Schopenhauer the Art of Controversy

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 1 Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy

Translated by Thomas Bailey Saunders Edited by Axel Wendelberger

Megaphone eBooks 2008

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 2 Preface

The essay on The Art of Controversy was never and what it can tell us about modern-day published as a whole in Schopenhauer’s lifetime politicians. (1788 – 1860). It was discovered in his papers While editing the text I have made some and made public soon after his death. adjustments according to the German version. I After publishing the German version of the have put the fragment of the introduction in the essay as a Megaphone eBook, recent political appendix. I have extended Stratagem 36 by an events in the U.S. inspired me to release an extract from Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of English version, too. Wakefield. I have adjusted the text structure to As the translator, Thomas Bailey Saunders the German version (just in case one or two (1860 – 1928), pointed out in 1896, “The afficionados set out to compare the two editions). intelligent reader will discover that a good deal of Missing parts are indicated by three stars its contents is of an ironical character.” Although (***). Though, some incongruences still remain. it is a highly scientific study on dialectic and Nevertheless, I hope you enjoy the text as much rhetoric, the irony of the text reveals the true as I did. genius of Arthur Schopenhauer. Reading the essay can be challenging at times. Hence, I find it astonishing how fresh and up-to-date this text is, Axel Wendelberger, 2008

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 3 Controversial Dialectic

Controversial Dialectic is the art of disputing, and not in the least care whether the truth proved to of disputing in such a way as to hold one’s own, be in favour of the opinion which we had begun whether one is in the right or the wrong — per fas by expressing, or of the opinion of our adversary. et nefas.1 A man may be objectively in the right, That we should regard as a matter of no moment, and nevertheless in the eyes of bystanders, and or, at any rate, of very secondary consequence; sometimes in his own, he may come off worst. For but, as things are, it is the main concern. Our example, I may advance a proof of some assertion, innate vanity, which is particularly sensitive in and my adversary may refute the proof, and thus reference to our intellectual powers, will not appear to have refuted the assertion, for which suffer us to allow that our first position was there may, nevertheless, be other proofs. In this wrong and our adversary’s right. The way out of case, of course, my adversary and I change places: this difficulty would be simply to take the trouble he comes off best, although, as a matter of fact, he always to form a correct judgment. For this a man is in the wrong. would have to think before he spoke. But, with If the reader asks how this is, I reply that it is most men, innate vanity is accompanied by simply the natural baseness of human nature. If loquacity and innate dishonesty. They speak human nature were not base, but thoroughly before they think; and even though they may honourable, we should in every debate have no afterwards perceive that they are wrong, and that other aim than the discovery of truth; we should what they assert is false, they want it to seem the

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 4 contrary. The interest in truth, which may be course of the dispute another argument will occur presumed to have been their only motive when to us by which we may upset it, or succeed in they stated the proposition alleged to be true, now confirming the truth of our statement. In this way gives way to the interests of vanity: and so, for the we are almost compelled to become dishonest; or, sake of vanity, what is true must seem false, and at any rate, the temptation to do so is very great. what is false must seem true. Thus it is that the weakness of our intellect and However, this very dishonesty, this persistence the perversity of our will lend each other mutual in a proposition which seems false even to our- support; and that, generally, a disputant fights selves, has something to be said for it. It often not for truth, but for his proposition, as though it happens that we begin with the firm conviction of were a battle pro aris et focis. He sets to work per the truth of our statement; but our opponent’s fas et nefas; nay, as we have seen, he cannot argument appears to refute it. Should we abandon easily do otherwise. our position at once, we may discover later on As a rule, then, every man will insist on that we were right after all; the proof we offered maintaining whatever he has said, even though was false, but nevertheless there was a proof for for the moment he may consider it false or our statement which was true. The argument doubtful.2 To some extent every man is armed which would have been our salvation did not against such a procedure by his own cunning and occur to us at the moment. Hence we make it a villainy. He learns by daily experience, and thus rule to attack a counter-argument, even though to comes to have his own natural Dialectic, just as he all appearances it is true and forcible, in the belief has his own natural Logic. But his Dialectic is by that its truth is only superficial, and that in the no means as safe a guide as his Logic. It is not so

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 5 easy for any one to think or draw an inference himself for a similar purpose. Therefore, even contrary to the laws of Logic; false judgments are though Logic may be of no very real, practical use, frequent, false conclusions very rare. A man Dialectic may certainly be so; and Aristotle, too, cannot easily be deficient in natural Logic, but he seems to me to have drawn up his Logic proper, may very easily be deficient in natural Dialectic, or Analytic, as a foundation and preparation for which is a gift apportioned in unequal measure. his Dialectic, and to have made this his chief In so far natural Dialectic resembles the faculty of business. Logic is concerned with the mere form judgment, which differs in degree with every of propositions; Dialectic, with their contents or man; while reason, strictly speaking, is the same. matter — in a word, with their substance. It was For it often happens that in a matter in which a proper, therefore, to consider the general form of man is really in the right, he is confounded or all propositions before proceeding to particulars. refuted by merely superficial arguments; and if he Aristotle does not define the object of Dialectic emerges victorious from a contest, he owes it very as exactly as I have done it here; for while he often not so much to the correctness of his allows that its principal object is disputation, he judgment in stating his proposition, as to the declares at the same time that it is also the cunning and address with which he defended it. discovery of truth.3 Again, he says, later on, that Here, as in all other cases, the best gifts are born if, from the philosophical point of view, propo- with a man; nevertheless, much may be done to sitions are dealt with according to their truth, make him a master of this art by practice, and Dialectic regards them according to their plausi- also by a consideration of the tactics which may bility, or the measure in which they will win the be used to defeat an opponent, or which he uses approval and assent of others.4 He is aware that

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 6 the objective truth of a proposition must be ment without contradicting himself, or generally distinguished and separated from the way in without being defeated. The discovery of objective which it is pressed home, and approbation won truth must be separated from the art of winning for it; but he fails to draw a sufficiently sharp acceptance for propositions; for objective truth is distinction between these two aspects of the an entirely different matter: it is the business of matter, so as to reserve Dialectic for the latter sound judgment, reflection and experience, for alone.5 The rules which he often gives for Dialectic which there is no special art. Such, then, is the contain some of those which properly belong to aim of Dialectic. It has been defined as the Logic Logic; and hence it appears to me that he has not of appearance; but the definition is a wrong one, provided a clear solution of the problem.6 as in that case it could only be used to repel false *** propositions. But even when a man has the right on his side, he needs Dialectic in order to defend To form a clear idea of the province of Dialectic, and maintain it; he must know what the dishonest we must pay no attention to objective truth (which tricks are, in order to meet them; nay, he must is an affair of Logic); we must regard it simply as often make use of them himself, so as to beat the the art of getting the best of it in a dispute, which, enemy with his own weapons. Accordingly, in a as we have seen, is all the easier if we are actually dialectical contest we must put objective truth in the right. In itself Dialectic has nothing to do aside, or, rather, we must regard it as an but to show how a man may defend himself accidental circumstance, and look only to the against attacks of every kind, and especially defence of our own position and the refutation of against dishonest attacks; and, in the same our opponent’s. In following out the rules to this fashion, how he may attack another man’s state-

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 7 end, no respect should be paid to objective truth, and it is seldom that we have any clear idea of the because we usually do not know where the truth truth beforehand. The true conception of Dialectic lies. As I have said, a man often does not himself is, then, that which we have formed: it is the art of know whether he is in the right or not; he often intellectual fencing used for the purpose of getting believes it, and is mistaken: both sides often the best of it in a dispute; and, although the name believe it. Truth is in the depths. At the beginning Eristic would be more suitable, it is more correct of a contest each man believes, as a rule, that to call it controversial Dialectic, Dialectica right is on his side; in the course of it, both eristica. become doubtful, and the truth is not determined Dialectic in this sense of the word has no other or confirmed until the close. Dialectic, then, need aim but to reduce to a regular system and collect have nothing to do with truth, as little as the and exhibit the arts which most men employ fencing master considers who is in the right when when they observe, in a dispute, that truth is not a dispute leads to a duel. Thrust and parry is the on their side, and still attempt to gain the day. whole business. Dialectic is the art of intellectual Hence, it would be very inexpedient to pay any fencing; and it is only when we so regard it that regard to objective truth or its advancement in a we can erect it into a branch of knowledge. For if science of Dialectic; since this is not done in that we take purely objective truth as our aim, we are original and natural Dialectic innate in men, reduced to mere Logic; if we take the maintenance where they strive for nothing but victory. The of false propositions, it is mere Sophistic; and in science of Dialectic, in one sense of the word, is either case it would have to be assumed that we mainly concerned to tabulate and analyse were aware of what was true and what was false; dishonest stratagems, in order that in a real

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 8 debate they may be at once recognised and defeated. It is for this very reason that Dialectic must admittedly take victory, and not objective truth, for its aim and purpose. I am not aware that anything has been done in this direction, although I have made inquiries far and wide.7 It is, therefore, an uncultivated soil. To accomplish our purpose, we must draw from our experience; we must observe how in the debates which often arise in our intercourse with our fellow-men this or that stratagem is employed by one side or the other. By finding out the common elements in tricks repeated in different forms, we shall be enabled to exhibit certain general stratagems which may be advantageous, as well for our own use, as for frustrating others if they use them. What follows is to be regarded as a first attempt.

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 9 The Basis of all Dialectic

First of all, we must consider the essential nature results. The direct refutation shows that the thesis of every dispute: what it is that really takes place is not true; the indirect, that it cannot be true. in it. Our opponent has stated a thesis, or we The direct course admits of a twofold proce- ourselves, — it is all one. There are two modes of dure. Either we may show that the reasons for the refuting it, and two courses that we may pursue. statement are false (nego majorem, minorem); or The modes are (1) ad rem, (2) ad hominem or we may admit the reasons or premisses, but show ex concessis. That is to say: We may show either that the statement does not follow from them that the proposition is not in accordance with the (nego consequentiam); that is, we attack the nature of things, i.e., with absolute, objective truth; conclusion or form of the syllogism. The direct or that it is inconsistent with other statements or refutation makes use either of the diversion or of admissions of our opponent, i.e., with truth as it the instance. appears to him. The latter mode of arguing a (a) Apagoge, the diversion. — We accept our question produces only a relative conviction, and opponent’s proposition as true, and then show makes no difference whatever to the objective what follows from it when we bring it into truth of the matter. connection with some other proposition The two courses that we may pursue are (1) the acknowledged to be true. We use the two direct, and (2) the indirect refutation. The direct propositions as the premisses of a syllogism attacks the reason for the thesis; the indirect, its giving a conclusion which is manifestly false, as

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 10 contradicting either the nature of things,8 or the truth in regard to this matter, that debates are other statements of our opponent himself; that is so long and so obstinate. Nor can we, in ordering to say, the conclusion is false either ad rem or ad the argument, separate actual from apparent hominem (Socrates, in Hippia Maj. et alias.). truth, since even the disputants are not certain Consequently, our opponent’s proposition must about it beforehand. Therefore I shall describe the have been false; for, while true premisses can give various tricks or stratagems without regard to only a true conclusion, false premisses need not questions of objective truth or falsity; for that is a always give a false one. matter on which we have no assurance, and which (b) The instance, or the example to the cannot be determined previously. Moreover, in contrary. — This consists in refuting the general every disputation or argument on any subject we proposition by direct reference to particular cases must agree about something; and by this, as a which are included in it in the way in which it is principle, we must be willing to judge the matter stated, but to which it does not apply, and by in question. We cannot argue with those who which it is therefore shown to be necessarily false. deny principles: Contra negantem principia non est disputandum. Such is the framework or skeleton of all forms of disputation; for to this every kind of contro- versy may be ultimately reduced. The whole of a controversy may, however, actually proceed in the manner described, or only appear to do so; and it may be supported by genuine or spurious argu- ments. It is just because it is not easy to make out

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 11 38 Stratagems

Stratagem 1 covered tragedy and comedy alone. This he knew very well. What he had done was to try to general- The Extension. — This consists in carrying your ise my proposition, so that it would apply to all opponent’s proposition beyond its natural limits; theatrical representations, and, consequently, to in giving it as general a signification and as wide a opera and then to music, in order to make certain sense as possible, so as to exaggerate it; and, on of defeating me. Contrarily, we may save our the other hand, in giving your own proposition as proposition by reducing it within narrower limits restricted a sense and as narrow limits as you can, than we had first intended, if our way of because the more general a statement becomes, expressing it favours this expedient. the more numerous are the objections to which it is open. The defence consists in an accurate state- Example 2. — A. declares that the Peace of ment of the point or essential question at issue. 1814 gave back their independence to all the German towns of the Hanseatic League. B. gives Example 1. — I asserted that the English were an instance to the contrary by reciting the fact supreme in drama. My opponent attempted to that Dantzig, which received its independence give an instance to the contrary, and replied that from Buonaparte, lost it by that Peace. A. saves it was a well-known fact that in music, and himself thus: “I said ‘all German towns,’ and consequently in opera, they could do nothing at Dantzig was in Poland.” all. I repelled the attack by reminding him that music was not included in dramatic art, which

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 12 This trick was mentioned by Aristotle in the judge, and draw conclusions; every particle of its Topica (bk. VIII., cc. 11, 12). body would be a perfect animal and it would Example 3. — Lamarck, in his Philosophic stand higher than man, as every part of it would possess all the faculties which man possesses only Zoologique (vol. I., p. 208), states that the polype has no feeling, because it has no nerves. It is in the whole of him. Further, there would be no certain, however, that it has some sort of per- reason for not extending what is true of the ception; for it advances towards light by moving polype to all monads, the most imperfect of all in an ingenious fashion from branch to branch, creatures, and ultimately to the plants, which are and it seizes its prey. Hence it has been assumed also alive, etc., etc.” By using dialectical tricks of that its nervous system is spread over the whole this kind a writer betrays that he is secretly of its body in equal measure, as though it were conscious of being in the wrong. Because it was blended with it; for it is obvious that the polype said that the creature’s whole body is sensitive to possesses some faculty of perception without light, and is therefore possessed of nerves, he having any separate organs of sense. Since this makes out that its whole body is capable of assumption refutes Lamarck’s position, he argues thought. thus: “In that case all parts of its body must be capable of every kind of feeling, and also of Stratagem 2 motion, of will, of thought. The polype would have all the organs of the most perfect animal in The Homonymy. — This trick is to extend a pro- every point of its body; every point could see, position to something which has little or nothing smell, taste, hear, and so on; nay, it could think, in common with the matter in question but the

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 13 similarity of the word; then to refute it trium- Here it is at once clear that there are four terms phantly, and so claim credit for having refuted the in the syllogism, lumen (light) being used both in original statement. a real and in a metaphorical sense. But if the It may be noted here that synonyms are two sophism takes a subtle form, it is, of course, apt to words for the same conception; homonyms, two mislead, especially where the conceptions which conceptions which are covered by the same word. are covered by the same word are related, and in- clined to be interchangeable. It is never subtle (See Aristotle, Topica, bk. I., c. 13.) “Deep,” “cutting,” “high,” used at one moment of bodies at enough to deceive, if it is used intentionally; and another of tones, are homonyms; “honourable” therefore cases of it must be collected from actual and “honest” are synonyms. and individual experience. This is a trick which may be regarded as identi- It would be a very good thing if every trick cal with the sophism ex homonymia; although, if could receive some short and obviously appro- the sophism is obvious, it will deceive no one. priate name, so that when a man used this or that particular trick, he could be at once reproached Omne lumen potest extingui for it. I will give two examples of the homonymy. Intellectus est lumen Intellectus potest extingui. Example 1. — A.: “You are not yet initiated into the mysteries of the Kantian philosophy.” B.: “Oh, [Every light can be extinguished. if it’s mysteries you’re talking of, I’ll have nothing The intellect is a light. to do with them.” Therefore intellect can be extinguished.]

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 14 Example 2. — I condemned the principle point d’honneur, which may be outraged by involved in the word honour as a foolish one; for, insult. And since an attack on the former cannot according to it, a man loses his honour by recei- be disregarded, but must be repelled by public ving an insult, which he cannot wipe out unless he disproof, so, with the same justification, an attack replies with a still greater insult, or by shedding his on the latter must not be disregarded either, but it adversary’s blood or his own. I contended that a must be defeated by still greater insult and a duel. man’s true honour cannot be outraged by what he Here we have a confusion of two essentially suffers, but only and alone by what he does; for different things through the homonymy in the there is no saying what may befall any one of us. word honour, and a consequent alteration of the My opponent immediately attacked the reason I point in dispute. had given, and triumphantly proved to me that when a tradesman was falsely accused of misrepresentation, dishonesty, or neglect in his Stratagem 3 business, it was an attack upon his honour, which Another trick is to take a proposition which is laid in this case was outraged solely by what he down relatively, and in reference to some partic- suffered, and that he could only retrieve it by ular matter, as though it were uttered with a punishing his aggressor and making him retract. general or absolute application; or, at least, to Here, by a homonymy, he was foisting civic take it in some quite different sense, and then honour, which is otherwise called good name, and refute it. Aristotle’s example is as follows: A Moor which may be outraged by libel and slander, on to is black; but in regard to his teeth he is white; the conception of knightly honour, also called therefore, he is black and not black at the same

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 15 moment. This is an obvious sophism, which will we were talking of theories. In this way I parried deceive no one. Let us contrast it with one drawn the attack. from actual experience. The first three tricks are of a kindred charac- Example 1. — In talking of philosophy, I admit- ter. They have this in common, that something ted that my system upheld the Quietists, and different is attacked from that which was asserted. commended them. Shortly afterwards the conver- It would therefore be an ignoratio elenchi to sation turned upon Hegel, and I maintained that allow oneself to be disposed of in such a manner. his writings were mostly nonsense; or, at any rate, For in all the examples that I have given, what the that there were many passages in them where the opponent says is true, but it stands in apparent author wrote the words, and it was left to the and not in real contradiction with the thesis. All reader to find a meaning for them. My opponent that the man whom he is attacking has to do is to did not attempt to refute this assertion ad rem, but deny the validity of his syllogism; to deny, namely, contented himself by advancing the argumentum the conclusion which he draws, that because his ad hominem, and telling me that I had just been proposition is true, ours is false. In this way his praising the Quietists, and that they had written a refutation is itself directly refuted by a denial of good deal of nonsense too. This I admitted; but, by his conclusion, per negationem consequentiae. way of correcting him, I said that I had praised the Another trick is to refuse to admit true premisses Quietists, not as philosophers and writers, that is because of a foreseen conclusion. There are two to say, for their achievements in the sphere of ways of defeating it, incorporated in the next two theory, but only as men, and for their conduct in sections. mere matters of practice; and that in Hegel’s case

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 16 Stratagem 4 Stratagem 5 If you want to draw a conclusion, you must not let To prove the truth of a proposition, you may also it be foreseen, but you must get the premisses employ previous propositions that are not true, admitted one by one, unobserved, mingling them should your opponent refuse to admit the true here and there in your talk; otherwise, your oppo- ones, either because he fails to perceive their nent will attempt all sorts of chicanery. Or, if it is truth, or because he sees that the thesis doubtful whether your opponent will admit them, immediately follows from them. In that case the you must advance the premisses of these plan is to take propositions which are false in premisses; that is to say, you must draw up pro- themselves but true for your opponent, and argue syllogisms, and get the premisses of several of from the way in which he thinks, that is to say, ex them admitted in no definite order. In this way concessis. For a true conclusion may follow from you conceal your game until you have obtained all false premisses, but not vice versa. In the same the admissions that are necessary, and so reach fashion your opponent’s false propositions may your goal by making a circuit. These rules are be refuted by other false propositions, which he, given by Aristotle in his Topica, bk. VIII., c. 1. however, takes to be true; for it is with him that It is a trick which needs no illustration. you have to do, and you must use the thoughts that he uses. For instance, if he is a member of some sect to which you do not belong, you may employ the declared, opinions of this sect against him, as principles.9

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 17 Stratagem 6 arrive at a very clear understanding, he who states Another plan is to beg the question in disguise by the proposition and wants to prove it may proceed postulating what has to be proved, either (1) under against his opponent by question, in order to show another name; for instance, “good repute” instead the truth of the statement from his admissions. of “honour”; “virtue” instead of “virginity,” etc.; or The erotematic, or Socratic, method was especially by using such convertible terms as “red-blooded in use among the ancients; and this and some of 11 animals” and “vertebrates”; or (2) by making a the tricks following later on are akin to it. general assumption covering the particular point The plan is to ask a great many wide-reaching in dispute; for instance, maintaining the uncer- questions at once, so as to hide what you want to tainty of medicine by postulating the uncertainty get admitted, and, on the other hand, quickly of all human knowledge. (3) If, vice versa, two propound the argument resulting from the admis- things follow one from the other, and one is to be sions; for those who are slow of understanding proved, you may postulate the other. (4) If a cannot follow accurately, and do not notice any general proposition is to be proved, you may get mistakes or gaps there may be in the your opponent to admit every one of the demonstration. particulars. This is the converse of the second.10

Stratagem 8 Stratagem 7 This trick consists in making your opponent angry; Should the disputation be conducted on somewhat for when he is angry he is incapable of judging strict and formal lines, and there be a desire to aright, and perceiving where his advantage lies.

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 18 You can make him angry by doing him repeated converse of the proposition, as though it were that injustice, or practising some kind of chicanery, which you were anxious to see affirmed; or, at any and being generally insolent. rate, you may give him his choice of both, so that he may not perceive which of them you are asking him to affirm. Stratagem 9 Or you may put questions in an order different from that which the conclusion to be drawn from Stratagem 11 them requires, and transpose them, so as not to If you make an induction, and your opponent let him know at what you are aiming. He can then grants you the particular cases by which it is to be take no precautions. You may also use his answers supported, you must refrain from asking him if he for different or even opposite conclusions, accor- also admits the general truth which issues from ding to their character. This is akin to the trick of the particulars, but introduce it afterwards as a masking your procedure. settled and admitted fact; for, in the meanwhile, he will himself come to believe that he has admitted it, and the same impression will be Stratagem 10 received by the audience, because they will If you observe that your opponent designedly remember the many questions as to the partic- returns a negative answer to the questions which, ulars, and suppose that they must, of course, have for the sake of your proposition, you want him to attained their end. answer in the affirmative, you must ask the

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 19 Stratagem 12 “system of religion,” is described by an adherent If the conversation turns upon some general as “piety,” “godliness”: and by an opponent as conception which has no particular name, but “bigotry,” “superstition.” This is, at bottom, a requires some figurative or metaphorical desig- subtle petitio principii. What is sought to be nation, you must begin by choosing a metaphor proved is, first of all, inserted in the definition, that is favourable to your proposition. For whence it is then taken by mere analysis. What instance, the names used to denote the two one man calls “placing in safe custody,” another political parties in Spain, Serviles and Liberates, calls “throwing into prison.” A speaker often are obviously chosen by the latter. The name betrays his purpose beforehand by the names Protestants is chosen by themselves, and also the which he gives to things. One man talks of “the name Evangelicals; but the Catholics call them clergy”; another, of “the priests.” Of all the tricks heretics. Similarly, in regard to the names of of controversy, this is the most frequent, and it is things which admit of a more exact and definite used instinctively: “religious zeal” = “fanaticism”; meaning: for example, if your opponent proposes “faux pas,” or “piece of gallantry” = “adultery”; an alteration, you can call it an innovation, as this “equivocal” = a “bawdy” story; “embarrassment” is an invidious word. If you yourself make the = “bankruptcy”; “through influence and proposal, it will be the converse. In the first case, connection” = by “bribery and nepotism”; you can call the antagonistic principle “the “sincere gratitude” = “good pay.” existing order,” in the second, “antiquated prejudice.” What an impartial man with no further purpose to serve would call “public worship” or a

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 20 Stratagem 13 several of your questions without the answers To make your opponent accept a proposition, you turning out favourable to the conclusion at which must give him the counter-proposition as well, you are aiming, advance the desired conclusion, leaving him his choice of the two; and you must — although it does not in the least follow, — as render the contrast as glaring as you can, so that though it had been proved, and proclaim it in a to avoid being paradoxical he will accept the tone of triumph. If your opponent is shy or stupid, proposition, which is thus made to look quite and you yourself possess a great deal of impu- probable. For instance, if you want to make him dence and a good voice, the trick may easily admit that a boy must do everything that his succeed. It is akin to the fallacy non causae ut father tells him to do, ask him “whether in all causae. things we must obey or disobey our parents.” Or, if a thing is said to occur “often,” ask whether by Stratagem 15 “often” you are to understand few or many cases; and he will say “many.” It is as though you were If you have advanced a paradoxical proposition to put grey next black, and call it white; or next and find a difficulty in proving it, you may submit white, and call it black. for your opponent’s acceptance or rejection some true proposition, the truth of which, however, is not quite palpable, as though you wished to draw Stratagem 14 your proof from it. Should he reject it because he This, which is an impudent trick, is played as suspects a trick, you can obtain your triumph by follows: When your opponent has answered showing how absurd he is; should he accept it you

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 21 have got reason on your side for the moment, and own actions or want of action. For example, must now look about you; or else you can employ should he defend suicide, you may at once the previous trick as well, and maintain that your exclaim, “Why don’t you hang yourself?” Should paradox is proved by the proposition which he he maintain that Berlin is an unpleasant place to has accepted. For this an extreme degree of live in, you may say, “Why don’t you leave by the impudence is required; but experience shows first train?” Some such claptrap is always possible. cases of it, and there are people who practise it by instinct. Stratagem 17 If your opponent presses you with a counter- Stratagem 16 proof, you will often be able to save yourself by Another trick is to use arguments ad hominem, or advancing some subtle distinction, which, it is ex concessis 12 When your opponent makes a true, had not previously occurred to you; that is, if proposition, you must try to see whether it is not the matter admits of a double application, or of in some way — if needs be, only apparently — being taken in any ambiguous sense. inconsistent with some other proposition which he has made or admitted, or with the principles of a school or sect which he has commended and Stratagem 18 approved, or with the actions of those who If you observe that your opponent has taken up a support the sect, or else of those who give it only line of argument which will end in your defeat, you an apparent and spurious support, or with his must not allow him to carry it to its conclusion, but

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 22 interrupt the course of the dispute in time, or refrain from asking him for the conclusion, but break it off altogether, or lead him away from the draw it at once for yourself; nay, even though one subject, and bring him to others. In short, you or other of the premisses should be lacking, you must effect the trick which will be noticed later may take it as though it too had been admitted, on, the mutatio controversiae. (See Strat. 29.) and draw the conclusion. This trick is an application of the fallacy non causae ut causae.

Stratagem 19 Should your opponent expressly challenge you to Stratagem 21 produce any objection to some definite point in his When your opponent uses a merely superficial or argument, and you have nothing much to say, you sophistical argument and you see through it, you must try to give the matter a general turn, and then can, it is true, refute it by setting forth its captious talk against that. If you are called upon to say why and superficial character; but it is better to meet a particular physical hypothesis cannot be accep- him with a counter-argument which is just as ted, you may speak of the fallibility of human superficial and sophistical, and so dispose of him; knowledge, and give various illustrations of it. for it is with victory that you are concerned, and not with truth. If, for example, he adopts an argumentum ad hominem, it is sufficient to take Stratagem 20 the force out of it by a counter argumentum ad When you have elicited all your premisses, and hominem or argumentum (ex concessis); and, in your opponent has admitted them, you must general, instead of setting forth the true state of

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 23 the case at equal length, it is shorter to take this you look as though you had also refuted his origi- course if it lies open to you. nal statement. Contrarily, you must take care not to allow yourself to be misled by contradictions into exaggerating or extending a statement of your Stratagem 22 own. It will often happen that your opponent will If your opponent requires you to admit something himself directly try to extend your statement from which the point in dispute will immediately further than you meant it; here you must at once follow, you must refuse to do so, declaring that it stop him, and bring him back to the limits which is a petitio principii For he and the audience will you set up; “That’s what I said, and no more.” regard a proposition which is near akin to the point in dispute as identical with it, and in this way you deprive him of his best argument. Stratagem 24 This trick consists in stating a false syllogism. Your opponent makes a proposition, and by false infer- Stratagem 23 ence and distortion of his ideas you force from it Contradiction and contention irritate a man into other propositions which it does not contain and exaggerating his statement. By contradicting your he does not in the least mean; nay, which are opponent you may drive him into extending absurd or dangerous. It then looks as if his propo- beyond its proper limits a statement which, at all sition gave rise to others which are inconsistent events within those limits and in itself, is true; either with themselves or with some acknowledged and when you refute this exaggerated form of it, truth, and so it appears to be indirectly refuted.

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 24 This is the diversion, and it is another application employed by your opponent, you must observe of the fallacy non causae ut causae. (1) whether the example which he gives is really true; for there are problems of which the only true solution is that the case in point is not true — for Stratagem 25 example, many miracles, ghost stories, and so on; This is a case of the diversion (Apagoge) by means and (2) whether it really comes under the of an instance to the contrary. With an induction conception of the truth thus stated; for it may (επαγωγη), a great number of particular instances only appear to do so, and the matter is one to be are required in order to establish it as a universal settled by precise distinctions; and (3) whether it proposition; but with the diversion (απαγωγη) a is really inconsistent with this conception; for this single instance, to which the proposition does not again may be only an apparent inconsistency. apply, is all that is necessary to overthrow it. This is a controversial method known as the instance Stratagem 26 — instantia (ενστασις). For example, “all ruminants are horned” is a proposition which A brilliant move is the retorsio argumenti, or may be upset by the single instance of the camel. turning of the tables, by which your opponent’s The instance is a case in which a universal truth is argument is turned against himself. He declares, sought to be applied, and something is inserted in for instance, “So-and-so is a child, you must make the fundamental definition of it which is not allowance for him.” You retort, “Just because he universally true, and by which it is upset. But is a child, I must correct him; otherwise he will there is room for mistake; and when this trick is persist in his bad habits.”

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 25 Stratagem 27 objection which you make places him in any Should your opponent surprise you by becoming ridiculous light. People are ready to laugh, and particularly angry at an argument, you must urge you have the laughers on your side. To show that it with all the more zeal; not only because it is a your objection is an idle one, would require a long good thing to make him angry, but because it may explanation on the part of your opponent, and a be presumed that you have here put your finger reference to the principles of the branch of on the weak side of his case, and that just here he knowledge in question, or to the elements of the is more open to attack than even for the moment matter which you are discussing; and people are you perceive. not disposed to listen to it. For example, your opponent states that in the original formation of a mountain-range the Stratagem 28 granite and other elements in its composition This is chiefly practicable in a dispute between were, by reason of their high temperature, in a scholars in the presence of the unlearned. If you fluid or molten state; that the temperature must have no argument ad rem, and none either ad have amounted to some 480° Fahrenheit; and hominem, you can make one ad auditores; that is that when the mass took shape it was covered by to say, you can start some invalid objection, the sea. You reply, by an argument ad auditores, which, however, only an expert sees to be invalid. that at that temperature — nay, indeed, long before Now your opponent is an expert, but those who it had been reached, namely, at 212° Fahrenheit form your audience are not, and accordingly in — the sea would have been boiled away, and their eyes he is defeated; particularly if the spread through the air in the form of steam. At

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 26 this the audience laughs. To refute the objection, a piece of impudence if it has nothing to do with your opponent would have to show that the the case, and is only brought in by way of boiling-point depends not only on the degree of attacking your opponent. warmth, but also on the atmospheric pressure; For example, I praised the system prevailing in and that as soon as about half the sea-water had China, where there is no such thing as hereditary gone off in the shape of steam, this pressure nobility, and offices are bestowed only on those would be so greatly increased that the rest of it who succeed in competitive examinations. My would fail to boil even at a temperature of 480°. opponent maintained that learning, as little as the He is debarred from giving this explanation, as it privilege of birth (of which he had a high opinion) would require a treatise to demonstrate the matter fits a man for office. We argued, and he got the to those who had no acquaintance with physics. worst of it. Then he made a diversion, and declared that in China all ranks were punished with the Stratagem 29 13 bastinado, which he connected with the immod- erate indulgence in tea, and proceeded to make If you find that you are being worsted, you can both of them a subject of reproach to the Chinese. make a diversion — that is, you can suddenly To follow him into all this would have been to begin to talk of something else, as though it had a allow oneself to be drawn into a surrender of the bearing on the matter in dispute, and afforded an victory which had already been won. argument against your opponent. This may be done without presumption if the diversion has, in The diversion is mere impudence if it com- fact, some general bearing on the matter; but it is pletely abandons the point in dispute, and raises, for instance, some such objection as “Yes, and you

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 27 also said just now,” and so on. For then the argu- Stratagem 30 ment becomes to some extent personal; of the This is the argumentum ad verecundiam. It kind which will be treated of in the last section. consists in making an appeal to authority rather Strictly speaking, it is half-way between the than reason, and in using such an authority as argumentum ad personam, which will there be may suit the degree of knowledge possessed by discussed, and the argumentum ad hominem. your opponent. Every man prefers belief to the How very innate this trick is, may be seen in exercise of judgment, says Seneca; and it is every quarrel between common people. If one of therefore an easy matter if you have an authority the parties makes some personal reproach against on your side which your opponent respects. The the other, the latter, instead of answering it by more limited his capacity and knowledge, the refuting it, allows it to stand, — as it were, admits greater is the number of the authorities who it; and replies by reproaching his antagonist on weigh with him. But if his capacity and knowledge some other ground. This is a stratagem like that are of a high order, there are very few; indeed, pursued by Scipio when he attacked the hardly any at all. He may, perhaps, admit the Carthaginians, not in Italy, but in Africa. In war, authority of professional men versed in a science diversions of this kind may be profitable; but in a or an art or a handicraft of which he knows little quarrel they are poor expedients, because the or nothing; but even so he will regard it with reproaches remain, and those who look on hear suspicion. Contrarily, ordinary folk have a deep the worst that can be said of both parties. It is a respect for professional men of every kind. They trick that should be used only faute de mieux. are unaware that a man who makes a profession of a thing loves it not for the thing itself, but for

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 28 the money he makes by it; or that it is rare for a biblical: paveant illi, ego non pavebo. That was man who teaches to know his subject thoroughly; quite enough for the municipal officers. A uni- for if he studies it as he ought, he has in most versal prejudice may also be used as an authority; cases no time left in which to teach it. But there for most people think with Aristotle that that may are very many authorities who find respect with be said to exist which many believe. There is no the mob, and if you have none that is quite opinion, however absurd, which men will not suitable, you can take one that appears to be so; readily embrace as soon as they can be brought to you may quote what some said in another sense or the conviction that it is generally adopted. in other circumstances. Authorities which your Example affects their thought just as it affects opponent fails to understand are those of which their action. They are like sheep following the he generally thinks the most. The unlearned bell-wether just as he leads them. They would entertain a peculiar respect for a Greek or a Latin sooner die than think. It is very curious that the flourish. You may also, should it be necessary, not universality of an opinion should have so much only twist your authorities, but actually falsify weight with people, as their own experience might them, or quote something which you have invented tell them that its acceptance is an entirely entirely yourself. As a rule, your opponent has no thoughtless and merely imitative process. But it books at hand, and could not use them if he had. tells them nothing of the kind, because they The finest illustration of this is furnished by the possess no self-knowledge whatever. It is only the French curé, who, to avoid being compelled, like elect Who Say with Plato: τοις πολλοις πολλα other citizens, to pave the street in front of his δοκει, which means that the public has a good house, quoted a saying which he described as

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 29 many bees in its bonnet, and that it would be a We should find that it is two or three persons long business to get at them. who, in the first instance, accepted it, or advanced But to speak seriously, the universality of an and maintained it; and of whom people were so opinion is no proof, nay, it is not even a proba- good as to believe that they had thoroughly tested bility, that the opinion is right. Those who it. Then a few other persons, persuaded before- maintain that it is so must assume (1) that length hand that the first were men of the requisite of time deprives a universal opinion of its capacity, also accepted the opinion. These, again, demonstrative force, as otherwise all the old were trusted by many others, whose laziness errors which were once universally held to be true suggested to them that it was better to believe at would have to be recalled; for instance, the once, than to go through the troublesome task of Ptolemaic system would have to be restored, or testing the matter for themselves. Thus the Catholicism re-established in all Protestant number of these lazy and credulous adherents countries. They must assume (2) that distance of grew from day to day; for the opinion had no space has the same effect; otherwise the sooner obtained a fair measure of support than its respective universality of opinion among the further supporters attributed this to the fact that adherents of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam the opinion could only have obtained it by the will put them in a difficulty. cogency of its arguments. The remainder were then compelled to grant what was universally When we come to look into the matter, so- granted, so as not to pass for unruly persons who called universal opinion is the opinion of two or resisted opinions which every one accepted, or three persons; and we should be persuaded of this if we could see the way in which it really arises.

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 30 pert fellows who thought themselves cleverer more established than an historical fact reported than any one else. by a hundred chroniclers who can be proved to When opinion reaches this stage, adhesion have plagiarised it from one another; the opinion becomes a duty; and henceforward the few who in the end being traceable to a single individual. It are capable of forming a judgment hold their is all what I say, what you say, and, finally, what peace. Those who venture to speak are such as are he says; and the whole of it is nothing but a series entirely incapable of forming any opinions or any of assertions (Bayle, Pensées sur les Comètes, I., judgment of their own, being merely the echo of p. 10.): others’ opinions; and, nevertheless, they defend Dico ego, tu dicis, sed denique dixit et ille; them with all the greater zeal and intolerance. For Dictaque post toties, nil nisi dicta vides. what they hate in people who think differently is Nevertheless, in a dispute with ordinary people, not so much the different opinions which they we may employ universal opinion as an authority. profess, as the presumption of wanting to form their own judgment; a presumption of which they For it will generally be found that when two of themselves are never guilty, as they are very well them are fighting, that is the weapon which both aware. In short, there are very few who can think, of them choose as a means of attack. If a man of but every man wants to have an opinion; and the better sort has to deal with them, it is most what remains but to take it ready-made from advisable for him to condescend to the use of this others, instead of forming opinions for himself? weapon too, and to select such authorities as will Since this is what happens, where is the value of make an impression on his opponent’s weak side. the opinion even of a hundred millions? It is no For, ex hypoihesi, he is as insensible to all rational

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 31 argument as a horny-hided Siegfried, dipped in any expression of opinion on it.” In this way you the flood of incapacity, and unable to think or insinuate to the bystanders, with whom you are in judge. Before a tribunal the dispute is one between good repute, that what your opponent says is authorities alone, — such authoritative statements, nonsense. Thus, when Kant’s Kritik appeared, or, I mean, as are laid down by legal experts; and rather, when it began to make a noise in the world, here the exercise of judgment consists in many professors of the old ecclectic school discovering what law or authority applies to the declared that they failed to understand it, in the case in question. There is, however, plenty of belief that their failure settled the business. But room for Dialectic; for should the case in question when the adherents of the new school proved to and the law not really fit each other, they can, if them that they were quite right, and had really necessary, be twisted until they appear to do so, or failed to understand it, they were in a very bad vice versa. humour. This is a trick which may be used only when you Stratagem 31 are quite sure that the audience thinks much better of you that of your opponent. A professor, If you know that you have no reply to the argu- for instance may try it on a student. Strictly, it is a ments which your opponent advances, you may, case of the preceding trick: it is a particularly by a fine stroke of irony, declare yourself to be an malicious assertion of one’s own authority, instead incompetent judge: “What you now say passes my of giving reasons. The counter-trick is to say: “I poor powers of comprehension; it may be all very beg your pardon; but, with your penetrating true, but I can’t understand it, and I refrain from intellect, it must be very easy for you to under-

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 32 stand anything; and it can only be my poor state- an objection of this kind, you take it for granted ment of the matter that is at fault”; and then go on (1) that the assertion in question is identical with, to rub it into him until he understands it nolens or is at least contained in, the category cited — volens, and sees for himself that it was really his that is to say, you cry out, “Oh, I have heard that own fault alone. In this way you parry his attack. before”; and (2) that the system referred to has With the greatest politeness he wanted to insinuate been entirely refuted, and does not contain a that you were talking nonsense; and you, with word of truth. equal courtesy, prove to him that he is a fool.

Stratagem 33 Stratagem 32 “That’s all very well in theory, but it won’t do in If you are confronted with an assertion, there is a practice.” In this sophism you admit the premisses short way of getting rid of it, or, at any rate, of but deny the conclusion, in contradiction with a throwing suspicion on it, by putting it into some well-known rule of logic. The assertion is based odious category; even though the connection is upon an impossibility: what is right in theory must only apparent, or else of a loose character. You work in practice; and if it does not, there is a can say, for instance, “That is Manichasism,” or mistake in the theory; something has been over- “It is Arianism,” or “Pelagianism,” or “Idealism,” or looked and not allowed for; and, consequently, “Spinozism,” or “Pantheism,” or “Brownianism,” what is wrong in practice is wrong in theory too. or “Naturalism,” or “Atheism,” or “Rationalism,” “Spiritualism,” “Mysticism,” and so on. In making

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 33 Stratagem 34 it out of a lunatic asylum; for, as a general rule, When you state a question or an argument, and half an ounce of will is more effective than a your opponent gives you no direct answer or reply, hundredweight of insight and intelligence. This, it but evades it by a counter-question or an indirect is true, can be done only under peculiar circum- answer, or some assertion which has no bearing on stances. If you succeed in making your opponent the matter, and, generally, tries to turn the subject, feel that his opinion, should it prove true, will be it is a sure sign that you have touched a weak spot, distinctly prejudicial to his interest, he will let it sometimes without knowing it. You have, as it drop like a hot potato, and feel that it was very were, reduced him to silence. You must, therefore, imprudent to take it up. A clergyman, for urge the point all the more, and not let your oppo- instance, is defending some philosophical dogma; nent evade it, even when you do not know where you make him sensible of the fact that it is in the weakness which you have hit upon really lies. immediate contradiction with one of the fundamental doctrines of his Church, and he abandons it. Stratagem 35 A landed proprietor maintains that the use of There is another trick which, as soon as it is practi- machinery in agricultural operations, as practised cable, makes all others unnecessary. Instead of in England, is an excellent institution, since an working on your opponent’s intellect by argument, engine does the work of many men. You give him work on his will by motive; and he, and also the to understand that it will not be very long before audience if they have similar interests, will at once carriages are also worked by steam, and that the be won over to your opinion, even though you got value of his large stud will be greatly depreciated;

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 34 and you will see what he will say. In such cases might be called “taking the tree by its root”; its every man feels how thoughtless it is to sanction a usual name is the argumentum ab utili. law unjust to himself — quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam! Stratagem 36 Nor is it otherwise if the bystanders, but not your opponent, belong to the same sect, guild, You may also puzzle and bewilder your opponent industry, club, etc., as yourself. Let his thesis be by mere bombast; and the trick is possible, because never so true, as soon as you hint that it is a man generally supposes that there must be some prejudicial to the common interests of the said meaning in words: society, all the bystanders will find that your Gewöhnlich glaubt der Mensch, wenn er nur opponent’s arguments, however excellent they be, Worte hört, Es müsse sich dabei doch auch are weak and contemptible; and that yours, on the was denken lassen. other hand, though they were random conjecture, [Commonly man believes that if he only hears are correct and to the point; you will have a chorus some words, there must be something in them of loud approval on your side, and your opponent to ponder over.] will be driven out of the field with ignominy. Nay, the bystanders will believe, as a rule, that they have If he is secretly conscious of his own weakness, agreed with you out of pure conviction. For what and accustomed to hear much that he does not is not to our interest mostly seems absurd to us; understand, and to make as though he did, you our intellect being no siccum lumen. This trick can easily impose upon him by some serious fooling that sounds very deep or learned, and

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 35 deprives him of hearing, sight, and thought; and dialogically?’ ‘I am for managing it rationally,’ by giving out that it is the most indisputable proof cried Moses, quite happy at being permitted to of what you assert. It is a well-known fact that in dispute. ‘Good again,’ cried the ‘Squire, ‘and recent times some philosophers have practised firstly, of the first. I hope you’ll not deny that this trick on the whole of the public with the most whatever is is. If you don’t grant me that, I can go brilliant success. But since present examples are no further.’ — ‘Why,’ returned Moses, ‘I think I odious, we may refer to The Vicar of Wakefield may grant that, and make the best of it.’ — ’I hope for an old one: too,’ returned the other, ‘you’ll grant that a part is “… ‘Right Frank,’ cried the ‘Squire; ‘for may less than the whole.’ ‘I grant that too,’ cried this glass suffocate me but a fine girl is worth all Moses, ‘it is but just and reasonable.’ — ‘I hope,’ the priestcraft in the creation. For what are tythes cried the ‘Squire, ‘you will not deny, that the two and tricks but an imposition, all a confounded angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones.’ — imposture, and I can prove it.’ — ‘I wish you ‘Nothing can be plainer,’ returned t’other, and would,’ cried my son Moses, ‘and I think,’ looked round with his usual importance. — ‘Very continued he, ‘that I should be able to answer well,’ cried the ‘Squire, speaking very quick, ‘the you.’ — ’Very well, Sir,’ cried the ‘Squire, who premises being thus settled, I proceed to observe, immediately smoaked him, and winking on the that the concatenation of self existences, rest of the company, to prepare us for the sport, ‘if proceeding in a reciprocal duplicate ratio, you are for a cool argument upon that subject, I naturally produce a problematical dialogism, am ready to accept the challenge. And first, which in some measure proves that the essence of whether are you for managing it analogically, or spirituality may be referred to the second

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 36 predicable’ — ’Hold, hold,’ cried the other, ‘I deny figure in a groupe of merry faces: nor, did he offer that: Do you think I can thus tamely submit to a single syllable more during the whole such heterodox doctrines?’ — ‘What,’ replied the entertainment …” (Oliver Goldsmith, The Vicar of ‘Squire, as if in a passion, ‘not submit! Answer me Wakefield, chapter 7). one plain question: Do you think Aristotle right when he says, that relatives are related?’ ‘Undoubtedly,’ replied the other. — ‘If so then,’ Stratagem 37 cried the ‘Squire, ‘answer me directly to what I Should your opponent be in the right, but, luckily propose: Whether do you judge the analytical for your contention, choose a faulty proof, you investigation of the first part of my enthymem can easily manage to refute it, and then claim that deficient secundum quoad, or quoad minus, and you have thus refuted his whole position. This is a give me your reasons: give me your reasons, I say, trick which ought to be one of the first; it is, at directly.’ — ‘I protest,’ cried Moses, ‘I don’t rightly bottom, an expedient by which an argumentum comprehend the force of your reasoning; but if it ad hominem is put forward as an argumentum be reduced to one simple proposition, I fancy it ad rem. If no accurate proof occurs to him or to may then have an answer.’ — ‘O sir,’ cried the the bystanders, you have won the day. For ‘Squire, ‘I am your most humble servant, I find example, if a man advances the ontological you want me to furnish you with argument and argument by way of proving God’s existence, you intellects too. No, sir, there I protest you are too can get the best of him, for the ontological argu- hard for me.’ This effectually raised the laugh ment may easily be refuted. This is the way in against poor Moses, who sate the only dismal which bad advocates lose a good case, by trying to

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 37 justify it by an authority which does not fit it, animalism. This is a very popular trick, because when no fitting one occurs to them. every one is able to carry it into effect; and so it is of frequent application. Now the question is, What counter-trick avails for the other party? for Last Stratagem if he has recourse to the same rule, there will be A last trick is to become personal, insulting, rude, blows, or a duel, or an action for slander. It would as soon as you perceive that your opponent has be a great mistake to suppose that it is sufficient the upper hand, and that you are going to come not to become personal yourself. For by showing off worst. It consists in passing from the subject a man quite quietly that he is wrong, and that of dispute, as from a lost game, to the disputant what he says and thinks is incorrect — a process himself, and in some way attacking his person. It which occurs in every dialectical victory — you may be called the argumentum ad personam, to embitter him more than if you used some rude or distinguish it from the argumentum ad hominem, insulting expression. Why is this? Because, as which passes from the objective discussion of the Hobbes (Elementa philosophica de Cive., chap. 1, subject pure and simple to the statements or Omnis animi voluptas, omnisque alacritas in eo admissions which your opponent has made in sita est, quod quis habeat, quibuscum conferens regard to it. But in becoming personal you leave se, possit magnifice sentire de seipso) observes, the subject altogether, and turn your attack to his all mental pleasure consists in being able to person, by remarks of an offensive and spiteful compare oneself with others to one’s own character. It is an appeal from the virtues of the advantage. — Nothing is of greater moment to a intellect to the virtues of the body, or to mere man than the gratification of his vanity, and no

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 38 wound is more painful than that which is inflicted of mutual advantage, in order to correct one’s on it. Hence such phrases as “Death before thoughts and awaken new views. But in learning dishonour,” and so on. The gratification of vanity and in mental power both disputants must be arises mainly by comparison of oneself with tolerably equal. If one of them lacks learning, he others, in every respect, but chiefly in respect of will fail to understand the other, as he is not on one’s intellectual powers; and so the most the same level with his antagonist. If he lacks effective and the strongest gratification of it is to mental power, he will be embittered, and led into be found in controversy. Hence the embitterment dishonest tricks, and end by being rude. of defeat, apart from any question of injustice; The only safe rule, therefore, is that which and hence recourse to that last weapon, that last Aristotle mentions in the last chapter of his trick, which you cannot evade by mere politeness. Topica: not to dispute with the first person you A cool demeanour may, however, help you here, meet, but only with those of your acquaintance of if, as soon as your opponent becomes personal, whom you know that they possess sufficient you quietly reply, “That has no bearing on the intelligence and self-respect not to advance point in dispute,” and immediately bring the absurdities; to appeal to reason and not to conversation back to it, and continue to show him authority, and to listen to reason and yield to it; that he is wrong, without taking any notice of his and, finally, to cherish truth, to be willing to insults. Say, as Themistocles said to Eurybiades — accept reason even from an opponent, and to be παταξον μεν, ακουσον δε (Strike, but hear me). just enough to bear being proved to be in the But such demeanour is not given to every one. As wrong, should truth lie with him. From this it a sharpening of wits, controversy is often, indeed, follows that scarcely one man in a hundred is

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 39 worth your disputing with him. You may let the remainder say what they please, for every one is at liberty to be a fool — desipere est jus gentium. Remember what Voltaire says: La paix vaut encore mieux que la vérité. Remember also an Arabian proverb which tells us that on the tree of silence there hangs its fruit, which is peace. ***

(1830)

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 40 Appendix

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 41 Fragment

This fragmental part most probably served as an Dialecticen appellant. Quintilian, lib. II., 12: Itaque haec introduction. pars dialecticae, sive illam disputatricem dicere malimus; and with him this latter word appears to be the Latin I equivalent for Dialectic. (So far according to Petri Rami By the ancients, Logic and Dialectic were used as synonymous dialectica, Audomari Talaei praelectionibus illustrata. terms; although λογιζεσϑαι, “to think over, to consider, to 1569.) This use of the words and synonymous terms lasted calculate,” and διαλεγεσϑαι, “to converse,” are two very through the Middle Ages into modern times; in fact, until the different things. The name Dialectic was, as we are informed present day. But more recently, and in particular by Kant, by Diogenes Laertius, first used by Plato; and in the Phaedrus, Dialectic has often been employed in a bad sense, as meaning Sophist, Republic, bk. VII., and elsewhere, we find that by “the art of sophistical controversy”; and hence Logic has been Dialectic he means the regular employment of the reason, preferred, as of the two the more innocent designation. Never- and skill in the practice of it. Aristotle also uses the word (τα theless, both originally meant the same thing; and in the last διαλεκτικα) in this sense; but, according to Laurentius Valla, few years they have again been recognised as synonymous. he was the first to use λογικη (Logic) too in a similar way. He II speaks of λογικας δυσχερειας, that is, “difficult points,” It is a pity that the words have thus been used from of old, προτασιν λογικην, αποριαν λογικην. — Dialectic (διαλεκτικη), and that I am not quite at liberty to distinguish their therefore, seems to be an older word than Logic (λογικη). meanings. Otherwise, I should have preferred to define Logic Cicero and Quintilian use the words in the same general (from λογιζεσϑαι) “word” and “reason,” which are significatio. Cicero in Lucullo: Dialecticam inventam esse, inseparable) as “the science of the laws of thought, that is, of veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem. Topica, c. 2: Stoici enim the method of reason”; and Dialectic (from διαλεγεσϑαι, “to judicandi vias diligenter persecuti sunt, ea scientia, quam converse” — and every conversation communicates either

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 42 facts or opinions, that is to say, it is historical or deliberative) For human nature is such that if A. and B. are engaged in as “the art of disputation,” in the modern sense of the word. thinking in common, and are communicating their opinions It it clear, then, that Logic deals with a subject of a purely à to one another on any subject, so long as it is not a mere fact priori character, separable in definition from experience, of history, and A. perceives that B.’s thoughts on one and the namely, the laws of thought, the process of reason or the same subject are not the same as his own, he does not begin λογος, the laws, that is, which reason follows when it is left to by revising his own process of thinking, so as to discover any itself and not hindered, as in the case of solitary thought on mistake which he may have made, but he assumes that the the part of a rational being who is in no way misled. Dialectic, mistake has occurred in B.’s. In other words, man is on the other hand, would treat of the intercourse between naturally obstinate; and this quality in him is attended with two rational beings who, because they are rational, ought to certain results, treated of in the branch of knowledge which I think in common, but who, as soon as they cease to agree like should like to call Dialectic, but which, in order to avoid two clocks keeping exactly the same time, create a disputation, misunderstanding, I shall call Controversial or Eristical or intellectual contest. Regarded as purely rational beings, Dialectic. Accordingly, it is the branch of knowledge which the individuals would, I say, necessarily be in agreement, and treats of the obstinacy natural to man. their variation springs from the difference essential to individuality; in other words, it is drawn from experience. Logic, therefore, as the science of thought, or the science of the process of pure reason, should be capable of being constructed a priori. Dialectic, for the most part, can be constructed only a posteriori; that is to say, we may learn its rules by an experiential knowledge of the disturbance which pure thought suffers through the difference of individuality manifested in the intercourse between two rational beings, and also by acquaintance with the means which disputants adopt in order to make good against one another their own individual thought, and to show that it is pure and objective.

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 43 Endnotes

1 (page 4) although it seems correct. These three last properly belong to the art of Controversial Dialectic, as they have no objective Eristic is only a harsher name for the same thing. — truth in view, but only the appearance of it, and pay no According to Diogenes Laertius, v., 28, Aristotle put regard to truth itself; that is to say, they aim at victory. Rhetoric and Dialectic together, as aiming at persuasion, Aristotle’s book on Sophistic Conclusions was edited apart πιϑανον; and Analytic and Philosophy as aiming at truth. from the others, and at a later date. It was the last book of his Aristotle does, indeed, distinguish between (1) Logic, or Dialectic. Analytic, as the theory or method of arriving at true or apodeictic conclusions; and (2) Dialectic as the method of 2 (page 5) arriving at conclusions that are accepted or pass current as Machiavelli recommends his Prince to make use of every true, ενδοξα, probabilia; conclusions in regard to which it is moment that his neighbour is weak, in order to attack him; not taken for granted that they are false, and also not taken as otherwise his neighbour may do the same. If honour and for granted that they are true in themselves, since that is not fidelity prevailed in the world, it would be a different matter; the point. What is this but the art of being in the right, but as these are qualities not to be expected, a man must not whether one has any reason for being so or not, in other practise them himself, because he will meet with a bad words, the art of attaining the appearance of truth, return. It is just the same in a dispute: if I allow that my regardless of its substance? That is, then, as I put it above. opponent is right as soon as he seems to be so, it is scarcely Aristotle divides all conclusions into logical and dialectical, probable that he will do the same when the position is in the manner described, and then into eristical. (3) Eristic is reversed; and as he acts wrongly, I am compelled to act the method by which the form of the conclusion is correct, wrongly too. It is easy to say that we must yield to truth, but the premisses, the materials from which it is drawn, are without any prepossession in favour of our own statements; not true, but only appear to be true. Finally (4) Sophistic is but we cannot assume that our opponent will do it, and the method in which the form of the conclusion is false,

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 44 therefore we cannot do it either. Nay, if I were to abandon disputation. Therefore, when Aristotle speaks of Dialectic, we the position on which I had previously bestowed much must include in it Sophistic, Eristic, and Peirastic, and define thought, as soon as it appeared that he was right, it might it as “the art of getting the best of it in a dispute,” in which, easily happen that I might be misled by a momentary unquestionably, the safest plan is to be in the right to begin impression, and give up the truth in order to accept an error. with; but this in itself is not enough in the existing disposition of mankind, and, on the other hand, with the 3 (page 6) weakness of the human intellect, it is not altogether Topica, bk. I., 2. necessary. Other expedients are required, which, just 4 (page 6) because they are unnecessary to the attainment of objective truth, may also be used when a man is objectively in the Lb., 12. wrong; and whether or not this is the case, is hardly ever a 5 (page 7) matter of complete certainty. I am of opinion, therefore, that a sharper distinction should be drawn between Dialectic and On the other hand, in his book De Sophisticis Elenchis, he Logic than Aristotle has given us; that to Logic we should takes too much trouble to separate Dialectic from Sophistic assign objective truth as far as it is merely formal, and that and Eristic, where the distinction is said to consist in this, Dialectic should be confined to the art of gaining one’s point, that dialectical conclusions are true in their form and their and contrarily, that Sophistic and Eristic should not be contents, while sophistical and eristical conclusions are false. distinguished from Dialectic in Aristotle’s fashion, since the Eristic so far differs from Sophistic that, while the master of difference which he draws rests on objective and material Eristic aims at mere victory, the Sophist looks to the truth; and in regard to what this is, we cannot attain any reputation, and with it, the monetary rewards which he will clear certainty before discussion; but we are compelled, with gain. But whether a proposition is true in respect of its Pilate, to ask, What is truth? For truth is in the depths, εν contents is far too uncertain a matter to form the foundation of the distinction in question; and it is a matter on which the βυϑῳ ἡ αληϑεια (a saying of Democritus, Diog. Laert., IX., disputant least of all can arrive at certainty; nor is it 72). Two men often engage in a warm dispute, and then disclosed in any very sure form even by the result of the return to their homes each of the other’s opinion, which he has exchanged for his own. It is easy to say that in every

Arthur Schopenhauer The Art of Controversy 45 dispute we should have no other aim than the advancement 11 (page 18) of truth; but before dispute no one knows where it is, and They are all a free version of chap. 15 of Aristotle’s De through his opponent’s arguments and his own a man is Sophistici Elenchis. misled. 12 (page 22) 6 (page 7) The truth from which I draw my proof may he either (1) of an We must always keep the subject of one branch of knowledge objective and universally valid character; in that case my quite distinct from that of any other. proof is veracious, secundum veritatem; and it is such proof 7 (page 9) alone that has any genuine validity. Or (2) it may be valid only for the person to whom I wish to prove my proposition, Diogenes Laertes tells us that among the numerous writings and with whom I am disputing. He has, that is to say, either on Rhetoric by Theophrastus, all of which have been lost, taken up some position once for all as a prejudice, or hastily there was one entitled ‘Αγωνιστικον της περι τους εριστικους admitted it in the course of the dispute; and on this I ground λογους εωριας. That would have been just what we want. ϑ my proof. In that case, it is a proof valid only for this 8 (page 11) particular man, ad hominem. I compel my opponent to grant my proposition, but I fail to establish it as a truth of If it is in direct contradiction with a perfectly undoubted, universal validity. My proof avails for my opponent alone, truth, we have reduced our opponent’s position ad but for no one else. For example, if my opponent is a devotee absurdum. of Kant’s, and I ground my proof on some utterance of that 9 (page 17) philosopher, it is a proof which in itself is only ad hominem.

Aristotle, Topica bk. VIII., chap. 2. If he is a Mohammedan, I may prove my point by reference to a passage in the Koran, and that is sufficient for him; but 10 (page 18) here it is only a proof ad hominem. Idem, chap. 11. The last chapter of this work contains some 13 (page 27) good rules for the practice of Dialectics. See Stratagem 28.

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