OUT of CASH US Presidential Pre-Nominations

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PARTY POLITICS VOL 6. No.1 pp. 47–59

RESEARCH NOTE

OUT OF CASH US Presidential Pre-nominations

Gordon S. Hanson

ABSTRACT

This is a report on the effects of party reform and federal election campaign finance reform on the US presidential pre-nomination process. It provides empirical support for commonly held perceptions about the importance of a first- or second-place finish in the New Hampshire primary. Specifically, a regression equation is used to demonstrate that the withdrawal dates of third-or-worse finishers can be predicted from the amount of the first 2 months of matching funds disbursements. A liberalization of the financial regulations or some restoration of state party control over delegate selection is needed, but not likely to occur.

KEY WORDS Ⅲ campaign ﬁnance Ⅲ party reform Ⅲ US presidential pre-nomination

The American practice of nominating presidential candidates through a series of local primary elections is a fairly recent historical development. It is rooted in an extra-legal tradition of choosing delegates to national party conventions, where the actual nominating would take place. But in 1968, supporters of Democratic anti-war presidential candidates found themselves largely excluded from most of the state-level processes. In an attempt to keep the peace within the party at the convention itself, it was agreed that a commission would be appointed to establish ofﬁcial guidelines for the selection of delegates to future conventions (Shafer, 1983: 29–40). That commission essentially abolished institutional forms that had been easily controlled by state party organizations and preserved only two methods: the participatory convention and the candidate primary. The former distinguished itself from the party caucus in that any party member

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– usually interpreted to mean anybody claiming to be one – could partici- pate at the bottom level of a tiered system of meetings that eventually chose the delegation. The candidate primary differed from the delegate primary in that votes for candidates are translated into votes for candidate-affiliated delegate slates, without the potential confusion involved in voting directly for prospective delegates whose presidential candidate preferences are not indicated on the ballot.1 The application of a fifth method, direct selection by a state party committee, had to be restricted to a maximum of 10 percent of a state delegation (Shafer, 1983: 197–202). Where changes in state law became necessary in order to ensure compliance with the new Democratic Party rules, the Republican delegate selection procedure was affected as well (Polsby, 1983: 54). Although the commission did not express a preference for primary elections, as opposed to a caucus or convention format (Bode and Casey, 1980: 14), setting delegate selection aside in a candidate primary was often found to be the more convenient form of compliance (Ranney, 1975: 206). In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the presidential pre-nomination process was further impacted by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments of 1974, modified in 1976 to satisfy Supreme Court scrutiny. Candidates could no longer accept contributions in excess of $1000; contributions of $250 or less would be matched by the federal government if the candidate agreed to observe limits on spending, and on self-financing.

Representativeness and the Early Withdrawal Problem

Representativeness had been regarded as an important justification for the reform of delegate selection. It was believed that arbitrary procedures were a threat to party unity; that those who were not fairly represented at the national convention would not feel obliged to support the nominee (Ranney, 1975: 138–9). Yet supporters of nomination losers since 1968 have still shown a tendency to abstain or defect in the general election (Southwell, 1986). Polsby (1983: 67) had argued that this was the natural consequence of a process that forces a divisive mobilization of candidate factions. Nomi- nations are no longer won through coalition building, but by surviving a ‘minefield’ of primaries. Ceaser (1982: 57) had observed that the rapid withdrawal of candidates ‘runs counter to the spirit of proportional representation’. Mayer (1987) provided a thorough assessment of this problem. New Hampshire’s primary, coming first on the calendar, had always received a lion’s share of attention from the news media, but has taken on a lion’s share of influence in the post- reform era. The elimination of state party-controlled methods of delegate selection removed a mitigating effect on the news media’s reporting of the results. The campaign finance restrictions, in turn, compounded the plight of those who did not do well by placing a limit on the amount of financial 48 03 – Hanson 4/1/00 12:09 pm Page 49

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support that could be received from a small core of followers. Consequently, ‘financial troubles force candidates to withdraw a lot earlier than they other- wise would, before they have a chance to test their appeal in more than one or two unrepresentative states.’ A candidate must ‘come in first or second in New Hampshire’ to attract more contributors, or be out of the race by late March (Mayer, 1987: 17–20). The implication is that duration of candidacy beyond New Hampshire for third-or-worse finishers is a function of the candidate’s finances. This can be modeled and tested as a least squares regression equation with days beyond New Hampshire as the dependent variable, and the first 2 months’ worth of matching funds certifications as the independent variable. If the post- 1968 reforms have ensured proportional representation and ‘improved the relative financial positions of minor candidates’ (Bartels, 1988: 24), money should not be the principal determinant of candidacy duration.

Methodology

Case Selection Criteria Candidates who are not professional politicians with traditional presidential qualifications have qualified for matching funds in every pre-nomination period. In order to avoid subjective judgments of ‘seriousness’, or problems with ‘unique’ candidacies, it was decided that, in addition to qualification for and acceptance of matching funds, the cases should consist only of candidates who had served as governors, in Congress, or in presidential admin- istrations.2 Even within these criteria, some exceptions had to be made, especially with regard to 1976 candidates.3 There were also singular exceptions made from the 1980, 1988, and 1992 campaigns.4 The 1996 field was plagued with a number of complications,5 including a severe shortfall in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. Until the fund could be replenished with $3 checkoffs from income tax returns that had not yet been received, the amounts actually disbursed amounted to only 60 percent of certifications for January, and just 1 percent in February (Cook and Salant, 1996: 63–4; Congressional Quarterly, 1996: 315). Candidates were able to anticipate this shortfall, however, obtaining loans to cover the unavailable funds. The list of cases from the six pre-nomination periods, with matching funds amounts converted to 1982–4 constant dollars, are displayed in Table 1.

Dependent and Independent Variables Duration of candidacy in days among those who ﬁnished third or worse in the New Hampshire primary is the dependent variable (Y) in a least squares regression equation. Independent variable X1 is the real amount of matching 49 03 – Hanson 4/1/00 12:09 pm Page 50

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Table 1. Third or worse in New Hampshire, 1976–96

Matching funds (X1) ————————————– Candidate Days (Y) Current Adjusted Party (X2) Bayh 1976 9b 2.7385c 5.0908 Democratic = 0 Shapp 1976 17b 2.4103c 4.4807 Democratic = 0 Shriver 1976 27b 2.1952c 4.0808 Democratic = 0 Harris 1976 44b 1.8770c 3.4893 Democratic = 0 Jackson 1976 67b 9.2281c 17.1550 Democratic = 0 Wallace 1976 105b 21.2359c 40.7787 Democratic = 0 Dole 1980 18b 3.6820c 5.0812 Republican = 1 Brown 1980 35b 5.2490c 7.2437 Democratic = 0 Crane 1980 51b 9.3095c 12.8471 Republican = l Anderson 1980 56b 3.4276c 4.7301 Republican = l Baker 1980 8b 13.0029c 17.9439 Republican = l Cranston 1984 1b 16.9766f 17.0276 Democratic = 0 Hollings 1984 2b 7.3913f 7.4135 Democratic = 0 Askew 1984 2b 8.7943f 8.8207 Democratic = 0 McGovern 1984 15b 1.0000f 1.0030 Democratic = 0 Glenn 1984 17b 26.3366f 26.4156 Democratic = 0 Gore 1988 44de 22.0423f 19.3972 Democratic = 0 Simon 1988 44c 22.3903f 19.7034 Democratic = 0 Babbitt 1988 2g 8.4166f 7.4066 Democratic = 0 DuPont 1988 2g 23.0040f 20.2435 Republican = 1 Haig 1988 –4g 4.3938f 3.8666 Republican = l Kemp 1988 23h 45.0645f 39.6568 Republican = l Harkin 1992 20i 15.4869f 11.3673 Democratic = 0 Kerrey 1992 16i 12.6664f 9.2971 Democratic = 0 Alexander 1996 15j 32.0462f 21.0223 Republican = l Gramm 1996 –6k 70.2543f 46.0868 Republican = l Lugar 1996 151 24.2591f 15.9376 Republican = 1 aRight column ﬁgures are in 1982–4 $100,000s calculated by multiplying the current amounts by the CPI of the preceding year (US Bureau of the Census, 1996: 481). bMayer’s compilation of dates from New York Times stories (Mayer, 1987: 24). cAs of 12 February 1976; 23 February 1980 (Freed, 1976: 320; Cook, 1980: 461). dUsing Super Tuesday as Day 0. eFrom dates indicated by Pomper (1989: 40–1). fFEC data (Federal Election Commission, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996). gHaig withdrew 4 days prior to the New Hampshire primary (Abramson et al., 1992: 58). hFrom the New York Times. iFrom the Chicago Tribune. j6 March (Greenblatt, 1996: 641). k14 February (Cook 1996: 399).

funds certifications up through the first 2 months of the election year. The X1 variable represents a candidate’s ability to raise funds in small amounts without the benefit of a strong showing in New Hampshire.6 The statistical significance of this variable would suggest that financial considerations are the principal cause of candidate withdrawals. 50 03 – Hanson 4/1/00 12:09 pm Page 51

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The determination of Day 0 is complicated by the fact that not all candidates have chosen to compete in New Hampshire. The evidence suggests that 1976 was a learning experience in terms of New Hampshire ballot placement (Cook, 1976: 461) and early spending behavior, relative to subsequent years (Freed, 1976: 320; Malbin, 1985: 74–5). In 1988, however, there was one clear example of deferred spending. Al Gore ‘disregarded the early contests and focused directly on Super Tuesday’ (Pomper, 1989: 38). More speciﬁcally, ‘Gore banked $3 million for the southern campaign’ and ‘borrowed another $1 million’ (Norrander, 1992: 82). This conservation and concentration of resources for a later group of primaries had to be regarded as a deviant strategy that could bias the X1 parameter estimate. Accordingly, Super Tuesday was counted as Day 0 in Gore’s case, but the date of the New Hampshire primary was used in all other cases.

Controlling for Party Mayer’s thesis that considerations of electoral potential are rendered moot by financial difficulties relied on Democratic examples. Reubin Askew and Ernest Hollings, both Southerners, withdrew 12 days before the Florida and Georgia primaries in 1984. Askew’s press secretary believed that Askew could have won in Florida, ‘but it would have cost us half a million dollars to do so’ (Mayer, 1987: 19). While the 1996 withdrawals of Phil Gramm and Lamar Alexander were clearly due to financial difficulties – brought on by the unlimited spending of self-financed candidate Steve Forbes (Corrado, 1997: 144) – the average Republican duration (17.5 days) has been 10 days shorter, even though the average 2-month matching funds certification for Republicans ($1.87 million) has been one-third larger than for Democrats ($1.24 million). Because of this, the concept of a party differential in the days-per-matching- funds relationship was used as an interaction term. In Table 1, ‘Republican’ was given a party (X2) value of 1, while ‘Democratic’ was given a value of 0. When X2 is equal to zero, the interaction with matching funds (X1X2) also has a value of zero. It follows that the value of coefficient b2 is only added to b1 when the candidate is a Republican:

Y = b0 + b1X1 + b2X1X2 ... The literature supplies abundant support for the existence of moderate and conservative factions within the Republican Party. The candidates identify themselves with one faction or the other, and Republican withdrawals are influenced by the outcome of early competition within those factions (see Clymer et al., 1981: 5, 7, 44; Jones, 1981: 81; Norrander, 1992: 75–7, 86). Accordingly, coefficient b2 was expected to be negative and statistically significant when Democrats are used as the reference category. The significance of matching funds coefficient b1 for Republicans could only be 51 03 – Hanson 4/1/00 12:09 pm Page 52

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determined by reversing the coding of the party variable so that ‘Republi- can’ would have the zero value. The 1980 candidacies of John Anderson and Philip Crane were problem- atic. Anderson was clearly an exception to the usual Republican strategies, banking heavily on the 18 states that held ‘crossover’ primaries, and then withdrawing to run as an independent (Bode et al., 1981: 132–3; Clymer et al., 1981: 5–6). Crane, like Keyes and Dornan in 1996, violated the assumption of a prompt formal declaration of withdrawal (Nowlan, 1983: 56). To address this problem, a binary variable was created to represent the anomalous strategies of Anderson and Crane. The model was estimated with and without this variable.

Behavioral Reactions From Table 1, it can be determined that the mean duration of candidacy was 44.8 days in 1976, and 33.6 days in 1980. It fell to 7.4 in 1984 before appearing to stabilize at 18.5 and 18.0 days in 1988 and 1992, then fell again to 8.0 days in 1996. The equation had to control for the collective behavioral reaction of the candidates, who realized that they must ‘gear up for their fund-raising campaigns much earlier’ (Alexander, 1992: 100), and of the state legislatures, who then locked this behavior in place by ‘front- loading’ the primary election calendar (Cook, 1986: 2001; Mayer, 1987: 36; Norrander, 1992: 1–2). With no variable to account for this, the residuals would violate the assumption of a random error term: they would be almost exclusively positive for the 1976 and 1980 cases, and almost exclusively negative for the 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 cases. The simplest means of addressing this problem was by using a binary variable to separate the 1976 and 1980 cases from those of the following years. The shift in intercept reﬂects the backward extension of the campaign period, and the competitive early spending and borrowing that has been eating up a portion of those ﬁrst disbursements:

Y = b0 + b1X1 + b2X1X2 + b3Xpost-80 + ... e But there was also something unusual about 1984. The candidates were going heavily into debt and spending an average of $100,000 per month (Bonafede, 1984: 58). While this represents a clear departure from previous behavior – a commitment to the early start strategy – it was undertaken largely without the beneﬁt of pre-candidacy PACs and cost-cutting devices that became standard practice in subsequent pre-nomination periods (see Glen, 1987: 998–1002; Alexander and Bauer, 1991: 14–15). The compara- tively inefﬁcient allocation of resources in 1984 would mean fewer days per dollars, or a difference in slope. In an attempt to capture this effect, the matching funds variable (X1) was interacted with a 1984 variable (X84). This separated the shift in intercept for all years after 1980 from a shift in slope for 1984: 52 03 – Hanson 4/1/00 12:09 pm Page 53

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Y = b0 + b1X1 ... + b3Xpost-80 + b4X1X84 ...

or Y = ... (b0 + b3) + (b1 + b4)X1 ... It should be emphasized that the party and year variables are a means of summarizing behavioral differences that are attributed to party afﬁliation, and behavioral changes that have occurred over time. This may include differences and changes in delegate allocation rules, for example, which would be much more difﬁcult to identify separately.

Simultaneity Bias A common overall criticism of this type of equation is that it is really one of two or more simultaneous equations. How well the candidate does is inﬂuenced by how much the candidate is able to spend, but the amount raised was actually inﬂuenced by how well the candidate was going to do.7 However, this equation is not predicting how well a candidate will do, but how long the candidate will last, given that the candidate did not do well in New Hampshire.

Analysis

In an attempt to validate Mayer’s assertion that financial difficulties are the cause of early pre-nomination withdrawals, a least squares regression equation was applied to a pool of third-or-worse New Hampshire finishers from the six pre-nomination periods that followed the passage of the FECA Amendments in 1974. The results of the regression analysis are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. The left side columns of Table 2 indicate that candidates running in 1976 or in 1980 and receiving no matching funds will last about 16 days beyond the date of the New Hampshire primary. The post-1980 variable controlled for the backward extension of the campaign period, and virtually cancels that 16-day duration (16.16 – 15.77Xpost-80). For every 100,000 constant dollars in matching funds, the duration can be extended by just over 2 days (2.19 X1). Because of the less efficient use of funds during 1984, the duration of candidacy for that year could only be extended by about half a day per $100,000 in matching funds (2.19 X1 –- 1.75X1X84). The literature suggests that Republicans react to early factional leadership competition; this equation indicates that they only get an additional 0.19 days per 100,000 constant dollars (2.19 X1 – 2.00 X1X2). The average pre- diction is off by less than 11 days. The strong statistical significance of the matching funds variable is con- sistent with the thesis that candidates’ financial difficulties are the principal cause of withdrawal decisions. But when the coding of the party variable is reversed so that Republicans are the reference category, the 0.19 days per 100,000 constant dollars is not statistically significant. This suggests that 53 03 – Hanson 4/1/00 12:09 pm Page 54

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Table 2. Duration of candidacy in days (Y ) beyond New Hampshire with anomalous strategy variable With 1984 interaction Without 1984 interaction ————————–— ——————————— Independent variable b S.E. b S.E.

Matching funds (X1) 2.19 0.26** 1.80 0.33** Intercept 16.16 4.45** 19.41 5.89** Controlling for Republican interaction (X1X2) –2.00 0.26** –1.49 0.31** 1984 interaction (X1X84) –1.75 0.40** – – Post-1980 (Xpost-80) –15.77 5.00** –23.62 6.26** Anomalous strategy 35.65 8.73** 31.38 11.67* R2 .85 .72 Adjusted R2 .82 .67 Variance ratio (F) 24.23** 14.16** Regression S.E. 10.80 14.52 Observations 27 27 *Signiﬁcant at p < .05; **Signiﬁcant at p < .01

the relationship does not necessarily apply to Republicans, in spite of the speciﬁc instances noted by Corrado (1997: 144). Republican withdrawals are apparently hastened by other factors, such as the failure to become established as the conservative or moderate faction front-runner. The stability of the matching funds parameter estimate is assured by the very high simulated percentage of variance explained (R2). Although the party and year variables have only removed representations of ‘speciﬁc

Table 3. Duration of candidacy in days (Y ) beyond New Hampshire without anomalous strategy variable With 1984 interaction Without 1984 interaction ————————–— ——————————— Independent variable b S.E. b S.E.

Matching funds (X1) 1.96 0.33** 1.63 0.36** Intercept 24.26 5.20** 26.32 5.97** Controlling for Republican interaction (X1X2) –1.73 0.33** –1.30 0.35** 1984 interaction (X1X84) –1.57 0.53** – – Post-1980 (Xpost-80) –23.01 6.11** –29.34 6.64** Anomalous strategy – – – – R2 .74 .63 Adjusted R2 .69 .58 Variance ratio (F) 15.26** 12.95** Regression S.E. 14.13 16.37 Observations 27 27 *Signiﬁcant at p < .05; **Signiﬁcant at p < .01 54 03 – Hanson 4/1/00 12:09 pm Page 55

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ignorance’ from the ‘general ignorance’ of the error term (Stimson, 1985: 923), and therefore cannot be construed to have supplied specific expla- nations, they do effectively summarize behavioral changes that have occurred over time, and behavioral differences that are attributed to party affiliation. The right side of Table 2 and both sets of parameter estimates in Table 3 show that the equation is not severely affected by the failure to control for the unorthodox strategies of Anderson and Crane (see anomalous strategy estimates in Table 2), or for the peculiarity of 1984. But the larger standard errors and lower variance explained suggest that those estimates are biased by an under-specification of the model. The model predicts that the mean 2-month matching funds certification for Democrats ($1.2 million in 1982–4 constant dollars) is only enough for about 27 days beyond New Hampshire in the post-1980 environment. Using the median of under $900,000 to control for Wallace, the model predicts withdrawal within 20 days.

Conclusion

Mayer’s assertion that third-or-worse New Hampshire finishers are forced to withdraw by late March, regardless of electoral prospects, clearly does apply to Democrats. They borrow and spend all that they have in antici- pation of the matched amounts that they are going to receive. After any- thing less than a second-place finish in New Hampshire, the exhaustion of those funds forces a suspension of campaign activity. The early candidate withdrawals effectively abandon the field of competition for delegates to the front-runners, re-creating the unrepresentativeness that the Democratic Party’s reform guidelines were intended to eliminate – in the interest of party unity – and contradicting the equalizing intent of the FECA Amend- ments. While the days-per-$100,000 relationship for Republicans was not statistically significant, more self-financed candidacies, like that of Steve Forbes in 1996, could have a comparable effect on Republican competition. The equation, with its negative and statistically significant post-1980 coefficient, may suggest that a behavioral equilibrium has been reached, and that allowing higher contribution limits and larger matchable amounts could extend the duration of third-or-worse candidacies. But it provides no evidence that spending within the pre-New Hampshire period has reached a ceiling. If more money became available, it might just be absorbed in a post-1996 coefficient, without affecting the days per dollars relationship. Any incentive that would make it easier to remain competitive after a poor showing in New Hampshire, such as the ‘double federal match’ proposal for dollars raised from March to June (Malbin, 1985: 84–5), would also increase the size of the jackpot for those who do well, and reinforce the New Hampshire-or-bust mentality. 55 03 – Hanson 4/1/00 12:09 pm Page 56

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A series of regional primaries with wide time intervals between them could minimize campaign expenditures and give defeated candidates recov- ery time, but the actual implementation would be complicated by the absence of any formal legal means of enforcement in the US federal system. Reinstating banned forms of delegate selection, such as the delegate primary (see note 1), could circumvent most of the problems associated with divisive factional competition, as well as the financial difficulties, but would be a hard sell in a political culture that places a high value on direct popular nominations of candidates for all offices. And yet none of the reformers had envisioned or favored a Grand National form of presidential pre-nomination competition in which most of the riders are unhorsed at the first hazard.

Notes

This report was based on my PhD dissertation at the University of Illinois at Chicago (1994). I would like to thank committee members Gerald S. Strom, Paul Brace (Rice) Andrew S. McFarland, Twiley W. Barker, Jr, Scott Peters (Illinois Institute of Tech- nology); also Mark I. Lichbach (Colorado-Boulder) for encouraging the original idea.

1 It was the former supporters of Eugene McCarthy who were determined to eliminate this ‘blind ballot’ (Bode and Casey, 1980: 9–11), even though McCarthy (1969: 179) recommended that it be ‘developed as a national pattern’. Illinois Republicans used this form in 1980 without serious discrepancies between the direct candidate preference polling and delegate selection results, but voter complaints caused it to be abandoned (Nowlan, 1983: 55–7). 2 It has been noted, for example, that the extensive news coverage of Jesse Jackson’s campaign in 1984 was ‘unique’ because it had ‘little correlation with national poll standings or any other measure of candidate viability’ (Buell, 1987: 70). 3 Lloyd Bentsen was not on the ballot for the 1976 New Hampshire primary, and announced on 10 February that his candidacy was being scaled down to a ‘favorite-son’ effort. Terry Sanford had only filed for New Hampshire and Massa- chusetts before pulling out on 23 January. Frank Church and Edmund (Jerry) Brown were late entries who hadn’t even been certified for matching funds as of 12 February (Cook, 1976: 461; Freed, 1976: 320). 4 Refusal of matching funds in 1980 exempted John Connally from the individual state and overall spending limits, but not from the limits on contributions from individuals or PACs (Ceaser, 1982: 72). Gary Hart’s 1988 bid had already been destroyed in 1987 by a sex scandal; his re-entry and withdrawal were timed to collect an additional $1 million from the fund (Alexander and Bauer, 1991: 27–8). Refusing all contributions in excess of $100 was one of Brown’s campaign issues in 1992. 5 Two candidates, Pete Wilson and Arlen Specter, withdrew in 1995 and did not file for New Hampshire. Wilson did not want to ‘run up an unacceptable debt’; Specter claimed to be ‘out of money’ (Cook, 1995c: 3025; Cook, 1995a: 3606). Keyes was less than a major figure in the Reagan administration; Dornan and Arthur Fletcher never qualified for matching funds. The campaigns of Maurice 56 03 – Hanson 4/1/00 12:09 pm Page 57

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Taylor and Steve Forbes were self-financed (Gruenwald, 1995: 2298; Cook, 1995b: 2933). 6 There is no significant distortion due to disparities in contributions above $250. Even the greatest disparities in average contributions are nowhere near the matchable limit. In 1976, for example, the average contribution from Carter’s 94,419 contributors was $41.09; Udall’s 97,764 contributors only averaged $21.84. The respective matched amounts of $3,465,584 and $1,898,686 reflect the same proportion. The $1,000 contributor is a actually a rarity, accounting for less than one-tenth of one percent of the contributors to any candidate’s campaign (see Diclerico and Uslaner, 1984: 91, 95). Note that Udall actually had more contributors. 7 Jacobson (1980: 161–2) had concluded that this would only be true if campaigns were funded by ‘voters in general’. Since they are not, ‘campaign expenditures have an independent effect’. Jacobson (1990: 341) has not retreated from this position. The reader must separate admissions of the existence of simultaneity bias from conclusions about its actual effect.

References

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GORDON S. HANSON was a postdoctoral research associate for the Center for Research in Law and Justice at the University of Illinois at Chicago, and a Visiting Assistant Professor at the time of writing. He has taught a variety of political science and criminal justice courses at several universities, and has published previously in Economic Development Quarterly and the Journal of Research in Crime and Delin- quency. ADDRESS: Market Facts, Inc, 3040 West Salt Creek Lane, Dept 32 (2nd Floor), Arlington Heights, IL 60005, USA. [email: [email protected] or gghanson@ govst.edu]

Paper submitted 20 January 1997; accepted for publication 24 March 1998.