Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Deren Olgun | The Argument for Anomalous Monism, Again ESJP The Argument for Anomalous Monism, Again #1 | 2011 Deren Olgun 1. Introduction predicate dualism only). Thus Davidson is neither a non-reductive physi- calist, nor can he be accused of property epiphenomenalism – properties 31 The main focus of the contemporary debate on mental causation has cen- simply do not enter into his philosophical scheme. tred on whether mental events can cause other events in virtue of their mental properties, or only in virtue of their physical ones. Whilst reduc- This paper is divided into eight sections. The first section introduces tive physicalists maintain that the only properties that exist are physical the mental causation debate by giving a brief outline of its history up to properties, and that any mental or other “higher-level” properties are only the contemporary debate about property epiphenomenalism. The second properties in virtue of their being identical with some physical property, section outlines the argument for anomalous monism. The third sec- non-reductive physicalists maintain that mental or other “higher-level” tion outlines one of the earliest arguments that asserted that anomalous properties are irreducible to physical ones. A common charge that has monism implies property epiphenomenalism. The fourth section out- been levelled against non-reductive physicalists is that if mental proper- lines various non-reductive physicalist responses that attempt to defend ties are irreducible then they must be causally inert or “epiphenomenal” non-reductivism. The fifth section outlines Kim’s influential “overdeter- since it cannot be the case that both mental and physical properties are mination” argument – the claim that non-reductive physicalists must simultaneously causal, a position which the literature has come to call accept either property epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. The sixth property epiphenomenalism. This paper argues that the charge of property section makes the case that anomalous monism cannot imply property epiphenomenalism is misplaced when it is applied to Donald Davidson’s epiphenomenalism. The seventh section deals with Sophie Gibb’s (2006) anomalous monism. Davidson cannot be accused of property epiphenom- criticisms of Davidson’s underlying approach to ontology, as instances of enalism because properties do not feature in his ontology and, therefore, more appropriate criticisms. The final section concludes. play no role in his account of causal relations between events. Davidson’s work and name have become embroiled in the debate about property epi- phenomenalism because he is mistakenly thought to be working in an 2. The Mental Causation Debate old tradition that accepts properties as an ontological category and that maintains that it is only in virtue of their properties that events have the Cartesian dualism is the classic form of substance dualism. Descartes main- effects that they do. Whilst the conceptual irreducibility of mental types tained that there are two kinds of substance, material and mental, and to physical types (predicate dualism), which is the hallmark of non-reduc- that man is a union of a spatially extended, material substance (the body), tive physicalism, is, for non-reductive physicalists, a consequence of an which is incapable of thought or feeling, and a spatially un-extended, men- ontological non-reductivism (property dualism), for Davidson the start tal substance (the mind or soul), which thinks and feels. and end point is the denial of conceptual reduction (i.e. the acceptance of Now, pre-theoretic conceptions of agency hold that the mind and the Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Deren Olgun | The Argument for Anomalous Monism, Again body causally interact. When, for example, Alfred summons the waiter Token identity states that any mental event or object is identical with some (by raising his hand, say), we say that his wanting to order caused him physical event or object – accepting token identity implies a rejection of to do so, just as we say that my intention to read Emile Zola’s Germinal substance dualism. Type identity, in contrast, holds that mental event causes my buying of the text. And, in agreement with these common sense types are identical with/reducible to physical event types – “types” here are intuitions, Descartes also maintained that the mind and the body causally generally taken to mean properties, although, as we will later observe, it interact. However, one of the main problems for Cartesian dualism is how can also mean predicates. to marry the possibility of mental-physical causal interaction with the total Accepting both token identity and type identity is a reductive physical- independence of mental and material substances – it is very difficult to see ist position. Reductive physicalists deny mental causation because, as they how an un-extended, immaterial substance with no presence in physical maintain, a mental event only has the causal power it does in virtue of its space could causally influence material bodies that are subject to the laws being identical with some physical event; that it is only because the event is 32 of physics. And indeed, as Kim notes, the ‘inability to explain the possibil- of a certain physical type that it is the cause it is, and its being of a certain ity of “mental causation”, how mentality can make a causal difference to mental type is just a consequence of its being that physical type. the world, doomed Cartesian dualism’ (Kim, 1996: 4). In contrast to the reductive physicalist position, Donald Davidson’s The majority position (see Kim, 1996; Crane 2003) in contempo- anomalous monism (1970, 1993) seeks to defend the possibility of men- rary philosophy of mind rejects Cartesian dualism in favour of a kind tal causation. The idea that reasons are causes of actions is a central part of monism, which argues that there is only one kind of substance. More of Davidson’s philosophy (see Davidson, 1963) and anomalous monism specifically, it is a physicalist or “materialist” monism that has come to represents a stance in the philosophy of mind that combines his position dominate the debate, a position that is generally known as physicalism. on mental causation with other elements of his philosophy, including his Kim defines ontological physicalism as the position that ‘there are no con- views on events (see Davidson, 1969), causation (see Davidson, 1967b) crete existents, or substances, in the spacetime world other than material and semantics (see Davidson, 1967a, 1974a, 1977). Whilst anomalous particles and their aggregates’ (Kim, 1996: 211) and observes that ‘in most monism accepts token identity, it denies type identity (where by “types” contemporary debates, ontological physicalism forms the starting point of Davidson would have in mind predicates rather than properties), holding discussion rather than a conclusion that needs to be established.’ (Ibid.: that mental types are irreducible to physical ones. 211) In response, many critics (e.g., Honderich, 1982; McLaughlin, 1993; However, embracing physicalism does not resolve the problem of Kim 1993a) have argued that anomalous monism is inherently contradic- mental causation that dogged substance dualism: it still remains unclear tory and that the only reasonable way to resolve the contradiction is to as to how mental events or objects (whatever their apparent relation to accept that mental events are epiphenomenal, or rather that mental prop- the physical substance that constitutes them) can causally interact with erties are epiphenomenal – the general argument taking the form that it physical events or objects. The debate has simply shifted its focus from is only in virtue of an event’s being a certain physical type that it has the substances to properties, as Kim notes ‘the most intensely debated issue – effect that it does, and not in virtue of its being a certain mental type, that in fact, the only substantive remaining issue – concerning the mind-body mental events do not cause anything qua mental; a position which we relation has centred on properties – that is, the question how mental and shall call property epiphenomenalism. In response to these criticisms, argu- physical properties are related to each other’ (Ibid.: 211-212 – emphasis in ments in defence of anomalous monism (e.g., LePore & Loewer (1987), original). To make sense of the debate to which Kim refers it will be help- Macdonald & Macdonald (1991), Macdonald (2007)), which are usually ful to draw on the distinction between token identity and type identity. dubbed non-reductive physicalism, have been proposed. These arguments, Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Deren Olgun | The Argument for Anomalous Monism, Again in general, contort the positions developed by Davidson’s critics in such a In terms of the discussion of previous section, CI is just the acceptance of way as to (attempt to) restore causal efficacy and relevance to the mental the possibility of what we have been calling mental causation. NCC is, by properties of events. Davidson’s own acknowledgment (Davidson, 1970: 209), unsupported. AOM is defended by appealing to Quine’s argument of the indeterminacy In so far as the debate is one between reductive and non-reductive of translation: it is not possible to formulate strict laws that relate the physicalists, or one between non-reductive physicalists of different stripes, two, distinct, conceptual realms, because mental concepts are not explica- asking whether or not their positions imply property epiphenomenalism ble in physical vocabulary, nor physical concepts in mental vocabulary. As is a reasonable line of inquiry. Where it ceases to become reasonable is Davidson notes: when Davidson’s anomalous monism is made the object of this line of attack either explicitly or because it has been classed, as it frequently is ‘There are no strict psychophysical laws because of the disparate (e.g. Jacob, 2002), as a form of non-reductive physicalism. As Davidson commitments of the mental and physical schemes’ (Davidson, 1970: 33 (1967b, 1980, 1993) maintains, and as is reiterated by Tim Crane (1995) 222).