FOR: UǦUR ÜMIT ÜNGÖR, NIOD
Gangsters at Your Service:
A Comparison on the Use of Criminals by Genocidal Regimes
Fabienne Thijs
MA Thesis Holocaust and Genocide Studies, University of Amsterdam, May 2015
Teacher: Dr. Uğur Ümit Üngör
Second reader: Dr. Kjell Anderson
Date: 27 May 2015
Pages: 78
Word count (without appendix, bibliography, footnotes, and table of contents): 20.291
Word count (without appendix, bibliography and table of contents): 24.496
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Abstract
War and genocide perpetrators come from all ranks of society. Yet, one group may pose a more immediate danger than most other groups: criminals. Specifically, when they are aided and abetted by government officials and/or politicians. In this study, the question is discussed on how organized crime and criminals are used in genocidal contexts. The thesis compares the conflict in former Yugoslavia at the end of last century with the recent civil war in Syria, focusing on the role of organized crime and criminals in the acts leading up to, and in the perpetration of, atrocities. After an introduction into the topic of organized crime, three levels of analysis are discussed: the state, paramilitary groups, and the criminal. The analysis suggests that both former criminals and the state greatly benefit from each other’s activities during war, and that a government in trouble of maintaining power and suffering from deserters needs outlaws to do the “dirty work”. The main finding is that former thugs are transformed into valuable assets since they create more chaos and terror, being both a physical as well as a psychological force. Via paramilitary groups, the criminals are changed into fighters for the regime by condoning and stimulating their criminal behavior. This disruptive behavior is not only destructive during the conflict, but will most likely prolong the war and pose a problem for rebuilding a non- criminalized nation. Therefore, the international community should pay more attention to this phenomenon, preventing governments from using criminals early on in the conflict.
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Table of Contents
Introduction 6 Chapter I – Organized Crime and Conflict 10 § 1.1 What is organized crime? 10 § 1.2 How does organized crime “normally” function within a peaceful society? 11 § 1.3 How does organized crime function during conflict? 15 § 1.3.1 What is war and a genocidal context? 15 § 1.3.2 Conflict and crime 16 § 1.3 Concluding remarks 19 Chapter II – The State and Organized Crime 21 § 2.1 Former Yugoslavia – Serbia 21 § 2.1.1 Before the conflict 22 § 2.1.2 During the conflict 23 § 2.2 Syria 27 § 2.2.1 Before the conflict 27 § 2.2.2 During the conflict 29 § 2.3 Similarities and differences 31 Chapter III – Paramilitarism and Organized Crime 33 § 3.1 Paramilitarism 34 § 3.1.1 What are paramilitary groups? 34 § 3.1.2 How do these groups differ from the military? 34 § 3.1.3 Why do states use paramilitaries? 35 § 3.2 Connections between criminals and paramilitary groups 36 § 3.2.1 Former Yugoslavia 36 § 3.2.2 Syria 41 § 3.3 Similarities and differences 45 Chapter IV – The Criminal 49 § 4.1 Former Yugoslavia 49 § 4.1.1 Željko Ražnatović - Arkan 49 § 4.1.2 Ismet “Celo” Bajramovic 52
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§ 4.1.3 Jusuf “Juka” Prazina 53 § 4.2 Syria 55 § 4.2.1 Fawwaz al-Assad – the government criminal 56 § 4.2.2 Mihraç Ural aka Ali Kayali – the career criminal 58 § 4.2.3 Abu Rami – the future criminal? 60 § 4.3 Similarities and differences 61 Conclusion and implications 64
Acknowledgements 67 Bibliography 67 Appendix – Interview Slobodan Mitrić 72
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Introduction As Christopher R. Browning and many other scholars emphasize, perpetrators of genocide are often ordinary men and women.1 You do not have to be a psychopath, or need to possess certain characteristics, to be able to kill in a genocidal context. One must, however, as Harald Welzer emphasizes, undergo a gradual process of crossing a moral threshold in becoming an ‘ordinary’ genocidaire.2 But what if a person has already crossed this moral threshold? What if the rule of law was never an effective deterrent to prevent him or her from behaving in an anti-social way and being a danger to society? In other words, what dangers do criminals, those who undermine the rule of law, pose to failed states in which all factors for genocide are present? Two recent examples give us an idea. First, during the conflict in former Yugoslavia at the end of the twentieth century, some professional criminals took part in, and sometimes were in charge of, the atrocities committed.3 Some former thugs managed paramilitary organizations, leading to mass murder of the most brutal kind, but also to the expropriation of civilians on a massive scale. The most notorious is Željko Ražnjatović, better known as “Arkan”, a former bank robber and career criminal, who not only committed murders with his own paramilitary group, but also got wealthy from lucrative business opportunities such as selling weapons to the enemy, trading in oil and conducting plunder. Another example is the ranking leader of the Janjaweed, Musa Hilal, in Darfur. He also obtained a lengthy record of violent crime.4 In the first five year period of the 1990s, Musa killed a security guard at a bank he attempted to rob, and was sent to prison for these crimes. Furthermore, in 1997, he was imprisoned for purportedly killing seventeen black Africans in Darfur. Again, later, he was imprisoned for additional crimes. Despite his criminal record, the government of Sudan “chose him to help organize the militia” in its fight against the rebels in Darfur in 2003.5 It seems therefore that professional criminals can be seen as an asset in conflicts.
1 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992). 2 Harald Welzer, “On Killing and Morality: How Normal People Become Mass Murders” in: Ordinary People as Mass Murderers: Perpetrators in Comparative Perspective, Olaf Jensen & Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann (eds.), (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 180. 3 Samuel Totten, “The Release, Transfer and/or Use of Imprisoned Criminals and/or Known Gangsters During the Commission of Acts Potentially Leading Up to Genocide: A Clear and Unmistakable Early Warning Signal of a Failed State - Some Preliminary Thoughts”, Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, 1(2), (2009), p. 54. 4 Emily Wax, “In Sudan, A 'Big Sheik' Roams Free.” The Washington Post, Foreign Service, 18 July 2004, p. A01; Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan.” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004). 5 Wax, “In Sudan”, p. A01. 6
Both governments as well as criminals and organized crime may benefit from using each other in the perpetration of mass murder. Not much comparative research has been done with regard to understanding this phenomenon of employing “common criminals” as perpetrators and what benefits both these criminals as well as governments have when orchestrating genocide or mass murder. Scholars of particular genocides did write about convicted and violent criminals, but not many attempts have been made to put this in a comparative perspective.6 An exception is the work of Samuel Totten. In his article on the release, transfer and/or use of imprisoned criminals and/or known gangsters before and during genocides, he shows that in most genocides, government officials make use of “common criminals” by releasing them from prison and giving them ranks within military or paramilitary groups. Also underworld figures are sometimes instructed to do some of the “dirty” work. Totten sees this trend as something which should be understood as an early warning sign in the prevention of genocide or other major human rights violations. In his attempt to state some preliminary thoughts on this subject, he also emphasizes the fact that more research is of the essence:
Subsequent studies might focus on the following: the extent to which convicted -- and particularly violent -- criminals have been released to take part in genocidal processes; the varied activities such individuals took part in vis-a-vis genocide; the way in which the international community either addressed or neglected to address the release of such convicts for the express pursue of taking part in genocide; whether or not the released criminals were held accountable for the crimes they committed during the genocide; and whether or not the leaders and/or military officials who oversaw the release of the convicts and then steered them towards taking part in the genocidal process were held accountable for their misdeeds along this line.7
In this research, the focus will be on the first two topics: to what extent were convicted – and particularly violent - prisoners released to take part in genocidal conflicts, and what sort of
6 Totten, “The Release”, p. 63. 7 Ibid, p. 62. 7 activities did they have to carry out in relation to violence and expropriation. It seems of importance to get a deeper understanding of the phenomenon since it may inform the international community and relevant international organizations on how a state creates a genocidal environment. The release of prisoners, for example, cannot be a more obvious sign that a country is on the brink of disaster. The thesis will compare two genocidal conflicts by focusing on the role of organized crime and former criminals in the acts leading up to, and in the perpetration of, atrocities. As Harald Welzer argued in his chapter “On Killing and Morality: How Normal People Become Mass Murders” there seems to be a continuum or gradual process when becoming a perpetrator: “With each step, the moral threshold value which had at first seemed to mark an insurmountable obstacle, sinks. And in the end, even the extermination of human beings can seem like something that one can and should do.”8 The topic seems of relevance since the threshold for organized crime and criminals, especially those who committed murders before their involvement in genocidal activities, might be lower to perpetrate mass-murder than regular citizens. Thus, they may seem to pose an even more dangerous threat when societies transform into a hostile environment. Furthermore, those involved in organized crime and other former criminals could also be more likely to steal and plunder. Surely, not every thief or tax fraud falls within this description of a criminal. Therefore, the focus will be on professional or ‘career’ criminals, who have perpetrated (extremely) violent crimes before the genocide or mass murder. The main question of the thesis is: how are organized crime and criminals used in genocidal contexts? The remaining of the thesis will consist out of four chapters discussing different themes by examining two case studies. The situation in former Yugoslavia at the end of last century, with a focus on Serbia, and the first period of the still on-going hostilities in Syria are discussed. The cases are chosen based on the fact that criminals were or are part of the genocidal regime. Thus, the question is not whether criminals were used, but how they were used and what this tells us about the connection between the state and organized crime in conflict situations. The thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter tries to answer the question on how former criminals and organized crime fit into peaceful and conflict situations. How does
8 Welzer, “On Killing”, p. 180. 8 organized crime transform within a genocidal context? This section functions as a general overview and further introduction into the topic, and discusses some empirical examples. The following chapters are a comparison of the former Yugoslav and Syrian cases at the macro, meso and micro level. The second chapter discusses the relationships between the state and organized crime, and how these relationships transform in the process of war. In this chapter, a distinction is made between the situation before the conflict and during the conflict. The third chapter focusses on paramilitaries and their connections to organized crime and criminals. The fourth and final chapter discusses individual cases of former criminals who participated in genocides or massacres. In this last chapter, the micro level of analysis should give us some understanding of the day to day involvement of criminals; their recruitment, their tasks, their career after the massacres, et cetera. The thesis follows a qualitative research method. It discusses the case studies in depth through different topics via a literature study. Materials and literature presented in this research will primarily be secondary sources. In addition, primary sources such as trial transcripts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and reports of the United Nations (UN) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) were consulted.
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Chapter I – Organized Crime and Conflict
Every country in the world is familiar with some form of organized crime.9 Many scholars have studied the roots, developments and contents of organized crime.10 However, not much is known about this type of crime in conflict situations and, more specific, genocidal contexts. One reason may be the complexity of distinguishing between organized crime on the one hand, and rebellion and terrorism on the other hand. Is there a clear divide between these forms of, from the state’s point of view, illegal activity? Is there a difference between organized crime operating in a peaceful environment versus criminal enterprises working in a non-peaceful climate? When does organized crime prosper? In this chapter, these questions will be guiding the search for an answer to how organized crime may transform during conflict situations.
§ 1.1 What is organized crime? Scholars from different disciplines and backgrounds researched the complex phenomenon of organized crime and struggled in their aim to find a clear and workable definition.11 What is organized crime? According to criminologist Frank Bovenkerk, the concept refers to “systematic extortion plus the trade in forbidden goods and services.”12 Howard Abadinsky, in addition, highlights the feature of “instrumental violence…In its absence, there can be crime that is organized, but not organized crime.”13 In a recent contribution to organized crime concepts different definitions were compared which resulted in a clear overview on commonalities.14 According to this view, put forward by Frank E. Hagan, the field of criminology defines organized crime as a continuing group or organization: 1. That participates in illicit activity in any society by the use of force, intimidation, or threats; 2. That provides illicit services that are in strong public demand;
9 Stergios Skaperdas, “The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not,” Economics of Governance, 2 (2001), p. 173. 10 See for example: George B. Vold and Thomas J. Bernard, Theoretical Criminology (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Frank Bovenkerk, Misdaadprofielen (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 2001); Skaperdas, ‘The political economy’, pp. 173-202. 11 Ibid. 12 Vold and Bernard, Theoretical Criminology. Cited in: Bovenkerk, Misdaadprofielen, p. 21. 13 Ibid. 14 Frank E. Hagan, ‘Organized Crime,’ in: Introduction to Criminology. Theories, Methods and Criminal Behavior. (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2013), Chapter 13. 10
3. That assures protection and immunity through corruption According to Hagan, the strength of organized criminal groups is rooted in “their willingness and ability to use force or threats of force to assure discipline within and outside the organization.”15 Essential strategic tools of organized crime are bribery, blackmail and corruption. It is important to emphasize that this concept of organized crime should be conceived as a matter of degree. In other words, the definition above is an “ideal type” that may not exist in pure form but, according to Hagan, nevertheless represents a useful device for purposes of analysis. Furthermore one should keep in mind that there is also a distinction between “Organized Crime”, which refers to criminal organizations, and “organized crime”, which implies activities. Importantly, “not all “organized crime” is committed by “Organized Crime” groups.”16 In this regard, Bovenkerk comments that a “felon” – who commits one or more felonies – is different from a “criminal” who is destined to a criminal career, which is more prolonged and continuous.17 Therefore, the focus in this study will be on those who more or less made a career out of criminal activities. Even though the above description defines the type of trade conducted and underlines the importance of violence, it neglects the probable connection to the government. Jean-Louis Briquet and Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, in their book on organized crime, show that the phenomenon is strongly connected to the state and government officials. They demonstrate the “concrete processes through which the connections among criminal, political, and/or economic actors are established.”18 To investigate this in more depth, the section below discusses how organized crime interacts with society in a peaceful environment.
§ 1.2 How does organized crime “normally” function within a peaceful or stable society? The concept mentioned above may be fairly elaborate in its explanation. Yet, for analytical purposes it does help to give some examples on how a criminal enterprise prospers within a peaceful country. This section will describe some distinctive features of organized crime in a stable society.
15 Hagan, “Organized Crime”, p. 380. 16 Hagan, “Organized Crime”, p. 364. 17 Bovenkerk, Misdaadprofielen, p. 55. 18 Jean-Louis Briquet and Gilles Favarel-Garrigues (eds.), Organized Crime and States. The Hidden Face of Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), p. 3. 11
Organized crime is, more or less, always part of society without being on the surface or visible. In peaceful societies, which we can define as countries that do not experience war or other major violent outbursts,19 this form of crime is not public since the ways of doing business are illegal. Organized crime interferes with two important monopolies states typically have: the right to use violence and the right to collect taxes.20 Normally, citizens should obey the rule of law in a matter of (economic) dispute and pay the right amount of taxes based on national legislation. In the case of organized crime, both are neglected or contested. One important feature of organized crime is the strong social relations needed to facilitate the illegal businesses. Economic transactions are not based on equality or voluntarism, like we experience in our daily lives when monitoring economic progression. According to E. Kleemans, the illegality and secrecy demand certain preconditions that have to do with creating and maintaining trust.21 Social relations are therefore based on loyalty and trust through family ties, ethnicity and friendship. In extraordinary circumstances, the economic transactions are forced, and guarded with manipulation, threats and violence.22 There is a whole range of illegal businesses and activities criminals can benefit or profit from. For a long time, gambling was seen as the most interesting business.23 A related source of income is functioning as a loan shark. Loan sharks give quick loans at high and illegal rates to borrowers who are desperate for money. Other lucrative illegitimate activities involve protection racketeering, stolen property (such as cars), prostitution, human trafficking, illegal sale of alcohol, dealing drugs and labor racketeering.24 This last activity usually refers to the infiltration of unions so they can use their influence for personal profit. These operations, that often take the form of threats or bribes, allow the criminals to use pension funds, and to offer a “no-strike insurance” and contracts. At the moment, however, the largest illegal business is drugs.25 South America should be mentioned in this regard, trading large amounts of cocaine to for example Europe via Spain and the Netherlands.26 Around the world, large quantities of hash are found in
19 See §1.3.1 for more information on what is meant by war. 20 Bovenkerk, Misdaadprofielen, p. 21. 21 Tom Vander Beken, ‘De handdruk van de onderwereld’, Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 54(4), (2012), p. 401. 22 Vander Beken, ‘De handdruk’, p. 402. 23 Hagan, ‘Organized Crime’, p. 381. 24 Ibid, p. 382. 25 Ibid, p. 384. 26 Dina Siegel et al. (eds) Global Organised Crime. Trends and Developments (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2003), chapters 1and 3. 12
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal, as well as marijuana which is exported by Cambodia, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and all the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.27 Another feature of organized crime is that it often develops transnational, and gets influenced by global events. An example is the diaspora of organized crime from the former Soviet Union ‘that is facilitated by the presence of existing Russian-speaking communities all over the world.’28 In their book on global crime, Dina Siegel, Henk van de Bunt and Damián Zaitch (eds.) describe how major world events with global consequences can also influence the form and nature of organized crime. The fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War have had a major impact on organized crime and changed the landscape. The open borders between East and West provided criminals with new opportunities for illegal businesses.29 A more recent example is the way organized crime and its relation to the state is changing in light of the global economic crisis. Due to a fragile and weak economy, criminal organizations that are cash-rich can acquire financially vulnerable but potentially valuable businesses at bargain prices.30 Interestingly, international organized crime is not confined to a particular political system. For instance, it thrives in political climates such as liberal democracies.31 Liberal states like Canada, the United States, post-World War II Japan, and other Western European countries emphasize individual civil liberties that protect the right to privacy, freedom of speech, et cetera. These laws can be problematic for crime control, since human rights legislation can be contradictory to a country’s security policy, making it harder to crack down on organized illegal entrepreneurs and their allies. Thus, criminals will have more possibilities to maintain their businesses. Some of the organized crime groups are strongly embedded in society. In Japan for example, the Yakuza is an enormous criminal enterprise that is tolerated to a certain extent by society, because of their affiliations with right wing politicians and its influence in many different parts of society. Another example is China, which has many Triads, secret Chinese organizations, also referred to as ‘black societies’. They can be described as factions with each an independent
27 Ibid, p. 26. 28 Ibid, p. 3 and chapter 6. 29 After the break-up of the Soviet Union and the mass emigration that followed, Russian criminals had the opportunity to organize criminal enterprises abroad and to create networks among immigrants. Ibid, chapters 5 and 6. 30 Moisés Naim, ‘Mafia States. Organized Crime Takes Office’, Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2012), p. 100. 31 Hagan, ‘Organized Crime’, pp. 367-369. 13 boss and autonomous in planning and executing criminal enterprises. They can range from well organized crime syndicates to ordinary street gangs.32 When it comes to fighting organized crime, an ambiguous picture of the state emerges. One the one hand, she prevents organized crime groups from carrying out criminal activities. Official agencies such as the DEA in the United States and Interpol in Europe try to tackle criminal enterprises via electronic surveillance, financial analysis, and the use of informants or undercover agents. On the other hand, criminal enterprises cannot exist without some involvement of government officials. Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues argue in their book on the relationships between states and organized crime that “violent entrepreneurs enter into collusive relations with political actors in order to develop their activities, which cannot be carried out without the help of privileged contacts within the state apparatus.”33 The links between the Turkish criminal and political spheres, and its central role in global drug trafficking, are but one example in this regard.34 However, dependent on the level of corruption, most of it is not seen by the public or general population. In line with this, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moisés Naim, describes the emergence of a worrying trend: the Mafia State. In a Mafia state, “government officials enrich themselves and their families and friends while exploiting the money, muscle, political influence, and global connections of criminal syndicates to cement and expand their own power.”35 According to Naim, the fusion of criminal groups and governments is different from the more limited way the two have worked together in the past. Unlike normal states, which occasionally rely on criminal enterprises to win particular foreign policy goals, Mafia states have high government officials who become integral players or even leaders of criminal groups.36 The promotion and position of those criminal businesses become official priorities. In countries like Bulgaria, Myanmar, Ukraine, and Venezuela, the interests of organized crime and the national interest are intertwined. In Venezuela, for example, the minister of defense, Henry Rangel Silva, and several other officials are part of one of the world’s largest drug-trafficking groups. Owing in part to the government ties, the cocaine business has flourished
32 Hagan, ‘Organized Crime’, pp. 367-369. 33 Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues, Organized Crime and States, p. 4. 34 Ibid, p. 42. 35 Naim, “Mafia States”, p. 101. 36 Naim mentions with regard to normal states that spy agencies and governments, including those of democratic countries, “have often enlisted criminals to smuggle weapons to allied insurgents in other countries or event to assassinate enemies abroad.” See ibid. 14 in Venezuela in recent years.37 During its era of state-sanctioned crime, the country also has become a base of operations for money laundering, counterfeiting, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and the trade in contraband oil. Another recent example is the Mexican war on drugs and the official corruption which is exposed.38 In September 2014, 43 student teachers disappeared and were probably massacred by the gang Guerreros Unidos after the police had handed them over to the gang. This is a clear example of the ties between organized crime and government officials. Mexico, with its hostile environment, brings us to the next section of this chapter: organized crime in conflict situations.
§ 1.3 How does organized crime function during conflict? One of the most paradoxical questions within this section is how organized crime functions within a genocidal context. Is the fact that systematic massacres are committed not evidence enough of how organized crime works at that particular moment in time? Yes and no. Without any doubt, one can see the act of systematic mass killing as a form of organized crime. Yet, as stated above, there is a difference between criminal acts and a criminal organization. In this research, the focus will be on the last category, since the object of investigation is the criminal and its development. The parts below briefly discuss the concepts of war and genocide, and describe features of organized crime during conflicts.
§ 1.3.1 What is war and a genocidal context? War is a fluid concept and has therefore generated a large number of definitions.39 According to Micheal Sheehan, who dedicated a chapter on its origins, the best definition is the one Quincy Wright wrote in 1968: “War is a conflict among political groups, especially sovereign states, carried on by armed forces of considerable magnitude, for a considerable period of time.’’40 This definition may be broad, but it encourages one to look beyond the stereotypical features of war such as state-to-state military rivalry. “New” forms of conflict (terrorism, insurgencies, and internal crises) are for the most part not new as such, but have received more Western attention
37 Ibid, pp. 106-107. 38 Jo Tuckman, ‘Bringing up the bodies: Mexico's missing students draw attention to 20,000 'vanished' others’, The Guardian, 26 November 2014, at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/26/mexico-missing-students-thousands-vanished-grave-diggers 39 John Baylis ea, The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 217. 40 Quincy Wright, ‘The Study of War’, (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1968), p. 453. Cited in: Ibid, p. 218. 15 since the end of the Cold War.41 Moreover, military forces and international security are becoming more privatized,42 which also adds a new dimension to warfare analysis. The term genocide is a politically sensitive one, which makes almost every academic definition controversial and prone to criticism. Without starting a debate that could lead to many more theses, the paragraph below briefly discusses what definition is used here and why. In his book Purify and Destroy, Jacques Sémelin discusses the controversy surrounding the term genocide.43 After establishing that the concept is problematic and subjective, Sémelin emphasizes the political uses massacres can have by discussing three political dynamics of mass killings: subjugation, eradication, and insurrection. First, destroying to subjugate is used to kill a group partly to repress or overpower the rest of them. This form of destruction is about instilling terror, rather than eliminating a particular group. Destroying to eradicate, on the other hand, has that particular goal. The process “focuses on the identity of the individuals defined as belonging to that ‘other in excess’.’’44 These two dynamics, subjugation and eradication, often coexist, where one is dominant, and the other is more in the background. The final dynamic emphasized by Sémelin is destroying to revolt. Terrorism belongs to this category. The aim is to traumatize and scare a population, which in turn should lead to a change in governmental policies. However, even though this is an important dynamic within modern society, this form of massacre differs greatly from genocide. Therefore, in relation to the topic at hand, the focus is solely on the first two dynamics which are seen as indicators for a genocidal context.
§ 1.3.2 Conflict and crime During a conflict, the separation of organized crime and the state becomes more blurred and crime in general can evolve faster. What used to be secret activities and out of public sight, now become sources of survival and daily routine. With the collapse of the rule of law and some of the government institutions, organized crime groups fill up the vacuum the state leaves behind.45 In
41 The current conflicts are “often characterized by great brutality, the absence of heavy weaponry and superpower support.” Ibid, pp. 216, 226. 42 See for example: P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003). 43 Jacques Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (London: Hurst & Co., 2007). 44 Sémelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 308-361. 45 See for example: Russian criminals who benefited from the collapse of the Soviet Union in countries such as Chechnya and Azerbaijan. See: Victor Yasmann. “The Russian criminal world played a key role in Chechnya and continues to do so”, The Jamestown Foundation, 1(8), (1995), at: 16 this seeming anarchy, weapons and other formerly illegal goods are distributed on a more regular basis.46 After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union for example, local conflicts had effects on criminality and drug trafficking.47 Belligerents could normally rely on their powerful protectors, but now had to find alternative resources in different forms of illegal activities.48 In some 30 conflicts around the world in the year 2000, half of them in Africa, the presence of drugs in various levels and forms was apparent.49 According to political economist David Keen, conflict is “a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection.”50 More “traditional” analyses portray civil wars as political or military struggles and may therefore overlook economic benefits that arise: pillaging to supplement or replace soldiers’ wages, controlling or monopolizing trade, exploiting individuals or groups to work cheaply or for free, stealing aid supplies, et cetera. These short- term benefits suggest that there is more to civil war than simply winning and that organized crime groups could greatly exploit the situation. As we established before, drugs is a major income source for organized criminals, also during conflicts. Still, the money gained from the drugs trade under those circumstances is not solely about greed or other individual benefits, but may also be a way to buy weapons and ammunition. For example, the amount of taxes on drugs collected by the Taliban in Afghanistan annually was estimated at $100 million. And in the case of FARC in Colombia this number should be multiplied by three or four.51 Today, the bulk of the global cultivation of opium and coca is taking place in conflict zones, while the trafficking of their derivatives has come to
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5874&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=23 9&no_cache=1#.VVjzePntmko 46 See for example: the situation in Syria where Syrian rebels trade relics for rifles. ‘Relics for rifles: Syrian rebels trade antique treasures for weapons’, RT news, 23 October 2014, at: http://rt.com/news/198496-syria-rebels- antiquities-trade/; David Keen. The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 40-43. 47 A. Labrousse, and M. Koutouzis. Geopolitique et geostrategies des drogues . (Paris: Economica, 1996), pp. 23-32. Cited in: Dina Siegel, Global Organized Crime, p. 27. 48 J.C. Ruffin ed., Economie des guerres civiles. (Paris: Hachette, 1996). Cited in: Dina Siegel, Global Organised Crime, p. 28. 49 OGD. The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1998/1999. Annual Report . Paris: OGD. Cited in: Dina Siegel, Global Organised Crime, p. 28. 50 Keen. The Economic Functions. 51 OGD, 2000. Cited in: Dina Siegel, Global Organised Crime, p. 28. 17 heavily involve insurgent and terrorist groups operating between the source and destination areas of illicit drugs.52 During conflicts, the influx of basic and necessary goods can be sabotaged or absent due to sanctions and embargos, and demand often increases.53 Therefore the market for illegal entrepreneurs seems to expand. Since the state fails to deliver on essential goods, criminals can fill that gap. As a result of the shortage in commodities, the line between criminals and non- criminals becomes blurred since citizens will try to find ways to survive and may become “creative”. Whereas criminal transactions normally would demand special social relations because of the secrecy, in conflict situations one can more easily trade and may be forced to expand its regular secret network. Combatants in the conflicts of Chechnya, Azerbaijan-Armenia and Georgian civil wars, for example, tried to find funding in all areas, trafficking drugs, oil, strategic metals, and so on.54 Arkan, the most famous gangster of former Yugoslavia, traded not only in cigarettes and stolen cars, but also in natural resources such as oil and gas.55 The role of the state with regard to preventing organized crime is even more dubious than before the war. During conflicts, government forces fight non-state actors or other state actors, so they prioritize staying in power, even more than usual.56 This can make them more desperate for ‘muscle’, something criminal organizations can provide, since violence and the threat of violence is often part of their business model. Their wisdom or know-how can be of vital importance to state leaders. As a consequence, the state and its criminals may become one. Charles Tilly made a clear observation in this regard, without attempting to brand all generals or statesmen as murderers or thiefs: “If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war making and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organized crime.”57
52 Svante E. Cornell. “Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(3), 2007, p. 208. 53 Keen, The Economic Functions, chapter 4. 54M. Koutouzis, “Drogues al'Est: logique de guerres et de marche”, IFRI politique etrangere 195, 2000. Cited in Dina Siegel, Global Organised Crime, p. 28. 55 C.S. Stewart, Hunting the Tiger: The fast life and violent death of the Balkans’ most dangerous man. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2007), pp. 199-200. 56 John Baylis ea, The Globalization of World Politics, introduction. 57 Tilly, Charles. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, in: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back in. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 169. 18
§ 1.4 Concluding remarks All in all, it seems that organized crime in conflict situations can flourish and that both statesmen and criminals benefit from illegal transactions and exercising violence. When comparing organized crime in peaceful situations with conflict situations, certain elements stand out. First, it seems that the main goal of criminals stays the same: getting as much money as fast as possible via illegal means. Also, drugs and trading in illegal commodities remain a primary source of income. Nonetheless, it is easier to extend and expand the market during conflicts. Finally, the transnational or even global component is present in both situations, even though in conflict situations local trade in basic goods seems more urgent and is therefore probably more attractive. One of the most important differences between both situations is the extent of ‘openness’ of dealing in illegal goods. During conflicts, the surveillance of criminals has less priority and becomes problematic when the rule of law and different government institutions collapse. The situation often makes it easier for criminals to create a power base and attract new recruits. Stealing, plundering, and sacrificing natural resources for economic benefit are possible without any direct repercussions since state officials are often busy maintaining their position in society or fighting the (civil) war. Besides the similarities and differences discussed above, a more general observation is in order: civil war seems to influence organized crime and vice versa. Keen underlines this by stating that contemporary civil wars have often encouraged crime, rather than revolution.58 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler also argue that many civil wars are caused by economic rather than socio-political factors, and by loot-seeking rather than by justice-seeking.59 Mark Phytian makes a similar claim for the illicit arms trade after the Cold War. The trade used to be part of a country’s foreign policy, but is nowadays motivated by profit potential.60 The criminalization of society during a civil war may then increase.61 Due to the negative effects of sanctions and embargos and a weaker, more fragile state, organized crime groups can extend, expand and take over lucrative businesses. Moreover, the longer a civil war maintains, the more likely it becomes
58 Keen, The Economic Functions, pp. 71-72. 59 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, (Washington, DC: World Bank, October 2001) , cited in: Cornell. “Narcotics and Armed Conflict”, p. 222. 60 Mark Phythian, “The illicit arms trade: Cold War and Post-Cold war,” Crime, Law & Social Change, 33 (2000), p. 1. 61 By criminalization of society or the state is meant: Institutions, state functions and apparatuses facilitating and being used for ends and means that are criminal in nature. Jean-François Bayart, Stephan Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou. The Criminalization of the State in Africa. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999). 19 that people will find ways to profit from it. As a consequence, “opposing” parties may have a shared interest in the war, which could hamper attempts to create peace.62 In short, organized crime and civil war influences and magnifies one another, and states could manipulate this dynamic. A worrying trend that could probably lead to the earlier discussed Mafia states. In the next chapter, we will take a closer look at the links the state may have with organized crime in genocidal contexts.
62 See for example: Mark Duffield, “The Political Economics of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid” in: Joanna Macrae, Anthony Zwi, Hugo Slim and Mark Duffield (eds). War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies (London: Zed Books, 1996), pp. 50-69. Cited in: Keen, The Economic Functions, pp. 43, 73 20
Chapter II – The State and Organized Crime
The previous chapter demonstrated that organized crime can intensify and flourish during conflicts. The role of the state could be of vital importance in this respect. Interestingly, conflicts seem to undermine the tasks states normally are supposed to have. In theory, government officials and civil servants should maintain order and prevent crime.63 By actively and effectively preventing people from pursuing criminal activities, by being a capable guardian, the state prevents motivated perpetrators of finding suitable or easy victims. According to the American criminologist Travis Hirshi, citizens with strong social bonds to society feel no need to commit criminal deeds. Their attachments to certain people, institutions and norms protect them from the temptation of behaving delinquently.64 However, during a conflict these institutions and norms may erode, vanish or transform. The state changes its priorities and becomes occupied with staying in power and overthrowing opposition, rather than preventing people from criminal behavior. Moreover, when the institutions and norms change in the process and become genocidal, those people with strong attachments may change their vision and behavior too. In some instances, criminal behavior among citizens can be exactly the one thing a regime needs to pursue its goal. To find out how the relationships between organized crime and the state transform, the cases of former Yugoslavia - Serbia and Syria are discussed. To analyze whether there is a clear change in activities, connections and communications, the situation a few decades before the war and during the conflict are described. The main question of this section is how the relationships between the state and its criminals, or organized crime in general, transform in genocidal contexts.
§ 2.1 Former Yugoslavia - Serbia After World War II, Yugoslavia was ruled by communist leader Marshal Tito.65 After his death in 1980 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, Yugoslavia changed towards capitalism and
63 Sabrina P. Ramet. Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002, fourth edition), chapter 1. 64 Travis Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency. (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009, ninth printing). 65 See for example: David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda (eds). Yugoslavia and After. A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth. (London and New York: Longman, 1996), p. 12; Frank Bovenkerk, “Organized Crime in 21 gradually became democratic. Tito’s death left a power vacuum in the region and many Yugoslavs saw new chances to improve their status and position, which resulted in war, sanctions and a criminalized environment.66 Nationalism became a source of power and made it possible to mobilize people through ethnic rage. One of the radical political leaders who conducted this political strategy was Slobodan Milošević. Through the use of propaganda, referring to old sentiments such as the battle of Kosovo in 1389 or the infamous images of the hostilities during World War II, Milošević eventually created a political power struggle that led to a brutal civil war.67 Calls for secession by the former Yugoslav republics led to the collapse of the state.68 Ethnic cleansing to “win” or maintain territory became structural during the war.69 In May 1993, the ICTY was established by the UN in response to mass atrocities then taking place in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reports revealing horrendous crimes, in which thousands of civilians were being killed and wounded, sexually abused and tortured in detention camps and hundreds of thousand expelled from their homes, caused outrage across the world and spurred the UN Security Council to act.70 Currently, the ICTY has charged over 160 persons. Among them former head of State Security Jovica Stanišić, military leader Ratko Mladić, and former president Milošević.
§ 2.1.1 Before the conflict Organized crime did not thrive during Tito’s reign. Yet, certain kinds of organized crime existed. These could be found among Yugoslav emigrants stationed in Western Europe who worked for themselves or the secret service. The secret agency of Tito (UDBA) targeted what they called “dissidents and terrorists”. For these “jobs” the secret service recruited promising young career criminals, who came straight out of prison, to do the spying and, occasionally, the killing. Many of these young gangsters were sons of middle echelon military commanders. They specialized in
Former Yugoslavia”, chapter 5, in: Dina Siegel et al. (eds) Global Organised Crime. Trends and Developments (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2003), p. 45. 66 See: C. Morus. “Slobo the redeemer: The rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic and the construction of the Serbian ‘people’”, Southern Communication Journal, 72(1), (2007), p 2; Maartje Weerdesteijn and Alette Smeulers, “Propaganda en Paramilitairen: De Normalisatie van Geweld in het Servië van de Jaren Negentig”, Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 53 (4), (2011), p. 333; J.S. Sörensen. “War as social transformation: Wealth, class, power and an illiberal economy in Serbia”. Civil Wars, 6(4), (2003), pp. 55-82. 67 Morus, “Slobo the redeemer”, pp. 2, 11. 68 See for example: Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway (eds). Yugoslavia’s Ethnic Nightmare: The Inside Story of Europe’s Unfolding Ordeal. (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1995), p. 1. 69 Weerdesteijn and Smeulers, “Propaganda en Paramilitairen”, p. 333. 70 Website ICTY, About the ICTY, at: http://icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last accessed: 3 May 2015). 22 robbing jewelry stores and banks, extortion, stealing art and trafficking women. After their return to Yugoslavia, these mobsters would open their own nightclub, bar, or shop in Belgrade or Zagreb. 71 During the 1970s, these underworlds became more political. From the outside, Yugoslavia presented itself as a political unit. However, former nations within Yugoslavia kept up their differences. Serbs, for instance, had always dominated the secret service and military. Another example is how a student uprising in 1971 against communism had successfully been framed as the “Croatian Spring”. The regime’s crackdown had resulted in a small group of political refugees of which many were Croatian. They became the new targets of aggression by the secret service and their gangster offspring in Western Europe. The Serb underworld was connected with the Ravna Gora nationalist movement at that time, which also had divisions in other countries. In the 1980s, Vuk Drašković, one of Milošević’s rivals and an ultra-nationalistic politician, went by each of the Ravna Gora departments to collect contributions for the coming military struggle. 72 As mentioned earlier, the situation in Yugoslavia changed drastically in the 1980s. On June 28th, 1989, Tito’s successor Milošević held an infuriating speech, which was a sign for émigré mobsters to return home.73 By then, the war was underway.
§ 2.1.2 During the conflict During the war, the state institutions that used to protect its citizens now turned on those who did not fit the profile of their new state. Officials of militarized state institutions became perpetrators by committing crimes of obedience - they demonstrated criminal behavior that was condoned by state authorities.74 What happened next, according to Maartje Weerdestijn and Alette Smeulers, is that “violence, criminality and international crimes were rationalized, and then normalized and eventually glorified.”75 This led to a different society based on ethnic divisions, in which friendly neighbors turned into enemies. Even though the conflict led to many civilian victims and deaths, not many citizens were willing to fight each other. Since the population demonstrated a lack of will towards taking up
71 Siegel et al., Global Organised Crime, p. 46. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid, p. 47. 74 Weerdesteijn and Smeulers, “Propaganda en Paramilitairen”, p. 334. 75 Ibid. 23 arms,76 politicians had to make use of those who were already in the business of violence.77 According to Mueller, a common mechanism was the following:
“A group of well-armed thugs would arrive or become banded together in a community in which civil order had ceased to exist. As the only group willing—indeed, sometimes quite eager—to use force, they would quickly take control. Members of the other ethnic group would be subject to violent intimidation at best, atrocities at worst, and they would quickly leave the area in despair and misery usually to areas protected by their own ethnic thugs and perhaps to join them to seek revenge…The thugs in charge often exercised absolute or supreme power in their various fiefdoms, and carnivals of often-drunken looting and destruction would take place, as would orgies of rape and gratuitous violence.”78
Mueller emphasizes that these thugs, to a substantial degree, carried out the wars. It was them who were the effective murderous core instead of hordes of ordinary citizens that were incited into violence against their neighbors via propaganda.79 In addition, journalist Robert Block mentioned that “Gangsters, outlaws and criminals have had a special place in the war in the former Yugoslavia. Their skills in organizing people and their ruthlessness made them natural choices for Balkan rabble-rousers looking for men to defend cities or serve as nationalist shock troops.”80
76 In one town, only two of the 2,000-3,000 “volunteers” expected in a call up showed up, and in several cities there were virtual mutinies against enrollment. Another example is how Serbs from Serbia were unwilling to be part in the war outside their own republic, Belgrade had to reform its approach to the wars in Bosnia and Croatia in major ways. There was a high desertion rate and a lack of success in mobilizing. As a solution, they tried to involve locals, but the fighting quality of the militaries was poor. A lack of discipline, ineffective control and command, and a reluctance to take casualties, especially on the Serbian side, caused this. This led all sides to rely on special and irregular groups. See: John Mueller, “The Banality of “Ethnic War”, International Security, 25 (1), (summer 2000), pp. 48-49; Norman Cigar. “The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991: Political and Military Dimensions.” Journal of Strategic Studies 16 (3), (September 1993), p. 315. Cited in: John Mueller. “The rise, decline, shallowness, and banality of militant nationalism in Europe: Hobbes, thugs, “Ethnic conflict”, and the future of warfare.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, (11August 1999), p. 8; Tim Judah. The Serbs. History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 185. 77 Franke Wilmer. The Social Construction of Man, the State and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in former Yugoslavia (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 197, 252, 266. 78 Mueller. “The rise, decline”, p. 3. 79 Mueller, “The rise, decline”, p. 8. 80 Robert Block, “Killers”, The New York Review of Books, 18 November 1993. 24
One important feature within the war was the use of paramilitary groups by government officials. A UN-report from 1994 states that it is estimated that around 83 paramilitary organizations took part in the war of which 56 – about 40.000 men – on the side of Serbia. It is estimated that 80 percent of these forces consisted of criminals and 20 percent of enthusiastic nationalists.81 Many of the participants were drawn from bands of soccer hooligans or street gangs.82 Others were criminals released from prison to fight in the irregular groups. This was required, since the Yugoslav army, even though they had their fair share of influential nationalist propaganda and supposedly pent-up ethnic hatreds, significantly disintegrated at the beginning of the war and refused to fight. An example of how new armies were formed with the help of paramilitaries becomes clear from Roger Cohen’s description of the Serbian army in Bosnia Herzegovina: “The Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (ABH) had come together haphazardly over the summer months, formed from a host of paramilitary units. These included the Patriotic League volunteer militia that Muris had frequented before the war; the official Territorial Defense; an SDA militia called the Green Berets; elements of the police force; and leaders of the Sarajevo underworld who knew how to handle a Magnum.”83 The ties between the paramilitary forces and political leaders were striking. Politicians and official security agencies encouraged, recruited, and sometimes coordinated the hooligans and thugs. Even though many of those released from prison together with other criminals generally worked independently, there does seem to have been a fair amount of coordination in Serb areas, mainly by the secret police of Milošević.84 The army also played its part; it created an overall framework of order and occasionally participated directly in the deprivations.85 Paramilitary leaders had to protect their ‘people’, even though they were often hard-core criminals.86 Examples are the Serb paramilitary leader ‘Captain Dragan’, who had been a pimp in the Sydney underworld, Celo, who was a convicted rapist, and Juka, a former mob boss and racketeer, who protected the Muslims. The Croats had Tuta, a former protection racketeer, who
81 Mary Kaldor, New and old wars, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p. 57. Cited in: Weerdesteijn and Smeulers, “Propaganda en Paramilitairen”, 329 82 Mueller, “The Banality”, p. 42. 83 Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo (New York: Random House, 1998): chapter 21. 84 Weerdesteijn and Smeulers, “Propaganda en Paramilitairen”, p. 336; Mueller, “The Banality”, pp. 43, 47, 49. 85 United Nations, Final Report, par. 18, 24. 86 In his analysis of the Algerian war of independence, Robert Malley observed something similar. Those who once belonged to the criminal underworld could be rehabilitated as political heroes. See: Robert Malley, The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), p. 126. Cited in: Keen, The Economic Functions, p. 49. 25 scared entire villages.87 Those in fortunate positions, like them, quickly found out a lucrative way to trade with the enemy, so “hundreds of millions of Deutschemarks’ worth of weaponry, ammunition, fuel, and goods were exchanged across the front lines.”88 Many Serb leaders in Bosnia, for example, went looking for buyers to sell weaponry and found them nearby: the Muslims and Croats were eager for weapons. Another example is how the speaker of the Bosnian Serb assembly made millions purchasing oil and selling it to Croatia’s Serb enemies in Bosnia. During the war, smuggling became big business for both criminals as well as government institutions. The State Security Service or Služba Državne Bezbednosit (SDB) developed smuggling channels to help Serbia cope with the international sanctions that were imposed on them. Moreover, this was especially important to keep the war machine going. Under orders of Milošević, the SDB started to control the economic, political and criminal life in Serbia.89 An example of the government’s involvement in smuggling is the republic’s illicit trade that was largely controlled by the right hand man of Milošević, Mihalj Kertes. He was in charge of “importing” oil and drugs, and “exporting” weapons to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sanctions and embargos created by the international community also contributed to extending the smuggling empire. For instance, in Sarajevo during the longest siege in modern history, a narrow and damp 800-meter tunnel bypassed both the siege lines and the UN controls, which made it possible for thousands of people and tons of food, arms, and other supplies to move through the underground passageway, providing an enormous opportunity for black market profiteering.90 In Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, elites proclaimed that smuggling was “necessary” to help them survive under the “unfairly” imposed sanctions.91 The above shows that criminality fused with government practices, which in turn were no longer indistinguishable as the war proceeded. It was a process in which politics became criminalized and crime became politicized.92 The ties between the Milošević regime, the smuggling networks and paramilitary leaders, like Arkan, highlight the way the state made use of criminals and organized crime.
87 Robert Block, “Killers” New York Review of Books, (18 November 1993), p. 9. 88 Mueller, “The Banality”, p. 58. 89 Mark Hajdinjak. “Smuggling in South-East Europe”, Center for the Study of Democracy, (2000), p. 25. 90 Andreas, Peter. Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. VII. 91 Ibid, p. 26. 92 P. Andreas, “Criminalizing consequences of sanctions: Embargo busting and its legacy”, International Studies Quarterly, 49 (2005), p. 109. Cited in: Weerdesteijn and Smeulers, “Propaganda en Paramilitairen”, p. 339. 26
§ 2.2 Syria Since 2011, Syria experiences a civil war that started as a regional crisis and has now spiraled into an international conflict. In this ongoing fight, different groups have taken up arms to protect themselves and their families.93 Others fight for a ‘new’ Syria, such as the Free Syrian Army, or a new state involving not only Syria, but also Iraq and other parts of the Middle-East, like Islamic State (IS). This section, however, focuses solely on the Syrian regime and its institutions. It will mainly describe the years before the civil war and the first two years during the war.
§ 2.2.1 Before the conflict Since the summer of 2000, Dr. Bashar al-Assad is the president of Syria. Hafiz, his father, had made sure one of his sons would take over his position. In his book The Truth about Syria, Barry Rubin compares the leadership of Hafiz to that of Don Vito Corleone from the film The Godfather: “He was in effect Don Hafiz who…survived by placing relatives and kinsman in key positions, doing people favors they would have to repay some day, and recruiting among his own ethnic community.” The former president moved aside his own generation to clear the way for Bashar. Similar to the Corleones, the Assads owned numerous judges and politicians while “skimming off profits from a number of criminal enterprises, smuggling, drugs, counterfeiting, and the protection racket.”94 Bashar’s grip on the country through abuse (arrests, torture, et cetera), censuring of the media, and many secret services and military power, has left him untouched for a decade.95 Assad focused his efforts on opening up the economy, without establishing public institutions that are accountable for their actions or increasing public freedoms. Visitors to Damascus would then be able to dine in new restaurants and sleep in smart boutique hostels, while ordinary Syrians continued “…to risk jail merely for criticizing their president, starting a blog or protesting government policies.” The security agencies, the feared Mukhabarat, facilitated Bashar’s grip. They detained people without arrest warrants, frequently refused to disclose their whereabouts for weeks or
93 According to an estimate in 2013 by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, an estimated 1,200 rebel groups are fighting against the Assad regime. Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Intelligence Official Says Syrian War Could Last for Years,” New York Times, 20 July 2013. 94 Barry Rubin. The Truth about Syria (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 127. 95 Human Rights Watch, A Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s First Ten Years in Power (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), pp. 1-2. 27 months, and often engaged in torture.96 Even though some police were held liable for torture, the security services benefited from extensive legal immunity for acts of torture.97 Syrian authorities relied on the so-called emergency law, which gave the security forces broad powers of arrest, as well as “security” provisions in Syria’s Penal Code.98 They also routinely interrupted or prohibited press conferences and meetings by human rights groups, civil society and political activists.99 With regard to the use of former criminals by security services, two men involved in the Holocaust and closely linked to Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, SS captain Theodor Dannecker and Karl Rademacher, were employed for some time as advisors to Syrian security services.100 When it comes to organized crime, Syria has been functioning as a key trade corridor for illicit trade.101 Criminal groups have long used Syria’s geographic position to deal in illicit products such as weapons, illegal drugs, and untaxed luxury goods. Even though individual government officials were likely to profit financially from the smuggling, there is little indication that the state had an institutional involvement in the illicit business.102 This changed in 1976 when Syria invaded and subsequently occupied Lebanon for twenty-nine years. During that period, the Syrian regime became more involved in illicit commerce. The lucrative business was controlled by young Alawite men - Assad family relatives in particular. The smugglers “…dressed up in uniforms and pretended to be members of all-Alawite Defense Companies to get through Syrian Army checkpoints on the Lebanese border.”103 The connection between Syrian authorities and the criminals “became symbiotic, with smuggling organizations supporting the political status quo through the continuous financial support of elites.”104 Lower level officials, such as military officers and soldiers, profited through the taxation of illicit business
96 Human Rights Watch, A Wasted Decade, p. 2. 97 Ibid, p. 20. 98 These security provisions are for example “spreading false or exaggerated information that weakens national sentiment while Syria is at war or is expecting a war”(Article 286 of Syrian Penal Code). Human Rights Watch, A Wasted Decade, p. 6. 99 Human Rights Watch, ‘’No Room to Breathe: State Repression of Human Rights Activism in Syria’’, 19(6(E)), (October 2007), chapter V. 100 In light of the hostile relationship between Syria and Israel, these former war criminals represent and underline the Syrian political message in which Zionism and Israel are seen as evil forces. See: Rubin, The Truth, p. 69. 101 Matt Herbert, ‘Partisans, Profiteers and Criminals. Syria’s Illicit Economy’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 38 (1), (winter 2014), pp. 70-71. 102 Herbert, “Partisans”, p. 72. 103 Joseph Holliday. “The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War.” Middle East Security Report 8, Institute for the Study of War, (March 2013), p. 17. 104 Herbert, “Partisans”, p. 72. 28 and direct involvement in the trade. After profits from narcotics trafficking in Lebanon diminished and due to UN sanctions on Iraq, illicit trade (in textiles, food and, above all, oil) grew along the Syrian-Iraqi border around the middle of the 1990s.105
§ 2.2.2 During the conflict By early 2011, Syrian citizens went into the streets to imitate the Arab Spring by organizing protests via social media websites.106 After a few months, the protests intensified and so did the government repression. Some of the Syrian soldiers began to doubt their involvement in the repression and subsequently refused to shoot unarmed demonstrators as “the relationship between the state and society crossed the threshold of violence.”107 At the beginning of 2012, daily demonstrations were overshadowed by the spread of armed conflict. The war has brought an interesting twist to the government ties with the smuggling business. According to Matt Herbert, who focused primarily on cross-border illicit activity, “the Syrian government has long benefitted from the nation’s position as a smuggling node in the Middle East...over the last three years the government has ceded dominance over the illicit sector to insurgent organizations and smuggling groups.”108 According to the director of the Center for Middle East Studies at Oklahoma University, Joshua Landis, IS militants who now control the oil fields in Iraq and Syria are likely to generate more than 1 million US dollars in sales each day. Much of the oil pumped up in eastern Syria is done so with the tacit approval of the Assad regime. The fuel distribution and sales seem to be handled by brokers. “In particular, one person who’s been fingered is a very prominent Christian businessman close to the [Syrian] president who buys it, then arranges with the Syrian government to have it shipped back.” The western trade sanctions prevent imports of fuel into the country, which made the Assad regime reliant on oil that is pumped up inside Syria itself or smuggled into the country.109
105 Douglas Jehl, “Syria Sneaks Iraq’s Oil Out As Old Foes Become Friends”, The New York Times, 26 April 1999, at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/26/world/syria-sneaks-iraq-s-oil-out-as-old-foes-become-friends.html 106 Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Mass Violence in Syria: A Preliminary Analysis”, New Middle Eastern Studies, 3 (2013), p. 6. 107 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 108 Herbert, “Partisans”, p. 70. In line with this, for an overview on how the governments become the weaker party during a conflict when the opposition is trading in drugs, see: Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conflict” 109 Stephen Snyder. “ISIS is selling cheap oil to its enemies – from Syria’s government to the Kurds.”, Public Radio International, 16 September 2014, at: http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-16/isis-selling-cheap-oil-its-enemies- syrias-government-kurds 29
The Assad regime has a well-equipped and extensive security force, which subsists of at least twelve organizations. The structures of violence show that the regime commands a security force with an immense destructive potential, and the uprising has unleashed the full force of its violence.110 According to Syrian expert Hussein Ibish, “the regime operates like an organized crime syndicate”, which makes it impossible to reform. If so, it would mean “dismantling a mafia operation...a set of interrelated criminal enterprises.”111 The networks of thugs that the Assad regime uses to intimidate and enforce, known as the Shabbiha, are exploiting the situation for business opportunities and they resort to plundering, extortion and profiteering.112 Yet, criminal activity has not stayed limited to smuggling. The security apparatus, and especially the Shabbiha, have made it their goal to keep the Assad regime in place by terrorizing those who oppose the government. Violence and repression of opposition have been the main activities of the Assad regime during the war. Among other strategies, such as beating people up in the streets and shooting at protesters,113 tens of thousands of people were subjected “to arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions, enforced disappearances, ill-treatment, and torture using an extensive network of detention facilities...scattered throughout Syria.”114 Importantly, as described above, torture and executions by the regime were present before the conflict. However, the extent to which these practices are used during the war is of significance. According to HRW, the authorities established multiple temporary unofficial holding centers in buildings such as schools, military bases, stadiums and hospitals where they rounded up and held people during massive detention campaigns before moving them to branches of the intelligence services. In light of the increasing criminalization of the violence and the involvement of the Assad regime, one group should be mentioned in particular: the Shabbiha. As stated above, the group plunders, extorts and profiteers, but also tortures and murders for the regime under the rule of
110 Üngör, “Mass Violence’’, p. 7. 111 Expert Hussein Ibish, quoted by Jill Dougherty. “Al-Assad’s inner circle, mostly family, like ‘mafia’.”, CNN, at: http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/09/assads-inner-circle-will-it-crack/ 112 Jamie Dettmer, “Syria’s Jihadists Linked to Organized Crime.” The Daily Beast, 12 September 2013, at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/09/syria-s-jihadists-linked-to-organized-crime.html 113 Salwa Amor and Ruth Sherlock, “How Bashar al-Assad created the feared shabiha militia: an insider speaks”, The Telegraph, 23 March 2014, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10716289/How- Bashar-al-Assad-created-the-feared-shabiha-militia-an-insider-speaks.html 114 Human Rights Watch, Torture Archipelago. Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Enforced Disappearances in Syria’s Underground Prisons since March 2011. (July 2012), p. 1. 30 leading members of the Assad family, such as Hafez Makhlouf.115 Even though the Assads also arrested many of the smugglers before the war and for the most part brought their criminal businesses under control after they began to undermine state authority, since March 2011 the group has been recast by the government as an important force of repression and intimidation against the protesters.116 “Once fighting for a cause—the Syrian state with Bashar al-Assad at its head—shabiha militias today are fighting for the al-Assad family and the network of contacts surrounding it, which, importantly, they see as being the best guarantees of securing their own future interests.”117 By using the Shabbiha, which orchestrates civil disorder, petty crime and kidnapping, the regime is underlining its rhetoric that the uprisings embody an increasingly unstable environment. The criminality is not all on one side. Those who call themselves freedom fighters or opposition are, according to Herbert, often also thugs or former criminals.118 Still, once again, it becomes clear that government officials use criminals to do “the dirty work”. In line with the findings on former Yugoslavia, militias were used or created to be able to use brutal force on its own citizens.
§ 2.3 Similarities and differences As John Mueller argues in his article on policing the remnants of war, much of the described warfare could be substantially eliminated or reduced by well-trained police and military forces. However, as we discovered along the way, in the cases above it is precisely those who are in charge who promote and encourage this type of massive violence. In former Yugoslavia as well as Syria, military men were refusing to participate in the violence against their own people. This led to desperate measures of the regimes. Packs of criminals, bandits and thugs were recruited as mercenaries by state officials or became warlord gangs within weak or failed regions.119 In the cases above, one can see how organized crime was used to increase the chances of a regime to stay in power and overthrow opposition. Where normally, before the conflict,
115 See for example: Amor and Sherlock, “How Bashar Al-Assad”, and Üngör, “Mass Violence’’, p. 7. 116 Aziz Nakkash. “Alawite Dilemma’s in Homs: Survival, Solidarity and the Making of a Community”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, march 2013, p. 8. See also: Stephen Starr. “Shabiha militias and the destruction of Syria”, Combating Terrorism Center, (28 November 2012); Mike Elkin and Mikel Ayestaran, “A Hired Killer in Syria Reconsiders His Role”, The New York Times, 25 April 2013. 117 Starr, “Shabbiha militias”. 118 More recently, the media has picked up on how European thugs are lured to become fighters for IS or other forces in the Syrian war and what this means for when they return to Europe. See for example: Herbert, “Partisans”. 119 John Mueller, “Policing the remnants of war”, Journal of Peace Research, 40(5), (2003). 31 criminals could, to a certain extent and out of public sight, go their own way, they were now given the chance to behave as public gangsters with impunity. Those criminals or thugs are needed to do the dirty work officials cannot do themselves without risking (international) blame. Even those individuals, who were officially seen as criminal and were sentenced to prison, were released to take part in militias. Importantly, the fusion of politics and crime during these conflicts is causing a vague and chaotic image of war and makes it hard to distinguish between those fighting for their country and those fighting for their own benefit. As both cases demonstrate, not only on the side of the government, but also on the opposition or rebel side, criminals are involved. Furthermore, smuggling is of importance to both the government and its criminals in both countries. As Peter Andreas described, the sanctions imposed by the international community undermine their initial goal. During the sanctions, smuggling flourished and probably gave criminals an extra incentive to participate in the war. A difference between Yugoslavia and Syria is the degree of criminalization within the government before the conflict. Where Yugoslavia seemed to gradually become more criminalized in the years before the war, Syria was what Moisés Naim typified as a Mafia State. The Assads owned numerous judges and politicians while making profits on a number of criminal enterprises. This brings us to answering the main question of this chapter: how did the relationships between the state and its criminals, or organized crime in general, transform during the conflicts? First, we see that criminals are able to handle with impunity and in public during the conflict whereas the thugs used to do their business in secret out of fear of government sanctions. Second, the criminal is no longer typified as an outlaw but rather as a patriot. Third, and in addition to the second point, their image changes from being someone who undermines the state to someone who owns a set of skills that is useful and valuable. What has become clear is that both regimes made use of criminals through paramilitary groups. It seems that they could not have handled the situation without them. What makes paramilitary forces interesting for regimes? How do they work? And why are criminals or thugs essential for these forces? These questions are addressed in the following chapter.
32
Chapter III – Paramilitarism and Organized Crime
One of the features of many violent conflicts is the use of paramilitary organizations by governments.120 In his book Genocidal Crimes, Alex Alvarez states that the implementation of destructive action usually depends upon a range of different institutions that turn the abstract initiatives of the state into reality. This organizational context then largely determines the nature of the participation of the perpetrators. There are different types of organizations in which individuals can serve the needs of genocidal regimes. The military and police agencies are most commonly used in this respect.121 Notably, however, governments also make use of what is known as paramilitary groups or militias. During the hostilities in Guatemala and Brazil in the 1980s, in East Timor in 1999, and in conflicts in Haiti, Uruguay and El Salvador, paramilitaries took part in politically motivated violence.122 Militias also played important roles in the Rwandan, Armenian, and Bosnian genocides. These groups contributed greatly to a dangerous and hostile environment, and carried out much of the violence. Often linked to the worst excesses such as rape, torture and massacre, they are a particularly deadly form of social organization.123 Why and how do governments make use of these groups? Importantly, how are organized crime and/or former criminals connected to this phenomenon? In the following, there will be a brief discussion on what paramilitarism entails, how it differs from the military and why governments make use of them. Subsequently, the focus will be on the cases of former Yugoslavia and Syria.
120 Alex Alvarez, “Militias and Genocide”, War Crimes, Genocide & Crimes against Humanity. 2(2), (2006). 121 Alex Alvarez, Genocidal Crimes. (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), p. 75. 122 See for example: Geoffrey Robinson. “People’s war: militias in East Timor and Indonesia”, South East Asia Research. 9(3), (2001); Martha Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros and Philip G. Zimbardo. Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002); J. Patrice McSherry. “Death squads as parallel forces: Uruguay, operation condor, and the United States.” Journal of Third World Studies, Vol XXIV, No.1, (2007); William Blum. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2003) 123 Alvarez, Genocidal Crimes, 78 33
§ 3.1 Paramilitarism
§ 3.1.1 What are paramilitary groups? Paramilitary forces “are a product of changing political environments that create opportunities for some and extreme uncertainty for others.”124 More concrete, they are generated in order to take part in acts of collective violence. Militias operate along semi-military lines and can differ in size from just a few members to several thousand. By being part of a group, it becomes easier to use excessive force. Its function “seems to be at least partly that of making murder easier, not just physically, but also morally, by suggesting that killing is performed under orders, and so is no more murder than the killing of an enemy combatant in time of war.”125 As a consequence, it further strengthens the command structure of the group since it provides a license to participate and continue in something so dreadful. In many ways, paramilitary organizations can be seen as a type of mercenary group. “Historically, mercenary groups have been perceived as military forces that operate solely for pay rather than out of loyalty or affiliation to a specific cause.”126 Militias seem to be in between working purely out of loyalty to a specific cause, which can be linked to military discipline, and participating for money. In addition to this, the civilian component should be emphasized. A group is “paramilitary if it affects the style and method of military institutions – with military discipline, a hierarchy of command, directed towards violent ends, and self-licensed to kill – while existing within civilian institutions.”127 It is therefore important to make a clear divide between the military and militias.
§ 3.1.2 How do paramilitary forces differ from the military? During conflicts, it may be hard to separate those who belong to the official government forces from the ones who randomly take part in hostilities. The existence of paramilitaries makes recognizing this distinction even more complex. What separates the authorities from the civilians?
124 Julie Mazzei. Death Squads or Self Defence Forces. How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009) , p. 203. 125 Roger Scruton, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought. (Third Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 505. 126 Alvarez, Genocidal Crimes, pp. 79-80. 127 Scruton, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary, p. 505. 34
In his essay on fascist paramilitaries during World War I, Sven Reichart argues that the contrast with armies lies in that “…members of paramilitary organizations had political ambitions and defined themselves as political soldiers.”128 Even though these groups did not promote a structurally defined political program, they challenged socialists, communists and the existing political system. The other way around is also possible, where the paramilitaries reinforce the current political regime and its plans. According to Alex Alvarez, militias can be distinguished from regular military forces in a number of ways.129 First, the military clearly acts on the authority of the state, while the link between paramilitaries and governments is more hidden or obscured. Second, armies are formally organized while militias have a looser structure. Military organizations tend to be very hierarchical and inflexible, which is not a common feature among militia forces. Membership is often more organized around personal relationships and personalities instead of impersonal and formalized roles. Consequently, militias have more dynamic and fluid social arrangements than police forces and traditional armies. Third, already mentioned above, the militias also act for personal gain and profit. Via plundering and looting, they enrich themselves and benefit from the violence. Despite historical examples of soldiers and militaries that looted and pillaged, it is often not considered the norm for army forces to enrich themselves during battle. The fourth and last important difference is that militaries consist of professionals whereas militias are composed of amateurs. “Even though professional soldiers and ex-soldiers may advise and train paramilitaries, and in some cases even serve with them, as a whole these groups tend not to have the professional skills, ethos, and experience that regular military organizations possess.”130 Violent criminals, however, may also be familiar with weapons and have developed their fighting skills so they transcend the amateur level and be more similar to professionals. This last point of Alvarez may therefore not apply to those paramilitary organizations that exist out of a majority of thugs.
§ 3.1.3 Why do states use paramilitaries? A case study by Achilles Batalas on the early nineteenth-century Greek state-building shows that “…state elites will utilize irregular troops when they are incapable of imposing and/or
128 Sven Reichardt, “Paramilitarism,” in: World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia, ed. Cyprian P. Blamires, 2 vols. (Santa Barbara, CA, 2006), pp. 506–7. 129 Alvarez, Genocidal Crimes, 79 130 Ibid. 35 maintaining a monopoly over the means of coercion, when war-making activities are constrained by more powerful states, and when indigenous resources are not available for extraction…”131 These conditions are all incentives for a regime to use militias. Yet, one important other reason should be mentioned: deniability. The police and military forces of a state are always official and recognizable branches of a country. Increasingly, state officials realize that they may end up in front of a tribunal because of their actions during a possible or actual conflict. Thus, a group of fighters that cannot be linked easily or formally to the government is desirable to genocidal regimes.132
§ 3.2 Connections between criminals and paramilitary groups This section discusses the cases of former Yugoslavia and Syria with regard to militias and criminals who became part of these forces. The focus will be primarily on one specific paramilitary group per case, to be able to establish the link between paramilitaries, the government and criminals, the dynamics within the group, and the relationship with organized crime.
§ 3.2.1 Former Yugoslavia The military conflicts in former Yugoslavia during the nineties underwent different stages, and involved multiple parties at various times that operated separately, but were frequently interrelated. At the begin stages of the conflict, most combatants, including members of the regular army, did not wear distinctive uniforms, insignias of rank or emblems. As a consequence, officers were able to move freely from one unit to another and from army to militia. Furthermore, the “order of battle” of almost all militia and army units was not clearly established and the chain of command was blurred, even to insiders. Henceforth, the groups “command and control” structures were significantly eroded, which led to much confusion. According to UN experts, this chaotic organization was “purposely kept that way for essentially political reasons.”133 Apart from the regular armies and Territorial Defense, two other types of paramilitary formations and groups were part of military operations. According to the experts, they consisted
131 Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (eds). Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 169. 132 Alvarez, “Militias and Genocide”, pp. 17-18. 133 United Nations. Final Report, 30. Accessed on 20 February 2015 via: http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf 36 of: 1. “special forces”, and 2. local police forces enlarged by local armed civilians. The two should be seen as separate entities. In these forces, the lines of authority and the structure of command and control were confusing to both insiders and outsiders. Moreover, 80 percent of the Serb irregulars for example, were thought to be prisoners.134 The focus here will be on the “special forces”, put in place by the government. One of them being the Tigers, a Serbian paramilitary group led by one of the most notorious gangsters of former Yugoslavia: Arkan. Yugoslavia after Tito took a bad turn both economically as well as politically. Many of the men were newly jobless, felt stripped of their manhood, and were willing to do anything to get their lives back on track. One of the ways to channel their ethnic hatred and anger about their situation was through hooliganism. One particular soccer club, Red Star, had fans that were seen as “weapons of mass destruction.” The hooligans fought fans from other teams with iron bars, fists and bayonets.135 They took British hooliganism “a hundred miles north of sanity.”136 When Milošević’s power was rising, these fans responded to his message. The Serbian politician wanted this “animal force” to be entirely for him, and made a lucrative deal. Even though Milošević has always denied any association with Arkan, his head of State Security, Jovica Stanišić, was a member of the Red Star board and drafted Arkan to take over the fan club.137 Uncertainty about the regular army led Serb leaders to discreetly construct paramilitary forces. The government hereby made use of people who actually enjoyed fighting Croats: it needed a group that could terrorize civilians, so that Croats and Muslims would flee the territories that the Serbs hoped to control.138 Under the leadership of Arkan, the hooligans were operating within a strict hierarchy that took their orders from a single leader. The dynamic within the group was determined by harsh discipline, and the fear and respect they felt for their leader. Arkan’s sweetshop and mansion
134 John Mueller. “The Rise, Decline”. It is not clear from Mueller’s claim whether these prisoners were hard core criminals or simple felons, however, Louis Sell mentions in this regard “…their members were often drawn from the roughest elements of the Serbian criminal underworld…”, which seems to fit the image of career criminals. See: Slobodan Milosevic and The Destruction of Yugoslavia. (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 325; History Channel. Targeted – Arkan, Baby Face Psycho. 2004, minute 7.30. See also: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xmy008_history-channel-targeted-arkan-baby-face-psycho_shortfilms 135 Franklin Foer. How Soccer Explains the World: An Unlikely Theory of Globalization. (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), chapter 1. 136 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 119. 137 Ibid, p. 124. 138 Foer, How Soccer Explains, p. 21. 37 were transformed into the headquarters of his new army.139 Before the war, the gangster trained his men in specialized street fighting, informed them of the time they would have to defend themselves, and promoted new pro-nationalist songs. He also had them tested for drugs, made them stop drinking, let them cut their hair and shave regularly. To strengthen the relationship between Arkan and his men, the fighters had to sign written statements swearing to the Orthodox Church, and were then baptized. This would differentiate them from Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims.140 This was an important move that probably increased the feeling of brotherhood and unity. As Sonja Biserko, the director of the Helsinki committee of Human Rights in Serbia, mentions with regard to Arkan’s leadership style: “…he established a fatherly relationship with all of his men. Like the godfather in a mafia structure. They were all afraid of him….He would go to their funerals and pay their wages, and if they died he’d give their families money every month.”141 At first, Arkan’s militia consisted of radical Red Star fans, but the group was growing over the years, before and during the war. Local crime figures, refugees and weekend warriors were also participating in the paramilitary group. Furthermore, recruitment of teenagers and young criminals took place. Moreover, with permission of the Serbian government, Arkan toured the prisons where he personally selected murderers and bank robbers who would be released when the time was right. When the war started, there were over 3,000 men that had signed up for the paramilitary force. The main body of the group was numbered between 500 and 1,000 fighters. Still, the force would sometimes grow as large as 9,000 men.142 During the war, the Tigers stood out in a number of ways: they dressed in black or camouflage uniforms, with bulletproof vests and black woolen balaclavas, with slits for eyes, and they wore Tiger patches on their upper arms or stitched into hats with the words “Arkanove Delije” which translates roughly to “Arkan’s Heroes.” They also had heavy weaponry – submachine guns, grenades, long “Rambo-style” knives and ropes “for choking people.” Furthermore, the leader organized his combatants as an army platoon, dividing them in strike, combat and operative companies. Even though some people may have been relieved to see Arkan
139Testimony of witness B129 at the ICTY, former personal assistant of Arkan, trial of Milošević, Slobodan (IT-02- 54). Transcript 17 of April 2003, page 19483. See: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/030417ED.htm (Last accessed: 17 May 2015) 140 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 124-131. 141 Quote by Sonja Biserko, the director of the Helsinki committee of Human Rights in Serbia, cited in: Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 131. 142 A large part of them came from weekend warriors, refugees and Red Star football fans. Ibid, pp. 129, 136. 38 and his men as they were fighting similar Croatian or Muslim gangs for months, most civilians feared them because of the horror stories they were told. This installment of fear throughout the region’s led many civilians to leave their homes.143 Most of these gruesome narratives cannot be verified, yet, a UN report by experts investigating the atrocities linked the Tigers to many of the crimes such as mass killing, rape and torture.144 During the Bosnian war, for example, the region of Bijeljina fell victim to Serbian troops. The Tigers stayed for one or two weeks. The result was that over twenty thousand people had been expelled, brought to concentration camps, or were killed. When there was no fighting, the Tigers were looting homes and businesses, and then sold off everything on the black market. This was an attractive option for the unemployed and criminals. Cash, gold, jewelry, whiskey and factory equipment were shipped back to their training camp and would then be distributed for sale.145 For those who wanted to fight for their country, the paramilitary groups were probably more appealing than the military. The regular army, the Yugoslav Army or JNA, paid its soldiers incredible low wages, some as low as 7 dollars a month, and fed them with only water and bread. In contrast, the Tigers were paid around a thousand dollars a month, and could plunder during their battles.146 The Tigers were stationed in the captured town of Erdut. There they had transformed buildings into barracks and created rooms for weapon supplies and training tools. Training was harsh and long. Besides the physical and weapons training, the fighters also got morale talks, were instructed on strategies of ethnic cleansing, and discussed the psychology of death with specialists. The men started calling Arkan “Commander”, a name that former Tigers kept using during and even after the war. New recruits arrived weekly in buses and jeeps, and were tested for drugs, sworn in, and required to give up all personal identification. Most of these new combatants were young, others were semiliterate hooligans. According to Christopher Stewart, who wrote a biography on the Commander, Arkan continued to enroll convicted criminals, which “delighted him”.147
143 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 143, 147. See also: minute 19.50 of History Channel. Targeted – Arkan, Baby Face Psycho. 2004, at: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xmy008_history-channel-targeted-arkan-baby-face- psycho_shortfilms 144 United Nations, Final Report, p. 76. 145 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 162, 179. 146 Ibid, pp. 145-146. 147 Ibid, p. 154. 39
Arkan was feared for his punishment by the recruits. He had a reputation of ruthlessness. Combatants that disobeyed could receive fifty to one hundred lashes, or were hoisted up a flagpole in the training yard. Those who tried to escape the camp or battlefield were dealt with accordingly. One example is that Arkan instructed a soldier to beat a deserter fifty times with a baseball bat in front of a soldier formation. One of the interviewed, a former Tiger, stated: “You get in with Arkan and you never get out. That was rule number one.”148 This callousness probably contributed to the transformation of his men into becoming extreme and ruthless killers.149 The paramilitary group was not working independently.150 According to Arkan’s secretary, also known as ICTY witness B129, there was frequently contact between government officials and the leader of the Tigers. Besides the detailed descriptions she gave about the contact between certain government officials and Arkan, the following statement clarifies the deep involvement of the state: “Arkan did not fall from the sky. His units would never have been able to act in the way they did had they not been an integral part of the state security of Serbia.”151 For instance, the secret police (SDB) had secretly financed the camp in Erdut and visited regularly giving instructions on towns to be sacked. Another interesting example was that the jeeps of Arkan had special license plates which were issued by the Serbian Interior Ministry, that acted as a free pass in the region.152 Furthermore, the Yugoslav Army or JNA had also armed and supported Arkan and other paramilitaries.153 The Serbian government employed a policy of sending locked-up criminals to the front lines as a “reform” method. For most of these criminals, the conflict allowed them to drink, kill, rape and thieve – something which many of them had done before and what got them in prison in the first place. Unlike other warlords, who were less organized and worked more in an ad hoc manner, Arkan trained his prisoners and made them understand that if they disobeyed it was easy to make them disappear. This disciplined style, however, did not apply to his vision on the rules of engagement. Arkan killed whoever he saw as dangerous or got in his way.
148 Interviews with former Tigers. Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 155, 192. 149 See for example: Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo, Violence Worker, conclusion 150 Tim Judah. The Serbs. History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 199, 206-207. 151 Testimony of witness B129 at the ICTY, page 19533. 152 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 153, 177. 153 United Nations, Final Report, p. 76. 40
Later in the war, the international community imposed economic sanctions that made it illegal to supply almost anything to Serbia. For Arkan and other government-connected thugs, the sanctions made it possible to extent and expand their black market activities. Thanks to his Tigers’ work in Croatia for example, Arkan controlled every major oil plant in eastern Slavonia. There was no legitimate economy anymore, and the criminals or mob became the state.154 All in all, the fusion of criminals and the state sponsored militias turned out to be problematic in that it was efficient in reaching (part of) its goal of an ethnically cleansed Serbia. According to Cherif Bassiouni, elected chief of the commission of experts for the UN, Arkan’s gang worked in more operations than any other group. “So, statistically speaking, they probably committed more war crimes than any other gang”.155 The policy of the state, to let the convicted criminals join the battlefield as a means to reform them, did probably help the Serbian state. Moreover, putting a talented criminal in charge of a paramilitary force clearly served its purpose.
§ 3.2.3 Syria In Syria, a complex situation exists in which both pro-government forces as well as the opposition have different factions. Pro-government militias or armed forces, also known as Shabbiha156, have a similar function as to what most paramilitaries are used for: instilling fear and doing the dirty work. At the time of writing, the Syrian conflict is four years old, and academic analysis of the connection between pro-government militias and criminals is still in the beginning phase. Nevertheless, the media, non-profit organizations like Amnesty International and HRW, and the UN, have written a substantial amount of articles and reports, and these sources are primarily used in the analysis below. At the start of the conflict in 2011, the Syrian army faced increased attrition in equipment and personnel due to casualties and defections. According to a report by the UN of August 2012, the defections affected the soldiers psychologically, which increased a loss of confidence within the ranks and led to further defections. The regime also had problems in drafting new recruits, since many of those called up for mandatory military service never reported for duty.157
154 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 196-200; Andreas, Blue Helmets; History Channel. Targeted – Arkan, Baby Face, see minute 28.30. 155 Quote by Cherif Bassiouni, cited in: Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 203. 156 Sometimes also referred to as: Shabiha, Shabeeha, and more recently, National Defence Forces. 157 United Nations. Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. General Assembly, Human Rights Council. A/HRC/21/50. (16 August 2012), p. 8. 41
Besides the matter of deniability, the use of paramilitaries is with reference to the decline within the regular army a strategic and historical logical step. Similar to his father’s approach to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising over thirty years prior, Bashar’s regime militias had to be a supplement to the armed forces. According to Joseph Holliday, a Senior Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, Assad has relied heavily on two types of pro-government paramilitaries. The first type is the Shabbiha, which is “…made up of mostly Alawite criminal smuggling networks led by members of the extended Assad family.”158 The second class of militia, often called Popular Committees or Lijan sha’abiya, draws its ranks from minority populations who are protecting their towns and neighborhoods from opposition fighters. The opposition in Syria has not made distinction between these two sorts of militias, referring to both as Shabbiha. This use of words may have been useful to the opposition in creating a generalized image of the Assad supporter. However, according to researcher and Syrian expert Aron Lund, it has also, probably unintentional, helped the government to cover up the increasing fragmentation of its repressive state apparatus.159 The term or name Shabbiha comes from old Alawite smuggling gangs.160 They had connections with the Assad family and were conducting smuggling operations in guns, drugs and commodities. At the start of the conflict of 2011, these men turned out to be “a dangerous cocktail of religious indoctrination, minority paranoia and mafia roots.”161 Yet, it should be noted that there is no single Shabbiha force and no single type which fits the Shabbiha character.162 Those called “Shabbiha” belonged to different communities and organizations, and were by far not all Alawites. For example, in Idleb City, gangs of Sunni regime supporters did Assad’s dirty work, until the army took over. Furthermore, in Quseir, some members of the Christian Kasouha clan – Greek Orthodox – created checkpoints and took up arms funded by the government to stop the opposition.163 With regard to the connection between criminals and the paramilitaries, a group
158 Joseph Holliday. “The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War.” Middle East Security Report 8, Institute for the Study of War, (March 2013). 159 Aron Lund. “Gangs of Latakia: The Militiafication of the Assad Regime.” Syria Comment. 23 July 2013, at: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-militiafication-of-the-assad-regime/ 160 Lund, “Gangs of Latakia” ; and Mohammad D. “The Original Shabiha”. Syria Comment. 17 August 2012, at: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-original-shabiha-by-mohammad-d/ 161 Hugh Macleod and Annasofie Flamand. “Syria: Brutally violent shabiha militia member tells it like it is”, Global Post, 15 June 2012, at: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/syria/120614/syria-shabiha- thug-assad-mafia-guns-smuggling-violence-houla 162 Nakkash. “Alawite Dilemma’s in Homs, p. 8, and: Lund, “Gangs of Latakia”. 163 Sam Dagher. “Syrian Conflict Draws In Christians”, The Wall Street Journal. 23 July 2012, at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303644004577524653025270434 42 of mafiosi from a politically connected Sunni clan, the Berri clan, are referred to as ”Shabbiha” in Aleppo. The leaders of the clan were executed by rebels in July 2012.164 Another example does involve Alawites: “In Homs and many other places, local Alawite thugs were funded by regime- connected businessmen like Rami Makhlouf, to transform their street gangs into well-armed militias.”165 The Shabbiha groups employ many different activities and have a strong connection to the regime. They plunder, extort and profiteer, but also torture and murder for the regime under the rule of leading members of the Assad family, such as Hafez Makhlouf.166 For example, in 2012, civilians in the area Al-Houla were attacked by gunmen leading to a massacre of at least 108 people. According to both HRW as well as the UN, pro-government troops were the perpetrators.167 Rami Makhlouf and Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother, planned the development of the Shabbiha and commanded the group to do their dirty work.168 It was a direct chain of command from the Syrian leadership, operating alongside the Syrian military. During a meeting in July 2011, Maher and Rami expressed their concern that the army, with the extensive media coverage, could not use the force needed to stop the protests. Thus, a paramilitary group was needed. The orders given were specific; kill protesters, armed or unarmed, and torture those you capture. There were also instructions on where to recruit fighters. Prisoners held in Homs and Tartous jails were an option. Also, criminal Alawites who were charged with a death sentence were suddenly released.169 These ex-convicts had no choice; they were ordered to be part of the Shabbiha.170 So, among young, rural, Alawi men doing the dirty work, professional criminals with a prior career in violence were used to fill the ranks. Members of the leader’s inner circle converted the Shabbiha “from a smuggling ring into a violent militia force.” An interview with one of the Shabbiha men reveals the connection to the government and the dynamics within these forces. Abu Jaafar, an Alawite militiaman with a wife and children of
164 Brown Moses. “Aleppo – Zaino Berri, Shabiha Leader, Captured and Executed.” Brown Moses Blog. 31 July 2012, at: http://brown-moses.blogspot.se/2012/07/aleppo-zaino-berri-shabiha-leader.html 165 Lund, “Gangs of Latakia”. 166 See for example: Amor and Sherlock, “How Bashar al-Assad”; and Üngör, “Mass Violence, p. 7. 167 UN, Report on the independent, pp. 10-12; Sarah Leah Whitson, “Syria: UN inquiry should investigate Houla killings. Survivors describe execution of family members.” Human Rights Watch, 28 May 2012, at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/27/syria-un-inquiry-should-investigate-houla-killings 168 Amor and Sherlock, “How Bashar Al-Assad”. 169 See for example: Amor and Sherlock, “How Bashar al-Assad”; and Üngör, “Mass Violence, p. 7. 170 Amor and Sherlock, “How Bashar Al-Assad”. 43 his own, described to reporters how it is logical to kill women and children to defend his family, friends and president: “Sunni women are giving birth to babies who will fight us in years to come, so we have the right to fight anyone who can hurt us in the future.”171 He explains how his day, which he usually spends in the gym and at nightclubs of Latakia, changes when his boss is calling. At that moment, he collects the Kalashnikovs, machine guns, pistols and grenades that were given to him “by the government”, and subsequently joins the militia of 100 Shabbiha. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Jaafar lived a criminal high life, plying his trade in organized smuggling networks. During his involvement in the conflict, his pay of around 20 dollar for a day’s thuggery increased to a steady monthly income of about six times the average state salary. “In addition to our salaries we take whatever we can get during the attacks: TVs, video players, electronics….We got money and arms from our government to fight those Wahhabi radicals.”172 In the city of Homs, the Shabbiha were also used as a “strategy established to militarize the community and obtain its allegiance as a whole rather than solely a means of defeating the uprising.” As a consequence, all Alawites, whether they like it or not, are implicated in the conflict. To justify the use of force, the often young Alawite men recount stories that they heard from others, all of which involve the “massacre” of Alawites in other areas. Within Homs, different Shabbiha militias operated. The Shabbiha in Zahra, for instance, were known to have taken over the businesses and homes of Sunnis in the neighborhood. In Zahra, most of the Sunnis were eventually forcibly evicted and the belongings looted by the paramilitary group and sold in what became known as the “Sunni market.”173 Instilling fear through the Shabbiha was one of the main objectives of the regime. During protests, for example, Shabbiha men would dress as civilians to seem like normal pro- government members when using extensive force against peaceful protesters. This created a confusing situation in which protesters were unable to recognize who was with or against them, subsequently working as a deterrent for taking part in the protests. Furthermore, besides criminals, men were also recruited from bodybuilding clubs and encouraged to take steroids.174
171 Macleod and Flamand, “Syria: Brutally violent”. 172 Wahhabi radicals are a reference to (a part of) the opposition. Macleod and Flamand, “Syria: Brutally violent”. 173 Nakkash. “Alawite Dilemma’s in Homs”, pp. 8-10, 16-17. 174 Comment by Dr. Azzawi, who runs the Syrian Network for Human Rights from London. Harriet Alexander and Ruth Sherlock. “The Shabiha: Inside Assad's death squads” The Telegraph. 2 June 2012, at: 44
The pictures and video clips of Shabbiha on the internet show big muscular men with semi- automatic weapons posing in front of a car or on a motor cycle.175 Even though not all of these pictures and video clips can be verified, it does demonstrate how these men want to portray themselves and how they like to increase their status as fearless combatants who rule by impunity. More importantly, the most significant contribution to a society of fear is the involvement of the Shabbiha in the kidnapping and torture of civilians. Various organizations, such as the UN and HRW, have reported about their involvement.176
§ 3.3 Similarities and differences The cases of former Yugoslavia and Syria present evidence of a deep involvement of the government in the paramilitaries and their willingness to involve (convicted) criminals or mafiosi. In both Yugoslavia as well as Syria, huge amounts of weaponry and ammunition were delivered to the paramilitaries. It may have also helped that some of the criminals involved had connections with weapon suppliers. Furthermore, convicted criminals were enrolled in the militias in both situations. Another similarity is the complexity of the military and paramilitary landscape. Often it was unclear whether the militia men belonged to the regular army or not. Furthermore, there was not one paramilitary group involved but mostly multiple, which increased the confusion. This chaotic and confusing scenery contributes to the deniability of a regime’s involvement. On the outset, it confirms the stereotypical image of criminals or bandits who do not obey the law and undermine the state’s authority, which is beneficial to those government officials who like to keep a “clean” sheet when it comes to war crimes and violating human rights. The members of the militias were not all former thugs or mafiosi, but a significant part was criminal before the conflicts. It is difficult to verify whether a paramilitary group that has no former criminals among its members differs from a militia that does. However, as Stewart states with regard to Yugoslavia: “The front lines were probably a dream come true, a paradise lost or a real world version of Pirates of the Caribbean. The criminal fighters drank, killed, raped, and
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9307411/The-Shabiha-Inside-Assads-death- squads.html ,anonymoussyrian ,الشبيحة في سوريا :See for example 175 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q7tFn0nvF2M. (Last accessed on: 19 April 2015) 176 See for example: UN, Report on the independent, and UN, Torture Archipelago. 45 thieved – things many of them had done before they were thrown in jail.”177 Based on their history, the criminals were probably more willing to participate than most regular civilians or at least were better able to adapt to the situation. Moreover, an experienced criminal as leader of a paramilitary force would probably be efficient, as the Tigers of Arkan showed. As the expert commission of Bassiouni learned during their investigation in Yugoslavia, the Tigers were the worst in terms of involvement in operations and murders among all of the volunteer Serb gangs.178 By making use of criminals, the level of ruthlessness and subsequently the level of fear among the population increased, forcing more people to flee their country or region. War often leads to large amounts of refugees,179 nonetheless, the paramilitaries seem to have contributed in both cases substantially to the spread of terror and fear. As a consequence, there is a decline in possible opposition which makes that the regimes are better able to conquer the villages, towns or regions. In the Syrian case, the militarization in Homs created a dilemma and increase in fear for those Alawites who are not in favor of Assad, but were already implicated by the regime through their identity and ties to family, friends and neighbors who do support the regime. The strategy of creating fear makes the militias not only a physical force but also a psychological force, which makes them highly valuable to genocidal regimes. Finally, the two cases show a strong connection between the paramilitaries and organized crime. Those who were, previous to the conflict, involved in smuggling for example, could enlarge their profits and, in Arkan’s case, create or extend their smuggling empire. Thieving, looting and plundering became routine activities during the conflicts. Moreover, the combatants got more money working for the paramilitary groups instead of working for the army. In the case of Yugoslavia, Arkan’s secretary recalled how she began to see a man who was increasingly obsessed with war profit.180 This obsession or addiction to massive income and wealth may become dangerous to criminals over time, since normal society has not given them the same opportunities as they experience during the conflict. As a consequence, perpetrators may want to
177 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 145. 178 Quote by Cherif Bassiouni, cited in: Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 203. 179 See for example: Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War”, International Organization, 60(2), 2006. 180 Testimony at the ICTY, witness B129, cited in: Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 201. 46 extend the war as long as possible.181 In such a situation, the conflict becomes autonomous which subsequently makes it harder to solve the conflict. Another concern is that, when the conflict is over and the regime takes back power, what will happen to those who increasingly profited from the war? A Syrian government official made a similar statement to TIME Magazine with regard to the rise of Assad’s militias: “Two years ago they went from nobody to somebody with guns and power. How can we tell these shabiha to go back to being a nobody again?”182 As the above demonstrates, genocidal regimes significantly benefit from using former criminals or thugs in paramilitary groups during a conflict. However, the two cases also show some contextual differences that may influence the outcome of a conflict. Whereas both governments seemed similarly chaotic in their oversight of, and connection to, the paramilitaries, the investigation in the workings of the Tigers displayed a structured and strict organization. Surely, not every paramilitary group was this well organized and, the leadership of Arkan should not be underestimated, but it reveals the willingness on both sides to strengthen each other’s cause which was the creation of a Greater Serbian state and being in power. In Syria, however, the ethnic and religious lines in reference to either being pro- or anti- regime are more blurred. Sunnis, Kurds and Christians are not homogeneous in their views on this matter.183 This could be dependent on the region the people live in, whether they have ties with the government, and/or if they are a member of a certain clan. According to Syria expert Aron Lund, the militias have been very useful to the regime, but they also represent a weakening of its centralized structure. The pro-Assad gangs have begun to self-finance through looting, protection rackets, smuggling, et cetera, and this may make them less dependent on the president. In the end, he probably will have to share power and resources with paramilitary men on the fringes of the state.184 Lund sees a “militiafication” of the Assad apparatus, where warlordism is not only on the opposition side but also on the pro-regime side. Only time will tell whether or not Assad can incorporate these groups or whether they will pose a real problem. Yet, the first signs
181 See for example contributions by David Keen and Peter Andreas on this topic. 182 Aryn Baker. “Syria’s Assad May Be Losing Control Over His Deadly Militias”, TIME, 11 September 2013. See also: http://world.time.com/2013/09/11/syrias-assad-may-be-losing-control-over-his-deadly-militias/. A similar comment was made by an aid worker with the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone during an interview with David Keen: “By fighting, you get a lot of money and excitement and see the country. You’re going from being nothing in a village to being Rambo.” Keen, The Economic Functions, p. 48. 183 Quote of Aron Lund, cited by: Baker, “Syria’s Assad”. 184 Lund, “Gangs of Latakia”. 47 of fragmentation are present. At the end of April 2015, certain members of the National Defense Forces (NDF)185 were accused of robbing, creating problems and conducting kidnappings in at least one pro-regime district in Homs. The Syrian army therefore clashed with the NDF forces, leaving wounded and dead on both sides.186 To better understand what may happen during and after a conflict with criminals or thugs that take part in paramilitaries, the following chapter will provide an overview of short biographies of some of the most prominent criminals in the Yugoslav and Syrian conflict.
185 The NDF are similar to the Shabbiha, but is a more structured and formalized pro-regime force. 186 Osama Abu Zeid and Dan Wilkofsky. “Tensions escalate between Syrian army, NDF in Homs city”, Syria: direct, 30 April 2015, at: http://syriadirect.org/news/tensions-escalate-between-syrian-army-ndf-in-homs-city/ 48
Chapter IV – The Criminal
In this chapter, the focus shifts from paramilitary organizations towards actual criminals who took part in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Syria. A few perpetrators were selected that can illustrate how criminals can be part of genocidal processes. To be consistent, their lives before and during, and in the case of Yugoslavia also after, the conflict are described. There will be a focus on their criminal behavior and their connection to the government or politicians. Due to a limited amount of data, the sections may differ in size and specific content. The purpose of this chapter is to present the reader with a micro level view on the topic, and to demonstrate similarities and discrepancies between the brief biographies.
§ 4.1 Former Yugoslavia As already became clear from previous chapters, criminals were instrumental in the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Some thugs became warlords, while others were merely part of a paramilitary group. Due to a lack of data, solely those who made “a name” for themselves are discussed below. In other words, the focus is on former criminals who obtained a function of significance and were frequently mentioned in local and international media.
§ 4.1.1 Željko Ražnatović - Arkan Arkan is one of the most notorious criminals of former Yugoslavia and fulfilled a major role in the massacres and looting committed in former Yugoslavia at the end of the last century. Because of his controversial celebrity status during and after the war, a lot has been written about this gangster.
Before the conflict Already at a young age, Arkan had a hard time to conform to the communist lifestyle in Yugoslavia and trouble with obeying the law.187 During his childhood, he hanged out with delinquent friends and skipped several classes. In his teen years he gradually moved toward the world of serious gangsters. His father, a colonel during World War II and after, worried about his
187 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 17-20. 49 son moving toward the thug life.188 Arkan had a very disciplinary father, pressing him from all sides, slapping him around and hanging him out of apartment windows. According to C.S. Stewart, this discipline strengthened him, but probably also “screwed him up.”189 During puberty, the future gangster was arrested a few times and by the age of seventeen he was sent to a detention center for boys in Vajevo, Serbia.190 A psychologist at that facility, Dobrivoje Radovanović, remembers the young Arkan as constantly interrupting his teaching. The soon to be mobster earned respect of his fellow inmates by being tough and violent. One day, he took a chair and smashed the head of a bigger kid that made fun of his high voice. After that, he organized his own crew and became one of the gang leaders in prison. Over the years, Radovanović conducted some psychological tests and concluded that “Arkan’s behavior stemmed from his father’s strict military discipline.”191 Because he lacked control as a child, he strove to have complete control when he was older. According to the psychologist, there was little or nothing they could do to rehabilitate him. Arkan was “almost destined to do the things he did.”192 After Arkan was released from jail in 1972, he was arrested again for armed robbery.193 The judge, who had seen him before, gave him a ten-year sentence. When he was in jail for only a couple of weeks, he escaped from prison, left Yugoslavia, and went to England and Italy. His father, the colonel, urged his son to join the military but eventually arranged a job for him at the secret service UDBA.194 This institution provided forged documents, fake passports and driver’s licenses, guns, ammunition and money. Under Tito’s regime, Arkan became active as an assassin and travelled through Europe to eliminate political opponents. In exchange for his ‘services’, the UDBA would offer him “a new life whenever he got too deep into crime and needed a trapdoor.” His first murder, however, was not an assignment of UDBA. During the robbery of an Italian family restaurant, Arkan shot the owner of the place.195 After this crime, he was suddenly more than only a thief.
188 See answer to question 7 in: Appendix – Interview with Slobodan Mitrić. 189 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 20. 190 See answer to question 7 in: Appendix – Interview with Slobodan Mitrić, on how Arkan also was arrested once before 1969. And: Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 22-23 191 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 23-25. 192 Quote from psychologist Dobrivoje Radvanovic. Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 25. 193 Ibid, pp. 25-26. 194 Slobodan Mitrić confirms the relationship between Arkan and the UDBA. He also mentions the SDB in this regard. See answers to questions 6 and 7 in: Appendix – Interview with Slobodan Mitrić. See also: Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 35 195 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 35-37. 50
During his time at the UDBA, he became a notorious bank robber. In 1979, for example, he robbed a jewellery store in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.196 Already at the age of twenty-three, he was on the most-wanted list of Interpol.197 Even though Interpol was after him, he travelled through Europe for about twenty-five years without encountering any major obstacles. A few times he was caught by the police, yet, he always managed to escape prison.198 In the 1980s, the gangster went back to Belgrade to continue his criminal activities and his work for the secret service. At the end of the eighties, “Arkan was Serbia’s thirty-six-year-old mobster king, piloting a pink Cadillac, sporting flashy suits and gold Rolexes, and flashing large-bore revolvers.”199 No one dared to challenge him, not even the police. He also had a pet tiger and fighting dogs to protect him.
During the conflict According to Weerdesteijn and Smeulers, Arkan’s criminal activities would increase in severity and extent during the wars. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed independence after a lengthy and bloody fight. During this battle, Arkan was seen as being responsible for some of the most extreme and brutal excesses. An example is the battle of Vukovar, a city that was overpowered by paramilitary groups. Among the militias were the Tigers of Arkan.200 During the war, the mobster was able to enrich himself greatly. He had invested in casinos, sold war profits, and dealt in cigarettes, whiskey, wood, food and oil. Rumours were also that Arkan was expanding his heroin-trafficking business through Western Europe. In Erdut, next to his training camp, he created a gas and contraband depot. The place became his private state with his own rules and laws. The profits were enormous and increased due to the international sanctions.201 In a documentary made by an independent Belgrade radio station, B92, he explained that the Serbian criminal philosophy was not to make DM 5 million in five years but to make DM 10,000 a day.202
196 Bovenkerk, Misdaadprofielen, p. 84. 197 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 8. 198 Bovenkerk, Misdaadprofielen, pp. 84-86. 199 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 8. 200 Weerdesteijn and Smeulders, “Propaganda”, p. 33; Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, p. 159. 201 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 199-200; Bovenkerk, Misdaadprofielen, p. 82. 202 Judah, The Serbs, p. 257. 51
After the conflict After five years of war, Arkan officially disbanded the Tigers in 1996. He began working with his wife Ceca to get her a music career. In addition, he invested for example in casinos and property development. He also purchased Belgrade’s Obilic Football Club, which was the start of his soccer stardom. In late 1997, the ICTY secretly indicted Arkan for war crimes, but this was halted due to the war in Kosovo. On March 31, 1999, Louise Arbour, chief prosecutor of the ICTY, had finally charged him with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.203 On January 15th, 2000, Arkan was murdered in Hotel Intercontinental in Belgrade.204 Four men, three of them well known underworld figures and a former police officer, shot him and one of his bodyguards in the lobby. This murder happened only a few weeks after a rumour surfaced that he would turn himself into The Hague and attempt to trade information incriminating Milošević for leniency.205
§ 4.1.2 Ismet “Celo” Bajramovic
Before the conflict Not much is publically known about the life of Ismet Bajramovic before the war. Journalist John Burns of The New York Times claims that if Celo was well known in Sarajevo during that time, “it was for his activities as a small-time villain, and for the fact that he had spent several years -- some accounts say six, others eight -- in prison for rape.”206
During the conflict Burns described Celo as “the godfather of Sarajevo”. He was the head of what amounted to the local mafia. The mobster controlled “a black-market empire built on smuggled food, alcohol, arms and ammunition, as well as, some say, prostitution and drugs.” Celo was also in charge of a protection racket that controlled most of the coffee bars and nightclubs that had reopened in Sarajevo after a year, when there was virtually no place where you could buy a sandwich, a cup of coffee or a drink. He also controlled clandestine exits from the city, charging up to DM 1,000
203 Stewart, Hunting the Tiger, pp. 241, 254-262. 204 Bovenkerk, Misdaadprofielen, p. 86. 205 Wilmer, The Social Construction, p. 194. 206 John Burns. “Gangs in Sarajevo Worry Diplomats”, The New York Times. October 4, 1993. 52 to guarantee safe passage. His power came from his secret contacts with Serbs, conducting a thriving trade at night. Celo’s army existed out of hundreds of men, and had a reputation for ruthlessness. His men beat and sometimes killed their victims.207 The behavior that got him in prison earlier was now a normalcy. In a deposition made by S.K. from Sarajevo, Belesici, on 23 November 1992 at the Gynaecology-Obstetrics Clinic in Belgrade a woman testified that she had been raped repeatedly during her 25-day detention. One of the perpetrators, and leader of the rape on her first night there, was Ismet Bajramovic.208 During the war, his connection with government forces seems ambivalent. Some underlined how gang leaders in Sarajevo were too strong to resist. Others claim that the government officials were “so entangled with these thugs” that they could not break free.209
After the conflict In 2005, Bosnian police had arrested Celo upon a request from the Serbian authorities claiming that he was responsible for war crimes against Bosnian Serbs. In the years afterwards, the godfather was investigated and tried for multiple crime offences. Yet, most of the trials against him were delayed because of a heart condition where he was suffering from. In December 2008, at the age of 42, Celo was found dead in his apartment in Sarajevo. As reported by the police, he committed suicide by shooting himself in the head. According to his lawyer and friends, Celo was depressed due to his medical problems and because his sister had recently died.
§ 4.1.3 Jusuf “Juka” Prazina
Before the conflict According to journalist Alfonso Rojo, who interviewed the mobster in 1992, Juka was the Godfather of the Bosnian capital’s underworld before the war. He often had been sent to prison:
207 Ibid. 208 United Nations, “Annex I Depositions of Serbian women given to the State Commission for War Crimes”, General Assembly, Security Council. A/47/813 S/24991, 18 December 1992, at: http://serbianunity.weebly.com/uploads/1/1/9/2/11921599/iv_sec_council_s_24991_on_the_rapes_of_serbian_wome n.pdf 209 Burns, “Gangs in Sarajavo”. 53
“I was sent to jail five times because the villains who ran things round here made up false charges against me...Now we’re seeing who are the good guys and who are the bad guys.”210
During the conflict During the war, Juka made sure he secured a political license for looting. Journalists, intellectuals and politicians could count on physical protection, which he could offer. When popular professor Zdravko Grebo attached Juka’s picture on his car, the famous gangster was accepted by the circles which otherwise would have remained beyond his reach.211 The confused government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by Alija Izetbegović, accepted the large and well-armed group of Juka’s men who were ready to give their lives for a “unitary and sovereign Bosnia.” Juka’s men were well fed, often drunk, had good cars and were armed. Juka gave leftovers of food and other commodities to hospitals and children. The domestic media saw him as a hero, and a foreign journalist called him the Robin Hood of Sarajevo. According to the gangster himself, he was adored by the people of his city: “Before we visit the frontline positions, we’re going to drop by the hospital to see if there’s any food needed. Then we’ll go to visit some refugees...Many people love me in Sarajevo.”212 During a visit of Rojo to the outskirts of Sarajevo, Juka’s men demonstrated a brotherly relationship with their commander. They slapped him on the back, took a packet of cigarettes or asked for a few litres of petrol, all the time saying “Juka, Juka” in tones of fascination and amazement. Juka was very powerful. He was able to provide food and arrange for people to leave town, or even decide on who were allowed to get a telephone line. These circumstances allowed the mobster to gain enormous wealth. Furthermore, he coordinated the city’s police forces and oversaw the defense of key installations. Later on, he was appointed Commander of special units of reserves of the Interior Ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina. “His forces grew so that it is assessed that at one point he commanded the army of 4,000 well-armed and well fed soldiers whose officers were mostly recruited among the people who are familiar to the police.”213 The level of impunity and power Juka experienced was overwhelming…. He was, for example, employing ‘effective’ ways of dealing with enemy snipers - throwing them over the
210 Alfonso Rojo. “Sarajevo’s Godfather turns crimebuster”, The Guardian, 3 June 1992. 211 “Juka of Sarajevo”, Vreme News Digest Agency, 10 January 1994, at: http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/serbiandigest/120/t120-5.htm 212 Rojo, “Sarajevo’s Godfather”. 213 “Juka of Sarajevo”, Vreme News Digest Agency, 10 January 1994. 54 edge of a building to save time and bullets: “They’re very dangerous...But we’re exterminating them like rats.” Other instances of his criminal background surfaced during a car trip with journalist Rojo back to his headquarters. The journalist witnessed how an old Renault was blocking the way and stalling the drive. Juka was furious and shot, without saying a word, the engine of the car. Furthermore, a couple driving a Seat with no license plates was ordered seizure of their car, even though Juka’s own car had no license plates either. According to the Godfather, the couple could not show him the car papers or license plates for the car: “I mean, you can’t just have people going round stealing whatever they want.”214 Juka was a well-known criminal who offered the services of his private army to the Bosnian government at the beginning of the war. But later on changed sides when he received a better offer from the Croats.215 There he was in charge of an anti-terror unit that effectively fought against Muslim troops of General Arif Pasalic, which made him a hero in the Croatian media. The warlord financially benefited on such a level that he was driven around in limousines. Ironically, Juka’s conflict with his superiors was about how the army top was enriching themselves by maintaining the war. When Muslims and Croats turned on each other, Juka deserted.216 In total, he deserted twice, which is a clear indicator that not ideology but his interest for plunder and fighting was the main motivator to participate in the war. In December 1993, the gangster was liquidated in Luik-Aken, Belgium, by a murder squad from Yugoslavia. Juka received death threats since he deserted the Bosnian army.217 It is rumoured that one of his bodyguards was involved in his murder.
§ 4.2 Syria The Syrian conflict is on-going, so gathering credible data on former criminals and their involvement in the war is complicated. Much of the data on individual combatants on both the Assad side as well as the opposition side are hard to verify and often incomplete for the purpose of this chapter. An example is the story of Abu Rami that was described by Aziz Nakkash in his report on the Alawite community in Homs. Rami is the owner of a real estate business and claims to be in charge of about 200 Shabbiha men. Before this, he was convicted and imprisoned for
214 Rojo, “Sarajevo’s Godfather”. 215 The Civil War in Bosnia, 1992. The Imperial War Museums. http://www.wartime.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205118142 216 “Juka’ in Belgie geëxecuteerd”, Trouw, 4 januari 1994. 217 Ibid. 55 murder. However, since March 2011 he has succeeded in gaining the confidence of the army and secret service, and has established direct contacts with high-ranking officers within these institutions.218 Even though this account illustrates that former criminals play an important part in the war, it does not provide us with any detailed information. Therefore I will work along a different approach using a typology of criminals: the government criminal, the career criminal and the possible “future” criminal. This typology represents the sorts of criminals that, according to this research, take part in the current civil war.
§ 4.2.1 Fawwaz al-Assad – the government criminal In the search for former criminals involved in the civil war in Syria, many of the books and articles studied mention the Assad family as a clan who runs an enterprise that is structurally linked to criminality.219 Smuggling rings and other illegitimate businesses are often connected or even run by its family members. Common names in this regard are Makhlouf and al-Assad. In this section the focus will be on one member in particular: Fawwaz al-Assad.
Before the conflict Fawwaz al-Assad may be the most prominent “criminal” within the Assad family. He and his henchmen gave the meaning we know today to the word Shabbiha. Other men from the al-Assad family played a role in creating this word and the concept of Tashbeeh, which means to act like a thug, but it was Fawwaz who was the pioneer thug that stood out in the city of Latakia and its surroundings.220 By the time Fawwaz was attending high school he surpassed every smuggler in the region. Along the Syrain coast and in al-Qurdaha, where he grew up, smuggling flourished. Fawwaz knew he had power because he and his brother, Munther, were full-blooded nephews of President Hafez al-Assad. He quickly understood that he was above the law. Fawwaz rapidly became the super power in Latakia, and probably its richest inhabitant. He and his cousins controlled the smuggling routes along the entire coast: Latakia, Jableh, Banyas and Tartus. Fawwaz started to show criminal and violent tendencies early on in his life. Stories about how his group was beating up people started coming out from the early years of the 1980’s. He
218 Nakkash, “Alawite Dilemma’s in Homs”, p. 9. 219 See for example: Rubin. The Truth, p. 127, and Holliday, “The Assad Regime”. 220 Mohammad D. “The Original Shabiha”. 56 would drive around Latakia staring down people and if you challenged him or didn’t demure you would pay a heavy price.221 At that time, Latakia had many cafes and meeting points for the local population. Soon all of these public areas would be invaded by Fawwaz. For example, in a café owned by two brothers from the Sheiko family, he verbally abused most of the visitors. Soon, no locals went there anymore and the Shabbiha of Fawwaz dominated the place. When Fawwaz was around 20 years old his entourage was not that big or known, but you would see them in action every now and then. Fawwaz was always armed. The other smugglers were not interested in him at first, yet, they slowly started working with him enabling him to parade them and intimidate people even more. The thug in Fawwaz started to grow. People started hearing and seeing more and more of his henchmen. Those guys were mostly big tough mountain kids, who saw a chance to make some money and to intimidate people with their appearance. Mohammad D. lived in Latakia and has often seen Fawwaz act in a criminal way:
“The Actions of Fawwaz and some of that generation of Shabiha that I witnessed and could be called thuggish are many. I can list tens of them, or probably need a full book for them….Fawwaz was a real bully and acted like one. Officials would avoid him. He gave the word Shabih its full meaning in the minds of Syrians.”
By the end of the 1980’s, Fawwaz was a millionaire, married a beautiful girl, had the biggest house in al-Zira’a, and was the president of the soccer club Tishreen Sports Club. He led a successful career in smuggling cars and cigarettes, gaining increasing notoriety for rape, driving in a multi-car convoy, and ransom kidnappings.222
During the conflict Not much is known about the precise role Fawwaz plays within the Syrian conflict. The European Union, however, has imposed sanctions on Fawwaz for his alleged involvement in “the
221 Mohammed D. experienced this behavior during the time he lived in that region. 222 Mohanad Hage Ali. “Rape and ransoms: Hilal al-Assad’s ‘thug’ legacy”, Al Arabiya News, 25 March 2014, at: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2014/03/25/Deaths-in-the-Syrian-clan-Hilal-al-Assad.html 57 repression against civilian population as member of the shabiha.”223 Some even mention him as the leader of the Shabbiha militias and how he would coordinate them with his brother Munther.224 According to a Syrian news station, Fawwaz died in March 2015 of a chronic liver disease. One of the sources quoted in the article says that his death brings peace to the region of Latakia. During the conflict, he was apparently storming the houses of civilians who were involved in the anti-Assad protests.225
§ 4.2.2 Mihraç Ural aka Ali Kayali – the career criminal
Before the conflict Mihraç Ural was born in Hatay province, which is on the Turkey-Syria border. Ural was one of the leading members of the organization Hatay Liberation Army that tried to annex the province to Syria. In August 1980, he fled to Syria where he was granted Syrian citizenship. “Mihraç Ural…has long been in the service of the Syrian intelligence agency, the Mukhabarat, according to his former comrades at the Turkey's People's Liberation Party/Front (THKP-C), a revolutionist, communist terrorist organization founded in the early 1970s in Turkey.”226 Engin Erkiner, a former member of the organization, emphasizes the criminal or terrorist background of Ural and his connection to the Syrian government. Erkiner claims that Ural was responsible for the killing of his communist comrades. Furthermore, he became a double agent, working for both Turkish and Syrian intelligence agencies after he was arrested in 1978 in Turkey.227 In addition, he “entered the Beqaa Valley-centered underworld of Syrian-backed radical factions, developed connections to the Kurdish PKK, and also seems to have struck up a
223 The Council of the European Union. “Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria”, Official Journal of the European Union, 10 May 2011; “Syria unrest: Who are the shabiha?”, BBC News, 29 May 2012, at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14482968 224 See for example: Grace Abuhamad and Andrew J. Tabler. “All the Tyrant’s Men: Chipping Away at the Assad Regime’s Core”, The Washington Institute, 23 August 2013, at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/all-the-tyrants-men-chipping-away-at-the-assad-regimes-core; “Fawwaz Al-Assad”, Foundation for Defense of Democracy, at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/fawwaz-al-assad; Barah Mikaïl. “Who supports Assad?”, The Fride Blog, A European Think Tank for Global Action. 23 May 2014, at: http://fride.org/blog/who- supports-assad/ 225 Beri Mohammed, “Death of Assad’s cousin brings peace to Latakia: Activists”, ARA news, 29 March 2015, at: http://aranews.net/2015/03/death-of-assads-cousin-brings-peace-to-latakia-activists/ 226 Aydin Albayrak. “Mihraç Ural, a man with a long history of terrorism”, Today’s Zaman, 14 May 2013, at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-315474-mihrac-ural-a-man-with-a-long-history-of-terrorism.html 227 Albayrak. “Mihraç Ural”. 58 relationship with the Assad regime itself.”228 He has married a secretary of Rifaat al-Assad for example.229
During the conflict The Syrian government made use of Ural’s services to recruit Arab Alawites in the Hatay province in Turkey. In an interview with the BBC in September 2012, Ural claimed that young people from the Hatay, Mersin and Adana region in southern Turkey have fought on Assad’s side in Syria. However, he emphasized that he was not involved in encouraging or recruiting them: “They come here looking to join in the thousands.”230 Ural has also been blamed for creating unrest between Alawite populations in Hatay Province by organizing rallies in support of the Syrian government and against the Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).231 With regard to actual violence, Ural took up arms when the civil war started and now leads his own unit, the Syrian Resistance. Allegedly this unit is composed of 2000 militias. He was also the number one suspect in the bombings in Reyhanli, Turkey, on 11 May 2013. The bombings killed 52 people.232 The alleged terrorist has also been part of the propaganda machine of Assad. In a video, Ural or “Kayali” claims that the “Banias must be soon besieged, liberated and cleansed…if required we will participate in the battles in Banias and fulfil our national duty….Our job is to cleanse and liberate towns…for [regime] troops.” He was most likely involved in mass violence against Sunni’s in the Alawite-majority coastal region of Banias in the spring of 2013. Furthermore, an article by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi for Syria Comment on Kayali demonstrates their activity on social media. For instance, Ural’s unit has a Facebook page with video clips containing speeches of Ural with pictures of himself, Bashar al-Assad and Che Guevara in the background.233
228 Aron Lund, “Gangs of Latakia”. 229 Joshua Landis, “Do the Massacres in Bayda and Banyas Portend Ethnic Cleansing to Create an Alawite State?”, Syria Comment, 13 May 2013, at: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/round-up/ 230 Mahmut Hamsici, “Suriye’de isyancılara karsı savasan Türkiyeliler,” BBC Turkce, 2 September 2012. Cited in: Stephen Starr, “The Renewed Threat of Terrorism to Turkey”, Combating Terrorism Center, 25 June 2013. 231 Recai Komur, “Hatay Rally Supporting Assad is Work of Syrian Organization,” Sabah, September 3, 2012. Cited in: Starr, “The Renewed Threat”. 232 Selcan Hacaoglu and Dana El Baltaji, “Turkey Arrests Nine in Deadly Bombings Blamed on Syria,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2013. 233 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi. “A Case Study of “The Syrian Resistance,” a Pro-Assad Militia Force”, Syria Comment, 22 September 2013, at: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/aymenn-al-tamimi-speaks-to-ali-kayali-and- profiles-the-syrian-resistance-a-pro-assad-militia-force/ 59
§ 4.2.3 Abu Rami – the future criminal? The “future criminal” is the last category and differs from the concept of being a criminal before a conflict. The following solely functions as an illustration of how young people are lured into the conflict by government forces. This feature is common in conflicts and is therefore not specifically linked to the Syrian case. Still, with the international attention towards young people leaving their own country to fight this war, and the possible problems Assad may experience in the future regarding the fragmentation of his power base, it seems of relevance to mention this category. One example is briefly described below.234 The name Abu Rami is often used as a pseudonym by Syrians who are interviewed by the media.235 In this case, the story is about a 17-year-old boy who was killing for the Assad regime in 2012. In his neighborhood, people called him the Assassin of Nisreen.236 “Some fight for ideology, some for the love of Bashar, others money…I did it for revenge.” His first job with the Shabbiha was to scare off the protesters: “We didn’t do anything until they started to curse Druse, Alawites or Christians. Then we would act. At first we didn’t carry guns, just sticks and knives.”237 Later on, when the uprising turned into urban warfare, the army used the Shabiha to man checkpoints. First these were 6-hour shifts but later became 11-hour shifts. During these long shifts, they started drinking a lot of energy drinks mixed with alcohol. Rami was paid 15,000 Syrian pounds, which is around the minimum wage in Syria. Men who accepted missions outside their own neighborhoods and who killed armed opponents received higher payments. Those who had a confirmed kill even earned a bonus. After nine months of fighting, Rami’s brother took him to an opposition group that promotes dialogue over violence. The boy experienced a revelation and changed his behavior. After this, he left the Shabbiha and started studying for a high school diploma. He claims he “ended up tired of killing.” In the case of Rami, he was fortunate since his brother got him out of the situation and because he responded to the discussions and therapy. Yet, some of these boys may experience a form of power that is hard to let go, especially when they were having trouble obeying the law
234 On young people leaving their own country to fight in Syria, see: Raffaello Pantucci and Laura Dawson. “Thick as Thieves: European Criminals Take to Syria’s Battlefield”, The Royal United Services Institute, 31 March 2014, at: https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C533931D971E60/#.VRk9i_msW_E On fragmentation in Syria, see: Lund,“Gangs of Latakia”. 235 Many combatants use pseudonyms or street names to prevent from being captured by the enemy. 236 This name was taken from a street of Alawite and Druse families in Tadamon. 237 Elkin and Ayestaran, “A Hired Killer”. 60 before the conflict. As has been mentioned in chapter III, how can these boys go from being a “nobody”, to somebody with guns and power, back to being a “nobody” again?
§ 4.3 Similarities and differences The biographies give a preliminary insight in how criminals were used by regimes. It seems that thugs were often put to work and once they were in place would have the freedom to do whatever suited them. In the Yugoslav case, the authorities may not always have had the power to keep the criminals under their control. The president of Bosnian-Herzegovina, for example, was in a way forced to condone the power base of Juka, since he was seen as a Robin Hood and local hero. How is it possible that a criminal can be seen as a hero? In his book on social bandits, Eric Hobsbawm describes how there can be a supportive relationship between bandits and the peasant population even though the elites see the bandits as outlaws. Economists Nicholas A. Curott and Alexander Fink make his argument more broadly applicable by setting it loose from the Marxian class analysis and historical developments. They state that “bandits are praised because they provide valuable service to society, though mostly unintentional.” In other words, they are making an argument for rational behavior rather than social behavior.238 Juka seems to fit that model. Another valuable observation is the fact that Juka deserted twice during the war, which underlines a lack of ideological motives and supports the claim of handling purely out of self- interest. Public opinion and “image building” appear to be important. For instance in the case of Arkan who had a strong reputation as a successful and terrifying leader. Also in the case of Syria, the feature of reputation seems of relevance. Ural, for example, is contributing to the propaganda machine of Assad by creating an image of a fierce militia leader through video messages and photos. Furthermore, the criminalization of the state becomes clear from the short biographies. Even before the conflict, both Yugoslavia as well as Syria used criminals as assets in their secret services. During the war, they let the thugs roam free, which in some cases resulted in taking over basic services the government used to arrange like supplying basic commodities and telephone lines.
238 Nicholas A. Curott and Alexander Fink. “Bandit Heroes: Social, Mythical, or Rational?”, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. 71(2), (2012). 61
Another similarity is the importance of smuggling. The embargos and international sanctions created an environment that stimulated smuggling and black markets, as we also established in previous chapters.239 Especially in the case of Yugoslavia, Juka and Arkan enriched themselves tremendously via the import and export of (basic) goods such as food and cigarettes. Interestingly, before the latest war in Syria, smuggling was strongly connected to the Assad family. Yet, no data was found about smuggling operations on the Assad side for the criminals described in this chapter. Still, the multiple stories about black markets combined with the imposed international sanctions make one believe smuggling may flourish as never before.240 Furthermore, civil wars create new borders within a country or region, which also encourages black market activity. The siege of Sarajevo, with its many checkpoints, was only one example in this regard.241 In Homs and Aleppo, similar artificial borders are contributing to the same phenomenon. The fact that smuggling is easier during conflict makes it an incentive for the criminals to get involved and to maintain that particular situation. According to Keen, the international community should therefore find ways to eliminate this incentive. For instance, by providing realistic economic alternatives to violence and by punishing abuse and exploitation by all combatants, not just those who are seen as “rebels”. An important difference between the Yugoslav and Syrian case is the enforcement of the rule of law before the conflict starts. In the Yugoslav case, all the thugs described had been to prison, and were officially recognized as criminals by the authorities. Clearly, the relationships between the government and its criminals changed during the war. In Syria, however, the thugs described are not recognized as official criminals. By contrast, they were often part of the government via family ties, as the examples of Fawwaz and Ural demonstrate. In other words, in the Syrian case the ties between the state and crime were much deeper and structural. Interestingly, all the Yugoslav biographies end with a description of how the criminals ended up death. Two out of three were murdered by other criminals that very likely had ties with government officials. This touches upon the possible downside of using criminals: when given that much freedom, how does the government get the criminals under control again? Furthermore, if they have worked together with the regime and performed an important function
239 Keen. The Economic Functions, chapter 4 240 See for example: Snyder, “ISIS is selling cheap oil”. 241 Andreas, Blue Helmets. 62 during the war they could also implicate their superiors in trials, even though they may lack credibility in front of a judge. In Syria, this problem will probably only surface if the international community tries to prosecute the Assad regime via the ICC or a tribunal. If this is not the case, then most former and war criminals will be protected by their surname or ties to the Assad family. All in all, the micro-level presents us with evidence of actual criminals taking part in the hostilities and enriching themselves during the wars. It also demonstrates how governments let these thugs “roam free” to profit from their skills.
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Conclusion and implications This thesis sought to examine how criminals are used by genocidal states. The analysis suggests that former criminals can be of great benefit to a government in trouble of maintaining power. The main finding is that government officials can transform former thugs into valuable assets needed in their battle against “the enemy” or opposition. Via paramilitary groups, the criminals are changed into fighters for the regime by condoning and stimulating their criminal behavior. Their ability to instill great fear and terror, their experience with violence, murder and plunder, their lack of codes of conduct, and their ability to extend and expand smuggling networks during sanctions and embargos, all contribute to their attractiveness for usage in violent conflicts. Furthermore, paramilitary groups are a perfect institution to deny a connection between the criminals and government officials, leaving room for the genocidal government to exploit the criminal’s talents without direct damage to its (international) status. Finally, the criminals profit as well, being able to do the things that are normally considered illegal without being afraid of (direct) repercussions. It seems then that all parties will, at least at first, observe the conflict as a win-win situation. However, the problems some government officials encountered in Sarajevo and the fragmentation of the Shabbiha in Syria reveal that governments also risk losing power by employing criminals and paramilitary groups. Even though this research offers a substantial amount of data on different levels, additional research should be done with more cases to make the results more reliable and to improve its generalizability. Due to a limited word count and time constraints, not more than two case studies were included. In future research, one would be wise to also consider cases in South America for instance or look into the Rwandan or Armenian genocides.242 Furthermore, secret services seem to play an important role in recruiting the criminals.243 New studies should examine the role different government institutions fulfil in the recruitment and abetting of criminals in these contexts. In addition, the cases described suggest that not only government agencies recruit and use thugs in their fight. Rebel or insurgency groups in Syria and the FARC in Colombia make use of smugglers and murderers to sustain.244 Additional research could be done to find out what dynamic is created and how it may influence the government’s battlefield
242 See for example the contributions of Totten, “The Release” and Mazzei, Death Squads. 243 See for example: Bovenkerk, “Organized Crime”, p. 45, and: answer to question 5 in: Appendix – Interview with Slobodan Mitrić. 244 Herbert, “Partisans”, p. 79; Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conflict”, pp. 219-221. 64 decisions. Finally, the micro-level focus was on criminals who made a name for themselves. It would be interesting to also consider criminals who were less in the media, to see if governments treated them different from those who were on and off in the media. During this study, some concerns were raised. First, in both former Yugoslavia and Syria, organized crime seemed to intensify during the conflict. This raises the question of how countries after a conflict can overcome this situation. Former Yugoslavia still suffers from the criminalized environment the war left behind.245 Bovenkerk emphasizes that the rise of the mafia is closely connected to the Wars of Partition in the 1990s and the corruptive Milošević regime between 1988 and 2000.246 Syria seems to be heading the same direction. Before the war the country was strongly criminalized and full of corruption. Nevertheless, the war is leading to many different factions with their own particular interests and power bases. Ironically, this further criminalization threatens the long held power base of the Assads. The recent fighting between the Syrian army and the NDF groups in Homs is illustrative in that sense.247 Second, the conflicts are beneficial to criminals and are therefore a situation they most probably would like to endure as long as possible. This view clashes with the intentions of the civilian population and the international community. It is important that the international community takes this into consideration when negotiating about peace and rebuilding a nation. To return to the discussion that triggered this research: criminals are used by governments to do the “dirty work” during conflicts for the above mentioned reasons, which adds a new dimension to the debate on whether ordinary people are able and willing to become mass murderers. If the contested notion of how normal people can all become mass murderers was convincing, it should not have left government officials desperate to turn to criminals in the first place. Apparently, even with years of indoctrination in former Yugoslavia, not many, or at least enough, people were willing to fight. Yugoslavs demonstrated a lack of will to take up arms against their neighbors or to join the army. In a similar vein, many Syrian army men deserted when the protests turned into violent encounters with civilians. Thus, it is no surprise that those first considered outlaws would now be seen as perfect “patriots”. This thesis offers a comparative analysis on how criminals are used by genocidal governments and provides insight into the transformation of criminals into combatants. The
245 See for example Andreas on Bosnia in: Blue Helmets, pp. 119-121. 246 Bovenkerk, “Organized Crime in Former Yugoslavia”, chapter 5. 247 Zeid and Wilkofsky. “Tensions escalate”. 65 results suggest that the international community should pay close attention to this phenomenon, since most of the atrocities are committed by paramilitary groups with criminals as combatants or even leaders of the militias. In accordance with Samuel Totten’s account on this topic, the international community should see this trend as an indication that needs to be understood as an early warning sign in the prevention of genocide or other major human rights violations. If governments or terrorist organizations release groups of prisoners and start militias, that is a clear indication that a society is on the brink of disaster. Gangsters, benefiting from war situations, pose a problem when trying to solve a conflict. One should therefore give greater attention to this situation and prevent it or deal with it in an early stage of chaos and war.
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Acknowledgements: I thank my teacher Dr. Uğur Ümit Üngör, second reader Dr. Kjell Anderson, Iva Vukusic, Fieke Hamers, Merel Hoftijzer, Marthe Huigens, Lianne Hulsebosch, Suzanne Jekel and Jana de Vries for their time and suggestions.
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Appendix – Interview Slobodan Mitrić: This section outlines an interview with Slobodan Radojev Mitrić, also known in the Netherlands as “Karate Bob”. He belongs to the first Yugoslav diaspora that came to the Netherlands and became well known in the seventies when he shot five people of which he killed three. During his trial in the Netherlands, he claimed that he refused an assignment to liquidate political dissident Vladimir Dapčević and therefore deserted the secret service (UDBA). As a result, his life was in danger and he had to defend himself during the shooting. Karate Bob was sentenced to eighteen years, which two years later was reduced to thirteen years, of imprisonment and has since stayed in the Netherlands via an alien status.248 Due to practical reasons, the interview was done via the e-mail instead of face-to-face. Below one will first find the questions and answers that were of importance to this thesis, translated into English.249 This is followed by the complete interview (in Dutch) and some additional information the respondent sent.250
Translated questions and answers: 5. What was the connection between organized crime/criminals and the UBDA? Were they working together? If so, how did this became clear? Answer: For the OZNA and later UDBA, that was dissolved in 1966, organized crime/criminals were not recruited at the national intelligence and secret services UDBA and KOS and one was fighting them. After […] 1966, when instead of the UDBA the SDB came, changes were made – one chose for the English intelligence doctrine in which war criminals were recruited. Yet, in 1966 special contra-intelligence services “CBOB” and “TAJNA” were founded, which successfully controlled all the workings of OSI-SDB and KOS. “TAJNA” facilitated the infiltration of officers of JNA under false “legende” in organized crime – for example, lieutenant Radonjic of JNA infiltrated the Yugoslav national casino which was stationed on Montenegrin island “Sveti Stefan”. Later, Radonjic went to the US and became the “Godfather” of the Serbian underworld. (Everything is described in my autobiography “TAJNA”.251)
6. Earlier, you mentioned that you knew Arkan’s father, and Arkan himself. Where did you know them from? What sort of relationship did you have? Answer: Colonel Haim Ražnatović, the father of Željko (Arkan) had a flat in the building of the Ministry of the Interior across the building of the JNA were my father had a flat in the building of the officers of Tito’s National Guard on Omlandinskih Brigada in New Belgrade. Haim, also known as Seho, a resistance man of Muslim descent that on request of his resistance woman changed the name Haim into the Serbian orthodox name of Veljko – otherwise, she would not marry him. He used to be the minister of Tourism of federal Yugoslavia. Because of that, he was punished and banished by the communist party. Nevertheless, Tito later granted
248 Bovenkerk, Misdaadprofielen, p. 100 249 Only parts of the interview, that I refer to in the thesis, are translated due to the usefulness of the answers and time constraints. 250 To keep the interview as transparent and authentic as possible, I have not changed or corrected any of the writing of the interviewee. Even though some of the grammar and spelling used, which is a fusion of Dutch and Serbian, may be challenging to the Dutch reader, I believe the overall content is clear. 251 Karate Bob often refers to his book TAJNA. Unfortunately, this book is not (yet) translated in Dutch, which made some of his answers incomplete. 72 him clemency and gave him the position of Colonel in the JNA army in northern Yugoslavia, in the border area of Slovenia - Jescenica, where he got his pension in the early sixties. However, in 1966, he was named head of a special section at one of Tito’s civil ultra-contra-intelligence service “CBOB”. From 1968/1969, [I was together with Haim], which is to say, we worked in Veljko. In this special section, we had more than 1000 pensioned high officers with the minimum rank of major. On request of Haim, I recruited his son Željko in “TAJNA” section “OSI”. Somewhere in the middle of the seventies, Željko (Arkan) came to the Netherlands with the purpose of contacting me. To contact me, he had orders to “go to jail”. During his imprisonment in Maastricht, he wrote me often. After [a while], I broke contact with him since he complained and blamed me for doing [what I did] because I knew he was half Muslim, which of course is nonsense. I simply broke contact with Arkan because the BVD started to fantasize and blamed me for refusing to undergo plastic surgery and work together with Mike van der Sluis in the Dutch embassy in Belgrado to operate against my country. Well, I refused that since I did not want to work for whatever secret service […]. Still, they were blackmailing me via the “murders” described in Tito’s moordmachine. It was painful for them, and they had to see that when I openly wrote about how I had not done it. I wrote a book to arrest the real perpetrators of which some also protected the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Dutch BVD was immediately interested in Arkan, because he had [given them] information on me, and had not omitted that I was a member of the “SDB”. Arkan rose quickly to a high position within a special section of the BVD, which existed out of Dutch top criminals. This is also extensively described in my book “TAJNA”. Top secret reports of the SDB reveal that Arkan was also in Amsterdam in December 1973, he had the assignment that if I had killed general secretary of Leninstise & Marksistise communistic party colonel Vladimir Dapčević that he should liquidate me – this information I received from a very trustworthy source – I am not sure that it is true. During that time, the son of Haim’s best friend was in Amsterdam. “Mica” was found in the same building on New Belgrade, and it could be the case that also Arkan was there, but I have not seen him there at that time.
7. What do you remember of your meetings with Arkan? How was Arkan behaving during that time for example? Answer: I got to know Arkan in 1965 – at that time, he was a boy […] living in the building across of where I lived. Later, it appeared that together with the son of a colonel of Tito’s National Guard who lived in my building, he robbed a cigar shop at night between the building Sloliter C7 and Sloliter A1 on Omlandinskih Brigada in New Belgrade. Subsequently, both boys ended up in youth detention. The father of Željko felt sad about it. After Željko’s release he told me that the burglary was an assignment of the SDB to be able to get in contact with organized crime. He once brought me to his boss, a certain “Pera – Pezo 404”, the son of a general secretary of interior affairs who lived in a skyscraper near our building. In the presence of Arkan, I called this “Pero – Pezo 404” faggot since he let Željko do such things. This happened somewhere in the summer of 1969. Afterwards, I took Željko to a Yugoslav Karate match in the neighborhood Vozdovac in Belgrade – there I had an argument with the organization of the [championship] (later on, one of them went to the Netherlands and worked as a dentist and in his free time as a “Djakon” of Serbian orthodox bungler – but also as a “brilliant” advisor of the Dutch BVD and the police, where he was also a bungler commissioned in a prison in The Hague were Serbian resistance people were held) because of false categories and people of 100 kilos were allowed to participate in the category of people who only weighted 70 kilos. 73
In 1968/69, I was a Karate assistant trainer of Djoko Djurisic who was head […] trainer of the UDBA and later SDB – I trained, among others, French and US marines in Karate at our special Karate Institute of the Yugoslav Freedom Service in the sportshall of Central Branwer of Belgrade. In 1968/1969, I had personal contact with the heads of MI6 and CIA and visited them at their private addresses, but also in their embassies. SDB did not know about this. This is also written in my book “TAJNA”.
Original interview:
1. Kunt u iets vertellen over uzelf? Waar bent u opgegroeid, uit wat voor familie komt u, en had u een goede/prettige jeugd? Antwoord: Ben heburen in Backo Dobro Polje op 3 mart 194? - in een dorp in Vojvodina die vor de twede wereld orlog was okupert dor de Mofen (volks dojtsers) die de nam dragde "Kisker" - het was een protestantse dorp die had de hrotste protestantse kerk in Vojvodina.. de bevoners van "Kisker" waren leden van Hitlers SS en haden fel verskeklihe misdaden tehen Serben in de orlog hedan en bij befreding van Jugosavije dor Partizanen heben alemal hevluht nar Mofelanland.. later in 1968 heb antal van hun in Mincen leren kenen,, Ik had zer slete jugd - want tun i 4 jar was mijn fader is verhaust nar Bosnie in de stat Foca - war hij Latente komandant was van JNA.. Mijn famielie van vaders kant - zo als ale andere familis in PIVA waren edelen van Serbise Rijk die in 1389 is dor Turken bezet en heben in PIVA (momental de een van Montenegro provincis - en gebid van cirka 50 kilometers in kwadrt - war hogste Serbise bergen zijn :Durmitor - Maglic - Soko - Vojnik, enzovort - med twe reviren Piva i Tara ) heben gerila orog tegen Turen vorheset - die 500 jar lang durde..de laste belanreste leder van Piva tehen Turke ven Austoungarse monarhi was mijn grot-grot opa Mato..en in de twede wereld orlog waren mijn opa Gabriel - fader Radoje - oms Novak en Novica (Novica is een dag na befreding dor naci muslims in Bosnie dodgeskoten) - tante Milka en oma Milica ale partizanen.. Mij moedr famieli stamt rekstreks van serbise Koniklike familie Music (Stevan i Lazar wins om was Car Lazar - die op 28 juni 1389 op Kosovo zijn dor Turken vermord)..In de twedewereld orlog ale leden van mijn moeder familie waren in de dinst van Koniklike Jugoslavie.. war 4 broers van mijn moeder die waren hoge oficiren bij Koniklike Jugoslavie en later bij de Koniklike verzet tehen Hitler zijn vermord.. (in de autobiografie van mij "TAJNA" is bred over dat boven henumde jou vrahen ales besrijven..)
2. Hoe bent u gerekruteerd door de geheime dienst van Tito (UDBA)? Hoe ging dat in zijn werk? Antwoord: ook dese vrah is bred beantword in de de autobiografie van mij "TAJNA"
3. In uw boek “Tito’s moordmachine” laat u doorschermeren dat uw oom Bozidar Nikolic een grote rol bij heeft gespeeld bij uw rekrutering. Denkt u dat deze manier van rekruteren representatief is voor hoe de meeste werknemers werden gerekruteerd bij de UDBA? Via familie/kennissen?
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Antwoord: Slobodan Radojev Mitric was and is a Serbian writer, and has never been a liquidation agent! In the beginning of August 1973, Slobodan Radojev Mitric started in Belgrade an investigation into the liquidation of hundreds of Yugoslav political emigrants in the world. At the end of August of that year, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia, General Franjo Herljević ordered the Yugoslav Internal Security Service SDB to liquidate Slobodan Radojev Mitric. Some 20 SDB agents then attacked and severely wounded Slobodan Radojev Mitric in front of the building of the Yugoslav Daily NewspaperPolitika in Belgrade. On December 24 of that same year, SDB agents shot at Slobodan Radojev Mitric with a machine gun in the center of Amsterdam. In self defense, Slobodan Radojev Mitric prevented the SDB from liquidating him. Slobodan Radojev Mitric winds up in jail and starts writing novels about the misdeeds of the Yugoslav Security Service and publishing them (in Dutch), such as “Tito’s Murder Machine” and “Tito’s Secret Agent”. But, of course a murderer he never was; instead, by presenting himself as a murderer, he succeeded in revealing almost all the misdeeds that were committed against the political emigrants from Yugoslavia. The most important novel “The Murder Machine of Belgrade” was written in 1977. At the request of Tito, the CIA confiscated it… The last ‘CIA’ agent Radonjic of the organization "SOPO" has a copy of that novel, in which all the murders of the political emigrants are described in detail…252
4. Wat voor een type mensen werden volgens u voornamelijk gerekruteerd door de geheime dienst van Tito? Zat daar een patroon in? Met andere woorden, denkt u dat de overheid een specifiek beleid had in dat opzicht? Antwoord: Autslotend de vorzets mensen werden lied van jugoslavise inlihtinge en kontrainlihtinge dinstyen - zo als het hefal in Nederland was nar de Twede Wereld Orlog.. 1947/48 werden veranderinge in Jugoslavie gedan - de nacionale Inlihtinge en Kontra Inlihtinge Dinst OZNA werd ophehewen en in plac darvan kwam UDBA (die under ministeri van Binelandse zaken kwam en KOS die under minisyteri van Defensi kwam).
5. Hoe was de verhouding tussen georganiseerde misdaad/criminelen en de UBDA? Werkten zij samen? Zo ja, waar bleek dat uit? Antwoord: Tot het OZNA later UDBA was die in 1966 was ophegewen werd organiserde misdaad/criminelen werden niet regrutert bij nacionale inlihtinge en vajliget dinsten UDBA en KOS en werden tegen hun hevohten.. na de 1966 tun in plac van UDBA de SDB kvam werden veranderingen hedan - men heft gekosen Engelse inihtinge doktrine war kriminelen werden regrutert .. mar dan werden 1966 hestiht speciale kontrainlihtinge dinst "CBOB"en ''TAJNA'' die sukcersvul kunde kontroleren al die hedu van OSI - SDB en KOS.. "TAJNA" liet oficiren van JNA under false ''legende'' infliteren in organiserde misdsd - bijforbeld lojtenant van JNA Radonjic werd inflitert in jugoslavise nacionale kazino die was stasionertb op een Montenegrianse ejland "Sveti Stefan".. later Radonic hing nar USA en werd de "PET VADER" van Serbise Underwereld.. (in de autobiografie van mij "TAJNA" is ales besrijven..)
6. U liet weten dat u de vader van Arkan, en Arkan zelf ook, gekend heeft. Waar kende u hen van? Wat was uw precieze relatie met hen?
252 Mitrić answered this question by giving a summary of one of his books. Unfortunately, the content does not fit the question. 75
Antwoord: Kolonel Haim Raznjatovic deVader van Zeljko (Arkan) had een vlet in de hebauw van Ministeri van Binelanse Zaken tehenower hebauw van JNA war mijn vader een vlet had in hebauw van ofucren van Titos Nationale Garde op Omladinskih Brigada in Niuwe Belgrado.. Haim bijnam Seho (een verset man van muslim ordjine die op verzuk van zijn verset vrauw de nam van Haim in Serbise ortogddose nam Veljko liet veranderen - anders waude ze niet mede Haim trauwen.. was minister van turisme van federale Jugoslavie gewest.. dor dat werd dor koministise partij hestraft en uit verbanen - war later Tito heft haim verheven en in de JNA leger als Kolonel laten hem werken in nord van Jugoslavie Slovenie in de grenc hebit Jesenice war hij behin sestige jaren werd pensionert mar in 1966 benumt als hoft van speciale sekti boj een van Titos civile ultra kontrainlihtingr dinst "CBOB"..vanaf 1968/69 ben samen med Haim dat wil sehen Veljko heverkt.. in dese speciale sekti haden wij mer dan 1000 pensionerde hoge oficiren med de minimum rang van major.. Op verzuk van Haim heb ik zijn zon Zeljko regrutert in "TAJNA"sekci "OSI". ergens miden seventige jaren is Zeljko (arkan) nar nederland gekomen med de dul med mij kontakt optenemen.. om mij te kontakteren heft hij opdraht gekrehen in gewangenis te belanden.. hij skrijft darna mij regelmatig uit huis van bewaring in Mastriht.. nar een potje heb ik tun kontakten med hem grbroken war hij zich beklagt en beshuldig mij dat ik sou dat hedan heben omdat iik wet dat hij half muslim is.. wat nsturlich vlauwe kul is - ik heb sempel kontakt med arkan hebroken omdat BVD behint te vantaeserennen en mij beshuldigde dat ik gewegert heb om p;astik operatie te krehen en darna samen med Mike van der Sluis nar Belgrado ihn Nederlanse Ambasade tegen mijn land te opereren.. Nijh ik heb dat gewegert omdat ik waude nietc mer med welken dan ook heheme dinsyten hedu hreben - mar ja ze liten mij santeren vor de ''morden'' die in Titos Mordmashjne werd beskrijven..penlik ewas vor hun en dat moeten ze ook slikn tun ik openlik skrijf dat ik dat niet hedan heb mar roman geskrewen om werklihev daders te aresteren die ook somige koninklike nedrland tin beshermde.. Nederlanse BVD had dierekt grote belangsteling in Arkan - want hij haf hun informatie over mij en verzweg niet dat ik lied van "SDB" was.. Snel klemt Arkan hog in nederlanse speciale sekci van BVD welken was vormert van top Nerderlanse Kriminelen.. ok over dat hedu is bred beskrjven in de roman "TAJNA'' .. (uit topsikert raporten van SDB blijk dat arkan ook in december 1973 in Amsterdam was die opdraht had als ik Gendral Sekretaris van Leninistise & Marksistise Komunistise Partej Kolonel Vladimir Dapcevic vermord had dat hij dan mij moet likvideren - hu vel dese informati bij mij is hekomen dor zer betrauwbare brun - ben ik niet seker dat het war is - wel in die tijd was in Amsterdam een zon van Haims beste vrind "Mica"die ook in hetselvde hebauw op Niuw Begrado vonde en is dan moglih dat ook Arkan hier was mar iki heb Arkan tun niet hezin)..
7. Wat kan u zich herinneren van uw ontmoetingen met Arkan? Hoe gedroeg Arkan in die tijd zich bijvoorbeeld? Antwoord: Ik heb Zelkjo leren kenen 1965 - tun was hij noch een johie di vonde in de soliter A1 tehen over hebauw war ik wonde.. later blikt dat hij samen med een zontje van een kolonel van Titos Nacionale Garde die wonde in mijn hebauw sloliter C7 heben sawunds een inbrak heft hedan in een cigarevinkeltje die befind zih tusen onse hebauwen Sloliter C7 en Soliter A1 op Omladinskih Brigada in Niuwe Belgrado.. Dor dat werde bijde johis in een jugt gewangenis beland.. Vader van Zeljko had vel vedrid dordat.. na vrajlating van Zeljko vertelde hij mij dat hij in opdraht van SDB dese inbrak heb hedan on zo dunde in kontakt te komen med organiserde misdad.. Hij braht mij een kier bij zijn bas een sekere "Pera - Pezo 404" die de zon van een van 76 generalsekretaris va binelandse zaken was en wonde in een wolkkraben vlak bij onse hebauwen., Ik heb dese "Pero - Pezo 404" in anwesiget van "Arkan"een fliker henumt omdat hij Zeljko zolke dinge liet dun.. Dat heburde ergens in de zomer 1969.. darna heb Zeljko me henomen nar een Jugoslavise Krate westred op in een Belgradse wijk Vozdovac - war ik grote rusie heb hedan med de ledende organisatie van dat kampijonat (en van hun is later nar nederland hekomen en hewerkt als tandatc en in vrije tijd als een Djakon van Serbise Ortodokse pruster - maar ook ''brilijante'' atvisor van nederlanse BVD en Politie war werd hij ook als hulppruster ingezet bij gewangenis in den hag war Serbise vorsetstredes ziten) omdat ze valsificerde kategoris en mensen van 100 kg liten delnemen med kategoris van mensen van 70 kg.. in 1968/69 was ik Karate asistenbt trener van Djoko Djurisic die hoft Krener tener vas van UDBA en later SDB - ik trende under andere Franse mar ook USA marinirs Karate in onse speciale Karate Institut van Jugoslavise Vijlihet Dinst in de sportsal van Centrale Branwer van Belgrado.. Ik had noch in 1968/69 personlike kontakten med hoften van MI6 en CIA en bezoht hun op hun prive adresen mar ook in hun ambasades.. SDB wiste nietc van.. In roman "TAJNA"is dat ook beskrjven.
Additional material Karate Bob sent with regard to the interview questions (in Dutch): Hier ic over werken med de kriminelen. In behiun 1968 werd dor kontra spiunage dinst ''cbob'' ondekt dat sdb heft regrutert zware kriminelen om kolonel dapcevic te kidnapen c/q vermorden. Een hoge amternar van sdb uit novi sad heft opdracht heheven an speciale agent van sdb ing.p. z. om twe zware kriminel lj.m. en d. c. te polsen om in ruil vor de gevangenis straf dat ze bijde noch tegud haden om kolonel vladimir dapcevic te kidnapen. Zo heb ik personlik bijde heren leren kenen en het is apsulut bevijsen dat bijde heren werden dor sdb benadert om vladimir dapcevic te kidnapen.. De hoge amternar van sdb uit novi sad werd arestert mar niet wegens regruteren van kriminelen mar omdat zijn dinst sofer een burger heft med zijn dinst auto overreden en de hoge amternar uit novi sad haf opdracht an zijn shofer dor te rijen zondr hulp te vorlenen nar slachtofer die later overled. Ok ing. p.z. vund op misteriose wijsen dod na dat hij een gevangenis straf van 5 jar in rumenie heft uietgezeten. mar ok bijde krimineen.. d.c. (wet ik niet precis wanier is hij dodgehan) mar lj.m. werd likvidert in franfurt - dojcland in de burt van de rechtbank - anta jaren heleden.. Ergens in oktober 1973 in amsterdam - heb ik opdracht gekrkjgen van r.n. een andere hoge amternar van sdb uit novi sad om e.m. en m.k. twe zware kriminelen van albanese avkomst te benaderen - ondangs mijn nadruklike beswar dat med kriminelen is niet verstandih te werken - werd ik min of mer hedvungen om twe krminelen te benaderen en hun vorstel te geven - indin ze sdb helpen dapcevic te kidnapen c/q vormorden dat zal ze vorse geld beloningt krijhen - mar ook en van hun m.k. die de straf van antal jaten wegens zare inbraken tegud in serbie had dese zal zijn straf seponert worden. Bijde heren aan sdb anbod hingde akord en heben dan aktiv delhenomen an vorbereding van kidnaping van dapcevic. Ook waren bijden kriminelen med mij nar brusel antal kier herest en ook op 15 december 1973 tun ik afsprak med dapcevic had om hem te ontmutem waren ze bijden med mij.
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Op 24 december 1973 - op katolike en protestanse kerstawund - jugoslavise overheit liet dor en tim van mordomando van sdb een anslag op mij dun - omdat ik heb vladimir dapcevic - nar dat ik hem hekidnapt heb op 25 december in brise - vraj laten han en hem vertelt heb dat sdb wil hem likvideren.. Med us tomson mitralez werd op kerstavund - dus 24 december 1973 - op mij fur heopent (war werd later dor bvd vast gestelt dat 17 kugels in mijn richting zijn geshoten en amsterdamse oficir van justieti en politie had dese vijten undrer tave hehauden )mar ook fur was heopent op m.k. een van die heren di betroken was med vorbereding van kidnaping van dapcevic. Dag later op 25 december probirden de zelfde leden van sdb mij te vermorden war med mij ook waren bijde albanese kriminelen die met mij op 15 december 1973 nar brusel hingde om dapcevic te kidnapen.. In dat shitpartij werden antal sdb oficirs war under andere ook een vrauw herakt mar ik ook werd gevund op mijn rechte hand med de zelfde wapen dat twe sdb mensen die nacht dod vunde tun ik probirde te vorhinderen dat nederlanse politi mensen werden dodheshoten.. Al die dingen zijn bij nederlanse regering bekent en nojd heben dese fajten bij proces rol hespelt.. nederlanse ovehet liet ales under tavel mofelen.. een van die albanesen werd dor bvd regrutert om vor hun valse papiren te produceren want hij was top expert in dat hedu.
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