IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 33 - JUNE 2018 ISSN 22532-6570 © 2018 IAI 1 Programme at theIstituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone isHead of theDefenceProgramme and Senior Fellow in theSecurity Policies intheConte government. Development, LabourandSocial the postof Minister of Economic of Economic Development, assuming the Ministryof LabourandtheMinistry minister, hastaken over (andmerged) the leader of theM5Sand deputy prime is nocoincidence that Luigi DiMaio, fiscal deficits andthewelfaresystem. It economic policy, particularly regarding are twofold. Ontheone handstands The key priorities for thegovernment strategy tocarrytheseforth. well known, what isless clear is the the priorities of thegovernment are change, radicalism andpragmatism, policy. Caught betweencontinuity and trajectory of Italian foreign anddefence uncertainty remainsregardingthe novelty inItalian politics andsome coalition represents asignificant M5S) andLegaparties. Thegoverning Five Star Movement ( parliamentary majority formed bythe by Giuseppe Conte relies on a The newItalian government headed by Alessandro Marrone in Italian Foreign andDefence Policy? Radical Changeor Pragmatic Continuity The Conte Government: Movimento 5 Stelle , extraordinary flows that Italy has challenge, andthereduction of The second priority is the migration 5ec0ce9694cc.shtml situazione-italia-7dcf55e2-f96a-11e7-908c- corriere.it/cronache/18_gennaio_14/migranti- Sera della Italia”, in in situazione la “Migranti, dlci.interno.gov.it/it/node/1300 2018, latest giornaliero_31_dicembre_2016.pdf sites/default/files/allegati/cruscotto_statistico_ libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/ giornaliero Immigration, and Liberties for Civil of Interior. Department Ministry Italian 2017. in 119,369 and 2016 See in 181,436 plus 2015, 1 prime minister. as well asactingthesecond deputy presently heads the Ministry of Interior campaigned heavily on this issue and Lega, whose leader, Matteo Salvini, tops thepolitical agenda of the accelerate therepatriation of migrants arrivals in four years. experienced since2013,with 624,747
In particular, 170,100 in 2014 and 153,842 in in 153,842 and 2014 in 170,100 particular, In Cruscotto statistico giornaliero http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione. , 14 January 2018, 2018, , 14 January , 31 December 2016, 2016, , 31 December . Cruscotto statistico 1 . See also also . See Efforts to https://www. ; and the the ; and http://www. of 14 June Corriere Corriere The Conte Government: Radical Change or Pragmatic Continuity in Italian Foreign and Defence Policy?
Against this backdrop, a toughening pledged a strengthening of these of Italy’s negotiation stances with policies, including the opening of new countries of origin and/or transit is identification centres to process asylum to be expected. Aside from a recent requests and increased repatriations. spat with Tunisia, confrontational exchanges have also occurred with Tensions, however, are likely with Malta, a country that has repeatedly Brussels and other European capitals been accused by Italy of preventing on the relocation of asylum seekers
© 2018 IAI vessels carrying migrants from docking and the related reform of the Dublin in its ports, instead directing them to regulations. On 6 June Rome opposed the Italian coast. the latest EU compromise proposal, as this was deemed insufficient to address Following two alleged episodes of the needs of first-arrival countries like such practices by Maltese authorities Italy but also Spain, Greece, Malta and since the beginning of June, Salvini Cyprus. announced Italy’s refusal to grant docking permission to the Aquarius It remains to be seen how new ISSN 2532-6570 vessel, a ship affiliated with the Franco- negotiations will unfold, as well German charity SOS Méditerranée, as what proposal and alliances the and carrying 629 migrants rescued Conte government will build within in the Mediterranean on 9 June. the Union to advance its priorities. With the ship stranded between The appointment of Enzo Moavero Maltese and Italian waters, the Italian Milanesi, a former minister in the government reiterated its request for governments headed by Mario Monti European assistance in sharing the and Enrico Letta, could serve as an migration burden, leading by 11 June important channel of communications to an announcement by the Spanish with European interlocutors. government that it would accept the migrants. With regards to security and defence policy, the new Italian government When it comes to the EU dimension of has signalled its intention to prioritize the migration issue, many European the Mediterranean region at the recent partners are likely to support Italian NATO and G7 meetings, highlighting efforts to reduce arrivals and increase the twin tracks of migration and anti- repatriation. Italy’s tough migration terrorism. Italy’s new Defence Minister policies actually date back to the Elisabetta Trenta – an expert of security previous government and Salvini has and defence issues with both research declared his intention to continue and operational experience who ran this strategy. Praising the efforts of for parliament with the M5S – has his predecessor, Marco Minniti,2 he stressed that NATO should do more for the Southern flank, while reassuring 2 “Migranti, Salvini: o Ue ci aiuta o sceglieremo altre vie. Da Minniti buon lavoro”, in Il Sole 24 shtml; Italian Senate, Informativa del Ministro Ore, 4 June 2018, http://www.ilsole24ore.com/ dell’interno sulla vicenda della nave Aquarius, art/notizie/2018-06-04/migranti-salvini-o- 13 June 2018, p. 6, http://www.senato.it/service/ ue-ci-aiuta-o-sceglieremo-altre-vie--100310. PDF/PDFServer/BGT/1067790.pdf. IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 33 - JUNE 2018 IAI COMMENTARIES
2 The Conte Government: Radical Change or Pragmatic Continuity in Italian Foreign and Defence Policy?
partners of Italy’s intention to fulfil its During a recent meeting with NATO commitments on the Eastern one.3 Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Rome, Conte also reiterated much of These steps are fully in line with the what is in the M5S-Lega government coalition agreement signed by the agreement: Italy is a committed NATO leaders of the M5S and Lega last May. member, with the US as its privileged The agreement – or “contract” – clearly ally, but is also keen to dialogue with identifies the Mediterranean region as Russia, considered an important 6
© 2018 IAI the locus of threats, describing how interlocutor for Europe’s security. “more factors of instability are gathered [in the Mediterranean], such as: Islamic With regards to Russia, Italy has extremism, uncontrolled migratory traditionally sought to balance its flows, with consequent tensions commitments to Euro-Atlantic security [among] regional powers”.4 with Rome’s good economic relations with Moscow. It is no coincidence The Euro-Mediterranean region was that the NATO-Russia Council was already identified as a priority area established under Italian auspices at ISSN 2532-6570 in the 2015 Italian White Paper for an extraordinary NATO summit in International Security and Defence. the outskirts of Rome in 2002. After In recent years, Rome worked the 2014 Crimea crisis, Italy remained hard in both EU and NATO forums committed to Allied reassurances, to increase multilateral efforts to defence and deterrence measures vis- address security challenges from the à-vis Russia,7 while also arguing for southern neighbourhood. Notable a sustained and meaningful dialogue examples include the naval missions with Moscow to find a diplomatic EUNAVFORMED Sophia and Sea solution for the crisis in Ukraine. Guardian, and the establishment of a NATO “hub for the South” in Naples that The new executive therefore seems will become fully operational in July.5 to be largely in line with traditional Italian approaches to foreign and defence policy. During a speech at the senate just prior to the confidence 3 Italian Ministry of Defence, Nato: Minister vote, Conte noted his government’s Trenta Meets with Secretary General Jens support for a revision of the existing Stoltenberg, 11 June 2018, https://www.difesa.it/ EN/Primo_Piano/Pagine/parcb.aspx; and NATO Defence Ministerial, 7 June 2018, https://www. difesa.it/EN/Primo_Piano/Pagine/trab.aspx. 6 NATO, Press conference by NATO Secretary 4 M5S and Lega, Contract for the government of General Jens Stoltenberg and Prime Minister change, 18 May 2018, https://m5s.international/ Giuseppe Conte of Italy (Audio), 11 June contract-government-change#foreign. 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ Original version: Contratto per il Governo di opinions_155816.htm. cambiamento, p. 18, http://download.repubblica. 7 Francesca Bitondo, Alessandro Marrone and it/pdf/2018/politica/contratto_governo.pdf. Paola Sartori, “Challenges to NATO and Italy’s 5 Carolina Polito and Paola Sartori, “Italy, the North Role: Trump, Brexit, Collective Defence and Atlantic Alliance and the 2018 NATO Summit”, in Neighborhood Stability”, in Documenti IAI, IAI Commentaries, No. 17|33 (December 2017), p. No. 16|18E (January 2017), http://www.iai.it/en/ 2, http://www.iai.it/en/node/8643. node/7060. IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 33 - JUNE 2018 IAI COMMENTARIES
3 The Conte Government: Radical Change or Pragmatic Continuity in Italian Foreign and Defence Policy?
sanctions against Russia.8 At the G7 recent visit – the first since assuming meeting, the prime minister added the role of Minister of Economic that these sanctions are linked to the Development – to a major Italian full implementation of the Minsk defence manufacturer, Leonardo, may agreement and that Italy will not take also be indicative of the government’s unilateral decisions in this regard. priorities in this domain. Noticeably, the Ministry of Economic Development When it comes to Italian military is endowed with a yearly budget of
© 2018 IAI operations abroad, both parties about 2,7 million euro for investments have shown scepticism regarding in national military procurement, on NATO’s Resolute Support mission in top of those already envisaged in the Afghanistan, where Italy is presently defence budget.10 engaged with about 900 troops. In contrast, the Lega did not oppose a Ultimately, the Conte government can decision to dispatch Italian military be expected to pursue more radical personnel to Niger in December 2017, policies than its predecessor on the due to its relevance to counter people migration file, as this is a key priority ISSN 2532-6570 traffickers and migrant flows. Both for the Italian electorate. This will likely Trenta and Moavero Milanesi have exacerbate tensions with European also reassured allies that Italy will not partners, particularly with regards to renege on its commitments in ongoing repatriation and the sharing of the military operations. Yet a future review migration burden. When it comes to and possible re-arrangement of Italian NATO, Russia, military operations troop distributions from Central Asia abroad, defence spending and to the Mediterranean region cannot be industrial policy, pragmatism and a ruled out. certain degree of continuity can instead be expected, particularly with regards to Finally, the M5S-Lega government Italy’s traditional allies and partners in contract does not envisage cuts or Europe and the US. Obviously, all these significant increases to the Italian policies are connected and tensions in defence budget, which in 2019 is likely one area, such as the migration dossier, to remain stable about 1.1 per cent of may negatively impact other domains. GDP. However, the agreement clearly notes how the “protection” of Italy’s These underlining trends of defence industry is “essential”, and pragmatism and radicalism reflect mentions the “design and [production] the mixed composition, and of ships, aircraft and high tech- novelty, of the new Italian coalition systems” as key focus areas.9 Di Maio’s government. Grounded in an uneasy and unprecedented alliance between the Lega and M5S, the government’s 8 Italian Senate, Comunicazioni del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, 5 June 2018, p. 8-21, priorities in foreign and defence policy http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/ BGT/1067706.pdf. Governo di cambiamento, cit., p. 17-18. 9 M5S and Lega, Contract for the government of 10 Paola Sartori and Giovanni Finarelli change, cit., https://m5s.international/contract- Baldassarre, Defence Budgets and Industry, July government-change#defence; Contratto per il 2017, http://www.iai.it/en/node/702. IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 33 - JUNE 2018 IAI COMMENTARIES
4 The Conte Government: Radical Change or Pragmatic Continuity in Italian Foreign and Defence Policy?
will need to trace a difficult balance between the radical change each coalition partner has promised its electorate, and the institutional (and budgetary) constraints of governance that have generally led Italian executives to embrace pragmatism in foreign and defence policy. © 2018 IAI
15 June 2018 ISSN 2532-6570 IAI COMMENTARIES 18 | 33 - JUNE 2018 IAI COMMENTARIES
5 The Conte Government: Radical Change or Pragmatic Continuity in Italian Foreign and Defence Policy?
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Founded by Altiero Spinelli in 1965, IAI does research in the fields of foreign policy, political economy and international security. A non-profit organisation, IAI aims to further and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences and publications. To that end, it cooperates with other research institutes, universities and foundations in Italy and abroad and is a member of various international networks. More specifically, the main research sectors are: European institutions and policies; Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle © 2018 IAI East; defence economy and policy; and transatlantic relations. IAI publishes an English- language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (Affarinternazionali), two book series (Quaderni IAI and IAI Research Studies) and some papers’ series related to IAI research projects (Documenti IAI, IAI Papers, etc.).
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