantinople 1877-1880. 2. One of the exceptions was Gratton Geary, editor of the "Times of India", who made the journey through -Mesopotamia in spring, and who wrote eloquently of the.date groves and gardens along the banks of the Euphrates ... things of beauty in their fresh spring verdure, and the plain itself laid down with crops." G. Geary: Through Asiatic Turkey. Narrative of a journey from Bombay to the Bosphorus. London 1873, 2 vols. Vol* I p,192 6.

Mesopotamia, Gertruda Ball, writing sixty years after bayard, gives a delightful, although a very pathetic picture

"The native of Irak, gazing upon the empty desert which now meets his eye, is accustomed to allude proudly to the days when "a cock could hop from house to house, all the way from Basrah to Baghdad," and the saying illustrates the fundsimental truth that the present poverty-stricken condition of the land is due not to the niggardliness of nature, but to the destructive folly of

The wretched condition of the country could only have been remedied by an honest and strong administration. But the Turkish

Empire in its Asiatic provinces was little more than a hollow shasi, and na part more so than the Province of Baghdad.

"On paper, every co-efficinet of sovereignty, every process of administration, could be found in its proper nlace, ^ith its fitting attributes and its staff, from Pasha to Gendarme, all with suitable emoluments clearly set down, and activities defined".

It was, however, on paper alone that such an ordered^ystem existed, Stratford de Redcliffe’s definition of the needs of the

Tigris-Eurhrates Valley in 1856, as "a determined system of policy accompanied with good administration and maintained by means of a sufficient regular force properly distributed and duly paid",3 was equally valid throughout the whole of the Nineteenth Century*

1. G.M.L. Bell; Amurath to Amurath , London 1911 p.186

2* G*M*L, Bell: "The,Basis of Government in Turkish Arabia”printed in the Arab of M esopotamia, a collection of essays on subjects relating to Mesopotamia, Published by Government Press Basra 1918 3, Stratford de Redcliffe to Clarendon, No: 643 May 26,1856, P.O. 78/1180 In 1856, the Tigris-Euphrates Valley was, in theory, governed according to the "loi des vilayets", set forth in the Hatti-Cherif I, of Gulhane of November 1839. This aimed at bringirg the provinces more Effectively under the control of the central government, and at conferring on them "le bienfait d'une bonne administration".

It was some time before the Tigris-Euphrates Valley received the doubtful benefits of these refonas, which trailed in their wake officials, great and small, registers and instructions, in fact all the paraphenalia of bureaucracy. To the ordinary people, little change can have been apparent: the despotism of the Mamluk Pashas was followed by the extortion of their bureaucratic successors which gave no cause for rejoicing. Reminders of the Dark Ages still lurkod in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, In 1864, the British

Consul-General at Baghdad reported an attbcious case of torture used in attempt to extort confession from two men who were later proved innocent. Five years later, his successor informed the in Foreign Secretary that traffic^sleves was carried on openly throughout the Province,^

1. The text is given in G. Young: Corps de Droit Ottoman, 7 Vols, Oxford, 1905 - Vol. I, p,29 2. Kemball to Eulwer. No: 46 August 24, 1864 P*0, 195/803A 3. ^erbert to Clarendon. No: 1. Slave Trade, November 26, 1869 P.O. 195/949 8

The men selected to govern the Province of Baghdad were 1. »»Pashas with three tails", ranking as Viziers. They were apparently indifferent to the measures promuùlgated with so much ceremony at

Constantinople and applauded by the 'liberal* Powers of Europe.

A modern writer has summed up the Nineteenth Century rulers of

Baghdad quite adequately as. : -

"Liberate but not otherwise educated, backward but decorous in social habit, uniform in a travesty of European dress, exact and over-refined in the letter of officialdom, completely remote from a spirit of public service, identifying the body public with their own class, contemptuous of tribe and cultivator, persistent speakers of Turkish among Arabs, and, finally, almost universally corrupt and venal

Some of the Pashas of Baghdad are perhaps deserving of more personal notice. Muhammed Rashid Pasha, nicknamed "GouzEki" or

"the spectacled", was an honest and comparatively able man. He governed the province tolerably well from 1853 until he died, in

1858, worn out by his exertions to reform the corrupt administration.

His reputation spread to Europe, and he even received honourable 3. mention in "The Times". His successor, Omer Pasha, left 4. Constantinople with some wholesome advice from Stratford de Redcliffe,

1. Distinmvishing marks of rank of the high officers/f the Ottoman Empire were: - Sultan 7 horse-tails Grand Vizier 5 " " Vizier 3 " " Pasha 2 " " Bey 1 " " see Encyclopaedia of Islam, London 1934. 2. Longrigg op* cit. pp. 281-282 3. "The Times": July 2, 1856 4. Stratford to Clarendon. No: 996. November 11, 1857. P.O. 78/1273 9.

but all to no purpose. The following year, Bulwtr reported that

"the corruption of OmeiT Pasha and cf those under him is now matter

I. of general remark. The immediate successors of Omen Pasha call for no comment, and the newt Governor of note was the Anglophobe

Namik Pasha who held office for seven years, Namik was a Turk of the 'old school', nerrow and bigotted, mistrustful of foreigners

and all the wicked works which they wished to introduce into his

province, yet wily enough to remit taxes regularly to Constantinople

and so to retain the Sultan's favour, Mamik has left his mark in the records of the British Embassy at Constantinople where the number of complaints made to the Porte regarding his behaviour bears testimony to his Anglophobia. He was indeed fortunate in enjoying the Sultan's favour, which made it very difficult for the English to receive any redress of grievances.

Meanwhile, there had been further general reform of the Turkish provincial administration, based on a new system introduced into the

Danubian Provinces by Midhah Pasha and originally founded on the departmental system of France, The "loi des Vilayets" of November Z 1864 , set forth in minute detail the duties of the h'eirarchy of officials who were henceforward to administer each subdivision of each province. Each province or Vilayet was to be divided into

1. Bulwer to Malmesbury No: 181. August 28, 1858. F.O. 78/1367 2, The text is printed in Young op, cit. Vol: I p, 36 ff. 10.

sandjaks each under the Government of a mutessaflj- ; the sandjaks

were in turn to be sub-divided into Kazas governed by Kaimakams, and

each Kaza was divided into communes supervised by moukhtars, and

with "conseils des Anciens" to assist in the supervision of local

affairs. The duties of each official were duly set out and the

whole scheme looked very impressive on paper. But local conditions

had been completely ignored and its application to the Province of

Baghdad was an almost impossible task.

Midhat Pasha, iùi& author of the new "loi des vilayets", was

appointed Vali of Baghdad in 1869, He was a man of tremendous

driving power, fundamentally honest and with a veneer of western

culture. He did his utmost to enforce the new system and to

improve the administration of Baghdad Vilayet, setting up municipalities

and administrative councils. Most of his schemes were, howevey

too hastily conceived, and only too often not carried out by the

subordinate officials. The Tigris-Euphrates Valley had for so long

been misgoverned and backward that even the tremendous energy of

Midhat could make but little impression. His successors were of the usual type of Turkish official, almost inveiriably incompetent, too

often corrupt and bigotted. From time to time, the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley was divided into three Vilayets, when Mosul and Basra were

separated from Baghdad and made the headquarters of new provinces.

Such re—arrangement made little difference to the life and condition 11.

of the people. Three Valis, each ranking as "Pasha with three tails", were no more effective than one, and a smaller unit of government was no more competent or honest than a lomger one.

"It was a government of force and fraud", wrote Blunt after his travels in Turkish Arabia, "corrupt and corrupting to the last degree, where every)evil engine was employed to enslave and degrade the people, where the Moslems were worse treated than the Christians and where all alike were pillaged by the Pashas Everywhere land was falling out of cultivation, and the Government, like a moral plague, was infecting the inhabitants with its own corruption."^

Yet the Governors of Baghdad were no worse than those of other

Turkish provinces, and at least one English traveller gives them 2 credit for being superior to the system which they administered.

In spite of the elaborate administrative machinery, the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys remained wretchedly uaad4rdeveloped, poor and lawless. Outside the towns, there were strong feelings of hostility against the Turk, and the situation described by Consul General kemball in 1858 remained virtually unchanged throughout the contury; -

"The authority of the Turkish Government, " Kemball wrote, "is in fact limited to the precincts of the Garrison towns, and where force is wanting to controul the feuds of the Arab tribes by securing at least a predominance to one side or the other,, their recurrence must sooner or later be anticipated".^'

1. W.S. Blunt: Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt London 1907. up* 27-28 2. D.G. Hnr^rth: The Wandering Scholar. London 1925 p. 91 3. Kemball to Malmesbury, No: 4. March 2, 1858, Fv.0. 78/1397 12,

The mass of the pcoiple of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley were

üxabs, a few settled in towns or on the land, but for the most part

nomadic. They all regarded the Turks as conquerors, alien Vn race

and religion, and every possible opportunity to embarrass them was

seized. So long a» the arabs paid their contribution to the revenue,

they were virtually exempt from any manifestation of Turkish an authority. But the collection of the revenue was/Invariable cause

of friction, not infrequently leading to the open rebellion of the

Arabe whose depredations caused severe dislocation of the life of the

province. To add to the general confusion, the Turks did their utmost to foster tribal feuds, so that when not in open rebellion

against their hated conquerors, the Arabs were engaged in tribal warfare amongst themselves.

English travellers appear to have been extremely fortunate in the Arab tribes they encountered, for there * 0 doubt that some, if not all, of the Bedouin Arabs considered bàackmail and "highway" robbery a fair means of livelihood. But English travellers were not infrequently given to extravagent enthusiasms, and were quite willing to bestow the benefits of constitutional government, of the

English variety, upon semi-wild tribes, W.S. Blunt and his wife, grand-daughter of the poet Byron, considered in 1878, that the time was ripe for an independent Arab state, and did their utmost t. to enlist the support of English statesmen, Gertrude Bell, a great i.i

1. W.S, Blunt, on, cit. pp. 27 ff. 13.

friend of the iirabs, Trriting during the 1914-1918 War, gives a more just appreciation of their character, although it must be remembered that she, too, was a protagonist of an independent

Arab state.

"The Tribes inhabitating the Iraq", she declared, "were men who [ha

Not only were the majority of the people of the Tigris and

Euphrates Valleys different in race and custom from their conquerors and governors, but they also belonged to a different sect of the

Mohammedan religion. The majority of the population belonged to the Shiah persuasion, whilst the Turks were almost invariably

Sunnis, These two sects of Islam were divided not only in matters of law and ceremonial, but also on the political theory of the

Caliphate, The Shiahs regarded the Caliphate as an office conferred only by God, and they acknowledged no living ^aliph, but awaited the advent of the Mahdi, The Sunnis, on the other hand, maintained that the office was elective and accepted the Sultan of Turkey as wiK 3, Caliph, An do wing him/^both spiritual sind temporal power* The Sunni el.ement in Turkish Arabia thus occupied a political and social position out of all proportion to its numerical strength. The

1, Bell; "The Basis of Government in Turkish Arabia*loc: cit, p.21 2. See The Arab of Mesopotamia article entitled "The Shiahs and their position in the Iraq? pp. 63 ff. 14.

governing classes were naturally drawn entirely from that sect,

which also included the great landowners, the wealthy merchants and most of the town-dwellers. The Shiahs were consequently deprived

of all political status. Baghdad contained an important Sunni

shrine and was the resort of pilgrims from many parts of the Moslem

world. The most important the Shiah shrines were situated in the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and the Holy Cities of Kerbela, Nejeff and

Kazimain were much frequented by pilgrims from Persia and India where

there were large Shia^ congregations.

The Christian communities of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley included groups of Protestants and Roman Catholics, in addition to independent Asiatic churches, which were mainly concentrated in the

North fiLTound Mosul, and consisted of the Nestorian, the Jacobite and the Chaldaean Communities, The Jacobites and the Chaldeans were

each divided into two groups, one acknowledging Papal supremacy eind the other repudiating any allegiance to Rome and strictly adhering to their ancient canons. The divisions led to continual disputes about

Church property, in which the French consular representative at

Mosul supported the Fapal party, whilst his British colleague upheld the traditionalists. In addition to the Moslem and Christian communities, there were many Jews, who resided mainly in Baghdad and formed a large part of the mercantile class there. Apart from disputes with the Moslems about the tomb of the prophet Ezra, who was 15.

respected by both persuasions, the relations of the Jews and the

Moslems call for no comment. Various quaint religious sects also existed in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley* Of these, the Texldis and the Sabeans are the most well kno'wn, although politically both sects were quite insignificant. The Yezidis, or 'Devil-Worshippers* were mainly concentrated in the region round Mosul, and were, from time to time, severely persecuted, being considered idolaters by both Christians and Moslems, The Sabeams, the 'Star Worshippers' or ,1, 'Disciples of John, T*ormed a community of their own at Sook-es-

Shiookh on the banks of the Shatt-ol-Arab, They were, in the

Nineteenth Century, commonly supposed to be followers of Saint John the Baptist, but their religion was in fact a curious mixture of paganism, Judaism, Mohammedanism and Christianity* Although they were neither numerous nor politically important, the Sabeans received assistance and protection from the British consular authorities.

For the most part, the non-Moslem population of the Tigris- tuphrates Valley was not subjected to the harsh persecution practised in other Turkish provinces* The Kurds in the north, were responsible for occasional outrages against Christian inhabitants of the country, but up to 1888, such outbursts were neither sufficiently frequent nor on a sufficiently larg__e scale to attract attention* Colonel kemball

1, The Arab# of Mesopotamia p* 94 ff. 16 o

accounted for the lack of persecution by the fact that the numbers

and social position of the Christians were too insignificant to

"provoke the jealousy or fanatic ill-will of their Mahomedan fellow

subjects". Ten years later, his successor, Nixon, continued the

strange story of Turkish toieration:-

"I can safely assert", Nixon reported, "that the Turkish authorities in this part of the Ottoman dominions are most tolerant towards their Christian and Jewish subjects, and I have not heaird of one single case of ill-treatment or collision. In fact, so far as I can judge, the Mohammedans are far more forbearing towards the Christians than the latter are towards the Mussulman. The Christians have the same rights and privileges as their Mohammedan brethren, and justice seems to be fairly administered, although not very prompt.

Among the Mohammedans themselves, however, quarrels frequently arise between thq Sunnis and the Sheahs,‘ and a fertile source of quarrel is regarding their graveyards".K

The Tigris-Euphrates Valley in the Nineteenth Century did not,

therefore, provide a very happy hunting-ground for the consular

officials of the European Powers, hsnt on tracing down cases of the maltreatment of their own Christian brethren. Indeed, the region was singularly clear of foreign consuls. Great Britain and France alone of the great Powers maintained consular representatives at

Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, The Persians maintained a Consul-General at Baghdad, on account of the numbers of Persian pilgrims visiting the

Shiah shrines of the province. The material interests of other

1. Accounts and Papers (1877) Vol: LXXXIII (c 1855) p.771. Report by Consul General Nixon on'the Trade and Commerce of Baghdad for the year 1876-77. Dated Baghdad June 15, 1877. ' 17.

countries scarcely warranted the expense of consular es'^lishments;

Great Britain and France extended their protection to the few

European nationals to be found in Baghdad, In 1856, Italian, Austrian, 1. German and Swedish subjects received British protection. It was not until 1881 that Russia established a consulate in Baghdad, and two years later appointed a Consul to Mosul. Germany was not represented at Baghdad until 1890.

The few European residents in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley did not call for the numbers of consuls usually found in Turkish provinces, nor did the maltreatment of Christians provide an excuse for interference in Turkish internal affairs in Turkish Arabia, The interests of France and Persia were almost entirely concerned with the protection of their co-religionists - the Persians with the

Shiah pilgrims, and the French ostensibly with the protection of

Roman Catholic religious orders established at Baghdad and Mosul,

In fact, the French consular representatives, when actually at their posts, spent most of their time in archaeological pursuits. Great

Britain alone had material interests of sufficient magnitude to require the presence of consular officers at Baghdad, Basra and

Mosul.

1, Memorandum on the protection of Greek subjects at Baghdad by E. Hertslet, Dated May 30, 1881. F,0, 78/3354. 18.

CHAPTER I

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE TIGRIS-EUHiRATES VALLEY BEFORE 1856.

British interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley were, by 1856, of long standing: their origin lay in the quest for Eastern trade 1. of the late Sixteenth Century. In 1639, the aast India Company established a factory at Basra, in order to be "beyond the reach of the oppressions which our factories experienced in the Kingdom 2. of Persia". In 1764, the factory was officially recognised by the Porte, when the British Ambassador in Constantinople obtained a Consular Berat for the Company's Agent, "for the better security 3. and prosperity of their affairs in trade". An Agent, a Senior and a Junior Merchant eind two Waiters formed the staff of the Basra 4 * factory at this time. It was, however, not a very great success commercially and only too often the reports of trade there declared 5. that "our people had sold but few goods at mean prizes." Towards the end of the Eighteenth Century, English trade at Basra was

1. See S. Purchas: Purchas His Pilgrimes. lib. VIII p.449 (1625 Edn..) and R. Hakteyt: Principal Voyages of the English Nation (^lasoow IgoS', Part I pp. 247-71 2. A. Malet : Precis containing information in regard to the first connection of the Hon'b3e East India Company with Turkish Arabia. Calcutta 1874 p.4. 3. C.U. Aitchison: A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds relating to India and neighbouring, countries. Fourth Edition* Calcutta 18V6. Vol;VII. p.7* Document No.II

4. Malet, op. cit. p.46. 5. W. Foster: The English Factories in India. 1637-1641. Oxford 1912 p. 308 and passim. 19.

confined to a small quantity of Surat piece goods and English muslins, and some English broad-cloth and thin wodlens. The profits from these sales were scarcely sufficient to balance the cost of the factory establishment, now composed of a Resident; his

"assistant as Accountant, reader of Divine Service"! a Surgeon; a Turkish writer, and a linguist, in addition to tther servants whose 1. duties were not specified.

During the Napoleonic Wars, fears of French designs on India led the Company in 1798 to appoint a permanent Resident at Baghdad in place of the native agent who had been stationed there since

1783, The Resident's duties were to arrange for the transmission of official despatches overland between the Persian Gulf and the

Mediterranean, and to observe and counteract the work of French 2. agents believed to be active in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, In

1802, Lord Elgin, British Ambassador at Constantinople, obtained a Consular Be^at for Harford Jones, the Resident of Baghdad, "in order to protect the affairs of British merchants established there, 3 or of travellers". Eight years later, the Baghdad and Basra

Residencies were amalgamated in the Baghdad post, the Basra Residency being relegated to the rank of Assistant Political Agency. In 1812,

1* Bee JMalet, op. cits p.84 and J. Taylor: Travels from England to India in the year 1 7 8 9 . Vol* I p . 270 2, Malet op. cit. p.78 3. Aitchison op. cit. Vol: VII p.8. Document No.Ill 20.

the designation "Resident at Baghdad", was changed to that of

"Political Agent in Turkish Arabia",

After the Napoleonic Wars, doubts were expressed as to the necessity for maintaining the establishments at Basra and Baghdad, but both the Governor of Bombay and the Governor-General of India in Council, were agreed on the inexpediency of abolishing those 1. agencies, and both posts were retained. The duties of the Political

Agent in Turkish Arabia were of a somewhat vague character, now that the French menace had faded away. In 1832, however, the Secret

Committee of the East India Company gave instructions for the guidance of the public conduct of that officer* He was not to consider himself the 'Plenipotentiary at the Court of a Sovereign and independent Prince', nor was he to meddle in local affairs.

"The Company's Resident in Turkish Arabia," the instructions Continued," ought, we conceive, to consider himself as acting exclusively in a consular capacity. On the duties which belong to that character it is not necessary here to enlarge, but a watchful püotection of British interests and the persons of British subjects, diligence in the collection of important information, and an unfailing communication to your Government and to this country of all public events, and political changes, all these are properly consistent with that firm and guarded abstinence from personal interference with the internal Administraticn and external relations of the Pachalic, which we conceive it for our honour, no less than our interest, to observe".

Consular rank became attached to the post of Political Agent almost by accident. The agent of the East India Company had long

1. Malet op. cit. p. 124. 2. Secret Committee to the Governor-General of India in Council January 3, 1832. Malet op* cit. p . 128. 21.

been designated "Consul" in the Berat granted by the Sultan, but the Berat did not carry full consular powers, and the agent did not receive a Consular Commission. He was purely an officer of the

East India Company. In December 1839, however, a Vice-Consul was appointed to Mosul, to keep an eye on the general situation there, 1. in view of the conflict between the Sultan and Muhammad *Ali.

The latter had at the end of June completely routed the Sultan's forces at the Battle of Nisibin, and the way to Constantinople as well as to the Persian Gulf seemed open to him. Muhammad *Ali had long been suspected of cherishing dreams of an independent Arab

Kingdom, embracing all Arabic-speaking peoples. Palmerston had been consistent in his opposition to such a project* In his opinion, the establishment of an independent Arab state was the first step to the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, which formed "as good an 2. occupier of the road to India as an active Arab sovereign would be".

Palmerston therefore readily agreed to Ponsonby's suggestion that a

Vice-Consul should be appointed to Mosul^which provided a good point of observation for any movements down the Tigris-Euphrates Valley in 3. the direction of the Persian Gulf. Christian Hassam, a native

Chaldaean, who had acted as interpreter to the English expedition t

1. Ponsonby to Palmerston No: 282. October 8, 1839 P.O. 78/359 2. Palmerston to William Temple. March 21, 1833. H.L. Bulwer: Life of H.J. Temple, Viscount Palmerston Vol: II London 1870. p.345 3. Palmerston to Ponsonby No: 192, December 31, 1839 F.0.78/353 22.

for surveying t ^ e Euphrates, was accordingly appointed Vice-Consul, and placed under the supervision of the Consul at Erzerum.

This arrangement, however, did not satisfy the British merchants who had recently settled in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, Mosul was situated in the Pashalic of Baghdad, whilst Erzerum was the headquarters of a different province. The merchants therefore suggested that the Political Agent at Baghdad should be appointed

Consul-General, "to enable him to exercise a proper controul over our Commercial relations in the Pashalic of Baghdad", and that the 1. Vice-Consul at Mosul should be subordinate to him. Colonel Taylor was accordingly appointed Consul at Baghdad, the reasons for his appointment being clearly stated in a letter of instruction from

Palmerston; -

"... it is not intended by the Commission to interfere with your present Position as the E (ast) I (ndia) Company's Resident at Baghdad, further than to place under your Superintendence the British Vice-Consul, who has lately been appointed to reside at Mossoul

Ten years later, the Consul at Baghdad was elevated to the rank ofConsul-General, but again it was stipulated that the new rank was not in any way to alter his position as Political Agent. This 3, officer continued to be nominated and paid by the Indian Government ,

1. Memorandum from H.B* Lynch to Sir John Cam Hobhouse. June 13,1841, Passed to Palmerston. P.O. 78/462 2. Palmerston to Taylor, No.l, August 10, 1841. P.O. 78/442 3. In 1835, the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, hitherto under the Bombay Government, was put directly under the control of the supreme Government, 23

but he reported both to that Government and the Foreign Office, as

well as to the British Ambassador at Constantinople and the Minister I. at Teheran.

The duties of Political Agent, originally of a commercial

character, gradually assumed more and more a political aspect* The

first officers had been appointed to superintend the commercial

transactions of the East India Company's factory at Basra; but

by the Nineteenth Century, the Agent had become more closely concerned

with the political affairs of the region in which he was stationed, and

more especially in bringing about those conditions most favourable z to trade. The instructions of the Government of India to Rawlinson '

on his appointment in 1843, illustrate the importance which had by

then become attached to the political aspect of the post in Turkish

Arabia.

ft # « o The Governor-General in Council ... has appointed you Political Agent in Turkish Arabia. His Lordship in Council has adopted this measure in the earnest desire to preserve peace between Persia and Turkey and, in the confidence that you will most zealously devote all your exertions to the accomplishment of this object,

1. Stratford de Redcliffe complained in 1856 that he did not know "what parts of his correspondence with this Embassy, if any, Captain Kemball” transmitted to the Foreign Office. (Stratford de Redcliffe to Clarendon No; 1379, November 24, 1856. F.0.78/1192) The matter was not formally regulated until 1880, when a Circular to Consuls in the Ottoman Empire instructed them "to address all their Despatches to the Embassy, and to look to H.M's Ambassador for instructions and guidance, and only to communicate direct with the Foreign Office in cases of necessity", Granville to Goschen No; 302, Jùly 26,1880 F.O.78/3075 %. (^PSWLIfYSOf^ , SlK Cr66W\cke (isio £asr Ik A*cx. fV rh ^ k ISzy, KoV€m\xt 1939 ^ ScrAa . OdoW t«lK) ; C o ^ c S u x r . Ucy , 24.

"you will feel that your efforts can only he effectually aided by the reliance of both Governments upon your perfect impartiality in every question which exists or which may arise between you, and you will so act as to induce them to place their reliance upon you.

... you will understand that the sole object of your mission is the preservation of peace and the creation of a good understanding between the Governments and subjects of Persia and Turkey . 1 *

In addition, the maintenance of maritime peace in the Shatt-el-

Arab and the Persian Gulf, and the suppression of the Slave Trade formed an important part of the Political Agent's duties in the early part of the Nineteenth Century* Moreover, the Political

Agent was responsible for the distribution of large sums of money within the Pashalic of Baghdad* In 1825, the Shiah King of Oudh entered into an agreement with the Indian Government for the payment of sums of money annually to the guardians of the Shiah shrines at 2, Kerbela and Nejeff, This agreement came into force in 1849, and three years later, after complaints that the funds were being misappropriated, it was arranged that the "Oudh Bequest” should be distributed by the Political Agent in Baghdad* In addition, that official paid out pensions totalling £ 2,000 a year which the

British Government had granted in 1836 to three Persian Princes

1. Secretary to the Government of India to Rawlinson, 1843, Malet op. cit. p.137. 2. Aitchison op. cit. Vol:II p . 132. Document XLIV 25.

exiled to Baghdad. The total amount of these transactions was considerable and recpjwTed a large Treasury in the English

Residency, where the Consul General sometimes had as much as

£10,000 in his charge, and by 1884 distributed nearly £30,000 a 2. year. For this reason, if for no other, it was considered necessary to maintain at Baghdad the Sepoy Guard originally granted to the

Resident in 1800 "to support his respectability".

These payments made to Turkish and Indian subjects in the

Pashalic of Baghdad gave added importance to the British Resident there. In the early Nineteenth Century* particularly, the British establishment was most impressive; a stately consulate with its prosperous staff, its stables and river craft, its lavishly uniformed servants and its sepoy guard (whose cast-off clothing often formed part of the "uniform” of the Pasha's guard), all added to British prestige, and contrasted strangely with the mean establishment of the French Consul. * The Political Agents themselves lent distinction to the post they occupied, and a succession é‘f outstanding men, including Harford Jones, Rich, Rawlinson and Kemball were

1, Palmerston to McNeill (Minister at Teheran) No:25, August 23, i836. F.O.60/42. 2, plowden, Memorandum on the Sepoy Guard and Mounted Escort attached to the British Residency in Turkish Arabia, January 4, 1884. F.O. 78/3532. 3, See: J.S, Buckingham; Travels in Mesopotamia 2 Vols, London 1827, Vol:II p.209-213. C,M, Alexander: Baghdad in Bygone Days. London 1928.p.46 and passim A description of a ceremonial visit of the Resident to the Pasha of Baghdad gives some idea of the magnificent state maintained by the British representative, p.46. 26.

appointed to Baghdad during the early Nineteenth Century,

Perhaps the most colourful of them all was Rawlinson who became an almost legendary figure in the Pashalic of Baghdad, He had a fine sense of dignity eind of the consideration due to the representative of the British Government, Thirty years after Rawlinson had returned to England, he was still remembered in Baghdad with respect and admiration* Wallis Budge, visiting Baghdad an behalf of the British

Museum in 1888, heard of his reputation from an old Residency servant,

Rawlinson y/as reported to have sat on the Majlis or Town Council of Baghdad, and when he spoke, Budge was told, "the heart of the

Wali pasha melted and the Knees of his councillors gave way under them". As a further illustration of the respect in which Rawlinson was generally held, Ya'Kub declared:-

"The Balios Beg lived here for twelve years, and each year his power in the country became stronger. And towards the end of his time here, had he taken one dog, and put his English hat on his head and sent him to the Serai, all the people in the bazar would have made way for him, and bowed to him, and the soldiers would have stood still and presented arms to him as he passed, and the officials in the Herai would have embraced him; and if he had sent another dog with another of his hats across the river to Kazimen, the Shi'ites and Sunnites would have stopped fighting each other, and would have asked him to drink coffee with them",

Far more mundane were the positions occupied by the British representatives at Basra and Mosul, At Basra a servant of the

1- â.A.W, Budge: By Nile and Tigris. 2 Vols, London 1920, Vol: I p.232, 27.

Government of India combined the posts of Assistant Political Agent and Vice-Consul. H q was raised to the rank of Consul in 1879 at the request of the Government of India, "it being considered that the higher rank (would) increase the weight of any official communications wh(ich) he (might) have to make to the Wali of Bussorah on matters connected with British interests". ^-

At Mosul, the Vice-Consul was purely the agent of the British

Government, appointed and paid by the Foreign Office. The appointment was an unusual one, for at Mosul there were no British interests to protect, no British trade, and no British subjects apart from the 2 British Vice-Consul and his wife, *and a few Indians studying at the

Schools of Mohammedan Law who neither possessed British passports nor asked for protection. The post had originally been created for observing the activities of Muhammad*Ali, but by the time of the death Itv^rtL - two of the first Vice-Consul, who held office for %woety--ei^gtet years, the reason for his appointment was lost in obscurity* The Vice Consulate was, however, maintained in case anything should happen in that region 3, which would make it desirable to have a British officer on the spot*

Closely linked with British interest in the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley and with the consular officers stationed there were the early

1, Salisbury to Layard* No: 67 Consular. July 28, 1879. F.0*78/2975. 2, The first Vice Consul was a Turkish subject, his wife being the only British subject resident in Mosul* 3, Elliot to Granville. No: 15 Consular. August 5, 1872. F.O.78/2224. 28.

assyriologists. At the end of the Eighteenth Century very little was known of the former civilisations which lay buried in Mesopotamia.

Travellers had visited the mounds supposed to be the sites of ancient

cities, but their interest had been restricted to "conventional

curiosity". Towards the end of the Eighteenth Century, however,

discoveries of "inscribed bricks" at Babylon and among the ruins of

Persepolis in Persia, had attracted the attention of European

scholars who were soon occupied with the task of deciphering the strange characters. Amongst those interested in the new discoveries were successive British Residents at Baghdad, Rich, Taylor and

Rawlinson, who were all men of considerable linguistic ability, and whose official duties left them ample time fcr study. These men ' u u .c u, attracted to the Residency Englishmen who, for various reasons, were travelling in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Many of them were scholar- explorers, others were attached to the Turco-Persian boundary commission, or to Chesney's expedition for the survey of the

Euphrates, Layard, the most famous of them *11, was "prompted to exploration only by his own youthful initiative".

"Yet", writes a modern archaeologist, " whatever the motive which originally brought them to the country, they one and all remained captivated by the increasing fascination of its antiquities, and their purposeful application to archaeology made Assyriology a science".

1« S. Lloyd: Foundations in the Dust. Oxford 1947, pp.3 and 4. 2. Lloyd, c^^bidlt, p.5. 29.

'The appointment of Rich to Baghdad in 1808 initiated a period of

serious antiquarian research. Rich himself gathered together a valuable collection of antiquities, manuscripts, cylinders and coins,

and his researches 'virtually exhausted the possiblities of inference without exca^vation*, In addition, he travelled extensively in the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley, on what his wife called "ruin-hunting

expeditions", Taylor, Rich's successor, confined his studies to

Arabio manuscripts, but unfortunately never published the results of his research* His knowledge of Arabic was so sound that local officials often consulted him on the correct ydading of manuscripts.

Rawlinson had already made his reputation as an archaeologist before he succeeded Taylor at Baghdad, where he continued his researches into cuneiform writing, and firmly established his reputation as the

"Father of Assyriology",

Meanwhile, the French Asiatic Society had in 1842 obtained instructions for Botta, the French Consul at Mosul,, to conduct exca_vations on the supposed site of Nineveh* The exoafvations subsequently undertaken by Botta were the first to take place in an ancient Mesopotamian city-mound* In the course of a journey from

Baghdad to Constantinople, Layard visited the French excavations.

was already deeply interested in archaeology, and believed that the

French site at Khorsabad, just outside Mosul, was only one of the mounds

1. H.J, Ross; Letters from the East; 1857 - 1857. London 1902. p.54 footnote. 30.

covering the ruins of Assyrian palaces. In Constantinople, Stratford

Canning shared Layard*s interest and enthusiasm. He ageeed therefore, to provide money to put Layard*s theories to the test, in the hope that the results would justify official assistance. Layard started work at Nimrud, the ancient city of Calah in 1845, and his discoveries there were sensational. He remained there for two years, and in that time he had

"identified the sites of the Biblical Calah (Nimcrud) and of Nineveh itself, and discovered the remains of no less than eight Assyrian palaces connected, as was subsequently proved, with such illustrious names as Ashur-nasir-pal, Sargon, Shalmaneser, Tiglathpileser, Adad-nirari, Esarhaddon and Sennacherib;. He had completed his own part in the transporting to England of some hundreds of tons of Assyrian sculpture",

After two years in England, during which he wrote an account of his 2, work * which attained instant popularity on its publication,

Layard returned to Mosul in 1849. The British Museum had eventually given him a grant of £3,000, which was to last for two years, Layard immediately began excaij^vations at Kuyunjik, where he uncovered

Sennacherib's palace 'with its reliefs of the of Lachish and

|he vast royal library with the State archives and religious texts which included the legends of the Creation and the Flood*. At the end of two years, in 1851, Layard finally left Mosul, his discoveries on the ancient site of Nineveh having given the British Museum an exceptionally fine, if not unique, collection of Assyrian antiquities.

1, Lloyd op. cit. p.135 2, A.H. Layard; Nineveh and its Remains, 2 Vols. London 1849 31,

On Layard*s departure, Rawlinson took charge of British archaeological

interests at Mosul, but his official duties did not permit him to

supervise the work personally. Exca^vations were therefore continued

by Hormuzd Rassam, a native Christian, who had assisted Layard,

and whose brother was British Vice Consul at Mosul* Rassam*s

diggings produced many fine exhibits for the British Museum, but

archaeological investigation was fast degenerating into an undignified

"scramble for antiquities" with which to stock the museums of Europe.

In other parts of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, particularly an the

site of Babylon, not far from Haghdad, exca/vations were carried out with less success by both English and French archaeologists.

The Crimean War temporarily put a stop to all excarvations, and

the British did not nesume work at Nineveh until 1873. For the rest un of the period British works compared very/favourably with those

carried out by the French &nd the Americans who were provided with

adequate funds and could therefore work continuously and systematically.

Hormuzd Rassam acted as 'Supervisor of Excakvations* for the British

Museum, His activities appear to have consisted in flitting "about the country depositing gangs of workmen to dig tunnels in widely separated mounds, and either removing them when they failed at once to find large and obvious antiquities, or leaving them unsupervised for periods of up to a year". For short periods, from 1873 to 1876

1. Lloyd, op, cit. p.162. 32.

to 1876, George Smith, an Assistant in the Assyrian

Department of the British Museum, conducted diggings at Nineveh, hut on his death in 1676, Rassam was again employed by the Museum. In

1882, Rassam finally left Turkey, and it was not until six years later that the British Museum decided to resume their excavations at Nineveh, and sent out Budge of the Oriental Antiquities Department, From that time until the excavations were finally closed in 1905, work was carried out under the supervision of officers of the British Museum, 33.

CHAPTER II

THE ALTERNATIVE ROUTE TO INDIA;

THE EUIHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 1856-1857.

Early in the Nineteenth Century, the Tigris-Euphrates Valley assumed new importance both for Britain and for the Indian Presidencies, when developments in the steam engine led to hopes of improving communications between the two countries. The Cape Route was slow; in the early Nineteenth Century the fastest of the East Indiamen took anything from five to eight months to perform the voyage between England and India, Developments in steam navigation were at first confined to river and canal navigation and to short sea voyages, and partly for this reason interest was focussed on the shorter routes to India through the Mediterranean and then by way of Egypt and the Red Sea, or alternatively through the Tigris-

Euphrates Valley, Interest in these routes was further stimulated by the unsettled condition of the Near East and by the publication of diaries and books of travel by those-who had made the journey

1, In 1825, the Steamship Enterprize made the voyage from Falmouth to Calcutta, round the Cape of Gooi Hope, in 113 days. The experiment was not a success, and the ship's captain declared that he was "thoroughly convinced that the communication between England and Calcutta under the existing state of steam navigation (could) never be accomplished but at a heavy sacrifice", A.&P. (1831-32) X Part I (735-H) p.144. Q.17,18. Evidence before the Select Committee on the affairs of the East India. Company. 34.

between England and India through Suez or through Mesopotamia.

Experiments were at first concentrated on the Egyptian route,

but that route was not wholly satisfactory because a south-west monsoon rendered the Red Sea very dangerous to shipping for four

months of the year, in addition to other hindrances to navigation.

Interest was not, however, lacking in the Euphrates Route. In May

1830, John Taylor, brother of the Political Agont at Baghdad, left

Bombay to travel with despatches to England through Mesopotamia.

Taylor was supposed to have received a concession from the Pasha of

Baghdad granting the "exclusive navigation of the Tigris for steam

vessels for the period of ten years".Hg was unfortunately killed

in a foray with some Yezidis shortly after leaving Mosul on the last 2* stages of his journey to the Mediterranean, His project survived him,

end shortly after his death, several surveys of the lower reaches of

the Tigris and the Euphrates were carried out by officers of the East

1, Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register. New Series VoliV May-August 1631. London 1831. ^art II p.46 2o Ibid p.133 35.

1. 2 India Compemy. * Early in 1831, Captain P.H, Chesney carried out an

elementary survey of the Euphrates, passing from An ah to Basra on a

raft kept afloat by inflated goat-skins, * and taking soundings with

a pole,

Chesney returned to England in the autumn of 1832 and urged the

Directors of the East India Company to try the experiment of a mail

communication between England and Bombay by means of steamers on 4 ^ the Euphrates. * His survey had attracted a good deal of attention

in influential quarters in England, where already TPeacod^^Senior

Examiner at East India House had expressed himself in favour of the

1« Ibid Vol: VI September-Deeember 1831. Part II p.130 2. Chesney: Francis Kawdon (1789-1872). Educated for a military career and commissioned in the Royal Artillery: the first years of his career were occupied in routine garrison duties. In 1829, Chesney went to Constantinople to offer assistance to the Turks in their war against the Russians. He was, instead, persuaded to meike a tour of inspection in Egypt and Syria* 1831: Surveyed the Euphrates from An ah to Basra, 1834-37: Commanded the Expedition for the survey of the Euphrates# 1843-47: Commanded the artillery at Hongkong. 1856; Consulting engineer to the Euphrates Valley Railway Company. 1856-72; Took an active part in projects for a Euphrates Valley railway and was a leading exponent of the alternative route to India# 1864: Gazetted Lieutenant-General. 3. A Keleklwhich was the normal means of navigating the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates and remained so well into the Twentieth Centpry. 4. Reports on the Navigation of the Euphrates. Submitted to Govern­ ment by Captain Chesney, of the Royal Artillery, London 1833. 36.

Euphrates route, Eventually, in June 1834, a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed "to inquire into the best means 2 of promoting Communication with India by Steam", The Committee heard evidence on the merits of all three routes. They reported on

July 14th, 1834, recommending that, since the Euphrates rout® had not been put to the test of experiment, " a grant of £20,000 be made by Parliament for trying (it) with the least possible delay".

Parliament endorsed the Committee's recommendation in August, *" and

Chesney was appointed to command the expedition. In December of the same year, Ponsonby, British Ambassador at Constantinople obtained a Firman from the Sultan granting permission for two steam vessels to navigate the Euphrates.^*

1, Evidence of Peacock before the Select Committee on the i^ffairs of the East India Company, A.&P. (1831-32) X Pt.l. (735-11) p.119- 130. This Committee deliberately refrained from making recommendations on Steam Communications, See the Report of the Committee A.4P. (1831-32) VIII (734) p.60-61. 2, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3rd Series Vol:XXIV. p.142. June 3, 1834. 3, A.&P. (1834) XIV (478) p.369 ff., 4, Hansard XXV August 4, 1834, p.930 ff. 5, The text of this Rirman is to be found in E, Hertslets A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions ♦». at present subsisting between Great Britain and Foreign Powers ... so feir as they relate to Commerce and Navigation, etc, Vol: XIII London 1877 p. 838-839, An incomplete English translation is given in Aitchison op,cit. Vol: VII p.l5. 3i7.

The expedition set out in February 1835. Two steam vessels, the

Tigris and the Euphrates were taken in pieces to the Syrian coast,

and from thence transported with great difficulty to Bir on the

upper Euphrates. There, the vessels were assembled under very

trying conditions, the task taking almost a year to accomplish.

Having at last launched the steamers, and set off on their real mission of navigating the Euphrates, the expedition was dogged by a

series of disasters. One of the vessels, the Tigris capsized and

sank in a storm with the loss of many of her officers and crew, and the river did not prove so easy to navigate as Chesney's preliminary

survey had led him to believe. Towards the end of 1836, the funds voted for the expedition became exhausted, and as Chesney had by that time achieved only half the task, by descending the river, it was decided to abandon the expedition.^* The results so confidently expected by Chesney did not materialise: much interesting scientific and geographical data was collected, but the primary object of the expedition had not been attained. It had not been proved ( conclusively that the Euphrates route could provide a practicable alternative to that through the Suez Peninsula. The Euphrates line as a mail route to India was therefore set aside by the

English Government.

1. Sir J.C, Hobhouse to Chesney October 28, 1836. À.& P. (1837) XLIII (540) p.232-233. 3'8.

The East India Company, however, decided to continue the work

begun by the Chesney expedition, and brought out the component parts

of three more iron river-steamers from England to Basra# These

arrived in 1839 and were immediately assembled at Basra. Lynch,

second-in-command of the Chesney expedition, was appointed to command

the Company's flotilla* His instructions from the Secret Committee

provide some clue to the Company's intentions in continuing the

survey

"You will, in concert with and under the guidance of Colonel Taylor (Political Agent at Baghdad) enter into friendly relations with the tribes frequenting the rivers of Mesopotamia, and will endeavour to establish with them such relations as may be serviceable to the interests of Great Britain, and may add to the facilities for a speedy and regular transmission of mails between the Persian Gulf and the coast of Syria. You will be furnished with a chart of the Euphrates, executed by the late Expedition, and you will complete the surveys of that river and of the Tigris, making such astronomical geographical and statistical observations as the more direct objects of the service may permit ..."1*

Lynch conscientiously carried out his instructions, maintaining

communications between Baghdad and Basra, surveying both rivers, and

exercising a sobering influence on the riparian Arab tribes. The

surveys carried out by the officers of the East India Company's flotilla proved of inestimable value, and even by 1914 the most

1. Becret Committee to Lynch April 18, 1837 A, Malet: op. cit.p. 133. 3&.

reliable charts of the rivers and surrounding country were those compiled by Lynch, Felix Jones, Selby and their successors in command of the Indian Navy vessels stationed in Mesopotamian waters. Three of the vessels were withdrawn in 1842, to the chagrin of the Political

Agent at Baghdad, who reported great rejoicings on the part of the

French, who interpreted the withdrawal as a sign of declining British prestige in Tukkish Arabia,^" One vessel, the Nitocris,remained at the disposal of the Political Agent, and was stationed at Baghdad.

When the Nitocris became unserviceable in 1852, she was replaced by the Comet which was maintained as an armed vessel by the Indian

Government until the abolition of the Indian Navy in 1863. Thereafter, the Comet and her successors, now belonging to the Bombay Marine, were attached to the Baghdad Residency as unarmed despatch vessels, mainly for the purpose of upholding the dignity of the British

Political Agent, and maintaining what was considered to be the British right to navigate the Tigris and Euphrates.

The decision of the East India Compsiny to withdraw three of their steeimers from Turkish Arabia coincided with the final adoption of the Suez line as the normal route for mail: communications between

England and the East. This route proved quite satisfactory in spite of the various hindrances to navigation, and projects for a canal

1. Taylor to the Secret Committee No: 40 November 20th, 1841. No 2 44 December 24th, 1841. India Office Records. Persia and the Persian Gulf. Vol: 74. through the Isthmi/sof Suez;^" succeeded those for the establishment of a line of steamers on the Euphrates, The route through the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley was consequently neglected as being incapable, for the time being, of further development. Occasional reference was made to the undesirability of England's relying solely on the Egyptian route for her mail communications with the East*

Serious consequences to the security of India, were predicted in the event of England's being embroiled in a European war, when every attempt would obviously be made to interrupt her communications with

India, Such warnings went unheeded, and it was not until the

Crimean War that attention was again forced to the question of an alternative route to India,

Shortly after the outbreak of the Crimean War, the threat of

Russian military operations in Armenia resulted in the severe dislocation of the English trade with Persia, English merchants, who normally traded with Persia by way of Trebizond and the Black Sea, now had to divert their traffic by way of Diarbekir and Baghdad. An enterprising London firm of naturalized Greeks, Spartali and

Lascaridi, who had extensive trading interests in the Levant, hoped to improve communications along this route as a means to finding new

1, In 1841, Arthur Anderson, Managing Director of the Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company, laid before Palmerston plans for a Suez Canal. See Anderson to Palmerston February 20th, and March 18th, 1841, F.O. 97/411. Cited H.L, Hoskins: British Routes to India New York, 1928. p. 295. 4&.

markets to replace those lost through the war. The Beyrout agents of this firm laid suggestions before the British Consul General for a railway between Suedia, on the Mediterranean, and Bir on the Upper

Euphrates, "and thence by means of some contrivance on the

Euphrates, by steam to Baghdad and its neighbourhood". Consul-

General Moore forwarded their letter to Clarendon,and from these beginnings grew the first scheme for a railway which would not only provide England with an alternative route to India but would also 2. increase her trade in Asia Minor and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.

It 7ms an opportune moment for such proposals, for not only was the war attracking attention to the Tigris-Euphrates Valley as a possible 3 theatre of military operations, should Persia join Russia, "but the steady improvement of the steam locomotive, cheap steel, and the success of railways in Europe and in India were leading engineers and capitalists to seek new fields of enterprise.

Clarendon ?ms not unimpressed by the idea of linking the

Mediterraneam and the Persian Gulf by a railway* Writing to

Stratford de Redcliffe shortly after the arrival of Moore's despatch

1. Moore to Clarendon. No: 19 Political* fune 17, 1854, P.O. 78/1711 2. In 1850, Sir R. Macdonald Stephenson laid before Palmerston a vague scheme for an Indo-European railway which was to pass through Asiatic Turkey, but he received no encouragement* See India Board to Foreign Office, May 2, 1856, F,0» 78/1420. 3. ‘Memorandum by Rear Admiral Slade dated May 10, 1854. Stratford Canning Private papers* F.O. 352/38* 42.

he declared; -

"The importance of improving communications and extending British Commerce in (Syria and Mesopotamia) and of preparing the way for an additional communication cannot be exaggerated. Her Majesty's Government are disposed to entertain this great question".

^eanv/hile, the correspondence from Moore had been sent to

Chesney for his opinion as to the feasibility of the project, Chesney still retained his great enthusiasm for the Euphrates route; , and not only did he draw up lengthy and detailed memoranda for Clarendon,^*! but he set about at once to form an association, primarily to J increase and extend British trade and at the same time to establish a second line of communication with India.

Eventually, in 1856, The Euphrates Valley Railway Company emerged, with the object of connecting "the Mediterranean and the Fersian Gulf by a railway from the ancient port ofmSeleucia by Antioch and Aleppo, to Ja'ber Castle on the Euphrates, and afterwards from thence by other towns, to Baghdad, and on^the head of the Persian Gulf. Thence, by steamers, communications will be established with all parts of India". * W.P. Andrew,4. Chairman of the Scinde Railway, and already well-known in connection with Indian railways, was

1, Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe. No: 488. August 18. 1854, F.O. 78/984. 2, Chesney to Clarendon. July 13, and August 14, 1854, F.O. 78/1711 3, Prospectus of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company, printed in W.P, Andrew: Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, London, 1857. p. 175. 4, Andrew, William Patrick (1806-1887), An engineer who served in India for a short period in early life. Founder of the Scinde, Punjaub and Delhi Railway Company. Took an early and prominent part in promoting railway and telegraphic communication with India. Great scheme of his life was the Euphrates Valley Railway which he urged, from 1856 until his death, upon successive Governments and the public. Awarded K.C.I.E. in 1882, (See The Times March 14, 1887) 4 3,

chairman of the Board of Directors, Other members of the Board

wore almost without exception retired Indian civil servants, or

Directors of the various Indian railway companies. Chesney and

Bir John Macneill,^"a distinguished civil engineer, were appointed

consulting engineers. Aali Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizier assured

Chesney and Andrew of his support, and the formal prospectus of the

Company was issued shortly after Bali Pasha's visit to London in

June 1856. There was no difficulty in raising the necessary capital, "the whole of the shares, about £1M sterling being engaged in two days, and during the following week there were applications for upwards of £ 4M sterling in addition". The omens seemed most

favourable, Chesney and Macneill proceeded to Constantinople and '

Syria, to negotiate for a Firman from the Porte and to survey the

first stage of the line, from Seleucia to Ja'ber Castle, Clarendon

instructed Stratford de Redcliffe to "use his best efforts to assist

this important undertaking", "whilst a vessel of the Royal Navy,

H.M. Sloop Stromboli was placed at the disposal of the engineers

1. Macneill John Benjamin (1793?-1880)♦ Civil engineer who worked, as assistant to Thomas Telford, on the improvement of turnpike roads in the north of England, 1834 Macneill set up as a consulting engineer in London, and was responsible for the construction of several railways in England, Scotland and particularly in Ireland, 1842-52: Professor of Civil engineering at Trinity College, Dublin. 1856: Consulting engineer to the Euphrates Valley Railway Company in which he retained an active interest until his death. He was knighted in 1843. [He is not to be confused with Sir John McNeill (1795-1883) a surgeon and diplomat, British Minister to ^ersia 1836-42, who had no connection at all with the Euphrates Valley Railway Company^ 2. Chesney to Clarendon. June 24,1856, F.O. 78/1711 3. Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe. No; 1061. September 10, 1856 F.O. 78/1166. 4 4.

during their survey in Syria.

Clarendon had several times affirmed his approval of the

Company’s ain^ and it was believed that with Lord Stratford’s poworful assistance a Firman could be obtained from the Porte on reasonable terms • So far, the only discordant note had come from Hammond, the cautious Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, who was already a little uneasy lest the "present speculation" should be 2 made to appear a Government undertaking. ". Once the scene of action was transferred to Constantinople, difficulties began to arise on every side. In addition to the delays and annoyances common to all negotiations with the Turks, there were rivals to be contended with.

The most formidable competition came from a French association which hoped to obtain a concession for a railway from Constantinople to Basra: Layard, the English archaeologist and dçlomat, was reputed to 3. be acting for this company.

With Stratford de Redcliffe*s help, Chesney obtained a concession for a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, in

January 1857. The terms of the Firman, however, demanded an immediate deposit, which was contrary to the constitution of the Euphrates

Valley Railway Company, and it became apparent that financial assistance of some sort would be essential if the Company were to

1. Admiralty to Foreign Office October 30, 1856, enclosing report from Commander Burgess (H.M. Sloop Stromboli) on his proceedings with Chesney and Macneill on the coast of Syria. F.O, 78/1711. 2. Minute by Hammond on the docket of letter from Chesney to the Foreign Office. August £6,1856. F.O, 78/1711. 3. Andrew to Hammond. December £3, 1856. Enclosing a copy of Chesney*s Constantinople diary. F.o^ 45.

fulfil their obligations. Clarendon had already refused to

entertain a suggestion advanced by Andrew that either the Government,

or the East India Company on the Government’s recommendation, should

guarantee a minimum rate of interest on the capital invested by the

shareholders. ^"Andrew next enquired whether the Government would

object to the amalgamation of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company 2. with the Suez Canal Company. ‘ His motive in asking sanction for

such a measure is not quite clear, for the dislike of BflJlmerston and

other members of the Government for the Suez Canal scheme was very

well known. Clarendon’s reactions to Andrew’s suggestion were

surprisingly mild, but Hammond’s worst suspicions were fully roused.

He had already informed Andrew the previous week that the Government

disapproved of the Suez Canal and would therefore be unlikely to

welcome the participation of an English company in that scheme.

His earlier suspicions that Andrew was trying to involve the

Government in the Euphrates Valley Railway Company seemed fully

justified, and he showed great indignation in a minute to Clarendon

denouncing the whole scheme.

"I fairly tell Your Lordship," the irate Under-Secretary wrote, "I would in your case have nothing to do with Mr. Andrew’s scheme in any shape whatsoever. It is quite evident now that it has been from the'beginning little more than a shadow: and the parties

1. Foreign Office to Andrew. December 30, 1856, F.O. 78/1711. 2. Andrew to Clarendon, Private, March 26, 1857. F.O. 78/1711. 46.

"are now seeking to entangle the Gov(ernmen^t in a plan which I believe can never be brought to any useful end ... If you give an opinion, be it what it may, you will be held responsible for any consequences which may result, I should answer that as it is quite clear from the devices to which the Company is resorting that it rests as regards its original plan on no sure foundation, you can no longer hold out any encouragement to the original plan, still less give an opinion as to what the projectors of it should or should not do to bolster it up.l«

Clarendon accordingly declined to offer an opinion on the proposed 2. amalgamation.

Undeterred by the cpolness of Clarendon’s reply, the Euphrates

Valley Railway Company mustered their forces, and a very large and very impressive deputation waited on Palmerston on June 22md, 1857.

The deputation was led by Shaftesbury, who no doubt hoped that the railway would assist in protecting the Christian subjects of the Porte and in spreading Christianity in Asiatic Turkey, In addition to the

Chairman and Directors of the Company, the deputation included Sir

Justin Sheil, former Minister to Persia; Sir W.F. Y/illiams of Kars; the Earl of Mayo; the Earl of Dufferin; Alderman Finnis, Lord Mayor of London who was connected with the Baghdad firm of Lynch; and many other representatives of commercial and shipping interests, such as

John and Macgregor Laird, and J.C, Ewart, one of the founders of the

Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company. It is interesting to see

1. Minute by Hammond, March 28, 1857, F.O. 78/1711. 2. Foreign Office to Andrew. April 6, 1857, F.O. 78/1711. 4 7.

that the deputation included fifty sevem members of Parliament, of whom twenty four represented Irish constituencies, whilst the remainder

either themselves had trading interests in the East, or represented

constituencies likely to benefit from contracts arising out of the

construction of the railway. Palmerston received the deputation,

but was very non-committal. The Government appreciated the importance

of the Euphrates route which "they had and would continue to support ...,

but he could not give an opinion as to giving the guarantee on the

capital without consulting his colleagues". The Company were asked

to submit their proposals in writing.^" Andrew did so on June 30th,

asking for a counter-guarantee to that of the Turkish Government

(which was to guarantee a minimum rate of interest of six per cent)

of five per cent for twenty five years, or four and a half per cent

for fifty years, on the capital of £1,400,000 for the first section 2. of the line. There is, unfortunatèly, no record of Palmerston’s

reply or of the subject having been considered by the Cabinet at this

time. Chesney provides the only hint of the general feeling of the

Cabinet on the Euphrates Valley railway question, recording in his

1, See The Times June 23rd, 1857 and W.P. Andrew: A letter to Viscount Palmerston on the Political Importance of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company and the necessity of the Financial support of the Majesty’s Government. London 1857. 2. Ibid. p-7. 4=8.

diary on July 5, 1857: -

"^et Lord Shaftesbury, who, as he had done previously, urged pressing Lord Palmerston as much as possible, as he is favourable, but some of the Cabinet are not so.*'

In addition, the Treasury had already declared categorically

that they would not give financial assistance to the Railway Company,

although they considered the scheme important, and wished that "all

the assistance of the Government ... consistently with the policy 2 hitherto pursued by the Government and Parliament" should be given. *

The Company's hopes were thus already doomed to disappointment

when Sotheron Estcourt, ’ ’conservative member for Wiltshire, raised

the subject in the House of Commons on August 14th. Estcourt

recommended the undertaking to the Government "not as a private

speculation, for he had no shares or pecuniary interest in it, but as

a great national object", ^e did not ask for a guarantee but suggested

that the Government might undertake to supply the interest, should the

Company’s means prove inadequate during the construction of the line.^'

The House was singularly unenthusiastic: of the fifty-seven members who had packed the deputation to Pilm«rston a few weeks earlier not one raised a voice in support of Estcourt, Apart from the Prime

1. Life of the Late General F.K. Chesney; by his Wife and Daughter. (Edited by S. Lane-Poole). London 1885.p. 445. 2. Treasury to Foreign Office July 7, 1857, P.O. 78/1711 3. Brother to a member of the Chesney Expedition who had been killed in the Crimean War, 4. Hansard, 3rd Series CXLVII p. 1652 ff. 4.9.

minister's reply, the only speech of note came from Gladstone, and deserves attention as embodying the principles followed by the

Government, Deprecating the fact that Members should use their position to recommend commercial undertakings to the Government,

Gladstone declared the Euphrates Valley railway project to be

"essentially commercial" in spite of its potential political merits.

Such being the case, he thought that definite proposals should have been submitted in a regular manner, so that the House might judge the merits of the scheme, Gladstone added that "he viewed a guarantee with an instinctive aversion and almost horror", on the ground that it might be thought to confer rights of intervention in the domestic affairs of Turkey which would provide an evil precedent for other nations. Replying to the debate, Palmerston agreed that if the railway were constructed, there could be no doubt of "a considerably increased facility in the conduct of our commercial and political intercourse" with India: but it was unprecedented for the Government to take part in such undertakings, and he instanced other schemes of a similar nature which had been refused Government support. All hopes of an exception being made in this case vanished when he declared: -

"... with reference to the Euphrates Valley Railway, I can only assuf8 my hon. Friend who brought forward this question, that, however glad we should be to see that project completed, we cannot

1, Ibid p. 1664 ff. 6 0 .

"hold out the slightest encouragement that we should he disposed, either directly or indirectly, to advance any money for the attainment of that end."

If the Company entertained any hopes of inducing the Government to alter their decision they were finally dashed by the Turks. On

September 3rd, Mugurus Pasha, Turkish Ambassador in London, informed

Andrew that the Company's application to the British Government for an additional guarantee tended "to violate the general principle according to which no foreign Power can grant gueirantees or pecuniary subventions or assistance of any kind for works undertaken in the territory of another Power, and have thereby any direct or indirect means of interference in such works.■^'his in itself would have precluded the Euphrates Valley Railway Company from receiving assistance from the British Government, As Gladstone had pointed out, if the British taxpayers were to contribute to the cost of the railway, they not only had a right to know what was being done with their money, but also a right "to call upon the Government to take every measure in their power, even by resorting to force, for the purpose of preventing mismanagement or misgovernment, and of seeing 3 that this railway was properly dealt with", * Such was precisely the situation which both the British and the Turkish Governments wished to avoid. The reason for this sudden move by the Turks is very

1. Ibid p. 1676 ff. 2. Copy of letter from Musurus to Andrew, September 3, 1857, Enclosed in letter from Andrew to Foreign Office September 11, 1857, P.O. 78/1420. 3. ■“ansard 3rd Series CXLVII ?x 1666. 5(1»

obscure. Clarendon could find no reason at all for an act which he considered both "absurd and unfriendly".^* It is not improbable, however, that the root of the matter lay in the new international status which Turkey had acquired at the Congress of Paris in 1856.

Embodied in the Peace of Paris was a clause admitting Turkey "to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) 2 of Europe". * This might well have made the Turks more sensitive to any proposal which might seem to give a foreign Power rights of interference in their internal affairs. The three most prominent

Turkish statesmen of this time, Aali, Fuad, and Mustafa Reshidl Pashas were all experienced in Western diplomacy and were eager that a reformed Turkey should take her place in the Concert of Europe. They may, therefore, have been very much more conscious of their national dignity and more ready to resent anything which might seem to limit their independence.

The promoters of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company were, not unnaturally, bitterly disappointed at the failure of their plans.

It w^as commonly supposed that Palmerston had sacrificed the Euphrates

Valley railway on the altar of Anglo-French harmony on the occasion 3 of Napoleon Ill’s visit to Osborne, * Professor Hoskins accepts

1 .Minute by Clarendon on the docket of letter from Musurus to Hammond* Private* September 15, 1857. F.O, 78/1420, 2. E. Hertslet: The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol: II, London 1875, . Article VII of the Peace of Paris, p, 1254, 3, Life of Chesney op; cit; p.446 5 2.

this explanation, 'repeating the error of Chesney*s biographers, that

Palmerston was summoned to Osborne on the morning of August 14th, from whencehe returned " a changed if not wiser man", to destroy the hopes of the Company the same evening in the House of Commons. The

Emperor of the French had in fact visited Osborne from August 6th until

August 10th, when Palmerston and Clarendon were called to attend, and held several conversations with Napoleon. The 'Osborne meeting* was informal and there are only very meagre records of the conversations which took place, but there is no evidence to suggest that the

Euphrates Valley railway was ever discussed at Osborne, Similarly, there is no substantial evidence that Palmerston had originally intended to accede to the Company's request for financial assistance.

It is true that, in the previous year, Clarendon had supported the

Company to the extent of giving diplomatic support to the negotiators in Constantinople, But it must be remembered that this was before it was known that the Company would req^uire a guarantee from the

Government, Only so long as the Euphrates Valley railway was a purely commercial undertaking did Clarendon give it the support

"which he properly could". On the other hand he had from the very first refused to recommend the granting of financial assist by Her

1, Hoskins: op:cit: p. 341-342, 53.

Majesty's Government,^* Palmerston too was interested in the general idea of improving communications with India, and had written

to Clarendon on the subject exactly a year before Estcourt raised the matter in the House of Commons,

"... the real communication* with India," Palmerston wrote, "must be by a Railway to Constantinople and from Broussa or some point opposite Constantinople down through Asia Minor to the Head of the Persian Gulph",#*

Nevertheless, there is nothing to suggest that the Government

ever considered financing suj,ch a project or that they considered it

as being other than a purely commercial specuàation, Hammond had certainly always resisted any action which might have given the impression that the undertaking was sponsored by the Government,

In addition, the Treasury had never encouraged the belief that financial help would be forthcoming for establishing a second line of communication with India whilst the Red Securoute continued to prove satisfactory; they had on the contrary quite definitely refused to entertain the idea of guarantee, ^Furthermore, the proposal that the Euphrates Valley Railway Company should amalgamate with the

Suez Canal Company could hardly have ingratiated the former in

1, Foreign Office to Andrew: December 30, 1856, F.O* 78/1711 2, P.Guedalla; Polnierston,London 1926 p, 386. Quoting letter from Palmerston to Clarendon,^August 14, 1856, Only this very brief extract, from Palmerston s private papers, is quoted, without any indication of the sense of the rest of the letter, 3, Chesney to Clarendon, February 28, 1857 and Treasury to Foreign Office July 7, 1857. F.0.78/1711. 54.

Palmerston's favour, for the Suez Canal project was anathema to him.

Such a proposal was, in any case, scarcely calculated to convince

the Government of the soundness of the railway Company's promoters,

or of their ability to carry out their ambitious scheme.

At the same time, it is by no means certain that Napoleon III

was so violently opposed to the English scheme as to make a point of

insisting that the English Government should not support it. Earlier

in the year, Walewski had informed Cowley, British Ambassador in Paris,

that, although France was interested in Chesney's project, the

Emperor had decided, "that considering the general utility of such a railroad for commercial purposes, and that Great Britain was more than any other country interested in its construction, no difficulties would be thrown in the way of its completion by France, but on the j contrary, every support should be given to the promoter of the scheme,"

Whether or not Napoleon continued to take such a generous view of a

project which would, if completed, give England a considerable

influence in Asiatic Turkey,is, unfortunately, not recorded.

It is clear, however, that the ability of the Euphrates Valley

Railway Company to carry out their plans was in considerable doubt

unless they could obtain a substantial measure of financial support

from the Government. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that

: > , 1 . ; ' ) ______1, Cowley to Clarendon Nd; 30 January 4, 1857, F.O, 27/1187, See also a Memorandum by Francis Irving dated June 25, 1859, F,0,78/1711 6'5

Palmerston was not giving the real cause of the Government's refusal

of such help when he declared it to be contrary to precedent as well

as inexpedient for the Government to "meddle directly" in such undertakings, especially when they were to be executed in a foreign 1. country.

The Euphrates Valley Railway Company's failure to secure

Government backing ends the first phase of activity directed towards

the establishment of rail communications between the Mediterranean

and the Persian Gulf, It was a phase characterized by emphasis on

the technical aspects of the project, and for the tnrost part, the

active supporter^of the Company were already interested in railways,

and particularly in Indian railways. Some mention of the political

advantages of the scheme was made, but it had not yet attained

importance, which it was later to assume in the eyes of Imperialists,

as a bulwark against Russian and even French encroachments in Turkey,

1, Hansard 3rd Series CXLVII p. 1677. 56.

CHAPTER III

ENGLISH ATTEMPTS TO SECURE THE ALTERNATIVE

ROUTE TO INDIA : 1867-1888 5

The year following the collapse of the Euphrates Valley

Railway scheme saw the completion of the Egyptian Railway, connecting

Alexandria with Cairo and Sue&. This route proved eminently satisfactory for the conveyance of "both troops and mail to India and the Far East, At the same time, the relatively quiet state of the

Near East and a succession of crises in Europe diverted official attention from the alternative route to India.

On the other hand, nothing deterred railway promoters from advancing projects for railways from the Mediterranean to the

Persian Gulf, The promoters of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company soon recovered from the setback of 1857, and seized every possible opportunity for laying their plans before successive Foreign secretaries. They made little headway however, for Hammond was still permanent Under o^cretary at the Foreign Office and retained all his suspicion of such schemes. Any inclination on the part of a Foreign

Secretary to show even a benevolent interest in Andrew's projects was stubbornly resisted. Hammond's opinion, which usually prevailed, was invariably but a slight variant of: " I think I would only give a vague and g«jnoral answer". 57.

Nevertheless, in the oarly 1860*s several railway schemes were drawn up and submitted to the Porte by various English promoters.

Of these schemes, two were so far advanced as to obtain a concession from the Turks, The first, a revival of the Euphrates Valley project; in a slightly disguised form, was brought forward in 1862.

An association to build a railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem, with the intention of extending it to the Persian Gulf, was formed under the

Presidency of Sir Moses Montefiore. The association’s supporters included Stratford de Redcliffe, Dufferin,and Chesney • The latter, then aged seventy-three, proceeded to Constantinople and obtained a

Firman from the Sultan; but the association was dependent on a guarantee from the British Government and having failed to obtain such assistance, the scheme petered out.^* The second project j 2 appeared five years later in 1867, when Randolph Stewart * received 3 a concession for a railway from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf. * i

It seemed at last as if the railway would be built by English enterprise, for the Turkish Government were very much impressed by

Stewart’s plan, and appealed to the British Government for help in executing it. * The latter, however, firmly refused to depart from

1, Life of Chesney p. 453-460 2, Captain the Hon, Randolph Stewart was acting on behalf of various promoters in England, and claimed to have the support of French capitalist* and of the London and County Bank, 3, Elliot to Stanley. No: 39. November 19, 1867, F,0,78/1964, 4, Musurus Pasha to Stanley January 9, 1868, enclosing copy of despatch from Fuad Pasha, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated December 25, 1867. P.O. 78/2058. 58.

precedent, and confined themselves to "general expressions of friendly

interest", fearing lest they should be involved in any responsibility

for securing the observance of the contract by either party.

Stewart’s scheme eventually failed when the promoters, who included

Thomas Brassey, Liberal Member of Parliament for Hastings, found it impossible to form a company on the basis of the agreement signed with the Turks,

The visit of the Sultan Abdul Aziz to Europe in 1867 opens the

second phase of activity directed towards securing for England the

alternative route to India, by the construction of a railway through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, The Sultan’s visit was, moreover, closely followed by two other events which had a direct bearing on

British communications with India - the opening of the Suez Canal in

1869 and the Russian abrogation of the Black Sea clauses in the following year. On his visit to Europe, Abdul Aziz was deeply impressed by the railways, and by the benefits which might be derived from their construction in his Asiatic Empire, This naturally encouraged railway promoters of all nationalities, but predominantly English and French, to put forward their schemes. The opening of the Suez Canal further stimulated English interest in railways in Asiatic Turkey. The Suez

Canal formed an eminently satisfactory* route to India, but was in the

1# Stanley to Musurus Pasha, January 11, 1868. F.O, 78/2058. Stanley to Elliot, No: 138. May 20, 1868. P.O. 78/2016. 2, Elliot to Stanley, No: 52 Commercial. August 25, 1868. P.O. 78/2028. 59.

hands of the French, Imperialists therefore turned their thoughts towards securing for Britain a short route to India free from French control: this route could only lie through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley,

Early in 1870, Sir George Jenkinson,^"Conservative Member of

Parliament for North Wiltshire revived the Euphrates Valley railway scheme, apparently purely from patriotic motives, Jenkinson first consulted Musurus Pasha on the support which the Ottoman Government was likely to give to a railway from Alexandretta to Basra, via Aleppo and Baghdad, The terms on which the railway was to be built included a free grant of land for the railway and its works, the permission for

Britain to transport troops by that line and the free c o n v e y a n c e of

British mails. The funds were to be raised by an Ottoman loan, the interest of which would be counter-guaranteed by England, The Turkish 2, Government accepted these terms. * Jenkinson then submitted his proposals to the Foreign Office, and announced his intention of moving for a Select Committee of the House of Commons to enquire into the 3. whole subject of a line of railway through the Euphrates Valley, The

1, Jenkinson*s interest in the Euphrates Valley railway is entirely unaccountable. Before this time he does not appear to have had any connection with the project, and seems to have raised the matter either from purely patriotic motives or as a personal friend of Chesney. He later became a member of the Duke of Sutherland’s association for the promotion of an Asia Minor and Euphrates Railway,

2, Jenkinson to Musurus, February 16, 1870. Musurus to Jenkinson. March 12, 1870. Printed with the evidence before the Select Committee on the Euphrates Valley Railway, A&P (1871) VII (386) p. 542-543. 3, Jenkinson to Clarendon. March 18, 1870. F.O. 78/2254. 60.

question was considered in Cabinet on April 9, 1870, and it was decided that the Government could neither give the required guarantee nor agree to the appointment of a Select C o m m i t t e e . F o r the time being, Jenkinson was discouraged from proceeding with his scheme.

The abrogation of the Black Sea clauses by Russia in October 1870, coupled with that country’s advances in Central Asia, drew attention

to once more^the Russian menace in the Near and Middle East, and to the need for some measures on the part of England to combat it. The

Euphrates Valley railway was now attracting the notice of the imperialists who were fearful for the security of Indian communications, with the French, although now weakened, itill in control of the Suez

Canal, and Russian influence increasing steadily in the eastern

Mediterranean, The company formed in 1856 for the construction of the Euphrates Valley railway had consisted almost entirely of men interested in the more technical aspects of railways. Now, they were joined by those interested primarily in the political aspects of the question,

in the summer of 1871, Jenkinson moved for the appointment of a

Select Committee of the House of Commons, "to examine send report upon the whole subject of Railway communication between the Mediterranean euid the Persian Gulf", He raised the matter entirely on public '

1. Clarendon to Jenkinson, April 10, 1870, F.O. 78/2254, 61.

grounds, asserting that "he had no interest whatever in, or

connection with, any of the commercial enterprises mixed up in this

subject".^" There was certainly more interest in the question than

when it was raised in 1857, and the Government agreed to the

appointment of the Committee, The Select Committee was nominated on 2, July 4, * and set to work at once. After hearing evidence from thn

witnesses, the Committee reported on July 27, recommending that they

should be re-appointed uhe following session, to continue their 3 investigations. * The Committee was duly re-appointed on February 7,

1872; and the original members were re-nominated on February 19. The 4 ^ Committee finally reported on July 22, 1872, * They had examined

1. Hansard 3rd Series CCVII June 23, 1871, p. 525 ff, 2. The Committee consisted of:- Sir Stafford Northcote. M«E, Grant-Duff, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India Sir George Jenkinson Thomas Brassey, who had already been associated with a plan for a Constantinople to Basra Railway Viscount Sandon( members of the deputation to Palmerston in 1857 A.F, Kinnaird ( asking for Government aid for the Euphrates Valley ( Railway Company F, Walpole E,B, Eastwick, a distinguished orientalist, and traveller A. Baillie Cochrane J, Laird, head of the shipbuilding firm which built the vessels for the Chesney expedition Sir Charles Wingfield H,R. Brand W, M*Arthur Dyce Nicol Kirkman Hodgson Hansard 3rd Series CCVII, July 4, 1871. p, 540. Of the Committee, Brassey, Eastwick and Einnaird had supported Jenkinson*s motion, whilst Wingfield opposed it,

3. A&P (1871) VII (386) p , 503

4. A&P (1872) IX (322) p , 171 ff. 62.

a further twenty-eight witnesses, and a substantial amount of written evidence communicated by mcmbers/f the Consular Service who had served in Asiatic Turkey.^* Of the total of thirty-eight oral y witnesses, only two considered the project of an English railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf to be valueless, if not actually dangerous* They were Lord Sandhurst, lately Commander-invChief in

India, and Major Champain, who was engaged on the construction of the telegraph to India through Persia, The other witnesses were a very distinguished body of men, including Stratford de Redcliffe; Bartle

Frere; Strathnairn, Commander-in-Chief in India from 1860 to 1865;

Rawlinson; Kemball; and, inevitably, the original promoters of the

Euphrates Valley Railway Company, Chesney, Andrew, and Macneill, In addition, there were specialists in all branches of railway construction and finance, and rerresentaitves of commerciàl interests. They were all agreed that important political, commercial and strategic advantages were to be derived from a railway linking the Mediterranean with the

Persian Gulf* Various routes were proposed, some through the Tigris

Valley, others through the Euphrates Valley, and there was some divergence of opinion as to the termini at both ends of the line.

Almost all the witnesses were experts in some subject, and each brought detailed information to add weight to his arguments.

1. A&P (1872) XLV (c 534) p. 559 ff. 63.

When all the evidence had been heard and sifted, the Committee reported, recommending:-

that the tvfo routes, by the Red Sea and by the Persian Gulf might be maintained and used simultaneously, that the political and commercial advantages of establishing a second route would at any time be considerable, and might, under possible circumstances, bo exceedingly great; and that it would be worth the while of the English Government to make an effort to secure them, considering the moderate pecuniary risk (estimated at ten million pounds) which they would incur..."!"

An amendment proposed by Wingfield, advising the British Government,

on political as well as financial grounds, against incurring any responsibility for the construction and maintenance of a railway in 2 a foreign country, was supported only by Hodgson* .

The Report was duly laid before the House of Commons, but

aroused no interest, and no action was taken by the Government to implement the Committee’s recommendations. The only comment which appears to have been recorded, came from Elliot y/üting privately to

Hammond : -

"I see from the papers", wrote the Ambassador at Constantinople, "that the K, of Coromons has reported in favour of the Euphrates Valley Railway scheme being assisted by E,K,Govt*, - but H.M. Govt, will I suspect, judge for themselves of the propriety of any such proceeding, - of which they will probably have considerable doubt. Midhat Pasha, from his late connection with Baghdad, takes the greatest interest in it, and fully intends to carry it out himself; besides which, any guarantee or assistance which we might give would naturally confer upon us a right of controul over its

1. A&P (1872) IX (322) p. 178. 2. Ibid p. 193-4. 64.

"construction and direction, which he is not the man to he well disposed to agree to..."!* 2. Midhat Pasha’s plans were abandoned by his successors in office, and for the time being, interest in the Euphrates Valley railway died dovm. The English Government had clearly no intentionjof acting i on the vague recommendations of the belect Committee, especially at a time when the Near East was comparatively quiet and the Suez Canal was proving quite satisfactory. Moreover, as a result of experiments carried out during the Trooping Season of 1871, the Government of

India decided to adopt the Suez Canal route for the conveyance of 3 troops across Egypt, in preference to the Egyptian railway* * It was therefore improbable that any Government would have recommended to Parliament the expenditure of ten million pounds on a railway through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, whilst the Indian Government had already declared themselves opposed to any charge on their 4 ^ revenues for the construction and maintenance of the railway.

The purchase of the Khedive’s Suez Canal Shares in November

1. Elliot to Hammond. Private. Hammond Private Papers, August 21, 1872. F.O. 391/22. 2. For Midhat’s plan see;- Elliot to Granville No: 126,August 4, 1872. F*0* 78/2218 No: 70 Commercial, October 16,1872. F.O. 78/2223 No: 81 Commercial, November 20, 1872 F.O. 78/2223 3. India Office to Foreign Office February 2, 1872. F.O* 78/2250 4. Government of India to Secretary of State for India No:56 (Railway) dated Simla June 2, 1871. Printed as Appendix I to the Report of the Select Committee on Euphrates Valley Railway.A&P (1872) IX (322) p. 171. 65.

1875 gave England a seat on the Committee of Direction of the Suez

Canal Company and disposed of the remaining objections to the canal

as a route to the East, Possessing all the advantages of

uninterrupted voyage, in addition to a great saving in time, distance

and expense, the Suez Canal route had in fact become the great highway to India and the East, The success of the canal, and the

purchase of the Khedive’s shares together with the Balkan crisis of

1875 and the Turkish declaration of bankruptcy, gave a further j -

setback to plans for securing the Euphrates Valley route to India, \

For more than a year, the British Foreign Office was untroubled by

company promoters, bent on carrying the civilising influences of railways through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley for the benefit of

the British Empire,

It was not long, however, before the railway enthusiasts, now reinforced by ardent Russophobes, saw their opportunity to urge their

scheme as a means of bolstering up Turkey and forming a bulwark against Russian agression.^*In November 1877, Lord Stratheden eind 2 Campbell led an anti-Russian deputation *to the Foreign Office, to urge the Government to depart from their inaction and to bring about

1. Bedford Pim^? The Eastern Question, Past, Present and Future. London 1877, P,48 2, The deputation consisted of representatives of "The Society for the Protection of British Interests against Russian Aggression in the East", "The Turkish Defence Association" and "The Polish Society of the vVhite Eagle", The Times, November 29,1877,p,6 66.

a 'desirable peace?; the Euphrates Valley railway was mentioned as one of the interests requiring protection from Russia’s advance into

Asiatic Turkey, Derby, who received the deputation was not at all enthusiastic about the necessity for safeguarding the Euphrates

Valley route, and not only declared that he was satisfied that the buez Canal was quite adequate "for all purposes", but expressed his scepticism of the practicability of a Euphrates Valley railway.^*

The total defeat of the Turks, followed by the Treaty of San

Stefano gave Russia extensive influence in Armenia, To British

Imperialists, the new Russian position quite clearly menaced the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley and thereby constituted a danger to the alternative route to India, Sir Richard Temple, Governor-General of 2 Bombay, "Layard, Ambassador to the Porte, and Nixon, Consul General 3 at Baghdad J were amongst the more important Government officials who severally urged the British Government to use the Euphrates Valley railway as a means of combatting Russian infiltration into Asiatic

Turkey. Layard had already discussed the subject with the Sultan, and whilst Derby was expressing disapprobation of the scheme, had

1. For Derby’s attitude to the Euphrates Valley Railway see also, Layard to Lytton, January 2, 1878. British Museum Add: Mss:39,131 and Hansard 3rd Series Vol.CCXLI p. 1794, 2. Sir R, Temple to Salisbury, May 14, 1878.F.O, 78/2891 3. Nixon’s Report on the Trade and Commerce of Baghdad.1877-1878 No, 1, dated May 29, 1878, A&P (1878) LXXjjfV (c 2088) p. 706, No. 2. dated June 21, 1878.F.O, 195/1188 67.

reported his conversation privately to Beaconsfield.Layard,

reverted to the subject later in a letter to Salisbury, expressing

his conviction that an alternative route to India and the eastern

colonies was absolutely necessary, and that that route could only be 2 carried through Northern Syria and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. .

At the same time, the promoters of earlier schemes, still led

by Andrew, were not slow to seize the opportunities now offered for 3 pushing their plans, Macneill "wrote to Simmons, military adviser

to the British delegation to the Berlin Congress, suggesting that at

the Qongress, Britian should obtain from the Turks "the privilege of constructing a Railway from a port on the Mediterranean to the Head of the Persian Gulf".4# Simmons was not enthusiastic; he thought that

a memorial on the subject might be presented to Bismarck for members

of the Congress to see, but did not think that there would be time 5 to discuss matters not directly bearing on the peace settlement.

It would have been interesting to have seen the results^f such a course as Simmons suggested, but unfortunately events seem to have

1, Layard to heaconsfield. Private and secret. March 6, 1878. British Museum.AddxMss:39,131 2, Layard to Salisbury. Private, May 15, 1878, British Museum Add: Mss;39,131

3, Professor D.E. Lee is in error in supposing that this was Sir John MicNeill, the former Minister to Persia, (See;D.E.LeexGreat Britain and)the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878* Cambridge.Mass;1934. p.136 Note 26), McNeill the Diplomat was never connected with the Euphrates Valley Railway Schemes, and in any case, the letter to Simmons was addressed from "Orkney House, Cromwell Road"(South Kensington), the home of Sir John Macneill, the civil engineer. See Dictionary of National Biography. Vol:XXXV Sir John McNeill, the Diplomat p.249-251 Sir John Benjamin Macneill, Civil Engineer, p.251-252, 4, Macneill to Simmons June 23, 1878. Simmons Private Papers F.0,358/< 5, Simmons to Macneill, July 5, 1878,F.O.358/2. 6 8 *

moved too quickly for Macneill to write to Bismarck, for he would hardly have had time to collect the necessary data before the Congress ended.

On July 8, the day of the announcement of the Cyprus Convention, an association was formed "for promoting the Construction of a Railway from the Persian Gulf to Constantinople and the Mediterranean, affording alternative routes to British India, and for developing the resources of Asia Minor,"!» The Duke of Sutherland, a well-known.

Turcophile, was President of the association, W,P* Andrew Chairman, and Kemball, Vice-chairman, The Committee of the Association was most impressive: its fifty-five members included the aged Shaftesbury,

Macneill, Algernon Borthwick, editor and proprietor of the Morning 2. Post, five members of the Select Committee of 1871-1872, "and ten

Members of Parliament, in addition to the familiar selection of eminent travellers and orientalists, merchants, engineers, and ex-IncDlcwa officers,

Sutherland lost no time in asking the Prime Minister for the

Government’s support, but his letter was passed to the Foreign Office

3. without any expression of Beaconsfield’s opinion, Layard, however, whom the Duke had also asked for support, informed him that the Turks

1, Mémorandum andpcôpÿ of the Prospectus of the association, were sent to the Foreign Office. July 17, 1878. F.O.78/2893. Prospectus is given in W,P, Andrew; The Euphrates Valley Route to India, London 1882, 2, Brassey, Eastwick, Jenkinson, Kinnaird and M ’Arthur. 3, A. Turner to Tenterden. July 17, 1878. F.O. 78/2893. 69,

were in favour of an English company building the railway, but urged him to make specific proposals at once, as the Porte was already in

negotiation with General Klapka.^* Salisbury was at this time very

much interested in the proposed ’Asia Minor and Euphrates Railway’.

He saw the project as a useful auxiliary to the reforms in Asia Minor,

which the Turks were committed, by the Convention of June 4, to

undertake, Salisbury even toyed with the idea of the Government’s 2, giving a guarantee to Sutherland’s association," but the Chancellor

the Exchequer held out no hope of such a sensational departure 3 from precedent," and his opinion was officially confirmed in a 4 letter from the Treasury to the Foreign Office,

Salisbury’s instructions to Layard were therefore on much the

same lines as those from Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe, some twenty or more years earJier;-

"I should wish your Excellency", wroto Salisbury, "to give to the Duke of Sutherland’s plan such support as you can properly \ afford, without committing H»M, Govt, to any financial ' responsibility".5.

Whilst Layard was preparing the ground in Constantinople, and urging

Salisbury to spur on the Duke to formulate definite plans and to

1, layard to Sutherland. July 12 and July 24, 1878, British Museum Add:Mss: 39,131. 2, Salisbury to Stafford Northcote.August 5,1878. CecilXLife of Salisbury, Vol: JI p . 306. 3, Ibid p, 307 4, Treasury to Foreign Office, September 4, 1678, F.0.78/2895. 5, Salisbury to Layard No:986 Confidential. August 20, 1878. P.O. 78/2770. 70,

3oui cin cgcnt to negotiate with the Turks, the association was unable

to come to a decision. It seemed pæ if Salisbury’s gloomy

prognostications were about to be fulfil]ed:-

"... can anything", he had written to Northcote on August F^ "be a a reality in the hands of the Duke of Sutherland, and Sir Arnold Kemball, and a list of directors as long as my arm?" !*

The stumbling block once again proved to be the Government’s refusal

of a guarantee. On hearing the Treasury’s decision, Sutherland withdrew

from the Association, which was barely kept alive by the efforts of the

irrepressible Andrew and some of his fellow enthusiasts.

It is difficult to define precisely the extent of the Beaconsfield

Government’s interest in a Euphrates Valley railway. It was commonly

supposed that the annexation of Cyrpus was the first step towards the

Government’s sponsoring a Euphrates* Valley railway, but no hint of

such an intention was given by Government speakers in the debates on

the Treaty of Berlin. Granville asked Beaconsfield directly:" Y?hat is

the course Her Majesty’s Government is prepared to take in regard to 2 the Euphrates Valley Railway?" " He received no reply and no

indication of the Government’s attitude. The members of both Houses who were on the Committee of Sutherland’s association, were singularly

1, Cecil: op. cit. p. 306

2, Hansard. 3rd Series CCXLI p. 1783 ff. 71

reluctant to press their opinion on the subject, and it was left to Sir Charles Dilke to express his conviction that England should take steps to secure the alternative route to India,

It is known that Beaconsfield was very much interested in the alternative route to India, and he is alleged to have told Bismarck at Berlin that Cyprus was intended as a base from which England could cover the Mediterranean terminus of the Euphrates Valley 2, railway. * He is also supposed to have sent out agents to survey 3 the possible route of that railway. * These suppositions do not,

1. Hansard 3rd Series CCXLII 567. 3. The Times, June 12, 1882, Cited W.P, Andrew: Euphrates Valley Route to India. London 1882 p.45 3, See A.J, Grant and H.W.V# Temperley: Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. 1940 Edition, London p. 383-384. (a , Parker) "The Baghdad Railway Negotiation^: Quarterly Review October 1917. Vol: CCXXVIII p. 490 W,S« Blunt: "-^n Indo-Mediterranean Railway: Fiction and Fact". Fortnightly Review Vol: XXVI November 1, 1879. p. 702, Captain Cameron, the well-known African explorer, was commonly supposed to have made his journey along the proposed route of the Euphrates Valley Railway under Beaconsfield’s inspiration. In his record of his journey, however, Cameron denies that this was so, and assents that he was a free agent - see V.L* Cameron: Our Future Highway to India 2 Vols, London 1880. Vol: II. p, 341 Cameron’s assertion would appear to be supported by a despatch from Cross (Acting Foreign Secretary) to Layard (un-numbered) July 11, 1878. F.O. 78/2769. 72.

however, go further than prove that Beaconsfield, like Palmerston, entertained a lively interest in an impor/knt aspect of Imperial affairs, and an appreciation of the Euphrates Valley railway, should it ever become a reality. There is, unfortunately, no concrete evidence that he saw any way of overcoming the financial difficulty, which invariably proved the rock on which British projects foundered.

Salisbury saw that the railway might provide England with/a vantage point from which to keep an eye on Syria and -Mesopotamia, but he realised that an English company would require Governm_ent assistance, which would have to be sanctioned by Parliament.^* But whatever the interest of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary the objections to Government assistance remained substantially the same as in 1857, and if Members of Parliament cavilled at paying four million pounds for the Suez Canal shares, it was extremely improbable that they would have voted ten million pounds on an experimental railway. Even

Layard, eager as he was to see the railway in British hands, was 2. convinced of the undesirability of a Government guarantee,"without

1, There would appear to be no foundation for W.S. Blunt’s claim to have convinced Salisbury in May 1878 of the undesirability of the railway, for at the end of the year, the Foreign Secretary was still very much occupied with the question. See W.S, Blunt: Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt. London 1907, p.29. 2, Layard to Salisbury, Private. December 3, 1878. British Museum Add: Mss: 39, 131. 73.

which no British company could hope to proceed.

This was the IcLSt occasion on which the British Government seriously considered supporting,financially, a Euphrates Valley railway project advanced by private enterprise. English speculators continued to draw up plans and seek concessions, and successive

British Ambassadors in Constantinople, more particularly Dufferin, displayed considerable interest in the activities of would-be railway builders. One scheme after another was submitted for the consideration of the Porte: some were approved by the Sultan’s

Ministers but fell victim to the corruption and intrigue of the

Palace, and all failed to receive the Sultan’s Irade.

Early in 1880, an English banking firm at Constantinople,

Messrs. Hanson and Company, received a concession for a railway from

Haidar-Pasha, opposite Constantinople, to Ismidt, and hoped to obtain a concession for an extension to Angora and, in time, to Baghdadi*

Towards the end of the year, came the first suspicion that the

Germans were interested in railways in Asiatic Turkey, when it was rumoured in Constantinople that Dr. Strousberg, a German already notorious in connection with Roumanian railways, was on the point of obtaining a Firman granting him wide powers to build railways in

1# Layard to Salisbury, No: 375 March 31, 1880. P.O. 78/3084. 74.

Asia Minor and to Baghdad,^*It was hinted that Strousberg was likely to be supported by Bismarck, and that the whole project was closely 2 linked with a German colonization scheme in Asiatic Turkey, "

Dufferin was quite alarmed, but Ampthill’s enquiries at Berlin revealed that Bismarck took no interest in Strousberg*s schemes, which had never been submitted to the German Government, * The rumours that Strousberg had actually received the Sultan’s Firman proved equally unfounded, and his schemes were soon forgotten. By

1882, so many speculators, English, French, German and even American, had entered the field that the Sultan set up a special Commission to 4, soft out and consider the rival schemes, "The work of the Commission, however, proceeded at a very leisurely pace and was quite inconclusive.

In England, interest in the Euphrates Valley railway had died down with the excitement over the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus

Convention. The project remained in obscurity until the condition of the Suez Cahal once again provided an opportunity for airing the subject of the alternative route to India, By 1882, the Suez Canal had become quite inadequate for the amount of traffic wishing to

1.Goschen to Granville, No: 574 Confidential November 16, 1880. P.O. 78/3098. 2, Dufferin to Granville, No:702 Confidential, August 18,1881, P.O. 78/3283. 3. Ampthill to Granville. No,416 October 14,1881( P.0.64/983 No.426 October 29,1881f 4, Dufferin to Granville,No:228 March 27, 1882, No; 299 Confidential April 27, 1882, P.O. 78/3382. 75.

pass through it on the way to or from the East, Ships were detained for days at either end of the canal, awaiting their turn to pass through, whilst some of the newer vessels were too large to use it at all. Proposals for widening and deepening the canal inspired renewed interest in the Euphrates Valley railway, which its promoters fondly imagined might be built more cheaply than the canal could be enlarged. In July 1882, Lord Lamington^"raised the subject in the 2 House of Lords.'* Only Blantyre gave him any support, Derby and

Carnarvon were both very discouraging, whilst Ellenborough, nephew of a former Governor-General of India displayed lamentable ignorance in suggesting that a camel mail should first be tried to find out whether a mail service would be remunerative, Kimberley, replying in Granville’s absence, held out no hope of Government support for a

Euphrates Valley railway and condemned the project "to remain what it had been for so long - namely an interesting project, but one not likely very soon to be brought to a successful issue,

Kimberley agreed that the Report of the House of Commons’ Select

Committee of 1871-1872 should be laid before their Lordships but was doubtful about producing the correspondence with the Indian

1. As Baillie Cochrane, had been a member of the Select Committee of 1871-72. 2. Hansard 3rd Series CCLXXII July 17, 1882. p. 674 ff.

3. Ibid p , 680. 76.

Governmento This correspondence was never produced, and the

following year Lamington again moved for "Papers respecting the

formation of the Euphrates Valley line of railway.^' Granville merely replied that he was not aware of the existence of papers which could be produced. ’Salisbury, the only other speaker on the motion, which was withdrawn, expressed the pious hope that before the end of the Session, the House would have "some intimation from Her

Majesty’s Government of a definite policy on this question.^* It seems most improbable that a Liberal Government, already more deeply

entangled in the Near East than was to its liking, would have reversed the policy of successive Governments for the past quarter of a century. No declaration of policy was, however, forthcoming and matters continued as before. Work on widening and deepening the Suez Canal was begun in 1884, and that #oute to the East continued to give great satisfaction.

In the decade following the Treaty of Berlin, several English railway promoters laid their schemes before the Foreign Office, in the hope of official countenance: most of them had given up all hope of financial support, and confined their requests to diplomatic

1. Hansard 3rd Series CCLXXXII July 26, 1883. p. 507 ff. 2. Ibid p. 511. 3. Ibid p. 511-512 77.

assistance at Constantinople. There had been no substantial change of policy at the Foreign Office, and the replies might well have been drafted by Hammond himself twenty years earlier; the Government would be glad to see the communication established, and would give diplomatic support, but not financial backing in any form. After

the British occupation of Egypt, doubts were even expressed of the value of diplomatic support, for the Sultan was "so extremely

suspicious that every English commercial or financial enterprise was

connected with some occult political object".^"

As the English were falling from favour with the Turks, so the

Germans were gradually gaining influence. The general uncertainty of Turkish enterprise was leading English speculators to seek other

outlets for their capital; the Germans were only just beginning to

taKe an interest in Asiatic Turkey as a market for their manufactures.

In the years between 1880 andL 1893, the value of German exports to 2 Turkey rose from five million to forty million marks, * In 1881,

following hard on the German military mission,a German mission of

exploration arrived in Constantinople with the alleged intention of

establishing German colonies in Asiatic Turkey and encouraging trade

1. Wyndham (Charge d ’affaires) to Granville, No:46 Confidential, January 22, 1883, F,0.78/3864,

2. See J.B, Wolf: "fhe Diplomatic History of the Baghdad Railroad" University of Missouri Studies Vol; XI (no:2) Columbia, Missouri, April 1936, p.9. 78.

with G e r m a n y . A t the same time,* German writers were beginning to

be deeply impressed by the potentialities of Turkey as a field for

exploitation and colonisation.

In 1888, the completion of the European railway network made

possible direct railway communication between Berlin and Constantinople.

There, a German concern was already negotiating for the concession,

hitherto in English hands, to work the railway between Haidar-pasha

and Ismidt, and to continue this line to Angora, with preferential

rights for further extensions. The previous year, an English

company had actually received a concession to extend this railway from

Ismidt to Diarbekir, but had been unable to secure sufficient capital,

and had had to withdraw. * Now, not only were the Germans certain of having the capital necessary for their project but, in addition, they

were able to offer the Porte a loan on very reasonable terms. The

Sultan consequently granted the concession to Herr Kuallau who

represented a German syndicate headed by the Deutsche B a n k , * The

initiative thus passed from British hands, and the foundations of the

B^rlin-Baghdadbahn were laid,

1, Dufferin to Granville. No:943 October 25, 1881, P.O.78/3286,

2, (a .Parker) "The Baghdad Railway Negotiation^" loc.cit, p.491 . 3, The Times: August 9, and October 4, 6 and 20, 1887. 4, Report of Consul Wrench on the trade etc, of Constantinople 1887 and 1888. A&P (1889) LXXXI (C.5618) p, 73 ff. and Report by Major Baw on Railways in Asiatic Turkey A&P (1896) XCVL (c 8019) p.^761. 79.

For more than thirty years, a succession of schemes for a railway

through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, to provide England with an

alternatives route to India, had been advanced by English promoters.

They had been backed by men with extensive knowledge of India and the

Middle East. For thirty years, the question of assuring for England

the alternative route to her Eastern possessions had occupied the

attention of successive British Ambassadors in Constantinople as well

as that of members of successive Governments in England. It was

admitted by men of both nolii-ical parties that Britain must necessarily

be deeply concerned in all routes to India and her Eastern possessions.

%et, all efforts to establish a rapid line of communication along the most direct route to India, led to no practical result.

The British failure to secure the Euphrates Valley line of

communication arose largely from defects inherent in the schemes

advanced, from the nature of the British banking system, and from the

condition of Turkey. The initiative in formulating railway schemes

invariably lay with private individuals, whose plans were frequently of

an exceedingly vague nature, and who, all too often had not even

surveyed the country through which they proposed to build the railway.

The original project of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company was

certainly not defective in this respect, for a detailed survey of the

first part of the route was undertaken by Chesney and Macneill, This

project failed for the same fundamental reason that all the projects 80 *

failed, from inadequate financial backing. It was generally agreed

not’ that the railway could/vpay its way for the first ten or more years of its existence, and that the shareholders would therefore require a guaranteed rate of interest for that period. Kualla's syndicate was backed by the powerful Deutsche Bank: the only comparable support which a British Company would have hoped to receive was from the

Government, But no British Government of the Nineteenth Century was prepared to depart from the established principle that Her Majesty’s

Treasury did not finance such projects, and more especially when they were to be carried out in the territory of a foreign power. Any deviation from this principle would have required Parliamentary sanction, and it is extremely doubtful whether this would have been forthcoming. No Government thought it even worth-while to suggest it to Parliament. Greater facilities for financing such projects were to be found abroad, especially in Germany where the Bankers were less conservative than in England, Bankers generally preferred to restrict their transactions to legitimate banking business rather than # risk locking up their capital in speculative enterprise. In addition, \\ British investors became less and less eager to risK their money in

Turkey. The general instability of the Turkish finances, the delays and difficulties over the payment of interest to holders of Turkish

\ Bonds destroyed the confidence of English investors, who found more encouraging outlets for their capital in South America and Canada. 81.

At the same time, the Turks were becoming increasingly suspicious A'" of British designs on the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and the general decline of British influence in Turkey after the Treaty of Berlin, and more so after the occupation of Eg^pt, rendered it less likely that the concession for a Euphrates Valley railway would be granted fo an English company.

The poliay tf the British Government, and so far as can be ascertained, that of the Indian Government, towsirds projects for railways from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, was consistent throughout the period 1856 to 1888. The period, unfortunately for the Euphrates Valley railway project, coincided with the period of the successful development of the Egyptian route - the completion of the Buez railway in 1858, the opening of the Suez Canal,

Disraeli's purchase of the Khedive's shares and finally the successful widening and deepening of the canal to take heavier traffic. In these circumstances, no British Government was prepared to recommend that Parliament should either provide ar guarantee the money for the construction of a railway through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.

Disraeli's purchase of the Suez Canal shares gave Britain a large measure of control over the main "Imperial highway" and the / arguments in favour of an alternative route became even less / convincing. Indeed, when the question was raised in 1878, it was almost entirely for political reasons: the Euphrates Valley railway 82.

was to be, not so much a route to India, as a stabilising influence in the Sultan's Asiatic dominions, and a bulwark against advancing

Russian influence. Salisbury was tempted to depart from precedent and give active support to the railway for those reasons, working it in with the proposed reforms inAsiatic Turkey, It has also been suggested that had the Conservatives remained in power in 1880, some of the profits from the Suez Canal might have been applied as financial guarantees for the railway enterprise. There were, however, fundamental objections to such a policy, and it was never attempted.

The general attitude of the British and Indian Governments remained substantially unchanged, and was adequately summed up in the despatch from the Indian Government of June 2, 1871:-

Upon the whole, we desire to offer such encouragement as may be possible to the project for the construction of a railway from either the Bosphorus or the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, but we are decidedly averse to any promise of pecuniary assistance being made. We cannot consider the project of such vital and 1 paramount importance to the interests of India, as would justify I us in placing a charge upon the resources of the empire for its construction and maintenance,"^*

An examination of the material on the Euphrates Valley railway projects throws little light on the real reasons why so many eminent -'I

1* (a .Parker): "The Baghdad Railway Negotiation^'', loc.cit.p, 480. 2. Government of India to Secretary of State for India No:56 (Railway) Simla June 2, 1871, Appendix I to the Report of the Select Committee on Euphrates Valley Railway. A&P (1872) IX (322) p. 372. 83.

men took an active interest in the scheme, and no light at all on the proceedings of the associations formed for the promotion of the railway. The supporters of the main Euphrates Valley railway projects fall roughly into four groups. There were, in the first place, the men like Andrew, Chesney, and Macneill who appear to have been primarily interested in the technical aspects of the question, and together with those interested in the commercial and constructional aspects, such, for example as Lynch and Laird, these men formed the nucleus of the schemes' supporters. They were joined at an early stage by active members of missionary societies, such as Shaftesbury and Kinnaird^î who hoped that the railway would encourage the spread of Christianity in Asiatic Turkey and give more security to existing

Christian communities^ there. Finally, the scheme attracted many of those who were very much disturbed by Russian expansion towards India, and who saw in the Euphrates Valley railway a bulwark against that

Power, The majority of these supporters were men with wide political experience of the East, and they included Stratford de Reècliffe,

Bartle Frere, Rawlinson and Kemball, Such lists , as are available

1. A.F. Kinnaird (1814 - 1887). Tenth Baron Kinnaird (succeeded to the title 1878). Partner in the banking house of Ransom, Liberal M,P, for Perth 1837-1839 and 1852-1878. Keenly interested in all movements concerning the well­ being of the middle) classes. An activo sismber of the Church Missionary Society and other Evangelical Christian movements. Member of the deputation to Palmerston in 1857, asking for financial assistance for the Euphrates Valley Railway, a member of the Select Committee of 1871-72 on the Euphrates Valley Railway and a member of the Duke of Sutherland's Association for the promotion of the 'Asia Minor and Euphrates Railway,' 84.

of the supporters of the project auc, almost entirely made up of men

in these four classes and there is a notable absence of representatives

of powerful banking houses. In fact, the project seems to have

boon supported mainly by enthusia&s ^ one cause or another, each hoping that a railway would be instrumental in furthering his own

particular cause. If this is so, Salisbury's fears that nothing

could be a reality tn hands of such men seem* to have been fully

justified. 85.

CHAPTER IV

POSTAL AND TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS WITH INDIA

THROUGH THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES VALLEY : 1856-&888.

The Crimean War, which had indirectly led railway promoters to bring forward plans for a Euphrates Valley railway, was also largely responsible for awakening interest in telegraphic communications with

India. Since the first English line of electric telegraph had been laid along the Blackwall Railway in 1840, rapid progress in telegraphic coimriunications had been made, and with the opening of

the line between England and France in 1852, men had begun to dream of a vast network which would make communication with the outposts of the Empire a matter of hours instead of weeks or months. The

Crimean War had further demonstrated the enormous value of rapid communications and had led to the construction of a line of telegraph between England and Constantinople. At the same time, the construction of electric telegraphs in India had been proceeding

steadily, and by 1856 most of the principal cities were connected.

Plans for joining the European and Indian telegraphic systems were already drawn up, when the Persian War and the Indian|Mvkfhyi brought home very forcibly the urgent need for a quicker direct communication between England and India than could be provided by the new

steamships. 86.

Already in England, two rival groups existed, the one advocating

tho Red Lea route, the other that through the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley. The Red dea line would have formed a natural corollary

to the mail route and at the same time would have been relatively the free from political difficulties, but on/ other hand, the science

of marine telegraphic engineering was not very far advanced. The

Euphrates route was, of course, the shorter and most direct but a

large portion of this rout© lay through Turkish territory inhabited

by uncontrolled Arab tribes who would most likely destroy the

telegraph wires and steal the poles.

The exponents of the Mesopotamian line were^however, first in

the field. In June 1856, W.P, Andrew, Chairman of the Euphrates

Valley Railway Company, formed the European and Indian Junction

Telegraph Company for the purpose of establishing telegraphic

communications along the Euphrates Valley, connecting the Mediterranean

with the Persian Gulf, and forming an integral part of the line from

England to India,On August 5, 1856,i an application was màdô to the

East India Company se sê ss^ for financial assistance in the construction

of this line, which it was proposed to take from Seleucia on the

1. Andrew to Clarendon, June 23, 1856, P.O. 78/1420., The prospectus of the European and Indian Junction Telegraph Company is printed in W.P.Andrew: Memoir on the;Euphrates, Valley Route to India. London 1858. p. 229. It is interesting to note that the Board of Directors of the Telegraph Company was almost identical with that of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company. 87.

Mediterranean to Korna a town at the confluence of the Tigris and

Euphrates. 'The East India Company seemed favourably disposed towards the project, and expressed their readiness, "to enter into an agreement with, or afford -any pecuniary assistance to, the TelegrapfiCompany, in the event of its being employed, with the sanction of Government and of the other Governments concerned, to execute the work".l* At the same time Clarendon v/as willing to give the

Company diplomatic assistance in their negotiations with the Turks who in turn appeared to be prepared to discuss the terms of a concession. In January 1357, the British Treasury agreed to pay to the Telegraph Company, from the date of their completion of the line, an annual subsidy of twelve thousand pounds, or as much of it as should be necessary to provide a dividend of six per cent. This 2 arrangement was to remain in force for twenty five years.Clarendon approved the terms of the proposed agreement, and by ^ r o h the negotiations between the Company and the Treasury were sufficiently advanced for the latter to request Clarendon to instruct Stratford d© Eedcliffe to assist in obtaining the concession from the Turks.

The East India Company placed the services of 5ir William 0*Ehaughnessy

Superintendent of Indian Toiegraphs, at the Telegraph Company's disposal and agreed to transfer telegraphic stores from General

Outram*3 army for the construction of the line. * A hill was drawn

1. "Memorandum regarding, the Construction of a Line of Telegraph through the Ottoman Territories". (Printed for private circulation by the India Office). Published in H.C, Rawlinson: Notes on the Direct Overland Telegraph from Constantinople to Kurrachi. London 1861. p.4. 2. Treasury Minute dated January 19, 1657. P.0.78/1420. 3. Foreign Office to Treasuy,- January 23, 1857. P.O. 78/1420. 4. Treasury to Foreign Office. March 21, 1857. P.0.78/1420.

5. Andrew to Foreign Office Jh%e,iQ, leg?, 78/1711 bb.

up to incorporate the Company by Act of Parliament, and everything seemed plain sailing when the Turks suddenly refused to grant a * concession to the Company.^"

The "European and Indian Junction Telegraph Act" received the

H o ^ l Assent on July ’and the Company determined to begin the construction of the line early in August, notwithstanding the Turkish refusal to grant the concession, Stratford de Redcliffe and the consular agents at Aleppo, Baghdad, Diarbekir and Mosul were therefore 3, instructed to give every assistance to the Company's employees. In addition, Palmerston declared his support for the Euphrates line of telegrs-Ah, oddly enough in the very same speech in which he dashed 4 the hopes of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company. * The support of

Stratford de Redcliffe and Palmerston and the energetic determination of the Company proved unavailing: on August 22, the Turks reiterated their refusal to grant the necessary Firman to the European and Indian

Junction Telegraph Company.^" Undefeated even by this news, and in the belief that their plan had been rejected because the proposed line was

1, Andrew to Foreign Office. June 29, 1857. F.0,78/1420. 2, 20 and 21 Viet. Cap, XC (1857), 3, Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe. No: 683, and to H.M'sConsuls at Aleppo, Baghdad, Diarbekir and Mosul, July 29, 1857. F,0# 78/1420.

4, Hansard, 3rd Series CXLVII p, 1678. 5, Stratford de Redcliffe to Clarendon. Cypher Telegram August 22,1857. F.O. 78/1420. 89.

intended to join the European telegraph system at Seleucia and not at Constantinople, the Company proposed to modify their original scheme and to apply for a Firman to lay a line of telegraph between

Constantinople and the Persian Gulf, if the Treasury would continue the subsidy.^* So far, the British Government had given the Company every support, but the undertaking was, of course, regarded purely as a commercial one, although of great value to the British and

Indian Governments. The financial aspects of the question had been dealt with entirely between the Company and the Treasury and apart from arranging that the British Ambassador inC8nstantinonle should support the application for a concession, the Foreign Office had had few dealings with the Company. Nevertheless, Hammond, Permanent ^

Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, seems to have harboured strong suspicions of the Company's policy and to have resented Andrew's claim that all his proceedings had been on behalf of the British 2 Government. *

The East India Company and the India:. Board however seemed willing to maintain the subsidy to the Telegraph Company should the

Turks grant the Firman for the line from Constantinople to the Persian

Gulf, But already this plan was doomed to failure. On September 1,

1. Andrew to Foreign Office. August 27, 1857. F.O. 78/1420. 2, Minute by Hammond (undated) on Andrew's letter to the Foreign Office of August 27, 1857. F.O. 78/1420. 90

Lord Stratford reported that the Porte persisted in keeping the telegraphic communications towards India via the Euphrates Valley, in its own hands, but that it was prepared to enter into a convention with the British Government and to employ Englishnen in making, maintaining and working the line.^" This was followed by the statement from the Turks that they objected on principle to granting concessions to companies guaranteed on subsidized by foreign

Governments. ’ Such an objection made it useless for the European and Indian Junction Telegraph Company to proceed, for they were unable to do so without financial backing, which was only to be obtained from the Government, The British Government were very much less perturbed than the Company by this news. Clarendon inclined to take a practical view of the matter, minuting the letter from Andrew:-

"It is quite true that we have given some encouragement to the Co-^gany and that the refusal of the Porte is very ungracious, but if the Porte makes to us a proposal more acceptable than that of the Company, I think we should accept it, for I have no confidence in the Company".3*

Stratford de Redcllf# was accordingly instructed to inform the

Porte that the British Government would welcome the construction of a line of telegraph from Constantinople to Basra by the Turks, They

1. Stratford de Redcliffe to Clarendon. Cypher telegram. September, 1, 1857. P.O. 78/1420. 2. Musurus Pasha to Andrew. September 3, 1857. Copied to the Foreign Office September 11, 1857. F.O. 78/1420. Vide bupra Chapter II, p. 51. 3. Minute by Clarendon on docket of letter from Andrew to Foreign . Office. September 11, 1857. F.O. 78/1420. 91.

would also be willing to enter into an agreement with the Porte,

(or should the Porte decide not to build the line, with any private

Company receiving a concession) to pay an annual subsidy for British messages. On the other hand, the British Government were not prepared to press the Porte to grant the concession to any particular company.^*

It had, however, been forgotten that the Austrian Government had already been promised that if they constructed a telegraph line to

Alexandria, which was continued to India through the Red Sea, the messages of the British Government and of the East India Company should be sent by that route* The Austrian Government had in fact already made arrangements for laying this line, and a company had been formed to continue it to India. The British Govorhment therefore withdrew their offer to enter into a convention with the Porte in respect of

2 * the proposed line from Constantinople to the $»ersian Gulf. * At the same time, it was considered most desirable that this line should be built to provide an alternative to the Red Sea line which was regarded with some misgiving since a large portion of it would be 3 submarine, *

For the time being, however, the Euphrates route was overshadowed by its Red Sea rival* The exponents of the Red Sea route, Francis and

1. Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe: N o , September 17, 1857. F.O.78/1420. Extract printed in A&P (1857-8) LX (2377) p. 283 2. Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe, Cypher telegram,October 3, 1857 and No:919,October 14, 1857. F.0.78/1420.Extract of Despatch No: 919,printed in A&P (1857-8) LX (2377) p.285. 3. Board of Trade to Foreign Office, November 26, 1857, F,0.78/1420. 92,

Lionel Gisborne, had proved wiser than Mr, Andrew and his associates, and had first obtained a concession from the Turkish and Egyptian

Governments, to construct a line of telegraph across Egypt, to connect the submarine line from Constantinople to Egypt with that which they proposed to build from Kurrachi to Suez, This concession having been secured, the Red Sea and Indian Telegraph Company was formed in August 1857. TheAfoldov/ing year this Company received a f generous subsidy of thirty-six thousand pounds a year from the i

English Government and embarked at once on the work of laying the submarine cable. In March 1860, the Company were able to report that the cable was "complete through its entire line". Unfortunately, this announcement was somewhat premature for the line very soon developed serious faults, eind finally bad to be discarded without ever having been used.

The failure of the Red Sea cable attracted public attention once again to the Euphrates line as being the only immediately practicable means of telegraphic communication with India, Already in 1857, the

Porte had undertaken to construct at its own expense a line of telegraph from Constantinople to Basra, which would form a component part of the great line connecting India with Europe.It was not

1* Copy of despatch from Aali Pasha (Turkish Foreign Minister) to Musurus, September 30, 1857, Communicated to Clarendon by Musurus October 12, 1857. A&P (1857-8) LX (2377) p. 284. 93.

expected that such a line would he remunerative to the Turkish

Government, for although it would be convenient both for purposes of internal administration and for commerce, such messages would hardly justify the initial capital outlay. It was therefore hoped to obtain a return on this outlay from British messages to India, and it was consequently necessary that the line should be continued from Basra to India, The British Government therefore agreed that as soon as the

Turkish line approached completion, they would extend the communication from Basra to India.Every assistance was accordingly given to the

Porte, and British officers under Lieutenant-Colo&el Biddulph were largely responsible for the construction of the Turkish line. After , the failure of the Red Sea cable, the British Government took a more active interest in the Turkish line, and Ken*ball, Consul General at

Baghdad was instructed to examine tho whole course of the line and to report on its condition, making suggestions for its improvement and efficient working. The first part of this line, between Constantinople 2. and Baghdad, was eventually completed in December 1860 I although it was not fully in operation until the following summer on account of the depredations of revolting Arab tribes between Mosul and

Baghdad.

1. H.C. Rawlinson: op. cit. p.5. 2. Acting Consul General Hyslop to Russell. No:7, December 19. 1860 F.O. 78/1634. 94.

The connection of Baghdad with the Persian Gulf presented many

difficulties, originating mainly in the constant tribal warfare in

that region. Plans for a subfluvial ca/ble in the bed of the Tigris

were eventually abandoned, and Kemball was instructed to make a

survey of the country, to select the most suitable route. At the

same time, it was decided, as a precautionary measure, to construct

a loop-line from Baghdad by way of Teheran to Bushire, where it would

be connected with the Indian lines ? British officers were again

responsible for much of the direction of the work, Kemball for the

line from Baghdad to Basra, and Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Stewart for

the line through Persia. Both lines were completed towards the end

of 1864, and a convention between England and. Turkey was signed in

Constantinople on September 3, 1864, "for the establishment of

Telegraphic üo*üuiunication between India and the CttomcJi Territory".^'

The British and Indian Governments maintained an interest in

the Euphrates Valley line of telegraph, which worked fairly

satisfactorily apart from interruptions when the Arabs destroyed the

wires and stole the poles. This route suffered of course from the

obvious disadvantages of running through the territory of a foreign

Power, and messages were occasionally subjected to malicious

interruption or arrived in a garbled version* The completion of

the Red Sea telegraph line in 1870 diminished the importance of the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley line, but the Red Sea line did not entirely

1. The text of the Convention is printed in E. Hertslet: Commercial Treaties etc, London 1871. Gol:XII p. 842 95

supersede it. Nevertheless, a rumour in 1880 that the Turks proposed to hand over the working of the Euphrates line to a private undertaking drew a protest from the Indian Government,^* Telegraphic communications could not be allowed to depend on one line, and the

Government of India made their position clear when they declared in

1882

"that on political gfW*ds it is desirable to provide for the maintenance of the line through Asiatic Turkey, to which recourse may be had in the event of interruption of the present lines through Egypt on the one side and through Persia and Russia on the other,"2.

■Meantime, whilst plans for more modern methods of communications attracted wide attention, the humble "Dromedary Dak" regularly carried mail through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, From the early days of

England's contacts with the Persian Gulf and India, the Desert Route had been used for urgent communications to and from India and more 3 particularly in the close shipp&ing season, * No regular communication, however, seems to have been established until the end of the

1, India Office to Foreign Office, November 27, 1880. F.O*78/3174. 2, India Office to Foreign Office, P.W, 2-018, October 13, 1882. F.O. 78/3410, The Bussian line was not often used: itjran via Berlin, St, Petersburg, Tiflis and Teheran, Details of the various European routes by which telegrams were sent between England and India are to be found in the Evidence given before the Select Committee on communications with East Indies. A&P ( 1866)U M - (422) , 3, See W.N, Sainsbury (Ed,): Calendar of State papers. Colonial Series East Indies and Persia 1650-1634, London 1892 p, 1630. and E,B. Sainsbury: A Calendar of the Court Minutes etc of the East India Company 1635-1739, Oxford 1907-1927- 96.

Eighteenth Century, when Wellesley instituted a monthly service between Bombay and the Mediterranean via the Tigris-Euphrates Valley,

This service commenced on January 1, 1798, and two mails were transmitted by each dispatch, one via Aleppo and the other via

Baghdad,^* The service was unfortunately not successful financially, and the losses incurred were estimated at twelve thousand pounds a 2. year, or one thousand pounds on each packet. * No doubt for this reason, it did not meet with the approval of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, and, after operating for a number of years, the service was allowed to lapse# It was, however, revived by the 3 Bombay Government in 1836, supposedly at the instigation of Chesney,

Alexander Hector, storekeeper and purser to the Chesney expedition was appointed "Dromedary Agent", at a monthly salary of three hundred

Rupees, and was instructed to "establish a regular communication for every alternate month, by Dromedaries between Mohammarah and Damascus, aid by Horses between Damascus and Beirout",^-

1, "Regulations affecting the transmission of Letters by the monthly mail to Bussora". dated Bombay Castle December 7, 1797. Printed in J. Taylor: Travels from England to India in the year 1789 2 Vols: Loâidon 1799, Vol: il pp. 193-195. 2, Ibid Voltll p. 195 3. F.R# Chesney: Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition. London 1868 p. 329. 4. Copy of instructions f^cm Chief Secretary to Government of Bombay to Hector No: 3365, December 14, 1836. Enclosed in despatch from Chief Secretary to Government of Bombay to British Ambassador at Constantinople, No: 3373 C . December 14, 1836. F.O. 195/113. 97.

In f*ct, the Navy engaged on surveys of the 'Mesopotamian rivers maintained a monthly steam communication on the Tigris between

Basra and Baghdad, which soon superseded the dromedary for that part of the journey.^* Lynch, Commander of the Indian Navy flotilla succeeded Hector as "Dromedary Agent" in 1841, and in the following year the Dak was placed under the control of the Political Agent at

Baghdad, and a monthly allowance of twnnty pounds was assigned by the 2, Indian Government for the maintenance of the post, ’ Originally int'^nued as a bi-monthly service for the carriage of official despatches, the Dromedary Dak soon developed into a monthly service, and in addition to Government despatches, earned a small number of private letters, free of charge, between the Consulates, At the request of the Baghdad mercantile community the service was further increased in 1849 to two mails a month, a small charge being levied 3 on private letters, to cover increased costs,'

The Dak was continued without interruption and without opposition on the part of the Turks, It was the only regular mail communication in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and as such was of great value and

1. British Resident at Baghdad to Secret Committee of. the East India Company, Secret Department No: 32, October 22, 1841. India Office Records: Persia and the Persian Gulf Vol: 74, 2. "Memorandum on the Dromedary Dak between Baghdad and Damascus" by À.E. Kemball, February 26, 1875. F.O.78/2426. 3. "Memorandum on the Dromedary Post between Damascus and Baghdad" by H.C, Rawlinson. March 15, 1875. Enclosed in India Office to Foreign Office, April 6, 1875. F.O.78/2427, 9b.

convenience to the merchants as well as to the staff of the British posts at Baghdad and Basra. The journey between Damascus and Baghdad took nine days, the Arab couriers riding mainly at night, to avoid the heat of the sun and to escape molestation from predatory Arabs, for in spite of "safe-conducts" from the Sheikhs through whose lands they passed, the mails were occasionally plundered or detained on the road.^* In addition, in order to minimise the risk of robbery, only letters were carried. The Turks raised no objections to the post and if any doubts as to the continuance of the service were entertained, they were voiced only by the Government of India, and then on the grounds of financial economy.

In 1841, the Egyptian route was finally selected by the Indian

Government as the quickest and safest mail route between England and

India, and the Euphrates Valley route consequently declined in importance. During the Persian War and the Indian Mutiny, several private individuals offered to organise more rapid mail communications with India through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. One scheme, propounded by W,P, Andrew, the railway and telegraphpromoter, met with 2 Clarendon's approval, "but failed to impress the East India Company

/ 1. ’’Itinery of the Dromedary route from Damascus to Baghdad as Z performed by the Messenger who conveys the English mails”♦ Enclosed in Consul General Moore (Beirout) to Clarendon No:55 (Political) November 24, 1854. P.O.78/1711. 2. Foreign Office to India Board, January 8, 1857. P.O. 78/1524. 99.

In turning do^wn Andrew's plan, the Company stated;-

"should anv axnergency call for an extraordinary or immediate communication with this Country, the Government of India will no doubt avail themselves of the vessels and the means at their disposal for effecting it by way of the Red Sea,*

The overshadowing of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley route by the Red

route had already begun, and with the completion of the Alexandria

to Sue?, Railway in 1858, the Red Sea route gained a formidable

advantage.

In spite of this marked development in the Egyptian route, the

Dromtdary Dak continued to carry some of the Indian mails via the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and it was of course used for communications

between Baghdad and Constantinople. On the establishment of

commercial steam services between Basra and Baghdad, the Indian 4

Government entered into a contract with the Euphrates and Tigris

Steam Navigation Company, for the conveyance of mails between Basra

and Baghdad, agreeing to pay the Company an annual subsidy of four

thousand eighc hundred pounds for a fortnightly mail services 2. b&tween those two places.

In the early eighteen^&eventies, however, the Government of

India became imbued with a great zest for financial economy, and

the mail subsidies attracted the attention of the Financial Department,

1, Copy of letter from East India Company to India Board, October 15, 1857, Enclosed in letter from India Board to Foreign Office. October 16, 1857. P.0.78/1330. 2, Memorandum on the Euphrates and Tigris Mail Contract Secret Department, Government of India, May 25, 1878. F.0.78/5;/89, loo.

The service between Basra and Baghdad was, of course, a necessity but after the opening of the Suez Canal, there was no apparent reason for continuing the alternative mail service through the Tigris-

Euphrates Valley. Denying that the Dromedary.Dak benefitted Indian interests in ^.iny way, the Government of India determined in 1871, to withdi'av/ fhu subsidy from the service between Baghdad and Damascus!'

No objections to this course were raised by the Foreign Office or by Elliot, Ambassador at Constantinople, and the subsidy was discontinued. Nevertheless, the Dromedary Dak continued to function, still under the control of the Consul General at Baghdad, and drawing on accumulated savings to meet its losses.

The English camel mail was still the only regular postal communication between Baghdad and Constantinople. There was no

Turkish postal service between those cities and despatches between the Porte and the Pasha of Baghdad were carried by Special Tartar, as and when the need arose. From time to time, in their more irritable moods, the Turks complained that private correspondence was carried by the English mail contrary to the original agreement, but since no-one appeared to be able to lay hands on a copy of the original agreement, and in the absence of alternative postal arrangements, such complaints were easily disposed of by the British

1. India Office to Foreign Office. May 4, 1871. P.O. 78/2200. loi.

Ambassador in Constantinople.^'

In June 1881, the Turks declared their intention to establish a regular mail service between Beirout and Baghdad, and accordingly 2 requested the suppression of the English post. ' On political grounds, the British Consul General at Baghdad put forward strong objections to such action,' and the Turkish demands were stoutly 4 resisted by Dufferin at Constantinople,'The Turkish post was established, but the English Dromedary Dak continued to function until it could do so no longer without a Government subsidy. It had been maintained for over ten years, partly from the capital accumulated over the years when it was subsidized by the Indian Government, and partly from current earnings, but the latter amounted only to three hundred and sixty-ysix Rupees a month against an expenditure of eight hundred and forty-five Rupees.

In December 1883, Consul General Plowden put forward a strong plea for the continuation of the Dromedary Dak. It would, he considered, be construed as an act of extreme weakness on the part of the British, to surrender lightly what was tantamount to a right-of- way across the Desert, and more especially so at a time when the

1. Llliot to Derby No: 74, February 8, 1875. F.O. 78/2380 2. Plunkett (Chargo d'affaires, Constantinople) to Granville No:462 June 10, 1881.F.O. 78/3280 3. Plowden to Dufferin.No:55, June 22, 1881 F.O. 78/3314. 4. Dufferin to Granville.No:61Q July 25, 1881 F.O,78/3282 No: 475 June 19,1882 F.O.78/3386 No:580 July IJ, 1882 F.O.78/3387 No:529 September 6, 1883 F.O,78/3512 102.

Turks were doing their utmost to encroach on British rights in the 1. 2. Tigrifi-Euphrates Valley. " Dufferin supported Plowden, 'but neither

Her Majesty’s ^reasury nor the Government of India displayed any enthusiasm for the Dromedayy Dak, and, considering the question from a narrow utilitarian angle, remained unconvinced that the advantages of the service would warrant a charge, however small, to their respective revenues. 3,

The Foreign Office made feeble efforts to press the views of those most competent to judge the political value of the post, but to no avail. The English Dromedary Dak which for the better part of a century had carried English mails across the Desert between Baghdad and Damascus was allowed to peter out in 1885 when its funds became exhausted.

As a line of communication with India, the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley route had failed, and the British claim to possess actual interests in that region as one of the routes to India can hardly be maintained in the face of the evidence. The 'one well established line of communication by that route failed from the parsimony of the

1. Plowden to Dufferin No: 56. December 5, 1883. F.O. 195/1445. 2. Dufferin to Granville, No: 71. February 27, 1884. F.O. 78/3622. 3. treasury to Foreign Office. No: 18806. November 29, 1884. F.O. 78/3661. Government of India to Secretary of State for India, June 5, 1885, enclosed in letter from India Office to Foreign Office, July 18, 1885. F.O, 78/3795. 103.

Imperial and Indian Governments: it was not worth a mere two hundred and forty pounds a year to England or India, The telegraph alone had proved a success, hut even this instrument of communication was mainly in the hands of the Turkish Government. The supremacy of the Egyptian route was complete: the Suez railway, the canal and ultimately the Telegraph all contributed to make that line the most important Imperial highway between Britain and her Eastern possessions, whilst the Tigris-Euphrates Valley route "was doomed to remain a wandering spirit, often seen and heard, but never quite able to materialise".^*

1, Hoskins: op.cit.p. 407, /0/|,

CHAPTER V

BRITISH COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE TlgRIS -

EUPHRATES VALLEY : 1856 - 1888.

The object of the House of Commons in voting £20,000 f o r the

Euphrates Expedition of 1834, was described by Wellington "the promotion of the commerce and general interests of His Majesty's subjects".^* The expedition coincided with an increasing demand for British manufactured goods in the countries outside Europe.

"Manchester" writes an economic historian, "lived on "shirts for black m&n", and yellow men, and brown men, and for the Moslem world. While the German market remained stagnant, and the French market shut, the markets of the Turkish Empire and of the East were in brisk motion.^-

It is therefore not surprising to find that one of the more important results of the Chesney expedition was the establishment of two British firms at Baghdad, Both these firms were founded by members of the expedition; the first, late in 1837 by Alexander Hector who had served as purser and storekeeper, and was now the "Dromedary

Agent" of the Bombay Government, responsible for the transmission of the mails over the Desert between Mohammerah and Beirout. The second firm was established in 1838, on the initiative of Hendry

1, Wellington to the President of the Board of Control, November 28, 1834. A&P (1837) XLIII (540 p.227.

2, J.H. Clapham: An Economic History of Modern Britain 3 Vols. Cambridge 1923-38. Vol:I p. 481. Blosse Lynch,second-in-command to Chesney and commander of the

surveys undertaken by the East India Company. Lynch was joined by two

of his brothers, Stephen and Thomas Kerr Lynch who established the house of Stephen Lynch and Company, in Baghdad. Unfortunately, the travel literature, as well as the official papers, provides but a poor

picture of these first merchants. They ar» mentioned casually by travellers, as intelligent and hospitable. The Political Agents often

them a nuisance, harsh in their dealings with the Turk and perpetually complaining of his pebty exactions. The merchants remain in the background, overshadowed by the colourful personalities of the

Political Agents. Layard perhaps gives the best, although a very inadequate, description of the merchants whom he had met in 1840,

shortly after their establishment at Baghdad.

"... There were three British merchants," he noted,"two of them brothers of Captain Lynch, and a Mr. Hector, who had established themselves at Baghdad with a view to opening up trade between the south-eastern provinces of Turkey and England. They were enterprising men, sociable and hospitable, ... and were the founders of that commercial intercourse between the countries watered by the rivers of Mesopotamia, which is destined to attain a vast development, and at the same time pioneers of that civilization which follows in the • wake of commerce".

1. Printed copy of the evidence of T.K,Lynch before the Committee of the Hou&e of Commons the European and Indian Junction Telegraph Company: May 28,1857. Enclosed in letter from Andrew to Hammond June 29, 1857. P.O. 78/1420. Printed in W.P. Andrew: A letter to Viscount Palmerston on the Political Importance of the Euphrates Valley Hailway. londonlSSY. p.60. 2. A.H. Layard: Autobiography and Letters. 2 Vols. London 1903 Volrl p. 330. loL

For many years the two firms of Hector and Lynch were the only English merchants established in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and their business represented the commercial interests of England in that region. Meeting with little or no competition in an area whose potentialities for development were almost unlimited, the

English merchants quickly built up establishments of important proportions. Each firm chartered a vessel from England once a year, to bring out manufactured goods from Manchester Sheffield. In addition, they engaged in the internal trade of the country between

Baghdad and Basra, taking their merchandize down the Tigris and the

Shatt-el-Arab in the native type of sailing craft which were sometimes their own property and sometimes hired from local Turkish subjects*

Froit the very beginning, the Turks were highly suspicious of the

English merchants, and jealous of their prosperity and success, for they were protected from the extreme rapacity of the Turkish local govvernment by the British political agent. Difficulties between the Turkish authorities and the merchants arose almost immediately after the establishment of the latter. The complaints of Hector in

1838 that the Turks we*v levying unjust dues on their traffic, inaugurated the wearisome series of protests by the British Consular

Representatives to the pashas of Baghdad. The Turks sought to prohibit

1. Taylor to the British Ambassador at Constantinople Political No; 38. October 13, 1838. F.O. 195/113. \0].

the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates by British merchant vessels other than under the Turkish flag, and in any case, to levy excessive dues on them. The Pasha's early attempts to discourage

British merchants ended in a Pyrrhic victory for the latter in 1846, when the Consul at Baghdad referred the matter to the British

Ambassador in Constantinople. Stratford Canning eventually reached an agreement with the Porte on the right of vessels owned or hired by British merchants and engaged in trade on the Tigris and Euphrates, to fly the British flag, and on the question of river dues*

"The substance of the Agreement is this," Sir Stratford wrote to Aberdeen: "British Vessels, qualified to navigate as . such, will be allowed to pass up and down the rivers without obstruction under their own flag, paying for the merchandize on board according to the Treaty of Balta Liman, and staying to carry on the internal traffic at their pleasure. British-owned boats or vessels built in the country and employed in the internal trade will pay duty on the s8Lme terms but will not be allowed to bear the national colours".

In making this arrangement, Sir Stratford hoped that he had

"permanently secured to our merchants the right of navigating the waters of Mesopotamia under the protection of their own national flag," and considered the dues to be levied as "only those which we could not, 2 with any show of justice or shadow of propriety refuse". * A

Vizierial letter was in due course addressed by Raouf Pasha to Nejib

Pasha, Governor of Baghdad, advising him of the arrangement between

1 Canning to Aberdeen No: 45* March 18, 1846. F.O. 78/638

2. Ibid. the Porte and the British Ambassador, and instructing him to carry it into effect.^' It would appear, however, that Nejib Pasha and his successors at Baghdad had scant respect for Vizierial Letters, for the complaints of Hector and Lynch followed in monotonous sequence and the replies of the Pasha to the representations of the British consul were tediously evasive and almost without exception unsatisfactory.

The merchants were not, however, entirely blameless, and successive

British Consular Agents in Baghdad, whilst faithfully representing the merchants’ complaints to the Pasha, wrote bitterly of their ingratitude and of their discourtesy to the Turks, in despatches to Constantinople. In 1858, Kemball, exasperated by the ceaseless demands of Lynch, which he considered unreasonable, declared to

Alison, Charge d ’affaires at Constantinople: -

’’At no place I believe where a British Consul is located, do British subjects enjoy such advantages, their business being moreover done for them gratuitously, as do the British Firms established at Baghdad, a fact which their flourishing condition in a country like Turkish Arabia sufficiently attests, and yet nowhere I believe will they be found so grasping illiberal and exacting ,..’’2^»

The general attitude of the merchants seems to have changed but little, for Kemball’s successors made similar complaints, and Herbert’s description of them as lacking ’’breadth of views and commercial

1. Lettre du Grand Vizier au Pacha de Baghdad en date 2 Avril 1846 le 6 Rebiul-Akhir, 1262. Printed in S. Hertslet: Commercial Treaties... Vol: XIII p.839-840 and G.P, Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley: British Documents on the Origins of the War. London 1938. Vol: X Part II p.92, 2, Kemball to Alison. No: 27 June 5, 1858. F.O. 195/577 loç

intelligence" appeared in a Blue Book.^*

In spite of their unfriendly relations with the Turkish

Authorities at Baghdad, the two British firms prospered, and the volume of their trade increased so rapidly that it outgrew the primitive forms of river transport. Early in the Nineteenth Century the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates was still confined to native craft ’time-honoured before Herodotus savf them,’

"Skin-borne rafts of the Zabs and upper Tigris, flat wooden rafts from Birijik to Fallujah, pitched coracles at every ferry and fishery, reed and wooden skiffs in the marshes, sailing and rope-drawn craft on lower Tigris and Shatt ul ’Arab, and the hundred-ton sea-going muhai] alls of Fao,,.^.

Developments in river transport seem for some time to have eluded the Tigris and the Euphrates. For fifteen years after the withdrawal of the Indian Navy flotilla, the only steam vessel on those rivers was that attached to the British Residency at Baghdad.

The initiative in introducing steam vessels for commercial purposes lay, strangely enough, with the Turks. In 1855, Rashid Pasha

Geuzlikli called a meeting of Baghdad merchants and formed a Company, in which half the capital was subscribed by the public, and half by the Government, The following year^, two steamers were purchased from

1. Baghdad* Report by Colonel Herbert, dated January 1873 A&P. (1873) LXVII (c 860) p. 989. 2. Herodotus* Book I paragraph 194 (Translated by H.Cary. London 1849) gives a description of the craft which navigated the Tigris from Mosul to Baghdad, 3. Longrigg: Op.cit. p.292 110

Belgium. They arrived at Basra in 1857 and were introduced on to

the Tigris late the same year. On their arrival at Baghdad in April

1858, Kemball described them as being unsuitable for river work and

very indifferently manned.^"Although intended as trading vessels, the

steamers were in fact primarily used by the local authorities for

transporting troops during the constant tribal warfare taking place

in the lower reaches of the Tigris, and they were left little

opportunity for carrying private freights on trading voyages.

Stirred by the example of the Turks, yet annoyed by their

refusal to accept private freights, the firm of Lynch decided to run

their own steamers purely for trading purposes. In I860, the firm

approached the Foreign Office through their house in London,

enquiring whether British merchant vessels had a right to navigate 2 the Tigris and Euphrates, * The Foreign Office, in reply, quoted 3 the agreement concluded by Stratford Canning in 1846. * In transmitting

copies of the correspondence to Bulwer, British Ambassador to the

Porte, Russell informed him that the Government "would not disapprove"

if he supported Lynch in an application to the Turkish Government 4 ^ for permission to run steamers on the rivers of Mesopotamia,

1, Kemball to Alison, No: 29 April 27, 1858, F.O, 195/624 2, Lynch to Hammond, February 9, 1860, F.O. 78/3988. 3, Foreign Office to Lynch, February 17, I860.,F.O. 78/3988. For the agreement between Stratford Canning and|the. Porte see Supra ^,^0/ 4, Russell to Bulwer No: 663, November 27, I860, F.O, 78/3988. Accordingly, in January 1861, Bulwer obtained a Vizierial Letter

addressed to the Pasha of Baghdad, confirming the arrangements of

1846,^“ The incorporation of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation

Company Limited followed in April 1861. The three Lynch brothers who had founded the Baghdad firm were the Directors of the nev^ompany,

and the firm of Lynch the Baghdad Agents. Kemball and Bulwer were

instructed to give "such countenance and protection" to the interests 2. of the Company as they could properly afford.

The Company’s first steamer, the City of London was commissioned

and placed on the Tigris in the summer of 1862. Nothwithslanding the

Vizierial instruction of the previous year, the Ottoman authorities

at Baghdad were most reluctant to withdraw their opposition to foreign

enterprise. This was only too apparent to Kemball who was quite

certain that Namik Pasha would find some impediment to the fulfilment

of his instructions from Constantinople. * Nevertheless, a few months later, Kemball was able to report to Bulwer that the venture had proved successful.

"I cannot refrain from observing", wrote the Consul-General, "... that in spite of Namik Pasha’s aversion the benefit of Steam Communications between Bussor ah and Baghdad is universally

1. Bulwer to Russell. No; 47. January 18, 1861, F.O. 78/3988. 2. Russell to Bulwer No. 364 June 5, 1861. ( P.O. 78/3988 Russell to Kemball No. 4 Consular July 7, 1861 \ 3. Kemball to Bulwer, No: 22. May 21, 1862, F.O. 195/717. lia

"appreciated by the Mercantile community of either place as is attested by the constant occupation of the "City of London" and the full cargoes with which she is always freighted..."I-

Trade continued to expand steadily but satisfactorily, A Greek firm established at Manchester, Tambaci and Company set up a mercantile house under British protection at Baghdad in 1860, to be followed by two other European firms, one Greek and one Swiss, The

London and Baghdad Banking Association was established in 1864, its operations being almost entirely confined to exchange transactions 2. with India. * Yet a further stimulus to trade was given by the opening of steam communications between Bombay and the Persian Gulf ports, including Basra, by the British India Steam Navigation Company in 1862. The general increase in the trade of the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley, of which all these developments were symptomatic, once again outgrew transport facilities on the Tigris, and in 1864 the Euphrates cLnd Tigris Steam Navigation Company proposed to run a second steamer between Baghdad and Basra, Namik Pasha protested vehemently against this proposal, asserting that the original Firman granted in 1834 to the British Government explicitly limited the number of steam vessels 2 engaging in the internal traffic of Mesopotamia to two. " He further contended that two British vessels were already thus engaged, the City of London belonging to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam

1. Kemball to Bulwer, No: 46. September 24, 1862, F.O, 195/717. 2. Report by Kemball on the general condition and commerce of the Province.of Baghdad. A&P (1867) LXVII (3761) p. 292. 3. Kemball to Erskine, Charge d ’affaires at Constantinople, No:11 March 16, 1864. F.O. 195/803A. (13.

Navigation Company, and the Comet, formerly a vessel of the Indian

Navy, and at that time attached to the British Residency as a despatch boat. After British representations had been made to the

Porte, Namik Pasha was over-ruled, and permission was granted for the Dijla to be placed on the Tigris. In the same year, 1864,

Kemball reported the formation in Baghdad of a steam navigation company of French parentage, under the auspices of Namik Pasha, to compete with the English Company.^" The Porte declared the report to be without foundation, and it would appear that the jealousy of the 2. Pasha of Baghdad embraced all foreign enterprise.

Even two steamers proved inadequate to deal efficiently with the ever-growing trade of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. From this time, the history of British commercial relations- with that region is that of a perpetual struggle on the part of the British merchants to obtain adequate transport to deal with the bulk of their merchandise.

It is, at the same time, a story of Turkish obstruction and Turkish attempts to restrict British trade to the narrowest possible limits.

It was about this time, when the right of the English Company to run a second steamer on the Tigris had been raised, that the British

Government first began to urge the Porte to open the navigation of the

1. Kemball to Stuart, Charge d ’affaires at Constantinople No:64. November 16, 1864. F.O. 78/1808. 2. Stuart to Russell. No; 123 Confidential, March 14, 1865.F.O.78/1858 Illl.

Mesopotamian rivers, without restriction, to the commerce of all nations» In March 1865, Stuart, Charge d ’Affaires at Constantinople, reported to Russell that in accordance with instructions, he had

frequently spoken to Aali Pasha, the Turkish Foreign Minister, on the subject, and that Aali Pasha had now informed him that Regulations for the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates were actually in the course of preparation.^' Promises of this nature were, however, merely part of the diplomatic stock-in-trade of the Turks, and no such regulations were forthcoming. Stuart was instructed to continue his representations on the subject, and at the same time to inform

Aali Pasha that Her Majesty’s Government had

"great reason to be dissatisfied with the unfriendly course which Namik Pasha (took) in questions in which British interests (were) concerned, and that they (had) only been prevented by consideration for the Porte from seriously urging upon it the removal of the Pasha from Baghdad as he (seemed) incapable of understanding the benefits of commerce, and (was) an enemy to The Sultan’s Friend and Ally." 2.

This protest was, of course, ignored. In the following year* further evidence was forthcoming of the hostility of Namik Pasha to

British commercial interests and of his wanton indifference to the development of the resources of his Pashalic. Furthermore, by virtue of his favour with the Sultan, to whom he remitted his taxes regularly,

1. Stuart to Russell. No; 123 Confidential. March 14, 1865, F.O.78/1858 2, Russell to Stuart. No: 119. March 30, 1865,F.O.78/1852 (Seen by Palmerston and the Queen), 1(6.

the anglophobe Pasha was supported in his short-sighted policy by the

Forte, despite Lhe strongest protests of the British Government. ^"

In 1866, the firm of Lynch sought permission to import into Baghdad several steam engines for cleaning cotton and rice, and steam pumps for irrigation. It was their intention to work these machines for hire, and to supply water or clean cotton or rice at stipulated rates of remuneration, hoping thereby to encourage the cultivation of cotton and rice, which were profitable exports. Namik pasha was immediately suspicious, that such machinery would give foreign merchants undue influence in his Province. The arguments of Kemball failed to convert him to a more reasonable view of the benefits to be derived from the introduction of modern agricultural machinery. The

London house of Lynch appealed to the Foreign Secretary for support, which Clarendon was willing to accord. Lyons was therefore instructed to point out to the Ottoman Government "that it (was) to its interest to give every encouragement to enterprising merchants such as Messrs. Lynch in their endeavours to open out the agriculture and trade of (a) Pashalic like that of Baghdad". He was, moreover, to "request that orders such as he (could) not disregard (might) be sent to Namik Pasha enjoining him not to interfere with the admission into Baghdad of the machinery in question. * Lyons ’remonstrated very strongly’ with the Porte, reporting that he had ’spoken with some warmth* on the subject to Aali Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs.^" The latter

1. Lyons to Stanley. No: 419 Confidential November 19, 1866. F.O.78/1915 2. Clarendon to Lyons, No: 94 March 20, 1866. F.O.78/1903, 3. Lyons to Clarendon. No: 141 April 24, 1866. F.O.78/1909. \[L>,

assured him that a communication had been sent to NamiK Pasha, "in a

form which will ensure its not being disregarded". It proved, however, to be no mean task to send instructions to the Pasha of

Baghdad which he would find it impossible not to carry out. Far from

obeying the Vizierial instructions which Aali Pasha alleged had been

sent, Namik not only continued his vexatious policy of thwarting foreign enterprise, but convinced the Porte of the soundness of his 1 views. .

The concurrence of the Porte in Namik Pasha’s policy drew further and more vehement protests from the British Government, Stanley had succeeded Clarendon at the Foreign Office, but their policy on the protection of British trade interests was, mn this occasion, scarcely distinguishable. Stanley took up the case with some warmth. The

British Government, he declared in a despatch to Lyons, were not surprised at the policy pursued by Namik Pasha, On the other hand, the British Government considered that they had "a right to expect from the Porte that it (would) not suffer itself to be misled by any such evil Council to the prejudice of the industry of British subjects, seeking it (was) true their own advantage in a commercial enterprize, but stimulating by the results of their improvements if successful, the industrial habits of the Turkish population with far greater advantages to the interests of the Porte," Emphasis was laid on the benefits which would accrue to Turkey from the introduction of modern machinery and equipment, and from the general development of the

1. Lyons to Stanley, No: 313. August 25, 1866, F.0,78/1912. “7.

Pashalic of Baghdad, At the same time, no doubt was left that the

British Government considered such restrictive practices, condoned by the Turkish Government, to be an unfriendly act, not only towards

British merchants, but also towards a Power "in alliance and amity with the Bultan". Finally, Lyons was instructed to leave a copy of this despatch with Aali Pasha, emd, if he thought it desirable, to

"apply for an audience of the Sultan and lay personally before H.M. the reasons ... for over-ruling Namik Pasha’s opposition to the introduction and employment of the machinery which Messrs, Lynch and Co, (desired) to import into and set up in the Province of Baghdad."

After strong representations by Lyons, the Turkish Government agreed to permit the importation of the machinery for cleaning rice and cotton, but they persisted in their refusal to allow the introduction of the 2 machinery for irrigation, ’* The Ambassador did not think it politic to address the Sultan personally on the matter, considering it more expedient to refrain from such strong measures unless the British

Government were prepared to manifest their displeasure "in an 3 unmistakable and effectual manner", *

Stanley appears to have had no intention of going beycrid diplomatic action, but before the incident was closed he instructed Lyons

1.Stanley to Lyons, No: 57, September 13, 1866. F.O. 78/1905 2, Lyons to Stanley, No 418, November 19, 1866, F.O, 78/1915 3. Lyons to Stanley. No: 419 Confidential November 19,1866. F.O,78/1915 IIS

"to express in an official note the regret of Her Majesty’s Government at the decision of the Porte not to allow Steam Engines for the purpose of irrigation to he erected by Foreigners, which decision is more injurious to Turkey as affecting, in the present instance, the general welfare of an important Province of the Sultan’s Dominions, than to England whose interest in the matter is only that of an individual Firm," 1.

Ultimately, a compromise was reached between the London house of Lynch and the Turkish Ambassador, the machinery being sold to the

Turkish authorities at Baghdad at cost price. The machinery was in fact taken over by the Government of Baghdad, but there is no evidence

Lhat it was either erected or put into use. On the contrary, it is only too probable that the "fine English-made traction engine" which

Gratton Geary saw sinking into the clayey soil of the road from 2. Baghdad to Kerbela, * was the very engine which in the capable hands of Messrs, Lynch, could habe been of so great value to the country.

Instead, it was left to rust itself out unused, with birds nesting in the funnels, a fitting monument to the intransigence of the bigotted

Turkish rulers of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.

During the next few years there were no major differences between the English merchants and the Turkish authorities, calling for the serious intervention of the Foreign Office. Namik Pasha continued his repressive policy until his recall to Constantinople in 1868, when he

1.Stanley to Lyons : No: 127, December 4, 1866. F.O, 78/1905 2.Gratton Geary: Through Asiatic Turkey Vol: 1 p. 146 "9

was succeeded temporarily by Takkee-ud-Deen Pasha who filled the post until the arrival of Midhat Pasha in the following year. The

English merchants continued to prosper in an unspectacular manner, and as their trade increased,so Messrs, Lynch found that the demand for cargo space in their steamers also increased, despite the determination of Neonik and his successors to drive the English steamers off the river by competition. To this end, Namik Pasha had commissioned three more steamers from Belgium, These steamers arrived at Basra in 1867 and were forthwith put into operation, carrying freight at much lower rates than those of the Euphrates and Tigris

Steam Navigation Company. Only the habitual incompetence and mismanagement of the Turkish officials and the unreliability of their service saved the English Company from an embarrassing competition which might well have resulted in their failure.^*

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 opens a new phase in

British commercial interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, With the opening of the canal came the establishment of direct communieaticns between England and the head of the Persian Gulf, creating yet a further stimulus to trade euad causing a deviation from trade routes y^hich had been followed for centuries. Previously, goods from

England were generally shipped first to India, and then trans-shipped

1, Herbert to Secretary to the Government of India, No: 8, April 7, 1870, Copy enclosed in Elliot to Clarendon, No: 25, May 21, 1870, F.O. 78/3988. \to.

to Basra. There was also quite a large trade in English manufactured

goods which were taken through the Mediterranean by sea and then

reached Baghdad across the Desert by caravan either by way of

Beirout and Damascus, or through Alexandretta and Aleppo, -Merchandise

from Constantinople to Baghdad also followed one of these routes, and

it was estimated that, before the opening of the Suez Canal, ten

diousand/ camels were annually employed in carrying this trade from

England and Constantinople, * After the opening of the Suez Canal,

English manufactures were sent direct from the English port to

Basra and thence to Baghdad by river steamer. Goods from Constantinople

were also sent by sea through Suez, because such a route was not only

quicker but also cheaper and safer. In two years, the caravan

trade was reduced to a fifth of its previous size, Baghdad retained

its position as the great trade-centre of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley 2 and of South-West Persia, * Merchandise taken from Basra to Baghdad

by river steamer was carried northwards to Mosul, westwards to the holy cities of the Shiah Moslems, Kerbela and Nejeff, and eastwards

to Kermanshah and Ispahan in Persia, The return trade, which also

passed through Baghdad on its way to the Persian Gulf for shipment

1, Evidence of H,Paul before the Select Committee on the Euphrates Valley Railway, A&P (1872) IX (322) p. 268 ff, 2, Curzon gives an estimate of the transit trade from the Persian Gulf to Persia via Baghdad in 1889 as 20,000 to 25,000 laden mules a year, G,N, Curzon: Persia and the Persian Question, 2 Vols, London 1892, Vol: II p, (Il

to Europe and India, consisted largely of gall-nuts for dyes, and

wool, from Mosul; tobacco and cotton from Persia, and horses, hides,

wool, cotton, rice and dates from the country between Baghdad and

Basra.

The trade between India and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley had been

rapidly expanding since the British India Steam Navigation Company had

opened communications between Bombay and the Persian Gulf ports, 2 including Basra, in 1862. * This Company first ran steamers from

India once in six weeks, but in ten years the bulk of merchandise was

so much increased that by 1872 a weekly service had become necessary.

The river steamers to carry the goods from Basra to Baghdad were

unfortunately hopelessly inadequate, and parts of the cargo often had '

to be left behind at Basra for lack of space in the river steamers.

The important effect of the opening of the Suez Canal on the

trade of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley had best been described by

Herbert in his trade report for the year 1870 - 1871,

"The large increase shown in the imports from India and Europe", Herbert wrote, "is attributable to the enhanced facilities of communication, particularly with Europe through the Suez Canal, and to the sudden impulse which has been thus given to speculation. The competition which has sprung up is described as alarming.

1, Evidence of T.K* Lynch before the Select Committee on the Euphrates Valley Railway, A & P (1871) Vll (386) p. 535, 2. For an account of the British India Steam Navigation Company see the evidence of the Chairman, W, MacKinnon before the Select Committee on the Euphrates Valley Railway. A&P (1872) IX (322) p, 265 ff. \zt

"Formerly, the import trade was entirely in the hands of a few leading merchants, hut these now find that every petty merchant makes his own purchases in the markets of Europe through the help of commission agencies, and goods have come into the country in such large quantities that their disposal cannot be explained. On consequence is that the market is glutted with all kinds of European goods

In his trade report of the same year, Robertson, Vice-Consul at Basra , stated that two companies had been formed in England for the purpose of establishing a monthly steam communication between London and Basra 2. direct, through the Suez Canal,

The trade boom brought about by improved communications with

Europe did not prove to be so short-lived as was expected. In

January 1874, Herbert reported, with mild surprises -

"The cause of this increase of trade is of course, the Suez Canal and the constant means of communication which are opening up the resources of the country to a wonderful extent by forcing foreign merchants from sheen competition, to accept less remunerative prices, thus enabling sales in Persia and the surrounding districts to be made at much lower rates than formerly and a corresponding increase in the demand is, of course, the effect."

Lynch was still the most important firm in the Tigris-Euphrates WO-S Valley, hector, founder of the other British firm in Baghdad h«d long repufei. to kcLirc ^ since^made his fortune and retired to England. " The Greek firm of

1, A & P (1872) LVII (Cmd, 543) p, 293, 2. A & P (1872) LVII (Cmd. 543) p. 300. 3. A&P, (1874) LXVII ( c 1009-1) p. 304, 4, Chesney informed Clarendon in 1854 that he believed Hector was about to return to England "having realized a moderate fortune". Chesney to Clarendon, November 30, 1854, F.O.78/1711, itéclbr cvjppears Voucher^ L Uo^ve LtS ConnecLok» wiK (Lt -jt-rrr,

f\-V(cc^or' cu\(i CoKipaKcj onlrJ Uis C^C(xtU

Stc rfixon lo EII,ob Ko'. Zq , ^ I S lojL , \z?>

Tcimbaci which had direct connections with Manchester, and which

claimed to be the largest firm representing British trade in Baghdad,^*

received British protection. The British India Steam Navigation

Company had agents at Baghdad, who were chiefly interested in the

shipment of wool and grain. There was certainly room for all these

firms in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, in addition to the native and

Jewish merchants of Baghdad. This was only too evident from the

insufficiency of the English and Turkish river steamers to cope with

the perpetually increasing amount of cargo space demanded. Yet, the

Turks persisted in their refusal of further concessions to the British

Company. Indeed, the Turks were the chief obstacle to their own

prosperity, and persevered in their policy of attempting to sti^fle

foreign enterprise of any description. An interesting example of their

pettiness and lack of appreciation even of their own interests was

to be found in their Customs-house policy. According to the

statistics, provided with great reluctance by the Baghdad Customs­ house authorities, the value of British imports alone had risen from

£ sterling 34, 506 in 1869, to £ sterling 118, 823 in 1870, and yet

further to £ sterling 172, 268 in 1874. Yet the Turks actually

reduced the establishment of the Baghdad Customs-house, which

resulted in considerable delays there, injurious alike to customs

1, Secretary to Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Foreign Secretary July 8, 1875. P.O. 78/2397. receipts and trade. Furthermore, the vessels of the Euphrates and

Tigris Steam Navigation Company were prohibited from loading on

Fridays, although Turkish vessels were permitted both to load and to discharge cargo on that day. ^" In this and in other matters, the protests of the Consul-General were unavailing, and the Turks seized every possible opportunity to discriminate against the English

Company.

Matters continued in this state until the years immediately following the Husso-Turkish war of 1877 to 1878. British trade continued to show satisfactory results. A decline in British imports in 1875 and 1876, due to the Shah of Persians forbidding his subjects to make pilgrimages to the Shiakshrines at Kerbela and Nejeff ' was counterbalanced by an increase during the Russo-Turkish war, when supplies of Russian goods to areas north-east of Baghdad, reaching as far* as Tabreez, were temporarily cut off. The British Government continued to give what diplomatic assistance they could to British merchants in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Elliot was instructed to support the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company in their

1. Herbert's report on the Trade and Commerce of Baghdad for the year 1873. A&P (1874) LXVll (c 1009-1) p. 305. 2. Complaints of losses were made by Tambaci of Manchester, see letter of Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Derby July 8,1875 F.O. 78/2397. Elliot and Thomson (Minister at Teheran) were asked for reports on the subject, for which see:- Nixon to Derby No:l Commercial March 20, 1876. F .0*78/2518. Thomson to Derby No:15 Commercial September 30, 1875, F.O. 60/373. application to the Porte for permission to replace one of their vessels which had been sunk in a storm on the Tigris. Both the

Ambassador at Constantinople and the Minister at Teheran were instructed to enquire into the Turco-Persian differences which were keeping Persian pilgrims from the Shiah shrines in Baghdad Province, and thereby causing loss and inconvenience to British merchants.

Before anything more could be done for British trade, the co-operation of the Turks was necessary.

"The chief requirements in this Country," wrote Nixon in 1879, "are in my opinion, increased facilities for extension of British Commerce in this and adjacent Countries, opening up Steam Communications with Mosul an the Tigris and Dheir on the Euphrates near Aleppo. Industrial enterprises will follow fast on the opening up of the Country as there is a most enterprising Community of Jewish and Christian merchants ... (who) will be ready enough to get up industrial enterprises as the Country begins to progress in civilisation) manufacturing enterprise will come in due course, but at present it does not appear to me to be necessary to regard this centre as anything else than an Entrepot and mart for the furtherj^ance of our Commerce ..."^»

The Turks were, of course, little disposed to permit any such

*opening-up* of the Vilayet of Baghdad, or any change in the commerce of the Province, unless it should be a return to the halryiron days when no foreign merchants or enterprises meddled in such trade as there was in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.

The period immediately following the Russo-Turkish War opens another phase in the history of British interests in the Tigris-

1. Nixon to Layard. No: 6, January 25, 1879. P.O. 195/1242. izL.

Euphrates Valley. In the commercial sphere, the actual changes were

not drastic, for although there were rumours of concessions to

foreign concerns which might well have threatened British commercial

preponderance, in the decade following the Treaty of Berlin no

serious foreign competitors entered the field. The Treaty of

Berlin had, however, given Russia a strong position on the north­

eastern frontier of Turkey, from which to survey the road to the

Persian Gulf through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. The appointment

of a Russian Consul to Baghdad in 1880, the first Russian Consul

to be established in Turkish Arabia, boded no good in the opinion

of the British Consul General who regarded it as the beginning

of Russian infiltration into the Province.^* Moreover, the Turks

themselves were increasingly suspicious of British designs and even

less inclined than formerly to tolerate her growing commercial interests in the Vilayet of Baghdad, which might give her a position

of no little importance in the eyes of Arab tribes who were not

amongst the most loyal subjects of the Sultan.

From 1880 onwards, it appeared highly probable that foreign companies, of divers nationalities, would obtain osnoessions similar to that of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, to ply steamers on the Tigris, First it was rumoured in January 1880 that the Turkish steamers on that river had been sold, with a monopoly

1. Plowden to Goschen, No: 151. December 31, 1880. F.O.195/1310• Plowden to Granville: No: 133/p,D. March 12, 1885. F.O.78/3774, of the navigation of the rivers of ‘Mesopotamia for fifteen years,

to a Turkish Company,^" Whilst enquiring the truth of this rumour

from Savas pasha, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Layard was informed

that a Dutch Company had applied for a concession similar to that

of the English Company, to run two steamers on the rivers of

Mesopotamia. Savas added that the foreign law adviser^6f the Porte had reported the Dutch claim to such a concession to he well founded

and that it could not, therefore, be refused, Layard, after % questioning the Minister on the bona fides of the Dutch Company, in

case it should prove of Russian extraction, urged upon him the opening

of the Mesopotamian rgvars to the commerce of all nations, a 2 suggestion which was favourably received. ' In approving Layard*s

despatch reporting this conversation, Salisbury observedt-

*’her Majesty's Government consider that British interests are likely to derive greater benefits from a general measure of this nature than from representations made in favour of an English Company".^»

This was the attitude of successive British Governments, and Layard and his successors at the Constantinople Embassy continued on every suitable occasion to encourage the Turks to carry out such a policy.

The Turks, however, inv/nriably gave a non-commital reply indicating

1. Salisbury to Layard. No;2 Commercial January 13, 1880. F.0.78/3112, 2. Layard to Salisbury. No: 3 Commercial January 16, 1880. F.O.78/3989. 3. Salisbury to Layard. No; 13 Commercial February 5, 1880. P.O.78/3112 IZS,

that they had no intention of acting on the Ambassador's representations,

The Dutch Company renewed their efforts to obtain a concession for the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates in 1883, when Wyndham,

British Charge d'affaires at Constantinople reported that, should the

Dutch succeed, a Spanish Company intended to follow their example, ^*

Presumably the Turks found some ground for refusing the Dutch request, for no concession was granted to them, and the Spaniards would appear to have been discouraged by the Dutch failure. A rumour of the previous year, that French merchants at Basra had received permission 2, to run two steamers on the Tigris proved to be unfounded, *as did a report in The Times, Allegedly communicated to that newspaper by the Ottoman Embassy in London, that a concession to establish a steam navigation service on the Tigris, without monopoly, had been granted 3 to a Turkish merchant of Baghdad. * In fact, the English Company and the Ottoman Company continued to share the carrying trade of

Mesopotamia, with the exception of the merchandise still carried in the ancient native river boats.

The importunity with which Her Majesty's Government urged the

Turks to open the Mesopotamian rivers to all merchant shipping, merely

1, Wyndham to Granville. No: 200 Commercial, July 13, 1883,F.O.78/3990

2, Dufferin to Granville.No.6 January 13, 1882.F.0.78/3990.

3, The Times January 29,1883. 1%^

increased their suspicions that the British intended to seize

Mesopotamia, and were using their commercial activities, particularly those of the Steam Navigation Company, to prepare the ground for such action.^' The increasing unpopularity of Great Britain was manifested in a policy of more active hostility towards British commercial interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and Lynch, the

Baghdad agents of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, were singled out for special attention. On several occasions, the

Turkish local authorities at Baghdad, upheld by the central government, tooKthe course most calculated to injure the interests of that

Company, Four incidents which took place between the years 1879 and

1885 amply illustrate the Turkish attitude to British commercial interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley,

In 1379, a prolonged drought in Armenia and Turkish Arabia reduced the Tigris to an exceptionally low level, making navigation very difficult, and causing much distress amongst the riparian

Arabs of the rice-growing districts round Amara. Disregarding the question of navigation, and with typical ineptitude, the Turkish authorities permitted and even encouraged the Arabs to construct a dam of interlaced reeds and earth across the river, which not only

1. Layard to Salisbury, No; 126, January 17, 1880 F.O, 78/3080. Enclosing a translation of an extract from the Turkish newspaper Terdjman Hakekat on the alleged intention of England to put a fleet on the Tigris, 130

temporarily stopped all navigation, but threatened to become a permanent impediment when broken down. The protests and warnings of

Her Majesty's Government, against this action, communicated to the

Porte in a Memorandum by Layard,^‘went unheeded, and direct communication between Baghdad and Basra by river was suspended from

July until November 1879. The dam was then swept away by the current, having in any case proved almost useless for the purposes of irrigation. Fortunately, no permanent damage was inflicted on the course of the river, but the process of trans-shipping the cargo on either side of the dam was so slow that goods from Europe and India accumulated in vast quantities, and the English Company had to suspend all bookings for a short time.

Throughout the following year, there were serious disorders in th/e Tigris-Euphrates Valley. The Turks exercised no authority at all among the Arab tribes, and their occasional efforts to subdue them were without any permanent result. In 1880, the disorders were of a more widespread character, and some alarm was felt by British merchants for the safety of their lives and property. On July 8th, the

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's vessel Khalifah was fired on by Arab tribesmen from the bank of the Tigris near Amara, and o^e member of her crew ms killed, and others were wounded. The

1. Layard to Salisbury. No: 731 August 14, 1879. F.O.78/2956. Enclosing a copy of his Note and Memorandum to the Porte, dated August 14, 1879. m.

Secretary of the Company in London lost no time in urging upon Granville that immediate steps should be taken to safeguard British life and property.^*Goschen, Layard*s successor at Constantinople, had already 2 been instructed to protest to the Porte and to demand redress. * At the same time, the question of sending a Gunboat to Basra was mooted at the Foreign Office. Dilke, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, was in favour of strong action.

"I think", he wrote, "the navigation of these rivers is now so ^ important to us that a light draft gunboat might be very useful..."

Tenterden, the Permanent Under Secretary, was more cautious, besides being somewhat doubtful of the right of British warships to navigate the Shatt-el-Arab. More moderate counsels prevailed and the idea of sending a gunboat to Basra was dropped. The representations of successive Ambassadors at the Porte, lasting over a period of four years, proved quite ineffectual, and measures, which the Turks considered

"reellement énergique", resulted in no advance whatsoever towards the punishment of the culprits or the pacification of the area in which 4 ^ the attack had taken place. * Finally, the matter petered out except as an example, in later negotiations on the subject of the navigation of

1, Secretary of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July 13, 1880#F.0.78/3171# 2.Granville to Goschen. Telegram No:247, July 12, 1880.F.O.78/3102. 3. Undated minute by Sir Charles Dilke on the docket of a Memorandum by W.S. Blunt on the attack on the Khalifah. P.0.78/3171, 4, Details of the representations made by British Ambassadors to the Porte on the subject of the attack on the Khalifah are set out in a Foreign Office Memorandum by W.H# Huggard, dated July 12, 1883. p. 0.78/3990. the Tigris fey English merchant vessels, of the apparently deliberate intention of the Turks, to acquiesce in any incident which might injure British corrmierce and discourage her traders from pursuing their legitimate interest in that part of the Ottoman Empire.

Stil] further evidence of the malevolence of the Turkish authorities both in Baghdad and in Constantinople, towards British enterprise in Mesopotamia, had been manifested earlier in 1880 when famine was raging in the district round Mosul. In order to increase the amount of grain and other essential foodstuffs for the famine- stricken area, the English navigation Company had attempted to increase their carrying capacity by towing barges loaded with grain and other relief materials. They had at once been forbidden to do so by the

Turkish authorities. Fruitless attempts to secure the repeat of this prohibition were made by the Company, fully supported by the Consulr

General at Baghdad and the Ambassador at Constantinople, After a struggle, the ban was lifted for the duration of the famine,^'but it was re-imposed at the earliest possible moment, and the Turks remained adamant on the general principle.

Throughout the following years, several attempts were made to induce the Porte either to permit the Company to increase the number of thor steamers, or to allow the two steamers to tow barges, in

1, Layard to Miles. Telegram .dated May 14, 1880. F.O.195/1296. 153

order to meet the ever-increasing demands for cargo-space for imported and local merchandise. The matter was considered of -SuxM great importance that, in September 1881, Granville submitted the

Company’s claim to tow barges on the Mesopotamian rivers as a right, to the Law Officers of the Cro’-m.^* The latter reported that, in their opinion, the Company were "entitled to employ steamers having authority to ply upon the Rivers of Mesopotamia for all commercial purposes for which such vess][es (were) ordinarily employed, and (they thought that) this would probably include the towing of barges".

They observed, however, that if the authority of British steamers to run on those rivers were derived from the Firman of 1834, it should be remembered that that document was open to revocation by the Turkish authorities. Dr. Parker Deane, the Queen’s Advocate, differed from the opinion of the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General in considering that the right to tow barges, maintained by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company could not "properly be maintained".

This was the beginning of a long controversy over the legal rights of the English Company to navigate the Tigris and Euphrates, and over the interpretation of the various Firmans, Viaierial letters and agreements which were thought to confer on British merchant vessels the right to navigate those rivers. Whilst the Foreign Office

1. Sir Jo Pauncefote to the Law Officers of the Drown and Dr. Deane. September 17, 1881. F.O.78/3989. 2. ^aw Officers and Dr. Deane to Granville. November 18, 1881. P.O. 78/3989. 134.

and the Law Officers were attempting to clarify the legal position

of British claims, Dufferin continued, to press the Porte for

permission for the English steamers already on the Tigris to tow

barges 0 It was, however, obvious that the Turks had no intention of

giving a straightforward reply, for whilst the Prime Minister and

Foreign Secretary declared to Dufferin that the matter was in the

hands of the Sultan, the latter in turn informed the Ambassador that

he awaited information from his Ministers,

"I have been forced to the conclusion," reported Dufferin to Granville on March 23rd 1882, "that His Majesty is quite determined not to grant our request. I am confirmed in this view by the fact that Prince Reuss (the German Ambassador), to whom of course His Majesty would have been anxious to show every possible favour, had been induced for private reasons to support the interests of the Company, end had pressed the Sultan strongly on this point, but found to his great disappointment that all his efforts were fruitless",^•

Dufferin’s conjecture proved to be only too well-founded, and

it was scarcely to be hoped that the Sultan*s hostility towards the

expansion of British interests would be modified by the bombardment

of Alexandria and the subsequent British occupation of Egypt, These

actions only served to confirm the Sultan in his suspicions that

England intended also to destroy his authority in his Asiatic

Dominions in order ultimately to annex them.

1. Dufferin to Granville. No: 36 Commercial. Confidential. March 23, 1882. P.O. 78/3990. Eventually, in 1899, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company were granted permission to tow barges. was not, however, until the following year that Anglophobia reached its peak in Baghdad, with a definite challenge to the rights of English steamers to olv on the Tigris. On June 15, 188^, Tweedig, acting Consul-General in Baghdad, telegraphed to Granville that the

Vali, Takkee-ud-Deen Pasha, allegedly acting on instructions from the Minister of the Interior, had prohibited the Euphrates and

Tlvrib Steam Navigation Oornany's vessels from dying on the Tigris 1 on the ground that the privilege applied specifically to the EuphratesJ .

The representations of Wyndham, Charge d’affaires at Constantinople, were more or less ignored, the Turkish Foreign Minister declaring that his Government had business of too pressing a nature to bring the matter at once before the Grand Council. Wyndham therefore requested instructions from Granville to present a Note to the

2 * Porte. * Meanwhile,' Takkee-ud-Deen had taken measures to implement his decision by forcibly preventing the British from loading, by closing the Customs House against them, and finally by piacing

Turkish soldiers on board the steamers to prevent the embarkation of cargo and passengers. Whilst Wyndham continued to press the matter at the Porte, Granville protested formally to Musurus Pasha, a. Turkish Ambassador in London. The British Government took a very

1. Tweedie to Granville, Cypher Telegram, June 15, 1883. F,0.78/399G. Technically speaking, it was true that the Firman of 1834 mentioned only the Euphrates, but the Vizierial Letter of 1861 mentioned permission having been granted to the British ^*to station two steamers on the River Euphrates at Baghdad (sic)’’. In fact, the Company had restricted their operations to the Tigris, between Basra and Baghdad. 2. Wyndham to Granville. Cypher Telegrai:., July 2, 1883.F.O.78/3990

3. Granville to Musurus. July 5 and 11, 1883. P.O. 78/3990. /3b

serious view of Lliis latest manifestation of Turkish hostility towards British commerce in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, Pauncefote,

Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office expressed the general indignation when described the Turkish action as "most injurious to our interests, damaging to our prestige and unjustifiable on the part of a friendly nation". He thought that a firm line should be taken, repeating the suggestion of Plowden, the Consul

General at Baghdad, who was on leave in England.

"that the Consular officer in charge at Baghdad shd. be withdrawn and that Gunboats from the Persian Gulph shd, he sent to Bussorah and Gorna (at the junction of the Euphrates and Tigris) to stop all traffic to and from Baghdad until the "status Quo" is restored. ^ This is a grave matter for the cons(idereti)on of the Cabinet..." 2, The papers were in fact circulated to members of the Cabinet "but there is no record either of the subject being discussed in Cabinet or of the batter’s decision. The matter was raised in the House of

Coimnons from time to time, by Mr. Arthur Arnold, Liberal Member for

Salford, but little information was/given by Fitzmaurice, Parliamentary

Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Indeed, little could be said without introducing the legal aspects of the question, which were still under the consideration of the Law Officers, and which it would have been injudicious to reveal.

1. Memorandum by Bir Julian Pauncefote, July 11, 1883. F.0,78/3990.,

2. Granville to Members of the Cabinet, enclosing relevant papers on the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates. August 4, 1383. y.O, 78/.39S1. anwhile, Wyndham was unceasing in his efforts to induce

the Porte to rescind the orders to the Vali, but the Turkish

Foreign Minister could hold out no hope of a favourable decision

by the Council of Ministers when they should have an opportunity to

discuss the matter.^* The Russian Ambassador, M-, Nelidov, was

reported to be encouraging the Sultan in his resistance to the

British demands, which he was rumoured to have declared to be as 2 dangerous to Russia as to the Ottoman Empire. ' On August 1, however,

Wyndham telegraphed that the Foreign Minister had told the Chief

Dragoman to the British Embassy, unofficially, that the Council of

Ministers had decided to direct the Vali of Baghdad to suspend

execution of the orders of the Minister of the Interior, until he

received further instructional‘ On the same day, Musurus received

similar information by telegraph from the Ottoman Foreign Minister,

4 , which he communicated to Granville two days later. ' On August 6,

Fitzmaurice informed Arnold, in reply to a Parliamentary Question

that the Turkish Government^had signified their intention to put an

end to the violent proceedings which have recently taken place on

1. Wyndham to Granville. Cypher Telegram. July 19, 1883,P.O.78/3991 2. Wyndham to Granville. No: 447 Secret. July 26,1883,F.O.78/3511, 3. Wyndham to Granville,Telegram. August 1, 1883,F.O.78/3991. 4. Musurus to Granville, August 3,1883,F.O.78/3991. I'bS,

the Tigris’, but that the terms of a final settlement were still under discussion.^* On the same day, Wyndham sent a very curious telegram to Granville:-

’’The Minister of Foreign Affairs has requested me privately to beg Your Lordship to overlook the mistake made by the Porte with regard to the navigation of the Tigris.^"

There is no clue to the reason for the Turkish Foreign Minister’s sudden change of attitude. Granville evidently did not take it very seriously, for Plowden was instructed to delay his return to

Baghdad "for a short time longer until the question at issue with the Porte relative to the navigation of the Tigris is further advanced." -^ost certainly Takkee-ud-Deen Pasha was greatly displeased by this sudden change of attitude on the part of the Porte, for he considered that even provisional permission for the English 4 steamers to navigate the Tigris was injurious to Turkish interests.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to reach a permanent solution,

Fitzmaurice and pauncefote held several meetings with Musurus Pasha.

On December 5, however, the Turkish Ambassador informed the Under­ secretaries that he had been instructed to announce that the Porte could not continue to allow the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company

1. Hansard, 3rd Series CCLXXXII p. 1633. 2. Wyndham to Granville. Cypher Telegram. August 6, 1883.F.O.78/3991. 3. Fitzmaurice to Plowden. August 8, 1883, F.O.78/3991 4. Wyndham to Granville, No: 254.Commercial. Secret.August 16, 1883. F.O. 78/3991. Enclosing translation of a telegram from the Vali of Baghdad to the Grand Vizier, to run steamers on the Tigris, and that in future such permission would he restricted to the Euphrates.^' It is interesting to observe that in his Note of December 28, confirming in writing, at Granville’s request, the Porte’s decision, j^usurus strongly denied that the question of the navigation of the Tigris bore any relation to the 2. commercial interests of England in the Tigris-Euphrates Vallty,

The Turkish note was in due course referred to the Law Officers for their decision. They were more particularly asked to consider whether the Vizierial Letter of 1861, to enable the English Company to establish steamers on the Tigris and Euphrates, and their enjoyment of that privilege for twenty two years was "evidence of an Agreement by the Porte to the establishment of the two steamers of the Company on those rivers; and, if so, whether, having regard to the capital invested on the faith of that Agreement, to the private rights which it had created, and to all the surrounding circumstances, Her Majesty’s Government (were) entitled to insist on the maintenance of the "status quo" of the Company." Granville proposed, should the

Law Officers agree, to reply to the Turkish Ambassador in the belief thàt this was in fact the case, and that the Porte's attitude during the past twenty two years debarred them from disputing the validity of the rights claimed and exercised by the Company under the Vizierial

Letter of 1861.

The Law Officers replied on April 9, agreeing with the draft reply to Musurus submitted by the Foreign Office. They added that

1. Fitzmaurice to Granville. Minute. December 6, 1883,F.O.78/3992, 2. musurus to Granville. December 28, 1883, F.O. 78/3991. 3. Pauncefote to Law Officers. February 19, 1884, F.O.78/3991. 140

they now considered the position of the British Government to be stronger than they had previously thought to be the ease.^" Granville replied to Musurus' Note on June 6. After expressing the opinion agreed with the Law Officers, Granville went on to complain of the

"abrupt and arbitrary" action of the Porte, which was marked by "a singular lack of friendliness and courtesy towards Her Majesty's Government, and (presented) an incident unparalleled in the history of the commercial relations of this country in any part of the world".

The Note continued

"It is hardly necessary to add that whatever solicitude may be evinced by Parliament and by the public in the case, it will not have for its object the pecuniary advantages of a private Company, but the maintenance of the just rights of a British Company, legitimately acquired by Agreement between the British Government and the Porte, and confirmed by long usage and acquiooconce."^*

The firm tone of Granville's reply seems to have shocked the

Turks into silence, for here the matter appears to have rested. The two steamers of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company continued to navigate the Tigris and the Turks to resist any extension of their privileges. The English Company drew up a claim for damages 3 against the Turkish Government,^"but on the advice of the Foreign 4, Office and the Law Officers, it was not submitted. * Rumours were

1. Law Officers to Granville, April 9, 1884. F.O. 78/3991. 2. Granville to Musurus. June 6, 1884, F.O. 78/3991. 3. Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Granville October 15, 1883, F.O. 78/3992, 4. Pauncefote to Law Officers. March 25, 1884, F.O.78/3992. Law Officers to Granville. April 9, 1884, F.O.78/3991. 141

current that the Vali of Baghdad was endeavouring to form a Turkish

Steam Navigation Company, in addition to the Turkish vessels employed on the Tigris and that his plan included the compulsory purchase of the steamers of the English Company.^' It would appear, however, that the Porte was a little weary of the whole controversy, for it refused to consent to the formation of such a company unless it did not infringe on the privileges of the English company.

The annoyance caused by the stoppage of the English steamers to

British merchants trading with the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, was freely expressed by British firms in correspondence with the Foreign Office, 3 spurring the latter to action, * The London Chamber of Commerce urged Granville not to accept any limitations to British trading rights in Mesopotamia, instancing Russian commercial progress in

Armenia^ as an additional reason for standing firm, and expressing the hope that he would "endeavour to extend the powers possessed by

1. Dufferin to Granville. No: 53 Commercial March 15, 1884,F,0.78/3992 2. Dufferin to Granville. No:57. Commercial. Secret. March 17,1884 F.O. 78/3992. Enclosing copies of translations of telegrams between the Minister of the Interior and the Vali of Baghdad. 3. See Letters to Granville from the following firms:- Gray, Dawes and Co. July 12, 1883 ( Steel, Young and Co, July 12, 1883 ( F.O. 78/3990 Glover Brothers July 13, 1883 ( traders under the British flag, of navigating the rivers flowing into

the Persian Gulf."^* In the House of Commons, Arnold continued to

question Fitzmaurice on the success of his negotiations with the 2, Turkish Ambassador, * but the subject was not one of very wide

Parliamentary interest.

Despite the indiransigence of the Turks on thfc question of the

navigation of the Tigris by English commercial vessels, English

trado had continued to flourishin the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. The

Consul General at Baghdad reported in March 1885, that as far as he

could ascertain, British trade in that Province was in a very

satisfactory condition, * This was the first trade report from

Baghdad since 1879, and had only then been drawn from Tweedie after

Arnold had tabled a motion in the House of Commons to reduce the

Consular Vote by £30, the amount paid from British funds to the Consul 4 General at Baghdad. * The Turks had, as usual, shorn great disinclination to impart any information about local trade, so that

Tweedie*s Report was of a rather general character, remarking on such matters as the absence of English leather and the primitive habits

1. Secretary to London Chamber of Commerce to Granville August 22, 1883, F.O. 78/3991. 2. Hansard 3rd Sorias CCLXXXIV. p. 432. February 11, 1884. 3. Heport on the trade of Baghdad. Dated November 23, 1885. A&P (1886) LXV (c 4610) p. 248. 4. Hansard. 3rd Series CCXCVIII p. 1760. July 6, 1885. 143

of the inhabitants of Baghdad. The latter apparently longed to possess such diverse articles as Manchester delfware, Birmingham knives and forks, lethal European weapons, watches and zinc bath­ tubs - the latter articles to be used as the central ’dish’ from which it was the Arab custom for the whole company to eat.

By 1885, several European firms had either headquarters or branches at Baghdad. In his trade report for the year ending in inarch 1885; Tweedie specifically mentioned three English firms, Lynch,

Darby Andrews; and Muir, Tweedy; and the Swiss firm of Julius Weber as being the most important European firms in Baghdad.^* A report by Mockler on the trade and commerce of Basra for the year 1884, showed that the three English firms prominent in Baghdad also had branches at Basra, in addition to Gray, Mackenzie and Company, the agents for the British ^ndia Steam Navigation Company, and three other European firms, two of which were French. " There was still no

European firm established at Mosul, and in fact Richards, British

Vice-Consul there, reported in 1885 that direct importation from

Europe had ceased, and that European goods were purchased in the 3 markets of Aleppo and Baghdad.

1. A&P (1886) LXV ( c 4610) p. 248 ff. 2. A&P (1884-85) LXXIX (c 4526) p. 628 ff. 3. Report on the trade and commerce of Mosul, dated April 12,1885. A&P (1884-85) LXXIX (c 4525) p. 178 ff. The mere number of British firms, however, bore but little

relation to the importance of British commercial interests in the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley, for a great deal of the trade of the region

was in the hands of one firm - Lynch - whose enterprise covered

many fields. Accurate statistics of British trade or any other trade

in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley do not exist from official sources.

Until 1864, the Customs revenues of every town in the province of

Baghdad were farmed to the highest bidder, and the jealousy of the

tax-farmers made it impossible to obtain information. Thereafter,

the Consular reports bear testimony to the reluctance of the Turkish

authorities to divulge the secrets of the Customs House, and to the

unreliability of such information as was imparted. This reluctance

to give details of trade was shared by the English merchants of

Baghdad, who generally omitted to answer requests from the Consul-

General for such information.^'

It is, however, clear enough from the general text of the

Consular reports, that British commercial interests had assumed

important proportions in the three decades following the Crimean War,

That those interests were considered important by the British

Government is evident from the action which the Foreign Office were prepared to take in such incidents as the refusal of the Turks in 1866

1. Herbert to Granville. No: 1. Commercial. January 22, 1873, F.O. 78/2299. The reference to the unwillingness of the English firms to give such information is omitted in the published Report in A&P (1873) LXVII (c 860) p. 988. to permit the import of steam machinery, and in the question of the right of British merchant vessels to navigate the Tigris. In addition, the very hostility of the Turkish authorities at Baghdad, annoyed because the carrying trade of the Tigris was almost exclusively in the hands of an English Company, despite the presence of a subsidized Turkish Company, and because of the general prosperity of English firms, protected by their Consul-General from the extreme rapacity of the Turks, was significant of a success which the Turks feared would give England more excuse for interfering in the affairs of the Province and possibly for ultimately annexing it. The support of the Turkish Government for the actions of the Governors-General of

Baghdad, varied with such factors as the pressure applied by the

British Ambassador, the prevailing opinion of the Porte and the mood of the Sultan. It is , however, generally apparent that the Porte agreed with Takkee-ud-Deen Pasha when he declared that "la compagnie de Lynch n ’a fait que du mal au gouvernement depuis son institution,"^* and with Messrs. Lynch were no doubt coupled the other British traders in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.

1. Dufferin to Granville: No.; 57, Commercial, Secret. March 17, 1884 P.O. 78/3992. Enclosing resume of a despatch from the Vali of Baghdad to the Minister of the Interior, I 4-L

CHAPTER VI.

AN OUTPOST OF INDIA: BRITISH POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC

INTERESTS IN THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES VALLEY.

**••• [Britiah] Interests in the eastern end of the Baghdad Railway are political and strategic, and the proposition which I submit, is that these considerations start into being the moment we leave Baghdad. It would be a mistake to suppose that our p^olitical interests are confined to" the Gulf. They are not confined to the Gulf; they are not confined to the region between the Gulf and Busra; they are not confined to the region between Busra and Baghdad; they extend over the whole region right away up to Baghdad. ... the Gulf is part of the maritime frontier of India, and ... in"the politics of the Gulf are involved the security, integrity, and peace, of India itself. This is no new discovery, but an admitted truism accepted by all Parties on both sides in both Houses of Parliament ... " 1

The closing years of the Nineteenth Century had seen a marked increase in the activity of foreign powers in the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley and the Persian Gulf. These activities, at first comparatively innocuous to British interests, eventually aroused the misgivings of the

Government of India, who in 1899 drew the attention of the Home Government to the infiltration of the French,

Russians and Germans into this outpost of the Indian Empire

Lord Curzon's Government took this step, not because they

1, Curzon in the House of Lords, March 22, 1911, Hansard. 5th Series (House of Lords) Vol.VII p . 586- 587. -y.

wished to invest these "symptoms of external interest" with undue importance, but in order "to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the fact that in an area, by' land and by sea, which Great Britain regards with good reason as falling within her sphere of influence, that influence is being directly and increasingly challenged by other nations* 1 More particularly they feared lest any other

Power should acquire territorial or naval concessions

in the Gulf. The Indian Government, liowever, thought that it would be "accepted as a cardinal axiom of British policy that no such development would be acquiesced in by Her Majesty's Government. "2 The attitude of the British

Government had already been defined earlier in the year, after rumours that Persia was to cede a port in the Gulf to Russia. Salisbury had then Informed the Persian

Goveriiment that "it would not be compatible with the interests of the British Empire that any European Power should exercise control or jurisdiction over the ports of the Persian Gulf."3

As plans for the Berlin-Baghdad Railway took more positive shape, so the threat to the British position in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley and the Persian Gulf increased.

Accordingly, it became necessary that British interests in that area should be more precisely and more publicly defined, in such a manner as to leave no doubt of her intentions in

1. Government of India to Secretary of State for India- in-Council. September 21, 1899. G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley: British Documents on the Origins of The War, Vol.IV p.356 ff.

2. Ibid. p.358.

3. Ibid. p.358. ms

the face of hostile competition* Lansclowne gave that definition in the liouse of Lords on May 5, 1903. Britain» s policy, he stated, was directed to the protection and promotion of her own trade in the Gulf, although not to the exclusion of the "legitimate trade" of other Powers.

On the other hand, he declared most emphatically:

should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal."1

The » Lansdowne Declaration» was the first of many statements of Britain»s determination to defend the position which she had built up in the Persian Gulf over the past two centuries. This position was an unusual one: she had virtually become the "Protector of Trade" in that area, and in her endeavour to give effective protection, had become the "arbiter and Guardian of the Gulf." She had assumed this position, not "through a restless ambition urging her on to control the waste spaces of the earth, but in obedience to the calls ... made upon her in the past to enforce peace between warring tribes, to give a free course to trade, to hold back the arm of the marauder and oppressor; to stand between the slave dealer and his victim."2

British activities in the Persian Gulf during the

Nineteenth Century were not, however, quite so altruistic

1, Hansard. 4th Series, Vol.OCXI, p. 1348.

2. T.J. Bennett: "The Past and Present Connection of England with the Persian Gulf." Journal of the Society of Arts. Vol. 50. London, 1902. and disinterested as Mr. Bennett*s eloquence might suggest.

Even although her only » visible interests» were of a

commercial nature, the importance of the position of the

Gulf as one of the »maritine frontiers» of India, could not fail to present itself to Indian statesmen. The emphasis on the strategic and political importance of the Gulf and of its natural extensions, the valleys of the Tigris and

]5uphrates, was not a new feature in Imperial policy, although the danger at the beginning of the Twentieth

Century was of more substance than before.

Early in the Nineteenth Century, Napoleon, in

spectacular alliance with Russia, Persia and Turkey, had

planned to reduce England to submission by the conquest of her Indian territories. His ambition was not fulfilled, but his threat left behind a lasting uneasiness that any

alteration in the status quo of Syria and Mesopotamia would be but the prelude to a serious threat to British hegemony

in the Persian Gulf and to her rule in India. Throughout

the Nineteenth Century this factor increasingly influenced

British policy in the Eastern Question and made her acutely

sensitive to the moves of other powers, and more particularly

of Russia, in the direction of Mesopotamia and the » Green

Sea». The first hint of it comes in the early 1830 »s

when Muhammad *Ali was threatening to disturb the

tranquility of Turkish Arabia by annexing the Pashalic

of Baghdad, and establishing an independent Arab State. 1^0

Palmerston left him in no doubt as to the British attitude

to such a move, warning him on more than one occasion that

Great Britain would "think her interests directly concerned in preventing the authority of the Sultan from being shaken or interfered with at Baghdad."1

Early in the Nineteenth Century, fears of French designs on India were superseded by fears of a Russian move in that direction. Already in 1829, T.L. Peacock,

Senior Assistant Examiner at East India House had expressed his opinion that the Russians ^muld "do anything in Asia 2 that [was] worth doing and that we [left] undone." Pour years later, Taylor, Political Agent at Baghdad reported that Russia had obtained "a paramount influence in Turkish

Councils ", and suggested that the Government of India

should give him discretionary permission to travel within the Pashalic of Baghdad in order "to observe the current

and progress of these pernicious influences, and to detect 3 the intrigues of Russia.” Such fears were not likely

1. See: H.H. Do dwell: 'The Founder of Modem Egypt. A Study of Muhammad »Ali. Cambridge, 1931. Chapter V. and H.W.V. Temper ley and L.M. Pen son: Foundations of British Foreign Policy. Cambridge, 1938. pp.126-127.

2. %emorandum respecting the application of Steam Navigation to the internal and external Communications of India." A. and P. [1834] XIV [Cmd.478] p.610 ff.

3. Taylor to the Government of Bombay. July 29, 1833. Malet: op.cit. p.129. See also Dodwell: op.cit. p.131. 1^1

to be allayed by Russian expansion towards India in the

region of the Aral Sea and by her attempts to establish

a predominant influence in Turkey. The expansion of

Russia coincided with the development of modern methods

of communication and with the growing importance of the

» alternative» route to India through the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley. This route lay athwart one of the lines by which

Russia might conceivably have reached the Persian Gulf,

by way of Armenia. In consequence, the idea that England

had vital strategic interests in Turkish Arabia gained a

wide measure of support, more particularly amongst retired

Indian military and political officers. Supporters of

this theory considered it within the bounds of possibility

that Russia would attempt to reach the Persian Gulf in a

series of moves, proceeding » slowly and cautiously, taking

advantage of continental complications, when the attention

and energy of European States [would be] engaged in contests

more nearly concerning them.» Securing her left flank by

annexing the outlying provinces of Persia, Russia would

proceed to conquer Armenia and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley.

Once in possession of the Euphrates Valley, the road to

the Mediterranean via Aleppo and Antioch, Asia Minor and

Syria, as well as the road to the Persian Gulf, would be

) open to the Russian armies. The strategical importance of

the Tigris-Euphrates Valley in resisting such an advance I^Z

would be great, for all Russian lines of advance south- westwards would be intersected by the line of the Euphrates.

"It must therefore be the political and strategical task of Russia," wrote the Austrian Minister of War in 1858, "to get the Euphrates line into her own hands, and that of her enemies to prevent her doing so at any cost." 1

'.whether Russia really harboured such designs can not be established from the evidence available, but it is quite clear that the British Governments of the latter half of the Nineteenth Century regarded any change in the status quo of Turkish Arabia as equsl ly objectionable as any change in that of the Persian Gulf. This attitude emerged during the Crimean War, and became even more evident during the

Eastern Crisis of 1877 and 1878, and still more so in the years of the Twentieth Century preceding the outbreak of war in 1914.

1. Kuhn Von Kuhnenfeld: The Strategical Importance of the Euphrates Valley Railway. (Translated by C.W. Wilson), London, 1875. This work was originally written in 1858, and first published in Austria in 1869. The author was Austrian Minister of War 1868-1874. Gp . Justin Shell: %emorandum on the Political Advantages of the Euphrates Valley Railway", in W.P. Andrew: Letter to Viscount Palmerston etc. also A.H. Layard: Memoirs. Add.Mss. 38,937. and the evidence before the Select Committee on the Euphrates Valley Railway of Bartle Frere, Rawlinson, Kemball, etc. "Two former Commanders- in-Chief in India, Sandhurst and Strathnaim disagreed on the value of the Euphrates Valley Railway from the military and strategic point of view. A. and P. [1872] IX [Cmd.322]. !6%.

Very shortly after the outbreak of the Crimean

War, the weakness of the Turkish army in Asia caused serious

apprehensions lest the Russians should make a considerable

advance into Armenia. It was not improbable that Persia

would then have declared war on Turkey and attempted to

seize the Province of Baghdad. Such an event. Admiral

Slade declared, might have necessitated "the sending of an Anglo-Indian army to the Euphrates, for the extension of Persian power under Russian protection interests England as much as the decline of Ottoman power under Russ[ian] pressure," 1 A British naval demonstration in

the Persian Gulf and Shatt-el-Arab shortly afterwards,

achieved its object in making Persia hesitate before

embarking on a war with Turkey at that precise moment, and

seeking to compensate herself at Turkey»s expense for

earlier Russian annexations of Persian territory. Later,

during the Anglo-Fersian War of 1856 and 1857, a series

of sharp naval and military actions, including the capture

of Mohammerah, served to remind Persia of the superior

British position in the Gulf.

The retrocession by Russia of her Turkish conquests

did not altogether lay the bogy of Russian designs on

Armenia and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Her assimilation

of territory in Central Asia and northern Persia seemed to

1, Memorandum by Rear Admiral Slad,e. May 10, 18 54. Stratford Canning Private Papers. P.0.352/38. 1^4

justify the suspicions that these v/ere but the preliminary steps of securing her bases, prépara to r^^ to converging on

India both through Central Asia and through Turkish Arabia.

Her moves in Central Asia were the more spectacular and more likely to engage the serious attention of the Indian

Government. In consequence, it was mainly left to the

Home Government to maintain British political influence in the Tigris-FXiphrates Valley, in order to counteract possible Russian advances in that direction.

The position of Turkish Arabia in the Anglo-Indian diplomatic field was somewhat anomalous. It was a region in which the spheres of authority and interest of the

British and Indian Governments met and overlapped. There was no clear dividing line between exclusively Indian and exclusively Imperial interests, a fact which was reflected in the extraordinary position of the Political Agent and

Consul-General at Baghdad, who was a diplomatic officer under the Indian Government and a consular officer under 1 the British Government. To the Government of India, the

1, Herbert, Political Agent and Consul-General 1871-1875, complained in 1874 of the anomaly of his position and suggested that the Foreign Office should recognise the diplomatic aspect of the post which in future should be known as that of "Resident" both in England and India. Herbert to Locock (Chargé d ’affaires) No.21. March 19, 1874. F.0.195/1030. Constantinople Locock forwarded the suggestion to the Ibreign Office, but Derby considered it inexpedient to raise any question of the status of the Political Agent, and the position remained anomalous. Derby to Elliot, No.50. July 7, 1874. F.0.78/2328. Tigris-Euphrates Valley was one of the rather distant outposts of defence - an inconvenient land frontier which was very occasionally troublesome; whilst to the Imperial

Government, it was but one aspect -not always obvious but albeit important - of the Eastern Question.

This difference of outlook is apparent in the attitude of the two Governments to the maintenance of the political influence of Britain at Baghdad, and particularly in the case of the despatch boat Comet. Since 1842, Britain had maintained an armed despatch vessel attached to the Residency at Baghdad. The vessel was useful as an adjunct to British prestige and in case of ’prospective emergencies’ of an unpredictable nature. In 1866, the Comet became unfit for service, and the question of her replacement was first raised.

The matter dragged on for some considerable time, for three

Government Departments v/ere concerned, in addition to the

Embassy at Constantinople and the Sublime Forte. Finally, in 1869, the latter granted permission for the replacement 1 of the vessel. Almost exactly a year later. Lord Mayo’s

Government decided against maintaining a vessel at Baghdad, on the grounds that there was "little likelihood, with the increase of civilization in Asiatic Turkey that a British Vessel of war [would] be required, as the Folitical Agent

1, Elliot to Clarendon. No.299. July 14, 1869. F.0.78/3988. "[considered] that it possibly mi^Jit be, as a place of refuge for British Subjects at Baghdad." 1 They therefore

recommended that the Comet sliould forthwith be put out of

commission and her crew disbanded. The British Foreign

Office, however, persisted in the opinion that it would be

undesirable to renounce or limit the privilege of maintaining

a vessel at Baghdad, especially as it was a privilege which

was not unchallenged by the Turks. It later transpired that

lord Mayo’s objections arose partly from considerations of

financial economy, for in addition to the purchase price

of a new vessel, her maintenance cost a half lakh of rupees

annually, and the v/hole cost had hitherto been borne by the

Indian Government. Eventually, in 1879, it was agreed that

the Imperial Treasury should bear half the cost of the 2 new vessel, and what might have developed into a serious

difference on policy was thereby averted. 'The fact that it

was not until 1884 that the Comet was finally replaced by

another vessel, also called the Comet. illustrates the

inconveniences caused by dual control in the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley, the replacement of one vessel by another having

taken eighteen years to accomplish.

1. Extract from Proceedings of the Government of India. June 13, 1870. Copy enclosed in Herbert to Elliot. No.12. July 20, 1870. P.0.195/949.

2. Treasury to Foreign Office 488/79 April 18, 1879. P.0.78/3028. 'V-

Meanwhile, the Russian advances in Central Asia were approaching nearer still to the Indian north-west frontiers. By 1868, Tasiikand, Khokand and Samarkand had been occupied and in 1873, in defiance of the Boundary

Settlement reached with England earlier in the same year,

Russia obtained Khiva. At the same time, she was pursuing an active policy against ihrkey, and had attempted to obtain advantages whilst the attention of the European Powers was momentarily distracted by the Franco-German conflict.

In addition, Russia was planning to buijd railways in the direction of ïabreez. Von Kuhnenfeld’s suppositions were proving almost prophetic, as Russia appeared to be fulfilling the destiny assigned to her in the spurious ’political 1 testament’ of Peter the Great. Even the British Foreign

Office was not entirely blind to the potential dangers of a further Russian advance in Asiatic Turkey. In 1867,

Murray, Assistant Under-Secretary, minuted a report on the

1. Although Dr. Lockhart, in an article in the Slavonic Review (Vol.14. No.41. January 1936. p.438) declares the testament to be a forgery, it is true, as Curzon declared, that the document "enshrines with adjnirable fidelity the leading principles that have guided the Asiatic policy" of Russia. G.N. Curzon, Persia;/ and the Persian Question. 2 Vols. London, 1892. Vol.II. p.601. Sykes gives an English translation of the '^ill of Peter the Great". P.M. Sykes: History of Persia. 2 Vols. London, 1930 (3rd Edition) Vol.II. pp.244-246. (S'S

defence of Eastern Turkey, against Russian aggression:

"••• our trade and general policy are intimately connected with the maintenance of Turkey; and ... the security and well doing of our Indian Empire, and of our communication with India, could not fail to be materially affected by further appropriation of Turkish Terri to r^/by Russia . . .

'The real danger to British political interests in

Turkish Arabia, did not, however, reach a climax until the

next occasion of Russo-Turkish hostilities, in 1877. The

purchase of the Suez Canal shares and the proclamation of

the Queen as Empress of India had already given earnest of

the more active part which the Conservative Government

intended England to take in Eastern affairs. Beaconsfield’s

intention was not only to enhance the dignity and prestige of the British Empire, but also to provide it with adequate

safeguards * in the face of a simultaneous and sweeping

advance of Russian power and propaganda, both in Europe 2 and in Asia.’ This being so, it is surprising that a

suggestion put forward in 1876 by Nixon, Consul-General at

Baghdad, should have excited no comment from the Prime

Minister, and the more surprising in view of later develop­ ments.

1. Minute by J. Murray dated November 5, 1867 on a Report on the Defence of Eastern Turkey by Consul Palgrave of Trebizond enclosed in his Despatch to Stanley. No.42. October 12, 1867. P.0.78/1989.

2. G.E. Buckle: Life of I.. Beaconsfield. London, 1920 Vo 1.y i . p.3. 1^9'

In a Confidential Memorandum dated March 20, 1876,

and sent both to the Government of India and to the Foreign

Office, Nixon reported that he had just visited the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who had asked him in open durbar why the

British did not take possession of Mohammerah. According

to Nixon, suggestions that the British intended to purchase

Mohammerah had lately been made in Continental newspapers, and the question was supposed to have been discussed by

the Russian ^’’oreign Office. The Memorandum continues

"I cannot conceive anything that could be more to our advantage than the possession of this point at the head of the Persian Gulf, as it commands one of the flanks of our Eastern Empire on the west ... and events are marching forward which enables one almost to predict that if ever our possession of India is seriously menaced by Russia the real Battle field will be Mesopotamia as the projected railway to Tabreez will enable that Power to concentrate Forces within 250 miles of the waters of the Tigris, and thus seriously menace our flank. It seems to me to be an argument that is founded on the Law of self preservation that we should inform Russia that if she advances near our Northern frontier of India, or possesses herself of Merov, or Persian territory, we shall guard our interests by again occupying Mohammerah ...." 1

Nixon’s Memorandum appears to have excited very little interest at the Foreign Office, and to have been passed over entirely without comment by the Queen, Disraeli and

1. Memorandum by Nixon, attached to Trade Report dated March 20, 1876. F.0.78/2494. \loO

1 Derby. The Government of India on the other hand were considerably alarmed by the suggestion that Britain should acquire Mohammerah as a counterpoise to Russian aggression in Persia. Even the threat of such a course appeared to

Lord Lytton’s Government to be "neither justified by necessity nor calculated to promote the interests of the 2 British Empire in those quarters." Nixon’s proposals had come two years too early, and his Memorandum was merely filed and forgotten in the recesses of the Foreign Office archives.

Two years later, the scene had changed beyond all belief, and the worst fears of the Russophobes seemed about to be realised. After less than a year’s fighting

Russia had completely defeated the Turkish armies in the

Balkans and in Asia and was virtually in possession of

Constantinople. She had, moreover, imposed upon the Sultan a Treaty which established Russian predominance throughout the whole of the Ottoman dominions. The threat to Ehglish and Indian interests which British Statesmen feared, loomed

1. The memorandum was circulated to the Queen and Disraeli but was returned by both of them without comment. See the docket of the memorandum. Ibid. loc.cit.

2. Government of India to Salisbury. No.125. Confidential, dated Simla June 19, 1876. Printed copy enclosed in India Office to Foreign Office, July 29, 1876, and bound in P.0.78/2518. lÜ

large on the horizon. Fortunately, the direction of

British foreign policy had passed from the hands of the

lethargic Derby into the control of Salisbury and Beacons-

field, w}r> were determined to resist, even by force, any

threat to British interests and influence in the Near and

Middle Fast.

The Tigris-Euphrates Valley now leapt into prominence.

The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano relating to Turkey

in Asia concerned the interests of Great Britain alone among

the European Powers. Of particular importance was the clause by which Turkey virtually ceded to Russia ’the last of

Armenia,* and v/ith it the control of the commercial highways

from the Black Sea to Northern Persia and the valleys of 1 the Tigris and Euphrates. The threat to the status quo

in Turkish Arabia meant that the very outposts of India were jeopardised and must be protected, if other measures

failed, by force. The necessity for devising some means

of countering Russian domination in this area had already

exercised the minds of Beaconsfield, Salisbury and Layard,

who were agreed that the Russian political domination of

Asiatic Turkey constituted a real menace to the security of

1, See Layard to Derby. No,543. March 13, 1378. P.O.78/2781. The Treaty of San Stefano is printed in Hertslet: Map of Europe by Treaty. Vol.IV. London, 1891. p . 2672 ff. iloZ

India. As a counterpoise to the new Russian position, it was eventually decided to occupy Cyprus, and to guarantee the Sultan’s Asiatic territories against further Russian aggression, on condition that suitable reforms were intro­ duced into these provinces by the Sultan.

On his return from the Berlin Congress, Beaconsfield declared:- "In taking Cyprus, the movement is not

Mediterranean but Indian." The major aim of the Cyprus

Convention was to defend Turkish Arabia against further

Russian advances in the direction of the Persian Gulf.

Colonel Home had noted that in selecting a place d* armes in the Levant, it ought to be a station which would give

England potentially the ^*Keys of Asia Minor

"... some place sufficiently large for us to assemble an Army on, to make it the secure base for checking any hostile advance from the Cacausus [sic], or the head waters of the Tigris and Euphrates or either the Persian Gulf or Suez Canal." 1

From the strategic point of view, events have justified the critics of the selection of Cyprus as a place d* armes. The island has never been developed in any way to make it into a military or naval base of value. Layard*s suggestion of a Dort on the Persian Gulf would have been eminently more

1. Confidential Memorandum by Colonel Home (undated) Simmons Private Papers F.0.358/1. Printed in Dwight E. Lee: "A Memorandum Concerning Cyprus, 1878." Journal of Modern History. Vol.III. June 1931, pp. 235-241. lU

suitable for the defence of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley

and would have been more obviously an ’Indian move.’ Layard had suggested the acquisition of Mohammerah, or of some

town on the 3hatt-el- :Crab, which would have consolidated

the English position in the Persian Gulf and at the same time provided a good base of operations from which to oppose a Russian army advancing from Armenia. In addition, a station on the Gulf would at that time have aroused few foreign jealousies, and would have given England a very considerable advantage twenty-five years later when her hegemony in the Persian Gulf was seriously threatened by the proposed construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and its extension to the Gulf, Even after the Berlin Congress,

Layard urged that England would acquire Mohammerah, but the suggestion met with no more success than that made by

Nixon two years earlier. The advantages of such a move

Layard gave in his Memoirs, written some years later:-

"There was this consideration which recommended the occupation of Mohammerah or of some place on the Shat-el-Arab to me. A railway must inevitably in the course of time connect Mesopotamia with the rest of Turkey and with Europe and form one of the alternative roads to our Indian possessions. By establishing ourselves, as I had suggested, at the mouth of the Euphrates we should virtually be in the command of it. Secondly, whilst the acquisition of Cyprus, even allowing for the unscrupulous and

1. Layard to Salisbury. No.1038 Secret. August 19, 1878. P.O.78/2796. /(o4

"unpatriotic attempts of the Opposition to discredit it, was not at the time it was effected altogether understood or acquiesced in by English public opinion ... I believe on the other hand that a policy which would have secured to England the political and commercial advantages offered by the command of the Euphrates and Tigris and their free navigation, would have received the v/illing and unanimous -, approval and support of the British Nation ..."

It seems extraordinary that the opinions of two such men as Layard and Nixon, with personal knowledge of the country, should have been set aside in the selection of a place of arms in Asiatic Turkey. Yet there is no evidence to show that Mohammerah was ever seriously considered in this capacity by Beaconsfield and Salisbury, Colonel Home, who played a large part in the selection of a station in the Levant, seems to have confined his suggestions to the 2 Eastern Mediterranean. This supports the contention that Cyprus was not selected primarily from strategical considerations, as a jumping-off ground for military operations in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Both in his private correspondence with Layard and in his public pronouncements, Salisbury had stressed the political rather than the strategic importance, both of Cyprus and of the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley. He does not appear to have

1. Layard » s Memoirs. British Mus eimn: Add.Mss .38,937. Folios 103-112.

2. See Home’s Memorandum, loc.cit. IK.

apprehended a serious Russian military threat to India

through the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, which had only a hypothetical strategic importance. On the other hand, the political importance of Turkish Arabia, derived from its connection with India, was enormous, as Salisbury’s term of office as Secretary of State for India must have shown him.

The political importance of the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley had its origin partly in the close religious affinity of that region with India. Three cities of Mesopotamia were sacred to Shiah Moslems, of whom there was a large number in Bombay and its neighbourhood. Indian pilgrims flocked to the Shiah shrines at Kerbela, Nejeff and

Kazemain. Their fellow Moslems of the Sunni sect made pilgrimage to a Sunni shrine in Baghdad, and, in addition, they recognised the Sultan of Turkey as Caliph. Besides the religious bond, there was the question of ’ prestige ’ to be considered, particularly of British prestige in India, which Sir Henry Rawlinson so aptly defined as ’the power which enables us to achieve very great results with very

small means at our immediate disposal.’ It was an important factor, and one of which Layard was acutely

1. See Cambridge History of British Foreifin Policy. Vol.III. Cambridge, 1923. p.19. lU,

sensible. ’No wise man," he wrote to Cov/ley in 1877 "who has had experience of foreign politics, or has * studied them from any other point of view than that of passion or sentimentalism, can treat the loss of "prestige" as a thing of no consequence. If an Emnire ever was sustained by "prestige" it is India."!

Salisbury likewise was convinced of the importance of maintaining British prestige in the Middle East, which he believed to be threatened by the increase of Russian influence in Asiatic Turkey. His attitude on this point is made quite clear by his statement in the House of Lords on July 29, 1878:

"Whatever happens," he declared, "whatever Party be in power, we feel convinced, knowing what the spirit of the people of the country is, that they will never tolerate that Russian influence shall be supreme in the Valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris." 2

His public statements on this point are wholly in accord with his private letters to Layard. Salisbury was concerned primarily with the political effect in India, of Russian victories in Turkey and the extension of her influence in Syria and Mesopotamia, which "would be a very serious embarrassment and would certainly, through the connection of Baghdad with Bombay, make our hold on India more difficult ..." 3 Salisbury’s letter to Waddington

1. Layard to Cowley. Confidential, June 13, 1877, British Museum Add.Mss.39,130.

2. Hansard. 3rd Series, Vol.CCXLII, pp.508-509. (Misquoted in G.C. Thompson: Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsf ield. 2 Vols. London, 1886. Vol. II. p. 491 and 3^ -consequently in Hoskins: op.cit. p.446.

3. Salisbury to Layard. May 9, 1878. G. Cecil: Life of Salisbury. Vol.II. p.268. ly.

1 justifying the Cyprus Convention has a similar argument, which he developed in the debate on the Treaty of Berlin in the House of Lords on July 18, 1878. Defending the acquisition of Cyprus, and the guarantee of Asiatic Turkey against Russian aggression, he demanded

"Are your lordships prepared to see the allegiance of the people of Asia given up to the advancing Power? If so, I ask v;hether there would be any chance of maintaining the loyalty of the people of India, when once they knew that the Russian power was dominant down to the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, and that the English power was nothing compared with it? That was the real danger which We had to fear .••" 2

It was, moreover, a danger v/hich had not entirely escaped the notice of some members of the Liberal Party.

Writing in 1877, Thomas Brassey, a Liberal Member of

Parliament, had taken a line not altogether dissimilar from that of Salisbury. Brassey dismissed as impracticable the suggestion that Russia might invade India by way of Armenia and the Persian Gulf, and pointed out that the Indian

Government did not attach sufficient importance to that route to India to give financial support to the promoters of a Euphrates Valley railway. On the other hand, extensive

Russian conquests in Asia Minor would endanger the security and tranquillity of India, where English rule ’must always

1, Salisbury to Waddington. July 7, 1878. B.P.S.P. Vol.LXIX, p.1345.

2. Hansard. 3rd Series. Vol.CCXLI, pp.1813-1814. ILS

be viewed by the natives as a foreign domination.’ Herein

lay the danger:

"'The advance of Russia tends to increase her prestige, and to some extent to diminish our own influence. By the circulation through the bazaars of India of rumours of invasion, the disaffected and turbulent elements in the native population might be set in motion, and another mutiny might take place.

It was for these, political, reasons that Britain

occupied Cyprus and guaranteed Asiatic Turkey against

Russia. The Convention symbolised British determination to

defend her interests in Syria and Mesopotamia, and to build

up her influence to counter-balance that of Russia. At the

same time, it supported the claim which Salisbury had

advanced for England at the Congress of Berlin, of "a right

to a dominant influence in Western Asia and especially in

Mesopotamia. "

There is unfortunately no evidence available from

the Russian side to show what designs, if any, that Power

really harboured against the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Indeed,

the only evidence of Russian interest in Mesopotamia comes

at the height of Russian elation at her victories in Armenia,

immediately after the fall of Kars in November 1877. It is,

1. T. Brassey: The Eastern Question and the Political Situation at Home. London, 1877.

2. Salisbury to Layard: Secret. October 29, 1878. Cecil: op.cit. Vol.II. p.332. moreover, in the rather unreliable form of an article in

the Russian newspaper Sovremenvi Tsveti. expressing great

surprise at the general Ignorance about the importance of

Mesopotamia. Describing England as the insect which destroys all the links formed by Russia with the East, the article continues:-

"So long as the question of Mesopotamia is not finally settled, so long as that key to the old world is not placed in firm hands, a thousand pretexts will always be found by England for the purpose of wresting from her rival Russia, the domination over the v/orld •••" 1

The article appears to be an isolated one and there is no suggestion that it was officially inspired, or that its intention was other than to gloat over England’s discomfiture at Russian victories in Armenia. Otherwise, there is no substantial evidence even of Russia’s appreciation, at this time, of the value of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, although articles pointing at India "as the Achilles’ heel of England" were commonplace in the Russian press of this period. It is doubtful, in any case, whether Russia would have been able to put sufficient troops in the field to extend her conquests in Asia Minor and actually to jeopardise British communications. It thus appears that from the military point

1. loftus to Derby. No.648. November 21, 1877. Enclosing extracts of articles from the Russian press. The Sovremenvi Isvesti was described as "a violent Slavophil and patriotic organ published at Moscow." P.0.65/970.

2. B.H. Sumner: Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880. Oxford, 1937. p.309 and passim. 7 0

of view there was little to fear from Russian action in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley and that such dangers as existed were of a political nature consequent on Russian victories in European and Asiatic Turkey.

After the high feelings generated by the Russo-

Turkish war, the events of the decade after 1878 provide an anti-climax in the field of British political interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. the conclusion of the

Cyprus Convention and the Treaty of Berlin, affairs in

Turkish Arabia resumed a purely local importance. The jurisdiction of the military consuls appointed to supervise the reforms which the Sultan was to promulgate in Asia

Minor, stopped short of the Vilayet of Baghdad. No special measures appear to have been regarded as necessary for the protection of British interests or for the furtherance of her influence there.

There were, almost inevitably, many rumours of

Russian intrigues to thwart the British and to cast doubt on their motives in Turkish Arabia, There was, too, tangible evidence of the ’peaceful penetration’ of Russia into the region between Armenia and the Persian Gulf. The first

Russian Consul-General ever to be appointed to Turkish

Arabia arrived at Baghdad in 1880. His arrival was reported by Consul-General Plowden,^ without comment, and his

1. Flowden to Goschen. No.151. December 31, 1880. P.O.195/1310. 7'-

activities do not appear to have aroused undue remark. Some two and a half years later, there were dark rumours of

Russian officers visiting Mesopotamia and surveying the country east of the Euphrates. Commenting on these rumours.

Dufferin deplored the apparent indifference of the British

Government to the country’s interests in Syria and Mesopotamia, giving warning that Russian activity would "naturally auicken 1 in proportion to British indifference."

Shortly afterwards, the stoppage by the Forte of 2 the British Company’s steamers on the Tigris, provided an opportunity for the Russians to dabble in England’s affairs in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley in a manner detrimental to

British interests. On this occasion, the Russian Ambassador at the Forte was alleged to have encouraged the Sultan to persist in refusing to allow English steamers to navigate the Mesopotamian rivers, contending that such navigation 3 threatened Russian as well as Turkish interests. This

incident was followed at the end of the year by the appointment

to Mosul of a Russian Consul, who made much of the fact that

1. Dufferin to Granville. No.411. Confidential. June 30, 1883. Enclosing an extract from the Eastern Express of April 10, 1883. P.0.78/3510.

2. See Chapter V. p.

3. #yndham to Granville. No.447. Secret. July 26, 1883. ^ P.0.78/3511. '7^

he was primarily interested in studying the ethnographical and antiquarian aspects of the province. It was by no means unusual for foreign consuls to pursue such interests in the vicinity of Mosul, but the calculated innocence of M. Kartzoff’s declarations immediately aroused strong suspicions, which were hardly allayed by his later indiscreet utterances about the imminence of a Russian occupation of the country. The arrival at Baghdad in November 1884 of a

Russian doctor, ostensibly making scientific enquiries into the recent outbreak of plague, but reported to be making a more detailed inspection of the country, gave added credence to wild rumours of an intended Russian occupation of the

Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Such was the interpretation given in 1885, to this series of Russian appointments, by the

British Consul-General in Baghdad. Otherwise he found himself totally at a loss to account for such a marked increase of Russian activity since 1878#

"These appointments," Plowden wrote,"must have some object for they involve considerable expense - which would not be incurred for nothing, and as the number of Russian subjects at Baghdad and Mosul who might be in need of protection is wholly insignificant, while Russian trade is practically non-existent, that object must apparently be of a political character." 2

1, Richards (Vice Consul at Mosul) to Flowden. No.8. December 10, 1885. P.O.78/3532.

2. PlOY/den to Granville. No . 133/P.D . March 12, 1885, P.0.78/3774. Similar suspicions had been expressed by Lord E. Pitz- maurice. Parliamentary Under Secretary, in 1883. See Memorandum by Pitzmaurice, dated August 27, 1883. Confidential Print No.4852. P.0.78/3991. 73.

Curiously ©nough., as Russia activity began to

increase perceptibly in Mesopotamia, so the liirks became more and more auspicious of British political influence

there. It is unlikely that this is other than p u r e l y coincidental, as British influence throughout the whole of

Turkey was waning, on account of such events as the occupation of Egypt. The special position of England in the Vilayet of Baghdad aroused both the fear and the resentment of the

Turks: fear that the British intended to seize the province, and resentment at the position of respect which they had come to occupy. So strong was this anti-British feeling that in 1885, the Grand Vizier issued instructions to the

Valis of Baghdad, the Yemen and Hedjaz on the measures to be taken for checking British influence. Persons active in the promotion of such influence were to be sent »loin du pays', and in particular, British consular agents and those under their protection were on no account to receive 1 preferential treatment.

Nevertheless, in spite of Russian infiltration and the thinly disguised hostility of the Turks, Great Britain continued to hold the exceptional position which she had

1. White to Salisbury. No.487. Secret. November 8, 1885. Enclosing translation of a telegram purporting to be instructions from the Grand Vizier to the Valis of Yemen, Hedjaz and Baghdad. P.0.78/3754. built up in Turkish Arabia in the first half of the century.

British policy aimed at maintaining a paramount influence

in the 'natural extensions' of the Persian Gulf, the Tigris

and Euphrates Valleys, as the outposts of the Indian Empire.

Threats to British hegemony were to be apprehended, in

the period 1856 to 1888, from Russia alone. The only

serious threat occurred in 1878 and was successfully countered without resort to war. Britain had achieved her aim, and her ability to do so by peaceful means left the strategic

value of the Ti gris-Euphra tes Valley still to be submitted

to the test of experience. Until the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, fears of Russian action detrimental to the British

position in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley were skill nurtured,

but before that date a yet more dangerous rival had arisen,

and the Russian bogy was gradually being succeeded by

the more substantial apparition of Germany. CONCLUSION

An examination of the evidence on British interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley in the years between the end of the Crimean War and the first German railway concession in Asiatic Turkey, shows the period to be one of consolidation

In retrospect, it appears as a time of preparation to meet the nerman economic and political challenge which was to come in the early years of the Twentieth Century.

England's connection with the Tigri s-Euphrates %lley was a natural one, which had grown out of her relations with India. The foundations of her interests were laid by the East India Company in their search for new markets and in their endeavours to bring about those peaceful conditions most favourable for trade. By the early Nineteenth Century the functions of the Company's officers stationed at Baghdad and Basra had become almost entirely political, and trade had passed into the hands of independent English merchants.

By 1866, British commercial and political interests were well established in Turkish Arabia.

Throughout the period 1856 to 1888, British trade increased steadily in volume. There were no spectacular achievements in this field, and similarly no failures. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 led to the establishment of direct sea communications between Basra and the \~jL

English ports, and was followed by a trade 'boom', but the slump which was expected to follow failed to do so.

British merchants and British goods had the trade of the

Province of Baghdad almost to themselves. In spite of the fact that the period 1856 to 1889 coincided with a period of Industrial development in Europe, foreign competition in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley was insignificant, and was to remain so until the Germans entered the field later in the century. By that time, the British position was well established, for her merchants were of a most enterprising character. Any challenge to British commercial interests came from the Turkish authorities, partly from jealousy at the obvious success and prosperity of British enterprise, and partly from a delight in wilful obstruction, possibly based on religious bigotry. But in spite of the intransigence of the Turks, the period was characterised by the steady growth of British trade, and the position established proved of sufficient strength to withstand

the German competition of the early Twentieth Century.

In the field of communications, the period was one of transformation: it was the age of railways, the electric

telegraph and steamships. In Turkish Arabia, however,

there was, superficially, little achievement, A line of

telegraph through the Euphrates Valley joining the Indian

and the European telegraph lines was the only obvious sign 7 /-

of progress. Indeed, a retrograde step was taken in the

abolition of the Dromedary Dak which had carried mail across

the desert from Baghdad to Damascus since the early

Seventeenth Century. On the other hand, the general progres;

in communications v/as reflected In the many plans advanced for the construction of a railway from the Mediterranean to

the Persian Gulf and in the number of surveys of the country made in order to select the most suitable route. There was much talk of a Euphrates Valley Railway, both in England

and in India, and a great deal of serious consideration was given to the project by statesmen of both countries, who

constantly expressed their interest in all aspects of

communications with India. But one English project after another failed for financial reasons: British enterprise proved inadequate for the undertaking, and no Government,

English or Indian, would hold out any hope of financial

support even on the recommendation of a Select Committee of

the House of Commons. It was therefore left to German

enterprise, with its superior organisation, to begin the

railway from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf, which was

not finally completed until 1940. Britain was, however,

necessarily interested in all routes to India, and in the

Ti gri 3-Euphra te s Valley route as being the shortest and

most direct: but her interest was confined to keeping open

that route rather than to acquiring a controlling position over it. The British aim was at all times to be certain of being able to use the Tigris-Euphrates Valley route without hindrance either from Turkey or from any other Power 1 which might acquire control of it. This attitude was clearly stated by Salisbury, shortly after the Berlin

Congress. Writing to Layard in October 1878, he declared that it was really immaterial*whether England or France received the Euphrates Valley railway concession. The important thing was to have a stipulation in any concession that it should lapse if the line did not show some signs of completion after five years. ^'Otherwise, " Salisbury added to the draft in his own hand, "there is reason for fearing that concessions will be used not to facilitate the making of railways by those who receive them, but to hinder such works being undertaken by other persons." 2

Great Britain still hoped to secure her communications with India by diplomatic action in Europe intended to maintain the status quo in the regions through which her routes to India passed. She still sought to avoid assuming direct political control over actual or potential routes to the East. On the other hand, it was appreciated that Britain could not remain indifferent to events in Asiatic Turkey.

1. See Layard to Derby. No . 1444. December 4, 1877. P.O. 78/2593.

2. Salisbury to Layard, N o .1223. October 9, 1878. P.0.78/2772. '71

From Palmerston had come the legacy of the belief that

Turkey was as good an occupier of the route to India as 1 any other Power or state, and that it was therefore to

Britain's interest to maintain the Sultan's rule in his

Asiatic dominions. It was to this end that British policy in Asiatic Turkey was directed.

British concern for the route to the East through the Tigris-5Xiphrat6 3 Valley and her commercial interests in that region, were indissolubly bound up with her political interests. The maintenance of the Indian Empire was bittimately connected with the maintenance of British influence in the approaches to India, and particularly in

Turkish Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The years following the Treaty of Paris saw a growing realisation of the importance of this connection. In Turkish Arabia as in the

Persian Gulf, the English were building up an unusual position. Their influence and trade were paramount, their rivals as yet insignificant. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of uneasiness lest the Russians, who had as yet no material interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, should extend their influence, as well as their conquests, southwestwards into the lands bordering on the Persian Gulf.

In the general field of Anglo-Russian relations, the period 1856 to 1888 was characterised by fiction. Russian A.

1. See Palmerston to Temple. March 21, 1833. Bulwer: Life of Palmerston. Vol.II. p.145. ISO

encroachments on Turkey, her disregard for formal obligations and her assimilation of territory in Persia

and Central Asia gave ample scope for British suspicion

and irritation. In addition Britain was thoroughly out of sympathy with the popular conception of the Russian form of government - "an obscurantist autocracy ruling with the Knout and the Cossacks, the enemy of freedom, the persecutor of Circassians, Poles, Jews, of all who were not Muscovites, standing in all matters of political, social and religious organization at the opposite pole to England." 1

On two occasions, in 1878 when it seemed probable that

Russia would obtain a preponderant influence in 'Turkey, and in 1885, over the so-called Panjdeh incident, England and Russia were brought to the verge of war. Since the

Indian Mutiny, Eagland had been very much concerned for the security of her Indian possessions, and very sensitive to any moves on the part of Russia which might have repercussions in India. Ihissian ascendancy on' the North-

West frontier, in Persia, Syria and Mesopotamia might eventually have turned those provinces into Russian

satrapies and have culminated in disaster to British prestige and, ultimately, to British rule in India. It was this "turning Russia-wards" on the part of the

inhabitants of Western Asia which England dreaded. Until

the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, therefore, the major

1. Sumner: op.cit. p.43. /SI

threat to the British position in the approaches to India was thought to come from Russia. In the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley, the period 1856 to 1888 was consequently marked by acute suspicions of Russian motives and movements, and by

the strengthening of British determination to protect her

interests in this region. Commercial prosperity was inevitably tending towards political hegemony, and already at the Congress of Berlin Salisbury was claiming the Tigris-

Euphrates Valley as a region in which Great Britain had a 1 right to a dominant influence.

British policy in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley in the later Nineteenth Century had for its aims the maintenance of peace and security, and the protection and advancement of trade. Peace and security were essential to the advance­ ment of trade, and it was towards this end that British influence was primarily exerted. It was for this reason that the local Government of Baghdad was urged to take steps for the pacification of revolting Arab tribes, and the

Governments at Teheran and Constantinople were exhorted to

settle their differences and put an end to the intermittent warfare which disturbed the peace and trade of the frontier regions. The time was not yet arrived for a definite policy of constructive action or even for a general declaration of

British interests in that area and of her determination to

1, Salisbury to Layard. October 29, 1878. Cecil, op.cit. Vol.II. p.332. defend them. It was nevertheless quite clear that Britain

would take defensive measures to preserve intact the position

and prestige v/hich she had founded some two and a half

centuries earlier.

The British position was in fact challenged only

by the Turks : it was defended with resolution in the first

instance by the local British consular officers and in

important cases by the Ambassador in Constantinople

supported by the Foreign Secretary. That there were

comparatively few occasions necessitating reference to the

Foreign Office is a tribute to the resource and ability of

British consular officers appointed to Turkish Arabia.

The Political Agent and Consul General at Baghdad must be

conspicuous in any study of British interests in the Tigris-

Fuphrates Valley. Few posts in the British consular service

could boast such a succession of able and distinguished men as Baghdad. The Indian officers appointed there during

the Nineteenth Century were almost without exception

outstanding men, well qualified to occupy a post which

above all required much patience, dignity and firmness.

High standards had already been set by such men as Harford

Jones, Rich, Taylor and Rawlinson. They were maintained

fully by their successors, Kemball, Herbert, Nixon, Miles,

Flowden and Tweedie. Tweedie might well deplore the fall

in dignity of his office as compared with the brilliant days of Rawlinson, and complain that he was "a very humble Indian officer whom the Government of India [had] sent to Baghdad to live for a few years, and to qualify for a pens ion, and officially [that he was] just a subordinate of Sir ^■’’^illiam White, dangling at the end of a telegraph wire from Constantinople." 1

Nevertheless, even although more rapid communications

rendered them less independent, the successors of Rawlinson maintairjed the traditions of absolute integrity, justice r and digitity which had grown up in a more leisured and less * austere age. Although the Political Agent and Consul

General lived in less splendour, his prestige was still

enhanced by the presence of an armed sloop flying the British

flag, on the Tigris, and by a Native Indian guard. No

doubt on arrival at Baghdad many English travellers found, > as did Gertrude Bell, that it was "a pleasant thing to be English and see the Sikh guard leap to the salute at the gateway of that palace by the Tigris which [was] our much- envied Consulate General." 2

1. E.A.T.W. Budge: By Nile and Tigris. 2 Vols. London,1920. Vo 1.1 . p.227. In the same volume, opposite page 230, Budge has an interesting photograph taken in 1386 of the Residency Staff and the Sikh Guard.

2. G.M.L. Bell: ' Amurath to Amurath. London, 1911, p.184. APPENDIX

British Ambassadors at Constantinoole 1856-1888

1841 October Sir Stratford Canning (Cr, Viscount Stratford de Kedcliffe, 1852).

1858 i'iay Sir Henry L, Bulwer (Cr, Lord Bailing and Bulwer

1865 August Lord Lyons.

1867 Augu s t Henry 0. Elliot (Sir Henry, 1869).

1877 March Austen Henry Layard (Sir Henry, 1878).

1880 May Go J. Goschen (Cr, Viscount Goschen, 1900).

1881 May Earl of Dufferin.

1884 December Sir ii.dward Thornton.

1885 April Sir William '/ifhite. British Consular Officers in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley,1856-1888

1. Political-Agents and Consuls-General at Baghdad

1855 April A.B* Kemball.

1871 February C. Herbert

1875 January J.P. Nixon

1879 July B.B. Miles

1880 April T.J.C, Plowden

1885 Augus t Wo Tweedie -

Basra

1851 August I. Taylor Agent

1858 October K. Rogers Agent.Received a Commission as Vice-Consul July 1861

1863 March V/, Johnstone Agent and Vice-Consul

1868 April P.J.C.Robertson 1673:Assistant Political Agent 1879: promoted Consul

1881 December E, Mockler Assistant Political Agent and Consul

1883 June H ,L . Rams ay n tt ti It

Vice-Consuls at Mosul

1839 December C. Hassam (died at his post May 30, 1872)

1872 December J, Dickson

1875 April-1877 February Post vacant

1877 February J.F, Russell

1883 May- . W.S. Richards

1885 November H.H. Lamb

1886 July J o F . Russell

1887 February Post vacant BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. UnpuLllshed Material, Parliamentary Papers and

Collections of Docunents.

A. The lijrelftrt Office fapers in the Public Record Office.

P.0.78 : despatches to and from Constantinople: 1856-1885.

: despatches to and from Baghdad and Mosul: 1856-1885.

: correspondence between the Foreign Office and the Turkish Ambassador in London 1856-188 5.

: "Domestic Various": containing inter­ departmental correspondence and correspondence with the general public: 1856-1885.

: "Case Volumes" : -

Euphrates Valley Railway

P.0.78/1711 Vol.I. 1854-62. P.O.78/2254 Vol.II. 1869-72. P.O.78/3864 Vol.III. 1882-85.

European and Indian Junction Telegraph

P.0 . 78/1420 Vol. I. 18 56- 58. P.0.78/1634 Vol.II. 1860-61. P.0.78/1900 Vol.III. 1862-65.

Navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates

1?. 0.78/3988 Vol. I. 1860-76. V.0.78/3989 Vol.II. 1871-81. P.0.78/3990 Vol.III. J a n .1882-July 1883. P.O.78/3991. Vol.IV. July-August 1883. P.O.78/3992 Vol.V. Sept.1883-Dec.1886. B. Archives of the British Embassy at Constantinople. in the lubllc Record Office.

P.0.195: Despatches to and from Mosul and Baghdad 1856-1885.

All these records are open to inspection only until 1885.

Much of the material on the major aspects of British

interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley has been

collected, by the Foreign Office, into "Case Volumes. "

These are, however, far from complete and must be

supplemented from the ordinary series of despatches.

Correspondence between the /mibassador at Constantinople

and the Consul-General at Baghdad provides mo s t of the

information on the ordinary business of the Consulate.

Consular officers at Mosul and Basra usually corresponded

through the Consul-General at Baghdad, who in turn

corresponded with the Ambassador. The latter used his

discretion in referring cases to the Foreigp. Office.

‘The Consul-General did not, however, provide the

Ambassador v/ith copies of his correspondence with the

Government of India, relating to purely Indian affairs in

the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. This correspondence is

unfortunately not yet available in the archives of the

India Office, so that the Indian aspect of British

interests is necessarily incompletely dealt with.

From the English side, the volûmes "Domestic Various"

provide much material consisting of letters from firms and commercial bodies, from promoters of railway

schemes and from members of the public offering advice

to the Foreign Office. Also in these volumes is the

correspondence between the Foreign Office and other

Government Departments, of which the most important is

the India Board and its successor the India Office.

Corresjnndence between the Foreign Office and the

Chassies at Paris, Berlin and St. Petersburg, contained

in the series F.0.27, F.0*64 and F.0,65 respectively,

has also been consulted, when direct reference has been

found to these despatches and at times of crisis.

C. Records of the East India Company in the India Office.

Factory Records: Persia and the Persian Gulf

Vols.21, 23, 24, Correspondence from the British and 34-74. Residents at Basra and Baghdad 1798-1841.

Generally speaking, the Indian records are not available for the period 1856-1888, but the early papers of the East India Company have been consulted.

D. Private Papers.

a) In the Public Record Office.

F.O.391/21-22 : Hammond Papers. Correspondence from Sir Henry Elliot to Hammond 1866-1872.

F.O.352/38 : Stratford. Canning Papers, and 64 46- 56. \S(j.

p.0,358/1-6 : Simmons Papers. Correspondence between Simmons and Home, and Sir John Macneill. 1878. Colonel Home's Memo rand urn on the acquisition of Cyprus.

b ) In the British M u seum.

Additional Manuscripts 39,131 - 39,143.

Private correspondence of Layard, mainly with Salisbury and Beaconsfield. 1877-80.

Additional Manuscripts 38,935 - 38,938.

Manuscript memoirs of Layard on his embassy to Turkey 1877-1880.

E. Parliamentary Papers.

Reports of Select Committees.

1834 : Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the best means of promoting communication with India by Steam, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index. A. and P. [1834] XIV [478] p.369.

1871 : Report from the Select Committee on Euphrates Valley Railway together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index. A. and P. [1871] VII [386] p . 501.

1872 : Report from the Select Committee on Euphrates Valley Railway together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index. A. and P. [1872] IX [322] p.171.

Reports[from Consuls] respecting communication with India through Turkey by the Euphrates Valley Route. A. and P. [1872] XLV [c534] p.559. <90

Correspondence on the tfMiphrateg Expedition.

1837 ; Copy of Instructions to Colonel Chesney. the Officer commanding the Euphrates Expedition, together with Abstracts of Correspondence and Accoimts of Expenditure relative to that Enterprise. A. and P. [1837] XLIII [540] p.223

1838 : Copies or Extracts from additional Communications or Despatches addressed to the India Board, relating to the late Expedition to the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris.

A. and P. [1838] XLI [356] p.365.

Correspondence on the European and Indian Junction Telegraph.

1858 : Correspondence respecting the establishment of a line of Telegraph between Constantinople and Busso rah. A. and P . [1857-58] LX [2377] p.281.

1860 : Further Correspondence respecting the establishment of Telegraphic communications in the Mediterranean and with India.

A. and P. [i860] LXII [2605] p.269.

Commercial Reports from Consular Agents at Baghdad, Basra and M osul.

1867 : Report by Vice Consul Johnson on the trade of Basso rah for the years 1864-1866.

A. and P . [1867] LXVII [3761] p.266.

: Report byConsul General Kemball on the General Condition and Commerce of the Irovince of Baghdad.

A. and P. [1867] LXVII [3761] p.277.

1871 : Report by Cblonel Herbert, on the Trade of Baghdad for the year 1869-70.

A. and P. [l87l] LXV [c343] p.501. '9'.

1872 : Report on the Trade of Bus so rah by Vice Consul Robertson for the years 1869-70,

A. and P. [1872] L^/II [c 543] p.296.

: Report by Consul General Herbert on the Trade and Commerce of Baghdad for the years 1870-71.

A. and P. [1872] L\r[I [c543] p.293.

1873 : Bagdad: Rapport by Consul General Herbert.

A. and P. [1873] LX^/II [c860] p.988.

: Report on Trade of Bussorah by Vice Consul Robertson. A. and P. [1873] LXVII [c860 ] p.992.

1874 : Report by Consul General Herbert on the Trade and Commerce of Baghdad for the year 1873.

A. end P. [1874] LXVII [c 1009-1] p.303.

: Report by Vice Consul Robertson on the Trade and Commerce of Bussorah for the year 1873.

A. and P. [1874] LXVII [cl079] p.864. ,

1875 : Report by Consul General Nixon on the Trade and Commerce of Baghdad for the year 1874. I A. and P. [1875] LXXVII [Cmd.1354] p . 3 7 4 .

1876 : Report by Consul General Nixon on the Trade and Commerce of Turkish Arabia for the year 1875.

A. and P. [1876] LXXV [c 1486] p.274.

1877 : Report by Consul General Nixon on the Trade and Commerce of Turkish Arabia for the year 1876-77,

A. and P. [1877] LXXXIII [c 1855] p. 770.

1878 : Report by Consul General Nixon on the Trade and Commerce of Bagdad for the year 1877-78.

A. and P. [1878] LXXIV [c 2088] p.706. I(l^.

1879 2 Report by Consul General Nixon on the Trade and Commerce of Baghdad for the year 1878-79,

A. and P. [1878-9] LXXII [c 2421] p.222.

: Report by Vice Consul Russell on the Trade and Commerce of Mosul for the year 1878.

A. and P. [1878-9] LXXII [c 2421] p.240.

1885 : Rej)ort by Vice Consul Richards on the Trade and Commerce of Mosul for the year 1884.

A. and P. [1884-5] LXXIX [c 4525] p.l78.

: RejKDrt by Consul Mockler on the Trade and Commerce of Busreh for the year 1884.

A. and P. [1884-5] LXXIX [ c 4526]p.628,

1886 : Report by Consul General I'weedie on the Trade of Baghdad for the year beginning March 12, 1884 and ending March 12, ]_885,

A. and P. [1886] LXV [c 4610] p.248.

1888 : Report on the Trade of Bussorah in the year 1887. A. and P. [1888] G U I [c 5252-125] p.313.

1889 : Report on the Trade of Baghdad for the years 1887 and 1888.

A. and P. [1889] LXXXI [c 5618] p.125. /Ç3

1896 : Report by Major Law on Railways in Asiatic Turkey. A. and P. [1896] XCVl [c 8019] p.761.

Parliamentary Papers provide little material for a study of British interests in the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley. Apart from the reports of Select Committees of the House of Commons, and the evidence given before those

Committees, there are only reports from Consular Agents and a very meagre selection of correspondence relating to the Euphrates Expedition, and to the European and Indian

Junction Telegraph. The series of consular reports on trade and commerce is by no means complete, and the information contained in them is of a very general nature.

The reports are published with very few omissions or alterations.

It is interesting to note that neither a

Conservative nor a Liberal Government was prepared to lay before Parliament correspondence on the Tigris-Euphrates

Valley; the Conservatives finding the correspondence on the navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers too voluminous, and the Liberals putting forward a similar excuse for not 2 publishing papers on the Euphrates Valley Railway.

1. Bourke to Sir George Balfour M.F. May 3, 1877. P.O.78/2606.

2. Granville in the House of Lords. July 26th, 1883. Hansard , 3rd Series. Vol.CCLXXXII. Col. 507. Aa a guide to Parliamentary Papers, the follov/ing

work has been consulted:-

Temperley H.W.V. and Penson L.M. :

A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books, 1814-1914. Cambridge 1938.

P. Collections of Documents.

Aitchison C.U. : A Collection of Treaties. Engagements and Sunnuds Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries. Volumes II and VII. Second edition. Calcutta 1876.

Vol.II Containing documents relating to the "Oudh Bequest."

Vo 1. WI Containing documents relating to the establishment of the British at Basra and Baghdad, and to the navigation of the Euphrates.

British and Poreign State Papers. Volume 69.

Containing despatch from Salisbury to Waddington (dated Berlin July 7, 1878) enclosing a copy of the Cyprus Convention.

Poster W. : The English Pactories in India, 1618-1669.

A calendar of documents in the India Office etc. Oxford 1906-1927.

Gooch O.P. and Temperley H.W.V. : British Documents on the Origins of the War. London 1926-1938.

Vol.IV : Containing documents relating to British interests in the Persian Gulf towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, particularly excerpts from the "Curzon Despatch" and the reply of the British Government. '1

Vol.X Part II : Containing a Memorandum on British rights to navigate the Waters of Mesopotamia, together with copies of relevant documents.

Hertslet E. : A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions • « at Present subsisting between Great Britain and Foreign Powers ... so far as they relate to Commerce and Navigation.

Containing documents relating to British rights to navigate the Euphrates.

Malet A. Precis containing information in regard to the first connection of the Hon'ble East India Company vfith Turkish Arabia. As far as the same can be traced from the Records of the Bombay Government, together with the names of the several British Residents and Political Agents who have been stationed at Bagdad and Bussorah between A.D.1646 and 1846, accompanied by other information.

Written 30th March 1847.

Printed at the Foreign Department Press. Calcutta 1874.

Containing many useful extracts of documents in the Records of the Bombay Government which are not at present available. Very few documents are given in full.

Sainsbury E.B. : A Calendar of the Court Minutes etc. of the East India Company: 1635-1679. Oxford 1907-1929.

Temperley H.W.V. and Penson L.M. : Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt to Salisbury. Cambridge 1938. Young G Corps de Droit Ottoman. 7 VO Is . 0xfo rd 190 5-1906.

Recueil des Codes, Lois, Règlements, Ordonnances et Acts les plus importants du Droit Intérieur, et d'études sur le Droit Coutumier de l'Empire Ottoman.

Vol.I only has been used; this contains documents relating to the internal administration of the Turkish Empire.

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates; 1856-1888.

'The Times; 18 56-1888. '97.

II. Bjn^s^hy, Travel and Contemporary Works.

Ainsworth W.F. A personal narrative of the Euphrates Sxnediti on . 2 Vols. London 1888. Surgeon and geologist to the Che sney Expedition.

Alexander G.M. Baghdad in By op ne Days. London 1928. from the Journals and Correspondence of Claudius Rich, traveller, artist, linguist, antiquary, and British Resident at Baghdad 1808-1821.

Andrew W.F Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India. London 1857. Containing copies of official correspondence ,

The Euphrates Valley the Shortest Route to India. 2nd Edition. London 1 8 5 ? ’. Copies of letters to "The Times".

Letter to Visco imt Palmerston K. G. on the Political Importance of the Euphrates Valley Railway and the necessity of the financial support of Her Majesty's Government. London 1857.

Euphrates Valley Route to India. London 1873. A paper read before the British A 3sociation.

Euphrates Valley Route to India in Connection with the Central Asian Question. London 1873.

India and her Neighbours. London 1878.

The Euphrates Valley Route to India in Connection with the Central Asian and Egyptian Questions. 2nd Edition. London 1882.

The Advance of Russia. London 1885. Letters reprinted from "'The Times". (W.P. Andrev/ was the chief protagonist of the Euphrates Valley Railway, and a prolific writer and lecturer in its cause. His works and lectures all contain the same arguments, suitably adapted to the international situation of the time).

Badger G.P. The Nestorians and their Rituals; with the narrative of a mission to Me so po- tamia and Coordistan in 1842-44, and of a late visit to those countries in 18 50. 2 Vols. London 18 52.

Bell G.M.L. : Amurath to Amurath, London 1911. An a c CO un t of travels in Asia Minor and Persia in the early years of the Twentieth Century.

Blunt Anne Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates. (Edited by 2 Vols. London 1879. W.S.B[lunt].) Containing a chapter on the Euphrates Valley Railway by W.S. Blunt.

Blunt W.S. Secret History of the English Occupation of E gypt. London 1907. The early chapters deal with his travels in Turkish Arabia and attempts to interest English statesmen in an Arab National State.

"An Indo-Mediterranean Railway: Fiction and Pact," Fortnightly Review Vol.XX^/I (New Series) London, November 1st, 1379.

Brassey T, The Eastern Question and the Political Situation at home. London 1877.

Buckingham J .S . Travels in Mesopotamia. 2 Vols. ------; London 1827. Including a journey"from Aleppo to Bagdad by the route of Beer, Orfa, Diarbekr, Mardin and Mosul, with researches on the ruins of Nineveh, Babylon and other ancient cities.

Buckle G.E. The Life of Benjamin Disraeli. Earl of Beaconsfield. Vol.VI. London 1920 Budge E.A.W. : By Nile and Tigris. A narrative of Journeys in Egypt and Mesopotamia on behalf of the British Museum between the years 1886 and 1913. 2 Vols. London 1920.

Bulwer W ,H . L. E. ; The Life of H.J. Temple. Viscount Palmerston with selections from his diaries and correspondence. Vol.II. London 1870.

Cameron V.L. : Our Future Highway to India. 2 Vols. London "1880 An account of a journey along the route of the proposed Euphrates Valley Railway in 1878, Cameron was generally supposed to be acting under Beacons- field ^ 8 instructions, although he claims to have been absolutely independent.

Carruthers B . : The Desert Route to India, being the (Editor) . Journals of Four Travellers by the Great Desert Caravan Route between Aleppo and Basra. 1745-1751. Hakluyt Society. London 1929.

Cecil G. Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury. Volume II. London 1921.

Chesney F.R. : Reports on the Navigation of the Euphrates. Submitted to Government by Captain Chesney, London 1833.

An account of his first surveys of the Euphrates in 1831.

The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris ... in the years 1835, 1836 and 1837; preceded by geographical and historical notices of the regions between the rivers Nile and Indus. 2 Vols. London 1850.

Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition carried on by Order of the British Government during the years 1835, 1836 and 1837. London 1868. Zoo

"Lieut,-Colonel F.R. Chesney" : "Our Portrait Gallery" No.XXIV. Dublin University Magazine N o . C i m November 1841. Volume Dublin 1841.

Chesney L. and 0 ^Donnell J. Life of the late General (Edited by F.R. Chesney. S .Lane-Poo le) . London 188 5. By his wife and daughter. Containing extracts from his correspondence, but it is not a critical study.

Do dwell H.H. The Founder of Modern Egypt. A study o f Muhammad ^ Ali . Cambridge 1931.

Euphrates Valley Railway. \iThat is thought of it in India as an alternative route. Reprinted from the Madras Mail of January 10, 1883. London 1883.

Pontanier V. Voyage dans 1 ^ Inde et dans le Golfe Persique par 1 * Egypte et par la Mer Rouge. 3 Vols. Paris 1344-46.

By the French Consul at Basra, strongly Anglophobe.

Fraser D. The Short Cut to India: the record of a journey along the route of the Baghdad Railway. London 1909.

Geary G, Through Asiatic Turkey. 2 Vols. London 1878. Narrative of a journey from Bombay to the Bosphorus, by the Editor of the "Times of India."

Goldsmid F.J Telegraph and Travel: a narrative of the formation and development of telegraphic communication between England and India. Inndon 1874.

Grant-Duff I.E.: "British Interests in the East." Nineteenth Century April 1880, London. .

Groves A.N. Journal of a Residence at Bagdad (Edited by during the years 1850 and 1831. A. J .SCO tt) . London 1832. The best account of the condition of Baghdad in the last days of the Mamluk Pashas. By an English missionary.

Hakluyt R. The Principal Navigations, Voyages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation. Vol.V. Glasgow 1904.

Hogarth D. G, llie Wandering Scholar. London 1925.

India Telegraphic Communication with India. London 1859. Letters to "'The Times" and the "Morning Chronicle" from Andrev/, Chesney, Layard, Rawlinson and others on the relative merits of the Red Sea and Euphrates Valley Routes.

,y Kuhn Von Kuhnenfeld P. The Strategical Importance (Translated from the of the Euphrates Valley German by C.W.Wilson) . Railway. 2nd Edition. London 1873. Written in 1858, first published 1869.

Von Kuhnenfeld was Austrian War Minister from 1868-1874.

Layard A.H. Nineveh and its Remains: with an account of a visit to the Chaldacan Christians of Kurdistan, and the Yezidis, or Devil Worshippers. 2 Vols. London 1849.

An account of Layard^s first excavations at Nineveh.

Discoveries in the ruins of Nineveh and Babylon. 2 Vo 1 s . london 18 53.

An account of Layard^s second expedition to Nineveh on behalf of the British Museum.

Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana and Babylonia. 2 Vols. London 1887. a o l .

Layard A.H. (Edited by Autobiography and letters from his W.N.Bruce). childhood until his appointment as H.M. Ambassador at Madrid. 2 Vols. London 1903.

MacCoan J. C. Our New Protectorate: Turkey-in-Asia, its geography, races, resources and government. 2 Vols. london 1879.

M i l e 3 3.B. The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf. 2 Vols. London 1919.

Miles was Consul-General at Baghdad from 1879-1880.

Mitford E.L. A Land March from England to Ceylon forty years ago. Volume I. london 1884.

Layard*3 companion in his early travels.

Moltke H. C.B. Von : Lettres du Maréchal de Moltke sur (Translated from 1^Orient. 2nd Edition. the Herman by Paris 1877. A. Marchand). Letters written between 1836 and 1339, part of which time Moltke was adviser to the Turkish general commanding the Sultan* s forces against Muhamifiad *Ali in Armenia.

Felley L. "‘The geographical capabilities of the Persian Gulf as an area of Trade." Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society. Vol.VIII. Session 1863-64. London 1864.

Porter R.K. Travels in Georgia, Persia, Armenia, Ancient Babylonia ... during the years 1817, 1818, 1819 and 1820. 2 Vols. London 18 21-22.

Pirn B. The Eastern Question. Fast, Present and Future. 2nd Edition. London 1877.

Pres se 1 W. Von Lea Chemins de_Per.en Turquie d*Asie. Projet d * un resean complet, Zurich 1902. Z03.

Purchas S. Purchas His P i i grimes. London 1625,

Rawlinson G. A Memoir of Major-General Sir H.C. Rawlinson. London 1898.

The chapters dealing with Rawlinson as Political Agent at Baghdad stress his archaeological activities rather than his official duties.

Rawlinson H.C. Notes on the direct overhead telegraph from Constantinople to Kurrachi, London 1861.

A paper read at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society. j

England and Russia in the East. London 1875. !

A series of papers on the political and geographical condition of Central Asia.

Rich C.J Memoir on the Ruins of Babylon. London 1815.

Second Memoir on Babylon: containing an \ inquiry into the correspondence between the ancient descriptions of Babylon and the remains still visible. London 1318.

Narrative of a residence in Koordistan | and on the site of ancient Nineveh; with journal of a voyage down the Tigris to Bagdad. 2 Vols. London 1856. I (Edited, with a biographical note, by i his widow).

Rich was British Resident at Baghdad from 1808-1821.

Ro 83 H.J. Letters from the East; 1857-1857. (Edited by London 1902. Janet Ross) Ross lived in Mosul from 1837-4-8, and was partner of Christian Rassam, the British Vice-Consul. He assisted Layard in his first excavations at Nineveh. ZOL|.

Taylor J . Travels from England to India in the year 1789, by the way of the Tyrol, Venice, Scandaroon, Aleppo and over the Great Desert to Bussora. 2 Vols. London 1799.

Thompson G.C. Public opinion and lord Beaconsfield; 187 5-1880 . 2 Vols. london 1886.

Containing selections from Beaconsfield*s sneeches.

Wellsted J.R. : Travels to the City of the Caliphs along the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. 2 Vols. London 1840. III. Secondary Works.

Antonlus G. The Arab Awakening. The Story of the Arab National Movement. London 1933.

An outline of the origins and develop­ ment of the Arab National Movement, beginning in the nineteenth Century, but mainly concerned with the 'Twentieth Century.

Arnold T.W. The Caliphate. Oxford 1924.

Asiatic Journal and Monthly Register for British and Foreign India, China and Australia. 2nd Series. London 1830-1843.

Bennett T.J. "The Past and Present Connection of England v/ith the Persian Gulf." Journal of the Society of Arts . Vo 1. 50. London November 1902.

Boulger D.C. "The Euphrates Valley Railway Project." United Thinire. The Royal Colonial Institute Journal. Vol.VII ^New S e ries). London 1917.

Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol.II, Cambridge 1940.

Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. Volumes II and III. Cambridge 1923.

Cambridge History of India Vol.VI. Cambridge 1932.

Chirol V. .[he Middle Eastern Question; or some political problems of Indian defence. London 1903.

Coke R. Baghdad; the City of Peace. i London 1927. ' A history of the city of Baghdad from its foundation until the Twentieth Century, containing descriptions of the administrations.

Clapham J.H. An Economic History of Modern Britain. 3 Vols. Cambridge, 1926-38, a.oL.

Curzon G.N. Persia and the Persian Question. 2 Vols. london 1892.

Dr 5 ail It J.E. La ^Politique Orientale de Napoleon, Sebastiain et Gardane, 1806-1808, Paris 190 4.

Earle E.M. Turkey, the Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway. A study in Imperialism. London 1923.

Encyclopaedia of Islam. London and Leyden 1913.

Porei[.n Office: Handlpooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. London 1919.

No ,81 The Persian Gulf. No. 92 Me so pot ami a. No . 96 a) The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate. b) The Pan-Islamic Movement.

Forte3cue A. The Lesser Eastern Churches. London 1913. ! Habib Shiha La Province de Bagdad, son passé, son present, son avenir. Le Caire 1908. !

Hilprecht V. Explorations in Bible Lands during the [ Nineteenth Century. : Edinburgh 1905. j I Hoskins H.L. British Routes to India. New York 1928. *

Based almost entirely on published sources. j

Ireland P.W. * Iraq. A study in political development. London 1937.

Deals primarily with the post-1918 period, but has a good introduction reviewing British interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. 2 07

La Jonquiere A. de. Histoire de 1 * Empire Ottoman. depuis les origines jusqu * au Traité de Berlin. Paris 1881.

Langer W.L, European Alliances and Alignments; 1871-1890. New York 1931.

The Diplomacy of Imperialism: 1890-1902. 2 Vols. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1935.

Lee D.E. Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878. Cambridge, Massachusetts 1934.

A Memorandum Concerning Cyprus, 1878." Journal of Modem History. Vol.III June 1931.

Containing Col. Ho me * s Confidential Memorandum on the British acquisition of a "place d'armes" in the Levant.

Lloyd S. Foundations in the Dust. A story of Mesopotamian Exploration. London 1947.

An account of the work of British Assyriolo gists in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, during the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, based mainly on their own works.

Longrlgg S.H, Four Centuries of Modem Irdc . Oxford 1925.

A good account of the internal history of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century. British Foreign Office records have not been used, but the sources include works by Turkish and Arab historians and the published records of the East India Company. Contains a good bibliography particularly of contemporary travel 11terature.

Low C.R. History of the Indian Navy: 1613-1863. 2 Vols. London 1877. Malle son G.B. : Final French Gtruggles In India and on the Indian Seas. London 1878.

Masson F . ; Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au >F/IIIe siècle. Paris 1911.

Medlicott W.N.: The Congress of Berlin and After. A diplomatie history of the Near Eastern settlement 1878-1880. London 1938.

Mesopo tamia The Arab of Mesopotamia. Government Press. Basrah 1918.

A series of short essays on subjects relating to Mesopotamia written during 1916 by persons with special knowledge of the subjects dealt with. Intended as a background work for British officers serving in Mesopotamia. Includes articles written for the Secret "Arab Bulletin" bv Gertrude Bell, of which the most important is "The basis of Government in Turkish Arabia."

[Gertrude Bell's contributions have been published separately in The Arab W a r . London 1940].

[Parker A.] "The Bagdad Railway Negotiations," Quarterly Review. Vol.CCXXVIII p.487-628. London. October 1917.

By the Librarian of the Foreign Office.

Penson L.M. "The Principles and Methods of Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy." Cambridge Historical Journal Vo 1. V. {No . T ) 1935 p.87-106.

"The Foreign Policy of Lord Salisbury, 1878-80. "

in Studies in Anglo-French History during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, edited by A. Coville and H. Temperley. Cambridge 1935. 20^ .

Ragey L. : La question du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad 1895-1914. Paris 1936.

Riley A.J.L. : Report on the Foundation of the Archbishop's Mission to the Assyrian Church in 1886. London 1887.

Seton-Wataon R.W, : Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question. A study in diplomacy and party politics, London 1935.

Sumner B.H. Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880. Oxford 1937.

"Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 1880-1914."

From The Proceedings of the British Academy. Volume XX^711. London 1940.

[Raleigh Lecture on History, May 1940],

Sykes P.M. : A History of Persia. 2 Vols. 3rd Edition London 1930.

Temperley H.W.V. : England and the Near East. London 1936.

"Disraeli and Cyprus." English Historical Review. Vo 1 .XL'71 TÂpril 1931) p.274-79.

"Further Evidence on Disraeli and Cyprus." Ibid. (July 1931) p.457-60.

"British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey. (1830-1914)." Cambridge His to rial Journal Vol.IV (No.2) 1933. p. 156-191.

Thompson R.C. and Hutchinson R.W. A Century of Exploration at Nineveh. London 1929.

Wilson A.T. The Persian Gulf. An historical sketch from the earliest times to the beginning of the twentieth century. Oxford 1928. 2fo.

Wolf J.B. : "The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad." The University of Missouri Studies. Vol.'XI (No.2) April 1, 1936. Columhia, Missouri.

Zaki Salih : Origins of British Influence in Mesopo tamia. [A Thesis]. New York, 1941.

Has used no original sources and adds little to Prof6 8 8 0 r Hoskins’s work. XII

IV. Maps

Kiepert H. : C-eneral-Karte des Tdrklschen Reiches In Europe und Asien. Berlin, 1855.

Carte générale de I ’Phipire Ottoman. Berlin, 1867.

Carte générale des provinces Européennes et Asiatiques de l ’Qnpire Ottoman. 3rd Edn. Berlin, 1886. R p p r O P>o*J-v>i)cvry 4» M Qi.-5Ua.Uctw IS6L fort^Ucio.^

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