The Nuclear Deal: Prelude to Proliferation in the Middle East?

Robert Einhorn Richard Nephew

Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series Paper 11 • May 2016 Acknowledgements

We want to express our deep gratitude to the senior officials and experts from several Middle East countries who shared their time and ex- pertise to inform the writing of this monograph. We would like to thank Derek Chollet of the German Marshall Fund and our Brookings colleague Steven Pifer, who took time to review drafts of this paper and provided valu- able comments and insights. We also thank Gail Chalef and her colleagues at Brookings for their assistance in the editing and production of this paper. And we would like to extend our special thanks to Research Assistant James Tyson for his invaluable support in the researching and editing of this mono- graph and ensuring that it found its way into print.

The contents and recommendations are the authors’ own.

Support for this publication was generously provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Carn- egie Corporation of New York.

The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to indepen- dent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The con- clusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.

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T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es i Table of Contents

Glossary ...... iii

On Sourcing ...... iv

Executive Summary ...... v

Chapter 1: A Cascade of Proliferation in the Middle East? ...... 1

Chapter 2: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ...... 6

Chapter 3: Challenges to the JCPOA ...... 13

Chapter 4: Reactions in the Middle East to the JCPOA ...... 19

Chapter 5: Prospects for Proliferation in the Wake of the JCPOA ...... 27

Chapter 6: Policy Recommendations ...... 47

About the Authors ...... 63

About the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative ...... 64

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es ii Glossary

123 agreement An agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and other nations, as required by section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act ACRS Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group AKP Justice and Development Party, AUMF Authorization to Use Military Force CENTO Central Treaty Organization E3 , , UK EU GCC Gulf Cooperation Council HEU Highly enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IMF International Monetary Fund IR-1 Iran’s first generation centrifuge IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ISIS Islamic State in and JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JPOA Joint Plan of Action KACARE King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy KAERI Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (South Korea) KEPCO Korea Electric Power Corporation Majlis Iran’s parliament MEWMDFZ Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone MNNA Major non-NATO ally NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIE National Intelligence Estimate NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe P5+1 P5 (, France, , UK, U.S.), plus Germany SMART System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor SWU Separative work unit, a measure of centrifuge efficiency, as in “SWUs/year” TRIGA Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics reactor UNSC U.N. Security Council UNSCR U.N. Security Council Resolution URENCO European centrifuge enrichment consortium WMD Weapon of mass destruction

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es iii On Sourcing

In this monograph, the authors make reference to a variety of sources, including official government statements, media reports, and technical assessments performed by non-govern- ment experts. The authors have also provided information—and, occasionally, direct quotes— obtained from an extensive series of interviews and conversations they conducted with a variety of senior government officials, military leaders, and academics from the Middle East. These discussions took place from May 2015 through November 2015 in a variety of locales, includ- ing , Cairo, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Washington D.C. The authors agreed to hold many of these conversations without attribution in order to permit the freest possible exchange, particularly with current government officials. The views expressed in these conversations have been buttressed, however, with on-the-record public statements, commentary, and written ma- terial where possible.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es iv Executive Summary

The global nuclear nonproliferation regime eventual termination of U.S., European Union has been remarkably resilient, with no new entrants (EU), and Security Council nuclear-related sanc- to the nuclear club in the last 25 years. But observers tions against Iran. believe that could change and that we may be head- ing toward a “cascade of proliferation,” especially in The JCPOA survived contentious reviews in the U.S. the Middle East. The presumed trigger for a possible Congress and Iranian Majlis (parliament); key nu- Middle East nuclear weapons competition is Iran, clear reduction and sanctions relief milestones have which has violated nonproliferation obligations, been reached; and implementation to date has gone conducted activities relevant to the development relatively smoothly, although Iran’s return to the of nuclear weapons, and pursued sensitive dual-use global economy has been more halting than Iran’s nuclear technologies without a persuasive peaceful leaders would have preferred. But despite the prom- justification. Tehran’s nuclear program—combined ising start, the nuclear deal remains highly contro- with provocative behavior widely believed to sup- versial in both Tehran and Washington as well as in port a goal of establishing regional hegemony—has several Middle East capitals. The potential for Irani- raised acute concerns among Iran’s neighbors and an and American critics to undermine the JCPOA— could prompt some of them to respond by seeking together with the complex compliance issues likely nuclear weapons capabilities of their own. to arise and the uncertainties surrounding leader- ship transitions in the and Iran—raise questions about the long-term sustainability of the The Iran nuclear deal deal, questions that will be on the minds of leaders of Middle East countries as they consider how best Conscious of the risks that Iran’s nuclear program to ensure their security in the years ahead. posed to the international and regional security order, the United States has sought to head off its further de- velopment until confidence could be built regarding Reactions to the deal in the Middle Iranian intentions. In July 2015, negotiations aimed East at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and heading off a regional nuclear arms competition Reactions to the JCPOA in the region have been resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action mixed. , in particular Prime Minister Benja- (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1 countries (Chi- min Netanyahu, has been the most vocally negative, na, France, Germany, Russia, the , although Israeli officials were consulted during the and the United States). The JCPOA provides for negotiations and are now working constructive- deep reductions in Iran’s existing uranium enrich- ly with the United States to promote vigorous en- ment capacity and the re-design of its planned pluto- forcement of Iranian compliance. Turkey and Egypt nium-production reactor, which together effectively have been generally positive, relieved by the peace- eliminate its capability to produce fissile materials for ful resolution of the long-standing Iran nuclear is- nuclear weapons for at least ten to fifteen years. It sue and—unlike Israel, some Gulf Arab states, and also calls for highly intrusive International Atom- American opponents of the deal—comfortable that ic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring measures, the JCPOA permits Iran to retain an enrichment many of which are unlimited in duration, capable program. Perhaps reluctant to break ranks with of providing confidence in Iranian compliance. In their American security partner, the members of the exchange, the JCPOA requires the suspension and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have publicly en-

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es v dorsed the nuclear deal, including at the April 2016 • The deal is part of a regional realignment U.S.-GCC summit meeting in Riyadh. unfavorable to America’s traditional part- ners. Based significantly on suspicions and However, despite public expressions of support, sev- distorted perceptions of events and trends, eral states of the region, especially the Sunni Arabs some Middle East governments, especially of the Gulf, have serious reservations about the nu- among the Sunni Arabs, see the JCPOA as clear agreement. Their concerns fall into three areas: an indication that the United States is with- drawing from or at least reducing its military • The deal will only delay and not prevent a presence in the region. They fear that the nuclear-armed Iran. Key restrictions on en- U.S. may accept a prominent and even cen- riched uranium- and plutonium-production tral role for Iran, and shift its allegiance from expire after 10 and 15 years, permitting Iran an exclusive focus on its traditional Arab to expand its nuclear capacities and greatly partners to an approach balanced between reduce the time it would need to produce those partners and Iran in which Iran would nuclear weapons, if it chose to do so in the become a U.S. partner in promoting stability future. While U.S. supporters of the JCPOA and resolving conflicts. Although the Obama believe that Iran can be deterred from seeking Administration has made a major effort to nuclear weapons after 15 years, Iran’s rivals, dispel these concerns, they persist to a signif- particularly the Saudis and Emiratis, are con- icant degree. vinced that Iran remains determined to pos- sess nuclear weapons and will bide its time, Will key regional states seek to use the 15 years to develop more advanced acquire nuclear weapons? centrifuges and missile delivery systems, and emerge after 15 years with a strengthened economy and in a better position than today U.S. supporters of the JCPOA argue that the remov- to quickly expand its infrastructure and go al of the near-term risk of a nuclear-armed Iran will for nuclear weapons. sharply reduce the incentive for regional states to ac- quire their own fissile material production capabil- • The deal does not impede Iran’s destabiliz- ities or nuclear weapons. Opponents claim that, by ing regional behavior and will even wors- legitimizing Iran’s enrichment program, permitting en the problem. Some of Iran’s neighbors Iran to ramp up its nuclear infrastructure after 10- accuse Tehran of meddling in the internal 15 years, and facilitating an economic recovery that affairs of its neighbors, using proxies such as will enable Iran to greatly boost the resources devot- and the Houthis to advance its ed to its nuclear program, the JCPOA itself will be goals, intervening directly in the Syrian and the catalyst for proliferation in the region. Yemeni civil wars, and in general seeking to sow instability, undermine rival govern- Whether states in the region eventually opt for nuclear ments, and become the dominant power in weapons will depend on a range of factors, some related the region. While they recognize that the to the JCPOA and some not. Among the key factors JCPOA could not be expected to resolve will be their perceptions of Iran’s future nuclear capabil- their concerns about Iran’s behavior, they feel ities and intentions, their assessment of Iran’s regional the deal could actually exacerbate them—by behavior, their view of the evolving conventional mili- releasing to Iran tens of billions of dollars in tary balance with Iran, their confidence in the United frozen assets, ending Tehran’s international States as a security partner, their evaluation of how the isolation, and strengthening its economic ca- United States and other countries would react to their pacity to upgrade its military and expand its pursuit of nuclear weapons or a latent nuclear weapons regional influence. capability, and, not least, the feasibility—in terms of

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es vi their technical expertise, physical infrastructure, and er. These concerns, together with their uncertainty financial resources—of succeeding in the effort to ac- about the future U.S. role, may motivate the Saudis quire fuel cycle facilities or nuclear weapons. to consider their own nuclear options.

In assessing the probability of proliferation in the But while the Saudis appear to be motivated to acquire Middle East, it is necessary to focus on how these nuclear weapons, their ability to do so is very much in various factors may affect nuclear decision-making doubt, at least for the foreseeable future. While they in individual countries, especially in the countries clearly have the necessary financial resources, the Sau- often cited as the most likely to go for a latent or dis lack the human and physical infrastructure and actual nuclear weapons capability: , the have had to postpone their ambitious nuclear power (UAE), Egypt, and Turkey. plans for eight years while they train the required per- sonnel. Although Riyadh is not willing to formally Saudi Arabia renounce the acquisition of an enrichment capability, Saudi nuclear energy officials state they have no plans Saudi Arabia is widely considered to be the most like- for enrichment and do not anticipate pursuing an en- ly regional state to pursue the nuclear option, an im- richment program for at least 25 years. pression reinforced by occasional remarks by promi- nent Saudis that the Kingdom will match whatever Given the Kingdom’s difficulty in developing an in- nuclear capability Iran attains. The Saudis regard Iran digenous nuclear weapons capability, speculation as an implacable foe, not just an external threat de- has turned to the possibility of the Kingdom receiv- termined to achieve regional hegemony but also an ing support from a foreign power, usually , existential threat intent on undermining the Sau- which received generous financial support from Saudi di monarchy. Moreover, while their concerns about Arabia in acquiring its own nuclear arsenal. But while Iran have grown, their confidence in the U.S. com- rumors abound about a Pakistani commitment to mitment to the security of its regional partners has help Saudi obtain nuclear weapons, the truth is hard been shaken. They cite what they regard as evidence to pin down. Senior Saudis and Pakistanis deny such of Washington’s unreliability, such as not preventing an understanding exists. If it does exist, it was proba- former Egyptian President Mubarak’s ouster, failing bly a vague, unwritten assurance long ago between a to enforce the red line against Syria’s use of chemical Pakistani leader and Saudi king, without operational weapons, giving lukewarm support to Syrian rebels, details or the circumstances in which it would be ac- and accepting a greater Iranian regional role. tivated. In any event, the Saudis would find it hard to rely on such an assurance now, especially in the Animated by what they see as a waning U.S. com- wake of Islamabad’s rejection of the Saudi request to mitment to Gulf security, the Saudis have beefed take part in the Yemen campaign. Pakistan is highly up their conventional defense capabilities, explored unlikely to become the Saudis’ nuclear accomplice. cooperation with Russia and other potential partners, and adopted a more assertive, independent role in So Saudi Arabia may be motivated to make a run regional conflicts, most dramatically in waging their at nuclear weapons, but its prospects for success are aggressive military campaign in Yemen. Still, senior very limited. Saudis maintain that they have no choice but to rely heavily on the United States for their security. United Arab Emirates

While confident that they can handle the current con- Like the Saudis, the Emiratis believe Iran poses a se- ventional military threat from Iran, the Saudis worry vere threat to regional security, has increased its ag- about the military implications of a post-sanctions gressiveness since the completion of the JCPOA, is Iranian economic recovery, and they regard a future still trying to export revolution, and will resume its Iranian nuclear weapons capability as a game-chang- quest for nuclear weapons when JCPOA restrictions

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es vii expire. Also like Riyadh, Abu Dhabi has lost con- porting causes that undermine the interests of siderable confidence in the reliability of the United Egypt’s main Arab allies and benefactors, Egypt does States as a security partner, has explored defense co- not see Iran as a direct military threat. Its principal operation with other outside powers, and has played security concern is the turbulent regional security an increasingly assertive, independent military role environment—extremist ideology, the fragmenta- in the region, especially in the Yemen campaign. But tion of Syria and Iraq, and instability in Libya— like Saudi Arabia, it knows it has no real choice but and its adverse impact on internal security. Unlike to rely heavily on the United States for its security. the Gulf Arabs, the Egyptians are supportive of the JCPOA and believe a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement Moreover, perhaps because of traditionally strong could have a positive effect on regional stability. economic ties between the UAE and Iran, the Emi- ratis take a more pragmatic approach to Tehran Although Russia is committed to work with Egypt than do the Saudis. While the Saudis tend to see on its first power reactor, Cairo’s nuclear energy’s the struggle with Iran as irreconcilable, the Emira- plans have experienced many false starts before, tis tend to believe that if Iran’s regional designs can and there is little reason to believe the outcome will be countered and a regional balance established, a be different this time around, especially given the modus vivendi with Iran can eventually be achieved. severe economic challenges currently faced by the Egyptian government. Moreover, although Egypt The ambitious UAE nuclear energy program—in- trained a substantial number of nuclear scientists in cluding a project well underway by a South Korea-led the 1950s and 1960s, its human nuclear infrastruc- consortium to build four power reactors—is the best ture atrophied when ambitious nuclear energy plans indication that Abu Dhabi has no current intention never materialized. to pursue an independent nuclear path. In negotia- tions on a U.S.-UAE civil nuclear agreement required So, given its preoccupation with nearby security for the project, the Emiratis accepted a legally bind- challenges and low-tech threats such as insurgencies ing renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing ( the and terrorism and given its shortage of technical so-called “gold standard”), effectively precluding the expertise and financial resources, it is unlikely that pursuit of nuclear weapons. Although the UAE sub- Egypt will reconsider its current non-nuclear status. sequently indicated that it might seek to renegotiate the gold standard in light of the JCPOA’s acceptance Turkey of enrichment in Iran, Emirati officials indicate that, while their acceptance of the gold standard received Because of its emergence in the last decade as a rising criticism at home and from other Arab governments, power, its large and growing scientific and industrial the Iran deal has not produced any change in their base, and its ambition to be an influential regional nuclear energy plans, and they still have no intention player, Turkey is usually included on a short list of to pursue enrichment or reprocessing. countries that may decide, in the wake of the Iran Egypt nuclear deal, to pursue a latent or actual nuclear weapons capability. But its pursuit of nuclear weap- Although Egypt flirted with nuclear weapons devel- ons is highly improbable. opment in the 1950s and 1960s and failed to report to the IAEA on some sensitive nuclear experiments Turkey has maintained reasonably good relations with it carried out between 1990 and 2003, Cairo today Iran, and it resisted efforts to restrict its engagement appears to lack both the inclination and the where- with Tehran even at the height of the global sanctions withal to make a push for nuclear weapons. campaign. Although Turkey and Iran have taken op- posing sides in the Syrian war, most Turks do not see Although Tehran and Cairo have occasionally Iran as a direct military threat. Instead, Ankara sees sparred on regional issues and Iran is actively sup- instability and terrorism emanating from that conflict

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es viii and from within Turkey’s borders as their principal program, including human and physical infrastruc- security threats, concerns that cannot be addressed by ture, financial resources, and a disciplined leader- the possession of nuclear weapons. ship. With most of the sensitive equipment acquired through Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s black market Tensions with Moscow over Turkey’s shoot-down of network shipped out of the country in 2004, the ab- a Russian fighter jet in December 2015 are a source sence of sufficient indigenous technical expertise, and of concern in Ankara. But the best means of address- the country in a state of disarray, the likelihood of ing that concern is reliance on the security guaran- Libya embarking on a renewed nuclear weapons ef- tees Turkey enjoys as a member of NATO. While fort in the foreseeable future is remote. Turkish confidence in NATO has waxed and waned in recent decades, most Turks, especially in the mil- In February 2016, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe itary, believe they can count on NATO in a crisis, Ya’alon stated publicly that “we see signs that coun- and would be reluctant to put their NATO ties in tries in the Arab world are preparing to acquire nuclear jeopardy by pursuing nuclear weapons. weapons, that they are not willing to sit quietly with Iran on the brink of a nuclear or atomic bomb.”1 Ya’alon Turkey has plans for nuclear power to meet energy did not offer any evidence for his statement. It is, of shortages, including by purchasing nuclear reactors course, possible that Israel has access to information from Russian and Japan. Moreover, although Turk- unavailable to the authors (or even to the U.S. govern- ish energy officials say they have no current plans for ment). But the current study has not found indications enrichment, they are unwilling to rule it out. Still, es- that any of Iran’s neighbors are making preparations pecially in light of current political difficulties with to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, our research and Russia, Turkish experts are skeptical that Ankara’s civil analysis suggest that none of them are likely to pursue nuclear plans will proceed in a timely manner, if at all. nuclear weapons or succeed if they do.

Other cases Policies to reduce the likelihood of a proliferation cascade in the Middle Although Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Turkey East are most often mentioned as potential aspirants to the nuclear club, three other regional countries mer- Still, even if prospects for proliferation seem remote it observation, given their past interest in nuclear today, predicting future developments with confi- weapons: Iraq, Syria, and Libya. But none of them dence—especially given the unpredictability of the are likely to revive their nuclear weapons ambitions recent past and continued turmoil in region—seems in the foreseeable future. imprudent. Whatever the likelihood that Middle East states may opt to acquire nuclear weapons in Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure was decimated by two the future, it is incumbent on policymakers, espe- wars and a decade of sanctions, and it is severely con- cially U.S. policymakers, to do what they can to re- strained by its conflict with ISIS, its internal political duce those prospects further. The following are pol- and religious differences, and an economy struggling icies recommended for the Obama administration to grow in the face of low oil prices. Israeli’s destruc- and future U.S. administrations. tion of Syria’s al-Kibar reactor in 2007 effectively end- ed Damascus’s nuclear weapons program. Moreover, 1. Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously mon- consumed by civil war and its survival as a unitary itored, strictly enforced, and faithfully state very much in question, Syria lacks the basic attri- implemented. Confidence by regional states butes needed to pursue a successful nuclear weapons

1 Raf Sanchez, “Arab states are seeking nuclear weapons to counter Iran, Israel warns,” The Telegraph, February 14, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/12156598/Arab-states-are-seeking-nuclear-weapons-to-counter-Iran-Israel-warns.html

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es ix that the JCPOA is working effectively as a toring provisions into routine IAEA safe- barrier to an Iranian nuclear weapons ca- guards applied elsewhere in the Middle pability will reinforce their inclination to East and in the global nonproliferation remain non-nuclear, whereas a JCPOA of regime. Making some of the innovative fea- uncertain sustainability with a checkered tures of the JCPOA’s monitoring systems compliance record will increase their incen- the new normal for IAEA safeguards could tives to hedge their bets. Effective and sus- enhance confidence that Iran’s neighbors tained implementation will mean not only are not pursuing nuclear weapons as well as pressing for strict Iranian compliance but ensure that Iran will remain bound by them also ensuring that Iran realizes the benefits indefinitely. Consideration should be given of sanctions relief that it is entitled to, in- to widening the application of online enrich- cluding by making modest adjustments in ment-level monitoring and continuous sur- sanctions policy if it is found that previously veillance of key elements of the enrichment unidentified and unintended technical prob- supply chain, such as centrifuge production lems are impeding sanctions relief. workshops. Explicitly banning activities re- 2. Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection lated to the development of nuclear weap- on Iranian proliferation-related activities ons, and verification of such a “weaponiza- and enhance intelligence-sharing on those tion” ban, should also be universalized. activities with key partners. Uncertainty 5. Pursue civil nuclear cooperation with Mid- about nuclear developments in Iran will feed dle East governments on terms that are re- concerns about the future and create incen- alistic and serve U.S. nonproliferation in- tives for regional states to keep their nuclear terests. To avoid continuing deadlock with options open. Washington should increase Middle East countries (particularly Saudi Ara- its investment in national intelligence ca- bia and Jordan) on bilateral civil nuclear coop- pabilities to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities eration agreements—which would exclude the and create mechanisms for better sharing United States from nuclear commerce in the such intelligence with regional partners. region and leave the field to nuclear suppliers 3. Deter a future Iranian decision to produce less interested in discouraging enrichment and nuclear weapons. Incentives for acquiring a reprocessing—the United States should be pre- latent or actual nuclear weapons capability pared, if necessary, to relax its insistence on a le- will increase if regional states believe Iran can gally binding renunciation of enrichment and successfully break out and produce , while still pressing for the stron- weapons. President Obama and his successors gest possible constraints on such capabilities. should declare that it is U.S. policy to prevent 6. Promote regional arrangements that re- Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and that strain fuel cycle developments. Developing the United States is prepared to use military region-wide or sub-regional arrangements force, if necessary, to stop Iran from break- (involving several states) could head off ing out and producing nuclear weapons. To competitive fuel cycle developments as re- demonstrate national unity and strengthen strictions on Iran’s programs expire in 2025- the deterrent effect, Congress should adopt 2030. Some measures could apply equally to a standing Authorization to Use Military all participants, such as a ban on reprocessing, Force (AUMF) in the event the president de- agreement to rely on foreign-supplied fuel termines and provides evidence to Congress for all power reactors and to ship all spent that Iran is breaking out and moving toward fuel out of the country, and agreement that nuclear weapons. all new research and power reactors would be 4. Seek to incorporate key JCPOA moni- light-water moderated and use uranium fuel

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es x enriched to below five percent. Some other commodation. In the longer run, Washing- measures might not apply equally to all par- ton should encourage the creation of an in- ticipants, such as agreement by some Arab clusive regional security forum. governments to forgo enrichment and agree- ment by Iran to postpone the expiration of A proliferation cascade? Unlikely, at least for now key JCPOA restrictions or accept limits on its enrichment capacity after 15 years. By sharply diminishing Iran’s capacity to produce 7. Strengthen security assurances to U.S. fissile material for nuclear weapons for at least 10-15 partners in the Middle East. Concerns years, the JCPOA has reduced incentives for neigh- about the credibility and effectiveness of boring states to acquire nuclear weapons or at least U.S. commitments to their security are the a hedging fuel cycle capability. But it has not elimi- principal reason that Gulf Arab countries, nated those incentives. especially Saudi Arabia, might decide to pur- sue latent or actual nuclear weapons capabil- For years to come, regional states will remain un- ities. At the U.S.-GCC summit meetings of certain about several factors affecting their securi- May 2015 and April 2016, the United States ty—how well the JCPOA will deter and detect any issued strong statements of support for the Iranian non-compliance; whether the agreement security of its Gulf partners. Among oth- will survive compliance disputes, challenges by op- er steps, the leaders called for stepping up ponents, and leadership transitions; and whether maritime security cooperation, expediting Iran will opt for nuclear weapons when key restric- the implementation of an integrated missile tions expire after 15 years. They will also be uncer- defense early system, training Special Oper- tain about other factors that could motivate them ations Forces units from each GCC country, to reconsider their nuclear options, especially Iran’s and expanding cooperation on cyber securi- future behavior in the region and America’s future ty. Building on those steps, the United States regional role. These uncertainties will keep concerns should explore with its GCC partners the about proliferation alive. development of a more closely integrated re- gional security framework, with strong oper- But this study suggests that, at least for now, those con- ational and institutional ties. cerns have been subdued, even if not permanently set 8. Promote a stable regional security envi- to rest. None of the Middle East’s “likely suspects” ap- ronment. In a Middle East less racked by pears both inclined and able in the foreseeable future conflict, incentives for acquiring nuclear to acquire an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. weapons, both by Iran and other states of the region, would be significantly reduced. In the years preceding the JCPOA, it had practically The United States should pursue a dual-track become the conventional wisdom that, given Iran’s nu- approach. On the one hand, it should instill clear program, several additional nuclear-armed states confidence in its partners that the United would inevitably emerge in the Middle East. That States is committed to their security, will conventional wisdom has largely been discredited. But prevent any country from achieving regional there is a risk that a more complacent conventional hegemony, and will maintain a formidable wisdom will take its place—that we no longer have to military and diplomatic presence in the re- worry about a regional nuclear arms competition. gion. On the other, it should promote the resolution of regional conflicts, especially in It will be essential for the United States and other in- Syria and Yemen, and encourage Iran and terested countries—pursuing policies along the lines Saudi Arabia to find ways to tamp down recommended here—to make sure that the earlier their disputes and eventually reach an ac- predictions of a Middle East proliferation cascade do not yet come to pass.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es xi chapter 1 A Cascade of Proliferation in the Middle East?

he global nuclear nonproliferation regime has and Iran; and a growing perception that the United Tbeen remarkably resilient. From time to time, States may be scaling back its overseas security com- there have been dire predictions about the number mitments. of countries that will acquire nuclear weapons. In a secret memorandum in February 1963, then U.S. Proliferation pessimism for the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wrote that Middle East eight additional countries might acquire nuclear weapons by 1973.2 McNamara’s study was the basis for President John F. Kennedy’s frequently-cited pre- Heightened concern about the future of the nonpro- diction one month later that 15 to 25 states might liferation regime has focused heavily on the Middle obtain the bomb by the 1970s. In December 2004, East. This is not surprising, not only because of the a United Nations High-level Panel warned “We are turmoil and insecurity prevailing throughout the approaching a point at which the erosion of the region today, but also because, historically, a signifi- non-proliferation regime could become irreversible cant number of Middle East countries have pursued and result in a cascade of proliferation.”3 nuclear weapons programs.

Such pessimistic projections have not materialized, Fortunately, most of those programs never resulted at least not yet. The nuclear landscape has remained in the production of nuclear weapons. Egypt flirted remarkably stable with no new entrants to the nu- with nuclear weapons under President Nasser but clear club in the last 25 years and potential nucle- abandoned the effort under his successors. Saddam ar-armed states from Latin America to the former Hussein’s Iraq advanced quite far in its pursuit of Soviet Union to the Middle East having been per- the bomb, but its quest was halted by the first Gulf suaded or compelled to abandon their nuclear weap- War and the United Nations inspections regime that ons projects or capabilities. followed. Colonel Gaddafi’s nuclear aspirations were supported by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s black Nonetheless, proliferation pessimism is again on the market network, but his program made little prog- rise. Among the reasons are the diffusion of sensitive, ress before the United States and United Kingdom dual-use technologies; increased worldwide interest confronted the Libyan dictator and pressured him to in nuclear energy (although not as great as before the call it quits. Syria surprised the world by construct- Fukushima disaster); the desire of a number of states ing a plutonium-production reactor with North to keep open the option to produce their own reac- Korea’s assistance, but its hopes were dashed by an tor fuel rather than rely on the market; challenges Israeli bombing raid in 2007. to regional stability by Russia, China, North Korea,

2 Peter Lavoy, “Predicting : A Declassified Documentary Record,” Strategic Insights, vol. III, 1 (January 2004), p. 1. 3 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, “A More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility,” United Nations, December 2, 2004, p. 39.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 1 To date, the one exception to these aborted efforts countries have been concerned that Iran’s acquisi- is Israel, which is believed to have acquired nuclear tion of nuclear weapons would prompt other states weapons a half century ago but has not acknowl- in the Middle East, and beyond, to pursue their own edged its possession of them and insists on using the nuclear capabilities. This concern was heightened in enigmatic formulation that it will not be the first to June 201l, when Prince Turki al Faisal, Saudi Ara- introduce nuclear weapons in the region. bia’s former intelligence chief and ambassador to the United States, hinted that the Kingdom would seek In the last 10 to 15 years, concerns about nuclear to match Iran’s nuclear capability: “It is in our inter- proliferation in the Middle East have centered on est that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, for Iran. The international community’s deep suspicions their doing so would compel Saudi Arabia, whose about Tehran’s nuclear intentions were based on foreign relations are now so fully measured and well many factors, including the 2002 public disclosure assessed, to pursue policies that could lead to untold by an Iranian dissident group of two previously se- and possibly dramatic consequences.”4 cret nuclear facilities capable of producing fissile ma- terial for nuclear weapons; the absence of a convinc- Reflecting what had become the conventional wis- ing peaceful rationale for constructing and operating dom, President Obama told The Atlantic’sJeffrey sensitive fuel-cycle facilities; the IAEA’s discovery of Goldberg in March 2012 that, if Iran gets nuclear many Iranian violations of its safeguards obligations weapons, “it is almost certain that other players in starting in 1981 and continuing through the 2000s; the region would feel it necessary to get their own and the IAEA’s assessment—offered initially in 201l nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a on the basis of over five years of investigations and nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the recently strengthened in December 2015—that, be- world.”5 fore 2003 and as late as 2009, Iran engaged in activi- ties relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. Negotiations to prevent a nuclear- armed Iran The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran has been viewed in the Middle East and more widely as an acute threat to regional and international security. Averting a Middle East nuclear weapons competi- Many in Israel, which has been repeatedly threat- tion was a major motivation for pursuing negotia- ened with annihilation by Iran’s leaders, and in Saudi tions to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weap- Arabia and the UAE, which are engaged in intense ons. Those negotiations spanned a period of over proxy, religious, and ideological struggles with Iran, 12 years. Between 2003 and 2005, the E3 (France, fear that Tehran might actually use nuclear weap- Germany, and the United Kingdom) failed to per- ons against them. But even if Iran would be deterred suade Iran to give up its uranium enrichment pro- from initiating nuclear war, many in the region are gram. Under President George W. Bush, the United convinced that it would use the umbrella provided States joined the P5+1 group of countries (the five by a nuclear weapons capability to interfere more Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council aggressively in the affairs of its neighbors and engage plus Germany), but little headway was made with in other destabilizing activities to advance its goal of Iran, which was building up its enrichment capabili- regional hegemony. ty. The first four years of the Obama administration’s engagement with Iran, including a continuation of Aside from these direct threats posed by Iran’s nu- the P5+1 process and secret bilateral U.S.-Iran talks clear program, the United States and many other in in 2012-2013, also saw little progress, and

4 Jay Solomon, “Saudi Suggests Squeezing Iran on Nuclear Ambitions,” ,June 22, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001 424052702304887904576400083811644642 5 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff,” The Atlantic,March 2, 2012, www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2012/03/obama-to-iran-and-israel-as-president-of-the-united-states-i-dont-bluff/253875/

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 2 the growth of Iran’s enrichment capacity shortened sanctions relief should be doled out more gradually, to about two to three months the time it would take if at all; Iran’s regional behavior and other provoca- to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a tive non-nuclear activities such as missile tests should single nuclear weapon. be addressed as part of the JCPOA; and so on.

A turning point came in the summer of 2013. Sanc- In the end, the Obama administration was able to tions, especially financial and crude oil sanctions, muster the support of enough Senate Democrats to were having a devastating impact on Iran’s econo- avoid a vote on a Congressional resolution of disap- my. was elected Iran’s president in proval. The decisive factor was that opponents were June 2013 on a platform of ending sanctions and unable to make a credible case that, after rejecting rebuilding the economy, and he and his supporters a deal supported by all of its P5+1 partners, the recognized that this would require reaching agree- United States could build international support for ment with the P5+1. With a new Iranian negotiat- strengthening sanctions dramatically in the hope of ing team in place, the negotiations—consisting of forcing Iran to make major new concessions. With secret bilateral talks and the multilateral P5+1 pro- the JCPOA surviving the congressional review in- cess proceeding in parallel—made rapid progress. tact—and the failure of Iranian opponents to de-rail In November 2013, agreement was reached on an it in the Majlis (Iran’s parliament)—the nuclear deal interim arrangement—called the Joint Plan of Ac- took effect on October 18, 2015, so-called Adoption tion—which essentially froze Iran’s nuclear program, Day. gave Iran modest sanctions relief, and provided time and space to work out a final, comprehensive deal. Throughout the negotiations, some close U.S. friends in the Middle East, especially Israel and Sau- After arduous negotiations over the next year and di Arabia, had expressed major reservations about a half, often carried out at the level of foreign min- the emerging deal. They wanted enrichment to be isters, agreement was reached on July 14, 2015 on banned in perpetuity, not just limited for a finite a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). period. They doubted that any monitoring system The JCPOA provided for deep reductions in Iran’s would deter Iranian cheating. And they believed the enrichment capacity and the re-design of its Arak deal would empower Iran to pursue a more aggres- reactor, which together would effectively eliminate sive regional agenda. its capability to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons for at least ten to fifteen years. It also called Now that the JCPOA has survived domestic re- for highly intrusive IAEA monitoring measures, views in Washington and Tehran and has successful- many of unlimited duration, capable of providing ly passed the crucial milestone of Implementation confidence in Iranian compliance. In exchange, nu- Day—when Iran fulfilled key nuclear commitments clear-related would be sus- and the United States, EU, and the U.N. Security pended and eventually terminated. Council suspended nuclear-related sanctions—U.S. partners in the Middle East, even Israel, have tended In the highly contentious U.S. congressional debate to tone down their criticisms. But they remain wary that followed, critics raised strong objections: Iran’s of the deal’s implications for their security. They will enrichment capability should be eliminated or at be watching closely to see whether the deal is serving least more sharply reduced; restrictions on enrich- as a reliable barrier to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear ment and reprocessing should last indefinitely or weapons. They will want to know that compliance at least much longer; IAEA inspectors should have is being strictly enforced, that the international “anywhere, anytime”6 access to suspect facilities; community is prepared to re-impose sanctions in

6 Louis Jacobsen, “Marco Rubio says Iran deal breaks ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspection promise by ,” PolitiFact, July 9, 2015, www. politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/jul/19/marco-rubio/rubio-iran-deal-breaks-anytime-anywhere-inspection/

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 3 the event of Iranian non-compliance, and that the (NPT) and JCPOA not to acquire nuclear weapons, United States and other key states are determined to will still be subject to rigorous monitoring measures push back against provocative Iranian activities not that would provide warning of an Iranian effort to covered by the deal. produce fissile material, and will continue to face the threat of a strong international response, including renewed sanctions and the use of military force, if it Prevent or only delay? attempted to break out and build nuclear weapons.

However, even if key regional states are satisfied that As long as the Iranian regime remains the same, this Iran is living up to its JCPOA commitments and debate over whether Iran will opt for nuclear weap- that the deal can be effective in preventing Tehran ons when key restrictions expire is unlikely to be re- from acquiring nuclear weapons for at least 10 to solved conclusively in the minds of Tehran’s Middle 15 years, they will remain concerned by what they East neighbors. For the foreseeable future, they will (and American critics) see as one of the deal’s major remain uncertain of what Iran will do beyond 15 flaws—that its restrictions on enrichment and re- years. processing will eventually expire, some after 10 years and others after 15. Once those restrictions lapse, But this is not the only uncertainty about the deal Iran would be legally entitled under the JCPOA to that they will have to cope with. Although imple- ramp up its enrichment capacity to “industrial scale” mentation has been smooth so far, compliance dis- and reduce to a matter of weeks the time it would putes may emerge that could call the future of the need to produce enough highly enriched uranium deal into question. Continued opposition to the for a single nuclear weapon. It would also be free to deal in Tehran and Washington, including by indi- develop the capability to separate plutonium from viduals and organizations in a position to take steps spent reactor fuel. to impede implementation, poses another signifi- cant threat to the longevity of the agreement. And JCPOA critics in Washington and elsewhere cite transitions in the leadership of the United States, the expiration of key enrichment and reprocessing Iran, and perhaps other countries—as early as the restrictions to claim that the nuclear deal merely de- 2016 U.S. presidential election as well as subsequent fers but does not prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear transitions likely to take place during the life of the weapons. They argue that the deal’s termination of JCPOA, including in the position of Supreme Lead- sanctions will greatly strengthen the Iranian econo- er—could introduce additional uncertainty about my and provide the resources needed to aggressively its sustainability. The unraveling of the nuclear deal, pursue nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems for any reason, would allow Iran to build up its nu- when the restrictions expire. In his address to the clear capabilities sharply even before years 10 and Congress in March 2015, Israeli Prime Minister 15, alarming neighboring states. Netanyahu asserted that the nuclear deal—which was not yet final at the time and its contents not publicly known—would not block Iran’s path to nu- Still uncertain about Iran’s nuclear clear weapons but would rather “pave the way” and intentions “all but guarantee” that Iran will eventually acquire them.7 So while the JCPOA may have reduced concerns in the Middle East about the possibility of a nucle- Supporters of the deal respond that, even after key ar-armed Iran, at least in the near term, it has not restrictions expire, Iran will remain bound by the put those concerns to rest. The states of the region Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will face considerable uncertainty going forward—

7 “The complete transcript of Netanyahu’s address to Congress,” Washington Post, March 3, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post- politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 4 about how well the deal will work in restraining Iran’s future nuclear plans. In particular, it focuses Iran, how long it will remain in force, and what Iran on whether certain countries of the region are likely will do after key restrictions expire. to seek their own nuclear weapons capabilities—or at least enrichment or reprocessing capabilities as Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the states of a hedge—and assesses whether those countries can the region will have to make plans for promoting succeed in such an endeavor. It also recommends their security in the period ahead. Their planning policies that the United States and the internation- will be influenced by such factors as Iran’s behavior al community in general can pursue to reduce the in the region and the perceived reliability of assur- probability that additional Middle East states will ances by the United States to its security partners. seek or achieve a nuclear weapons capability, as well Some regional states may not feel particularly threat- as to address the lingering question of what will hap- ened or worried about the uncertainty surrounding pen with Iran’s nuclear program after 10-15 years. Iran’s future nuclear plans. Others may feel they need to take action to bolster their security, whether Chapter two outlines the key features of the JCPOA enhancing their own defense capabilities, strength- and analyses the impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s ening security ties with the United States or other timeline for producing nuclear weapons. outside powers, pursuing “peaceful” enrichment or reprocessing capabilities as a hedging strategy, or Chapter three evaluates the implementation of the even embarking on their own nuclear weapons pro- JCPOA to date and describes key challenges to gram. Because several such actions could take many the smooth and sustained implementation of the years to realize (e.g., building an enrichment facili- JCPOA. ty), states may wish to get started now, long before Iran’s future nuclear intentions become clear. Chapter four describes reactions to the JCPOA of countries in the Middle East. The United States and its P5+1 partners intended the JCPOA not only to prevent Iran from acquiring Chapter five delves into what these countries may nuclear weapons for the indefinite future but also, as choose to do in order to manage their security in- a result, to head off a nuclear arms race in the Mid- terests in the face of uncertainty about Iran’s nuclear dle East. It is far too early to conclude whether they intentions. have succeeded on either count. Chapter six examines possible U.S. responses to This study examines how, in the wake of the JCPOA, these countries’ decisions and offers recommenda- key countries of the Middle East will seek to en- tions on how to ensure that a cascade of prolifera- sure their security in the face of uncertainty about tion is prevented.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 5 chapter 2 The JCPOA

uch of the controversy surrounding the are dozens of specific actions to be taken at various MJCPOA centers on the concern that, although times over the course of 25 years as well as some Ira- it may deal effectively with the near-term threat of nian commitments that will last for the life of Iran’s Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, it leaves long-term nuclear program. strategic issues unresolved—including Iran’s future intentions regarding nuclear weapons and its drive The JCPOA specifies that Implementation Day—a to expand its regional influence. Among the criti- key milestone in the operation of the nuclear deal— cal unanswered questions: what will Iran do when would be reached when the IAEA confirms that the deal’s key restrictions on its nuclear program are Iran has fulfilled key nuclear commitments. That, in gone and how will it behave in the meantime? turn, would trigger the suspension or termination of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran by the United These questions and preconceived notions about the States, the EU, and the U.N. Security Council. answers are a major reason why much of the reaction to the JCPOA in the Middle East has been unfavor- Implementation Day came on January 16, 2016, able. Countries throughout the region—including when the IAEA Director General reported to the Israel and Gulf Arab states—have now tempered IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security their criticism of the JCPOA, largely out of recogni- Council that Iran had taken all the actions it was re- tion that it is a done deal, but their initial impression quired to take under the JCPOA to receive sanctions was decidedly negative. This criticism often had less relief. Iran had: to do with the contents of the deal than with the concern that Iran’s nuclear ambitions have only been • Reduced its total number of installed centri- paused and that its regional ambitions have even fuges to a little more than 6,100, of which no been given a boost. But such broad-brush analysis more than 5,060 first-generation centrifuges minimizes the diversity of reactions held by audi- will enrich uranium for the next 10 years, ences even within countries in the region, much less and committed not to exceed an enrichment between countries. level of 3.67 percent for 15 years; • Exported or diluted its enriched uranium Key Features of the JCPOA stockpile in excess of 300 kilograms, and committed to keeping its stockpile at or be- In its simplest rendering, the JCPOA imposes con- low that level for the next 15 years; straints on Iran’s nuclear program and requires in- • Limited its uranium enrichment research trusive monitoring in exchange for relief from inter- and development (R&D) work, according to national sanctions against Iran and for civil nuclear a research plan that will remain in effect for cooperation with Iran. Within this broad framework the next 13 years;

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 6 • Halted its production of new centrifuges and Even after Implementation Day, the operation of parts for them, which will persist for eight the JCPOA will require constant activity by the years and then restart under constrained pa- parties. Among other tasks, the Arak reactor will rameters for the five years thereafter; be modified; the Fordow enrichment facility will be • Removed the core (precisely, the calandria) converted to a nuclear research center; Iran will keep from the Arak reactor, rendering the calan- enriched uranium stocks under the 300-kilogram dria permanently damaged and the reactor ceiling; the procurement channel will evaluate appli- itself unusable for the time being. Iran and cations for civil nuclear imports; and the Joint Com- the members of the P5+1 have agreed to an mission will meet to address compliance issues. In approach for the modification of the Arak addition, the Iranians will need to cooperate actively reactor using design parameters that make with the IAEA’s monitoring and inspection efforts it physically incapable of producing enough and assist the agency in the completion of the neces- weapons-grade plutonium for one nuclear sary declarations under the Additional Protocol (as weapon in anything less than four years; well as update any previous declarations that contain omissions or errors) in order to achieve a “Broad- • Committed not to construct new heavy wa- er Conclusion” concerning the nature of its nuclear ter reactors or accumulate heavy water in ex- program. But barring mutually agreed changes to cess of its agreed needs for 15 years; the JCPOA in the out-years, the key constraints on • Committed not to engage in any spent fuel Iran’s nuclear capacity are already in place. The stra- reprocessing for 15 years, with a stated inten- tegically relevant parameters of its nuclear program tion not to pursue reprocessing thereafter; will remain largely static for the next eight years, • Accepted intrusive transparency and moni- with some restrictions dropping off at years 10, 13, toring requirements, including the full im- and 15. The bulk of the transparency steps required plementation of Iran’s safeguards agreement beyond routine IAEA inspections would persist un- with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol til year 20. (in perpetuity). It will implement new mea- sures that go beyond these standard safe- With the suspension or termination of most nucle- guards arrangements for at least 20 years, ar-related U.S., EU, and UN Security Council sanc- including continuous monitoring of excess tions on Implementation Day, the main commit- centrifuges in storage, centrifuge manufac- ments on the P5+1’s side of the ledger with respect turing facilities, and other aspects of the fuel to sanctions have largely been fulfilled. cycle. Iran has also accepted monitoring of its uranium production for 25 years; The Security Council’s adoption of resolution 2231 in July 2015 created the framework within which • Committed not to engage in a variety of previous UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions activities that are associated with nuclear were relaxed. UNSC resolution (UNSCR) 2231 is weapons development, including acquiring now effective, having terminated resolutions 1737, technologies or equipment that could assist 1747, 1803, and 1929 on Implementation Day and with such work. This commitment does not replaced them with its own provisions. UNSCR expire; and, 2231 largely reapplies key elements of these previ- • Agreed to only procure items for its civil ous resolutions, particularly regarding conventional nuclear program through the channel es- arms and missiles, but with new language that per- tablished by the JCPOA and the UNSC in mits certain transactions with Iran only so long as resolution 2231, which will remain effective they are explicitly authorized by the UNSC. More- for 10 years. over, Iran is “called upon,” rather than obligated (as in previous resolutions), not to engage in cer-

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 7 tain missile activities, including launches of ballistic those sanctions has been placed in abeyance. At the missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear same time, the EU reserved the right to re-impose weapons. Among the elements of previous resolu- these sanctions in the event of significant nonper- tions that have not been reapplied are hortatory pro- formance by Iran of its obligations. Absent this step, visions that called upon states to exercise vigilance the EU is required to terminate its residual nucle- over transactions with Iran and the sanctioning of a ar-related sanctions in October 2023 or if the IAEA few Iranian individuals and entities. Certain provi- reaches its Broader Conclusion. sions of 2231 will be removed over time: The civil nuclear cooperation provided for in the • The prohibitions on the transfer of conven- JCPOA will involve a much more fluid set of ar- tional arms to and from Iran will be removed rangements, largely dependent on the national le- in October 2020 or when the IAEA reaches gal requirements of the countries involved and their its Broader Conclusion, if that happens first; own policies on whether to cooperate with Iran. • The restrictions on missile-related activities and provisions on asset freezes will be re- The United States will likely not cooperate with moved in October 2023 or when the IAEA Iran except in very restrictive situations, such as the reaches its Broader Conclusion, if that hap- modification of the Arak reactor (which advances pens first; and, the U.S. objective of eliminating Iran’s ability to produce weapons-usable plutonium) or perhaps as • The Security Council’s remaining sanctions, relates to safety or nuclear security. This is because including its ban on nuclear trade outside most U.S. nuclear cooperation of any great signif- the agreed procurement channel, will be re- icance requires a formal civil nuclear cooperation moved in October 2025 or when the IAEA agreement, governed by Section 123 of the Atom- reaches its Broader Conclusion, if that hap- ic Energy Act. Any 123 agreement with Iran would pens first. almost certainly be voted down by Congress—and by wide margins—and therefore will not likely be The United States has effectively suspended its most attempted either in the Obama administration or significant economic sanctions against Iran through any subsequent administration for quite some time. a combination of waivers, exceptions, and the elim- ination of certain executive orders. The waivers and The European members of the P5+1 will likely en- exceptions are time-limited, meaning that through- gage in more civil nuclear cooperation with Iran. out the JCPOA period, the U.S. administration in The JCPOA’s Annex III outlines a range of specific office will regularly need to decide whether to ex- projects, including nuclear safeguards, safety, secu- tend the relief or not. Assuming that the JCPOA rity, proliferation-resistant reactor design, and the survives until 2023 or the IAEA reaches its Broader humanitarian application of nuclear science. Russia Conclusion, the United States will, at that time, seek will cooperate with Iran on stable isotope separation legislative action to terminate those sanctions sus- at Fordow, which could permit Iran to produce a pended on Implementation Day, terminate any as- variety of industrial, agricultural and medical iso- sociated Executive Orders still in place, and remove topes. And China will take the lead in working with those individuals and entities still on the Treasury Iran on the modification of the Arak reactor from its Department’s nuclear-related designation list. original design to the new, agreed-upon design.

The EU has also effectively suspended its most signif- It is also likely that Iran will buy new power reactors icant economic sanctions against Iran, but through from abroad rather than seek to build one on its own a more direct procedure. The governing regulations until it has more experience in reactor design and for the Iran sanctions regime have been extensive- construction. Prior to the conclusion of the JCPOA, ly amended, meaning that the legal termination of potential vendors for Iran were limited essentially to

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 8 Russia’s Rosatom. On the basis of negotiations begun 2. Similarly, Iran’s ability to produce weap- before the JCPOA was concluded, Russia will build ons-grade plutonium will be eroded indefi- two additional reactors at the Bushehr site.8 But now nitely by modifications to the Arak reactor, that the JCPOA opens the possibility of cooperation the prohibition on the construction of any with other suppliers—and especially given indica- new heavy water reactors in Iran for 15 years, tions that Iran was frustrated with slow Russian per- the shipment of spent fuel out of the country, formance on the first Bushehr reactor—it is likely and the 15-year ban on reprocessing or even that Tehran will seek to broaden its partners in the an active R&D program on reprocessing. nuclear power field. Discussions with China are well Iran has not demonstrated any proficiency in advanced for the purchase of one or more power re- reprocessing to date nor made any discern- actors,9 and Iran and South Korea are talking about able investment in a significant reprocessing cooperation on small modular reactors.10 No doubt capability. It does not have any reprocessing other Western vendors will be interested in working facilities nor, based on the IAEA’s reports go- with Iran, depending on the terms available. ing back to 2003, has its reprocessing-related activities gone beyond the initial stages of de- velopment. The JCPOA’s commitments lock Impact on Iranian nuclear weapon Iran into this rudimentary position. timelines 3. Tight limits on centrifuge development and If the JCPOA is implemented faithfully, it is reason- manufacture will impede the introduction able to conclude that Iran’s ability to develop a nu- of advanced centrifuges. Iran’s centrifuge clear weapon will be severely hampered for the next component manufacturing base will be 10-15 years, and impaired for some time thereafter. weakened by inactivity over the course of This is for several reasons: the next eight years, as the JCPOA prohib- its the manufacture of new centrifuges or 1. The provisions of the JCPOA limit Iran’s their parts so long as there remains a store nuclear infrastructure to a degree that—ab- of existing IR-1 centrifuges. This prohibi- sent an already-existing clandestine nuclear tion will be lifted gradually starting in eight program—it would be very difficult for Iran years, with Iran permitted to manufacture to produce enough highly enriched uranium a limited number of advanced centrifuges (HEU) for a nuclear weapon in less than and their components in stages until year one year. The exceedingly small size of Iran’s 13, after which manufacturing will be un- permitted enriched uranium stockpile, its re- restricted. Similarly, Iran’s research and de- duced number of installed centrifuges, and velopment for advanced centrifuges will be other limitations make it mathematically dif- limited to single machines and very small ficult for Iran to build up its nuclear program cascades for eight years and to somewhat fast enough to reduce this lag. And such a larger cascades for the next five years. This buildup would be immediately noticeable to means that Iran will have to do additional IAEA inspectors, who will have continuous, developmental work and testing after the online surveillance of large parts of Iran’s en- restrictions are lifted, perhaps learning that richment program. what worked in single and small-centrifuge configurations does not work when scaled

8 “Russia to start building Iran nuclear reactors,” , December 23, 2015, www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/russia-start-building-iran-nuclear- reactors-151222131134565.html 9 “Official in China to Discuss Arak Reactor Redesign,” Kayhan, August 26, 2015, kayhan.ir/en/news/17617/official-in-china-to-discuss-arak-reactor- redesign 10 “Iran Eyes Nuclear Cooperation with South Korea,” Tasnim News, January 27, 2016, www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/01/27/983107/iran- eyes-nuclear-cooperation-with-south-korea

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 9 up. In short, while Iran will learn something acquisition of certain relevant technical competenc- from the R&D permitted under the JCPOA, es and capabilities.” The IAEA came to these conclu- its forward momentum will be significantly sions in the absence of a full and honest disclosure slowed, and it will take Iran time beyond the of past activities by Iran, which mainly stonewalled expiration of the JCPOA’s R&D restrictions the agency’s investigation of its past nuclear work. to build this momentum back up. And, of course, through the monitoring provisions We do not know now nor may we ever know how of the JCPOA, the international community close Iran actually got to developing the design of will have awareness of the progress of Iranian a nuclear weapon. In fact, a key criticism of the centrifuge R&D. JCPOA is that it did not compel Iran to offer a 4. Iran has committed not to engage in a variety complete picture of its past nuclear weapons-related of specific activities that could help it design work. But the very argument that critics use to de- and build a nuclear warhead. This includes: mand full disclosure—that Iran lied to us about its past work—is part of the reason why it would have a. Designing and modeling nuclear been hard to believe any Iranian confession made explosive devices (which the IAEA’s during the JCPOA negotiations. Questions would December 2 report on Iran’s past have remained as to whether Iran had made signifi- nuclear weapons work identified cant progress toward a workable nuclear weapon but as activities in which Iran had en- failed to disclose it. gaged); 11 and, b. Designing, developing, fabricating, In the end, it is prudent, in the absence of detailed acquiring or using essential equip- and verifiable knowledge of the past, to make the ment for the design and testing of a assumption that Iran had made considerable prog- nuclear device, such as multi-point ress on weaponization and would not require a great explosive detonation systems, ex- amount of time, in a breakout scenario, to proceed plosive diagnostic systems, and from the production of fissile material to the fabri- explosively driven neutron sources. cation of a nuclear weapon. Even though building a These JCPOA prohibitions on nuclear “wea- workable device would add to the breakout timeline, ponization” activities go beyond the restric- we cannot count on it adding very much. Compu- tions contained in the Nonproliferation tations of nuclear weapons breakout have tended to Treaty. focus primarily on nuclear material production, the closest proxy to warhead production that can be as- An uncertainty affecting Iran’s nuclear weapon time- certained by independent IAEA reporting. This will line is how close it got to a workable nuclear device continue to be the case during and after the JCPOA. as a result of past activities, especially prior to 2003 And so we assume that the main factors hampering when it is believed to have halted most weaponization Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons will be the work. The December 2 IAEA report on the “possi- JCPOA’s restrictions on Iran’s capability to produce ble military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program enriched uranium and plutonium. assesses that, prior to 2003 and—to a lesser degree, until 2009—Iran engaged in activities relevant to Expiration of key restrictions the development of a nuclear explosive device. It further judged that “these activities did not advance A major concern among critics of the JCPOA, both beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the in the United States and Middle East, is that those

11 “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” International Atomic Energy Agency, p. 15, https:// www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 10 restrictions will begin to expire after eight years and Project, the United States developed a spent fuel re- will be gone after 15 years. The primary restrictions processing capability—and the reactors to fuel it— of interest here are those that limit the size of Iran’s in three years. But other countries have taken longer centrifuge program and the types of centrifuges that to do so and modern surveillance measures—which can be used in it. These restrictions will begin to will not be eased with respect to Iran—would detect erode starting at year eight, with limited additional such a crash program. centrifuge R&D, but become significantly less bur- densome for Iran at year ten, at which point Iran can Only a Delay? theoretically begin to expand its centrifuge program in size. The JCPOA indicates that Iran will abide by an R&D plan that will limit the size of its centrifuge With the expiration of key restrictions and the abil- fleet until year 13 but, at year 15, all centrifuge-fo- ity of Iran to reduce breakout times dramatically, cused restrictions will have eased (though monitor- many critics argue that the JCPOA merely delays 12 ing will continue) and Iran will also be able to retain but does not prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. But more than 300 kilograms of enriched uranium in this argument ignores some key factors. Under the the country at any one time. JCPOA, and indeed under the NPT, Iran is bound not to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, the This means that Iran will eventually be free to build intrusive monitoring arrangements that will give the industrial-scale enrichment capability it says it the international community intimate knowledge needs for its nuclear energy plans. If it decides to of Iran’s nuclear activities will remain in place well do so, it will sharply shrink the time required to beyond 15 years and, in the case of the Addition- produce enough HEU for a single bomb—from the al Protocol, indefinitely. That close and continuous one year that will prevail through at least the first scrutiny will alert the United States and other in- 10 years of the JCPOA to a matter of a few weeks. terested countries to any future Iranian attempt to Depending on how quickly Iran chooses to ramp up suddenly break out and produce nuclear weapons, its capability and the efficiency of the advanced cen- giving those countries the opportunity to intervene trifuges it deploys, breakout time could be reduced to stop the breakout attempt, including with the use to a few weeks as early as year 13 but more likely of military force. several years later. Moreover, the argument that the JCPOA only de- The ability to produce enough plutonium for nu- lays Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons for around clear weapons, once restrictions on the plutonium 15 years assumes that Iran will inevitably pursue the path expire, would take longer to achieve. As noted bomb once it has rebuilt the necessary fissile mate- above, Iran has not engaged in significant reprocess- rial production capacity. However, the U.S. intelli- ing-related work and, consequently, it is starting far gence community has repeatedly judged that, while behind where it would need to be in order to achieve Iran has insisted on keeping open the option to ac- a viable plutonium-based bomb path. After year quire nuclear weapons, it has essentially deferred a 15, Iran could theoretically elect to construct new decision on whether to do so. This is not to say that heavy water reactors as well as research reprocessing Iran will not opt to acquire nuclear weapons in the techniques. With respect to a potential timeline, it future—only that it has not yet made that decision. is difficult to estimate how long it would take Iran And if that is the case, such a decision could be in- to master reprocessing sufficiently to field a pluto- fluenced by a range of factors, including Tehran’s nium-based bomb, given that Iran’s baseline knowl- perceptions of its security environment, whether edge appears to be rudimentary. In the Manhattan Iranian leaders believed their goals could be achieved

12 “Obama admits Iran nuclear deal only delays inevitable, leaves problem for future presidents,” , April 7, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/ politics/2015/04/06/obama-claims-tying-iran-deal-to-recognition-israel-would-be-fundamental.html

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 11 without nuclear weapons, their estimate of interna- Iran’s ability after 15 years or so to obtain the phys- tional reactions to their pursuit of nuclear weapons ical and technological capacity to do so—and to do (including the risk of military preemption), and the so legally under the JCPOA—is undeniable. And balance of political power within Iran. that is one of the most controversial features of the nuclear deal, and one that worries U.S. partners in But even if an eventual Iranian effort to become a the Middle East. nuclear-armed state is not a foregone conclusion,

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 12 chapter 3 Challenges to the JCPOA

mplementation of the JCPOA to date has been General Yukiya Amano stated that Iran was in com- Irelatively seamless. U.S. officials and other ob- pliance with its nuclear commitments. The report servers had predicted that Iran could not complete indicated that Iran had temporarily exceeded the all the requirements for Implementation Day until permitted ceiling on heavy water stocks but prompt- the spring or summer of 2016. But motivated by ly corrected that infraction. The February 26 report the desire to get sanctions relief before the Majlis contained significantly less information about Iran’s elections in late February, the Iranians fulfilled their nuclear program than previous reports, which the nuclear commitments with great urgency and effi- Director General said was consistent with the IAEA’s ciency and received the IAEA’s certification to pro- altered mandate under the new UNSC resolution. ceed with Implementation Day on January 16. The United States and other Board members urged the Director General, in the interest of transparency, In the several months preceding Implementation to provide more detailed information in subsequent Day, the P5+1 parties and Iran managed to agree reports. on a large number of implementation issues that had been left unresolved at the time the JCPOA was Challenges to Smooth and Sustained concluded in July 2015. The Iranians initially took Implementation positions that would lighten their implementation burden or otherwise favor their interests, but they relatively quickly came around to pragmatic solu- So the JCPOA is off to a good start. But the chal- tions. On technically complex and politically diffi- lenges to effective and sustained implementation of cult issues that might have produced a stalemate and the JCPOA are formidable. postponed Implementation Day—including the amount of centrifuge infrastructure to be disman- Even if all parties intend to abide by their JCPOA tled, the disposition of 20 percent enriched uranium commitments, compliance issues are bound to “scraps,”13 and agreement on the characteristics of arise. Despite the detailed implementation provi- advanced centrifuges14—the parties found mutual- sions nailed down in the JCPOA and subsequently ly acceptable solutions that established a promising worked out in the run-up to Implementation Day, foundation for implementation going forward. the parties will inevitably encounter ambiguities and differences of interpretation going forward. With In his February 26 report to the IAEA Board, his each party seeking the most favorable outcome from first following Implementation Day, IAEA Director its perspective and feeling domestic pressure not to

13 David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “Taking Stock of Iran’s Near 20 Percent LEU,” Institute for Science and International Security, December 14, 2015, p. 2, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/taking-stock-of-irans-near-20-percent-leu/ 14 Ollie Heinonen, Simon Henderson, “How to Make Sure Iran’s One-Year Nuclear Breakout Time Does Not Shrink,” Washington Institute for Near- East Policy, June 17, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-to-make-sure-irans-one-year-nuclear-breakout-time-does- not-shrink

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 13 give ground, there is a risk that even minor imple- (which would be a major breach of the JCPOA). mentation matters will become magnified in impor- Depending on the particular circumstances of the tance and become major sources of contention. transaction, a missile-related use might be credible, and the United States would presumably pursue the For some provisions, there may be practical difficul- matter as a violation of the Council’s missile restric- ties in complying strictly and consistently over the tions. But if the end-use was difficult to discern, and long haul. For example, complying with the limita- especially if the transaction was part of a recurring tion on Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is de- pattern of illicit shipments of high-grade aluminum, pendent on regular shipments of nuclear material suspicions about a clandestine nuclear weapons pro- out of the country or the timely and regular dilution gram would arise and the matter could well escalate of it. Iran could quickly breach this 300 kilogram into a major compliance dispute. limit should a flight be delayed for weather or any other reason. Similarly, Iran is limited to quantities Challenges Posed by Opposition in of heavy water that match its operational needs, but Capitals could exceed those amounts due to production or inventory errors. Or Iran may enrich uranium above the 3.67 percent mark identified in the JCPOA by In addition to the challenges posed to the smooth a miscalculation of uranium gas flows, which is not operation of the JCPOA by the many complex uncommon. compliance issues likely to arise in the course of its implementation, the long-term viability of the deal Such violations may not themselves be a cause for may be threatened by continuing opposition to the alarm, as reasonable explanations can often be of- agreement in both Iran and the United States. But fered for them. But a pattern of such breaches would there is a difference between the domestic debates probably raise concerns among JCPOA participants in Tehran and Washington. While the U.S. debate and throughout the region. It will be important to reflects a combination of sharp substantive differ- identify and correct even minor infractions at the ences, institutional rivalry between the executive earliest possible stage to prevent them from growing and legislative branches, and intense partisanship into major implementation problems. in an election year—a vigorous debate on a highly consequential foreign policy issue, but hardly an ex- Some aspects of the nuclear deal may lend them- istential matter—the internal debate in Iran reflects selves to questions of compliance. For example, the a fundamental struggle for the future of the country. deal requires Iran to seek authorization to procure sensitive items for its JCPOA-approved civil nuclear The groups in Iran that appear unreconciled to the program. But some items useful in civil nuclear pro- deal range from senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard grams, such as high-grade aluminum, are also useful Corps (IRGC) officers to some employees of the in the manufacture of ballistic missiles (as well as Atomic Energy Organization to hardline members other aerospace applications). Because Iran rejects of the Majlis, media, and clergy. The IRGC may feel U.N. Security Council restrictions on ballistic mis- that the suspension of sanctions and re-integration siles and will not submit missile-related transactions of Iran into the world economy would threaten the to international scrutiny, it will not go through the dominant position it has enjoyed in Iran’s econom- JCPOA’s procurement channel to import high-grade ic life under the sanctions regime. Iranian hardlin- aluminum if it is intended for its missile program. If ers fear that the end of Iran’s international isola- and when the United States discovers such an illicit tion could open the country to Western influences transaction, it might be difficult to know whether (which they term “infiltration”) that could threaten it was intended for a missile application (in which the ideological pillars of the Islamic Republic. And case it would be a violation of UNSC restrictions) or domestic opponents of President Rouhani are con- intended for a clandestine nuclear weapons program cerned that the economic benefits of the JCPOA

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 14 could strengthen Iranian moderates and produce a That said, Iranian opponents of the nuclear deal long-term shift in the internal balance of power. can be expected to seek any pretext to accuse the United States of violating its JCPOA commitments. The endorsement of the JCPOA by Iran’s Supreme JCPOA opponents and supporters alike suspect that Leader and the desire to proceed with- the United States will—in violation of its JCPOA out delay to Implementation Day and sanctions re- commitment “to prevent interference with the re- lief have, for the time being, kept hardline attacks on alization of full benefit by Iran of sanctions lift- the agreement largely in check. But Khamenei has ing”—attempt to discourage international banks compensated for his endorsement by aligning himself and businesses from engaging with Iran. Reflecting with hardline positions, including by railing against this widespread concern, Iranian officials strong- Western infiltration, opposing bilateral engagement ly protested to senior U.S. officials about the Visa with the United States except on the nuclear issue, Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel and advocating no change in Iran’s regional policies. Prevention Act of 2015, which requires individuals previously eligible for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program In addition, Khamenei has adopted positions on to apply for a U.S. visa if they had visited Syria, Iraq, JCPOA implementation that could spell trouble for and Iran (and other countries on the U.S. list of state the future of the agreement. For example, although sponsors of terrorism) in the last five years. Although the JCPOA does not preclude the imposition of new the legislation was intended as a measure to facilitate sanctions for non-nuclear reasons (e.g., support for screening of potential terrorists, it was widely seen terrorism, human rights abuses, missile activities), by Iranians as aimed at discouraging Western busi- he has declared that any new U.S. sanctions, for nessmen from going to their country. whatever reason, would be a violation of the JCPOA and would justify Iran not fulfilling its JCPOA com- In a letter16 dated December 19, 2015, U.S. Sec- mitments. The United States fully intends to impose retary of State assured Iran’s Foreign new non-nuclear sanctions whenever warranted. If Minister Javad Zarif that the Obama administration Iran responds by following through on its stated in- had the tools necessary to implement the change in tention to curtail its implementation of the deal, the visa requirements “so as not to interfere with legiti- agreement will not last very long. mate business interests of Iran.” Iranian authorities seemed satisfied with Kerry’s assurance, but Iranian The Obama administration’s January 17 imposition hardliners continued to charge that the law violated of sanctions against eleven entities and individuals U.S. JCPOA commitments. Should economic re- for procuring items for Iran’s ballistic missile pro- covery in Iran fall short of expectations, it is possible gram was the first test case. Iran condemned the the Iranians will blame the visa law (and any oth- sanctions as “unlawful”15 and threatened to respond er similar laws) and a serious implementation crisis proportionally and accelerate its missile programs. could erupt. But it stopped short of accusing Washington of violating the JCPOA or indicating that Iran’s per- A major challenge to the JCPOA could come if formance under the JCPOA would be affected. To sanctions relief does not produce the economic re- some extent, this experience mirrors the history of covery the Iranian public expects. In the wake of the JPOA period, when the United States was care- Implementation Day, there has been a surge of com- ful to impose sanctions that were permitted under mercial activity between the international business the JPOA and, though Iran complained, it accepted community and Iran, including major deals an- the U.S. interpretation each time. nounced during President Hassan Rouhani’s January

15 “U.S. sanctions illegal as American arms used against Palestinians, Yemenis - Iranian FM,” RT, January 18, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/329268- tehran-us-sanction-illegal/ 16 Mohammad Ali Shabani, “US, Iran move to avert firestorm over visa waiver program changes,” Al-Monitor, December 20, 2015, http://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/visa-waiver-program-changes-zarif-kerry-letter.html

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 15 trade-and-investment promotion trip to Italy and support—in particular, whether American oppo- France.17 But many international banks and busi- nents can succeed in adopting legislation designed nesses remain cautious about engaging with Iran, to impede or derail the deal and whether a future not due to any U.S. effort to impede economic re- U.S. administration will decide to withdraw from it. covery, but because of well-known difficulties of do- ing business in Iran and uncertainty about whether The Obama administration and supporters of the the deal will collapse and sanctions will be re-im- JCPOA on Capitol Hill (most Democrats) won the posed. If this hesitation continues and if factors such first round last September when opponents (all of as low oil prices and persistent structural problems the Republicans) failed to muster sufficient support hold back economic recovery, Iranian opponents to force a vote on a joint congressional resolution to will be quick to pin the blame on the JCPOA and its disapprove the nuclear deal. As a result, the JCPOA Iranian champions, and calls for withdrawing from took effect for the United States on October 18. the deal will increase. But opposition to the deal did not fade away. After a temporary lull following the congressional review A disturbing sign in that regard came on March 20 at period, the debate resumed. the Imam Reza Shrine at Mashhad, when Supreme Leader Khamenei blamed “the Americans” for im- Supporters of the agreement have been encouraged peding banking transactions: “On paper, they have that, in the run-up to Implementation Day, the Ira- lifted the sanctions, but in practice, they take steps nians fulfilled their nuclear commitments conscien- to prevent the sanctions from being truly lifted.”18 tiously and took reasonable positions in working out implementation ground-rules for the future. Do- Another challenge is that some Iranian opponents mestic support for the nuclear deal was also given of the deal may be in a position to interfere directly a boost by the release on January 16 of five Amer- with implementation of the JCPOA, either by re- icans detained by Iran. The release was criticized in fusing to take steps that are required, such as grant- certain quarters because it was accompanied by the ing IAEA access to military facilities, or by taking release of a larger number of Iranians found guilty of actions that are inconsistent with its terms, such as illicitly procuring sensitive items for Iran. But even continuing to use illicit procurement networks for though this “prisoner exchange” was not part of the nuclear imports. Whether or not such actions are JCPOA negotiations, it was widely seen as a divi- taken by individuals or by elements of the regime dend of the nuclear deal and, as such, lent support to opposed to the deal, their intent would be to under- the Obama administration’s argument that the deal mine the JCPOA. It is not clear whether Rouhani was working. or his allies have sufficient control over the IRGC or other hardliners to prevent them from taking steps Although Iran’s compliance to date, especially the on their own to impede or sabotage the nuclear deal. dramatic reduction in its capacity to produce weap- ons-usable nuclear materials, has tended to mute criticism of the JCPOA itself, Iran’s provocative be- Challenges in Washington havior outside the deal has contributed to renewed domestic efforts to undermine it. Since the JCPOA The principal challenge to the JCPOA on the U.S. was finalized last summer, Iran has stepped up its side comes from uncertainty about whether the direct military involvement in Syria,19 continued its deal will continue to command sufficient domestic support of other regional proxies, conducted long-

17 Jim Boulden, “Iranian president does big business in Europe,” CNN Money, January 26, 2016, http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/26/news/ companies/iran-europe-deals-italy-france/ 18 Mohammad Ali Shabani, “Banking sanctions take center stage as Iranian rhetoric toughens,” Al-Monitor, March 23, 2016, http://www.al-monitor. com/pulse/originals/2016/03/iran-sanctions-jcpoa-banking-khamenei-nowruz-speech.html 19 Dugald McConnell, Brian Todd, Holly Yan, “Iran to go to Syria peace talks while boosting its military power there,” CNN, October 28, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/middleeast/iran-russia-syria-civil-war/

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 16 range ballistic missile tests in violation of Security Supporters of new legislation on Iran are not confined Council resolutions,20 carried out live-fire military to those who would like to kill the JCPOA. There are exercises in close proximity to U.S. naval vessels,21 Democrats who want the nuclear deal to succeed but and cracked down on domestic reformers. believe the administration should push back hard- er against certain Iranian activities not covered by None of these activities violated the JCPOA, which the deal. Several Democrats in Congress, including focused exclusively on the nuclear issue at the in- JCPOA supporters, joined Republicans in rebuking sistence of both Iran and the United States. But if the Obama administration for allegedly having sec- the nuclear deal is viewed as facilitating troublesome ond thoughts about sanctioning Iran for its ballistic Iranian behavior—including by releasing billions of missile tests in October and November 2015, which dollars in restricted assets that Iran can use to fund violated U.N. Security Council resolutions (although its proxies or otherwise support an aggressive region- not the JCPOA). As it turned out, the Obama admin- al agenda—public and congressional support for the istration was only delaying the imposition of sanctions nuclear deal could sharply erode and domestic ef- to avoid jeopardizing the January 16 release of the five forts to undermine it could gain momentum. detained Americans. The missile sanctions were im- posed the day after the detainees were released, which The Obama administration has pledged, both to at least temporarily reduced interest in new missile domestic audiences and to regional partners critical sanctions, at least among Democrats. of the deal, that it would firmly counter Iran’s de- stabilizing regional activities and impose sanctions But many members of Congress remain determined for objectionable Iranian behavior not covered by to adopt new Iran-related legislation,22 some who the JCPOA, such as support for terrorism, human genuinely favor the JCPOA and want to penalize rights abuses, and missile activities. But it has op- Iranian activities not covered by it and others who posed congressional action that it believes would oppose the JCPOA and believe that strong new jeopardize the nuclear deal, such as sanctions not sanctions could provoke a harsh Iranian reaction narrowly targeted on such areas but aimed instead at that would put the agreement’s future at risk. denying Iran the benefits of JCPOA sanctions relief, which would give Tehran an excuse for curtailing its Whatever the outcome of these legislative efforts, implementation of the deal. vocal domestic opposition to the deal is unlikely to abate, especially if Iranian leaders continue to pursue So far, legislative efforts to disrupt the JCPOA have aggressive external and repressive internal policies. not made much progress. New legislative bills have The U.S. presidential and congressional campaigns been put forward that would do various things, rang- will ensure that strong opposition to the nuclear ing from renewing the Iran Sanctions Act (which deal, especially among Republican candidates, will is largely suspended as a result of the JCPOA but be heard throughout 2016. formally sunsets at the end of December 2016) to prohibiting the United States from purchasing the Leadership Transitions Introduce heavy water Iran produces in excess of its JCPOA Additional Uncertainty threshold to recreating the entirety of the now sus- pended U.S. secondary sanctions structure in order to penalize Iran for its ballistic missile tests and hu- The upcoming U.S. presidential election—and fu- man rights violations. ture presidential transitions during the planned

20 Louis Charbonneau, “Exclusive: Iran missile tests were ‘in defiance of’ U.N. resolution - U.S., allies,” , March 30, 2016, http://www.reuters. com/article/us-iran-missiles-idUSKCN0WV2HE 21 Jim Miklaszewski, Courtney Kube, Ali Arouzi, Alastair Jamieson, “U.S. Carrier Harry S. Truman Has Close Call With Iranian Rockets,” NBC News, December 30, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-carrier-harry-s-truman-has-close-call-iranian-n487536 22 “Kirk, Rubio Introduce Bill to Prohibit Iranian Access to U.S. Dollars,” Mark Kirk, U.S. Senator for Illinois, April 6, 2016, http://www.kirk.senate. gov/?p=press_release&id=1705

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 17 lifetime of the JCPOA—introduces an additional Future transitions in Iran could also affect the lon- measure of uncertainty about the durability of the gevity of the nuclear deal. The new Majlis elected in nuclear deal. Because the JCPOA is a political com- February 2016 will be more balanced between mod- mitment and not a legally binding undertaking, a erate/reformist-leaning, centrist conservative, and future U.S. president could decide to walk away hardline conservative members than its predecessor, from the agreement. But campaign rhetoric is often which had a more conservative complexion. As a re- an unreliable indicator of positions taken by newly sult, it is possible that Rouhani and the JCPOA will elected leaders. A future American president, con- receive less criticism than in the old Majlis. But the fronted with all the other foreign policy challenges labels assigned to these parliamentary groups are rel- facing the United States today, would have to con- ative and misleading, as the Iranian system worked sider whether she or he also wants to deal with the to ensure that truly reform-leaning politicians were probable Iranian response to a U.S. withdrawal de- ineligible to compete for Majlis seats. Moreover, the cision—the expansion of its nuclear program, a re- Majlis has comparatively little political power in duction of breakout time, and the end of enhanced the Iranian government in any event, and unelect- transparency and monitoring. ed hardline elements of the regime may continue to make the JCPOA a target, especially in the run-up A critical factor would be his or her judgment of to Rouhani’s re-election bid in 2017. how much international support Washington would have for its Iran policy in the wake of the JCPOA’s Also complicating the picture, sooner or later, but al- demise, especially how much support there would most surely before critical provisions of the JCPOA be for re-imposing powerful sanctions. In the ab- expire, 76 year-old Ali Khamenei will pass from the sence of Iranian violations of the JCPOA or highly scene and a new supreme leader will become the cru- provocative Iranian behavior outside the deal, there cial Iranian voice on the future of the nuclear deal. would likely be little international support, even At this stage, speculation is futile as to whether Iran’s among European P5+1 partners, for U.S. with- new supreme leader will be more or less committed drawal or for ramping up sanctions. The risks of to the JCPOA or more or less intent on possessing withdrawal are likely to appear substantial, even to nuclear weapons. But this inevitable transition is a president who has previously voiced strong oppo- another reason why the long-term operation of the sition. Such a stance could provide Iran a convenient JCPOA cannot be taken for granted. excuse to withdraw from its own commitments and paint the United States as the noncompliant party. In sum, the JCPOA thus far has been implemented Still, a more hawkish president could have a lower as well as could be expected, but its future is uncer- bar than a less hawkish one for ending the deal, and tain. This uncertainty—and the implications of that until a new U.S. president chooses her or his course uncertainty for the region—will be on the minds of of action, the future of the nuclear deal will remain the leaders of Middle East countries as they consider uncertain. how best to ensure their security in the years ahead.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 18 chapter 4 Reactions in the Middle East to the JCPOA

merican critics of the JCPOA claim that coun- He went on to say that “[the GCC states] are con- Atries in the Middle East oppose the nuclear fident that what they undertook makes this region deal. In the case of Israel, that is largely true. While safer and more stable.”25 security professionals in Israel generally have not at- tacked the JCPOA and at least some have seen it as a Commentators have suggested that this endorsement net positive for Israeli security,23 the government of of the JCPOA represents less a full-throated indication Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to regard the of support and more a calculated maneuver to main- JCPOA as a bad deal, arguing both that it will fail tain good relations with the Obama administration. to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and that it will in- In this telling, Gulf Arabs concluded that, since the crease the non-nuclear threat to Israel from Iran and JCPOA was going to be implemented in any event, its regional proxies. Israel has nonetheless chosen to it made little sense to waste political capital trying to work with the United States on implementing the undermine it. Rather, they could seek to take advan- agreement, hoping, as it sees it, to stiffen Washing- tage of the situation to gain access to advanced U.S. ton’s resolve to take a rigorous approach toward en- military hardware and cooperation with the United forcing Iranian compliance. Israeli public criticism States on other regional priorities.26 There is probably of the deal has therefore subsided, although strong something to this theory, as indicated by U.S. approv- reservations persist. al of expanded arms packages to Gulf Arab partners as well as its endorsement of—among other things—the Other public reactions in the region to the JCPOA Saudi-led military operation in Yemen. have been neither uniform nor overridingly nega- tive. In fact, a survey of public statements by govern- Moreover, beyond a somewhat cynical read of the ments in the region indicates that there is support GCC endorsement, there is also considerable logic for the JCPOA, even if in certain cases it is more to the calculation by the Gulf Arab states that, al- grudging and tepid than Washington would have though the JCPOA may not have been the deal they preferred. ’s Foreign Minister Khalid al-At- desired, it was the deal they had and that breaking tiyah summed up the Gulf Cooperation Council’s ranks publicly with their American security part- reaction in a statement on August 3, 2015:24 “[The ner was not in their interest. In this, the Gulf Arab JCPOA] was the best option among other options.” states had to contend with the reality that, while the

23 Leore Ben-Chorin, “Netanyahu and IDF Are Split on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The National Interest, March 2, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/ feature/netanyahu-idf-are-split-the-iran-nuclear-deal-15368 24 “Press Availability With Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid Bin Mohammed al-Attiyah,” U.S. Department of State, August 3, 2015, http://www.state. gov/secretary/remarks/2015/08/245610.htm 25 Michael Gordon, “John Kerry Wins Gulf States’ Cautious Support for Iran Deal,” The New York Times, August 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes. com/2015/08/04/world/middleeast/gulf-states-cautiously-support-iran-nuclear-deal.html? 26 Ilan Goldberg, Melissa Dalton, “Bridging the Gulf: How to Fix U.S. Relations With the GCC,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015, https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/bridging-gulf

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 19 Israelis have sufficient political and cultural connec- can now focus more on their nefarious activities in tions with the United States to weather a period of the region,”29 echoing a line of argument the Obama discord (at least in the short-term), Gulf Arab coun- administration had been making since the deal was tries do not. They could ill afford a sharp break with concluded in mid-July. the Obama Administration. Other neighbors also publicly supported the JCPOA There was also an economic rationale for support- on the basis of its constraint on Iran’s potential ac- ing the deal, particularly in the case of the UAE and quisition of nuclear weapons. Egypt’s foreign minis- Turkey. The UAE’s economic interest stems from its try commented on the deal’s potential for precluding long-standing trading ties with Iran. The Emiratis future nuclear proliferation in the region, expressing suffered significant business losses as a result of U.S. the “hope that the deal…prevents an arms race in sanctions imposed after 2011; the IMF estimated the Middle East, as well as ensuring the region is that the removal of Iran sanctions could add approx- free of all weapons of mass destruction, including imately one percent of GDP to the UAE economy.27 nuclear weapons.”30 Turkey maintained that the Turkish officials also expressed their delight with JCPOA’s full implementation “is of vital importance the removal of sanctions promised in the JCPOA; for peace, security, and stability in the region.” Iraq, Turkish Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek tweeted , Oman, and Qatar expressed similar sup- on the day the deal was concluded that the JCPOA port for the potential security benefits of the nuclear was “great news for the Turkish economy.” This per- agreement. spective was echoed by Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu, who stated, “Annulment of the sanctions Private conversations with former and current gov- imposed against Iran in this deal will benefit region- ernment officials in Egypt, as well as non-governmen- al economy and will directly leave positive effects on tal experts in Turkey, suggested that, at least in those Turkey’s economy.”28 countries, the JCPOA’s treatment of enrichment was consistent with their interpretation of the NPT.31 Al- Many of the public statements made by regional though some in the West and other parts of the Mid- states in support of the JCPOA—whether or not dle East lamented the lack of a permanent prohibition fully or truly reflective of private thinking—fo- on enrichment in Iran, these individuals believed that cused on the strategic and nonproliferation value it was important to reassure states not currently en- of the JCPOA itself. Especially noteworthy were riching that they retain at least the option to develop comments by Saudi Arabia, given frequent reports their own enrichment programs in the future. For during the negotiations of private Saudi misgivings. them, allowing enrichment was a positive element Following a meeting between King Salman and of the deal; they would have been concerned with a President Obama in September 2015, Saudi Foreign JCPOA that foreclosed that option. Minister Adel al-Jubeir stated that “we believe this agreement will contribute to security and stability in However, under the polite and positive veneer of the region by preventing Iran from acquiring a nu- many public statements, there are serious concerns clear capability.” He added, “Now we have one less about the JCPOA within the region. Principally, problem to deal with, with regard to Iran, and we these concerns fall into three baskets:

27 “IMF Country Report: United Arab Emirates,” International Monetary Fund, August 2015, p. 10, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/ cr15219.pdf 28 “The Final Deal: The Region Reacts,” United States Institute of Peace, July 15, 2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/jul/15/final-deal-region- reacts 29 Peter Baker, “Obama and Saudi King Sidestep Dispute Over Iran Nuclear Deal,” The New York Times, September 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes. com/2015/09/05/world/middleeast/obama-and-saudi-king-sidestep-dispute-over-iran-nuclear-deal.html 30 Clark Mindock, “Iran Nuclear Deal Reactions: Egypt Hopes Agreement Will Avoid Middle East Arms Race,” International Business Times, July 14, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-nuclear-deal-reactions-egypt-hopes-agreement-will-avoid-middle-east-arms-race-2008562 31 Ibid.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 20 1. The nonproliferation benefits are temporary, those facilities to the production of nuclear weapons at and Iran will emerge after 10-15 years with a time of its choosing. U.S. supporters of the nuclear an enhanced capability to pursue nuclear deal regard 15 years not just as a long-term, initial con- weapons; straint on any Iranian nuclear aspirations but also as an 2. Failure to address broader concerns about opportunity to pursue policies that can discourage and Iran’s behavior—combined with the boost to deter Tehran from opting for nuclear arms indefinitely. Iran’s economy provided by extensive sanc- tions relief—will facilitate more aggressive Many observers in the region, however, take little Iranian policies in the region than at present; comfort from a 10- or even 15-year hiatus. Prince and, Turki al-Faisal, former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the United States, is convinced that 3. The deal is a first step toward a broader reor- Iran intends to resume its nuclear weapons effort dering of the Middle East, with the United and regards 10 or even 15 years as “a mere second” States aligning itself with Iran at the expense that is “going to pass very quickly.”32 Regional con- of its traditional partners and significantly tacts tend to dismiss as overly optimistic the asser- reducing its military and diplomatic pres- tion by some JCPOA supporters that, in the course ence in the region. of 15 years, there may be a positive evolution in Ira- nian thinking on the nuclear issue or a fundamental Although these concerns are, to a significant extent, change in its internal power structure. unwarranted and, in any event, can be effectively addressed by resolute U.S. policies toward JCPOA By and large, this pessimistic view of Iran’s future nu- implementation and the region, they are deeply held clear intentions was not backed up with any evidence. by regional actors and will play a role in how region- Rather, most of our contacts asserted their confident al states respond in the long term to the JCPOA. belief in Iran’s continued determination to possess nu- clear weapons on the basis of Iran’s traditional desire Only a deferral of Iran’s nuclear to control the region—going back to the Persian Em- ambitions pire—and religious sectarianism. They also maintained that, having invested so much time and resources in its There is a widespread belief in the region that Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and having paid such a steep acceptance of the JCPOA reflects only a willingness price in terms of international sanctions, Iran would to delay and not to abandon its ambition to become not abandon its goal, now or in the future. a nuclear weapon state. It is practically taken as a giv- en—especially in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE— To Iran’s rivals in the region, it was seen as common that Iran’s nuclear objectives have not changed, and knowledge, almost self-evident, that Iran, if pre- that it wishes to acquire nuclear weapons as part of a sented with the opportunity, would acquire nuclear broader attempt to achieve regional hegemony. weapons. A senior Saudi Foreign Ministry official maintained that after 13-15 years, when constraints Many interlocutors suggested that Iran was perfectly on capability will be gone and Tehran will only have willing to accept a short-term delay of its nuclear am- to make a political decision; there will be an “open 33 bitions because, when key restrictions on its nuclear door” for Iran to build nuclear weapons. A minis- 34 activities expire at years 10 and 15, the JCPOA will terial-level Emirati official held that Iran’s commit- give Tehran a blank check to build nuclear facilities that ment to become a nuclear power will persist: “When are far larger than it possesses at present and to devote it sees it has a window, it will jump through it.”

32 Dan Drollette Jr., “The feud with Iran: A Saudi view,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 5, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/feud-iran-saudi- view9033 33 Interview conducted by the authors on November 3, 2015, in Saudi Arabia. 34 Interview conducted by the authors on November 4, 2015, in the UAE.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 21 Regional interlocutors did not suggest that Iran’s nu- greatly increase instability in the region even if none clear program was solely military in purpose. Nor of the countries actually developed nuclear weapons. was there any suggestion that Iran’s fossil fuel riches Interestingly, however, none of the interlocutors we undermined the Iranian claim that it needed civil interviewed asserted that their country would itself nuclear power. Rather, Tehran’s desire for civil nu- pursue a nuclear weapons option.37 Rather, our con- clear energy was seen as legitimate and unobjection- tacts suggested that other countries in the region able. But Iran’s neighbors assumed that its original would do so. So it was argued in Egypt that Saudi and primary motivation for pursuing enrichment Arabia and perhaps Turkey would respond to the facilities and a heavy-water reactor was to support JCPOA with their own nuclear fuel cycles. In Ri- a nuclear weapons program, and they believed that yadh, Turkey and Egypt were named. This form of the only way to have confidence in thwarting Iran’s finger-pointing seemed to be based less on clear ev- nuclear weapons ambitions was to ensure that there idence of an emerging nuclear proliferation cascade was no nuclear fuel cycle in the country—no en- and more on uncertainty throughout the region and richment or reprocessing facilities. By allowing Iran an expectation that the situation is more likely to to retain its enrichment program and shedding re- grow worse than better in the coming years. strictions on fuel cycle activities after 15 years, the JCPOA was seen as far too generous to Iran. Even Regional Challenges: Unresolved officials in Egypt (which generally supported the and Even Heightened deal and believed that all NPT states have the right to possess and use enrichment technology) had con- cerns that Iran’s intentions were inherently negative More troubling for regional interlocutors than the and believed it would have been preferable to re- JCPOA’s failure to ban enrichment or to impose lon- strain Iran longer.35 ger-duration restrictions on enrichment was its fail- ure to curb what they regarded as Iran’s destabilizing To those in the region most skeptical about the nu- behavior in the region. They accuse Iran of meddling clear deal, the terms of the JCPOA are consistent in the internal affairs of its neighbors, using proxies with a strategy by Iran of biding its time and defer- such as Hezbollah and the Houthis to advance its ring its goal of acquiring nuclear weapons. Under goals, intervening directly and militarily in the Syr- such a strategy, Iran would use the 15-year period ian and Yemeni civil wars, and in general seeking to of restrictions to develop and test more advanced sow instability, undermine rival governments, and centrifuges, continue to advance its missile delivery become the dominant power in the region. programs, build up its conventional military ca- pabilities, and greatly strengthen its economy—so Concerns about Iranian behavior were often seen that, by the end of 15 years, it would be in a much through the prism of the region’s sectarian divide. Iran better position than it is today to quickly expand its was viewed by Sunni government officials as motivat- 38 nuclear infrastructure and go for nuclear weapons.36 ed by a desire to establish a “Shiite crescent” extend- ing from Tehran through Iraq, , and Syria to Some regional actors are concerned not only that . Interlocutors in the UAE and Saudi Arabia Iran will pursue nuclear weapons after 15 years but cited attributes associated with the Shiite community, that other Middle East states, anticipating an even- such as a reverence for martyrdom and readiness to tual Iranian breakout, will also decide to seek nuclear absorb pain, as evidence why Iran would not desist weapons. This competitive strategic dynamic could from its regional goals or be bound by international

35 Interviews conducted by the authors on May 30 and 31, 2015, in Egypt. 36 Laurence Norman, “Nuclear Deal Allows Iran Significantly to Boost Centrifuges After 10 Years,” Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2015, http://www.wsj. com/articles/nuclear-deal-would-allow-iran-to-boost-centrifuges-after-10-years-1428170903 37 Interviews conducted by the authors in May/June and October/November 2015, in Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. 38 “The Shia crescendo: Shia militias are proliferating in the Middle East,” The Economist, March 28, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/middle- east-and-africa/21647367-shia-militias-are-proliferating-middle-east-shia-crescendo

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 22 agreements. While welcoming the JCPOA, Turkish vastly more threatening if Iran had nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu called on Iran to However, while recognizing that the JCPOA could abandon its “sectarian politics.”39 The hope expressed not be expected to resolve regional problems, key by some Western supporters of the JCPOA that the regional states are concerned that the nuclear deal nuclear deal would produce a positive evolution in actually exacerbates them. They are especially con- Iranian strategic thought and a moderation of Iran’s cerned by how Tehran will use the roughly $100 bil- regional behavior was widely dismissed as improba- lion in previously restricted oil revenues that were ble, given the ideological pillars of the Islamic Repub- released to Iran on Implementation Day. They know lic, which were seen as impeding such an evolution. that, because of outstanding debts, only about half that total is available to Iranian authorities and that The Gulf Arab states, in particular, believe the Unit- the lion’s share of available funds will be devoted ed States was far too focused on securing an agree- to meeting pressing economic needs. But they fear ment on the nuclear issue at the expense of address- that even a small share of those funds can increase ing deep-rooted regional problems that preoccupy the Iranian regional threat if devoted to supporting them. A senior Saudi foreign ministry official held proxies or financing Iran’s direct military involve- that the JCPOA should have included a commit- ment in regional conflicts. Foreign Minister Adel ment by Iran not to interfere in the affairs of its Al-Jubeir expressed Saudi worries about the re- neighbors and not to engage in sectarian conflict.40 leased assets: “I think most countries of the world Criticism that the nuclear deal should have con- are concerned that Iran will use these funds in order strained Iran’s regional behavior is somewhat unfair, to fund its nefarious activities rather than use them considering that during the nuclear negotiations the to improve the living standards of its people.”41 The Gulf Arabs strongly urged the United States and its Israelis share Arab concerns in that regard, and are P5+1 partners not to address regional issues with- especially worried that sanctions relief could find its out the full participation of regional governments. way to terrorist groups targeting Israel. Moreover, the odds of reaching a broad regional accord while simultaneously resolving the nuclear Regional states are concerned that the nuclear deal issue would have been exceptionally long, and the will greatly elevate Iran’s international standing. For United States feared that linking the two would not years, Iran’s political isolation and economic distress only greatly complicate and perhaps doom the nego- put the Gulf Arabs in a comparatively strong po- tiations but would also enable the Iranians to hold sition relative to their regional adversary. By end- U.S. requirements on the nuclear issue hostage to ing the Iranian regime’s isolation and enhancing its U.S. concessions on regional issues, or vice versa. legitimacy, the nuclear deal has removed much of that advantage. The Gulf states believe the Iranians In the end, U.S. regional partners generally accepted already feel empowered to play a more assertive re- the logic of dealing only with nuclear issues in the gional role, and they see Iran’s inclusion in multi- JCPOA negotiations and of countering objection- lateral diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syrian civil able Iranian regional behavior separately. They also war as evidence that the major powers, including the understood, even if they were not entirely comfort- United States, are prepared to accept a major role for able with, the Obama administration’s argument Tehran. They find it unnerving that Secretary Kerry for giving priority to the nuclear issue—that Iran’s and Foreign Minister Zarif stay in regular touch by regional behavior, as disturbing as it is, would be phone, email, and in person.

39 “Turkish FM welcomes nuke deal but calls on Iran to revise regional policies,” Hurriyet Daily News, July 14, 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews. com/turkish-fm-welcomes-nuke-deal-but-calls-on-iran-to-revise-regional-policies.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85441&NewsCatID=510 40 Interview conducted by the authors on November 3, 2015, in Saudi Arabia. 41 “Saudi Arabia Minister Avoids Questions On Acquiring Nukes From Pakistan,” NDTV, January 21, 2016, http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/saudi- arabia-minister-avoids-questions-on-acquiring-nukes-from-pakistan-1268358

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 23 Iran’s neighbors are also concerned that, over time, Realignment in the Middle East the sanctions relief provided by the JCPOA will significantly strengthen the Iranian economy and One of the most troublesome arguments by regional give Tehran the resources to upgrade its military states against the JCPOA—which is especially diffi- capabilities and expand its regional influence. They cult to address because it is largely based on suspi- see companies from Europe and elsewhere eager to cions about intentions and predictions about future do business with Iran and are worried that, once behavior rather than on demonstrable facts—is that the international business community becomes the nuclear deal was intended only to be the first heavily engaged with Iran, there will be a reluc- step toward a broad realignment of the Middle East. tance to pressure Tehran to stop provocative re- In this realignment, Iran would play a more prom- gional activities and an unwillingness to re-impose inent, even central, regional role. The United States sanctions in the event of Iranian non-compliance would accept and even encourage Tehran to assume with its JCPOA commitments. An Egyptian offi- such a role, and would look to Iran as a partner in cial, noting that the Egyptian government did not promoting stability and ending conflicts in the re- support the imposition of unilateral sanctions on gion. U.S. allegiances would return to a pre-1979 Iran, nonetheless lamented their passing because era, shifting from an exclusive focus on traditional the international community’s leverage on Iran regional partners to an approach balanced between would be substantially reduced. those partners and Iran, perhaps even leaning to- ward the latter. In most versions of this putative re- Some individuals interviewed for this report argued alignment, the U.S. role in the region, especially its that aggressive Iranian behavior in the wake of the military presence, would be greatly reduced. nuclear deal could trigger reactions by other region- al states that could heighten regional instability. In Concerns about realignment are held more in Arab Egypt, for example, some of our contacts expressed countries than in Israel, which is worried more about a concern that the Gulf Arab countries’ opposition U.S. fatigue after over a decade of military opera- to Iranian regional behavior could spur them to take tions in the Middle East than about a realignment unwise actions to counter the perceived threat and in the region. rebalance the scales.42 A similar concern was ex- pressed by contacts in the UAE and Turkey.43 For To substantiate their concerns, Arab interlocutors example, more than one person interviewed sug- point to a mix of current and historical factors, in- gested that Saudi Arabia’s intervention into Yemen cluding both actions and inactions: was, in effect, the result of a trap created by Iran to sap Saudi strength and sow discord in the region.44 • The U.S.-Iranian bilateral relationship was Very few of our interlocutors in the region—outside more or less positive until the revolution. of Saudi Arabia—believed the campaign in Yemen The two countries share cultural ties that are would damage Iran to any significant degree and, hard to sever, notwithstanding the more re- by contrast, many expressed the concern that, by cent bad patch. To paraphrase one contact’s dragging in Gulf Arab states, the Iranians may have interpretation, ‘Iran is your wife and the Ar- achieved a strategic victory. As a contact in Egypt abs are your mistress. You’ve decided to go put it, Iran’s goal in the Middle East is instability back to your wife.’ itself, rather than regional dominance, and reckless • The United States permitted Iran to obtain actions by Arabs can further that Iranian goal. dominion over Iraq, despite total control of

42 Interviews conducted by the authors on May 30 and 31, 2015, in Egypt. 43 Interviews conducted by the authors on May 29 and June 1-3, 2015, in Turkey and the UAE. 44 Hugh Naylor, “Yemen is turning into Saudi Arabia’s Vietnam,” , November 13, 2015, http://www.thestar.com/news/ world/2015/11/13/saudi-arabia-trapped-in-messy-yemen-war.html

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 24 the country after the 2003 invasion, and al- This criticism is not directed specifically at the lowed a Shiite majority to push Iraqi Sunnis JCPOA or its key elements. Rather it reflects frus- out of political relevance. tration with what is widely seen as the inability of • The United States has turned a blind eye to U.S. policymakers over the last two presidential ad- Iranian activities in countries around the re- ministrations to settle on a balanced, prudent mid- gion, including Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and dle path between excessive action and excessive inac- Saudi Arabia’s eastern provinces. Only when tion. Contacts throughout the region expressed the forced did the United States take steps to view that the United States had tilted unpredictably counter Iran in these areas. And, in many from an unwise use of force against Iraq in 2003 to a cases, U.S. support has been grudging, insuf- refusal to appropriately use force against Syria today. ficient, and unnecessarily critical of its Sunni Arab allies. Accompanying expressions of concern about realign- ment were appeals for the U.S. to repair relations • The United States announced its pivot to with traditional partners in order to confront Iran as Asia, which involves turning away from the well as warnings that the Gulf Arabs, abandoned by Middle East. their U.S. security guarantor, may have to fend for • The United States is weary of military in- themselves. As an Emirati official noted, “we cannot volvement in the Middle East and is look- run away from the region” and therefore must con- ing to scale back its military presence in the tend with a rising Iran.45 But even on issues where region. disquiet was expressed with respect to the degree of • The United States is now attaining ener- U.S. commitment (such as in Syria or Yemen), there gy independence so that it no longer needs was an acknowledgement that U.S. support has been to worry about the supply of oil moving invaluable and exceeded anything provided by other through the Gulf (the name of which, itself, countries outside the region. remains a sore point for Arab governments, as the official U.S. designation is ‘Persian’ The May 2015 U.S.-GCC summit at Camp Da- Gulf). vid—and the April 2016 follow-up summit in Ri- yadh—was intended by the Obama administration • The United States’ response to the “Arab to allay the concerns of the Gulf Arab leaders and Spring”—especially the widespread percep- gain their support for the nuclear deal then nearing tion that it helped push Egyptian President completion. According to some observers, including Hosni Mubarak out of office in 2011, and Brookings expert Kenneth Pollack, the effort did then was willing to work with a new gov- not succeed: “What the Obama administration of- ernment led by the Muslim Brotherhood— fered the Gulf states at Camp David failed to allay planted seeds of doubt in many Arab capitals their fears or reassure them that . . . a nuclear deal about Washington’s reliability. with Iran would not mean abandonment of the re- gion.”46 However, all of the interlocutors we spoke To an American reader, this list may seem like an exag- with about these summits indicated that, although gerated and unconnected version of events by a con- many questions and concerns remained, the meet- spiracy-minded Arab audience to support a theory of ings were successful in repairing some of the damage realignment. Yet it reflects the perception of many in done over the past several years of U.S. policy. the Middle East that the JCPOA demonstrates that the United States is finishing up its business in the Notwithstanding their concerns about a possible Middle East before handing the keys over to Iran. regional alignment, most of the people with whom

45 Interview conducted by the authors on June 2, 2015, in the UAE. 46 Kenneth Pollack, “Regional Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran,” Committee on Foreign Affairs The United States Senate, July 9, 2015, p. 8, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20150709/103727/HHRG-114-FA00-Wstate-PollackK-20150709.pdf

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 25 we spoke expressed the hope that, drawing on the lessons of the past 20 years, the United States would maintain and even strengthen its regional presence and its relationships with Gulf Arab states.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 26 chapter 5 Prospects for Proliferation in the Wake of the JCPOA

n the preceding chapter, we described reactions and they may feel compelled to pursue their own ca- Ithroughout the region to the JCPOA. In this pabilities to prepare for the time when Iran’s nuclear chapter, we will consider one of the most troubling program emerges from its restrictions in 2025-2030. questions prompted by the JCPOA: whether coun- tries in the region will pursue their own nuclear fuel Whether states of the region eventually opt for their cycles or nuclear weapons in response to the nuclear own nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear weapons capabil- deal. ities will depend on several factors, some related to the JCPOA and some not. After discussing these The Obama administration and other supporters of factors, we will address the considerations likely to the JCPOA have argued strongly that the removal affect the calculations of individual states, focusing of a near-term risk of Iranian nuclear weapons will most of our attention on those regional states most sharply reduce the incentive for regional states to ac- often regarded as nuclear aspirants: Saudi Arabia, quire their own fissile material production capabil- UAE, Turkey, and Egypt. ities or nuclear weapons. These observers note that it is paradoxical to claim that the JCPOA, with all Major considerations for regional its restraints on Iran’s nuclear program, will create states greater incentives for proliferation than existed from 2005 to 2013, when Iran’s nuclear program was practically uninhibited. Deciding to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities (i.e., uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocess- Others claim that, by legitimizing Iran’s enrichment ing facilities)—let alone nuclear weapons—is one program, permitting Iran to ramp up its nuclear in- of the most consequential decisions a country can frastructure after 10-15 years, and facilitating an eco- make. Unlike in the past, when the acquisition of nomic recovery that will enable Iran to greatly boost fuel cycle capabilities was mainly seen as motivated the resources devoted to its nuclear program, the by civil nuclear energy needs, pursuing the nuclear JCPOA itself will be the catalyst for additional prolif- fuel cycle is now often assumed to be linked to an eration. They contend that, while Iran may have been intention to obtain at least a latent nuclear weapons expanding its nuclear capabilities prior to the JCPOA, capability. That is the case because, given the wide- the international community considered Iran’s nucle- spread availability in today’s international market ar program at the time to be illegal and sanctionable, of reasonably-priced nuclear fuel for nuclear ener- and regional states had some hope that a deal would gy and other civil applications, there is little justi- be struck that would terminate the program and end fication, in terms of reliable or affordable access to the nuclear threat. Now, according to this view, re- fuel supplies, to pursue indigenous enrichment or gional states have concluded that the deal actually reprocessing capabilities, particularly in the case of reached is not capable of alleviating their concerns, relatively small nuclear power programs.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 27 In light of security concerns in the region about and in what timeframe? Are they still optimistic Iran’s future nuclear plans, countries in the Middle about the development of advanced centrifuges? Do East are particularly vulnerable to the assumption they still want to manufacture fuel for their nuclear that a fuel cycle program betrays an intention to power reactors? Do they still say they have no in- acquire nuclear weapons or at least a hedging capa- tention to pursue a reprocessing capability? As key bility. This is especially the case when economic or restrictions expire, are they manufacturing and de- fossil-fuel conservation rationales for nuclear energy ploying advanced centrifuges as rapidly as permit- programs are accompanied by hints, which are occa- ted? Are they continuing to restrict production of sionally heard in the region, that those programs can enriched uranium to below five percent? also bring security benefits. Iranian officials continue to say that, once restric- Iran’s neighbors are therefore aware that any decision tions expire, they will expand their enrichment ca- by them to embark on enrichment or reprocessing pacity to “industrial scale.” In a meeting with his programs would be viewed with considerable suspi- staff on April 2, 2015, , head of cion by the international community. Whether they the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, reaffirmed are weighing the acquisition of nuclear weapons or Iran’s goal of an enrichment capacity of 190,000 “only” the pursuit of a fuel cycle capability, they will “separative work units” or SWUs47 annually (a mea- proceed with the knowledge that their decision will sure of centrifuge efficiency), which is more than 37 have major implications for them and for the region. times48 the enrichment capacity permitted during the first ten years of the JCPOA. The following are among the factors that countries in the Middle East are likely to consider in deciding Although plans to build two additional Russian-sup- whether to embark upon a nuclear fuel cycle or nu- plied reactors as well as possible near-term reactor clear weapons program: purchases from other suppliers are likely to involve the same arrangements that applied to the first Perceptions of Iranís future nuclear capabilities Bushehr reactor—that is, foreign supply of enriched and intentions reactor fuel—Iranians claim that, once their enrich- ment capacity is allowed to expand, they will begin First and foremost, countries will look to see what to produce their own fuel, not just for foreign-origin Iran intends to do with its nuclear fuel cycle. It is reactors but also for power reactors they hope to be a given that Iran will continue to have a domestic able to design and build indigenously. To meet the uranium enrichment capacity. Throughout the op- fueling needs of a much larger power reactor fleet, eration of the JCPOA, regional states will be looking they also say that, in addition to significantly in- for clues about what capabilities Iran will pursue as creasing the number of centrifuges, they will be re- restrictions on fuel cycle programs expire. placing their first-generation centrifuges with much more productive, advanced machines. Beyond seeking intelligence on Iranian leadership views and decision-making, countries of the region It is unknown, of course, whether and when these will be listening carefully to what Iranian officials are plans will materialize. Given the JCPOA’s highly re- saying about their evolving nuclear energy plans. Are strictive centrifuge R&D provisions, it is not clear they still talking about an “industrial-scale” capacity whether advanced centrifuges can be proven and

47 Michelle Moghtader, Fredrik Dahl, “Iran’s Supreme Leader calls for more enrichment capacity,” Reuters, July 8, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-iran-khamenei-idUSKBN0FD0MY20140708 48 Based on the following figures: 5,060, the number of centrifuges Iran is allowed to operate under the JCPOA, all of which are IR-1 centrifuges located at ; 1, the estimated maximum average annual output of each IR-1 centrifuge, in SWUs, when operated in production cascades. David Albright, “Technical Note: Making Sense out of the IR-8 Centrifuge,” Institute for Science and International Security, September 23, 2014, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/technical-note-making-sense-out-of-the-ir-8-centrifuge/8

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 28 deployed as soon as currently anticipated by Iran. efforts, there can be a measure of confidence that Moreover, given potential legal and practical ob- Iran’s nuclear weapon capabilities remain nascent. stacles to Iran fabricating fuel for any foreign-built power reactors, the Iranians may decide that they Countries will be mildly reassured if there are no need not ramp up their enrichment capacity so signs that Iran is violating the JCPOA’s restrictions quickly. on weaponization, but they will still need to plan against the possibility of intelligence failure or that Unfortunately, a quirk of nuclear science is that the Iran made sufficient progress prior to halting its ac- amount of enriched uranium required for nuclear tive weapons program in 2003-2004 that it does not weapons is far less than the amount of enriched need to risk detection by working on nuclear weap- uranium required for nuclear power. So even if Iran ons presently. were to expand its number of operating centrifuges or deploy advanced centrifuges more gradually than Regional dynamics expected, it would probably not be long after restric- tions end in 2028-2030 when its breakout time for Decisions by regional states whether to pursue producing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear fuel cycle capabilities or nuclear weapons single nuclear bomb would be reduced to a matter will depend significantly on the regional context of weeks. in which Iranian nuclear developments take place. Although it is hard to fathom at present, the Mid- Regional countries will also regard Iran’s record of dle East could be a far more stable and secure place compliance under the JCPOA as an indication of its in 10-15 years than today, particularly if the crises future intent. Efforts by Iran to cut corners or step in Syria and Yemen are resolved. Though it is un- over JCPOA boundaries will be taken as an ominous likely that Saudi Arabia and Iran will have reached sign. Iran’s neighbors will also focus on whether it is a permanent settlement of their differences, stem- cooperating with the IAEA and with the Agency’s ming as they do from fundamentally irreconcilable use of advanced safeguards technologies intended to views on religion and the structure of government, provide rapid confirmation of an Iranian decision to they may also have reached an accommodation that produce highly enriched uranium. would permit each other a measure of security. If Iran were enjoying economic growth on the back of Especially important will be whether regional coun- increased stability, then it is at least plausible that its tries believe Iran is complying with the JCPOA’s per- own regional behavior would be more benign, both manent prohibitions on engaging in activities related to avoid undermining a positive economic environ- to the development of a nuclear explosive device and ment or creating incentives for other countries in on acquiring the equipment needed for such activities. the region to reconsider their nuclear options. In his December 2015 report indicating that Iran had engaged in past activities relevant to the development On the other hand, it is easy to imagine a Middle of nuclear weapons, IAEA Director General Amano East that is at least as fractious as it is today, cre- assessed that Iran’s past work had not advanced “be- ating security problems for all sides and prompting yond feasibility and scientific studies and the acqui- concerns that Iran would take advantage of its latent sition of certain relevant technical competencies and nuclear capabilities to exploit regional turmoil and 49 capabilities.” Assuming the IAEA continues to re- obtain a strategic advantage. If states of the region port that Iran is abiding by its commitments in these see Iran behaving provocatively—increasing sup- areas and there are no indications from intelligence port for proxies, interfering in the internal affairs of sources that Iran is engaged in covert weaponization neighbors, and in general seeking to dominate the

49 “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” International Atomic Energy Agency, December 2, 2015, p. 14, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68.pdf

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 29 region—they will be more inclined to begin hedging unilateral sanctions, which will remain even after the their nuclear bets. Security Council arms embargo is eliminated. But it is possible that one or more will decide the Iranian Conventional defense capabilities market is sufficiently lucrative as to warrant running the risk of U.S. penalties. In evaluating their own The perceived conventional military balance be- defense requirements and future nuclear options, re- tween Iran and its neighbors is also likely to be an gional states will be following carefully the growth of important factor in future nuclear decision-making. Iran’s conventional military capabilities. Strong conventional defense capabilities could give Iran’s potential regional adversaries confidence that The United States as a security partner and the they could effectively counter Tehran’s efforts to role of other outside countries intimidate them and expand its influence through military means. They could present Iran with the Support for the defense capabilities of Gulf Arab unattractive prospect of entering into a costly and states has come almost exclusively from their rela- unwinnable conventional military conflict, which tionships with the United States and other West- even a nuclear-armed Tehran might fear. Countries ern countries. These relationships have provided in the region—the Saudis and Emiratis, in particu- regional partners with advanced military hardware, lar—can boast having some of the most advanced training, and operational guidance. Moreover, the conventional military forces obtainable. Gulf Arab military-to-military partnerships have been robust, military spending far exceeds that of Iran. In 2014, with joint exercises and training programs arranged Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and to ensure some level of interoperability. Bahrain spent a combined $113 billion50 on their militaries. In a 2015 statement, Obama said that However, confidence by countries in the region that Iran’s defense budget is approximately $30 billion,51 they can cope with the perceived threat from Iran and U.S. arms sales in the past year will preserve and comes not just from their own defense capabilities even increase the advantages the Gulf Arabs enjoy but also from their belief that their security and relative to the Iranian military. Missile defenses, in- political ties with the United States afford them a cluding the prospect of networking GCC missile de- significant measure of protection. No states of the fense capabilities, further contribute to this capacity, Middle East (with the exception of Turkey) receive neutralizing to some extent Iran’s ability to threaten the kind of formal security commitment that the its neighbors with its large arsenal of conventional- United States gives to its treaty allies in NATO, ly-armed and potentially nuclear-armed missiles. Japan, and South Korea. But U.S. administrations of both parties have long maintained that no state But Gulf Arab advantages could erode over time. The should be permitted to dominate the Middle East, expected strengthening of the Iranian economy will and they have behaved as if the security of close U.S. allow Tehran to rebuild its defense capabilities. And friends was a critical interest of the United States, while the U.N. Security Council’s embargo against as Washington demonstrated most dramatically in the sale of major defense items to Iran will remain in the first Gulf War by protecting Saudi Arabia and effect for five more years, Iranian authorities are al- evicting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. And while the ready talking to arms suppliers in Russia, China, and United States has not explicitly extended its nuclear elsewhere about large purchases. These arms suppli- umbrella over the Middle East, its nuclear capabili- ers will have to decide whether they wish to risk U.S. ties would contribute to deterrence in the event of a nuclear-armed Iran.

50 Alia Chughtai, “GCC military spending spree,” Al Jazeera, August 8, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/08/gcc-military- spending-spree-150808120255563.html 51 Jon Greenberg, “Obama: Iran spends $30 billion on defense; U.S. about $600 billion,” PolitiFact, April 9, 2015, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o- meter/statements/2015/apr/09/barack-obama/obama-iran-spends-30-billion-defense-us-about-600-/

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 30 America’s robust military presence in the region— in Yemen and, to a lesser degree, in Syria) or eventu- including approximately 35,00052 military person- ally by pursuing a latent or actual nuclear weapons nel, Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain, air bases capability. at Al Udeid in Qatar, Ali Al Salem in Kuwait, and Al Dhafra in the UAE,53 and training and joint ex- Feasibility of acquiring the nuclear fuel cycle and, ercises—reinforces the credibility of its security as- later, nuclear weapons surances. The United States maintains a more robust military posture in the region than before the 9/11 There is a wide gulf between a country deciding to ac- attacks. To address concerns about Iran’s behavior in quire fuel cycle facilities or nuclear weapons and ac- the wake of the nuclear deal, Washington has fre- tually acquiring them. Several countries have sought quently sought to reassure its regional partners about such capabilities only to be stopped midstream by its determination to support their security and push external pressure (e.g., Iraq, Syria). A few have also back against destabilizing activities. At the Camp been halted in their tracks by the sheer difficulty of David GCC summit, President Obama reiterat- the endeavor and lack of persistence (e.g., Libya). ed the Carter Doctrine, pledging that “the United Although the science underlying nuclear weapons States is prepared to work jointly with GCC mem- and the nuclear fuel cycle has been made sufficient- ber states to deter and confront an external threat ly public so as to eliminate some of the guesswork, to any GCC state’s territorial integrity . . . using the countries must still invest in the necessary expertise, means at our collective disposal, including the use of materials, and physical plant—and this requires con- military force.”54 As long as the United States is seen siderable time, financial means, perseverance, and as a reliable guarantor of regional security, incentives often large-scale foreign assistance. The obstacles to for proliferation will be reduced. achieving fuel cycle or nuclear weapons capabilities are not insurmountable, but they pose a challenge But as noted earlier, traditional U.S. partners have to countries in a region where the necessary exper- become increasingly concerned that the U.S. com- tise, nuclear infrastructure, or financial resources are mitment to the region and to their security is weak- often lacking. And, of course, any country in the ening and that the United States is not showing region seeking to balance Iran would be starting at sufficient resolve in countering Iran’s efforts to ex- square one, or nearly square one, as compared to pand its influence at their expense. As confidence in Iran with its 30 years of investment in the nuclear Washington has waned, countries in the region have enterprise. explored relationships with other potential defense partners like Russia, although they acknowledge that Possibility of foreign objections and countermeasures they are unlikely to find another partner with both the ability and inclination to fill the crucial security Iran’s own nuclear endeavor was complicated by role the United States has historically played. To the foreign objections and countermeasures, which extent that countries in the region feel abandoned lengthened the timelines, costs, and difficulties. For by the United States and are unable to find new example, while Iran sought to purchase an enrich- partners that can fill America’s shoes, they may look ment plant outright from Russia (and received sub- to their own devices—by becoming more assertive stantial fuel cycle-related assistance from China) in militarily on their own or with Arab allies (as we see the 1990s, U.S. pressure prevented the provision of

52 “2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Middle East,” Heritage Foundation, http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/chapter/op-environment/ middle-east/ 53 Craig Whitlock, “U.S. relies on Persian Gulf bases for airstrikes in Iraq,” The Washington Post, August 26, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/us-relies-on-persian-gulf-bases-for-airstrikes-in-iraq/2014/08/25/517dcde0-2c7a-11e4-9b98-848790384093_story.html 54 “Remarks by President Obama in Press Conference after GCC Summit,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 14, 2015, https://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/remarks-president-obama-press-conference-after-gcc-summit

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 31 enrichment technology to Iran directly and rolled Mubarak’s concerns about nuclear safety and aversion back some of the cooperation that was initiated.55 to nuclear weapons were as critical to Egypt’s nuclear Iran was instead forced to turn to A.Q. Khan’s black abstinence as Moammar Gadhafi’s megalomania was market network and reverse-engineer a Pakistani to Libya’s unsuccessful attempt to join the nuclear centrifuge design originally stolen from URENCO club. In democratic systems, the views of the public in the 1970s. and elected officials will be more central. The end of military rule in Argentina and Brazil led to the aban- The contributions of the Khan network to the nu- donment of their nuclear weapons programs, while clear weapons programs of Iran, North Korea, and the 1998 election of the Bharatiya Janata Party gov- Libya motivated the United States and its partners ernment led to ’s nuclear weapons tests. In some to strengthen the international nonproliferation re- Middle East countries, the stigma attached to nuclear gime in the 2000s to prevent the transfer of fuel cy- weapons may be a factor, particularly when combined cle technologies. These efforts—including the tight- with the latent threat of punishment for pursuing the ening of the Nuclear Supplier Group’s restrictions bomb and the inherent cost of developing the neces- on transferring fuel cycle technologies, the strength- sary infrastructure. Leadership transitions, such as the ening of national controls on sensitive dual-use ex- generational change underway in Saudi Arabia, may ports, and international cooperation in interdicting bring leaders to power with their own perspectives on illicit shipments of sensitive goods and materials— options for promoting national security. have greatly complicated a would-be proliferator’s task of acquiring its own nuclear fuel cycle, unless it Country cases is able to find an existing technology holder willing to violate current norms against providing assistance in the areas of enrichment and reprocessing. In assessing the probability of proliferation in the Middle East, it is necessary to focus on how the var- In addition to considering the difficulties of gaining ious factors discussed above affect nuclear decision access to the necessary technologies, a state decid- making in individual countries. Four regional coun- ing whether to pursue nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear tries—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Turkey— weapon capabilities would have to weigh the risk are often cited as the most likely to go for a latent or that key countries from within or outside the region actual nuclear weapons capability. Each has one or would take strong measures to thwart its attempt. more of the prerequisites for obtaining that capabil- Such measures could range from diplomatic pressure ity, such as strategic interest, national will, technical to economic sanctions to cyberattacks to military expertise, and financial resources. However, none of strikes, all of which have previously been employed the four possesses all of the requirements of such a in the Middle East to disrupt or stop what was per- program nor has any of them indicated a clear, na- ceived to be a nuclear weapons program. tional decision to embark on this venture. Conse- quently, although some observers have assumed a Domestic attitudes toward nuclear weapons degree of inevitability that at least one of these coun- tries will start down the path toward nuclear arms, it In a number of countries—including some that opted is far from certain that this will be the case. for nuclear weapons as well as some that did not—the domestic balance between proponents and opponents Saudi Arabia was as important a factor in nuclear decision making as external considerations. In autocratic systems, the The Saudis are considered by many to be the most views of the ruler or ruling elite can be decisive. Hosni likely to follow Iran down a path to the acquisition

55 David Albright, Andrea Stricker, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” United States Institute of Peace, September 2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/ irans-nuclear-program

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 32 of nuclear weapons. In a May 2009 meeting in Ri- purpose of destabilizing the region so that Iran can yadh with senior White House official Dennis Ross, establish its regional hegemony.58 King Abdullah stated more than once that “if they get them, we get them,” suggesting an element of au- The Saudis see Iran not just as an external threat to tomaticity in Saudi decision making on this matter. their interests in the region but also as an existential Ross maintains that Saudi Arabia has a need to cre- threat to the Kingdom’s internal order. They believe ate an image of equivalence with Iran and to avoid the Iranians are seeking to undermine the Saudi looking as if the Kingdom is at a disadvantage in any monarchy, plotting with Shiite religious dissidents way with respect to the rival it views as both a secu- in Saudi Arabia as well as casting a poor light on rity threat and a competitor in the Islamic world.56 Saudi performance as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Subjects interviewed suggested that A possible Saudi interest in matching Iran’s nucle- problems with the Hajj in 2015—including a stam- ar capability stems from the Kingdom’s perception pede that reportedly left hundreds dead—were the of a multifaceted Iranian threat, not just from the result of Iranian provocation. The Saudi execution fear that Tehran may acquire nuclear weapons. In of Shiite cleric (and, according to the Saudis, sup- various interviews we conducted with Saudi officials porter of terrorism) Nimr al-Nimr and the resulting and think tank representatives, Iran was described Iranian ransacking of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran as an implacable opponent of Saudi Arabia and a only served to heighten existing bilateral tensions in menace to the entire region that was motivated by January 2016.59 religious zealotry. There was widespread skepticism that the Iranians would be capable of moderating At the same time that Saudi concerns with Iran have their approach to the region, which was seen as det- been rising, confidence in the United States has rimental not only to Saudi Arabia but also to the been falling. This has given rise to support for the United States. Kingdom acting more forcefully on its own as well as looking to additional foreign partners. Saudi of- According to polling data, this mindset persists ficials and non-governmental experts recite a litany throughout Saudi society. In one Zogby poll, re- of U.S. actions or failures to act that, in their view, spondents were asked to evaluate whether Iran is a illustrate a reduced U.S. commitment to the securi- threat and, if so, to weigh whether the threat stems ty of its partners and the region—including tacitly from its nuclear program, its regional activities, or supporting Egyptian president Mubarak’s ouster, both equally. While Saudis were split on where the failing to enforce its redline against Syrian use of threat stems from, only 14 percent believed that Iran chemical weapons, pulling back from its insistence posed no threat.57 This same poll identified concern that Bashar Assad “must go,” giving lukewarm sup- with the JCPOA itself, with 69 percent believing the port to Syrian rebels, and acquiescing in a greater deal was in Iran’s interest and no one else’s. Iranian regional role.

This negative view of Iran is based heavily on the on- Saudi expert Nawaf Obaid argues that, “With the going conflicts in Syria and Yemen, which the Saudi Obama administration abandoning the United government has identified as being directed by the States’ historical responsibilities and, by extension, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for the most of its prestige in the Middle East, the Saudis

56 Email to one of the authors from Ambassador Dennis Ross on March 30, 2016. 57 “Middle East 2015: Current and Future Challenges,” Zogby Research Services, November 2015, p. 28, http://www.zogbyresearchservices.com/new- gallery-1/ 58 Julian Pecquet, “Saudi king wants Obama to tackle Iranian ‘mischief’,” Al-Monitor, August 31, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2015/08/saudi-king-washington-visit-iran-deal.html 59 “Saudi Arabia cuts diplomatic ties with Iran over embassy storming,” RT, January 3, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/327820-saudi-cut-ties-iran/

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 33 have no choice but to lead more forcefully.”60 Of- assistance, including fighter aircraft, munitions, and ficial expressions of concern are less frequent, but spare parts, which have led to some of the largest Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense U.S. weapons sales in history. Given Iran’s efforts Mohammed bin Salman told The Economist: “The to strengthen its ballistic missile forces, the Saudis United States must realize that they are the number have prioritized building up their air defense capa- one in the world, and they have to act like it.”61 bilities—in particular, through the purchase of an updated Patriot air defense system and 600 inter- Saudi officials with whom we spoke tended to play ceptors in the summer of 2015.63, 64, 65 The replen- down such concerns. In fact, meetings at the Minis- ishment of Saudi munitions supplies announced in try of Defense as well as the Ministry of Foreign Af- November 2015 can give the Saudis confidence that, fairs supported the notion that, although the Saudis should they get engaged in a protracted conflict with have their doubts about the JCPOA and its regional Iran or its proxies, they will be able to sustain the ef- implications, they believe the United States remains fort with a reasonable expectation of U.S. support.66 committed to Saudi and broader Gulf Arab security. Overall, Saudi Arabia is the world’s second largest Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials, while com- importer of conventional arms. Its imports rose 275 plaining about the slow speed with which requests percent in 2011 to 2015 when compared against the for supplies were granted and fulfilled, noted that previous period, 2006 to 2010,67 and much of this U.S. support for the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen came from the United States. was good.62 When asked about Saudi overtures to other outside powers, including Defense Minister Saudi conventional military forces, among the most Mohammed bin Salman’s reported meeting with advanced in the world, ought to be sufficient to pro- Russians about the possible purchase of defense tect the Kingdom from conventional military attack items, these same officials denied that reports of from Iran. Although Iran invested in developing its Saudi interest in partnering with other countries— navy in the 1990s—and now fields a combination including France and Russia—should be interpreted of surface and submerged naval assets that could as a Saudi desire to replace the United States as the threaten passage through the Straits of Hormuz and Kingdom’s essential security partner. associated waters—Iran’s power projection capabili- ties do not extend beyond its naval forces. Anthony Yet, it is clear that the challenge from Iran has Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and Inter- prompted a re-examination of the Kingdom’s con- national Studies put it bluntly in 2014: “With the ventional defense requirements. The Saudis have possible exception of Iraq, Iran’s conventional forces taken advantage of the Obama administration’s in- cannot compete with the United States or Gulf states terest in keeping the Gulf Arab states at least mildly in any regular form of conventional warfare.”68 As- supportive of the JCPOA to request new military suming adequate warning, Saudi Arabia ought to be

60 Nawaf Obaid, “A new generation of Saudi leaders — and a new foreign policy,” The Washington Post, March 26, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost. com/opinions/a-new-generation-of-saudi-leaders--and-a-new-foreign-policy/2015/03/26/2cf83582-d102-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html 61 “Transcript: Interview with Muhammad bin Salman,” The Economist, January 6, 2016, http://www.economist.com/saudi_interview 62 Interview with MOD officials conducted by the authors on November 1, 2015, in Saudi Arabia. 63 Clay Dillow, “U.S. greenlights sale of 600 Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia,” Fortune, August 1, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/08/01/u-s-patriot- missiles-saudi-arabia/ 64 “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2015,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 2016, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/ SIPRIFS1602.pdf 65 “Raytheon Secures $213M FMS Contract for Patriot Program,” NASDAQ, February 1, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/article/raytheon-secures- 213m-fms-contract-for-patriot-program-cm573276 66 “The Government of Saudi Arabia - Air-to-Ground Munitions,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, November 16, 2015, http://www.dsca.mil/ major-arms-sales/government-saudi-arabia-air-ground-munitions 67 “Saudi arms purchases almost triple in five years,” Middle East Monitor, February 23, 2016, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160223-saudi- arms-purchases-almost-triple-in-five-years/ 68 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Gulf Military Balance Volume I: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 28, 2014, p. 119, http://csis.org/files/publication/1305022_Gulf_Mil_Bal_Volume_I.pdf

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 34 in a position (especially if operating in coordination electricity, the Saudis would forgo nearly $55 billion with other GCC states and the United States) to de- annually in export revenue, assuming present low fend its territorial integrity from an Iranian assault. oil prices continue. If, as is likely, oil prices were to climb back to a more “normal” range of $50 to $75 Notwithstanding the favorable conventional bal- per barrel, the Saudi opportunity cost of burning ance, however, the Saudis may believe that Iran’s na- this oil at home would exceed $100 billion annually. scent ability to field a nuclear weapon could trump Consequently, ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear their conventional military forces and render them program gets off the ground may be critical to the vulnerable to coercion—and this could motivate Kingdom’s economic future, not to mention its po- them to pursue nuclear weapons. But the King- litical stability. dom’s ability to achieve a nuclear weapons capabil- ity will require it to obtain the necessary physical However, despite the importance of developing non- and human infrastructure, and that is the principal oil electricity production, the Saudi nuclear program constraint on any nuclear weapons ambitions Saudi remains nascent. In January 2015, the initial time- Arabia may have. table for constructing 16 nuclear power reactors was postponed for eight years, apparently because Saudi Saudi Arabia has large-scale plans for its nuclear authorities recognized that they did not have the program. It intends to construct 16 nuclear power workforce, supply chain, or regulatory infrastructure reactors over the next 20 years. By 2040, it projects to support such an ambitious effort.70 17 GWe (gigawatts, electrical) of nuclear capacity.69 The main rationale for this plan is to rely more on According to officials at KACARE, the Saudis are nuclear and other non-fossil fuel sources for elec- years from being able to construct their first power tricity generation and to preserve fossil fuel produc- reactor and intend to start with foreign-constructed tion for export purposes. At present, Saudi Arabia research reactors within “the next few years.”71 These remains highly dependent on burning oil to provide officials noted that the highest near-term priority is the electricity required to make the Arabian Desert the establishment of scholarship and job placement habitable, particularly during the summer months. programs to create a cadre of nuclear scientists; they Senior staff of the King Abdullah City for Atomic anticipate being able to train approximately 1,000 and Renewable Energy (known as KACARE, which new nuclear experts in the next five years, assuming serves as the lead for Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program) consistent funding and interest. The knowledge base told us that the Saudis use between one-quarter and and expert pool presently in Saudi Arabia is small, one-third of their total oil production for domestic with only 40 to 50 people at KACARE involved spe- electricity production. They anticipate this number cifically in nuclear science. KACARE officials fur- would climb to one-half of their total oil production ther noted that its experts are mostly involved in the by 2035 if left unchecked. use of radioactive sources for civil uses—not surpris- ing given that this sector comprised Saudi Arabia’s Absent the generation of electricity from non-oil entire nuclear industry until now.72 sources, this would impose a considerable financial cost on the Kingdom; for example, by burning 50 With its indigenous human infrastructure only now percent of total Saudi oil production to generate being developed, Saudi Arabia has mostly been

69 “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia,” World Nuclear Association, January 2016, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/ countries-o-s/saudi-arabia.aspx 70 Dan Yurman, “Saudi Arabia delays its nuclear plans,” Neutron Bytes/Reuters, January 24, 2015, https://neutronbytes.com/2015/01/24/saudi-arabia- delays-its-nuclear-plans/ 71 Interview with KACARE officials conducted by the authors on November 2, 2015, in Saudi Arabia. 72 According to NTI, the Saudis possess one three-megavolt Tandetron accelerator and one 350 kilovolt light-ion accelerator for nuclear physics experiments (both located at King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals), and three cyclotrons for producing medical isotopes (located at King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre).

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 35 working with foreign partners. It has concluded has yet to be fully assessed.75, 76 As a consequence, broad agreements for civil nuclear cooperation with even though uranium enrichment might make little France, South Korea, Argentina, China, Finland, economic sense in the near term, KACARE suggest- Russia, and Hungary and has held discussions on ed it would be economically unwise to renounce it such agreements with the United States, Japan, the at this time. United Kingdom, , and Spain. GE Hita- chi, Toshiba/Westinghouse, Areva, and Rosatom Assuming that oil prices rebound and the Saudi eco- are among the entities interested in building power nomic situation improves, Saudi Arabia would have reactors in the Kingdom. The South Korean Korea the financial resources to support the full nuclear Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has a fuel cycle. Moreover, it is going about developing head start, signing an agreement with KACARE in physical and human infrastructure in a determined 2015 to assess the possibility of constructing at least and systematic way. However, they are starting at two 330 MWt (megawatts, thermal) System-inte- a very low base and will take many years to build grated Modular Advanced reactors (also known as the capacity to pursue fuel cycle programs. More- SMART reactors).73 over, with tightened nonproliferation constraints on transfers of fuel cycle technologies, acquiring such U.S. negotiations with the Kingdom on an agree- technologies from abroad will be very difficult. And ment for civil nuclear cooperation have been at an given the importance of nuclear power to the King- impasse for several years. In keeping with its policy dom’s energy future, Riyadh may be very reluctant to discourage the spread of fuel cycle capabilities, the to put its civil energy program in jeopardy by seek- United States has insisted on a legally binding com- ing sensitive nuclear technologies, openly or illicitly, mitment not to acquire enrichment or reprocessing from foreign suppliers. facilities, but Saudi Arabia has so far resisted such a commitment. Given the difficulty of Saudi Arabia developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability for the fore- KACARE officials told us that, while there were no seeable future, speculation has often turned to the current plans for an enrichment program and that possibility that a foreign power would assist Riyadh such a program was not anticipated for at least 25 in becoming a nuclear-armed state, perhaps even by years, there could be an economic justification for transferring the weapons themselves. In that con- an enrichment capability to provide fuel for the nection, the foreign power usually identified is Paki- Kingdom’s desired fleet of 16 nuclear power reac- stan. Saudi Arabia provided generous financial sup- tors.74 They said Saudi Arabia might have a far more port that helped Pakistan pursue its nuclear weapons compelling rationale for domestic enrichment than, program, and over the years the idea has gained cur- for example, the UAE, given the larger fleet of pow- rency that Pakistan agreed to return the favor by aid- er reactors the Kingdom envisions. They also not- ing the Kingdom’s quest for the bomb. The idea that ed that Saudi Arabia has potentially useful sources Pakistan has committed to help Saudi Arabia obtain of domestic uranium from its phosphate deposits, nuclear weapons has been repeated so many times which have been publicly reported as substantial in and for so long that it is widely taken as fact.77 size, even if the uranium content of those deposits

73 “Saudi Arabia teams up with Korea on SMART,” World Nuclear News, March 4, 2015, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Saudi-Arabia- teams-up-with-Korea-on-SMART-0403154.html 74 Interview with KACARE officials conducted by the authors on November 2, 2015, in Saudi Arabia. 75 “Saudi Arabia’s city of phosphate,” Oxford Business Group, March 2, 2014, http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s- city-phosphate 76 Mohammad A. Al-Eshaikha, Ahmed N. Kadachia, M. Mansoor Sarfrazb, “Determination of uranium content in phosphate ores using different measurement techniques,” Journal of King Saud University - Engineering Sciences, vol. 28, I, January 2016, pp. 41-6, http://www.sciencedirect.com/ science/article/pii/S1018363913000494 77 Mark Urban, “Saudi nuclear weapons ‘on order’ from Pakistan,” BBC, November 6, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24823846

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 36 But the truth about this alleged Saudi-Pakistani un- which provides another reason not to be Saudi Ara- derstanding is impossible to pin down. From our bia’s nuclear accomplice. conversations with Saudi and Pakistani officials, there are scant indications that such a commitment The idea of Pakistan deploying its nuclear weapons was ever made. During a June 2015 visit to Wash- on the territory of Saudi Arabia under Pakistani con- ington, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry trol—in a manner similar to U.S. nuclear deploy- stated that speculation that Pakistan would sell or ments on the territory of its non-nuclear NATO transfer nuclear arms or advanced technology was allies—has sometimes been mentioned as an option “unfounded and baseless.”78 At a 2015 conference for Saudi Arabia to meet its deterrence needs with- organized by the Carnegie Endowment in Washing- out acquiring its own nuclear weapons capability. ton, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Khalid Kidwai, who formerly But even with the NATO precedent, both Saudi had responsibility for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons Arabia and Pakistan could expect tremendous crit- program, also denied such a plan was in place: “I icism unless the Kingdom was faced with a grave don’t think Pakistan will ever be a potential source threat, such as from a nuclear-armed Iran. If the for any country. Never.” Asked whether Saudi Ara- Saudis do indeed have a “Pakistani option,” it may bia had ever considered purchasing nuclear weapons well be nothing more than a general assurance that, from Pakistan, Prince Turki al-Faisal said it had not: in the event the Kingdom is threatened or attacked, “You need a whole complex infrastructure to service Pakistan would take steps to support and defend its nuclear weapons. So it’s not just simply buying from ally. Such an assurance would fall far short of a com- Pakistan. And that’s never been considered an option mitment to transfer nuclear arms or sensitive nuclear in the Kingdom despite what American and Europe- technology. an reporters have said or written.”79 In a private in- terview, the former Saudi intelligence chief indicated If they believed they could manage the interna- that he never believed in such an understanding and, tional consequences, the Saudis might well seek to in any event, was never involved in it.80 acquire nuclear weapons or, at a minimum, a com- plete nuclear fuel cycle so as to create a latent nu- If such an understanding does exist, it was probably clear weapons threat. But the likely international between a former Saudi king and a former Pakistani consequences are a strong disincentive. Acquisition leader, and it probably took the form of a vague, of nuclear weapons could trigger strong U.S. sanc- unwritten assurance without operational details or tions and other international penalties. U.S. military agreement on the circumstances in which it would cooperation would be foreclosed, severely impair- be activated. But even if it does exist, Saudi Arabia ing Saudi ability to defend the Kingdom or project would find it difficult to rely on such an assurance power. Turning to others for defense support would now—mindful of Pakistan’s rejection of the Saudi be politically complicated and the transition away request that it participate in the Yemeni campaign. from dependence on the United States would not be The Pakistanis know that their ambition to exit the quick or easy. In sum, the combination of the slow international nonproliferation dog-house for the Saudi start on nuclear technology, the risk of losing crimes of A.Q. Khan and to achieve international access to international nuclear and military cooper- nuclear respectability would be permanently ham- ation, the uncertain relevance of nuclear weapons to pered by transferring sensitive technology or nuclear addressing the Kingdom’s most compelling security weapons to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, while Saudi-Pa- and political challenges, and the difficulty of gaining kistani friendship remains strong, Islamabad also foreign technical support for a nuclear weapons ca- wishes to maintain a good relationship with Iran, pability all reduce the likelihood that Saudi Arabia

78 Maria Khan, “Pakistan: Foreign secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry denies talks with Saudis on nuclear issues,” International Business Times, June 5, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/pakistan-foreign-secretary-aizaz-ahmad-chaudhry-denies-talks-saudis-nuclear-issues-1504551 79 Dan Drollette Jr., “The feud with Iran: A Saudi view.” 80 Interview with Turki al-Faisal conducted by an author on Oct 26, 2015, in Washington, DC.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 37 will elect to move in that direction or would succeed Doubtless, part of the reason for this approach is the if it did. close economic ties that exist between the UAE and neighboring Iran. Yousef Al Otaiba, UAE ambas- United Arab Emirates sador to the United States, writes that “perhaps no country has more to gain from normalized relations The Emiratis share many of the Saudis’ apprehen- with Tehran. Reducing tensions across the less than sions about Iran. They believe Iran poses a severe 100-mile-wide Arabian Gulf could help restore full threat to the stability of the region and that Iranian trade ties, energy cooperation and cultural exchang- aggressiveness has only increased since the JCPOA es, and start a process to resolve a 45-year territorial was concluded. They cite Iran’s direct military in- dispute.” But despite what he describes as Emirati volvement in Syria, its undue influence in Baghdad, efforts to coexist with Iran and the hopes created by and its support for the Houthis in Yemen (where the nuclear deal, Al Otaiba maintains that “the Iran Emirati troops are now fighting Iran’s proxies). They we have long known—hostile, expansionist, and vi- 83 believe Tehran is still trying to export revolution, olent—is alive and well, and as dangerous as ever.” including through Shiite conversions in the UAE, and they continue to protest Iranian occupation Emirati officials underscored that, although they of three of their islands. Like Riyadh, Abu Dhabi do not believe Washington has opposed Iranian re- is convinced that Iran has not given up its nuclear gional behavior strongly enough and they remain weapons ambitions and will resume its quest when upset that they were not trusted with information key JCPOA restrictions expire. According to poll- concerning the secret U.S.-Iran channel in 2012 ing, Emiratis are even more skeptical of the JCPOA to 2013 (and, perhaps more irritating, the Omanis than the Saudis, with 91 percent of Emiratis polled were), they continue to regard the United States as saying they do not support the JCPOA and only a their vital security partner. Emirati officials remind- slightly smaller percentage indicating that the Irani- ed us on several occasions that the UAE has fought ans got the better of the deal.81 alongside the United States in every conflict it has undertaken since the first Gulf War, something that However, while the UAE is deeply concerned with no other Arab country has done, a fact that they Iranian behavior and is a close partner of the Sau- mention with pride and that they believe has earned dis in prosecuting the conflict in Yemen, the Emi- them special consideration when it comes to U.S. 84 ratis have not taken the same hardline tack with support Iran overall as the Saudis have done. Emirati Presi- dent Sheikh Khalifa was among the first to offer his There are indications that the UAE is seeking to di- congratulations to the Iranians for completing the versify the sources of its security, including through nuclear deal.82 While the Saudis tend to view the defense cooperation with France (which has a base struggle with Iran as irreconcilable and see little to in Abu Dhabi) and purchases of military equipment 85 be gained through engagement, the Emiratis take a from other countries. As with the Saudis, officials in more pragmatic approach and believe that, if Teh- the UAE suggested that their purchase of non-U.S. ran’s regional designs are effectively countered and a military goods was not a strategic signal of Emira- regional balance is established, a modus vivendi with ti concern with the United States but rather a pru- Iran can eventually be achieved. dent decision to develop ties with various countries.

81 “Middle East 2015: Current and Future Challenges,” p. 27. 82 “Khalifa congratulates Iranian President on nuclear agreement,” Emirates News Agency, July 14, 2015, http://www.wam.ae/en/news/ emirates/1395283286975.html 83 Yousef Al Otaiba, “One Year After the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Wall Street Journal,April 4, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/one-year-after-the- iran-nuclear-deal-1459721502 84 Interview with a UAE official conducted by the authors on November 4, 2015, in the UAE. 85 Awad Mustafa, “Saudi, UAE Influence Grows With Purchases,” Defense News, March 22, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy- budget/budget/2015/03/22/saudi-uae-influence-grows-with-purchases/25013385/

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 38 However, the bulk of Emirati arms purchases still construction, the Emiratis are likely to move swiftly come from the United States and their major mili- from development to construction to operation of tary systems are American in origin.86 The Emiratis some of the most state-of-the-art nuclear facilities would have reason to fear such cooperation would in the world. be curtailed should they embark on an independent nuclear path. According to a U.S. official who works To achieve their ambitious nuclear energy goals, closely with the UAE, “the Emiratis know the Unit- the Emiratis are fully reliant on assistance from the ed States is their only security option, but it worries outside world. Their primary contractor is the Ko- them.”87 rea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), which is leading a consortium that involves other compa- The direction of the UAE’s civil nuclear program is nies from Korea as well as Toshiba and its subsidi- perhaps the best indication that Abu Dhabi has no ary Westinghouse.92 Although this project includes current intention to pursue nuclear weapons. a sizable package of training, human resources, and education programs in the UAE,93 these programs Like the Saudis, the Emiratis started on their nucle- will not be completed by the time the first reactor ar program comparatively late. The UAE’s nuclear becomes operational, and so the UAE will not be program began in earnest in late 2006 as part of a independently capable of operating its nuclear facil- broader Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) project ities for quite some time. to explore the feasibility of nuclear power in the region. The UAE’s own nuclear policy paper—the Lack of independence does not appear to be a ma- “Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evalua- jor Emirati concern. Far from seeking a fully inde- tion and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear pendent nuclear program (which is inconceivable Energy”—was published in April 2008.88 In it, the in any event given the paucity of uranium in the UAE laid out its rationale for nuclear energy—es- country), the Emiratis have instead sought the tech- sentially mirroring the Saudi goal of providing re- nological benefits of integrating their nuclear pro- liable electricity production without depending too gram with more advanced programs. The Emiratis heavily on the burning of fossil fuels—and its in- have also been clear that they have no intention of tention to develop a nuclear program of the highest developing the complete nuclear fuel cycle, a policy quality insofar as safety, security, and nonprolifera- that was formalized in the U.S.-UAE Agreement for tion standards are concerned. Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Ener- gy (aka, the “123 Agreement,” after section 123 of As of early 2016, the Emiratis have concluded nucle- the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which mandates such ar cooperation agreements with the United States, agreements). In the U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement, the Hungary,89 Russia, China, South Korea, France, and Emiratis went well beyond the minimum require- Argentina90 and have begun the construction of four ments for such agreements by undertaking a legally nuclear power plants, which are scheduled to come binding commitment not to acquire enrichment or online starting in 2017.91 Even if there are delays in reprocessing capabilities. This commitment became

86 Ibid. 87 Interview with a senior U.S. diplomat conducted by the authors on November 4, 2015, in the UAE. 88 “The Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, April 2008, http://www.enec.gov.ae/uploads/media/uae-peaceful-nuclear-energy-policy.pdf 89 “Saudi Arabia, Hungary agree to cooperation,” World Nuclear News, October 20, 2015, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Saudi-Arabia- Hungary-agree-to-cooperation-2010155.html 90 “Saudi Arabia, Russia sign nuclear power cooperation deal,” Reuters, June 19, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-russia-nuclear- idUKKBN0OZ10R20150619 91 “Timeline,” Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, http://www.enec.gov.ae/our-nuclear-energy-program/timeline/ 92 “KEPCO wins UAE civil nuclear bid,” Nuclear Engineering International Magazine, January 4, 2010, http://www.neimagazine.com/news/ newskepco-wins-uae-civil-nuclear-bid 93 "Prime Contractor," Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, http://www.enec.gov.ae/our-nuclear-energy-program/prime-contractor/

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 39 known as the “gold standard” for 123 Agreements, it was a reminder to Iran and the Emirati public that in that it was intended to serve as a model for future the decision to forgo enrichment and reprocessing civil nuclear cooperation agreements that would im- could change, even if such a change is never under- pede the worldwide spread of fuel cycle facilities. taken.

It is for this reason that concerns were raised when Emirati officials also acknowledged that seeking Ed Royce, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs to renegotiate the U.S.-UAE agreement to permit Committee, stated in the fall of 2015 that he had uranium enrichment could imperil the agreement been told by Yousef al-Otaiba that the UAE was re- and, with it, Emirati plans to finish their existing considering94 this pledge because of the Iran nuclear nuclear power project.96 Given that the KEPCO deal. The U.S.-UAE agreement permits the UAE project involves reactors with U.S. content, a col- to withdraw from its terms if another country in lapse of the U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement would likely the Middle East concludes a 123 Agreement with require a halt in activities and a significant delay in the United States on more advantageous terms. Al- the construction of the reactors, particularly since though the JCPOA is not a 123 Agreement, the fact a new agreement would require new congressional that it permits limited enrichment now and unre- consideration. Moreover, should the UAE decide to stricted enrichment and reprocessing after 15 years embark on its own nuclear fuel cycle, it would face has been viewed by some as giving the UAE a polit- some of the same challenges as Saudi Arabia in terms ically justifiable option, if not a legal right, to aban- of access to foreign sources of sensitive technologies don its renunciation of fuel cycle capabilities. and materials. The UAE is probably better prepared to pursue enrichment technology than Saudi Arabia, Emirati officials told us that the JCPOA’s treatment largely because its nuclear program is further along. of enrichment and reprocessing had put them in an But Emirati dependence on foreign contractors for uncomfortable position. Their government, they the construction of its planned nuclear facilities sug- said, had done the right thing but was now looking gests that—like the Saudis—they would face real as if it had negotiated a bad deal. The UAE had been human resources problems in making such a push. criticized by some Arab governments for accepting the “gold standard” and setting a precedent that they We do not believe the UAE has any current inten- were reluctant to follow, as well as for having con- tion to pursue nuclear weapons or an independent ceded too much to Washington. It had resisted that nuclear fuel cycle. Unlike in the case of Saudi Arabia, criticism, but now that Iran seemed to have gotten a there have been no rumors, speculation, or official- better deal, there was some interest in Abu Dhabi in ly-inspired hints to that effect. As long as the UAE renegotiating the 123 Agreement. remains committed to the terms of the current 123 Agreement and to completion of the project to build Interviewees in the UAE indicated that, despite four nuclear power reactors—and as long as it be- these concerns, the Iran nuclear deal had not pro- lieves its security requirements can be met through duced any change in Emirati nuclear energy plans; cooperation with the United States and its GCC there was still no intention to pursue enrichment or partners—this assessment is unlikely to change. reprocessing. Iranian enrichment, one senior official stated, “was a tough pill to swallow, but we won’t Egypt do something illogical in response.”95 The decision to reconsider the 123 Agreement did not mean the Of the four main countries addressed in this survey, UAE would necessarily seek to renegotiate. Rather, Egypt is the only one that previously made efforts to

94 Deb Reichmann, “UAE tells US lawmaker it has right to enrich uranium, too,” , October 16, 2015, http://bigstory.ap.org/ article/1c56cae59325422086997619d347d17b/uae-us-lawmaker-we-have-right-enrich-uranium-too 95 Interview conducted by the authors with Emirati officials on November 4, 2015, in the UAE. 96 Ibid.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 40 acquire nuclear weapons. But Egyptian leaders vol- been reported, which Egypt said was a result of a untarily abandoned an interest in nuclear weapons difference of interpretation regarding reporting re- long ago. In doing so, the Egyptians have made op- quirements under its safeguards agreement with the position to nuclear weapons in the Middle East and IAEA. Although the Agency believed that “repeated support for disarmament more generally a core part failures by Egypt”99 to report nuclear materials and of their foreign policy. Taken in combination with activities were “a matter of concern,” it welcomed their lackluster nuclear energy development efforts Egypt’s cooperation in addressing these matters and over the past 60 years and their current economic concluded that no explicit policy of concealment difficulties, it is unlikely that—unless faced with a seemed to exist—a conclusion endorsed by the Unit- direct threat from Iran that has yet to manifest it- ed States. Subsequently, traces of highly enriched self—the Egyptians would reconsider their present uranium were detected at Inshas in 2007 and 2008, stance. which Egypt said could have been brought into the country with contaminated transport containers. Under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt took The IAEA was unable to determine the source of the steps aimed at acquiring the capability to develop uranium particles. Despite this record, which some nuclear weapons. But Presidents Anwar Sadat and experts doubt has an entirely innocent explanation, Hosni Mubarak, particularly following the Six Day it is regarded as very unlikely that these Egyptian ac- War in 1967, calculated that Egypt’s interests were tivities were part of a government-sanctioned, pro- better served by renouncing nuclear weapons and grammatic effort to pursue nuclear weapons, and adhering to the Nonproliferation Treaty.97 The re- today there are no indications that weapons-related sult of this decision was not only to walk away from activities are underway in Egypt (a judgment that a nuclear weapons program, but also to step away the IAEA’s Annual Safeguards Implementation Re- from nuclear technology development writ large. port confirmed in May 2015).100 Since that time, the Egyptian nuclear program has foundered on the lack of financial support given to Egypt possesses two small research reactors (includ- it, concerns over safety (particularly after the Cher- ing one built in 1997), which offer an opportuni- nobyl accident in 1986), and a reliance on alterna- ty for substantive work by Egyptian nuclear scien- tive means of generating electricity (primarily from tists.101 But, even with these facilities, the Egyptian natural gas)98 in the country. nuclear budget remains small, something that is unlikely to be remedied during ongoing domestic Egypt’s record of compliance with its nuclear non- unrest. Moreover, while Egypt trained a substan- proliferation obligations is not without blemishes. In tial number of nuclear scientists in the 1950s and 2004, the IAEA indicated that Egypt failed to report 1960s, especially compared to other countries in the imports of uranium material or uranium irradiation developing world, its human nuclear infrastructure experiments carried out between 1990 and 2003. In has atrophied in recent decades as ambitious nuclear 2005, the IAEA director general notified the IAEA energy plans never materialized. Board of uranium conversion experiments, uranium and thorium irradiation experiments, and prepara- Egypt has committed to work with Russia on the tory activities related to reprocessing that had not construction of its first nuclear power reactor.102 But

97 Robert Einhorn, “Egypt: Frustrated but still on a non-nuclear course,” in The Nuclear Tipping Point, edited by Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss (Manas Publications, 2005). 98 “Egypt,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, June 2, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=EGY 99 “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt,” International Atomic Energy Agency, February 14, 2005, p. 5, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/egypt_iaea_gov-2005-9_14nov2005.pdf 100 “The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2014,” International Atomic Energy Agency, May 6, 2015, p. 8, https://armscontrollaw.files.wordpress. com/2015/07/sir-2014.pdf 101 “Egypt,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2015, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/egypt/facilities/ 102 “Wasting energy,” The Economist, , 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21679090-egypt-and-others- alternatives-nuclear-power-hold-more-promise-why-more

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 41 this is not the first time that a reactor project has In addition, in contrast to Saudi concerns about a been initiated in Egypt (it never followed through possible rapprochement between the United States on plans to build eight power reactors),103, 104 and it and Iran, Egyptians seem to believe that better is unclear the degree to which planning and prepa- U.S.-Iranian relations could have positive impli- rations are any more solid this time around. Even cations for regional security. A high-level Egyptian assuming that the commissioned Russian reactor is foreign ministry official told us it would be wrong built, the agreement between Russia and Egypt is to pre-suppose a future confrontation between Iran described in press reports to include the provision and its neighbors.108 of fresh fuel and arrangements for the disposition of spent fuel,105 likely involving the repatriation of A bigger security concern for Egypt than Iran is the spent nuclear fuel from Egypt to Russia. Moreover, turbulent overall regional environment and its effect although the agreement apparently involves training on internal security. This sentiment was echoed by and the domestic manufacture of some elements current and former Egyptian officials that we inter- of the reactor project, there are no indications that viewed in Cairo in June 2015. One former senior technology transfer will extend to the more sensi- military officer identified terrorist insurgency and tive aspects of the project. The overall picture of the the Muslim Brotherhood as Egypt’s top security Egyptian nuclear industry remains one of continued threats.109 This same officer said that Israeli nucle- interest, but capabilities are still nascent and will ar weapons would not motivate an Egyptian push take years to mature, especially with few financial for nuclear weapons, asserting that while Egyptians resources to throw into the effort. have concerns regarding Israel’s nuclear program, the Israelis “are not crazy.” A top-level foreign min- Assuming the Egyptians were even interested in a istry official listed extremist ideology, the fragmenta- nuclear weapons capability or hedge, it is not clear tion of Syria and Iraq, and instability in Libya as the that this would be in response to Iran. Certainly, main security threats facing Egypt.110 there is no love lost between Cairo and Tehran. A street in Tehran was named after Anwar Sadat’s as- Egyptians we interviewed also expressed concern that sassin until the early 2000s.106 Moreover, Iran is ac- the JCPOA’s impact on regional dynamics could in- tively supporting causes that directly undermine the directly have an adverse effect on them. Several main- interests of Egypt’s core Arab allies (who, inciden- tained that Gulf Arab states, responding to an Iran tally, provide substantial investment in the Egyptian they believed was empowered by the nuclear deal, economy and aid for the Egyptian government).107 have acted more assertively in the region, especially in But although the Iranians and Egyptians have occa- Yemen and Syria, and that these conflicts could breed sionally sparred on regional issues, the combination the terrorism and insurgency that pose the greatest of physical distance between the two countries and national security threat to Egypt. Some suggested that the absence of any direct, ongoing cause for conflict the absence of a regional security component in the probably avoids the security dilemma for Egypt that JCPOA reduced its positive impact. Egyptian polling might be created by any actual or latent Iranian nu- data indicate widespread skepticism toward the nucle- clear weapons capability. ar deal, with 90 percent of Egyptians polled by Zogby

103 “U.S. worried by Egypt plan for eight nuclear reactors,” World Tribune, May 29, 2002, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/ WTARC/2002/ss_egypt_05_29.html 104 “Egypt is Ready to Begin Nuclear Energy Program,” Agence France-Presse, March 13, 1995. 105 “Russia, Egypt sign agreement on Egypt’s first nuclear plant construction,” ITAR-TASS, November 19, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/economy/837847 106 “Iran and Egypt ‘to restore ties’,” BBC, January 6, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3371545.stm 107 Salma El Wardany, Tarek El-Tablawy, Ahmed Feteha, “Egypt Secures Billions in Aid, Deals as Gulf Arabs Lead Way,” Bloomberg, March 14, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-14/egypt-gets-billions-in-aid-deals-as-gcc-investors-lead-charge 108 Interview conducted by the authors on May 31, 2015, in Egypt. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 42 agreeing that sanctions relief granted to Iran would Israel and the United States to work toward a MEW- contribute to Iranian adventurism,111 and 77 percent MDFZ. Cairo has protested the nuclear asymmetry believing that Iran got the better of the deal.112 with its neighbor by refusing to join another arms control agreement as long as Israel refuses to join It was also notable that, although Egyptian officials the NPT and movement toward a MEWMDFZ is evinced strong dissatisfaction in our meetings with stalled. But despite its frustration with the nuclear the lack of progress toward a Middle East Weap- status quo in the region and the prospect that Egypt ons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMD- might even fall farther behind the nuclear capabili- FZ)—a centerpiece of Egyptian foreign policy for ties of other regional states, Egypt seems neither to decades—there was little suggestion that this was have the inclination nor the resources to move in the changing Egypt’s posture on nuclear weapons. For- direction of a military nuclear capability. eign Minister Shoukry told us that “Egypt will never seek nuclear weapons.” Egypt’s firm rejection of nu- Turkey clear weapons did not, however, apply to a nuclear fuel cycle. One former senior official suggested that Of the countries in this survey, Turkey is the one Egypt retains some interest in, among other things, with the least obvious need for an independent nu- uranium enrichment, but as part of a regional ap- clear weapons option. Alone among these countries, 113 proach; universally, there was recognition that Turkey is protected by a treaty-guaranteed nuclear Egypt can neither afford nor independently create umbrella as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty such a capability. Organization (NATO). Moreover, Turkey has had U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on its territory, crys- Overall, the picture we gleaned from our research on tallizing the sense of protection and commitment and time in Egypt is that the Iran nuclear deal has granted by its membership in the organization. Tur- not changed Cairo’s perspective regarding its own key has also enjoyed historically warm relations with possession of nuclear weapons. Its relatively poor Iran, serving as a major trading partner with the economy, combined with its preoccupation with country both before and after the fall of the Shah. low-tech threats like insurgency and terrorism, mean Turkey’s own foreign policy is predicated on having that there is little interest in embarking on a nuclear no conflicts with its neighbors, and this extended to hedge. Assuming these security concerns and eco- Iran despite entreaties by the United States and oth- nomic problems persist, it is unlikely that Egypt will ers to restrict its engagement with Iran during the reconsider its stance on nuclear weapons. height of the global sanctions campaign against it.

That said, as frustration builds in Cairo with the Yet Turkey’s confidence in its relationship with the lack of progress toward a MEWMDFZ and as other United States and its sense of security within NATO countries develop more advanced nuclear capabili- has diminished over the course of the Cold War and ties, even if for civil energy purposes, there may be since it ended, especially during the past few years. growing pressure on the Egyptian government to ac- During one discussion with Turkish academics, a quire similar capabilities and perhaps to demonstrate litany of examples of either lackluster support for to Israel and the United States that Egyptian nuclear Turkish security interests, such as the recent friction restraint can no longer be taken for granted. Many over the presence of air defense systems in Turkey,114 Egyptians regret the indefinite extension of the NPT or perceived betrayals from the distant past, such as in 1995 because they believe it removed pressure on the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey after

111 “Middle East 2015: Current and Future Challenges,” p. 29 112 “Middle East 2015: Current and Future Challenges,” p. 27 113 Nabil Fahmy, “The New Middle East, Iran Nuclear Deal and the Arabs.” 114 Metin Gurcan, “US plays politics with Patriot missile removal,” Al-Monitor, August 20, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2015/08/turkey-germany-patriots-controversial-arrival-controversial.html

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 43 the Cuban Missile Crisis, were presented as evidence Turkish consideration of strategic issues is heavily that NATO membership has sometimes meant little tied to the internal dynamics of the country. One to Turkey.115 These academics noted that the Turk- opponent of Erdoğan with whom we spoke even ish population had lost some of its admiration for opined that an Iran strengthened by the JCPOA the organization due to what was seen as excessive could usefully serve as a counterweight to an expan- NATO involvement in Turkish internal affairs in sionist, Islamist Turkish government. In fact, every the 1960s and 1970s. Although the prevailing view conversation that we had in Turkey began with the within the Turkish military remains that NATO will JCPOA and devolved quickly into a discussion of most likely be there for Turkey in a future contin- Turkish internal politics, which were then preoc- gency, policymakers and non-governmental experts cupied with parliamentary elections that would in Turkey do not take it as a given. determine whether President Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish) would have Turks are apprehensive about the current tensions the majority needed to amend the constitution to with Moscow triggered by Turkey’s shoot-down of give the presidency more power. The only person we a Russian fighter jet in December 2015. French met who believed Turkey might well pursue nuclear President François Hollande spoke about the risk of weapons tied the matter to a domestic motivation: if war between Russia and Turkey. But concerns about an Islamist government decided to do so in order to Russia are unlikely to drive Turkey toward nuclear advance a religious agenda. weapons. Indeed, Ankara will be reluctant to em- bark on a nuclear path that might imperil its abili- Not only is there little support in Turkey for pursu- ty to call upon NATO to address any challenges it ing nuclear weapons but, unlike in the three other may face from Moscow. Turkish expert Sinan Ülgen Middle East countries surveyed, the JCPOA itself notes that “interoperability with NATO forces re- is comparatively popular in Turkey. Polling data mains the key component of Turkey’s defense poli- show that a majority of Turks polled believe that the cy and it is unlikely that Ankara would threaten its JCPOA will effectively address the Iranian nuclear union with its most important allies.”116 problem.117

Although Ankara and Tehran have taken opposing Our interview subjects all agreed that, although Tur- sides in the , most Turks do not see key will likely preserve the option to proceed with Iran as a direct military threat. Rather, it is the in- the nuclear fuel cycle, it is not a near term prospect. stability and terrorism that are seen as emanating Turkish authorities have suggested that an enrich- from that conflict that the Turks regard as their ment capability might in the future be justified on principal security concerns. Each of the individuals economic grounds. They are also unwilling to fore- we interviewed in Turkey, who ranged from former close what they see as a legal right to pursue the fuel government officials to academics and journalists, cycle, and in the 2011 decision by the Nuclear Sup- agreed that continued fighting in Syria—and the pliers Group to strengthen restrictions on transfers concomitant flow of refugees into and through Tur- of enrichment and reprocessing technology, Turkey key—would create significant instability along Tur- was one of the members resisting the most rigorous key’s southern border and within the country more limits. In negotiations on nuclear cooperation with generally. All agreed that these problems could not Japan, Turkey apparently insisted on retaining the be addressed with nuclear weapons or even a latent option to pursue enrichment and reprocessing, but nuclear option. Energy Minister Taner Yıldız played down Turkey’s

115 Interview conducted by the authors on May 29, 2015, in Istanbul. 116 Sinan Ülgen, “Turkey and the Bomb,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2012, p. 23, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ turkey_bomb.pdf 117 "Middle East 2015: Current and Future Challenges,” p. 27

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 44 interest in the fuel cycle: “We don’t have any project base, and its ambition to be an influential if not regarding nuclear fuel and… enrichment.”118 dominant player in the region, Turkey is usually in- cluded on a short list of countries that may decide, This is consistent with the status of the Turkish nu- in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal, to pursue a la- clear program altogether, which remains in an early tent or actual nuclear weapons capability. But given stage of development. Turkey possesses two research its focus on terrorism and instability on its southern reactors: one 250 kWt (kilowatts, thermal) TRIGA border, the absence of a direct military threat from Mark-II reactor, operating at Istanbul Technical Iran, its reluctance to put relations with its NATO University119 and used for radiography experiments, allies in jeopardy, the continued albeit uncertain val- and a second 5 MWt reactor for the production of ue it places on NATO security guarantees, and its isotopes for medical and industrial uses.120 Turkey current preoccupation with the future orientation of is also pursuing power reactors to deal with its per- Turkish domestic politics, the likelihood that Tur- sistent energy dependency on foreign imports, al- key will pursue a nuclear weapons option is small, at though with its first power reactors planned to be least for the foreseeable future. constructed by Russia (at Akkuyu) and Japan (at 121 Sinop), it will still find itself tied to foreign sup- Other cases ply.122 Although the countries reviewed above are likely to While the Erdoğan government has billed these remain the focus of most speculation regarding a po- projects as necessary to promote Turkish nation- tential Middle East proliferation cascade, three oth- al development, experts we interviewed noted that ers bear mention, given their past interest in nuclear the expanded nuclear program is a big gamble for weapons: Iraq, Libya, and Syria. the Turkish government, given long-standing pub- lic concerns with nuclear energy safety and depen- Iraq. Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure was decimated by dency on Russia. These concerns may have been two wars, a decade of economic sanctions, and the exacerbated by the current downturn in relations efforts of the United States and its partners from between Ankara and Moscow. Ülgen believes that 2003 to 2008 to retrain Iraqi scientists and remove Russian-Turkish tensions as well as financial strains from the country all residual nuclear materials. Fur- that reduce Russia’s ability to meet it nuclear power ther, Iraq is hamstrung by its ongoing conflict with plant export commitments could delay or derail the ISIS, internal political and religious differences, and Akkuyu reactor project: “Under current conditions, an economy that is struggling to grow, particularly both Ankara and Moscow may have an incentive to with oil prices dramatically lower than in recent his- end cooperation, rather than accept risks that could tory.124 Though it is theoretically possible for Iraq to 123 be amplified by worsening political ties.” overcome these problems and support a new drive for nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that Iraq would Because of its emergence in the last decade as a rising be motivated to do so in order to counter a latent or power, its large and growing scientific and industrial actual nuclear Iran. Although assessments that Iraq

118 “Turkish energy minister denies uranium enrichment intention,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 9, 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish- energy-minister-denies-uranium-enrichment-intention.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60787&NewsCatID=348 119 “Istanbul Technical University Turkish Research Reactor (ITU-TRR),” Nuclear Threat Initiative,http://www.nti.org/facilities/494/ 120 “Turkish Reactor 2,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/facilities/495/ “Turkish Reactor 2,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/ facilities/495/ 121 “Turkey ratifies agreement for new plant at Sinop,” World Nuclear News, April 2, 2015, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Turkey-ratifies- agreement-for-new-plant-at-Sinop-02041502.html 122 “Nuclear Power in Turkey,” World Nuclear Association, May 22, 2016, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries- t-z/turkey.aspx 123 Sinan Ülgen, “Is this the end of Moscow-Ankara nuclear cooperation?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 13, 2016, http://thebulletin.org/ end-moscow-ankara-nuclear-cooperation9059 124 “An empty chest: Fiscal problems add to the country’s woes,” The Economist, March 21, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and- economics/21646804-fiscal-problems-add-countrys-woes-empty-chest

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 45 is subservient to Iran are overblown, there is no de- uranium hexafluoride feedstock for centrifuges, a fa- nying that Iraq and Iran have far closer ties now than cility for producing uranium hexafluoride, and asso- at any time since the Iran-Iraq War began in 1980. ciated machine tools and components. The Libyans Moreover, Iran can be expected to oppose a nuclear did retain from their previous program a research weapons capability in Iraq, would probably be able reactor and associated facilities at Tajura, but the on- to discover an Iraqi program at an early stage, and going turmoil effectively precludes any further nu- would have ample means of intervening to put a halt clear advances. Moreover, the dearth of indigenous to it. Iraq therefore is unlikely to revive its nuclear nuclear expertise that impeded Libya’s ability to weapons ambitions, especially in the context of its convert centrifuge components and other sensitive current material and financial shortfalls. equipment purchased from the A.Q. Khan network into a workable enrichment program remains a for- Syria. Although Syria evidently sought a capacity to midable constraint on any renewed Libyan interest produce plutonium for use in nuclear weapons—in in nuclear weapons. Indeed, the biggest nuclear the form of the al-Kibar reactor built with assistance threat at the present juncture is not the development from North Korea—its present circumstances make of an independent fuel cycle but rather the potential it all but impossible to pursue a nuclear capability diversion of nuclear materials from their present, se- now and for the foreseeable future. The destruction cured location to the hands of insurgent groups. of the al-Kibar reactor by Israel in 2007 likely put an end to Syrian nuclear weapons work. And while Unknowable Unknowns Syria has repeatedly rebuffed IAEA efforts to visit facilities suspected of being related to the destroyed It is important to underscore that the relatively op- reactor, it is highly improbable that significant ac- timistic assessment provided here of prospects for tivities related to the production of fissile materials further proliferation is framed by our present knowl- or nuclear weapons are continuing in the country. edge and expectations of the future development of Consumed by civil war—and with its survival as a the Middle East politically, technically, and strategi- unitary state very much in question—Syria lacks ba- cally. We assume that the situation in the region in sic attributes required to pursue a successful nuclear 10 to 20 years will not differ radically from the situ- weapons program, including human and physical ation today. But given the changes we have seen even infrastructure, financial resources, and a disciplined in the last five years, that is a very shaky assumption. leadership able to carry out a sustained effort. For Presently unforeseen but by no means inconceivable the near term, the greater weapons of mass destruc- developments—in terms of technological enablers, tion (WMD) threat in Syria is the government’s pos- internal political changes, regional dynamics, and session and use of any chemical agents not declared relations with external powers—could alter our and destroyed after Damascus adhered to the Chem- judgment that none of the states of the Middle East ical Weapons Convention in 2013. are likely to opt for nuclear weapons or even a latent fuel cycle capability. That is why, even if the cur- Libya. As with Syria, although the Libyans under rent outlook is positive, it is essential that the Unit- Gadhafi had nuclear ambitions, their present inter- ed States adopt policies that offer insurance against nal conflict makes it virtually impossible that a re- the uncertainties it faces going forward and that it vived nuclear weapons effort will emerge in the near continue to reduce the incentives and the opportu- term. Gadhafi agreed to ship to the United States in nities for countries of the region to reconsider their 125 March 2004 almost everything from his previous nuclear options. nuclear weapons program, including centrifuges,

125 Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of Libya’s Disarmament and Relations with the United States,” Arms Control Association, February 2014, https:// www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 46 chapter 6 Recommendations

s the preceding pages make clear, we do not To the extent that we are concerned about future pro- Abelieve the JCPOA will trigger a cascade of liferation in the Middle East, our primary focus is on proliferation. Due to a combination of technical, those countries that feel most directly threatened by political, economic, and strategic factors, none Iran—the Gulf Arabs, and particularly Saudi Arabia. of the most talked-about entrants in a new nucle- To reduce the likelihood that they—as well as others ar arms race are likely to acquire nuclear weapons. in the region—will opt for nuclear weapons, we rec- Consequently, we find the net nonproliferation ommend that U.S. policymakers pursue the following effects of the JCPOA in the region to be positive. policies, starting under the Obama administration By removing the most likely near-term instigator of and continuing under the next president: competitive nuclear arming—Iran’s own acquisition of nuclear weapons—the JCPOA will restrain future 1. Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously moni- proliferation in the Middle East. tored, strictly enforced, and faithfully imple- mented. However, although we find the chances of a cascade 2. Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on of regional nuclear proliferation to be slight, they are Iranian proliferation-related activities and in- not zero and much will depend on how effectively the telligence-sharing on those activities with key JCPOA is enforced and on a range of other factors pre- partners. viously discussed. Moreover, the turmoil that currently afflicts the Middle East renders any judgment as to the 3. Deter a future Iranian decision to produce “most likely” course of events prone to future revision. nuclear weapons by threatening the use of military force if Iran were believed to be pro- Of the countries that we have surveyed, we believe ceeding toward breakout. that Turkey and Egypt are the least likely to pursue 4. Seek to incorporate key monitoring and ver- an independent nuclear capability, whether in the ification provisions of the JCPOA into rou- form of a latent nuclear weapons option or in actual tine IAEA safeguards as applied elsewhere in weapons acquisition. Turkey’s most pressing security the Middle East and in the global nonprolif- challenges cannot be met with nuclear weapons, and eration regime. those challenges where nuclear weapons are more 5. Pursue U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with relevant are addressed by Ankara’s membership in Middle East governments on terms that are NATO. As for Egypt, its primary security threats realistic and serve U.S. nonproliferation in- arise from terrorism and internal turmoil. The pros- terests. pect of a nuclear-armed Iran is unlikely to change its threat perception significantly, and of the countries 6. Promote regional arrangements that restrain studied, Egypt is the least well-equipped financially fuel cycle developments and build confi- to mount a nuclear weapons program. dence in the peaceful use of regional nuclear programs.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 47 7. Strengthen security assurances to U.S. part- for such violations short of re-imposing sanc- ners in the Middle East. tions, such as by refusing to permit Iranian 8. Promote a stable regional security environ- acquisition of nuclear-related items through ment, especially the resolution of current the JCPOA’s procurement channel until the civil wars and the reduction of Saudi-Iranian situation is resolved. Likewise, the United tensions. States could slow licenses of authorized trans- actions with Iran in other areas, such as avia- 1. Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously moni- tion services, until the noncompliance is ad- tored, strictly enforced, and faithfully imple- dressed. Above all, the United States must not mented. give the impression that it cares more about the JCPOA than Iran does. If the JCPOA is Confidence by regional states that the JCPOA is no longer serving U.S. interests, it should be working effectively as a barrier to an Iranian nuclear scrapped, and such a stance is needed to re- weapons capability will reinforce their inclination to assure U.S. partners as well as deter Iranian remain non-nuclear, whereas a JCPOA of uncertain noncompliance. sustainability with a checkered compliance record • The United States should remain firm on will increase their incentives to hedge their nuclear the imperative of rigorous verification.At bets. the present time, it appears that Iran is ful- filling its obligations under the JCPOA and • The United States should respond imme- cooperating with the IAEA. This must con- diately to any Iranian violations of the tinue for the life of the agreement. The Unit- nuclear provisions of the deal. The precise ed States and its P5+1 partners should have nature of this response should be at the dis- no tolerance for any Iranian infringement cretion of the administration and will de- of the IAEA’s rights in the execution of its pend on the nature of the infraction. Some responsibilities under the IAEA Safeguards violations are likely to be relatively minor Agreement, Iran’s Additional Protocol, or the and technical, such as Iran’s apparently in- JCPOA. This includes any Iranian refusal to advertent production of more than the per- permit IAEA access to suspect sites. mitted amount of heavy water in early 2016. That said, the United States and its partners In these cases, there are remedial actions that should also maintain a healthy respect for can be taken by Iran without the need by the the IAEA. If the IAEA believes that it can P5+1 to re-impose sanctions or take other do its job, even using nontraditional inspec- coercive steps. In the heavy water case, the tion procedures, and U.S. technical experts IAEA reported in February 2016 that Iran concur in that judgment, then the Obama simply exported more of its heavy water administration and its successors should stockpile than required in order to remain trust in the Agency’s professionalism and ex- clearly under the threshold. pertise. At the same time, such confidence In other cases, however, Iranian breaches may in the IAEA would be easier to sustain if the not be as innocent. Tehran must be under no Agency were to provide more detailed infor- illusion that it will be permitted to “creep out” mation in its quarterly reports on Iran’s nu- of its JCPOA obligations. The United States clear program than it provided in its initial retains the option of re-imposing sanctions post-Implementation Day report in Febru- in response to such cheating, either through ary 2016. Iran should support such detailed the JCPOA’s Joint Commission process or reporting as a means of building internation- unilaterally if time is of the essence. However, al confidence in its nuclear program. the United States can also act to penalize Iran

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 48 • The United States must take reasonable from engaging with Iran. In a speech on April steps to ensure that Iran realizes the ben- 27, Supreme Leader Khamenei charged that, efits of sanctions relief that it is entitled “[t]he reason big banks are not ready to work to under the JCPOA. The JCPOA reflects with Iran is Iranphobia, which the Americans a fundamental bargain: nuclear limitations created and continue.”126 and intrusive monitoring in exchange for Well-informed Iranians understand that many sanctions relief and eventual Iranian nuclear of the problems impeding economic recovery normalization, provided Iran’s nuclear pro- are home grown. An Iranian Foreign Ministry gram remains in conformity with its interna- report sent to the Majlis on April 16 stated tional nonproliferation obligations. Absent that “[t]he biggest problem and challenge that full realization of the sanctions relief provid- the JCPOA faces, however, is an atmosphere ed in the JCPOA, Iran will find it unsustain- of trust and confidence-building in the coun- able to fulfill its nuclear commitments. try for foreign parties.”127 Nonetheless, senior The United States needs to ensure that the Iranians have complained repeatedly, both in JCPOA does not fall apart because of problems public and privately to the United States at in the area of sanctions relief. The United States senior levels, that Washington, especially the has a compelling national interest in Iran con- Treasury Department, is consciously imped- tinuing to fulfill its nuclear commitments. If ing sanctions relief. the JCPOA should collapse, it should be clear The United States has taken these concerns both at home and abroad that Tehran, not seriously. Secretary Kerry stated on April 22 Washington, is to blame. More generally, the that “the United States is not standing in the United States should maintain its internation- way and will not stand in the way of business al reputation for fulfilling its commitments, that is permitted with Iran since the JCPOA which is the bedrock of U.S. credibility so took effect.”128 Treasury Secretary Lew met essential to pursuing effective diplomacy and with the governor of the Iranian Central achieving U.S. national interests. Bank on April 14 to discuss ways to address This may mean that the United States needs Iran’s difficulty in gaining better use of the to make practical adjustments in the imple- international financial system. Washington mentation of sanctions relief if it is found that has also published 40 pages of frequent- previously unidentified and unintended tech- ly asked questions—and issued additional nical problems are impeding relief, just as Iran guidance, general licenses, and licensing needs to make practical adjustments in ful- policy notes—to help banks and businesses fillment of its nuclear commitments, such as around the world understand what sanctions exporting more heavy water than the JCPOA relief enables them to do. would require in order to avoid an implemen- These efforts notwithstanding, Iran’s access tation problem on the nuclear side. to international finance is lagging. Some Frustrated that they have not been reaping the of this is unavoidable: Iran abused the in- expected benefits of sanctions relief, Iranian ternational financial system for years—and officials have accused the United States of dis- implicated foreign banks, which were then couraging international banks and businesses subject to significant fines—so many banks

126 Arash Karami, “Khamenei says US pushing ‘Iranphobia’ to block foreign investment,” Al-Monitor, April 27, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/originals/2016/04/khamenei-us-banking-sanctions-seif-kerry.html 127 Caitlin Shayda Pendleton, “Translation: The Foreign Ministry’s First Report on the Nuclear Deal’s Implementation,” American Enterprise Institute Iran Tracker, April 22, 2016, http://www.irantracker.org/nuclear/pendleton-translation-foreign-ministry-report-nuclear-deal-implementation- april-22-2016 128 “Remarks Before Meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif,” U.S. Department of State, April 22, 2016, http://www.state.gov/secretary/ remarks/2016/04/256536.htm

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 49 are now simply unwilling to do business If the proposed modification simply permits with Iran. Moreover, the reality that signif- Iran to get what it bargained for—even if the icant non-nuclear sanctions remain available exact terms are not explicitly anticipated or to the United States, as well as the possibil- provided for in the JCPOA—then it ought ity of snap-back of sanctions in response to to get a fair hearing in Washington. Iranian cheating, is probably chilling banks’ readiness to work with Iran. Iran’s byzantine 2. Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on bureaucracy and threatening demeanor, par- Iranian proliferation-related activities and ticularly toward Israel, only reinforce these enhance intelligence-sharing on those activ- tendencies, which Washington can do little ities with key partners. to address. However, where there are modest modifica- Uncertainty about nuclear developments in Iran will tions to U.S. sanctions policy that could be feed concerns about the future and create incentives made to remove some of the discomfort for- for regional states to keep their nuclear options open. eign banks are feeling about doing business with Iran without undermining the sanc- • The United States should sustain and tions regime, the Obama administration and even increase its investment in national its successors should consider them. Some intelligence capabilities to monitor the of this has already happened. On March proliferation-related activities of Iran. 24, 2016, the Treasury Department released While IAEA monitoring and inspections General License I, which permitted negotia- will be critical and deserve strong support tions over aviation service supply to Iran to by the United States and the international take place without a specific license, while community generally, IAEA efforts must leaving the actual provision of the services be supplemented by those of the U.S. in- subject to specific licensing requirements.129 telligence community. The U.S. intelligence A similar modification to U.S. sanctions collection and analysis apparatus devoted to relief was apparently under consideration Iran is immense, dwarfing the assets brought with respect to the use of the U.S. dollar as to bear against Iran’s nuclear program by a means of currency exchange for business any other country in the world (although transactions. Although such a modification Israel’s intelligence effort, while smaller in quickly became distorted in press accounts as scale, is focused at least as heavily and with synonymous with granting Iran access to the great sophistication on the Iran target). U.S. financial sector, the device in question Even with the JCPOA and its unprecedent- is little more than a bookkeeping operation ed IAEA surveillance procedures in place, for banks struggling to manage trade with the U.S. national intelligence mission is far Iran without the use of the world’s domi- from over. In fact, it may have now gotten nant, most stable currency. The test for any more difficult, as Iran’s nuclear program will future proposals to facilitate sanctions relief become legitimized over time but still treat- is whether the modification helps Iran obtain ed with suspicion in the United States. For the relief it has already purchased with its example, discriminating between legitimate nuclear concessions or whether it extends the Iranian nuclear commerce and illicit Irani- reach of the Iranian economy into areas sub- an nuclear procurement will be a challenge, ject to remaining U.S. sanctions restrictions. requiring extensive collection and analysis

129 “Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, March 24, 2016, https://www. treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran_gli.pdf

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 50 resources. While Iran will have to compete this fashion, rumors and innuendo can be with many pressing U.S. intelligence pri- dismissed if unfounded and real leads de- orities in the period ahead, the U.S. effort veloped for further collection and analysis. against the Iranian nuclear program cannot slacken because of the JCPOA and must be 3. Deter a future Iranian decision to produce adequately funded. nuclear weapons by threatening the use of • The United States should create stand- military force if Iran were believed to be mov- ing mechanisms for the sharing of pro- ing toward breakout. liferation-related Iran intelligence with regional partners. The United States has Incentives for acquiring a latent or actual nuclear various mechanisms for sharing informa- weapons capability will increase if regional states tion with countries throughout the Middle believe Iran can and will successfully break out and East about the myriad threats they face to- produce nuclear weapons in the future—either in the gether. However, there remains a pervasive first 15 years of the JCPOA or once key restrictions sense of unease about the nature of U.S. on fissile material production capabilities expire af- proliferation intelligence and the degree to ter 15 years. Those incentives will be greatly reduced which it is being shared with regional part- if regional states are confident that the United States ners. Conscious of the Iraq WMD policy is committed to intervening and thwarting a break- and intelligence failures, and surprised by out attempt. the 2007 Iran National Intelligence Esti- mate release, which revealed that the Unit- • The United States should underscore its ed States had information confirming that readiness to use military force, if neces- a key component of Iran’s active nuclear sary, in response to an attempted Iranian weapons program ended in 2003 to 2004, nuclear breakout. U.S. policy with respect countries in the region may have some un- to Iranian development of nuclear weapons certainty about the quality of U.S. WMD has been known for over a decade. President intelligence in Iran and about whether George W. Bush refused to take any option they will know before the general public off the table to prevent Iran’s development does about any significant Iranian cheating of nuclear weapons, a stance which President on the JCPOA. The United States should Obama reaffirmed, including after the con- establish standing mechanisms with coun- clusion of negotiations over the JCPOA. At tries of the region to share relevant infor- the same time, there remains uncertainty in mation on Iran’s nuclear program as well as the Middle East (and beyond) about how the on other Iranian activities of strategic con- United States would actually respond to an cern, such as Iran’s missile program. Nat- Iranian breakout attempt. The formulation urally, there will remain a need for com- that “all options are on the table” is widely partmentalization and secrecy, even with seen as ambiguous and not sufficiently com- the closest U.S. partners, but it should be mitted to the use of military force. President possible to develop briefings and other in- Obama should state clearly that the policy of formational materials to give U.S. partners his administration is to use military force, if sufficient clarity into Iran’s nuclear pro- necessary, to prevent Iranian acquisition of gram and—importantly—what the U.S. a nuclear weapon. The next U.S. president intelligence community thinks about what should offer the same affirmation at an ap- it knows. Moreover, such information ex- propriate, early point in her or his adminis- change should be two-way, with the Unit- tration. Such a declaration need not spell out ed States also learning from its regional the exact nature of U.S. action nor the pre- partners what they see going on in Iran. In cise circumstances under which force would

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 51 be used. But, the statement should be suffi- Iran’s neighbors are not pursuing nuclear weapons ciently clear and committal so as to remove capabilities as well as ensure that Iran will remain the apparent uncertainty that still surrounds bound by them indefinitely. U.S. intentions. • The U.S. Congress should pass a stand- • The United States should work with oth- ing Authorization to Use Military Force er governments and the IAEA to build (AUMF) in the event a future Iranian nu- into standard safeguards practices some clear weapons breakout is detected by the of the signature elements of the JCPOA. United States. It is not clear that a formal United Nations Security Council resolu- AUMF would be necessary for either Presi- tion 2231 and the IAEA Board resolution dent Obama or his successor to use force to adopted on December 15, 2015 both state stop an Iranian nuclear weapons breakout. that the provisions of the JCPOA should Under the War Powers Act, absent a formal not be considered precedents for the IAEA’s AUMF, the president is permitted to commit standard verification practices. This may re- U.S. forces to action for up to 60 days, con- flect a reluctance of IAEA members to ac- tingent on a notification to Congress with- cept what they see as additional safeguards in 48 hours of military action having been burdens, an Iranian desire to eventually be launched. Any U.S. military action against free of non-standard practices, and perhaps Iran’s nuclear program would likely fall within an IAEA concern about being saddled with the 60 day period (if not the 48 hour period), inadequately funded responsibilities. Still, meaning that a formal AUMF is probably as experience implementing the JCPOA in not required for the president to act against Iran demonstrates the monitoring value and Iran. However, even though an AUMF is not cost-effectiveness of the non-standard provi- legally required, Congressional passage of an sions, it may be possible to build support for AUMF—by demonstrating that the executive incorporating them more widely. and legislative branches are united in pre- Iran’s provisional adoption and eventual rat- venting a nuclear-armed Iran—would signal ification of the IAEA Additional Protocol strong national resolve and strengthen the and its acceptance of modified code 3.1 on deterrent effect. Such an AUMF should not early notification of plans to construct new provide a blank check for future presidential nuclear facilities could generate support for action. Instead, it should specify criteria un- universalizing those critical measures. In ad- der which force might be used, such as a pres- dition, although on-line enrichment level idential determination that Iran was pursuing monitoring was being developed long before a nuclear weapons capability in breach of its the JCPOA as a means of improving IAEA NPT and JCPOA obligations, and require the inspector efficiency and reducing operating president to convey to the Congress evidence costs, its adoption by Iran could help build on which that determination is based. support for incorporating it in every enrich- ment plant operating worldwide as part of 4. Seek to incorporate key monitoring and veri- the IAEA’s standard monitoring package. fication provisions of the JCPOA into routine Similarly, the JCPOA’s use of electronic IAEA safeguards as applied elsewhere in the seals, which communicate their status with- Middle East and in the global nonprolifera- in nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, and au- tion regime. tomated collection of measurements record- ed by installed IAEA devices—though less Making some of the innovative features of the efficient than the transmission of such data JCPOA’s monitoring system the “new normal” for directly to IAEA headquarters in Vienna— IAEA safeguards could enhance confidence that reduce the operational demands on IAEA

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 52 personnel and improve the accountancy of cessing capabilities, as the UAE agreed to do nuclear material. Moreover, the JCPOA’s in its agreement with the United States. This continuous surveillance of centrifuge pro- dispute raises a concern that the Saudis and duction facilities and uranium mines and perhaps other regional states will pursue nu- mills, while not necessary or feasible on a clear cooperation with nuclear supplier gov- universal basis, could strengthen the case for ernments that are less demanding than the better access and more information with re- United States in terms of nonproliferation spect to those facilities than is provided for restraints. Continued deadlock might also under the Additional Protocol. lead the UAE to seek to renegotiate its agree- A JCPOA feature that should be universal- ment with the United States to permit the ized for all NPT non-nuclear weapon states acquisition of fuel cycle capabilities. is the explicit prohibition on activities relat- It is in the U.S. interest to be involved in ed to the development of a nuclear explosive the development of nuclear programs in device and on procurement of equipment the Middle East. This involvement gives the used specifically in those activities. Also uni- United States insights into the status and versalized should be the IAEA’s right to mon- progress of those programs and a role in de- itor such a ban on “weaponization” activities, termining the safety, security, and prolifera- even when no nuclear materials are present. tion-related design elements of the facilities to be constructed, as well as provides a boost 5. Pursue civil nuclear cooperation with Middle for U.S. nuclear-related firms. U.S. engage- East governments on terms that are realistic ment—and the desire of cooperation part- and serve U.S. nonproliferation interests. ners to benefit from U.S. nuclear technol- ogy—can provide leverage in serving U.S. An increasing number of regional countries are em- nonproliferation goals. An Emirati official barking on civil nuclear programs. Although sever- told us that the risk of losing access to U.S. al of them have abundant fossil fuel reserves, they technology was an element in the UAE deci- have a legitimate interest in conserving their fossil sion, and least thus far, not to renegotiate the fuels for export and relying more heavily on nuclear U.S.-UAE agreement. The reopening and energy for electricity production. At the same time, potential loss of the agreement could mean nuclear programs are also viewed in certain quarters an immediate halt in the construction of the as providing a possible option to pursue nuclear en- UAE’s first nuclear power reactors. ergy for military purposes. It is in the U.S. interest to But the United States should not overesti- be in a position to help those countries shape their mate its leverage in today’s nuclear market. future nuclear energy choices. There are suppliers, including Russia and China, that are eager to expand their mar- • The United States should pursue nucle- ket share and are willing to attract custom- ar cooperation arrangements with Arab ers with highly advantageous financing. The governments interested in nuclear power. inability to reach a civil nuclear deal with Although Turkey, Egypt, and UAE all have the United States will not prevent a country civil nuclear cooperation agreements with from developing a nuclear program. It will the United States (known as “Agreements only increase the likelihood that the pro- for Nuclear Cooperation” or “123 Agree- spective customer will pursue cooperation ments”), Saudi Arabia and other states in with a supplier that is less demanding than the region do not. U.S. efforts to negotiate the United States in terms of the nonprolif- a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi eration constraints it requires as part of the Arabia have stalled, largely due to the Saudi agreement. refusal to forswear enrichment and repro-

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 53 • In order to conclude civil nuclear agree- if risk mitigation elements were accepted by ments with key Middle East countries, the the party, such as capacity limits, enhanced United States should be prepared to mod- monitoring and transparency, or a require- ify the “gold standard” to meet the needs ment that any fuel cycle facility be multina- of particular partners. In negotiations tional in character. with the United States, both Saudi Arabia Another approach would be retain the essen- and Jordan have balked at accepting a for- tial aspect of the “gold standard”—a legally mal renunciation of fuel cycle capabilities, binding renunciation of enrichment or repro- and it is unlikely, especially in the wake of cessing—while shortening the duration of the the Iran nuclear deal, that any other state of agreement from the standard 30 years or lon- the region will accept the pure “gold stan- ger to, say, 20 years. For countries that wish to dard.” This objection appears to have little retain the option to acquire fuel cycle facilities to do with the whether states actually plan in the future but have no near-term plans to to have enrichment or spent fuel reprocess- pursue them, this could be acceptable. ing programs, particularly in the time frames in which nuclear cooperation agreements Yet another approach—one that could be would be in effect (usually 30 years or less). combined with and reinforce either of the Rather, the objection is largely political— first two—would be a non-binding commit- and almost theological—in nature, relating ment stating that the other party has no plan to the rights of sovereign states. The fact that or intention to pursue enrichment or repro- Iran will be permitted under the JCPOA to cessing. Many other approaches would be retain and eventually expand its enrichment possible. The objective would be to decrease program only reinforces this mindset, and the likelihood that additional fuel cycle pro- places it in the context of the regional com- grams would take root in the Middle East— petition between Iran and the Arab states. an objective that would be much harder to realize if continued U.S. insistence on the To avoid continuing deadlock in negotia- pure “gold standard” drove prospective U.S. tions with Middle East countries on civil partners to suppliers that did not seek any nuclear cooperation agreements—which constraints on fuel cycle capabilities. would exclude the United States from nu- clear commerce in the region and leave the 6. Promote regional arrangements that restrain field to other suppliers, who might have fuel cycle developments and build confidence lower proliferation standards—Washington in the peaceful nature of regional nuclear should be prepared, if necessary, to modify programs. the “gold standard.” In cases where the pure “gold standard” is not achievable, the U.S. The JCPOA’s limits on Iran’s fuel cycle programs will government should press for the strongest reduce pressures on Middle East countries to seek possible constraints on the acquisition of to match Tehran’s capabilities in the near term. But fuel cycle capabilities. It could, for example, as the main restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programs insist on a provision permitting—but not lapse in 2025 to 2030, the likelihood of competitive requiring—the United States to withdraw fuel cycle developments in the region could increase, from the agreement in the event that the especially if the regional security and political en- other party decides to pursue indigenous en- vironment remains as tumultuous as it is today. It richment or reprocessing. This would create would be useful to begin developing arrangements a strong disincentive for the other party to now that could head off difficulties down the road— opt for its own fuel cycle; but if the other arrangements that could be applicable to several re- party chose to do so, it would give the Unit- gional states or even on a region-wide basis. ed States the option to retain the agreement

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 54 • The United States should work with Iran to 15 years, or slow the buildup of its capac- and other Middle East governments on ity after 10 to 15 years. possible arrangements for addressing the Such regional arrangements would undoubt- nuclear energy requirements of regional edly be difficult to negotiate, especially in states while minimizing the risks of nu- today’s political climate. But they would sig- clear proliferation. The arrangements could nificantly reduce the likelihood of a regional take different forms: formal or informal, le- competition in nuclear fuel cycle programs gally binding obligations, or political com- while enabling participants to enjoy the ben- mitments. They could involve Iran and sev- efits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. eral neighboring states or could apply to the entire Middle East. They could address fuel 7. Strengthen security assurances to U.S. part- cycle activities, monitoring and transparency ners in the Middle East. measures, or both. A key motivation for such arrangements Concerns about the credibility and effectiveness of would be mutual fears between Iran and its U.S. commitments to their security are the princi- neighbors, particularly the Sunni Arab coun- pal reason that Gulf Arab countries, especially Saudi tries. For the Arab governments, the main Arabia, might decide to pursue latent or actual nu- risk is that Tehran would actually build the clear weapons capabilities. 190,000-SWU enrichment program that it has declared as its goal or would pursue • The United States should reaffirm and a reprocessing program. For Iran, the main build upon its security assurances to risk is that the Arab states—with their wealth members of the Gulf Cooperation Coun- and international partnerships—would seek cil (GCC). In May 2015, the United States to balance Iranian developments with their and the GCC released a joint statement fol- own nuclear fuel cycles. lowing the conclusion of summit-level talks Some arrangements could apply equally to at Camp David that contained a pledge of all participants. For example, the partici- U.S. support for GCC member security. pants could ban reprocessing and reprocess- Specifically, the United States committed “to ing facilities; they could agree to rely on for- work jointly with the GCC states to deter eign-supplied fuel for all power reactors and and confront an external threat to any GCC to ship all spent fuel out of the country; they state’s territorial integrity that is inconsis- 130 could agree that all new research and power tent with the UN Charter.” In support reactors would be light-water moderated and of that commitment, the United States af- use uranium fuel enriched to below five per- firmed its readiness to “work with our GCC cent; and they could accept indefinitely some partners to determine urgently what action of the enhanced monitoring and transparen- may be appropriate, using the means at our cy measures contained in the JCPOA. collective disposal, including the potential use of military force, for the defense of our Some other arrangements might not apply GCC partners.”131 equally to all participants. For example, some Arab governments might agree to forgo fuel The U.S. pledge was reaffirmed during Presi- cycle capabilities if Iran agreed to postpone dent Obama’s trip to the region at the end of the expiration of key JCPOA restrictions, ac- April 2016. The communiqué issued at the cept limits on its enrichment capacity after 10 second summit meeting of U.S. and GCC

130 “U.S.- Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 14, 2015, https://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-statement 131 Ibid.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 55 leaders in Riyadh stated that “the United theory, provide GCC countries the security States policy to use all elements of power to they seek. Such a structure once existed in the secure its core interests in the Gulf region region—the Central Treaty Organization, or and to deter and confront external aggres- CENTO, which was created in 1955 and in- sion against its allies and partners, as it did cluded Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the United during the Gulf War, is unequivocal.”132 Kingdom, and the United States. But the weak The next administration should consider am- and ineffective CENTO, which was disband- plifying the U.S. commitment by addressing ed in 1979, is hardly a model to emulate and, particular GCC security concerns, including in any event, the difficulties of establishing a the possibility of Iran attempting to close off formal alliance today—including significantly the Straits of Hormuz, a vital waterway for differing views among GCC members toward GCC members, and the threat posed by Ira- Iran and opposition in the United States to- nian ballistic and cruise missiles. The United ward alliance ties with the Gulf’s autocratic States and its GCC partners could also de- regimes—would likely be insurmountable. clare that Iranian noncompliance with either Moreover, such an alliance, by hardening and the NPT or the JCPOA would constitute “an deepening the divisions that exist in the region external threat” to the GCC that would call today, could increase the obstacles to eventually for immediate consultations and an appropri- finding a modus vivendi between Iran and the ate collective response which, in the event of Sunni Arab governments. an Iranian breakout toward nuclear weapons, A related option—one that would not nec- could involve the use of military force. essarily involve a formal, Senate-ratified mu- tual defense pact—would be to provide U.S. • The United States should explore with its partners in the Gulf with a “nuclear um- GCC partners the development of a more brella.” The term “nuclear umbrella” can be closely integrated regional security frame- construed in a variety of ways, but it is often work, with stronger operational and insti- meant as a pledge that, in the event nucle- tutional ties among its members. Reassur- ar weapons were threatened or used against ing America’s Middle East partners will take a U.S. partner, the United States would more than strong political statements on provide a fitting, powerful response, which paper. Arms sales—predictably the element could include the use of nuclear weapons. of U.S. security cooperation that attracts the While such a nuclear umbrella could be of- most attention—can make an important fered to protect Gulf Arab countries against contribution to the self-defense capabilities Iran, the offer—at a time when Iran does not and self-confidence of U.S. partners, but possess nuclear weapons—appears unneces- they are not sufficient to alleviate their con- sary or, at a minimum, premature. Should cerns, especially about the prospect of a nu- Iran eventually acquire nuclear weapons, a clear-armed Iran. The GCC countries need U.S. nuclear umbrella would be an appro- to know that they will not be left standing priate response. For now, it is sufficient—as alone, and this will require a tighter network recommended earlier—for the United States of political and military relationships with to commit to preventing Iran from acquiring the United States. nuclear weapons, if necessary by using (con- One option would be to create a multilateral ventional) military force. mutual defense arrangement—a Gulf ana- A more effective regional security framework, logue to NATO. A formal alliance could, in with stronger operational and institutional

132 “United States-Gulf Cooperation Council Second Summit Leaders Communique,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 21, 2016, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/21/united-states-gulf-cooperation-council-second-summit-leaders-communique

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 56 ties between the United States and GCC full breadth of GCC-U.S. security capabil- members, can be developed in the absence of ities.”134 This combined exercise should not a formal alliance or a nuclear umbrella. The be a one-off endeavor and instead should Obama administration has already taken sig- become a regular feature of U.S.-GCC mil- nificant steps in that direction. itary cooperation. If broadened beyond the The United States, in the annex to the U.S.- GCC, these exercises could help the Arab GCC Joint Statement of 2015, agreed to “… League’s “United Arab Force” develop real set up a senior working group to pursue the capabilities and become more than an orga- development of rapid response capabilities, nization that today exists largely on paper. taking into account the Arab League’s con- A future administration could also consider cept of a ‘unified Arab force,’ to mount or expanding these exercises to include select contribute in a coordinated way to count- partners from outside the region, such as er-terrorism, peacekeeping and stabilization the U.K. and France (both of which main- operations in the region.”133 The communi- tain a presence in the Gulf). qué released in April 2016 went farther, un- Gulf Arab confidence in U.S. security com- derscoring several key elements of an expand- mitments would also be reinforced by polit- ed, integrated, and collaborative approach to ical and policy-level engagement, including regional security. For example, it called for annual summit meetings, regular meetings of enhancing maritime security cooperation foreign and defense ministers, and frequent arrangements, which have already proven meetings of specialized working groups. helpful in interdicting Iranian-origin arms While strengthening U.S.-GCC institutional and equipment intended for the Houthis in ties is important, it should not come at the Yemen. It supported expedited steps to im- expense of traditional bilateral U.S. security plement an integrated missile defense early relationships with individual Gulf partners. In warning system. The communiqué also an- that connection, consideration should be giv- nounced initiatives to train specially-desig- en to awarding the status of major non-NA- nated Special Operations Forces units from TO ally (MNNA) to Saudi Arabia and the each GCC country and to expand coopera- UAE, a status that Tunisia, Bahrain, Kuwait, tion on cybersecurity. Future U.S. adminis- Egypt and Jordan already enjoy. (Israel is tech- trations should build on these efforts—and nically a “major strategic partner” of the Unit- the next president should commit to hold- ed States, which is a slightly elevated position ing a summit with their GCC counterparts with respect to MNNAs.) MMNA status within the first six months of a new admin- carries with it advantages from an arms pro- istration. curement perspective135, 136 and, in this regard, In a significant step toward strengthening could expedite the transfer of critical defense their defense ties, the United States and the capabilities in line with the conclusions of the GCC countries agreed at their April 2016 2016 communiqué. Given the scrutiny that summit to conduct a combined military arms sales to Saudi Arabia receive in Wash- exercise in March 2017 “to showcase the ington, awarding MNNA status may be

133 “Annex to U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 14, 2015, https://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/annex-us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-statement 134 “United States-Gulf Cooperation Council Second Summit Leaders Communique,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 21, 2016, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/21/united-states-gulf-cooperation-council-second-summit-leaders-communique 135 “Designation of Tunisia as a Major Non-NATO Ally,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, July 10, 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ prs/ps/2015/07/244811.htm 136 Gayatri Oruganti, Todd Ruffner, “U.S.-Tunisia Security Cooperation: What It Means to be a Major Non-NATO Ally,” Security Assistance Monitor, July 14, 2015, http://www.securityassistance.org/africa/blog/us-tunisia-security-cooperation-what-it-means-be-major-non-nato-ally

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 57 difficult politically. However, the military Arabs and the Iranians to find ways of tamp- and reassurance value of expediting arms ing down regional conflicts. sales and the potential for reducing incen- At the U.S.-GCC summit in April 2016, tives for nuclear proliferation suggest that, President Obama expressed his support for even if difficult, it would be worthwhile to a dual-track approach: “We have to be effec- make the attempt. Consultations with Con- tive in our defenses and hold Iran to account gress on MNNA status should be held early where it is acting in ways that are contrary to in the next administration. international rules and norms. But we also have to have the capacity to enter into a dia- 8. Promote a stable regional security environ- logue to reduce tensions and to identify ways ment, especially the resolution of current in which the more reasonable forces inside civil wars and the reduction of Saudi-Iranian of Iran can negotiate with the countries in tensions. the region, so that we don’t see an escalation of proxy fights across the region.”137 GCC In a Middle East less racked by conflict, incentives leaders also endorsed the dual-track concept for acquiring nuclear weapons, both by Iran and by committing to “address Iran’s destabiliz- other states of the region, would be significantly re- ing activities, while also working to reduce duced. regional and sectarian tensions that fuel in- stability.”138 • Pursue a “dual-track” approach of strengthening U.S. partnerships and U.S. • Seek to resolve current regional conflicts. regional presence while seeking to reduce Internal strife throughout the region, espe- regional tensions and conflict.A prereq- cially the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, have uisite to building a more stable and peace- provided a battleground for Saudi and Ira- ful Middle East is instilling confidence in nian proxies and even for Saudi and Iranian America’s partners that the United States is military forces. There are many reasons for committed to their security and will main- seeking the early termination of these con- tain a formidable military and diplomatic flicts, not the least of which is to de-escalate presence in the region to reinforce the cred- regional tensions that can fuel interest in ac- ibility of that commitment. The perception quiring nuclear weapons. Of course, the dif- of U.S. withdrawal from the region, howev- ficulty in achieving such a result cannot be er inaccurate, can be destabilizing. Fear of underestimated. abandonment can make U.S. partners both • Explore the creation of an inclusive re- more insecure and more unilaterally asser- gional security forum. In the near term, the tive, sometimes in ways that only exacerbate priority should be to encourage engagement regional tensions. And the impression that between the Iranian and Gulf Arab govern- the United States is heading for the exits ments, both in multilateral forums such as can tempt Iran to take advantage by seeking the Syria talks and in discreet bilateral set- to expand its regional influence. A United tings. While conflict is raging throughout States committed to maintaining a strong the region, it is far too early to establish a regional presence and to preventing any regional security body. But over the longer country from achieving regional hegemo- term, especially if a modicum of stability ny will provide incentives both to the Gulf can be brought to Syria, Iraq, and Yemen,

137 “Remarks by President Obama in Q&A with the Press—Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 21, 2016, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/21/remarks-president-obama-qa-press-riyadh-saudi-arabia 138 “United States-Gulf Cooperation Council Second Summit Leaders Communique,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 21, 2016, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/21/united-states-gulf-cooperation-council-second-summit-leaders-communique

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 58 it would be valuable to try to create a mul- A proliferation cascade? Unlikely, at tilateral mechanism—involving all countries least for now of the Middle East or confined to Iran and the Arab countries of the Gulf—to deal By sharply diminishing Iran’s capacity to produce with security issues. There is a precedent for fissile material for nuclear weapons for at least 10 such a mechanism: the Arms Control and to 15 years, the JCPOA has reduced incentives for Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group, neighboring states to acquire nuclear weapons or at which functioned in the early 1990s under least a hedging fuel cycle capability. But it has not the auspices of the Madrid peace process. eliminated those incentives. With the participation of Israel, the Palestin- ian Authority, most Arab governments, the For years to come, regional states will remain uncer- United States, Russia, and several other “ex- tain about several factors affecting their security— tra-regional powers,” ACRS was surprisingly how well the JCPOA will deter and detect any Iranian successful in facilitating frank, substantive non-compliance; whether the agreement will survive discussions between Israel and Arab states compliance disputes, challenges by opponents, and (most of which did not have diplomatic re- leadership transitions; and whether Iran will opt for lations with Israel) and in setting up data ex- nuclear weapons when key restrictions expire after 15 changes and other confidence-building mea- years. They will also be uncertain about other factors sures. But it was handicapped by the absence that could motivate them to reconsider their nuclear of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and it options, especially Iran’s future behavior in the region eventually fell apart as a result of the inability and America’s future regional role. These uncertain- of Egypt and Israel to come to terms on how ties will keep concerns about proliferation alive. to address nuclear issues in the region. A working group convened by the Brookings But this study suggests that, at least for now, those con- Institution and the Atlantic Council has pro- cerns have been subdued, even if not permanently set posed a multilateral forum modeled on the to rest. None of the Middle East’s “likely suspects” ap- Organization for Security and Cooperation pears both inclined and able in the foreseeable future in Europe (OSCE).139 Initially, the organiza- to acquire an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. tion would be limited to Iran, Iraq, the GCC countries, and key outside powers; it would In the years preceding the JCPOA, it had practically be a discussion forum; and it would address become the conventional wisdom that, given Iran’s only regional security issues. But over time, its nuclear program, several additional nuclear-armed membership could be broadened to include states would inevitably emerge in the Middle East. other Middle East states; it could consider That conventional wisdom has largely been discred- confidence-building and arms control mea- ited. But there is a risk that a more complacent con- sures; and its mandate could be extended be- ventional wisdom will take its place—that the Unit- yond security issues to economic and political ed States no longer has to worry about a regional matters as well (emulating the mandate of the nuclear arms competition. OSCE). While such a regional mechanism is undoubtedly unrealistic in current circum- It will be essential for the United States and other in- stances, creating a body along these lines in terested countries—pursuing policies along the lines the future would be an important element of recommended here—to make sure that the earlier a strategy for reducing the likelihood of nucle- predictions of a Middle East proliferation cascade do ar proliferation in the Middle East. not yet come to pass.

139 “Security and Public Order,” The Atlantic Council and The Brookings Institution, February 10, 2016, pp. 36-7, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ research/files/reports/2016/02/me-security-public-order-pollack/security-and-public-order-report.pdf

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 59 About the Authors

Robert Einhorn is a senior fellow with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, both housed within the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. During his career at the U.S. Department of State, Einhorn served as assistant secretary for nonproliferation during the Clinton administration and as the secretary of state’s special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control during the Obama administration. At Brookings, Einhorn concentrates on arms control, nonprolif- eration and regional security issues (including Iran, the greater Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia), and U.S. nuclear weapons policies.

Richard Nephew is a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program and affiliated with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative housed within the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. He is also a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. Prior to join- ing academia, Nephew was a civil servant in the U.S. government, including stints at the Department of Ener- gy, Department of State, and National Security Council. His last position in government was as the principal deputy coordinator for sanctions policy at the U.S. Department of State. In this capacity, Nephew also served as the lead sanctions expert for the U.S. team negotiating with Iran from August 2013 to December 2014.

T h e I ra n N u c l e a r D e a l : P r e lu d e to P ro l i f e rati o n i n t h e M idd l e E a st ? FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS • A r m s C o n t ro l a n d N o n -P ro l i f e rati o n S e r i es 60 About the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative

Few problems pose greater challenges to U.S. including the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Prolif- national security than controlling, reducing and coun- eration Series papers. tering the proliferation of nuclear arms. The Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative brings the This is the eleventh paper in that series. Previous papers Institution’s multidisciplinary strengths to bear on the are listed below; all may be downloaded at: http://www. critical challenges of arms control and nonproliferation. brookings.edu/about/projects/arms-control-nonprolifer- Housed in the Center for 21st Century Security and In- ation/arms-control-series telligence in the Brookings Foreign Policy program, the initiative addresses global arms control and proliferation #1 Resetting U.S.-Russian Leadership on Nuclear Arms challenges, as well as the central negotiations between the Reductions and Non-Proliferation, by Steven Pifer, United States and Russia. Joseph Cirincione and Clifford Gaddy, January 2010

Brookings Senior Fellow Steven Pifer directs the initia- #2 Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe tive, joined by Senior Fellow Robert Einhorn. Brookings Treaty Regime: Options for Washington, by Anne President Strobe Talbott is actively involved in the ini- Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett and Jeff McCausland, tiative, which also draws on the expertise of a number March 2010 of other Brookings experts. #3 U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Consider- Research by Brookings experts in the Arms Control and ations and Challenges, by Steven Pifer, Richard C. Non-Proliferation Initiative focuses on several clusters: Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack, May 2010 • nuclear arms reductions, including U.S.-Rus- sian nuclear arms reductions, reductions of #4 The Next Round: The United States and Nuclear third-country nuclear forces and the challenges Arms Reductions after New START, by Steven Pifer, of moving to a non-nuclear world; November 2010 • U.S. nuclear deterrence policy in the 21st cen- #5 The U.S. Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: tury; History, Current Views and Implications, by Richard • nuclear nonproliferation challenges, includ- C. Bush, February 2011 ing ratification of the Comprehensive Nucle- ar-Test-Ban Treaty and entry into force, a fissile #6 The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, materials cut-off treaty, strengthening the Treaty Russia and Nuclear Weapons, by Steven Pifer, May on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2011 nuclear security, civil nuclear energy cooperation, regional security (Middle East, Northeast Asia, #7 NATO, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control, by Ste- South Asia), the North Korea nuclear challenge ven Pifer, July 2011 and negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. #8 Missile Defense in Europe: Cooperation or Conten- The initiative supports a dialogue led by former Secretary tion?, by Steven Pifer, May 2012 of State Madeleine Albright, Strobe Talbott and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on U.S.-Russian #9 The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: cooperation on nuclear arms reductions and nonprolif- History and Lessons Learned, by Avis T. Bohlen, Wil- eration, which has produced joint recommendations that liam F. Burns, Steven Pifer and John Woodworth, De- are shared with senior U.S. and Russian officials. The cember 2012 initiative also sponsors the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Roundtable Series and public events #10 Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Requirements for aimed at discussing the key arms control and nonpro- a Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement, by Robert J. liferation challenges of the day. The initiative produces Einhorn, March 2014 research and policy recommendations on these issues,

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