General Equilibrium Model for Economy – Energy – Environment
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Nonlinearity and Chaos in Economic Models: Implications for Policy Decisions
WORKING PAPER SERIES Nonlinearity and Chaos in Economic Models: Implications for Policy Decisions James B. Bullard Alison Butler Working Paper 1991-002B http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/1991/91-002.pdf PUBLISHED: Economic Journal, July 1993. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Research Division 411 Locust Street St. Louis, MO 63102 ______________________________________________________________________________________ The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be cleared with the author or authors. Photo courtesy of The Gateway Arch, St. Louis, MO. www.gatewayarch.com NONLINEARITY AND CHAOS IN ECONOMIC MODELS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DECISIONS James Bullard Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Alison Butler Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis August 1991 Revised July 1992 Abstract. This survey paper discusses the policy implications that can be expected from the recent research on nonlinearity and chaos in economic models. Expected policy implications are interpreted as a driving force behind the recent proliferation of research in this area. In general, it appears that no new justification for policy intervention is developed in models of endogenous fluctuations, although this conclusion depends in part on the definition of equilibrium. When justified, however, policy tends to be very effective in these models. -
Informational Frictions and Commodity Markets"
Informational Frictions and Commodity Markets Michael Sockiny Wei Xiongz October 2013 Abstract This paper develops a model to analyze information aggregation in commod- ity markets. Through centralized trading, commodity prices aggregate dispersed information about the strength of the global economy among goods producers whose production has complementarity, and serve as price signals to guide pro- ducers’ production decisions and commodity demand. Our analysis highlights important feedback e¤ects of informational noise originating from supply shocks and futures market trading on commodity demand and spot prices, which are ignored by existing empirical studies and policy discussions. This paper supersedes an earlier paper circulated under the title “Feedback E¤ects of Commodity Futures Prices.”We wish to thank Thierry Foucault, Lutz Kilian, Jennifer La’O,Matteo Maggiori, Joel Peress, Ken Singleton, Kathy Yuan, and seminar participants at Asian Meeting of Econometric Society, Bank of Canada, Chicago, Columbia, Emory, HEC-Paris, INSEAD, NBER Meeting on Economics of Commodity Markets, Princeton, the 6th Annual Conference of the Paul Woolley Center of London School of Economics, and Western Finance Association Meetings for helpful discussion and comments. We are especially grateful to Bruno Biais, an Associate Editor, and three referees for many constructive suggestions. yPrinceton University. Email: [email protected]. zPrinceton University and NBER. Email: [email protected]. The boom and bust cycles of commodity markets in 2007-2008 have stimulated intense academic and policy debate regarding the e¤ects of supply and demand shocks and the role of futures market speculation. Despite the attention given to these issues, the academic literature largely ignores a key aspect of commodity markets— informational frictions— by treating di¤erent types of shocks as observable to market participants. -
Measuring Regulatory Performance
Measuring Regulatory Performance THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATORY POLICY: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE By David Parker and Colin Kirkpatrick Expert Paper No. 3, August 2012 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATORY POLICY: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE This study provides a critical literature review of the theory and quantitative evidence of the impact of regulatory policy. The theory is addressed through a causal chain analysis which connects regulatory policy through the “better regulation” agenda to economic outcomes. The literature review is intended to provide a reasonably representative sample of studies on regulatory policy and governance in general; administrative simplification and reducing regulatory burdens; ex ante and ex post analyses of regulations; consultation, transparency and accountability; and regulatory institutions. The main policy lessons are highlighted, alongside discussion of the limitations of the literature in terms of content and coverage. © OECD (2012). All rights reserved. 3 FOREWORD OECD countries require better information about where investments in programs to improve regulations should be focused to pay growth and welfare dividends. This is necessary to target scarce resources for reform efforts, and also to communicate progress and generate the political support needed for implementing regulatory policy reforms. The OECD work on Measuring Regulatory Performance is intended to assist countries with the task of identifying this information through the development of measurement frameworks and the collection and interpretation of salient data (www.oecd.org/regreform/measuringperformance). The OECD is developing a framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation to help countries evaluate the design and implementation of their regulatory policy against the achievement of strategic regulatory objectives (OECD, forthcoming). -
The Work of Commodity Definition and Price Under Neoliberal Environmental Policy
University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Papers U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2007 Discovering Price in All the Wrong Places: The Work of Commodity Definition and Price under Neoliberal Environmental Policy Morgan Robertson U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usepapapers Robertson, Morgan, "Discovering Price in All the Wrong Places: The Work of Commodity Definition and Price under Neoliberal Environmental Policy" (2007). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Papers. 150. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usepapapers/150 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Discovering Price in All the Wrong Places: The Work of Commodity Definition and Price under Neoliberal Environmental Policy Morgan Robertson US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, Wetlands Division, Washington, DC, USA; [email protected] Abstract: Price plays a unique role in neoliberal economic theory, quantifying value and pro- viding markets with the information needed to produce equilibrium conditions and optimal social welfare. While the role of price is clear, the mechanisms by which prices are discovered, and by which the commodities they value are defined, are left obscure in neoliberal theory. Automatic price discovery, and self-evident commodity identities, are assumed. Observation of newly created markets in ecosystem services suggests that this is a moment of significant ten- sion within neoliberal practice, as potential market participants seek guidance from the state on appropriate commodity measures and pricing practices. -
Shocks, Risks and Global Value Chains: Insights from the OECD METRO Model
Shocks, risks and global value chains: insights from the OECD METRO model June 2020 This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of OECD member countries. 2 │ Shocks, risks and global value chains: insights from the OECD METRO model Shocks, risks and global value chains: insights from the OECD METRO model Executive summary The economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have contributed to renewed discussions on the benefits and costs of global value chains (GVCs), and in particular on whether GVCs increase risks and vulnerabilities to shocks. Questions are being raised about whether the gains from deepening and expanding international specialisation in GVCs are worth the associated risks, and whether more localised production would provide greater security against disruptions that can lead to shortages in supply and uncertainty for consumers and businesses. To serve as a starting point for an informed conversation around these questions, this note presents the results of a set of economic model simulations, using the OECD’s trade model, METRO1. We explore two stylised versions of the global economy, one with production fragmentation in GVCs, much as we see today, and another where production is more localised and businesses and consumers rely less on foreign suppliers. Unforeseeable shocks can occur in both economic regimes, both domestically or elsewhere in the world. The question is which version of the global economy offers better performance, in terms of both the level and the stability of economic activity in the face of shocks? The two policy regimes and a set of stylised shocks to simulate systemic risks are used to compare both efficiency and exposure to risk outcomes. -
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE Research DEPARTMENT of ECONOMICS Institute University European Institute
Repository. Research Institute University European Institute. EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE Cadmus, on An earlier version o fpaperthis was given at a seminar the at University European Mario Nuti and Felix The Fitzroy. disclaimer usual applies. seminar. Weseminar. would acknowledge particularly the helpful that comments advice constructive the made commentsand at for grateful We ofFlorence,are Institute, Italy. ** University of Edinburgh, European University Institute * University o f Edinburgh University BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (F I) Access DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS European Open RKING PAPER No. ^fESIGHT, NON-LINEARITY § f by H yperinflation * * Donaldand A.R. GEORGE** Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library * 87/283 87/283 EUI the by produced version Digitised Repository. Research Institute University European Institute. Cadmus, on University Access (C) Leslie T. Oxley Donald and A.R. George. European Open reproduced reproduced in any form without No No part of this paper be may Printed in Italy in April 1987 European UniversityEuropean Institute permission of the authors. - 50016 San Domenico - Domenico (FSan 50016 i) - All rights reserved. Author(s). Available Badia Badia Fiesolana The 2020. © Ita ly in Library EUI the by produced version Digitised 1 Repository. Introduction Research Traditionally, attempts to model hyperinflationary processes have followed one of two routes. Cagan (1956) concentrated on Institute hyperinflation within a fixed output environment. Later writers for example Sargent (1977) Sargent & Wallace (1973) and Flood and University Garber (1980) retained this assumption but extended the basic model by incorporating rational expectations. The second route relates to models which consider inflation European within a growing economy. Here the basic formulation is due to Institute. -
Selecting an Internal Carbon Price for Academic Institutions
Selecting an Internal Carbon Price for Academic Institutions Working paper, September 5, 2018 Alexander Richard Barron1 and Breanna Jane Parker Smith College Summary Many businesses have adopted internal carbon prices (ICPs) to help drive smarter business decisions, innovation, and emissions reductions. The objective of this white paper is to provide a framework that institutions can use as they begin to think about selecting a price in the context of their own goals for an ICP. This white paper reviews some of the most common benchmarks for selecting an internal carbon price: 1. the social cost of carbon: an estimate of the economic damages to current and future generations from carbon dioxide pollution; 2. implicit prices: the cost to achieve specific policy targets; 3. regulatory risk: the potential future costs from climate policy; 4. current prices in existing carbon markets; and 5. the prices used by peer institutions. Depending on the framework, potential prices per metric ton carbon dioxide equivalent(MTCDE) can range from under $10 to over $100. Ultimately, academic institutions will have to carefully consider the goals of their sustainability policies and institutional constraints to select a price. These overlapping moti- vations and constraints make the process of selecting the price almost as important as the actual price selected. A robust process can help ensure buy-in when the adopted price begins to suggest institutional changes. Introduction Carbon prices are important tools for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (Goulder & Hafstead, 2018). They are flexible in that they can be used to achieve a wide range of policy objectives. Academic institu- tions, for example, may have a wide range of reasons for adopting a carbon price including accounting for the social cost of carbon (Greenstone, Kopits, & Wolverton, 2013), mitigating regulatory risk (Ahlu- walia, 2017), meeting internal emissions targets (Ecofys, The Generation Foundation, & CDP, 2017), funding projects, educating campus members, or aligning with peers. -
Price Setting Under Uncertainty About Inflation
Price Setting Under Uncertainty About Inflation ∗ Andr´esDrenik Diego J. Perez Columbia University New York University August 12, 2019 Abstract We analyze the manipulation of inflation statistics that occurred in Argentina start- ing in 2007 to test the relevance of informational frictions in price setting. We estimate that the manipulation of statistics had associated a higher degree of price dispersion. This effect is analyzed in the context of a quantitative general equilibrium model in which firms use information about the inflation rate to set prices. Not reporting accu- rate measures of the CPI entails significant welfare losses, especially in economies with volatile monetary policy. Keywords: Price setting, informational frictions, social value of public information. JEL codes: D8, E1, E3. ∗Drenik: [email protected]. Perez: [email protected]. We thank Hassan Afrouzi, Fernando Alvarez, Manuel Amador, Carola Binder, Nick Bloom, Ariel Burstein, Alberto Cavallo, Zhen Huo, Boyan Jovanovic, Pablo Kurlat, Brent Neiman, Pablo Ottonello, Monika Piazzesi, Ricardo Reis, Martin Schneider, Venky Venkateswaran, Pierre-Olivier Weill and conference participants at Stanford, SED Warsaw, NBER Summer Institute, NYU, Yale, the Federal Reserve Board, Minneapolis Fed, Boston University, Columbia, International Macro-Finance Conference at Chicago Booth, NBER Monetary Economics, UCLA, Rochester, University of Copenhagen, and the 2018 ASSA Meetings for valuable comments. We also thank MercadoLibre and their employees for their cooperation and help. 1 Introduction -
Water Bill Affordability for the City of Philadelphia Presented To: Philadelphia City Council Prepared Statement Of
Water Bill Affordability for the City of Philadelphia Presented to: Philadelphia City Council Prepared Statement of: Roger Colton Fisher, Sheehan & Colton Public Finance and General Economics Belmont (MA) April 9, 2015 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Promoting the affordability of home water service in Philadelphia today serves multiple economic objectives. These objectives extend far beyond the benefits provided to individual Philadelphia households. The objectives also include both: Generating business benefits to Philadelphia Water by improving payment patterns for low-income customers; and Improving outcomes that beneficially affect the municipal finances of the City of Philadelphia in its capacity as a provider of municipal services. In my comments below, I will separately review each of these sets of objectives. In my third section, I will consider whether the City’s existing water assistance program1 is capable of meeting these objectives without substantial reform. Objective #1: Improving Payment Patterns of Low‐income Customers Setting aside the positive municipal finance outcomes associated with a low-income affordability program, which I will describe in a separate section, there are at least the following expected utility-related, business-related outcomes that would be generated by a low-income bill affordability program for Philadelphia. 1 For purposes of these comments, I will not distinguish between the “City of Philadelphia” and the “Philadelphia Water Department.” Water bill affordability: City of Philadelphia 1 | Page A low-income bill affordability program can reasonably be expected to generate the following utility-related business benefits to Philadelphia Water: Increased Bill Payment Coverage. The first impact of a water bill affordability program2 in the City of Philadelphia would be an increase in the bill payment coverage ratio of participating low-income consumers. -
Equilibrium, Interest and Money: Three Essays in the History of Economic Theory Michael Syron Lawlor Iowa State University
Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Dissertations 1986 Equilibrium, interest and money: three essays in the history of economic theory Michael Syron Lawlor Iowa State University Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd Part of the Economics Commons Recommended Citation Lawlor, Michael Syron, "Equilibrium, interest and money: three essays in the history of economic theory " (1986). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 8263. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/8263 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INFORMATION TO USERS While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript, the quality of the repr^uction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted. For example: • Manuscript pages may have indistinct print. In such cases, the best available copy has been filmed. • Manuscripts may not always be complete. In such cases, a note will indicate that it is not possible to obtain missing pages. • Copyrighted material may have been removed from the manuscript. In such cases, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, and charts) are photographed by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is also filmed as one exposure and is available, for an additional charge, as a stondard 35mm slide or as a 17"x 23" black and white photographic print. -
A Model of General Economic Equilibrium Author(S): J
The Review of Economic Studies Ltd. A Model of General Economic Equilibrium Author(s): J. V. Neumann Source: The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1945 - 1946), pp. 1-9 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2296111 . Accessed: 30/06/2011 08:50 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Oxford University Press and The Review of Economic Studies Ltd. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of Economic Studies. http://www.jstor.org A Model of General Economic Ecuilibrium1 The subject of this paper is the solution of a typical ec-onomicequation system. -
Martin L. Weitzman: Prices Vs. Quantities
Prices vs. Quantities12 MARTIN L. WEITZMAN Massachusetts Institute of Technology I. INTRODUCTION The setting for the problem under consideration is a large economic organization or system which in some cases is best thought of as the entire economy. Within this large economic organization resources are allocated by some combination of commands and prices (the exact mixture is inessential) or even by some other unspecified mechanism. The following question arises. For one particular isolated economic variable that needs to be regulated,3 what is the best way to implement control for the benefit of the organization as a whole? Is it better to directly administer the activity under scrutiny or to fix transfer prices and rely on self-interested profit or utility maximization to achieve the same ends in decentralized fashion? This issue is taken as the prototype problem of central control which is studied in the present paper. There are a great many specific examples which fit nicely into such a framework. One of current interest is the question of whether it would be better to control certain forms of pollution by setting emission standards or by charging the appropriate pollution taxes. When quantities are employed as planning instruments, the basic operating rules from the centre take the form of quotas, targets, or commands to produce a certain level of output. With prices as instruments, the rules specify either explicitly or implicitly that profits are to be maximized at the given parametric prices. Now a basic theme of resource allocation theory emphasizes the close connection between these two modes of control.