NO. 44 JULY 2021 Introduction Challenges to ’s Role in in the Post-Soleimani Era Complex Rivalries, Fragmented Alliances, Declining Soft Power Hamidreza Azizi

On , 2020, the Iranian Quds Force commander, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, was assassinated by the United States in Iraq. He was considered the mastermind behind Iran’s regional strategy, especially in and Iraq. A year and a half later, the Islamic Republic continues to wield considerable influence in Iraq, and Iran- backed militias continue to violently pressure US forces to leave Iraq. However, Iran now faces a series of serious challenges that are directly and indirectly related to Soleimani’s death. In the geopolitical and economic spheres, the influence of Iran’s rivals in Iraq has increased, while Tehran’s room for maneuver has become increas- ingly limited. In the political arena, divisions among Iran-backed forces in Iraq have increased, while Iran’s direct influence over the Iraqi government has been declining. At the same time, rising anti-Iranian sentiments among the Iraqi people have reduced Iran’s social capital in the neighboring country. The combination of these factors seems to be limiting Iran’s influence in Iraq. The EU should build upon this opportunity to support a strong Iraqi government that pursues a multi-vector foreign policy.

The US military invasion of Iraq in 2003 2004. From 2006 onwards, two other presented a dilemma for Iran. On the one powerful Iran-backed militias – Kata’ib hand, the fall of Iraqi dictator Saddam and Asaib Ahl al-Haq – also Hussein, who had waged an eight-year war came to prominence as active members of on Iran in the 1980s, was good news for the anti-US front. When the US government Iranians. On the other hand, there were officially announced the withdrawal of concerns that after and Iraq, American troops from Iraq in 2011, Iran’s Iran might be the next target of US military influence in Iraq reached its highest level interventions. This was one of the main in recent history. reasons for Iran’s support for Shiite militias The rise of the so-called Islamic State in their fight against American forces. (IS/ISIS) in 2014 and its occupation of parts Among the militias supported by Iran was of Iraq (and Syria) provided a new oppor- Jaish al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army), which tunity for Iran to expand its influence. On started the anti-US insurgency in April the one hand, Iran-backed armed groups

were organized within the framework of between the two hostile states. In this vein, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and, attacks on US bases and military convoys along with the Iraqi army, became one of continue on an almost daily basis. Mean- the main pillars of ’s anti-terrorist while, frequent extrajudicial or illegal activ- campaign. The PMF was formed in response ities of some Iran-backed groups have made to a call from the Iraqi government as well the Iraqi people increasingly sensitive to as the influential Iraqi Shiite cleric Grand Iranian influence in their country. During Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani for a popular Iraq’s mass protests that began in October mobilization against ISIS. Some of the PMF 2019, one of the protesters’ demands was factions, such as the Badr Organization, to reduce Iran’s influence. Protesters even Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, attacked the Iranian consulate in the city of existed before its official formation and . As such, Soleimani’s were included in the PMF, while other, in January 2020 was the culmination of smaller groups were established in 2014. a trend that had begun in mid-2018 and On the other hand, units of the Quds Force marked the emergence of a new spectrum of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of challenges for Iran. (IRGC) were invited by the Iraqi government to help it fight ISIS. By the end of 2017, ISIS’ self-proclaimed Caliphate had fallen, Iran’s Interests in Iraq but the influence of Iran and its allied groups continued to grow in Iraq. In 2018, From the Ba’ath Party’s coup in 1968 until a number of those groups formed a political the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, rela- coalition called Fatah (triumph [of Islam]) tions between Tehran and Baghdad were and achieved a significant victory in the never good-neighborly or normal. In 1980, parliamentary elections, becoming the just one year after the victory of the Islamic second-largest faction in the parliament. Revolution in Iran, the decade-long rivalry But challenges to Iran’s role in Iraq also for regional dominance between the two began in 2018. In May, the Trump admin- countries gave way to full-blown war, which istration launched its “maximum pressure” started with the Iraqi invasion of Iranian campaign against the Islamic Republic. territory. Countering Iran’s “malign influence” in the Three decades on, lessons learned by region was announced as one of the cam- Iranian leaders from eight years of war and paign’s goals. Washington also imposed decades of rivalry with Iraq continue to sanctions on Iran-backed militia leaders in shape Tehran’s perception of its strategic Iraq. By the end of 2019, tensions between interests in the neighboring country. US troops stationed in Iraq and Iran-backed According to this perception, a strong Iraqi militias reached their peak. state, dominated by nationalist or pan-Arab In December 2019, a US strike on the forces, is a potential threat to Iran. There- positions of Iran-backed militias caused fore, Tehran has always sought to ensure those groups to mobilize their supporters that such forces would not regain power in to storm the US embassy in Baghdad. Less Baghdad. Instead, Iran has supported Shiite than 10 days later, Iran launched a massive groups in line with the Islamic Republic’s missile strike on a US military base in Iraq ideology to present them as an effective in response to Soleimani’s assassination. alternative to Sunni, nationalist, or pan- The chain of events raised concerns that Arab factions, which traditionally do not Iraq might become a battleground between hold a favorable view of Iran. From this Iran and the US. perspective, even if Shiite groups are un- ’s departure from power able to fully and sustainably dominate the in January 2021 reduced the risk of a direct Iraqi government, their strong presence is confrontation between Tehran and Wash- seen as necessary to maintain a balance of ington, but Iraq remains a scene of rivalry power in Iraq, given that they share Iran’s

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2 negative view toward the presence of the from developing any serious pro-Western US and its allies in the country. In the same approach. At the same time, the continued vein, Iran has always tried to maintain activities of Iran-backed groups have been unity among various Shiite factions in Iraq at odds with the European desire to regain and position them against anti-Iranian stability through inclusive rule and good currents. governance in Iraq. Similarly, Iranian influ- In addition, Iraq is of great geopolitical ence has limited the possibility of forming a importance in Iran’s regional strategy. As strong and genuinely independent govern- a western neighbor to Iran and an eastern ment in Iraq. In fact, so far, the only serious neighbor to Syria, Iraq allows the Islamic area of common interest between Iran and Republic to secure a land connection to its the EU in Iraq has been the fight against allies in Syria and . Especially since jihadi terrorism, especially ISIS. the start of the Syrian war in 2011 and the As for the role of Soleimani, he was rise of ISIS in 2014, this land connection long considered to be the main architect has allowed Iran-backed militias to move of Iran’s regional strategy. Under his com- easily between the three countries to counter mand, the IRGC’s elite Quds Force, which perceived threats against the Iran-led axis used to act mainly as a secretive and clan- in the region. At the same time, this geo- destine force, gradually came out of the political importance makes Tehran very shadows and became Tehran’s main instru- sensitive to the presence and activities of ment to advance its regional interests. In rival powers in Iraq. This was the main fact, Soleimani was in charge of command- reason why, in the post-2003 period, Iran ing or coordinating a vast network of Iran- tried, through its allied militias, to prevent backed militias from Iraq to Syria and Iraq from becoming a permanent zone of . He also enjoyed close ties with a influence for Washington and its allies, an number of regional politicians, such as approach that continues to be at the heart Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and promi- of Iran’s strategy in Iraq. Iran has had nent Shiite figures in Iraq. Therefore, by similar, albeit relatively less, sensitivity to giving the green light for his assassination, the influence of regional rivals, such as Trump actually wanted to deal a severe and , in Iraq. blow to Iran’s influence in the region, in- Economically, Tehran sees Iraq as a cluding in Iraq. And indeed, Iran has since potential market for Iranian goods as well been faced with increasing challenges in as electricity and gas exports. At the same realizing its interests. time, Iran tends to take advantage of Iraq’s geographical location to establish transit routes to Syria, the Mediterranean, and Geopolitical Challenges eventually Europe. Finally, in the social sphere, the Islamic Republic has sought to Among these challenges, geopolitical chal- provide a social and ideological ground for lenges are key. This refers to the role of expanding its influence in the neighboring Iran’s rival powers in Iraq and Iran’s efforts country by gaining the support of the Iraqi to contain their influence. In this context, people, especially the Shiites. Iran sees the US, the Arab states of the Among these interests and priorities, , and Turkey as its main rivals Iran’s desire for exclusive influence in Iraq in the competition for more influence in has been at odds with the interests of West- Iraq. Immediately after Soleimani’s assassi- ern countries. Although Iran’s domestic nation, Iranian officials, including Supreme economic problems have never allowed it Leader Ayatollah Seyyed , to become an unrivaled actor in the Iraqi promised “severe revenge” against the US. market, in the political and security A few days later, the IRGC launched a large- spheres, Iran’s influence has effectively scale missile attack on US airbase Ain prevented successive Iraqi governments al-Assad in Anbar province. Following the

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3 attack, Khamenei declared that “the ex- increased the risk of a direct confrontation pulsion of American troops from the between Tehran and Washington, leading region” had become a strategic goal for to Khamenei reportedly calling for an end Iran. At the same time, the Shiite-domi- to the attacks in October 2020. The attacks nated Iraqi parliament passed a resolution intensified once again after Trump handed calling on the government to end the pres- over the presidency to Joe Biden. Yet, the ence of all foreign troops in Iraq, pointing Biden administration has shown no less of specifically to the US-led coalition fighting a commitment in countering Iranian influ- ISIS. ence. In this vein, in February 2021, Biden In practice, however, things did not go ordered a strike on the positions of Kata’ib exactly as Iran had hoped. On the same day, Hezbollah, one of the major Iran-backed Trump said, “At some point, we want to get militias in Iraq. In late June, the US launched out [of Iraq],” but he emphasized that “this a similar attack on the positions of Iran- is not the right point.” Two months later, backed groups on Iraq’s border with Syria. the US began handing over some military In June 2020, a US-Iraqi strategic dia- bases under its control to the Iraqi govern- logue began, one of the goals of which, ment. By the end of August 2020, US forces according to Iraqi officials, was to discuss had evacuated eight bases. However, it soon the withdrawal of US troops. By January became clear that the evacuation of these 2021, the number of American troops in bases was not a prelude to a complete US Iraq had already dropped from more than withdrawal from Iraq, but instead was part 5,000 to about 2,500. However, when Iran of a redeployment plan to strengthen criti- seemed to be finally achieving its goal, cal positions. In April, the US installed Patri- NATO announced that it would increase ot missile defense systems at Ain al-Assad its forces in Iraq from 500 to 4,000 at the airbase. A few months later, in February request of the Iraqi government. Although 2021, it was announced that Washington the task of those forces is said to be to carry was developing Al-Harir base in the Iraqi out training and advisory missions, Iran Kurdistan region. In addition, some US believes that the US wants to continue its troops leaving Iraq were dispatched to US presence in Iraq under the cover of NATO. bases in Syria. The redeployment of Ameri- What is more, given the international com- can forces from Iraq to Syria did not solve position of NATO forces and its non-combat Iran’s problem but simply moved it to an- nature, Iran-backed militias will have a other arena. After all, Iran is pursuing a more challenging time justifying possible similar goal in Syria, which is to reduce US attacks against them. In sum, as far as the influence and expand its own. At the same presence of the US and its NATO allies in time, Washington’s focus on strengthening Iraq is concerned, Iran has not only failed its bases in Iraq’s Sunni and Kurdish areas to achieve its primary goal but is actually has raised concerns in Iran that the Ameri- facing a more complex situation. cans may consider the partitioning of Iraq as a serious plan B. Regional Rivals In this context, Iran-backed militias doubled down on their attacks against US What complicates the situation even fur- positions in Iraq in order to put more pres- ther is the growing influence of Turkey sure on Washington. From the first half and Saudi Arabia in Iraq. Since early 2020, of 2020 onwards, a range of new armed Turkey has increased its activities in north- groups, believed to be backed by Iran and ern Iraq with the primary aim of fighting the PMF, began routine attacks on US posi- insurgents of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party tions in Iraq to increase pressure on the (PKK). From the point of view of Iran and Americans. By April 2021, at least 15 new its allied groups in Iraq, Turkey’s ultimate militias had been formed in Iraq to counter goal is to dominate the Iraq-Turkey border the US presence. The attacks, however, zone. Disputes over Turkey’s plans for Iraq

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4 prompted Iran-backed forces to go to the the lack of consensus among Shiite factions brink of armed conflict with Turkey in prevented Iran from publicly supporting March 2021. It soon became apparent that him. The second nominee, Adnan al-Zurfi, Iran’s concerns were not unfounded. In was seen as a pro-US figure by Iran and the April 2021, Turkish Interior Minister Süley- Iraqi Shiite groups, whose prime minister- man Soylu announced that Turkey intended ship could jeopardize their interests. That to build a military base in northern Iraq to was why, despite strong opposition from strengthen control over its southern border, some Shiite factions such as Kata’ib Hez- as it had done in Syria. Some observers bollah, Iran eventually agreed to support interpreted the move as a step by Ankara Mustafa al-Kadhimi to become the new toward dominating northern Iraq. prime minister. Saudi Arabia has also expanded its rela- Ever since, however, Kadhimi’s attempts tions with the Iraqi government. It seems to balance Iraq’s foreign relations, especially that Riyadh is trying to contain Iranian between Iran and the Arab states of the influence in Iraq’s political, security, and Persian Gulf, have caused irritation with economic spheres by establishing close ties the Islamic Republic. He also openly calls with Baghdad. Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa for maintaining Iraq’s close relationship al-Kadhimi’s apparent intention to establish with the US. Kadhimi has also taken several a balance in his country’s foreign relations measures to limit the PMF’s power, which by strengthening ties with Riyadh could is also a challenge for Tehran and its allies. help the Saudis achieve this goal. Overall, Iran thus faces a more complex scene in Iran-backed Militia Iraq that challenges Tehran’s so-far over- whelming influence. The dispute over Kadhimi becoming prime minister was the first sign of a split among Iran-backed Shiite groups in the post-Solei- Political Challenges mani era, but it was not the last one. Gener- ally speaking, since the beginning of 2020, Political challenges to Iran’s role in Iraq disagreements within the PMF have been are more directly related to the loss of Solei- on the rise. The PMF’s political leadership, mani as a central actor. Soleimani’s role including its chairman Falih Al-Fayyadh, in Iraq was not limited to commanding has tried to present itself as committed to Iranian forces and Iran-backed groups. He the law and obedient to the prime minister. was also a charismatic and consensus- For example, when it comes to the calls for building figure who served Iran’s interests US troops to leave Iraq, Fayyadh often refers in Iraq in at least two ways: first, by making to the parliament’s decision and adopts a sure that the Iraqi government would not less confrontational tone. He has also fired act against Tehran’s interests, and second, some PMF commanders accused of corrup- by mediating between different Shiite tion and other illegal activities. factions and preventing divisions among In contrast, two powerful PMF factions, them. To fulfill those delicate tasks, he Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, maintained personal relations with sub- have taken a hardline stance on govern- sequent Iraqi prime ministers, as well as ment decisions, emphasizing armed resist- militia and political figures. ance against US forces. Tehran’s efforts to When Soleimani was assassinated, Iran- mediate between the leaders of the two backed Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi factions and the Iraqi government have had already resigned due to the 2019 wide- yielded few result. Meanwhile, in December spread protests but was still in office as a 2020, internal disagreements caused four caretaker. Although Mohammed Tawfiq PMF brigades to split off and form a new Allawi, the first nominee to succeed Abdul- structure called Hashd al-Atabat, or the Mahdi, was a favorable option for Iran, Shrine Units. This was another blow to

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5 Iran’s efforts to maintain the unity of Shiite peo, “the strongest sanctions in history.” groups in Iraq. The sanctions had an undeniable impact on Iran’s economic situation and, consequently, Influential Figures on the level of its foreign trade and invest- ment. This was while in 2016, after the What complicates matters even further for signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Iran is that some Iraqi politicians who were of Action (JCPOA), Iran was experiencing a traditionally known as being close to Iran considerable 12.5 percent increase in eco- have also been diverging from Tehran. At nomic growth. Iran’s economy shrunk by the top of the list is influential Shiite cleric about 4.99 percent from 2017 to the end of Muqtada al-Sadr. In the aftermath of the 2020. Also, Iran’s exports to Iraq decreased US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Sadrist mili- from $8.9 billion (March 2018 to March 2019) tias (known as Jaish al-Mahdi) were among to $7.4 billion (March 2020 to March 2021). the most active Iran-backed groups fighting The Covid-19 crisis, which led to the closure American forces. For the past decade, how- of Iran’s borders for several months and the ever, Sadr has sought to present himself as interruption of trade with neighboring coun- a pragmatic and nationalist political figure. tries, also contributed to the downturn. Since Soleimani’s death, he has not hesitated This came against the backdrop of Iran’s to openly criticize Iran’s actions in Iraq plans to counter the negative impacts of US from time to time. This change of behavior sanctions by expanding economic ties with can be attributed to Sadr’s attempt to catch Iraq and other neighboring countries with- up with the changes in the Iraqi people’s in the framework of the so-called neighbors attitude toward Iran, who are demanding policy. However, alongside sanctions and less Iranian intervention in their country. the Covid-19 crisis, ironically, Soleimani’s He may also be trying to profit from the assassination marginalized the economic leadership gap among the Iraqi Shiite fac- approach in Iran’s policy toward Iraq in tions after Soleimani’s death to position favor of a more security-oriented view. Im- himself as an alternative local leader. mediately after Soleimani’s assassination, Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri the Iranian parliament passed a bill to al-Maliki also appears to be gradually dis- increase the Quds Force’s budget by €200 tancing himself from Iran. This comes amid million. At the beginning of 2021, MPs once his efforts to win over public support to run again called for an increase in the force’s for the prime ministry once again. Support- budget. Iran’s frozen funds in Iraq have ing Kadhimi’s efforts to curb the militias, been another economic issue. By the end Maliki argues that “opposition to the US– of 2020, Iran was not able to access an esti- Israeli–Saudi axis does not permit Iran to mated $3.5 billion due to US sanctions. interfere in Iraq.” Overall, Iran’s political Tehran hopes that progress in the ongoing influence in Iraq faces increasing challenges, talks to revive the JCPOA will eventually both at the level of government and politi- convince the US to release the funds. cians. Indeed, apart from the absence of All this has happened while Iran’s rivals Soleimani, changing public sentiment in have been increasing their economic in- Iraq toward seeking a stronger and more fluence in Iraq. For example, the UAE’s independent government has also contrib- exports to Iraq increased from about $11 uted to this new political situation. billion in 2017 to $13.7 in 2019. During the same period, Turkey’s exports to Iraq also increased from about $9 billion to $10.2 Economic Challenges billion. At the same time, Iraq’s depend- ence on gas and electricity imports from As part of his maximum pressure campaign, Iran has led some Arab countries to con- Trump imposed severe sanctions on Iran, sider reducing Iran’s influence by offering called by his Secretary of State, Mike Pom- alternatives to Baghdad. In November 2020,

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6 it was announced that Iraq would join a 2020, the same institute published another Gulf Cooperation Council electricity net- poll showing that Iran’s popularity had work linked to Saudi Arabia. Qatar has also dropped to a mere 15 percent. expressed readiness to export gas (used in The reason for this decline in popularity gas-fired power plants to produce electrici- should be sought more than anything re- ty) to Iraq to resolve the country’s electricity garding the activities of Iran-backed mili- crisis. Some estimates suggest that Iraq will tias, which are active arbitrarily and outside have almost no need to import gas from government control in the political, eco- Iran in the next five years and may even nomic, and security spheres in various parts become a gas exporter in the region. of the country. Some Iran-backed militias On the other hand, although Iran’s plan are involved in opaque or illegal economic to build a railway from the Shalamcheh activities. They levy taxes at checkpoints, border area to Basra – which could facili- extend control over engineering and con- tate Iran’s land access to Syria and the struction companies, and interfere in the Mediterranean – has not yet been realized, functioning of seaports. The groups have Ankara intends to build a railway from also been accused of cracking down on anti- Basra to the Turkish border. The railway government protests in late 2019 and assas- could provide Ankara with easier access to sinating opposition figures thereafter. PMF the Iraqi market while derailing Tehran’s groups and commanders categorically deny long-term plans to be at the center of East– the allegations. Nevertheless, those issues West transit networks. If Iran’s rivals man- have contributed to the Iraqi people’s nega- age to consolidate their economic influence tive attitude toward Iran. in Iraq, Iran will not be able to reclaim its But even before these developments, share of the Iraqi market, even if the do- the inefficiency and weakness of the Iran- mestic economic situation improves and backed government made the Iraqi people sanctions are lifted. sensitive to Iran’s role in their country. During the 2019 protests, Iraqi demonstra- tors attacked Iranian consulates in Najaf Social Challenges and Karbala – two Shiite-majority cities. The Iranian Centre for Strategic Research, Iran and Iraq, two neighboring Shiite- which is affiliated with Iran’s Expediency majority countries, have significant histori- Discernment Council, writes in a report cal and cultural ties. The Ba’athist rule in that “the reaction to the 2019 protests Iraq, however, had for decades limited the has damaged the Islamic Republic’s image possibility of close social ties between the among the Iraqi elite and the public,” Iranian and Iraqi people. After the fall of warning that “this could weaken Iran’s role Saddam in 2003, Iran began its efforts to in shaping Iraq’s future governments.” The reach out to Iraqi Shiites (around 61.7 per- report also notes that public dissatisfaction cent of Iraq’s population) and develop its and criticism of Iran-backed PMF groups soft power in the country. The more the have increased in the aftermath of the pro- prolonged presence of American troops in tests. Generally speaking, criticism of Iran Iraq caused dissatisfaction among many seems to have become a regular part of Iraqis, the more Iran was successful in this popular and anti-government protests in field. Iraq. Those protests were the main reason After the rise of ISIS in 2014, Iranian behind the Iran-backed Abdul-Mahdi gov- assistance to the Iraqi government in fight- ernment’s resignation in November 2019. ing the jihadis increased Iran’s popularity. In early May 2021, after an activist was According to the Independent Institute for assassinated in Karbala, the Iranian con- Administration and Civil Society Studies, sulate in the city was attacked by protesters, in 2017, about 70 percent of Iraqis had a and its outer wall was set on fire. In fact, positive view of Iran. However, in mid- regardless of the extent of Iran’s support

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7 or even knowledge of the activities of the consolidate the central government’s Iraqi militias, the close ties between Iran authority at home is a promising sign for and those groups have led a large segment the stabilization of Iraq. Accordingly, Ger- of the Iraqi people to see Iran’s hand in many and its European partners should every unfortunate event and to seek to limit support Kadhimi’s initiatives in areas such Tehran’s influence in their country. as diversifying Iraq’s foreign partners, maintaining a strategic relationship with NATO, as well as establishing a state mo- Conclusions and Recommen- nopoly over violence by curbing militias. dations for German and Euro- The Kadhimi government has also indi- © Stiftung Wissenschaft pean Policies cated that it wants Iraq not to be a scene for und Politik, 2021 foreign rivalries but a venue for resolving All rights reserved Contrary to President Trump’s intention, them. Iraqi-mediated talks between Iran Soleimani’s assassination did not signifi- and Saudi Arabia that started in the spring This Comment reflects cantly change Iran’s role in Iraq in the short of 2021 illustrate that endeavor. This aspect the author’s views. term, nor could it deter Iran-backed militias of the Iraqi government’s policy should also The online version of from targeting US interests. On the con- be encouraged and supported by European this publication contains trary, threats against US positions and states. As a matter of principle, Europe’s functioning links to other troops in Iraq have since significantly in- Iraq policy should be based on supporting SWP texts and other relevant creased. That said, in the post-Soleimani a strong government that pursues a multi- sources. era, Iran faces growing challenges to its role vector foreign policy. Such a government SWP Comments are subject in Iraq. On the one hand, Iran has failed to could contribute to the realization of to internal peer review, fact- achieve its ultimate goal of rooting out the Europe’s interest in a more stable Middle checking and copy-editing. US presence in Iraq, with Washington and East. For further information on Baghdad actively working on maintaining Finally, it is important to note that our quality control pro- their strategic relationship. At the same although attacks by Iran-backed groups cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- time, Tehran’s obsession with confronting have been so far mostly limited to Ameri- .org/en/about-swp/ the US has come at the expense of Iran’s can interests, they also pose a potential quality-management-for- economic and social influence in Iraq. threat to European soldiers in Iraq, who are swp-publications/ Under these circumstances, regional rivals – tasked with training Iraqi security forces in in particular Turkey and Arab monarchies the fight against ISIS. As such, establishing SWP of the Persian Gulf – have found fertile an indirect channel of communication – Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ground to expand their influence in Iraq, through the Iraqi government or Tehran – German Institute for and the Iraqi government welcomes them with those groups appears necessary to International and to balance Iran’s role. To make things even guaranty the safety of European soldiers Security Affairs more challenging for Tehran, Shiite politi- and personnel. cal and militant groups are also increasingly Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin showing signs of divergence from, or at Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 least non-compliance with, Iran’s approaches Fax +49 30 880 07-100 and priorities. www.swp-berlin.org These trends could lead to more instabil- [email protected] ity in Iraq as a result of foreign rivalries (be- tween Iran and its adversaries) and domes- ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 tic competitions (within various militias, as doi: 10.18449/2021C44 well as between them and the government). Yet, Kadhimi’s apparent desire to establish a balance in Iraq’s foreign relations and

Dr. Hamidreza Azizi is a Visiting Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. This paper is part of a research project titled “Iran’s Foreign Policy-Making in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Iraq and Syria,” funded by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

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