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20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module Software Version 3.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module Software Version 3.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module Software Version 3.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version 1.1 Last update: 2021-04-15 © 2021 Canonical Ltd. / atsec information security This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Prepared by: atsec information security corporation 9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260 Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com © 2021 Canonical Ltd. / atsec information security This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 2 of 40 20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table of Contents 1. Cryptographic Module Specification ....................................................................................................... 6 1.1. Module Overview .................................................................................................................................... 6 1.2. Modes of Operation ................................................................................................................................ 8 2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................... 10 3. Roles, Services and Authentication ...................................................................................................... 11 3.1. Roles ...................................................................................................................................................... 11 3.2. Services .................................................................................................................................................. 11 3.3. Algorithms ............................................................................................................................................. 13 3.3.1. Allowed Algorithms ....................................................................................................................... 17 3.3.2. Non-Approved Algorithms ............................................................................................................. 17 3.4. Operator Authentication ....................................................................................................................... 18 4. Physical Security .................................................................................................................................. 19 5. Operational Environment ..................................................................................................................... 20 5.1. Applicability ........................................................................................................................................... 20 5.2. Policy ..................................................................................................................................................... 20 6. Cryptographic Key Management .......................................................................................................... 21 6.1. Random Number Generation ................................................................................................................ 21 6.2. Key Generation ...................................................................................................................................... 22 6.3. Key Transport / Key Derivation ............................................................................................................. 22 6.4. Key Entry / Output ................................................................................................................................. 22 6.5. Key / CSP Storage .................................................................................................................................. 23 6.6. Key / CSP Zeroization ............................................................................................................................. 23 7. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ............................................ 24 8. Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................................. 25 8.1. Power-Up Tests ..................................................................................................................................... 25 8.1.1. Integrity Tests ................................................................................................................................ 25 8.1.2. Cryptographic Algorithm Tests ...................................................................................................... 25 8.2. On-Demand Self-Tests ........................................................................................................................... 26 8.3. Conditional Tests ................................................................................................................................... 26 8.4. Error state .............................................................................................................................................. 27 9. Guidance .............................................................................................................................................. 28 9.1. Crypto Officer Guidance ........................................................................................................................ 28 © 2021 Canonical Ltd. / atsec information security This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 3 of 40 20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 9.1.1. Operating Environment Configurations ......................................................................................... 28 9.1.2. Module Installation ....................................................................................................................... 29 9.2. User Guidance ....................................................................................................................................... 29 9.2.1. AES XTS .......................................................................................................................................... 30 9.2.2. Triple-DES ...................................................................................................................................... 30 9.2.3. PBKDF ............................................................................................................................................ 30 10. Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................................................. 31 10.1. Blinding Against RSA Timing Attacks ................................................................................................. 31 10.2. Weak Triple-DES Key Detection ......................................................................................................... 31 © 2021 Canonical Ltd. / atsec information security This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 4 of 40 20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Copyrights and Trademarks Ubuntu and Canonical are registered trademarks of Canonical Ltd. Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. © 2021 Canonical Ltd. / atsec information security This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. 5 of 40 20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 1. Cryptographic Module Specification This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for version 3.0 of the Ubuntu 20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 1 software module. The following sections describe the cryptographic module and how it conforms to the FIPS 140-2 specification in each of the required areas. 1.1. Module Overview The Ubuntu 20.04 Libgcrypt Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a set of software libraries implementing general purpose cryptographic algorithms. The module provides cryptographic services to applications running in the user space of the underlying Ubuntu operating system through a C language Application Program Interface (API). The module utilizes processor instructions to optimize and increase performance. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module validated at overall security level 1. The table below shows the security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS 140-2 standard. FIPS 140-2 Section Security Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 3 Roles, Services and Authentication 1 4 Finite State Model 1 5 Physical Security N/A 6 Operational Environment 1 7 Cryptographic Key Management 1 8 EMI/EMC 1 9 Self-Tests 1 10 Design Assurance 1 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 1 Overall Level 1 Table 1 - Security Levels The cryptographic logical boundary consists
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