Cattle Killing and Eastern Abenaki Migration, 1725 to 1760
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Subsistence or Strategy? Cattle Killing and Eastern Abenaki Migration, 1725 to 1760 DAVID GHERE University of Minnesota A large force of Massachusetts militiamen ascended the Kennebec River in August 1724, hoping for a surprise attack on the Abenaki village at Norridgewalk. Most similar expeditions had been unsuccessful because the Abenaki routinely abandoned their villages during wartime for more secure locations. On this occasion, the attackers found the village inhabited and achieved the major English victory of Dummer's War — arguably the most famous incident in Maine history. After the battle, the militiamen discovered an unfinished letter by Father Sebastien Rale, the French missionary at Norridgewalk, which indicated that the Indians were close to famine and would be forced to harvest their corn early. According to Rale, they had just returned to their village for this purpose and planned to move upriver immediately after the harvest to a safer location. Their need for the corn, unfortunately, coincided with the timing of the militia raid on their village (Eckstorm 1934, Morrison 1974). Three decades later, in May 1756, a militia patrol encountered an Abenaki warrior who was headed up the Presumpscot River valley in the direction of the White Mountains. On his shoulder he carried a quarter of beef. As if this were not curious enough, the man did not give up his heavy burden when he sighted the militiamen nor even when they fired two shots at him as he fled. Only after being mortally wounded by the third shot did he drop the beef in his effort to escape. Other sources indicate that some Abenaki family bands were located in the White Mountains at this time and that earlier in the day warriors from that group had been encountered nearby. Since food would have been very scarce during a period of warfare and the warrior's actions reveal the importance he placed on the beef, the most logical conclusion seems to be that he was taking food to his hungry family in the White Mountains (Smith 1873:18-21, Dole 1916:82-85, Ghere 1993:193-207). These two examples raise a series of related questions. To what extent did subsistence needs and outright hunger influence Eastern Abenaki SUBSISTENCE OR STRATEGY? 113 diplomatic decisions and military actions during the mid-1700s? Did hunger prompt some instances of cattle killing in both war and peace? Did certain Eastern Abenaki migrate to Canada and become French auxiliaries primarily because of subsistence needs? Numerous references throughout this period indicate that the Abenaki were struggling to maintain their subsistence level and there is direct evidence that hunger was a critical motivation for some of these incidents. The historical evidence indicates that subsistence played a much more important role in Eastern Abenaki decisions concerning diplomacy, migration and warfare than has been previously thought. The Abenaki Indians inhabited the upper New England area, with the Western Abenaki living in modern-day Vermont and New Hampshire and the Eastern Abenaki occupying western and central Maine. By 1725, a half-century of warfare and English settlement expansion had prompted many of the Western Abenaki and a few Eastern Abenaki to migrate to the mission villages of St. Francis and Becancour along the St. Lawrence River where they would be under the protection and influence of the French. Other Western Abenaki continued to live in small villages or family band camps near Lake Champlain or along the upper Connecticut River. Most Eastern Abenaki chose to remain in their homes where they could maintain their land, preserve their diplomatic autonomy and benefit from the Anglo-French rivalry for their support. By the mid-1700s, these Eastern Abenaki were concentrated at the villages of Norridgewalk on the Kennebec River and Pannaouamske on the Penobscot River, while others resided in small villages and family band camps throughout western Maine. These Indians were identified by the English with the river valley that each inhabited (Penobscot, Kennebec and Androscoggin) except for those in southwestern Maine who were named for their principle village of Pigwacket. They considered the Western Abenaki to be their close relatives, and were on friendly relations with their eastern neighbors, the Passamaquoddy and Maliseet Indians living near Passamaquoddy Bay and in the Saint John River valley respectively (Calloway 1990, Morrison 1984, Day 1978, Snow 1978). The Eastern Abenaki subsisted primarily through a combination of hunting, fishing and gathering, moving in a seasonal cycle between a central village and numerous family band campsites. April and May were usually spent at the villages which were often located near falls or rapids 114 DAVID GHERE in the rivers to facilitate catching fish as they went upriver to spawn. While men engaged in fishing and fowling, women planted corn, beans and squash in fields next to the village. Agriculture could not be relied upon due to the extremely short growing season and its importance ranged from significant among the Pigwacket to nonexistent among the Penobscot. In June, the family bands journeyed to the seashore where they spent the summer months eating seals, porpoises, clams, lobsters, saltwater fish and seabirds. In September, they returned to the central village, gathering food as they went, and harvested any crops that had matured. From October to late December, and again during February and March, the family bands hunted moose, deer and caribou and trapped beaver, mink, muskrat, otter and porcupine in the interior. Warmer weather prompted the collection of ground nuts, sprouting plants and maple sap for syrup as the family band returned to the village (Thomas 1976:9-10; Speck 1940:25-26, 35-36; Snow 1968:1143-51; Sanger 1982:195-203). The presence of English settlements had a significant impact on Abenaki subsistence by disrupting their normal seasonal cycle. Food resources along the coast and for some distance inland were being devoured by an increasing number of settlers and their livestock. English dams and nets prevented fish from swimming upriver past the Indian villages to spawn each spring. This plentiful resource had always been the basis of their diet in April and May, and was particularly important because it could be depended upon to alleviate starvation resulting from an unsuccessful winter hunt. Furthermore, while previous settlements had hugged the coast, the seven townships established between 1733 and 1750 were at inland locations, resulting in a further contraction of Abenaki subsistence territories (Thomas 1976:12-15; Clark 1970:173; BM 11:143, 172-3, 186-7, 190-1,23:257-261). Two other factors would have contributed to Abenaki food shortages during the mid-1700s. A study of climate variations in colonial New England indicates that the agricultural growing seasons were somewhat shorter than normal in the 1730s and 1750s and were considerably shorter in the 1740s. These shorter growing seasons would have had the greatest effect on the Pigwacket but reduced agricultural production throughout New England would have complicated the efforts of all the Abenaki to secure food through trade (Baron 1982:205). A second factor concerns the epidemic diseases that ravaged northern New England during this period SUBSISTENCE OR STRATEGY? 115 hindering Abenaki hunting and gathering efforts as well as making trade contacts a less attractive alternative. Major epidemics of smallpox in 1731-32 and 1740-41 corresponded to the two peacetime periods of multiple cattle-killing incidents (1731-32,1740^12) which will be detailed later. Abenaki wartime subsistence was complicated by severe outbreaks of smallpox in 1747 and 1755-58 as well as diphtheria in 1748 and 1754-55 (Duffy 1953:53-64, 117-127, 131-5, 157-8, 171-3; Steam and Steam 1945:38, 43; Dobyns 1983:15-20; O'Callaghan 1853-87,9:1029). The Eastern Abenaki responded to these factors in a variety of ways. Their need for food resulted in increased exploitation of fur trapping tenitories and a steady rise in the volume of their trade at the English forts until 1753. Astute Abenaki diplomats were able to exploit the Anglo- French rivalry to secure increasingly generous diplomatic presents from both countries. Annual treaty conferences were usually scheduled so as not to conflict with the Indians' summer hunting, and individual absences from the meetings were often explained by the necessity for hunting. Fre quently, a large Abenaki contingent would attend the conferences, expecting to be provisioned by the English since their hunters were occupied by the negotiations. Finally, Indian spokesmen at the conferences routinely showed great concern about their ability to hunt, trap, and fish unmolested (BM 23:443; MA 119:435-4-47,531-545; MeHSC 1853:359^147, 1856:119-184; MBC 1742:6, 13). These Eastern Abenaki diplomatic efforts were complicated by varying degrees of factional discord during the mid-1700s. These kinship-based factions are usually identified as the pro-French and pro-English factions, but these terms distort the pro-Abenaki motives of both factions. Further more, their use implies a degree of influence that neither country was able to exert during this period. The terms conciliatory faction and confronta tional faction, based on the factions' relations with the English, more accurately reflect the attitudes of the factions as well as the autonomy shown in their diplomatic decisions. The Abenaki in the conciliatory faction believed that through trade and friendly relations their people could reach an accommodation with the English which would preserve their land and culture. The confrontational faction thought that English domination could only be prevented through strong, diligent resistance to every English encroachment. The various occurrences of Abenaki destruction of settler's livestock 116 DAVID GHERE can be organized into three types. First, there were occasional small incidents during peacetime which historians have usually characterized as expressions of underlying Indian resentment or as examples of a low-keyed resistance strategy against the English.