Pluralismo Giuridico

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Pluralismo Giuridico JURA GENTIUM Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale Journal of Philosophy of International Law and Global Politics Pluralismo giuridico Anno 2014 JURA GENTIUM Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale Journal of Philosophy of International Law and Global Politics JURA GENTIUM Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale Journal of Philosophy of International Law and Global Politics http://www.juragentium.org [email protected] ISSN 1826-8269 Vol. XI, numero monografico: Pluralismo giuridico, Anno 2014 Redazione Luca Baccelli, Nicolò Bellanca, Orsetta Giolo, Leonardo Marchettoni (segretario di redazione), Stefano Pietropaoli, Katia Poneti, Ilaria Possenti, Lucia Re (vicedirettore), Filippo Ruschi (segretario organizzativo), Emilio Santoro, Sara Turchetti, Silvia Vida, Danilo Zolo (direttore) Comitato scientifico Margot Badran, Raja Bahlul, Richard Bellamy, Franco Cassano, Alessandro Colombo, Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Pietro Costa, Alessandro Dal Lago, Alessandra Facchi, Richard Falk, Luigi Ferrajoli, Gustavo Gozzi, Ali El Kenz, Predrag Matvejević, Tecla Mazzarese, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Giuseppe Palmisano, Geminello Preterossi, Eduardo Rabenhorst, Hamadi Redissi, Marco Revelli, Armando Salvatore, Giuseppe Tosi, Wang Zhenmin Pluralismo giuridico a cura di Mariano Croce, Annamaria Vassalle e Valeria Venditti Indice PLURALISMO GIURIDICO 6 MARIANO CROCE, ANNAMARIA VASSALLE E VALERIA VENDITTI THE LIQUIDITY OF LAW AS A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL THEORISING 19 WERNER MENSKI WHAT CAN WE MEAN BY LEGAL PLURALISM? 43 VIRGINIO MARZOCCHI LEGAL PLURALISM: CONFLICTING LEGAL COMMITMENTS WITHOUT A NEUTRAL ARBITER 61 ANDRÉ HOEKEMA THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 104 MARCO GOLDONI BILLY O DEL PLURALISMO PROCEDURALE 124 MICHELE SPANÒ PLURALISMO GIURIDICO IN SOMALIA 140 SALVATORE MANCUSO WHAT IS LEGAL PLURALISM ALL ABOUT? 164 MARIANO CROCE GLI AUTORI 185 Pluralismo giuridico Concetti, contesti, conflitti Mariano Croce, Annamaria Vassalle, Valeria Venditti1 Il pluralismo giuridico è tema vecchio e nuovo a un tempo. Un tema vecchio, perché la natura plurale dell’esperienza giuridica sembra riemergere a ogni nuova crisi dello Stato, al punto che non sarebbe una forzatura né storica né concettuale sostenere che lo Stato moderno e tardo-moderno non è comprensibile se non come momento di una complessa dialettica che lo vede opporsi all’istintivo pluralismo del sociale: una dialettica per cui lo Stato tenta di ridurre e inglobare entro la propria (presunta) unità l’innata tendenza alla proliferazione delle pratiche sociali, per poi lasciarsi erodere dall’interno da quella irriducibile molteplicità, sempre troppo riottosa ai tentativi di uniformazione. Se lo Stato nasce infatti come superamento del particolarismo della modernità pre-rivoluzionaria, l’uniformità del suo diritto tardo-settecentesco e delle sue trasformazioni successive si è sempre nutrita di spinte idealizzanti, a dispetto delle grandi narrazioni, come ad esempio il nazionalismo, che pur hanno saputo produrre notevoli effetti sul tessuto sociale degli Stati europei. Di ciò è viva testimonianza la forza attrattiva dei grandi autori del pluralismo giuridico del primo novecento, oggi troppo spesso dimenticati, come Eugen Ehrlich, Santi Romano, Cornelis van Vollenhoven: proprio allorché la personalità dello Stato e la sua capacità di farsi garante di una sostanza etica comune sembravano profilarsi come la condizione di possibilità del sociale, costoro ne mostravano la natura eterogenea, precaria, storica, e facevano luce su una realtà sottostante che avrebbe nel tempo riscattato la propria autonomia. Il pluralismo giuridico, tuttavia, è anche tema nuovo, perché nuove sono le sembianze che esso assume nel panorama storico e giuridico-politico dei nostri giorni. Il presente fascicolo intende mappare le dinamiche e vagliare i contenuti di 1 La cura del fascicolo di Jura Gentium è frutto del lavoro comune dei tre autori. Annamaria Vassalle e Valeria Venditti sono le autrici della presente introduzione. JURA GENTIUM un dibattito che negli ultimi anni ha ricevuto un impulso decisivo dalle trasformazioni politiche, sociali e culturali dell’età globale. Nelle sue differenti possibili varianti, il pluralismo giuridico si presenta infatti come una possibile risposta alle sfide politiche e sociali del nostro tempo: dalla crisi dello Stato nazione all’emersione di nuove identità, dalle rivendicazioni delle minoranze etniche e religiose ai problemi connessi con l’integrazione. La proliferazione di studi sul pluralismo giuridico segnala evidentemente una tendenza in atto, negli studi politici, sociologici e filosofici, a riconoscere nel giuridico un terreno ineludibile sul quale misurare e risolvere i deficit delle democrazie occidentali e, al contempo, ridiscutere i paradigmi concettuali con cui l’Occidente ha pensato se stesso. Si tratta tuttavia di un complesso arcipelago di posizioni, di cui valutare punti di forza e criticità. Fin dalle sue prime elaborazioni o anticipazioni nel secolo scorso, l’idea del pluralismo giuridico ha mobilitato le energie di intellettuali e studiosi afferenti a settori disciplinari molto diversi: dall’antropologia alla sociologia, dal campo giuridico alla scienza politica, dalla filosofia del diritto alla filosofia politica e sociale. Questo carattere multidisciplinare non può che costituire un’occasione preziosa di incontro e di comunicazione fra prospettive e metodologie diverse, per chi voglia affrontare le sfide della contemporaneità senza trincerarsi nei confini angusti della propria disciplina. Un’apertura, questa, che la complessità dei processi e delle trasformazioni in atto rende certamente necessaria. D’altra parte, nonostante la multidisciplinarietà dell’approccio al tema, è senz’altro possibile individuare alcune nervature problematiche e concettuali che attraversano tutti i settori e le posizioni ascrivibili al composito paradigma del pluralismo giuridico. Comune è anzitutto la denuncia dei deficit costitutivi del centralismo giuridico, fondato sull’idea dello Stato come produttore unico del diritto e dell’ordine sociale e dunque, sul piano teorico, il riconoscimento dell’obsolescenza del paradigma statalista che ha dominato la riflessione giuridica e filosofico-politica degli ultimi due secoli. Alla monopolizzazione e alla centralizzazione della produzione giuridica, che ha costruito la narrazione sulla quale lo Stato ha legittimato il proprio potere dalla modernità politica fino ad 7 JURA GENTIUM oggi, i teorici del pluralismo giuridico oppongono l’idea – descrittiva e prescrittiva insieme e variamente declinata – della moltiplicazione o pluralizzazione dei centri di emanazione del diritto. La messa in discussione del monopolio dello Stato nella produzione del diritto apre la strada, inoltre, a una battaglia teorica circa i confini del giuridico e al suo rapporto con il normativo. Si tratta a ben vedere di una strada tutta in salita, che gli studiosi percorrono non senza forzature e aporie, e che sembra destinata ad essere risolta non tanto da definizioni univoche, quanto piuttosto da soluzioni contestuali. In generale, al pluralismo giuridico si deve non soltanto il riconoscimento della rilevanza politica e sociale dei sistemi normativi altri dal diritto statuale, ma anche la ricostruzione delle modalità con cui il contesto socio- culturale nel quale tali sistemi sono elaborati influisce sulla delimitazione e legittimazione di questi, condizionando la possibilità e/o la disponibilità dei singoli ad adeguarsi o meno ad un certo set di norme e a partecipare alla loro rielaborazione e trasformazione. La problematizzazione del rapporto fra potere statale e diritto implica, su un piano più generale, un radicale ripensamento della relazione fra politica e società. Insieme all’idea di un diritto unico quale emanazione dello Stato, il pluralismo giuridico mette in discussione anche la concezione del politico come latore e impositore verticale di un ordine prestabilito sul sociale. Aprendo ad una concezione del diritto quale prodotto delle istanze e delle richieste che attraversano le realtà sociali, infatti, il pluralismo giuridico contribuisce a riorientare (in senso orizzontale) il rapporto fra politico e sociale. Da questo punto di vista, esso si inserisce a pieno titolo nel dibattito in corso sull’ampiezza delle prerogative dello Stato e sul suo rapporto con gli attori sociali, e in tale dibattito può giocare un ruolo cruciale. Analizzare il pluralismo giuridico in ambito infra-statale, d’altra parte, consente di dare conto di una situazione radicalmente differente rispetto a quella che caratterizza il pluralismo a livello sovranazionale. Nel più circoscritto contesto nazionale, la riflessione pluralista è chiamata a evidenziare la superficialità di una comprensione del diritto come univoco (imposto dall’alto 8 JURA GENTIUM verso il basso) e unigenito (procedente da un’unica autorità). Inoltre, una simile prospettiva localista guarda al medium legislativo nella sua funzione di raccordo tra azioni e norme di condotta, lasciando in secondo piano la funzione coercitiva che invece risulta centrale nell’esame della giurisprudenza sovrastatale. I molteplici centri di produzione del diritto interni allo stesso Stato nazione, così come le plurime istanze che ne compongono il tessuto sociale, rimandano un’immagine dinamica della legge quale processo di negoziazione che culmina nella promulgazione statale, ma non si riduce a questa. L’attenzione viene rivolta, dunque,
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