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October 66 UNITEDSTATESARMYCOMMAND AND 6ENERAL STAFFCOLLEGE,FORTLEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANT Major General Michael S. Davison

ASSISTANT Ct)MMANDANT Brigadier General Robert C. Taber

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and General Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command. ,,. .-. ,“{--.~. ;- 7.­ :3’ l.: , ... ., , j$, , .,1 . )&‘. ;: :p&

I&;: , ‘“. ., “~ ,$-q; ~. .?.. - 2.;: Military Review Professional Journal of the US Army

Military Campaigns . . . ., ...... Anthony Sas 3

UN Peace Forces and International Law . . LTC Joseph k!. Corvino, USA 8

Return of the North Sea Ghosts , ...... Leslie Anders 19

Two Wiews on Wiotnam:

Let’s learn From the French . . . . (JOL Charles P. Biggie, Jr., USA 27 Specter of Dien Bien Phu . . . . . COL William F. Long, Jr., USA 35

leadership ...... GEN Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, Ret 411

Malhrovslry’s Manchurfan Campaign . . . . . Raymond L. Garthoff 5D

Nuclear Weapons Sharing ...... W. B. Bader 62

Implications of tho Developing flreas . . . . LTC L. D. Overstreet, USA 70

A Dragon With Nuclear Teeth . COL Ch’ien Cheng, Republic of China Army 1$

Soviet Defense Poficy . . . . Marshal R. Y. Ivlalinovsky, Soviet Army 85

Choose Your Weapon ...... COL Stanley W. Dziuban, USA, Ret 9D

MNitaryNotes ...... 97

Military Books ...... 1D7

The VIEWS expressed in this me azine ARE THE AUTHORS’ and not necessarily those of{ the US Army or the Command and Generaf Staff College. .. ‘3

Editor in Chief COL Oonald J. Oelaney

Associata Editor COL John B. Mcl(inney Army War College

Assistant Editor LTC A. Leroy Covey

Faatures Editor MAJ Charles A. Gatzka

Spanish.AmerioanEditor LTC Ren6 Ramos

Bracilian Editors LTC ParrloA. F. Viana LTC Walter J. Faustini

Production Officer MAJ Norman C. Murray

Staff Artist Charles k Moore

MILITARY ffEVl!l-Published monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff Colleae, Fort Leav­ enworth, Kansaa, in En Iiah, Spaniah, and Portuguese. Uae of funds for printing of this publication haa been approved by Heat quarters, Department of the Army, 28 May 1965. Second.claas postage aid at Fort Le?yenworth, Kansse. Subscription rates $4.00 (US currency) a year in the United Statea, B“!rlte~ Statqa mlhtary rmat oflicea, and thoee cormtriea which$re members of the Pan.American Postal Umon (mc!udwrgSpain); $5.00 a year in all other countriqs amgle copy price 50 canta. Address subscription mad to the Book Department, U. S. ArmY Commend and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansaa 66027. (Extractedfrom a speech by President Lyndon B. lohn- PEACEINASIA son, Washington, D. C., 12 July 1966)

If enduring peace can ever come to Asia, all mankind will benefit.

But if peace fails there, nowhere else will our achievements really be

secure.

By peace in Asia I do not mean simply the absence of armed hos­

tilities, For wherever men hunger and hate, there can really be no peace.

I do not mean the peace of conquest. For humiliation can be the

seedbed of war.

I do not mean simply the peace of the conference table. For peace

is not really written merely in the words of treaties, but peace is the

day-byday work of builders.

The peace we seek in Asia is a peace of conciliation between Corn

munist states and their noncommunist neighbors, between rich nations

and poor, between small nations and large, between men whose skins

are brown and black and yellow and whiter between Hindus and Moslems,

and Buddhists and Christians.

It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bonds

of peace: through international trade, through the free flow of people

and ideas, through full participation by all nations in an international

community under law, and through. a common dedication to the great

task of human progress and economic development.

PO L-J---JAN MILITARY o CAMPAIGNS ~

AnthonySas P T WAS Napoleon Bonaparte who Ionce said that the secret of war were lukewarm, if not cold, regarding lies in the secret of communications. such an endeavor. Thie is witneseed This maxim has been valid whenever by the uncoordinated planning and and wherever armies faced one an­ lack of cooperation among the three other, but it hae frequently been ig­ services. After futile efforts ,of the nored by military leaders. An out­ Luftwaffe to bomb England into sub­ standing example of the negative at­ mission, the invasion was postponed, titude regarding this dictum is that and German military planners on or­ of the German and Italian High Com­ ders from Adolf Hitler began to focus mands with respect to the Mediter­ their attention upon Eastern Europe, ranean theater of operations during specifically the Soviet Union. the Second World War. . After the >direct assault upon the When German troops-with token British Isles was abandoned in the help from the Italians—had victori­ late summer of 1940, some high-rank­ ously concluded the campaign in West­ ing Germans, including Grand Ad­ ern Europe by the end of June 1940, miral Erich Raeder, pointed out that the next logical step in trying to end Britain could etill be dealt a powerful, the war successfully would have been if not mortal, blow. This could he ac­ the defeat of Great Britain. This complished by severing her vital east- might have been accomplished by di­ west line of communications through rect invasion ,acrose the English Chan­ the Mediterranean Sea by occupying nel, but with few exceptions all the the British-held bases of Gibraltar higher war leaders of the Third Reich and Malta.

October 1966 “ Such a maneuver would interdict It was suggeeted that an attempt a significant part of Allied, especially be made to take Gibraltar by para­ British, eeaborne traSic to and from troopers backed by forcee that had the Middle and Far Eaet, forcing it croesed Spain. However, after pro­ to take the long route via the Cape of tracted negotiation with Spanieh Good Hope. It might, moreover, aid leadere, thie plan wae eventuaUy determined military efforts on the part dropped because the Spanish demands of the MIS from Libya into Egypt for euch collaboration proved to be exceesive and unrealistic. Strategic Location From a tactical standpoint, an oc­ cupation of the island of Malta would have been eimpler to carry out than an aeeault upon Gibraltar. Strategi­ cally, it would certainly have been most beneficial to the Axis cause. This rocky ieland with an area of about 100 equare milee hae little to offer ae far as raw materials are concerned. Practically all food and fuel muet be imported. Ite location made Malta strategically important eince it ie only about 60 miles south of Sicily, about 200 miles northeaet of Tripoli in Libya, and a similar dietance eaet of Tunieia. It lies about midway along the 2,200-mile-long sea route from Port Said and Alexandria to Gibral­ Grand Adadrsl Erich Reeder recognized tar. During the war, it formed a key tie strategicvalueof 4Xbraltersnd ?dalta link in the Allied supply line, with and the Nile Valley. This would de­ docking and repair facilities and a prive Britain of the use of the Suez refueling baee. For two years—July 1940 to mid­ Canal, threaten her petroleum eources eummer 1942-an attempt on the part in the Middle Eaet, and pose a flank­ of the Axis to wreet thie etrategic ing threat to the Soviet Union. croeeroads from British handa might Anthony SW ti Associate Professor have been crowned with eucceee. The of Geography at the Univeraitg of period between eummer 1940 and Sonth Caro13mzat Columbia. He holds early spring 1941 seemed especially a Ph. D. in Geographg from Cfnrk propitious for such an endeavor. The ?hiVeT8itU, WOYCe8tOT,Ma88fEChIWette; Germans during that time still had at and ha been on the Geography 8taff their dieposal a large force of highly at the Un$vemitg of Bfa@awd, and trained paratroopers that could have at Madimn CoUege, Harrieonburg, been employed in occupying the Brit­ Virginia. Thie article, writtctt while he woe a member of Madison CoUege, ieh airbasee on the island. was made poem”ble,in part, through a Even when the greater part of this reeearch grant from that college. elite force wae ultimately deetroyed

4 Miliity Review during the struggle for Greece and sity of a strong, continuous Mediter­ Crete in April and May of 1941, a ranean and North African war policy. Malta invasion might well have suc­ His vacillating and often negative at­ ceeded. Axis aifields and embarka­ titude for this theater of operations tion ports were only 60 to 70 miles was reflected in his considerations of away in Sicily, a powerful Italian fleet Field Marshal Rommel’s efforts as but was stationed on Taranto, and the a sideshow, aimed at cont@ning tbe Axis enjoyed air superiority over the Allies with a minimum of men and mid-Mediterranean. It is strange that so little attention was paid to Malta-apart from bomb­ ing and strafing raids+uring the time that German and Italian troops under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel fought their seesaw battles with the British in the Western Desert and Cyrenaica. For, just as Malta was vitally important to the Allied cause, an Axis occupation of the island would have safeguarded the supply route from Italy and Sicily to Libyan ports, thus assuring Field Marshal Rommel’s Afvika Km-pa of much needed mate­ riel and fuel. Invasion Pos@oned It appears that a determined effort to invade the island was contemplated only once, and that was during the us .4TnwPhoto. early summer of 1942 when Field Mar­ Malta ceuld haveaafegusrdedthe supply shal Rommel had enterad Egypt and route for Field MarshalErwinRommel’s was poised for a thrust to Alexandria Afrfka Korps and Cairo. But the overconfident Axis partners decided to postpone the Malta equipment. It was not until the Allied invasion until the Nile Valley had landinga in Morocco and Algeria in been captured with a final, lightning late 1942 that he finally awakened to thrust—a thrust that never material­ the importance of North Africa, and ized due to lack of fuel and armor, tried to save Tunisia by pouring the exhausted condition of Field Mar­ troopa and armor into tbia battlefield. shal Rommel’s troops, and the deter­ As for Allied strategy in the Med­ mined stand by the British at El iterranean theater after North Africa Alamein. had been cleared of Axis troops in A thorn in the side of the Axis, the spring of 1943, another statement Malta held out, surviving air raids, credited to Napeleon comes to mind. severe privation, and near-starvation. Upon being asked whom he preferred That it was never invaded is mainly to do battle against, the Emperor had due to the fact that Hitler could not eaid: “Alliee, beeause they seldom be persuaded of the strategic neces­ agree.”

Octobsr1966 !5 Of course, this was not entirely true Americans, aided by an amphibious during World War II, for the Allies landing at Salerno, captured Naples as far as Europe was concerned were on 1 October, and the British took the of one mind: the unconditional sur­ important Foggia airfields at about render of Italy and Germany. But it the same time. did hold true as to the ways and means In the meantime, Benito Mussolini of bringing this about. had fallen, the newly created Italian American military and political Government under Marshal Pietro leadere were staunch advocates of Badoglio had capitulated to the Allies, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s strategy for and German troops had begun to pour Europa-namely, a knockout blow at into central Italy. Germany across the Channel while all Enthusiasm Wanes other military operations in that thea­ It was then that a situation devel­ ter were to be considered as secondary oped in many respects reminiscent of in importance. Most of the British, that faced by Field Marshal Rommel and in particular Wineton Churchill, in Libya. The fighting continued— favored the exploitation of any weak against stiffening German opposition, spot in the armor of the enemy and in extremely difficult terrain, and un­ so regarded Europe’s soft underbelly. der appalling weather conditions-but The Soviet Union, clamoring for a it aeon became apparent that the Al­ second front, obviously favored the lies, and the United States in partic­ cross-Channel invasion and, hence, ular, considered this Italian theater played into the hands of the United important only insofar as it continued States who by that time had become to contain fairly numerous German the senior partner of the Western al­ forces. The result was that Allied liance. gains were usually measured in feet Invasion of Sicily rather than miles. An attempt to help Because a large-scale assault on the speed up their advance by a landing west coast of France was not feasible at Anzio early in 1944 failed for a then, a compromise was worked out variety of reasons, not the least of —to invade Sicily and to attempt to which was the lack of eqthueiasm for cross over from thk island to Italy. this operation on the part of some of It was hoped this move would knock the higher US commanders. that country out of the war. The Again, it is strange that no better insane for these undertakings, how­ use was made of the opportunities ever, were to remain limited because which offered themeelvee after the the buildup of the invasion forces in Italian collapse. Rather than persist­ England had to continue, and consid­ ing in the slugging match in the erable US forces and equipment bad rugged mountains of the peninsula, it to be channeled to the Pacific theater. might have been more expedient to Sicily was, indeed, invaded success­ have employed such forces ae were fully, and by the middle of August available for the occupation of Sar­ 1943 the island was in Allied hands. dinia and Corsica, especially eince the Then followed the crossing to the Germans had already evacuated them Italian mainland where, faced with early in October 1943. relatively minor opposition, Allied These two islands could then have forces rapidly moved north. The become important aircraft carriers

‘6 MiliiryReview MEDITERRANEAN from which to interdict movement of Occupation of that city would have troops and materiel in the valleys of had far-reaching political conse­ the Rhone and the Po and across the quence regarding future develop­ Alpine passes. They also could have ments in central Europe. becomestaging areas for a landing on Nothing is certain in war. Hence, Italy’s west coast, a maneuver which it is hard to eay whether such a strat­ would not only have put the German egy wOuldhave succeeded. But a mind forces in central Italy in jeopardy,, receptive and willing to exploit sud­ but might well have led to an invasion den opportunities rather than the sin­ of the Po Valley and an advance gle-mindedness of purpose exhibited through the Ljrrbljana Gap in the di­ in this case certainly would have ben­ rection of Vienna. efited the cause of the Western Allies.

LESSONSLEARNED The MILITARYREVIEWis particularly interested in receiv­ ing manuscripts covering lessons learned by US units in Vietnam. Problems of organization, command and control, equipment, tactice, and fire support merit informed discus­ sion. After complying with appropriate local regulations, authors may submit manuscripts direct to the MILITARYRE- VIEW.We will obtain the necessary security review on those accepted.

October1900 INCE World War II, most of the of natione. The most basic legal issue states of the world have heeome that arises ie the right of the United membersS of the United Nations “to Nations to use armed forces other save succeeding generation from the than those contemplated in chapter scourge of war.” To this end, they VII of the charter. have established as one of their pur­ Many other probleme of a legal na­ poses the maintenance of international ture also preeent themselves since the peace and eeeurity, and they have United Natione is an international or­ agreed to unite their strength “for ganization, while the members of mil­ suppression of acts of aggression” itary forces in its service are citizens and for the settlement of international of come nation-etate. This gives rise +J UN PEACE FORCES

INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 LieetemmtColonelJoseph M. Corvine, Um.ted States Arm#

disputes by peaceful means “in con­ to many questions involving tbe au­ formity with tbe principle of juetice thority to control and employ those and internatiomd law.” forces, the problem of financing such But the idea of using international operation, the legal etstus of indi­ forcee to maintain peace and eecurity vidual members of the forces, and the ie in direct conflict with the doetrinea rights and obligation of the states of national sovereignty and the rights and the organization involved.

.8 MilitaryReview ChapterVII of the charter provides thorized by chapter VII of the char­ for military forces under control of ter, both international law and the the Security Council to be employed charter itself prohibit the United Na­ in the maintenance of peace and se­ tions from placing such forces on the curity. These forces have not mate­ territory of a nation-state without rialized, and the United Nations has the consent of that government. It bad to develop new forms of peace­ is also necessary that the United Na­ keeping in an attempt to fulfill its tions have tbe consent of the members original purpose. The gradual change to employ their forces and materiel in thinking in the United Nations has in such operation. UN forces of one been due to the lack of nnanimity kind or another have been employed among the great powers since 1946 at least a dozen times since the or­ and to the radical change in the na­ ganization was founded. ture of war which haz been brought Majer Operations about through the development of In addition to a variety of observer highly sophisticated and destructive groups and truce supervisory experi­ weapon systems. ences, the United Nations has had Realistic Approach several major operations which used Collective security hae given way military units provided by member to a more realistic approach to peace­ nations. The United Nations. Com­ keeping. The United Nations has mand in Korea was established in abandonedthe idea that it can employ 1960 nnder chapter VII and is the ~ war to counter aggression and to en­ only example of the use of war to force peace. Forces from the less repel aggression. powerful nations have become an in­ The United Nations Emergency dispensable addition to the art of Forces in Egypt (UNEF) were cre­ peacekeeping through persuasion. To­ ated in October 1956 to deal with tbe day, the United Nations rises a mili­ Suez crisis. These forces were not de. tary force which strives not to fight signed to fight againat aggression, but and which is contributed by the rather were intended to bring about emaller powers. the peaceful settlement of one of the Since the peace-keeping forces nn­ most dangerous crises which the world der consideration are not those au- had seen since the end of World War II. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Cor­ The United Nations Observer vino in with the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Gronp in Lebanon was created in 1958 Advanced Studiee at Carlisle Bar­ to deal with the tense situation which racks, Pennsylvania. He received his had developed in that country. Prob­ B.S. degree in Military Studies from ably the greatest challenge to tbe the University of Maryland, hia M.S. United Nations arose in the Congo in Itttevnational Affai?’e from George in tbe latter part of 1960, when the Washington University, and wae grad­ Op&atbn dee Natiorw Vnies au Congo uated from the Air War College in was organized. Most recently, in 1965. He has eerved with both the March 1964, the United Nations Force 45th Infantry Division in Korea and with the .?d Armored Division in Ger­ in Cyprus was established. many, and was Signal Advisor with The role of UN peace forces was the Tnr’ki8h Atvmy. summed up nicely by Secretary Gen­

October1966 INTERNATIONAL LAW eral U Thant in 1963 when, referring rectieu and control of the Secretaq to the Suez, Lebanon, and Congo op­ Gerte~al acting on behalf of the or­ erations, he said: gane of the United Nationc. AU three LueTe impvouiaed and International law and international called into the jield at very short no­ organization are historical develop tice: all three were severelfl limited ments that have come about largely in their right to use fen%; all three because of a revulsion against war. were dem”gned solely for the mainte­ For at Ieaet 300 years, the nations of nance of peace and not for fighting the world have been aectdng ways of

USAriIw Turkeyeuppliedunite to the UnitedNations Commandiri Korea wherewar wae used to repel acgreeeion in the militarp sense; aU three were avoiding war by more judicious uee of recruited from the smaller powers and political actione and Iagal procedures. with special reference to thei~ accept- Old international law recognized tbe abilitg in the area in which thev were use of force as an instrument of in­ to eerve; all thrse operated with the ternational relatione. International exfmemcoweotrt and cooperation of the law attempted to prescribe the rules states or teffitm”es where theti wcTe for the conduct of wars that otber­ atationed, ae weU aa of arqt other par­ wise could not be prevented. ties directlv cowcerwed in the citua- The meet significant and revolu­ tion;and all thrse wore under the di- tionary development in international

10 Miliiry Review INTERNATIONAL LAW

law has been the outlawing of aggres­ as an unlawfnl aggressor or as a vic­ sive force ae a means of settling dis­ tim of aggression. To determine the putes.Contemporary law prohibits not legal Iimita governing the uee of force only the use of force in an aggressive by the United Natione, one must ex­ war, but also even the threat of force. amine the charter and the Uniting for The definition of “aggressive force;’ Peece Resolutions of 1950. however, is one still snbjeet to much Article 2 of the charter prohibits debate. members of the United Nations from Contractualand General laws either the threat or the use of force in Basically, there are two kinds of international relations or againet the international law: contractual law territorial integrity or political inde­ based on bilateral and multilateral pendence of any state. Afilcle 51 gives treaties, and general law which con­ ~,members the right of self-defense sists of the customary rules normally until the Security Council has taken followed hy etates in their relations measures necessary to maintain in­ with other states. Thus, law can be ternational peace and security. Chap­ taken ae the coordinated will of var­ ter VII ie the legal authority that ious states. permite the Seeurity Council to take The UN Charter is a multilateral “action with respect to threats to the treaty and constitutes contractual in­ peace, breaches of the peace, and acts ternational law. Ae an international of aggression.” These terms, however, organization, the United Nations has are not defined in the charter, and the only the powers and competence that Council has considerable latitude in are conferred ,upon it by the charter. their interpretation. However, the International Court of Collective Security Justice (ICJ) has rendered an ad­ The collective security eystem con­ visory opinion that the organization templated in chapter VII pledges all must also be deemed under law to members to refrain from the uee of have those powers necessary by im­ force and to participate collectively plication as being eeeential to the per­ through the organization to act formance of ite duties. The internal against any threat to peace. Peace­ w6rkings of the United Nations and keeping, however, is seen as a contin­ itz organs would, therefore, provide uous chain running through all of the rules in the general law category. methods of peaceful settlement. Mili­ One of the most important and tary force to restore peace is provided most controversial problems of inter­ as a last resort, and can be used only national law ie the establishment of if all of the five permanent members the legal Iimite within which states of the Seeurity Council are in agree­ and the United Nations may use force. ment. Military forces, however, have The basic rule-that force may not not been available to the Council be­ be used aggressively, but only in self- cause the great powers could not agree defens+is subject to interpretation on collective decisions that wonld be­ of the terms “aggression” and “self­ come the “law” under which those defense.” Also, this basic rule governs forcee could act. the actions of etatee rather than those The General Assembly’s role in of the United Nations eince the United peacekeeping was originally intended Nations can hardly be pictured either to be secondary to that of the Secur­

1 Octobsr1S0S ’11 INTERNATIONAL f.AW

ity Council, but in recent years the refer to the Council any matter re­ action of the Assembly has become lating to peace and security that m. increasingly important. The charter quires action. Strictly interpreted, authorizes the Aseembly to diecuss this limitation would appear to bar and to make reeommendations on any any recommendation by tbe Aseembly matter that might affect the mainte­ for any type of enforcement action. nance of peece and security or might A elightly broader interpretation, lead to international friction, but only however, would permit the Aseembly when the matter is not being diecussed to make recommendations when there in the Security Council. If the Coun­ is need for enforcement action other cil fails to take action, there ia noth­ than by the Security Council under ing in the charter which specifically chapter VII. prevents the Assembly from recom­ Legal Aspects mending appropriate actions. The legal basis for tbe Uniting for Uniting for Peace Peace Resolutions becomes rather in. Since the charter was eigned, the volved if considered from the stand­ Council has never been able to agree point of the collective seeurity powers on how to organize a UN police force, of the Council and the Assembly. Pro­ and, except for Korea, it has been un­ fessor Julius Stone, a noted authority able to agree on the use of force ae in the field, arguee that the legal and a coercive measure, The ability of the sociopolitical nature of the resolutions Council to take action without a veto is keyed to the self-defense provisions on the Korean question was a freak of Article 51. The members have tbe condition arising out of the abeence right of self-defense, individually and of the Soviet representation. Later collectively. They remain free to act debate in the Assembly resulted in or not to act on the recommendations the adoption of the Uniting for Peace of the Aseembly, Resolutions of November 1950 which It should be noted, however, that can be considered as a eeeondary plan Afilcle 51 states that members have for UN peacekeeping. the right of self-defense “if an armed The Assembly resolved that if the attack occurs againet a Member of Security Council ehould fail to exer­ the United Nations.” The Uniting for ciee its primary reeponeibility for the Peace Resolutions do not appear to maintenance of international peace be so restrictive. and security, the General Assembly Customary international law has would consider the matter immedb recognized for a long time that ately with a view to makhg appro­ friendly armed forces on the territory priate recommendation to members of another atate have a ‘cetiln im­ for collective rneaeuree, including use munity from the jurisdiction of the of armed force when necessary in the host etate. It ie almoet always neces­ case of a breach of the peace or act sary for the two etatee to enter into of aggreeeion. This resolution raised some type of agreement to establisb come legal problems. more specific rules for the clarifica­ The broad recommendation author­ tion of many legal and procedural ity of the Assembly is limited by the questione. History has recorded many last sentence of paragraph 2, Atilcle exzmplee of such agreements between 11, which requires that the Assembly states. The idea of international

12 INTERNATIONAL LAW forces, however, is a recent develop­ other country. The maintenance of ment, and the cuetomary law applic­ the international character of the op­ able to two etates, although related eration was to be considered of pri­ to the problem, does not apply directly. mary importance. The agreement between the United When UNEF personnel were in­ Nations and the best state is, there­ volved in a criminal action, they would fore, especially important. come under the jurisdiction of their The first real status of forces agree-” home countries. The Secretary Gen­ mentconclnded by the United Nations eral considered thk principle to have ,,. .,.- ,.­ .­

.­ U.ited Nation. Soldiers from India were Part of the United Nations EmergencyForcee in Egypt created to deel with the Suez crisis was the agreement with Egypt in set a most important precedent for 1957. The agreement provided that future agreements because it provided members of the force would conduct some guarantee of legal statua for themselves as international personali­ those personnel who might otherwise ties. The Secretary General was of the not be covered by any provisions of opinion that full loyalty to the aime international law. Civil juriedlction of the organization had to he required, was to be exercised hy the Egyptian and that the individual could not be Government in any matter not related permitted to divide his loyalty be­ to the official duties of a member of tween the United Nations and any the force. A Claims Commission would

October1966 ; 13 INTERNATIONAL LAW settle civil claims arising out of offi­ be settled by negotiation would be re­ cial duty. ferred to a tribunal of three arbitra­ The UNEF agreement also included tors. provision regarding freedom of As of Octuber 1958 the Secretary movament of personnel and vehicles, General believed that the status agree. use of communications and postal ment whkh applied to forces in Egypt serviees, uee of reads and other trans­ had met the test of experience. He portation facilities, and rights to pub­ recommended that ita basic principles lic utilities such ae water and electric­ be included in any similar agreements ity. It was agreed that the force, its in the future. He also cautioned that,

U.ilcd Natiow One of tbe gre-eteetchallenges to the United Netions arose in the Ckmgoin 1960 commanders, other oStcials, and mem­ although UN peace forces are not bers would have privileges and im­ fighting forcee, they must have the munities in accordance with the Con­ right to self-defense, and that there vention on the Privileges and Immuni­ must be a clear-cut definition of self- ties of the United Nations. defense in order to avoid conflict be­ Among other things, the agreement tween peace forces and combat opera­ also covered exemption from peespo~ tions under chapter VII. In the UNEF and visa regulations, the powera of opaation, the rule was applied that arrest and transfers of custody in­ men engaged in the operation could volving both the military police of the never take the initiative in the use force and the Egyptian authorities, of armed force, but were entitled to the right to beer arms, and the man­ respond with force to an attack with ner in which disputes that could not arms.

14 Military Rnviow INTERNATIONAL LAW

The formal agreement with the Re­ obvioue are that dependence was public of the Congo was not completed placed on voluntary contribution and until 27 November 1961, sixteen the solicitation of such contributions months after the initial request for was ieft to the Secretary General. He UN intervention in the Congo. Com­ has pointed out on more than one oc­ parison of this document with the casion that this method ia most un­ UNEF agreement reveale much simi­ satisfactory, that there is a large de­ larity. However, the Congo agreement gree of uncertahty about how much seems to incorporate many of the will actually be available, and that basic rules which were developed through the UN experience in Egypt. The Congo agreement included a para­ graph which differentiated the respon­ sibilities of the Congolese Govern­ ment and the United Nations in their mutual endeavora to maintain peace and security. LegalStipulation A statement wae also included to atipuiate that the United Natione wouid have recourse to force oniy as a Iaet resort, while the Congolese au­ thorities had the right to resort to force in conformity with iaw when executing their legal duties. Both par­ ties felt that the agreement would be considered as hating been effective from the date of arrival of the first elements of the UN force. TKIS pro­ vision was undoubtedly included to the planning and advance arrange­ provide some legal basia for the set­ ments essential to the efficient and tlement of juridical dieputeeand quee­ economical operation are sorely ham­ tions which had ariaen in the preced­ pered. ing months of operation. Tbe UN Charter deala with the The status of forces agreement be­ question of financing all operations of tween the United Nations and the gov­ the organization in Article 17. Thie ernment of Cyprus wee effected by an article provides that the General As­ exchange of letters on 31 March 1964, sembly shall coneider and approve the iess than one month after the Security budget, and that the expenses of the Council had authorized the estabiieh­ organization shaii be borne by the ment of the force. Examination of members as apportioned by the As­ thie document reveals a close similar­ sembly. In its brevity, the afilcie ity to the agreement which had been seems to leave no doubt as to its made in Egypt and the Congo. meaning. However, some members are In examining the UN methods of still dieputing the legality of Peace­ financing peace-keeping operationa, keeping aeaesamente. two particular aepeete which become Afilcle 19 provides that a member

October19SS \ 15 INTERNATIONAL LAW which becomes two yeere in arrears Council should be eeseseed in accord­ in the payment of its financial obliga­ ance with “the generally recognized tions shall lose ite vote in the Gen­ principle of international law that ag. eral Aesembly. By December 1961 the greeeor states bear political and ma­ Aesembly was faced with the fact that terial responsibility for the aggres­ many members had ,not made their sion they commit.” contributions to the peace-keeping ef­ The USSR held that the operations fort because they questioned the le­ in the Middle East and the Congo gality of their obligation to pay on were not conducted in accordance with the basic that the operation had not the UN Charter and, therefore, did been properly authorized. Faced with not place any financial obligation on a financial crisis, the Assembly au­ the membere of the United Nations. thorized a 200 milliondollar issue of She based her argument on the fact 25-yezr bonds and decided to aek the that UNEF had not been authorized ICJ for an advisory opinion. It took by the Secnrity Council, and that the this action “recognizing its need for General Assembly, while it might rec. authoritative legal guidance” regard­ ommend with regard to questions of ing the financing of UN operatilonein peace and security, must refer cases the W]ddle East and the Congo. requiring action to the Council. Legal Opinion In the case of the Congo operation, The Court found that the responsi­ the USSR stated that, although the bility of the Security Council was operation had been initially author­ “primaryfl not exclueive. The General ized by the Council, the Secretary Aesembly wae also considered to have General had violated the provisions of certain powers in connection with the charter by deciding for himself peace and security. The Court voted which natione would be invited to take nine to five that the expenses were part. Later, the General Assembly, properly those of the organization without competence under the charter, and should be paid by assessment on made a decieion to appropriate funds the members. Although the Court’s for the operation and to appofilon the opinion wae advieory and does not coet among the membere. have the binding force of a domestic British-Unitad States Viaws law, the General Assembly would he The Britieh and US Government inconsistent if it now took a view have taken.the stand that one perma­ contrary to the legal opinion. The ie­ nent member of the Security Council sue of Ati]cle 19—lees of vote in the cannot be considered to have the right General Assembly for those members to block completely the peace-keeping two years in arrears-must still be machinery of the Unit6d Nations. faced. Both governments point to the ad­ The Soviet Union has taken the vieory opinion of the ICJ and to the stand that the Security Council is the opinions of the majority of the mem­ only organ of the UN that ie author­ bers as reflected in pertinent resolu­ ized to take action when military tions of the General Aaeembly. forces are required. It eontends that The US statement concluded that military forces should be ueed only as the financial and constitutional crisie a last resort, and that the costs of must be solved if the organisation ie those operation authorised by the to continue ae an effective instrument.

16 MiliirsReview INTERNATIONAL tAW

It called for the cooperation of all that the idea of collective security membersin an effort to find a solution was overly ambitioua and has not which would avoid the requirement worked because the world waa not yet for application of Article 19, and ready for it. The great-power coop­ which would strengthen the organiza­ eration envisioned in the charter has tion and enable it to continue its role failed to materialize, and the mem. as “Man’s best hope for a peaceful hers of the United Nations have’ world.” sought another method of achieving The 19th General Assembly care­ and maintaining peace in the world. fully avoided any issue which might The new art-peacekeeping by per­ have required a public vote, thus euasion—when permitted to function avoiding the application of Article 19. hae proved successful as a method of Little meaningful business could be peaceful settlement of dieputes. Thus, conducted under such circumstances. something new, eomethhrg useful, but During the 20th Assembly, the United somethhig controversial has developed States agreed to abide by the major­ from the aspirations of 20 years ago. ity will and not to press the Article “Legality” Oispute 19 issue. In the meantime, there has Although tbe world is changing been much backstage negotiation in and the old international law is not an attempt to find a solution based on completely applicable, the nations of some United States-Soviet compro­ mise. A committee of 33 nations has the world have come to accept the idea been directed to examine tbe problem, of conducting international relatione but no solution has been suggested. according to a generalized body of contractual and customary interna­ Voluntary Contributions tional law. Althongh this law is ad­ It was expected that voluntary con: mittedly not enforceable in the usual tributions would be made to cover out­ standing peace-keeping costs. Only sense, it ie binding in the moral sense. about 20 million, dollars has been re­ The present controversy over the fi­ ceived to offset a deficit of over 100 nancing of peace-keeping operations million dollare. Neither France nor is a dispute over the “legality” of the USSR—heading the list of debt- those operations. It is evident that the ers—has made any contribution or members of the United Nations are a definite commitment to do so. The seeking legal answers to political United Statea ie still willing to pay questions. her fair share, but insista that others The Uniting for Peace Resolutions bear their part of the burden. The were developed as an expedient plan United Nations is approaching the for peacekeeping in the absence of point where it may have to abandon great-power agreement-e matter of those peace-keeping operations in necessity and an attempt to give some which it is now engaged. Several practical meaning to tbe peace-keep­ countries have informed the Secretary ing mission of the United Nations as General that they cannot go on ab­ contemplated in the charter. Support­ sorbing the costs, and will have to ers of the resolutions contend that the withdraw their troope unless they are legal issuee in peace-keeping finances reimbursed for their expenditures. are a matter of law and have been up­ A general conclusion can be drawn held by the ICJ.

October1966 , 17 INTERNATIONAL LAW

The advisory opinion of the ICJ cation-it must find some solution to supported the majority opinion of the the current impasse in ths United Na. Generel Assembly, upheld tbe legality tions. This solution must, of course, of the Uniting for Peace Resolutions, be n~gotiated in the political arena, legalised the Egypt and Congo opera­ but the outcome must be a legal solu. tions, andaf7irmed the legal reeponsi­ tion, legally accepted by and legally bility of the UN membere to share binding on all of the great powers and the financial burden of those opera­ all members of the United Nations. tions. Rut there were five dissenting Possible solutions include amend. votes on that advisory opinion. Just ment of the UN Charter and develop­ as there is lack of agreement among ment of an international convention the great powere, the legal opinion was on the subject of peacekeeping. No lacking in unanimity. The Assembly solution seems possible, however, un­ ia fmPing for a behind-the-scenes SO­ til those who now question the legal­ lution which will not be an utter dis­ ity of past peace-keeping operations regard for the Court’s advieory opin­ recall again that the preservation of ion--an opinion for which tbe Assem­ peace in the world is a question of bly asked. the preservation of law and order. If the world community is to con­ With this obstacle overcome, the world tinue to derive value from peace-keep­ community can then move closer to­ ing operations-in fact, if it is to ward the development of that world forestall a serious blow to the future law which will contribute to “world development of international organi­ peace.

Theroad to world order,theresdtoa rule of law irrthe worldie not an easy one. It will eentinrreto be arduous,and beset by agonizing hurdle% peinfal decision%dillicalt eempromises,and, et time% dishearteningset. bscks. Traveling the read will demsnd the most from each of ’es. I prsy that we shall beeqasl to the task.

Ambamador Arthur J. Goldberg

18 Military Revinw RETURNOF THE NORTH SEAGHOSTS Lsslie Aaders

N THE generation leeding up to World War I, the 1Unitsd Kingdom held the world leadership which has since passed to the United States. Like today’s American leaders, the Britieh chiefs then gazed nervously across frssdom’s ramparts in anticipation of a sscmingly in­ evitable climactic struggle with authoritarian militar­ ism. Soviet Ruseia’s reeket-rattling diplomacy is a fitting successor to Kaiser Wilhelm II’s diplomacy by bluster, and the commissar’s “world revolution” has succesded the Kaiser’s We2tpolit#c. Communism’s new industrial­ ism has rise+nto challenge the older industrialism of the Unitsd States just as Garman induetry once threw down NORTH SEA GHOSTS sphere and outer space, whereas be- ,, the Dutch, and the French had been fore 1914 it was the salt water of the repulsed in their turns. The Royal North Sea separating the British and Navy had faced the challenge of con­ German F1eeta. Unmanned missiles verting to eteam, iron hulls, steel have succeeded the manned warships armorplating, torpedoes, and ever- of 1914. greater ordnance. After 1898 the British, as did their Each threat had raised the fleet to American cousins 40 yeara later, re­ new heights of superiority over van­ luctantly abandoned a traditional quished or potential rivals. In all pre­ splendid isolation in favor of sub­ vious centuries, the Briton bad shaken stantial diplomatic commitments to off every appearance of decadence,and foreign powers. The Kaiser’s unman­ he was to display the same qualities nerly utterances and boundless am­ in the yeare leading to 1914. bitions for a “place in the sun” had German Challenge already caet a pall on Anglo-German Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, relations when, in 1898, the Germane German Navy Minister, had hardly announced a sudden new naval pro­ started his Imperial master’s cam­ gram calling for a sustained effort paign to “seize the trident of Neptune” to build 38 capital ships and 20 ar­ when a worthy opponent moved into mored cruiaere. the British Admiralty to take com­ Fear of Invasion mand of the fight to keep British Smoldering Britieh resentment of eupremacy on tbe North Sea. Admiral German commercial succeseee now Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher, relentless, ripened into fears of a future German remorseless, and ruthless, became invasion, a eentiment aggravated by First Sea Lord in 1902, bringing to a rising virulent anti-Germanism in the Admiralty a eense of urgency that England. British diplomacy soon it badly needed and would continue created a Triple Entente with France to have until the outbreak of war and Russia to contain Germany’s Tri­ justified bis expectations. ple Alliance with Italy and Austria- The officers of the Royal Navy were Hungary. put on notice that the enemies of Fisher’s drive for eecurity would have Facing the German threat, the Brit­ widowed wives and fatherless chil­ ish showed the courage, ingenuity, dren, that the neutral officers would and perseverance of their ancestors. see their careers blighted. If you did Dominating the seas around Europe not eupport Fisher totus percue, as since the late 16th century, they had he loved to say, you might as well survived every peril created by schem­ ing enemies or the implacable ad­ oppose him equally “whole hog.” For seven frantic years, the grim vances of technology. The Spaniarde, old seadog hammered away at the This article was digested from tremendous job of turning back the the original, publiehed in the German’s challenge. He established JOURNALOF THOUGHT,Jamuwlt nucleus crews for mothballed vessels, 1966. thereby gaining precious future mo­ Dr. Andere is Professor of bilization time. The submarine came HL407y at Cera?rd Mi880rLriState into the British naval establishment, COl&?Qeat wrTTT8?WbUTQ. although scoffers secretly laughed for

20 Miliiry Review NORTH SEA GHOSTS

a while at “Fisher’s toys.” Sir John It was far superior to all those con­ ruthlessly scrapped thousanda of tons ventional pre-Dreads, with their five of obsolete shipping, battled Parlia­ and eix-inch popguns. Some older mentyear in and year out for bigger ships, it is true, had a few 12-inch appropriations, and established the guns aboard, but their mixture of Home Fleet—a concentration of Brit­ large and small ordnance had caused ish naval power in the North Sea, great confusion in spotting salvos at headquartered at Scapa Flow, in the great ranges. Orkneys. The new battlewagon, having no In MS ferocious effort to keep the smaller artHlery, was the all-big-gun Royal Navy supreme, Fisher came UP type and thus a far deadlier kind of ship than its predecessors. Britain, with her long hezdstzrt in pre-llreads, now awakened to find the vast bulk of the Royal Navy obsolescent. Sup­ pose Tirpitz now hurried up and launched a German Dreadrwught-er two, or three? Taehnology had handed down the grim verdict that a new naval race must start, and Sir John bravely and unilaterally decreed that Britain would double Tirpitz’ Dread­ nought launchings “until charcoal sproute.” Guns or Butter? The new battleship was born under an unlucky political start. In tbe very year of ite commissioning, the Liberal Party swept into power on a platform promising expensive social welfare programs to an England beginning to suffer the consequences of a fading Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Ger­ industrial predominance. Guns or but­ man Navy Minister, thwarted British efforts to curb the naval arms race ter ? With Tirpitz on one side of them and economic insecurity on the other, with such a tremendous breakthrough the voters meant to have both guns in naval technology that even he was and butter. Let the politicians handle terrified at his success. In 1905 the the detills ! Government circles shud­ HMS Dr-.sarZrtougMwas placed in com­ dered, highly uncertah that the tax­ mission, a splendid behemoth 490 feet payer conld or would foot both bills. long, displacing 17,000 tons, and Hoping against hope that somehow carrying ten 12-inch guns in its five the German Government might let turrets. them off this hook, the Liberals de­ The Dreadnought had cost about cided to extend an olive branch to 4.5 million dollars (the value of Ho- Berlin by unilaterally reducing Brit­ ratio Nelson’s entire fleet at Cape ain’s naval program. Since the war­ Trafalgar) and could make 21 knots. like Tories had started this Dr-ea&

Octobsr1966 NORTN SEA 6NOSTS

~9ht race, and had laid down four Before he retired in 1909, Fisher Dreadnought keels in 1905, while the did it again. In that year, the Iv’err Germane laid only two, the Llherale Duke was launched, a 25,000-ton vee­ announced that they would lay only eel carrying ten 131/2-inchguna in five three keels in 1906. Tirpitz greeted turrets. Capable of landing seven tons the L]beral gesture by raising bie of “payload” on tergeta 35,000 yards 1906 program to three. Thinking that dietant, the Iron Duke bad armament Tirpitz had failed to get the meeeage, half again as potent ae anything Tir­ London reduced the 1907 estimatw to pitz had yet dieplayed. So far as two-only to find Tirpitz raising his gunpower was concerned, Fisher was to four. pulling away from Tirpitz in 1909 and The Llheral Cabinet had no choice 1910. but to go back to the naval race, and Fieher had aleo faced up to the ie­ the game wae played Fkher’e way sue of armor versus speed. You need again, for a while. both, he reasoned. But did every all- NavalSupremacy Ended? big-gun chip have to he weighted down During these years, the British with speed-capping armor ? In naval public and political leadership die- warfare, there was more to do than played a dietreeeing tendency to over­ just slug it out capitzl shipto-capital dramatize the immediate significance ship. What about a ship capable of of tbe Dreadvmvtght. This had hap­ outshooting anything that could catch pened many times before in other it and outrunning anything that could cseee. When Britabv floated her firet outehoot it? ironclad in the middle of the 19th Tbe answer was the battle cruiser, century, and it wae leerned in J..en­ an all-big-gun veseel designed for don that France wae getting two, tbe pursuit and outflanking work, with halle of Parliament rang with la­ the firepower of a Dreadnought, but mente over the end of Britiln’s navsl with only a fraction of the armor. supremacy. As if the great mass of Fieher’e new creotion, of which the wooden warships in Her Majeety’s Home Fleet had nine when war came, Navy had euddenly vanished! As if could make 25 knote to the average their shells had loet the power to kill! battleship’s 21. The British public in the last century, Churclrill’ainnovation as with the American public today, Two yeare after Fisher’s retirement seemed prone to hail each military in­ ae Britainae senior admiral, civilian novation as rendering worthless all leadership of the navy paseed to 37­ existing hardware. year-cdd Winston S. Churchill. The But thie is seldom the case in fact, new Liberal First Lord of the Ad­ and it waa not ao 50 years ago. Ad­ miralty, destined for greatness ae a miral Reinhard Scheer, who com­ war leader, laid ample foundations nanded the Cerman High Sea Fleet for his reputation as a creative mili­ at Jutland in 1916, later congratu­ tary thinker within the three ehort lated himself on a last-minute deci­ years of peace remaining after 1911. ~ion to take pre-Dreada introbattle­ Three great deeisione were before tfter learning that the old outmoded Churchill, each of which conttined ,eeeele had saved hia battle cruiser the possibility of decisive etrategic .quadron from probable annihilation. advantages-or devastating damage

Military Reviaw NORTN 55A GHOSTS

to the nation’s security. These were start” might be forfeited. But, backed ricks that demanded a Churchill, and by the enthusiastic Fisher, Churchill the man and the hour met without boldly took the plunge. ceremony and without trembling. All the guns were ordered after a The 13?./z-inchgun had amply proved hasty test firiiig of a model rifle by itself, hut Churchill was anxious to the Ordnance Board and a private “go one size better: an urge not un­ steel firm. It would be a year before known in the administration of pree­ the outcome of the gamble would be ent-day space exploration projects. fully known. And if it failed? Church- Why not a 15-inch gun for the capital ill needed little imagination to picture ships now being built ? Fisher, when an indignant House of Commons asked for his opinion, declared that hounding him into political limbo as adoption of the new naval rifle would a brash and erratic lad who had sub­ be the equivalent of a great naval stituted hia immature judgment for victory and agreed with Churchill that that of older and wiser heads—and failure to investigate its potentiali­ endangered his country in the bar­ ties would constitute “treason to the gain ! Empire.” But it all came right in the end. Increased Appropriations The 15-inch rifle proved capable of Problems arose, however. Bigger landing a ton of explosive on targets guns meant bigger ships, and this, 35,000 yards away, and with deadlier in turn, meant hectoring a balky Par­ accuracy than older models. “I felt as liament for increased naval appro­ if I had been delivered from a great priations. Moreover, the tense stra­ peril: Churchill later conceded. tegic situation on the North Sea made Fast Oivision it necessary to avoid construction This coup led the First Lord di­ delays while redesigning vessels al­ rectly to another. Eight of these new ready on hand. Worse yet, no 15-inch guns could throw a salvo greeter by a gun had ever existed. Was it even ton than 10 of the 13% ’s-znd give feaaible? Would it achieve the greater a disproportionately higher explosive range and accuracy along with in­ effect, too. The gleam returned to creased payload that the 13-inch gun Churchill’s eye. He pondered the out­ iiad shown in comparison with the 12? come of putting just eight of these Would it create unforeseeable stresses mighty guns on a regular Dremf­ that would fatally mar the five great nought, keeping the 13-inch armor- ships then being built ? plated sides, and devoting the old fifth Weighing the hazards, Churchill turret’s space to increaaed engine realized that it would take a year to power. He thought the result might prove out the new gun to the engi­ be a battleship with the apeed of a neers’ satisfaction. This meant that battle cruiser, but with superior ar­ fivecapital ships would have to be com­ mor and firepower. The Admiralty missioned “with an inferior weapon went right to work to build its Fast to that which we had it in our puwer Division—the 31,000-ton Warepite, to give them;’ or else that they would Barham, Mafa~a, QueenElizabeth, and go to sea with untried Ifi-inch rifles Valiant, ships fast enough and dan­ that might ruin them. Either way you gerous enough to fight two World sliced it, a year of precious “head Wars.

Octohor 1903 .....

NORTH SEA MOST’S

But brilliant advances have a way dependent on foreign oil sources of leeding into knotty problems. It would necessarily prees the govern- turned ont that the super-lh’eude of ment to take the lead in prospecting the Fast Division could make 25 knote for oil and purchasing oil properties only by using petroleum fuel. AddL in such places ae India, Pereia, and tionally, the Admiralty learned that the Arab Middle Eaet. “This led to oil would give the navy 40 percent enormous expenee and tremendous op more radius per ton of fuel coneumed position on the Naval Eetimatee; J&/

The HMS Dreadnought, carrying ten 12-inchgun%was the all-big-guntyps battleship and thus far deadlierthan the pre-Dreed8 than it could get using coal. Tankers Churchill admits, “yet it wae abso­ could refuel the battlewagons at see, lutely impossible to turn back.” whereas a fourth of a coal-burning The military literature of that “age fleet was always back in port taking of anxiety” on the eve of 1914 dra­ on coal. Under wartime conditions, matically captures for the reader the the coaling operation would rob the apprehensions daily haunting London. entire crew of ita shore leave. It was Would the Germans some day Pull a also found that Convefilng to oil cataclysmic surprise? would cut maintenance and operating Churchill had no fear of their gun­ personnel in half. Weighty reasons nery. The worst “nightmare novel” he for converting ! had ever read had portrayed a Ger­ But this had its repercussions. man fleet unmaeking 15-inch artillery Fleets of tankers had to be built to to inflict a climactic defeat on the bring in petroleum from abroad since Royal Navy. But Churchill could com­ England had no oil resources of her fort himself that “this boot wae on own. Great storage facilities had to the other leg.” But what about tor­ be built and protected. And a navy pedoes, increasingly sophisticated and,

24 MilitaryReview now deliverable with tenfold force by But the British official poiicy, ae submarines? Might not fiendish new enunciated by ChurchIll at Glasgow types of mines erase Britain’s margin in 1912, wee that “We have no of safety on the day of decision? thoughts . . . of aggression, and we To keep the navy alert, Churchill attribute no euch thoughts to other occasionally ordered surprise count­ Great Powers.” The Foreign Office downs, aeking the naval staff ‘What ehortly afterward declared to the Ger­ happens if war with Germany etarts mans that England would “make no today?” Always on their toes, the ad­ unprovoked attack on Germany, pur­ mirale triumphantly demonstrated to sue no aggressive policy towards her.” Churchill how they could on ehort no­ NavalIlolldajr tice effect dispositions that would face Such expressions awakened no cor­ the oncoming Germane with superior responding sentiments in Berlin, but seapower. the Britieh Government decided in The Home Fleet carefully chose the the winter of 1911-12 to approach time for ite cruises to Spain and back Germany with proposals for a “naval —waiting until the German Navy wae holiday.” As is so often the caee in having its winter refits. British North politics, the Cabinet had twin mot­ Sea maneuvers were conducted with ives. The more idealistic Ministers careful regard for coaling and chore primarily hoped for a relaxation of leave arrangements which would not teneions on the North Sea diplomatic unduly embarrass the Home Fleet front. The more hard-boiled members should the Germans make their move. argued that the government’s hand Seeking Solutions would be etronger in the annual battle As in today’s cold war, statesmen for military appropriation if the in pre-1914 Britain were continual y House of Commone were convinced searching for a release of the unbear­ that an honest effort had been made able tensions created by the strategic to mitigate the ruinously expensive situation on the North Sea. After the naval race. Liberal regime’s attempt to achieve The negotiations with Germany CUL disarmament by example collapsed in minated in the visit of the Secretary 1907, Fieher began campaigning for of State for War, Richard B. Haldane, a “Pearl Harbor” attack on the Ger­ to Berlin in early 1912. But the high mans after the faehion of the Japa­ British hopes for a naval settlement nese thrust at Port, Arthur in 1904­ went to pieces in a hurry. The IMser or Britain’s own ravishment of Den­ gave Haldane a copy of proposed Ger­ mark’s Fleet in 1801. man naval construction for the yeare Meet British statesmen rivaled their 1912-16. This revealed a naval pro­ American cousins in sentimentality, gram destined to give Germany a 29 and they were also morally above to 22 lead in capital ships unless a Fkher’s doctrine of the “pre-emptive naval moratorium were achieved right strike,” as we would cell it today. away+r a drastic increase in Brit­ The Committee of Imperial Defense ish construction undertaken. secretly considered it very likely that A naval holiday, the German For­ Germany would, if deeieive results eign Office insieted, was unthinkable were obtainable, try preemption unless coupled with a general political against the Home Fleet. settlement. Germany would be glad to

October 1966 nom SEA6HOSTS scrap her projected increase in cap­ of it will certainly bring swift and ital ships, provid~ Britain gave a bitl,cr retribution. contractual guarantee of her future Purity of motive and sincerity of neutrality in the event of a conflict intent are by themselves of little value among the continental powera. There­ when dealing with opportunistic an­ forg if Britain would junk the Triple tagonists cynically determined to ex­ Entente, the foundation stonee of h% ploit every ahow of generosity toward security, and return to “eplendid iso­ them. Panic is not very helpful in such lationfl Germany would be pleased to situations either, for human opponents scrap some of her unbuilt warakdps. never turn out to be supermen. Heads, Germany wina; Me, Britain Finally, there has never been a bet. 10SSS.Britain’s future security had to tar time in the history of the world be left at the mercy of what Prince than now to promote the education of Bismarck had pradkted would be the sovereign citizenry in the history “some fool thing in the Balkans.” and terminology of the profession of There exiets, then, a dkwernible arms. In recent dcsadcs, it has become similarity hetwean the pre-1914 and crystal clear that warfare can no the post-1945 eras. Whether the pres­ longer be the exclueive province of a ent era will end with a vast thermo­ closed society of professionals. nuclear incineration of the human Modern war has forced itself upon species is not witMn the competence the people as a whole, obliterating of the historian to euggcet. But while once meaningful db3tinctions between making all due allowances for large civilian and military epheree. The vo­ and for small dltferencca between the reeious requirements of past wars two eras compared above, it is clear and fears of future wars consume to­ that we can draw valuable lessons day more than half of the US Federal from the British experience of the budget, a tenth of the grose national earliei day. product. Each challenge poeed by technical The American public owes ite mili­ progrees must be faced reeliaticzlly, tary professionals the sympathetic notwithetantilng the tendency of mil­ understanding that comes only from itary eetablishmente to grow conser­ a deepening acquaintance with tbe vative toward familiar herdware. The past and present of warfare. Such value of vigorous and imaginative ci­ understandhg eecms the best guar­ vilian and military leadership cannot antee that our eociety will win the be overstresead. Vigilance ia no infall­ endurance conteet thrust upon it ible guarantee of vietory, but the lack within the pact generation.

26 MilitcIY RCVIO Two VIEW ON VIETNAM

z= LErSLEARHFROMTHE 3

C&rIel CharleoP. Bk@o, k Um%d Statee Arrw

ECAUSE the”f~rench Ioet their war in Vietnam, many Americans are Bprone to caet only a perfunctory glance at French experiences in that war. Americans are alao quick to point out that consideration of the French experi­ ence is not appropriate today because the United States is far wealthier and more powerful than France wae in those days. Besides, the aeerreationie some­ times made that the French Government and the French people were never fully behind the war effort. Although these argumenta may be valid, it would be foolish, if not dan­ geroue, to ignore the mistakes which the French made in Indochina. There are a surprisingly large number of aimilaritiee between the French war and the one now being fought in Vietnam: @ The terrain and climate are the came.

Octehor10S8 I 21 i.ET’~ f.EARN

. The foa is virtually the came. independence for Vietnam. But Ho � The enemy is using the came Chi-minh’e was not the only voice principles and tactics. clamoring for fraadom. There were . There isa contiguous sanctuary, other nationalist leadere who also and no feaeible means to eeal the wanted independence and who were border. not Communists. As late ae mid-1949, . The battle environment facili­ France etill had an opportunity to tates guerrilla operations. come to terme with these non-Com­ Importance of ldeolo~ muniet nationalist and thereby block Perhaps the most significant mis­ Ho Chi-minh. tske that the French made in Indo­ At that time, however, France did china wae not military at all. It was not see the problem in terme of inde­ the political dacieion to reinstitute pendence or nationaiiem. She wae not colonial rule after World War II. Juet prepared to make conceseione. She aix weeks after V-J Day, the French wanted to retsin Indochha ae a col­ eoldiers who had been interned in ony. Thus, Ho Chi-minh emerged ae Saigon by the Japanese took over the the strongest Vietnamese leader, and city in a coup d’etat, and French co­ he led the revolution againet French lonial administration was seen reee­ “colonial reconquest.” tahliehed on South Vietnam. By April Win Minds 1946, North Vietnam had also been Ho Chi-minh eaw the struggle ae brought under French control. an idacdogicai we in which colonial­ These meaeures were out of etap ism was but one element—albeit an with the surge of nationalism which important one. Although recognizing swept the colonial areas aftar World the importance of winning early bat­ War II. Moraover, the new leader of tles against the French, he felt tkat the Weet, the Unitad Statee, soon it was an absolute neeeesity to win made clear her opposition to colonial­ the minds of the paople by convincing ism. In spite of these developments, them that his ideoiogy wae better than however, France took positive meae­ that of the French. ures to consolidate her poeition. This doee not mean that Ho Chi­ minh tried to dazzle the peopl+many Aimoet immediately, ehe wae chal­ of whom were peaeants—with complex lenged by Ho Chi-minh, a Communist, Marxiat philoeophiaa. On the con­ who capitalized on the nationalistic trary, he reduced hie concepts to sim­ fervor of the people by demanding ple terme that all could understand. Colonel Charlee P. Btggio, Jr., is It wae not difficult for him to explain with the Defense InteUigence Agsn@ that Vietnam should belong to the in Waahingtow, D. C. He served in Vletnameee, that the Frenchmen were Europe dzwing World War II; was there to enrich themselves at the ex­ oseigned to Headqmzrteve, US ArtmI pense of the Vietnamese, that France Security Agencg in Wmhington; and ae a nation was keeping herself strong eaw eeroice with the 8Zd ArtiUer?t, US by stealing the resourcee of her colo­ Army, Europe. He hokia an M.A. da­ nies, and that it wae time for the gree from the University of MaW­ hated colonial rule to come to an end. iand, and was graduated from the US Army War College in June of this He biamed aii the ioeai probiems— WXZT. political, social, and economic-on the

28 MilitaIY ROViOW I.ST’S LEARN

system which the French had im­ they took were too little and too late. posed on Vietnam. He found fertile The bulk of the population had allied ground on many issues where reforme itself with the aide whoee cause were, indeed, long overdue, euch as seemed to be cloeeet to their own— reapportionment of the land. the Vietminh. Ideology was given primacy so as Intalligenca to provide a “noble csuee” to both the Success in guerrilla war depends people and the army. By thoroughly on intelligence. Good intelligence de­ indoctrinating hk troops, he was able pends on the support of the people. te instill strong revolutionary 2ss1 Once the bulk of the people was lost, and a willingness to endure extreme therefore, the French found them­ privations and riske. Under the man­ selves at a terrific dlaadvantage. Vir­ tle of a common ideology, the people tually every time the French made a and the army were to function as a move, the word wae paased by local single entity. Vietnamese civiliana to the nearest Offensive Underestimated Vietminh ‘agent who, in turn, got the The French underestimated the po­ word to the army. The French found tency of this ideological offensive. themselves trying to conduct military They saw the problem as one which operations in a “fiehbowl: thereby simply required military suppression denying to them the important ele­ in the conventional colonial manner. ment of tectical srrrpriee. French ideology was based on a con­ The possible use of helicopters to viction that reeolonialization of Viet­ obtain surpriee with epeed was not nam was a eort of validation of their feasible since there were only a hand­ victory in World War II, and thus ful of helicopters in the theeter. The neeeeeary for the maintenance of Communists alwaya had a good eeti­ French greatnees. They also rational­ mate of French strength in a given ized that the Vietnamese would, there­ sector, but the French seldom had a by, benefit from French culture and good idea of what was facing them. civilization. when the French made a mobile These views were convincing to thrust into enemy territory, the Com­ most Frenchmen, but they had little munists not only could tell the prob­ I appeal to the Vietnamese. Many thou­ able depth of the penetration and the sands of Vietnamese, in both North probable duration of the operation, and South, made their choice againat but aleo the probable intentions of communism. Many other Vietnamese tbe commander. might have preferred liberal democ­ Recognizing the importance that in­ racy to communiem if democracy had telligence would play in the struggle, provided them with political independ­ the Vietminh in about 1948 formed ence ineteed of colonial status. France, an intelligence eervice that became an however, was unwilling to make this elite corps whose members were hand­ concession, nor was she ready to make picked. Its functione differed from meaningful land reforme and social those of Western intelligence unite. reforms. In addition to the traditional intelli­ when French officiala finally real­ gence functions, V1etminh intelligence ized their shortcomings in the ideo­ also reconnoitered retreat and advance logical area, the corrective meesures routea, picked placee for ambushes,

October19e6 , 29 ,.,,

Ers WH planted agenta, taught and supervised important to the West, wae reduced in eemouflage, determined 10ssss of men effeetiveneee by the heavy vegetation, and arms, and performed many other mountainous terrain, and the weether. duties. The Franch, of course, knew how From captured documents, the important it ie for guerrillas to get French found that Vietrnhh inteSi­ good intelligence. They had learned gence pereonnel prepared extremely the Ieeeon the hard way during the detailed and accurate surveys of an­ -@s operations against the Ger­ ticipated battle arena to include traf­ mans in World War II. Nevertheless, ficability charts for cooliea. Even the they lost the intelligence aspect of the wai in Vietnam, and were never strong enough in combat power to make up for their intelligence deficit. Sbategy and Tacticc Prior to 1949. the French enjoyed a definite mili&y superiority - over the V]etrahh, but they were not able during thie period decisively to beat down the rebellion. When the Chinese Communists closed on the North Viet­ namese border in 1949, the war tank on an entirely new dimension; The French were able temporarily to counter this advantage through the genius of General Jean de Lattre de Taeeigay. His strategy was to try to bring about aetpieee bettlee where the French could get the enemy out in the open and deal him a fatal blow. In eerly 1951, General De Lattre enticed General Vo Nguyen Giap to Generel Jean de Lattre de TaeeignY attack the French in force, and the result was a number of bloody defeats attitudea of the local populace were for the Vietmhh. These battles taught assessed so that the VietmM com­ General Glap a leseon. Subsequently, mander could be advised of what to he refused to be drawn into the type exmwt in the way of local support. of meat grinder operation which the The Vietminh intelligence pereon­ United States bed ueed @ such ad­ nel not only were adept at intUtrat­ vantage in Korea. From then on, he ing enemy areas, but their racial cher­ accepted battle only on hle own terms. acterietics also permitted them to General Glap threatened the Thai merge with tbe population. They often Highlands in late 1952, and the new remained undetected right among the French commander, General Reoul A. French. The French by their racial L. Salan, deeided to counter this move dissimilarity, on tbe other hand, did by Idtilng tbe Vietminh at their base not enjoy the same advantage. Fur­ of supply at Phu-Dean. General Salan thermore, photo reeonnaieeenee, eo dispatched four ‘mobile regimental

MilitaryRcviow LET’SLEARN combat team~ver S0,000 men—but den. General Navarre considered the these unite were frequently nmbushed, Vietminh atilllery effeetivenese to be and never reached the main Vletminh the major surprise of the battle. depot. General Navarre also tried to ex­ General Henri Navarre took com­ ploit the mobile power of his mech­ mand in mid-1’953, and tried to stem anized and armored unite by creating further Communist succeeseeby build­ powerful mobile groups to clear roads ing a series of forte along the Lao- and reinforce strong pointa. The larg­ Vietnameee border. The French, at est euch group, GrorqrremerdMobile one point, had over 80,000 troops in 900 forte. The most important of the forte was Dien Bien Phu where the French ultimately lost about 12,000 men. The Vietminh losses were even higher by the time the fort finally surrendered, but here again wee demonstrated the Vietmhh’s propensity for political coneiderationa. At the time of the siege at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva negotiation had begun, and the Viet­ minh decided that a victory over the garrison there would force the French to end the war. Tactissl lessons The battle of Dien Bien Phu pro­ vides at least two important teetical lessons: firet, the fort was located too far from its source of rmpplieeand re­ inforcements, and eecond, the French underestimated the capability of the “ “-hare% RSOU1 A. L Selen enemy to innovate and to tailor his tactics to fit the situation. 100, wae an elite force of eeasoned Approach trenches were dug in veterans, many of whom had fought ever-tightening circles, thus permit­ in Korea. Within seven monthe this ting the infantry to close within a group was so badly beaten that it few yards of the defenders before no longer existed ae a unit. GM 100, launching their attacks. ArtWery despite its strength, was alwaya at pieces were disposed on the forward a dieadvantage because it was tied slopes of the surrounding hills in­ to the roads by its heavy equipment stead of on the reverse slope. The and was vulnerable to repeated am­ artillery pieces were dismantled and bushes. The last euch ambush almost carried into predug emplacements un­ annihilated the unit. der the cover of night. Then shell- The ambush was a primary tactic proof roofs were erected. The camou­ of the Vietminh. Ambushes were not flage was so good that even the paths spur-of-the-moment operations, but of the ammunition handlera were hid­ were carefully planned and prepared.

Octeber1SS3 ; 31 LET’S LEARN

This Vietminh tactic recognised that the rear elements of the convoy. After the French enjoyed superiority in many defeats, they learned that most numbers and firepower, but were tied ambushes contahed enemy bloeklng to the roads by their equipment and forces at both ends of the ambushed by the conventional tactics that they stretch of road, plue a main ambush­ employed. ing element on both eides of the road The Vietminh aleo had other ad­ —thue pinning the column down and vantages. They possessed a superior preventing it from maneuvering. The intelligence network, they could take French found that it helped eomewbat advantage of heavily vegetated ter­ to stretch the column out to make it

rain for conceabnent, and their lightly harder for” the Vietminh to encircle equipped eoldiers could move quickly the whole unit. It wae also of some acrosa country to ambueh much larger help to use helicopter for detection, roadbound French units. Moreever, but the French had only four heli­ the Vletminh could stake out an area copters in the entire theater in March and lie in wait for days without fear 1954. that their position would be discloeed Early in the war, tbe French tried by the local populace. a program of pacification as a means For a long time, the French forces’ of ultimately winning over the coun­ antiambush tactics were based on an try. The program was both military erroneous assumption that ambushes and political. It aimed to crush the , were being eet up ae conventional guerrilla, to aeeiet the local peeple roadblocks that could be finked by to defend themselves, and to restore

32 Military k#iOW LET’S LEARN

kxal administration to normal. The mary and interrelated factore that French enjoyed some success in this contributed to the military success of venture, especially in the military as­ the Vietminh: pect. The political side, however, was e The use of five, simple tactical doomed to failure by the reluctance principlee—speed of movement, sur­ of France to grant independence to priee, undermining of enemy morale, the Vietnamese, and by ite failure to security, and collaboration with the initiate neceesary reforms and im­ populace. provements once military control had e Good, accurate, and up-to-date been gained. intelligence. CountergsrerrillaForcos e Detailed planning. Another tactic that the French tried was the use of counterguerrilla Tho “Sanctuary” forces patterned after the maquie op­ The “sanctuary” was another vital erations of World War II days. In aspect of the war. In retrospect, it is the opinion of General Paul H. Ely, now evident that the beginning of the counterguerrilla forces were the only end for the French came in late 1949 ones which could successfully cope when the Chineee Communists occu­ with guerrillas since the same meth­ pied all of the Chinese provinces bor­ ods of trickery, flexibility, and mo­ dering on Tonkin. A sanctuary was bility had to be used to defeat them. thus provided the Vietrninh where He felt that the French realized this troops could be trained without moles­ too late, and that counterguerrillas tation by tbe French, and where sup­ were used in insufficient numbers. plies could be etored and drawn as Not too much official information is needed. This wae prohahly tbe key available on these French “comman­ development of the conflict. Becauee do” operation, but apparently the the French did not have the resources French used several thousand moun­ to seal off the border, they tried to tain tribesmen as @guerrillas under block enemy movements by the tradi­ French advisors. tional method of spotting forts as key Bernard B. Fall does not fully points along main roadi. Vietminh, share General Ely’s enthusiasm for however, did not rely on the roads and the counterguerrillas. Mr. Fall points easily bypaseed the forts. out that as long as the home area is Within a few months the Vietminh highly infiltrated, it is extremely dif­ took the offensive, after being aug­ ficult to keep theee unite from being mented by several battalions of troops betrayed. He also reports that many trained in China, and after being sup­ of these tribesmen would not leave plied with large numbers of howitzers their familiee after the armistice wae captured from the Chinese National­ signed. Many of these men, together ists. One by one the French forts fell, with French advisore who decided not and by October 1950 almost the en­ to attempt to work their way through tire northern half of North Vietnam enemy territory, fought to the very had come under Vietminh control. end against the Vietminh mopup op­ The war was to Iaet another four eration. years, but the sanctuary on the north From the purely military point of prevented the French from gaining a view, there were apparently three pri­ decisive victory. It aleo enabled the

October1900 u I LET’s LESRN

Vietminh progressively to bleed the be given primary attention if we bopc French Army until France was to win the war with the Viet Cong. obliged to aue for peace. Tbe French From a military standpoint, we are knew how important the sanctuary fighting a competent, dangerous foe was to the Vietminh, but the French in terrain that worke to his advan­ Army simply did not have sufficient tage. He will try to avoid fighting a military capability to seal off the battle of our choosing and on our border. terms. He may make strategic and tac­ When preesure was brought to bear tical mistakes, but he will correct by the great powere to end the fight­ them promptly. He will capitalize on ing in Indochina, both the French and US mistakes. He will move bin forces the North Vietnamese tried to im­ faster than seems possible. He will prove their military pozturee in the employ ambushes of all types with field so that they could be in a better telling effect unless we employ effec­ bargaining poeition at the conference tive countermeasures. He will try to table. But here, again, the French reduce our forca by ambusbes, mines were outfoxed by Ho ChLminh, Real­ and booby traps, sniping, and over­ izing that the political stakes de­ running small posts. He will place a manded a military victory of large great deal more emphasis on intelli­ propofilons, and that the French did gence than US forces ordinarily do not expect him to accept a setpiece in a combat situation. Our success in battle, Ho ChLminb decided to go all the intelligence field will depend to a out to capture Dien Bien Phu. When large extent on our success in winning the fort eventually fell, bis political the Vietnamese to our side. objective was within hk grasp. The V]et Cong may try to acbievc There are several important Iwsona a military victory after negotiations that the United States should have have begun so that they will enhance learned from the French experience, their position at the bargaining table. and that we should be applying in They may concentrate large numbers Vietnam today. of units and hlt a position like Da. The Communists saw the situation Nang with an enormous force. Their in Vietnam as ripe for revolution, eo objeetiva would be to destroy the en­ they fought a revolutionary war. They tire complex and ite garrison, and recognized that in order to win a rev­ tbna eehiave a psychological victory olutionary war, they had to convince that they would attempt to Parlay into a sufficient number of people, PSSS­ further concessions. Thay might also anta and elites, that their cause was try to achieve the same effect with a more in the interest of the people commando raid against a eupply de­ than wee that of the government. The pot. Thus, the United StMes should people wanted independence. be extremely careful not to let down Thus, the French experience teaches her guard when negotiations have the United States that ideology should begun.

,

34 Milikwy Rwi8W lwo VIEWS ON VIETNAM

THE SPECTER DIEN BIENPHU @ “ ColonelWi33iamF. Long, Jr. United Stofes .4rmg

OLITICAL pundits and military reasons. The net result has been the Pprophete periodically probe and development of a DBP syndrome with peel the situation in Vietnam in order reference to tbe war in Vietnam to­ to produce parallels predictive of an­ day. Whenever any one or several of other 1’Dien Bien Phu.” the symptoms is present, the spscter Dien Bien Phu-or DBP—hss be­ of Dien Bien Phu is raised. come an acronym or shorthand symbol Many t.actisal aspects of Dien Blen for the defeat of the West by the Phu are interesting. The dramatic as­ East, for the triumph of primitive, pecte of seltleas heroism in the face new doctrines and techniques of peo­ of a forlorn hope reeeived-and will ples’ ware over the eophieticated prin­ continue to reeeivs-widespread ro­ ciples and maxims of the heritage of mantic publicity. However, the basic Napoleon Bonaparte. Dien Bien Phu distortion ia that DBP made any dif­ reeulted in severe political conse­ ference at all. When tbe Vletmhh La quences. The Communists glorified the Hong Phong II offensive cleared the results for political and psychological Chineee Connnunist border of a

October 1986 i 35 DIEN BIEN PHU

French presence, the logistic scales failed, the United Statee will also fail. swung to the side of the Vletminh. Perhaps the same was said about By March 1954 the ,%bversive polit­ the Panama Canal after the French ical battle had been all but won in abandoned that effort. In any event, the entire Red River Delta. Tactically, acceptance of thie equation muet he the French at Dien Bien Phu were based upon tbe concept that tbe sit­ reduced by the application of euperior uation ie parallel, and both countries firepower and siege tactics as classic are equal in their political orienta­ as any devised hy Napoleon. tion, national will, and national re­ Reasons for Defeat sourcee. This is not true, and any The strategic factw are that the illueione based upon parallel thinking French loet the war in Indocldna for or romantic mysticism only works to three basic reasone: the advantage of tbe Communists � They could not present a polit­ whose strategy it is to blur the mili­ ical attraction equal to nationalism. tary picture and distort the political � Lacking a persuasive, attractive issues. local appeal, the French home sup­ US Position Clear port for the war was not strong and The United States does not labor direst enough to provide the military under the political handicap of colo­ resources for continued colonialism. nialism ae did the French. The South � They did not have the physical Vietnamese Government is not the resources to project sufficient mititary creature of the United States. Our strength into the arena to prevail after position to ourselves and to the world Communist China appeared on the In­ is quite clear. Communist chargee of dochina border in 1960. c010nia3tsm or neocolonialism are The fear that the United States raieed only to distort the real political faces a new Dien Bien Phu in Viet­ iseue,! which is not colonialism, but nam in the current situation is the aggre sive international communiem apeeter that hauntc many critice of and ~hineee imperialism versus the the present US involvement. Also, growth of diverse nationalism. much of the current criticism of US There is no comparison between the involvement in Vietnam reflects the phyeical resources of France in the French point of view that since they early 1950’e and the United States of today. France was exhausted by Colonel WWiam F. Long, Jr., is on World War II. She was hampered by the stnff and facultg of the Naval War a large, disloyal Communiet Party College. Hti assignments include dutg with the Sd Znfantrg Divieien during which wae strong enough to play a the Korean War, Headqzuwtere 2’th major role in the government; rent Army in Germmw, the O&e of the by the frustrations of a crumbling co­ De@w Chief of Stafl for Persomwl lonial empire; and engaged in a war in Waehingten, and with the US Army in which no amount of French gal­ Element, Military As8ietance Advisory lantry and military dedication could Growp in Vietnam. He ia a gradwate of substitute for sound pdtttcal strategy. the U. S. Army Command and General France had to put together make­ Staff College, the Armed Fercea Staff CoUege, and the Naval War CoUege, shift forces at the end of an 8,000­ and received hia Master’e degree from mite supply line without the cervices George Waehingten University. of the largeet navy and air force in

36 Miliiu Rrdew DIEM BIEN PNU the world which is available to the rificed Czechoelovaklafor a transitory, United States. France could not pose temporary respite. a threat to the national existence of There is also apeychological argu­ Communist China; while the United ment which was used quite effectively States could ruin China even without in rationalizing the US position with the uaeof nuclear weaponaby destroy­ reference to the Cbineae Communist ing her transportation eyetem and “agrarian reformers” in 1949. The commerceby see and air action alone. fact that the Chinese Nationalist Gov­ PsychologicalWeapona ernment may have been inept and cor­ There is no doubt that China and rupt was ample excuse to some for the other Communist powera in Asia understand the real military situation and the awesome power available to the United States. Therefore, they have unleashed every weapon in their psychological arsenal upon their only hope of euccese--US homefront sup­ port for the war in Vietnam. Know­ ing the US concern for human lives, they play upon the war itzelf as the evil rather than tbe evil purpose be­ hind the war. Thue, the major thrust of the Communiet psychological cam­ paign to erode US support is based on the simple but fallacious proposi­ tion that war causes death; death is bad; therefore, etop fighting. There is another equally dangerous and potentially effective psychological weapon that they use to tranquilize Amv Nsm Fed.­ distant observers. It goes like thk: US troops in Vietnam are backed by Communist subversion is merely civil vastlygreaterstrengththantheir French war; overt help by the United States predeeeseors is aggression; therefore, stop the ag­ gression and let events prevail. abandoning reeiatance to a Commu­ Then there is the argument aimed nist takeover in China. Now, the new at the intellectual, detached, objective syllogism is: The South Vietnamese audience in the West. Thla approach Government is unstable and corrupt: is that southeast Asia is legitimately Ho Chi-minh ia stable and puritan; in Chhra’s sphere of influenc+there­ therefore,let Ho Cbi-rninh (the Asian fore, be reasonable and get out. Amer­ Oliver Cromwell) prevail. This ap­ icans of this generation can certainly proach subordinates the US national hear Adolf Hitler in the wings chuck­ interest to a personalized view of col­ ling to himself as he aces his argu­ lective government morality, and ig­ ments at Munich being supported by nores that the Communists project a some of the people who were so out­ seemingly upright image of moral raged when the Western Powers sac­ rectitude for totally evil reasone.

October1966 37 lllEN BIEN PNU

There is also an argument which that there ia no political or social dis­ appcsle to those who opt for inaction. cipline in southeast Asia; the Commu­ This is one that a united Communiet nists have developed the mechanism Vlatnam would be better able to resist for instituting and perpetuating dis­ an imperialistic, expaneioniet Chine. cipline through the use of party cad­ Therefore, it would be better ta aban­ res; therefore, let the Communists don South Vietnam in order te bring their kind of order out of pe­ strengthen Ho Chi-minh and make litical and social chaos in southeast Asia. Both arguments neglect the tragic local consequencesfor those who reeieted Communist terror and per­ suasion, and the international impact upon those whose own future depends upon the strength and stamina of the Western democracies. Elements ef Truth The danger is not ao much that theee psychological weapons have a total appeal, but that there are ele­ mente of truth and attractiveness in each of the arguments for different segments of the diverse Western World. There is aleo adeqnate proof in the Communist conquest and or­ ganisation of mainland China that ~Mao Tse-tung has developed effective techniques for manipulating and man­ aging the Eastern peasant mentality. This gives rise to the frequently articulated apprehension that thh is Eastern Ior+too mystical and remote from the West for Western men to combat, much less understand, How­ ever, even if thie point is conceded, PresidentHo Chi-minh ~ it is well to remember that the Fili­ pinos, Japanese, Thais, Malays—in him better abIe to resiet Chinese ag­ fact, the Vietnamese-are also East­ gression. This assumes, of course, that ern people, and that, perhaps, our best Ho Chi-minh is both willing and able role ie ti hold open the opportunity to deny the Chinese what they desire. and make way for the Ramon Mag­ It also doee not cope with the recip­ saysays of the free Eastern World rocal of thie proposition that a united when they do emerge. Communist Vietnam could also gobble Meanwhile, the US military forcee up Leoe and Cambodia and effectively ehould be permitted, and even encour­ ieolate Thailand. aged, by the US people to do what Another “reasonable” argument in they can. Military forces can win bat­ the Communist psychological bag ia tles, they can restrict the military and

90 Miliiry Retiaw IIIEli BIEN PHU political maneuvere of the enemy, and nam and in the United States, They they can reverse the psychological count upon their psychological argu­ point of view—namely, that the Com­ menta individually and collectively to munist are winning. It will be in­ sow dissension, develop inhibkions, creasingly hard for the Vlet Cong to promote feelings of guilt, and wear go on losing the military battles and down the psychological stamina of retain their morale and political poise. their enemies. All of their publiehed F]nally, logietics can govern battles. purposes and programe are baaed on and change attitudee. Ae government their confident predictions that they and US military offeneivee force the have euperior resources of psycholog­ Viet Cong to use their scarce suppliee ical etamina and political will. at an accelerated rate, and ground In our society, political will and forays and air raids destroy enemy moral stamina are based upon eeeing caches and interdict routes of supply, the issues clearly, and then determin­ the Vlet Gong will, of necessity, be­ ing a resolute course of action. It will come increasingly oppressive in their be well to review continually the true attitudes toward the local Vietnamese issues, and carefully chart the Com­ people. Continued pressure in this re­ munist psychological techniques that spect can give lie to the Communist are used in an effort to convince us claim th”atthey are the friends of the that wrong is right and weakness is people, and can expose them as rapa­ strength. The Chinese Communists cious enemies of the people even be­ claim that all things are divisible, in­ fore they consolidate their political cluding the power of the United power. States. Therefore, it is quite in keep­ Lacking the phyeical and techno­ ing with their advertised strategy and logical resources, the Communist aim traditional outlook to attempt to use at a political and psychological DBP. our own diversity to actdeve by clever They depend upon the teehniquee of psychology what they can never protracted war to wear out the people achieve by force of arme—a new Dien who are opposing them both in Vle& Bien Phu.

Octebw IWO , 39 GeneralMatthewE. Mdaw8Y.United State8 Armn, Retired The following article ie based on of human nature combhed with those an addre8e bg Genaral Ridgwag at of combat, and to a lesser degree with the U. S. Army Cammund and Gew those in peacetime training, make the eral Stafl College, 19 May 196&­ exercise of leadership far more of an Editor. art than a ecience. There ie, of course, a great deal of N DISCUSSING the subject of bad lcaderehip ae well ae of good. It, 1 leadership, I am struck by two dia­ too, deeerves study eo that its pitfalle metrically opposite concepte. One con­ may be avoided. But in general, I be­ ceives lcaderehip as an exact science lieve bad leadership is the reeult capable of being undereteed and prac­ either of violation of basic principle, ticed by anyone. This view ie ably de­ or the lack or failure to develop onc veloped by Colonel Sherman L. Klser, or more of the qualitiee of good lead­ US Army, Retired, in his baolq The ership. In any event, I want to spsak American Concept of Leadership. An now of the goed type of military lead­ ership with some spwific reference of learning will make a man a leader later to combat hsaderehip of large unless he has the natural qualitiae of unite-the division, corps, and army. one.” This latter view was that of The chief ingredient of Icadcrship, General Sir Archibald P. WaveII, and as I have known it to be exerciesd by is expounded in hie published lectures those whose careers I have etudied, in Generals and Gencralehip. One con­ or under whose command I wae priv­ cept tracts leadership as a ecience; the ileged to serve, are three. I call them other as an art. the three C’s-character, courage, and I incline strongly to the Wavell con­ competence. cept. While rccoguizing that there are Character is the bedrock on which many principle, or truths. PctiIning the whole edifice of laedership rests. to the exereise of leadership, and It is the prime element for which while firmly believing that powers of every profession, every corporation, leadership can ba greatly increaeed in every industry saarchee in cvaluati]ng any individual through knowledge of a member of ite organization. With these principles and practice in their it, the full worth of an individual can app~catilon, I still thhk the variables be developed. Without it-particularly .. a Military ROViOW in the military profession—failure in replied: “That goes for me, too.” peace, disaeter in war, or, at best, There was no amplification. None was mediocrity in both will result. necessary. Each knew the other would TYpes of Character stick however great the preseure; We often use this word “character” would extend help before it was asked, carelessly. There are those of notori­ if he could; and would tell the truth, ously evil character, as well ae those seek no self-glory, and everlastingly of an exemplary one. Yet in its usual keep his word. Such feeling breeds acceptation it standa for those mag­ confidence and eucce.w. nificent traits which placed George Self4tiscipline Washington first among his country­ Only those who have disciplined menand, in fact, made him the Father themselves can exact disciplined per­ of bis Country—the unanimous choice formance from others. When the chips for our first Presidency. It etands for are down, when privation mounts and the time-honored code of the officer the caeualty rate risee, when the crisis corps. It stands for eelf-discipline, is at hand, which commandeq I aek, loyalty, readiness to accept responsi­ receives the better reeponse? Is it the bility, and willingness to admit mis­ one who has failed to share the rough takes. It stands for selflessness, mod­ going with his troope, who is rarely esty, humility, willingness to sacrifice seen in the zone of aimed fire, and who when necessary, and, in my opinion, expects much and gives little ? Or is for faith in God. Let me illustrate. it the one whose every thought ie for During a critical phase of the Bat­ the welfare of his men, consistent tle of the Bulge, when I commanded with the accomplishment of hk, mis­ the 18th Airborne Corps, another sion; who doee not ask them to do corps commander just entering the what he hae not already done and fight next to me remarked: “I’m glad etands ready to do again when neces­ to have you on my flank. It’s char­ sary; who with hki men has shared acter that counts.” I had long known short rations, the physical discomfort him, and I knew what he meant. I and rigors of campaign, and will be found at the crieee of action where General Matthew B. Ridgwasi com­ the issues are to be decided? manded the 82d Airborae Division I know your anewer: self-dieci­ during World War II in North Af- plined, self-controlled, and so in con­ Tica, SicilSI, and France; the i8th Air­ borne Corps in Belgium aud Germmw; trol of othere, no matter how tough and was Deputy Supreme AUied Com­ the going—Washington at the Battle mander, Mediterran8a% He aesumed of Long Ieland and at Valley Forge; command of the 8th US Army in Ko­ Grant at Shiloh; Mackenzie of the 4th rea in 1950, and the following year Cavalry in his epic raid; the junior waa appointed Supreme Commander, officer pureuing hostile Indians in sub­ Allied Power8; Cvmmande?’ in Chief zero weather on our western plains, of the UN Command; and Commander closing up at dark for a dawn attack, in Chief of the Far East Commamd in with no tires permitted and only cold Japan. He 8eTved as Supreme Com­ rations, if any, before H-hour—much mander, Allied Powers, Europe, until 195s when he became Chief of Staff the same many times in Korea, I of the US Amw. GeneTarRidgwart wae might add, and I am sure under retired in Jmw 1956. equally arduous conditions in Vlet-

Octaberlees ,.

LEADERSHIP

nam today; the young ship com­ General Washington wrote to Con. mander named Kennedy, his patrol grass from Valley Forge: torpedo beet sunk in action, hie crew . . . without fwroganse or the smali. safely on the beeeh, then swimming est deekvtion from truth, it may be out in sberk-infested waters to try said that m historg now extant, am to intercept a friendfy destroyer and furnish an inet(mce of an Armu’a eaf. reaeue his men. fOT@Y such uneommoa hardships os The world’s annala and our own are aura have done, and beating them with studded with the nemee of euch men, the same patieace and fortitmZe. Te .

...... ,,+:

US Amy General George Washingtonshared the privationsand short rstions of his men and earnedtheir mwwervingloyalty

of all services and all grades. Always eee mea without clothee to clothe theiv ready to assume reeponsibilities, they makednees, without bfankets to lie en, could always assign them to othere without ehoee, by which their marchee and know they would be willingly might be trased by the blood from aesepted. True to themselves and to their feet, and almost aa often with­ their eonesience, their men sense they out PTevisiovw as with; marching wifl be true to them, giving them full threwgh frost and .vnow, and at ctilt, and fratddy admitting mis­ Christvmw taking up their winter takes and accepting responsibility quarter8 within a day’s march of the when they themselves are to blame. enemy, without a hovwe or hut to

42 MiliteIY RWiOWI LEADERSHIP

cover them till they cordd be built, and then etuck overlong to the controls to submitting to it without a murmur, ineure that their Iaet man was out. is a mark of patianee and obedience Courage, the second “C; could well whish in my optnkwr can scarce be be treated as a trait of character, as, paralleled. indeed, it is. Yet it deservea, I believe, And what Washington did not eay a eeparate category, for I know of not -a mark of his own unexcelled laed­ one recipient of history’s accolade for emhip. battle leadership of enduring fame An eyewitness report of Lae after who was not known for great gal­ Pickett’e failure stated: lantry. His face did rwt .vhow the slightest Physical and Mersl Courage disappointment, care or aruwgance, There are two kinde of courage, awl he rufdreeeed to eve~ eotdier he physical and moral, and he who would met a few worde of encouragement; be a true leader muet have both. Both ‘AU rviU come right in the aud, we’ll are products of the character-form­ talk it over afterwards.’ And to a Bti­ ing proeese, of the developmentof self­ gade Commander speaking angrily of -control,eelf-discipline, physical endur­ the heavy loaeea of hie mcu: ‘Never ance, of knowledge of one’e job and, mind, General, all thie km been my therefore, of confidence. These quali­ facdt. It ie I who kave loet thie fight, ties minimize fear and maximize and garb must help me out of itthe sound judgment under pressure and— beat wag vou can.’ with come of that indispensable stuff For leadership through willingness called luck-often bring euccaes from to admit mietakes and inetantly to ac­ seemingly hopeless situations. cept responsibility, I think, hletory Putting aeide impuleiveacts of reck­ can offer few examples to eurpass this. lese bravery, both kinds of courage Willingrresste Sacrifice bespeak an untroubled conscience, a Archibald Rutledge once wrote that mind at peace with God. An exampleie there can be no real love without a Colonel John H. Glenn who was asked willingness to sacrifice. Tuck this after his first rocket flight if he had away in your inner minds. It may pay been worried, and who replied: “I am off in some crisis coming to you in trying to live the best I can. My peace the yeare now hidden beyond the ho­ had been made with my Maker for a rizon. Do you love your country and number of years, eo I had no pafilc­ its flag ? Do you love the branch in ular worries.” which you are serving, the men with Examples of physical courage are whom you will be privileged to share neither confined to combat nor limited service and to command? If you do, to a stouthearted few, but are com­ then you will be prepared to sacrifice mon throughout the world among men for them, if your responsibilities or and women of every color, creed, race, the situation so demands. The com­ and age, in peace as well ae in war. mander of Torpedo Squadron 8 at However, examples of moral courage Midway; the four Army chaplains on are lese well known. They can be con­ the torpedoed SS Dorchester off Ice­ sidered as proof of true greatness of land in predawn darknese in February SOULWhere the individual has not 1942; the many aircraft cornmandere measured up, he has generally failed who have ordered “abandon ahlp,” fortune’s bid to fame.

October 19SS To me such incidents most fre­ ples’ money, and sometimes easier quently found in war are those where still with other men’e lives, particu­ the career of the leader is at stake, larly when your own ie in no great and where his actions or decisions danger. You remember the command­ will determine the saving or slaughter ers’ conference prior to one of the big of many of hk men. History is full offensives of World War I, when a of these cases. The lure of glory, the corps commander—whose command fear of being thought afraid, of ~os­ poet wae miles behind the front— ing personal power and prestige, the spoke out during a lull in the meeting, saying: “I’d give 10,000 men to take that hiR.” And a liaison officer from a frontline infantry unit remarked to a brother officer standing beeide bim in the back of the room: “Generous, isn’t he?” Oppositionto Orders The military cervices deal harshly, as they ehould, with failure to carry out orders in battle. The commander present on the scene is entitled to full, inetant, and enthusiastic execution by subordinates. Yet when faced with different situation from those antici­ pated, as well as in tbe transition from plans to orders, there sometimes comes the challenge to one’s con­ science, the compelling urge to op­ poee foolhardy operations bsfore it ie too late, before the orders are is­ sued and lives are needlessly thrown away. us Amw Or the leader may be faced with GeneralRobertE. Lse the decision: Shall I take the reepon­ mistaken idea that blind obedience to sib]lity of dkcarding the original mie­ orders has no altsrnativ+all have sion ? Shall I take the initiative and been followed by tragic losses of lives etrive for euccess along different with little or no gain. lines? He will have to put those ques­ History often glosses over the count­ tions to his conscience. ,“Blind obed­ less thousands of lives which have ience,” said Napoleon Bonaparte, “is been fruitleeely sacrificed to the pull due only to a superior present on the of power, preetige, and publicity. epot at the moment of action.” I Haig’s Flanders Campaign in 1917 is concur. a conspicuous example. Here, 100,000 I still support a etatement of mine men were sacrificed for the gain of of some years ago: 1,000 yarde of almost bottomless It has long ssemsd to me that the morass. hard decieions are not ths once you It is easy to gamble with other peo­ make in the heat of battle. Far harder

44 Militars Review LEADERSHIP to make are thoee involved in epeak­ oppose this plan, at the rkk of mg ing your mind about come hare­ career, right up to the Theater Com­ brained scheme which proposee to mander. commit troops to action under condi­ The drop wae not ordered. tions where failure eeems atmoat cep The second experience was a pro­ tain, and the enly reeults will be the posed attack by the 82d across the needless sacrifice of priceless livee. Volturno River where the Germans When all is eaid and done, the most had brought the Allied advance to a precioue aeeet anw nation hae is its halt. The sector chosen involved get­ gouth, and for a battle commander ting across an unfoldable river and, ever to condone the urmeceeearp sac­ then, after an advance of roughly rifice of hie men ie inexcusable. In 1,000 yards across open flat terrain, anp action you muet balance the in­ the attack and eeizure of a line of evitable cost in livee againet the ob­ hills, curving away from the river on jective8 IIOUseek to attain. Unless the vesults to be expected can reasonably justify the eetimated 1088 of life the action involvee, then f er m~ part I want none of it. General George C. Marshall, one of the noblest men who has worn an American uniform since Washington, once said of decisione of this kind: “It is hard to get men to do this, for this is when you lay your career, perhaps your commission, on the line.” Twice in my personal experience as a division commander I felt compelled to protect against tactical decisions that were about to be aesigned to my 82d Airborne Division. ‘The firet occasion was the planned drop on Rome in September 1943. I have recounted the incident in some detail in my book, SoZdier. Recently, however, published memoirs of Ger­ man generals then present in the Rome area have confirmed my views. One one flank, then like a bow curving passage from the account of that in­ back almost to the stream again on cident illustrates the point I wish to the other flank of the zone of attack, make: so that the assaulting troops would When ths time comes that I muet be under concentrated tire from the meet mg Maker, the eourcs of most front and both flanks. humble p-ride to me will rtot be accom­ While the proposal to use the 82d pliehmente in battle, but the fact that was a high compliment-since it was I was guided to make the decieion to the weakest numerically, and much

October1966 “.

LEADERSHIP

later study of battle records may fail to erase that line, for it is next to impossible to reconstruct the exact picture as it was thrown on the screen of the commander’s brain at any par­ ticular crisis of combat. Yet experi­ ence, your own and that of others which you have absorbed, together with commonsenee, will be your best guides, and with good luck will see you through. Physical Fiiass Phyeical fitness comes under com­ petence, the third of my three basic ingredients of leadership. It playa a great part. My own earlier training at Fort Leavenworth, Fort Benning, Fort Sam Houston with the 2d Divi­ sion, with the 33d Infantry in the Panama area, and with the airborne paid off in battl~first as a division, then ae a corps, and, finally, ae an army commander. Because of strenu­ ous and unremitting physical train­ ing, I waa able to keep up with the best of my treope in the hottest eec­ tors and the toughest terrain and cli­ mate. I.& me mention briefly what I think the standards should be for command­ ers of large unite. The division com­ mander should have the physical en­ eral Lucien K. Truecott, Commanding durance, etamina, and rese~ee of his General, US 3d Infantry Divieion, a best infantry battalion commanders, field commander conspicuous for com­ because that is where he belongs— petence and gallantry, and an old with them-a good part of the time; friend. He eaid he wouldn’t touch it the corps commander, those of hie in­ with a 40-foot pole, even with his fantry regimental commanders; and heavier division. So I spoke my mind, the army commander just about the first to the corps commander, under same. whom the operation waa to be mounted And remember this, since no one —and I reed I used the word “fan­ can predict today when you may be tastic’’—and, finally, to the army com­ thrown into combat, perhaps within mander. The plan was canceled. hours of deplaning in an overeeas In action and out, there is often a theater-as happened to thousands in thin dividing line between reckless­ Korea, and ae I have no doubt to many ness, boldness, and caution. Even in Vietnam—you will have no time to

4a MlliSmy ROVIOW LEADERSHIP

get in shape. You must bs in shape No other means will provide the all the time. commander with what his personal There is another element in battle­ perceptions can provide, if he is pree­ fieldleadership which I want to men­ ent at the critical time and place, He tion and illustrate. It ie a cardinal re­ can personally intervene, if he thinks sponsibility of a commander to fore­ that necessary, but only to the ex­ see insofar as possible where and tent that such intervention will be whencrises affecting his command are helpful and not interfere with his likely to occur. It etarte with his ini­ subordinates. He is in a position to tial estimate of the situation—a con­ make instent deciaiona, to defend, , tinuing mental process from the mo­ withdraw, attack, exploit, or pursue. ment of entering the combat zone If, at this time, he is at some rear until hie unit is pulled out of the line. command post, he will have to rely on Aek yourself these questions. What reports from others, and time will be are the enemy capabilities ? What lost, perhaps just those precious mo­ ehall I do, or what could I do, if he ments which spell the difference be­ should exercise that one of his capa­ tween success and failure. Notwith­ bilities which would be most danger­ standing the console capabilities of ous to me, or most likely to interfere future television in combat, I still be­ with the accomplishment of my mis­ lieve what I have said is true. In any sion? event, keep tide time factor ever in Personal Presence mind. It ie the one irretrievable, in­ As commander of a division or eatensible, priceleea element in war. smaller unit, there will rarely be more Relief of Commander than one crisis, one really critical sit­ The occasion for the relief of com­ uation facing you at any one time. manders may regrettably ariee. If it The commander belongs right at that does, there are three pointa to con- spot, not at some rear command post. eider: Ie your decieion based on per­ He should be there before the crisis sonal knowledge and observation, or erupts, if possible. If it ie not possi­ on secondhandinformation? What will ble, then he should get there aa soon the effect be on the command con­ as he can after it develops. Once cerned? Are you relieving a com­ there, then by personal observation of mander whose men think highly of terrain, enemy firee, reactions, and him-even with affeetion-regardless attitudes of his own commanders on of professional competence? And, fi­ the spot—by his eyes, ears, brain, nally, have you a better man available? nose, and hie aixtb sens+he gets the Every man is entitled to go into best possible picture of what ia hap­ battle with the best chance of survival pening and can best exercise hie troop your forethought se a leader can pro­ Iesdershlp and the full authority of vide. What best helps you dlacharge hia command. He esn start help of thie responsibility? Sharing things every khsd to hie hard-prwsed subor­ with your men; to be alwaya in the dinates. He ~anurge higher command­ toughest speta; always where the cri­ er to provide additional fire support, sis is, or seems most likely to develop; artillery, air, other infantry weapons, always thinking of what help you can and, in the future, perhape, nuclear give your commanders who are etm­ atrikes. cuting your orders; doing your ut-

Octohar 1SSS LEADERSHIP most to see that the best in rations, on his own strength of character, his shelter, firet aid, and evacuation facil­ tact and persuasion in carrying out ities are available; being generous his dutiee. with praiee, swift and fair with pun­ Between tbe commander and his ishment when you have the facts, in­ chief of staff in a division or larger tolerant of demonstrated failure in unit there ehould he thorough mutual leadership on which lives depend, yet respect, understanding, and confidence making full allowances for human with no official secrets between them. weaknesses and the stressee and Together they form a eingle dual per­ strains of battle on individuals. sonality, and the instructions issuing Know Your Men from the chief of staff muet have the Know your men, and be constantly same weight and authority as those on the alert for potential leaders— of the commander himeelf. you never know how soon you may But this does not mean that a com­ need them. During my two years in mander who delegates such authority command of the 82d Airborne Divi­ to his chief of staff can allow his chief. eion in World War II, I was in close to isolate hlm from the rest of his imd daily touch with every regimental etaff. If that happens, the commander and moat battalion commanders. Be­ will soon find himself out of touch, fore acceding to command of the divi­ and the chief of etaff will be running eion, and while I waa General Omar the unit. N. Bradley’e assistant division comm­ There ie a fine balance here. The ander, I had learned to call by name chiefs of staff sections should know every infantry officer in the division. that they always have access to their Later, by frequent exchange of commander. He should see them and views with the infantry regimental vieit their eections with sufficient fre­ commanders and the divisional artil­ quency to understand their problems, lery commander, I knew in advance to let them know he appreciates their whom they had earmarked for bat­ efforts, and that he stands ready to talion command. I do not recall any help where he can. instance where I thought the regi­ mental commander had not picked the Inform Suborrfinatss right man. The payoff came in Nor­ Closely akin to the relationship mandy. I went in with 12 infantry with staff officers is keeping in close battalion commanders-four regi­ personal touch with your principal ments-and I had 14 new ones when subordinate commanders-in the divi­ we came out, for some battalions lost sion, with your brigade and separate as many as three commanders during battalion commanders; in the corpe, the 33 days we were in that tight. with your division commanders, their The quaSities of a leader are not chiefe of etaff, and ae many of the limited to commanders. The require­ commanders of attached corpe units ment for leadership are just as es­ as you can; and in the army, with sential in the staff officer, and in some corps and division commander and reepcets more exacting, since he does their chiefs of staff. There is always not have that ultimate authority which time for these visits; adminietrative can be used when neceseary and must work can be done at night, BY day rely even more than his commander you belong with your troops.

Military Review LEADERSHIP

Keep them informed of your think­ Some suggestion for leadership ing and plans. When You have the are: concept of an operation first in mind, o Read widely and wieely all the consult your principal commanders history and biography possible. Soak without delay and get their reactions. up all the pereonal experiences you No matter how eound a tactical plan can of battle-tested brother officers. may be, the chances of successful ex­ This broadene your understanding of ecution will be greatly increaeed if an art of which you can never hope you have firet secured tbe willing ac­ to know all. ceptance by commander responsible o Study thoughtfully the records for execution of tbe miseions you plan of past successful Ieadere and adapt to aesign them. Insure that they re­ their methods to youre. ceive notice of your decision and the e Work hard to keep fit. That lit­ principal detaile of your plan as ap­ tle extra stamina may come day pull proved in ample time to permit them you out of some deep holes. and their subordinates to make their e Work hard, in your own way, at necessary reconnaissance and issue being tops at your job. their orders. e Keep tbe three C’e-character, These are come of the reasons why courage, and competenc+alwaye be­ I hold that leadership ie not a science, fore your mind, and with faith in God, but an art. It conceives an ideal, be yourself. states it as an objective, and then @ Remember there are many others seeke actively and earnestly to attain on your team, and be inwardly hum­ it, everlasting]y persevering, because ble. Every man’s life ie equally pre­ the records of war are full of successes cioue, although all are at the disposal coming to those leaders who stuck it of our country, and the contribution out just a little longer than their ep­ each makee in battle ie of equal po­ ponents. tential value.

Sendin your CHANGEOF ADDRESS To assure uninterrupteddelivery of Your Military Review, be sure to submit promptly both your old and new address, including Zip cods-four weeks in advance, if possible. Address to Military Review Subscription Service, Book Department,U. S. Army Commandand General Staff Col­ lege, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas 66027.

October1906 -m

MARSHALMAIINOVSKY’S

MANCHURIACAMPAIGN

RaymondL. Garthotf

The view8 expreeaed in this ar­ of 1942 through 1945 in Europe hav­ ticle are the author’s and are not ing been generated in the course of a nece88arily tho8e of the Department war initiated by the other eide. of State, the Department of De­ During the four months from April fense, or the U. S. Armu Command to August 1945, the Soviete moved and General Staff College.—Editor. 39 divisions and brigades and other unita from Europe to bolster their OVIET troops were last com­ forces in the Far East. They collected mitted to battle 20 years ago in a total force of over one and one-half thes brief campaign against the Japa­ million men for the campaign-w”th neee in Manchuria. That campaign 5,500 take and eelf-propelled g s, has reseived little attention in the 5,000 combat aircraft, and 27,000 r­ West, but is of intereet sc the one tillery piecee and mortars. real Soviet preplanned offeneive, those A special high command of So iet 1 so MllitauRCVIOW forces in the Far East was set up Manchuria had a total of 24 divisions under Marshal Alekeandr M. Vasi­ and 11 brigadee, but few bed been in levsky who was, until the summer of existence more than six months, few 1945,chief of the general staff. Three were properIy equippad, and the Jap­ fronts were established, with the anese rated their effectiveness equiv­ Transbaikel Front being under Mar­ alent at only seven dkisions. shal Rodion Y. Malinovsky. The other The main and, in many reepecta, two fronts were the 1st Far Eastern the most interesting operation of the Front under Marshal Kirill A. Me­ campaign woe the 626-mile advance retskov,and the 2d Far Eastern Front across Manchuria by tbe Transbaikal under General of the ArmY Maxim Front. A. Purkayev. Admiral Ivan S. Yuma­ Marshal Malinovsky was 47 yeare shev wae commander in chief of the of age in 1945; so was his Chief of Pacific Fleet. Staff, General of the Army (now Mar­ strategic Plan shal) Matvei V. Zakbarov-now, too, The strategic plan was simple al­ his Chief of Staff in the Ministry of though some elements of its execution Defense. Marshal Malinovsky’s staff, were complicated and bold. Tbe two a guards tank army, and a combined main thrusts would be made by the arms army were all transferred to Transbaikal Front from the west, Siberia and Mongolia from Prague cutting through most of Manchuria during the period from May into to Mukden and Changchun, and by July. the 1st Far Eastern Front from the Composition of Front east, breaking through the Japanese Tbe Transbaikel Front comprised fortbled area facing the Maritime five ground armies, the supporhg Provinces and moving to Klrin and 12th Air Army, and a joint Soviet- on to Changchun. The 2d Far Eastern Mongolian composite “cavalry-mecha­ Front in the north would make a nized group” composed of about six lesser thrust up the Sungari toward divisions, mainly horse cavalry. The Harbin. front forces totaled 654,040 men, of The Japanese Kwantung Army in whom 416,000 were in combat unite. Raymond L. Garthoff ie SpeciaJ Ae­ Nearly half of the Soviet military ‘eistant for Soviet Bloc Polit20-Mili­ power in the Far East was assigned taW Affairs with the Department of to this front which faced the weakest State. He gradwated from Princeton Japanese concentration. It had, how­ Vnivereity in 1948 and received hie ever, unueually challenging terrain Ph. D. from Y&e University in 1951. and a difficult supply problem. The Before aeeuming hia present poeition, Soviets calculated, and authoritative he waa a Foreign Affaive Advisor Japaneee sources have subsequently with the Department of the Armg. confirmed, that the enemy would not An authoritv on Soviet political and expect a major offensive over hun­ milita~ affaive, Dr. Garthoff is a dreds of miles of desert in Inner Mon­ frequent centra”butor to Wofeesional golia and across the Great Heingan jourrrafe and has lectured extensively throughout the Un{ted Statee. The Mountain Range. author of eeveral books, htk meet re­ The first problem was ge~lng the cent ia Soviet Military Policy: A His­ troops to the concentration areas in torical Analysie. Outer Mongolia. The Trans-Siberian , October 1900 51 i Railroad was taxed to the utmost to ing marches, partly for reasons of meet the demands. Nearly 750,000 security, but also due to the high day­ men were moved, and 136,000 carloads time temperatures-up to 112 degrees of materiel were sent in the period Fahrenheit. The existence of only a May through July. Due to the over. single rail iine in Mongolia from Choi­ all demands on the rail system, it was balaan to Tamsag-Bulag led to off- decided that atl motorized units of the loading of materiel along the last 125 Tmnsbaikel Front would move on to 375 miles of the rail line across their own from the Chits-Karyrnskaya eastern Mongolia. The three armies moved from Eu­ rope to the Transbaikrd Front brougbt all their weapons and equipment, with the exception of the 6th Guards Tank Army. It left all its tanks and self- propelled guns in Czechoslovakia, and at Choibalsan received nearly a thou­ sand new ones sent dhctly from the Ural factories to Mongolia. Wstsr Supply Problsm Perhaps the greatest problem of all was the water supply. Only about one- third of the subsistence requirements was available for the entire front. Accordingly, all 10ss1 engineer units and five other engineer battalions cent in advance from the armies al­ ready in Siberia were detached to dig wells and build water stations. From 10 June to 8 August, 635 new wells were opened. There still remained the problem of water eupply during the offensive. Since there were no known wells in Life the first 100 to 125 miles of enemy lfsrshal AleksandrM. Vasilevsky territory, it was necessary to carry sector of the Trans-Siberian to the water needed during the first phase concentration area in eastern Mon­ of the advance. Metal water canisters golia—requiring up to 760 miles trav­ received just prior to the operation el, mainly over desert. were not considered entirely zatiefac­ Even the infantry of the 17th and tory or sufficient, and tbe front staff 36th Combined Arms Armies had to resorted to the expedient of filling make the last 160 to 300 miles by feet all available rubber inflatable rafts march. The infantry averaged about with water instead of air. 25 miles per day while the tank and In addition to preparations for mechanized units averaged about 95 water supply, large numbers of logs miles per day. Almost all movements were brought in from Siberia, and were made in evening and early morn­ eecb tank and self-propelled chassis

52 Military Review MANCHURIA CAMPAIGN

carried no less than two logs and nized, and one motorized infantry other construction materiale needed brigades). In addition, one local Sibe­ for the mountain and river crossings. rian motorized infantry division was All fuel, parts, and construction nmte­ added to each field army, and two to rials had to be brought from the So­ the 6th Guards Tank Army. viet Union. The 6th Guards Tank Army wae Among the host of lesser probleme compoeed of two mechanized corps, was that of finding fuel for cook]ng one tank corps, two motorized infan­ —petroleum, oils, and lubricants try divisions, two self-propelled bri­ (POL) had to be ueed, in many casee, gades, and four independent tank where there was no firewood. Also, in brigades. Each mechanized corps was view of the known prevalence of epi­ reinforced to have 400 tanks and self- demic diseases in northern China, all propelled guns, and about 450 artil­ the Soviet troops were inoculated lery pieces (including heavy mor­ against the plague and other dieeases. tars), as well as 19 motorized Bold Action infantry battalion. The plan of the front operation was Opposing Forces bold. The entire 500-mile distance to The opposing Japanese 3d Area Changchunand Mukden from Tamsag Army (Army Group), under General —the main axis of the attack-was Jun Ushiroku, had the 44th Army to be taken without pause. The first facing the main Soviet thrust, and mission for the spearhead and core the 30th Army in east-central Man­ of the front, the 6th Guards Tank churia. Only four of its nine divi­ Army, was to overcome the Great sions, all infantry, were west of the Heingan Mountain Range and take Changchun-Mukden line in central the Lupei-Lichuan line, about 280 Manchuria. miles away, in five days. The Japanese rated the effective­ The Stawka (general headquarters ness of these divisione from 40 to 65 staff) planners were aware that this percent. The 3d Area Army had was the first Soviet operation to em­ enough ammunition for only three ploy a tank army ae the first echelon and one-half divisions parceled out of a major striking force. This deci­ among its nine divisions and three , sion was based on appreciation of the brigades. Two divieions had just been need to move rapidly in order to sur­ transferred to Manchuria from north mount the Hsingan Range before the China within the preceding two Japanese could bring up their main months. In fact, several battalions of forcee, which were known to be de­ one division were still in China when ployed about 175 to 250 miles from the war came, and they never reached the western frontier, to defend that Manchuria. natural terrain barrier. Under a different command—the Supporthrg units for the 6th Guarde independent 4th Army in northern Tank Army included the 36th and Manchuria—were the l19th Infantry 17th Armies, which were fully ac­ Division and the 30th Independent customed to the theater, and a joint Composite Brigade in the Hailar area. cavalry group (mainly four Mongo­ Other units of that army were either lian and one Soviet horse cavalry never committed, or faced the Soviet divisions, with one tank, one mecha- 2d Far Eastern Front on the north­

October lees ..

MANCHURIA CAMPA16N

THEMANCHURIACAMPAIGNAREA I � m�� winADvVicEs 0- X0 KJ­ = JAPANESI OEENSl PUSlnONS I ~ AP%iOXNAATELINEAT TIME OF JAPANESESJJRRENOES o JAPANEsEFtANNEomoJmT

54 MNisaIy Review eastern frontier of Manchuria. The Guarde Tank Army there would be a l19th Division was one of the best gap of up to 45 miles between tbe two units in the Kwantung ArmY, but it columns of ita advance. still was rated only 70 percent ef­ Red Army Offenslva fective. The 80th Brigade was one of At 0001 on 9 August, immediately the weakesti compoeed of only five after the presentation of a declara­ underetrength infantry battalions, tion of war to the Japaneee Ambae­ and was rated by the Japanese ae eador in Moscow, the Red Army only 15 percent effective. opened an offeneive on all fronts. Due The 6th Gnards Tank Army was to the general absence of enemy expected tQ lead tbe Tranebaikal forces, there was no artillery or air Front in a lightning thruet to Chang­ preparation on the Weetern Front. chun and Mukden, with the aim of The 86th Army in the north, croes­ breaking UP the enemy’s main etra­ ing from Soviet territory at M8n­ tegic deployment, preventing hie with­ chouli, hlt a Japaneee “fortified area” drawal to south Manchuria, and de­ near Manchouli where there were stroying him. The final pheee wae to some pillboxee and emplaced artAlery. continue the rapid advance the entire They rapidly overcame the border way to Dairen and Port Arthur on defenses and advanced 25 miles the the Liaotung Peninsula. first day. Advance detachments, skirt­ Ite planned echedule was to allow ing emall centere of reeietance, rawd two days to cross the 125 milee of 60 miles to the outekirte of Hailar. desert steppe to the mountains while The main Soviet forces bypassed seizing terrain suitable for building Hailar and engaged the Japanese at airfields; three days to croes the Wunoerh on the 18th. Hailar fell on mountilns, secure the range, and 18 August. Since they were cut off move down to the Lupei-Llchuan line, from higher headquarters, the de­ a distance of 155 miles; then withh fenders had not known of the Japa­ five days to take Mukden and Chang­ nese capitulation on 14 Auguet. Also, chun. on 18 August the troops still de­ constantReconnaissance fending their positions at Wunoerh Considerable strees was placed on learned of the capitulation and sur­ reconnaieeance. Aviation wae as­ rendered to the 36th Army. ‘signed responsibility for the area The 39th Combined Arms ArmY from 30 to .626 miles beyond the ad­ faced strong and immediate oppesi- , vancing forcee. Each corps was given tion in the Anshan area where there a reinforced motorcycle battalion to were field defenses, including 126 pill­ maintain constant forward reconnais­ boxes, in an area 25 miles wide and sance 45 to 50 miles in advance of four miles deep. A Japanese regiment the main forces. These battalions held out in Anshan against the So­ were given the strongest available viets until 12 August. The main blow . radio transmitter. Finally, each point of the 39th Army wae actually thrown brigade was responsible for forward to the south of tbe Anshan fortMed and flank reconnaissance for 15 miles. area, with the mission of crossing the This was especially important since Great Hsingan Mountain Range and there would not only be gape between taking Solun and Wangyehmiao. each army, but even within the 6th The 5th Guards Rifle Corps moved

Octsbsr 1906 55 I MANCHURIA CAMPA16N on Solun, meeting with no resistance mente of the Japanese 107th Infantry until 12 August when they encoun­ Division, unaware of the capitulation tered and defeated .a Japanese infan­ of Japan, attacked approximately 45 try division withdrawing from An­ miles north of Wangyehmiao about shan. After defeating theee unite and 22 August. The Soviets counterat­ a 2,000-man cavalry force the next tacked and killed about 1,000 Japs. day, Solun fell on 13 August. nese; the remaining 7,850 surren­ Parallel with this movement, the dered on 24 August. Other elements l13th Ritle Corps moved toward of the same division, however, fought Wangyehmiao. Harsh terrain and on until 30 August. gross cartographic errors slowed the The Soviet-Mongolian cavalry force advance. Fuel consumption ran one had advanced rapidly on two axes MANCHURIA CAMPAIGN

The other column took Changpei croseing involved eharp turns, 30-de­ against some opposition and then gree inclinee, narrow paseages, and moved on to Kalgan-not far north the need to chore up the road at of Peiping. It fell on 19 August after places. Command and control were two days of combat. These forces difficult to maintain; radio faded out were,however, stretched very thh by frequently even at moderate dietancee. that time, and only advance detach­ The 5th Guards Tank Corps crossed ment went the entire way to Cheng­ the 26 miles of mountain roads in teh and Kalgan. These detachments seven hours, which was very credita­ had advanced nearly halfway from ble for a night armored crossing in Kalganto Peiping when on 20 August rough unfamiliar terrain. they received Marshal Malinovsky’s After crossing the range, the 5th orders to stop at the border of China Guards Tank Corpe assumed battle Proper, whereupon they withdrew to formation and spearheaded the ad­ the Great Wall of China. vance on the morning of 11 August. Enemy Forcos Absent Heavy rain soon began to slow the The advance of the 6th Guards advance. There were no roads along Tank Army following the declaration the route, and POL expenditure was of war on 9 August is worth review. high. It met no resistance at all for four By the end of 11 August, the ad­ days and no real opposition during vance detachment of the 5th Guarde the entire campaign. Ita northern Tank Corps tobk Lupei, and Llchuan axis-toward Changchun—was led by was taken a day later. There had been the 7th Mechanized Corps, its south. no contact with the enemy, and the ernaxis by the 9th Mechanized Corps. first phase line had been reached on Due to the complete absence of time. enemy forces, extended march order Fuel Shortage was ueed with the two mechanised At that point an unplanned and corps, each in six to eight parallel undesired two-day holdup of the ad­ columns.In this way, epeeds of up to vance wae compelled by serious fuel 25 miles per hour were reached de­ shortage. Air transport flew in hun­ spite an absence of roads. PO-2 bi­ dreds of tons of POL which was a big planes and Mongolian scouts were help, but far from enough. There used to help maintain the march were too few aircraft, and they used order. Spacing of about 110 yards be­ nearly half their carrying capacity tween vehicles helped to maintah the for their own fuel on the round trip. speed of advance. Reconnaissatice Marshal Malinovsky now ordered units fanned out as planned. each corps to form advance detach­ The main force advanced 75 to 100 ment which aeeumed the corpe’ mis­ milee the first day, and by noon of 10 sione and received the full fuel r- August the mountains were reached. serves and allotments of their corps. Marshal Malinovsky then decided to The main forcee were to follow se advanceby one day—to the end of 12 fuel subsequently became available to Augus&the target time for reaching them. With no enemy forcez yet en­ the Lupei-Lichuan line. countered, thk wee reasonable. As it During the night of 10 August, the developed, smaller advance reconnais­ units started crossing the range. The sance detachments usually fulfiUed

October f96e 51

i MANCHURIA CAMPA16N * the corps and army objectives. On 16 nized Corps advance detachment took August the larger advance detach­ Changchun. Small air landings were ment of the 5th Guards Tank Corps made at Port Arthur and Dairen (250 took the city of Tungliao, and that men at each) on 22 August, and from of the 7th Mechanized Corps took 34 to 39 August the main force of the Wdtung. The main forcee reached 6th Guards Tank ArmY concentrated these areas on 13-19 August, advenc­ in Mukden, Dairen, and Port AAhur. ing very slowly. On 30 August Marshal Malinovsky The Kwantung Army Commandhad ordered the 5th Guarde Tank and 9th declared ita readiness to surrender Mcchaniaed Corps to belt their ad­ on 17 August and dld so the next ‘day. vance and concentrate at Tungliao and However, some unite continued to Mukden. withdraw to the southeast. Accord­ Ammunition Expsnded ingly, Marshal Melinovsky ordered During the entire campaign, the the 6th Guards Tank Army to reach Transbaikal Front expended only Changchun and Mukden as quickly as 14,’746 shells and 42,134 bullets from possible and, leaving a reinforced a total of 361,079 shells and 1,023,697. brigade at each, to proceed by forced bullets fired by Soviet forces on all march to reach Port Arthur by 25 fronta in the Far Eastern campaign. Auguet. Serious difficulties with fuel, and to a To accomplish this, Marshal Mali­ lesser extent with communications, novsky ordered the advance detach­ had developed, but were overcome. ment reduced to tank battalions, and Reconnaissance was, perhaps, the instructed them to ignore the fact most important role of the air forces that they would become separated -sfter the critical mission of trans­ from the main force. Corps com­ port of POL to advancing tank and manders were told to move their mechanized units. There were, how­ forces by rail from Mukden to the ever, insufficient reconnaissance unite, Liaotong Peninsula. and other combat unite were quickly Air Activity converted. On 18 August a company-sized what happened to the main force force was air landed at the airileld of the Japanese Kwantung Army at Harbin, and on 19 Au.guet emall facing the Transbaikal Front? From forces were landed at the airilelds at the outset of the war, the main Japa­ Mukden (226 men), Chengchun (200 nese forces in the east, feting the 1st men), and Kirin. Thsae air landings Far Eastern Front in the Maritime were undertaken to prevent organiza­ Province, were heavily engaged. On tion of resistance by those who might the Western Front, however, with a later decide to fight on, to prevent vast virtually uninhabited arcs, the withdrawals to Japan, and to prevent Japanese forcaz were deployed well destruction of installations and sup­ to the rear. plies. The Japanese contingency war plan The 36th Army took Tsitaibar called for moving troops forward to without opposition on 19 Augost. The engage in delaying operations and advance detachment of the 5th Guards guerrilla warfare to harass the Soviet Tank Corps occupied Mukden on the forces es they advanced. General Jun 20th, and on the 21st the 7th Mccbz­ Ushiroku, commander of the 3d Area

5E Milltwy Revbw lAANCNURiAN CAMPA16N MANCHURIA CAMPAIGN was accepted as a fait accampli, and 365 knots; Japanese bombers had a for the honor of all concerned was maximum bomb load of one and onc­ formally “endorsed.” half tons and speeds of up to 250 At the close of hostiIitiee, nearly knots, all units of the 44th Army were in Most of the effective air defenses the Mukden area. None except one —fighter aircraft as well as antiair­ infantry division had had more than craft atilllery-had been deployed in nominal, if any, contact with enemy southern Manchuria in the year forces. preceding the Soviet attack to meet Capitulation Intervenes the US B-29 raids beginning with the The 90th Army was deployed in raid on Anshan in July 1944. the Tailai-Changchun-Ssuping-Tung­ Standing War Plans hua areas without having been com­ Upon notification of the outbreak mitted to battle, except for the 107th of war on 9 August, the 2d Air Army Infantry Division. On 14 August Gen­ was ordered to implement its stand. eral Yamada persuaded General Ushi­ ing war plans. On that basis, it began roku to abandon his plan to defend reconnaissance, bombing of advancing the Changchun raiI line, and with­ Soviet forces in the weet, and fighter draw south to the planned redoubt defense-but all on a very modest in southeastern Manchuria, but the scale. Plans to attack Soviet forces capitulation intervened. in Mongolia and the Trans-Siberian The course of operations ended Railroad near Chits were for reasons without a decisive military confronta­ unknown never actually attempted. tion and, on the front facing Marshal There is little information availa­ Malinovsws Transbaikel Front, with ble on the volume of Japanese air scarcely any combat. The average activity in the first days of the cam­ tempo of advance was 61 miles per paign, but judging from both Soviet day-closer to current Soviet doctrine and Japanese accounts it was not than any other past Soviet perform­ great. In what was probably the maxi­ ance. The Japanese had preserved mum effort, a total of 184 fighter their forces, but the confusion in communications and command was sofiles were mounted on 12 August, On the 13th bad weather hampered appalling. Also, they bed failed even to attempt to take advantage of the operations, and there were only seven exposed Soviet position about 14-15 attack sorties. August. On 14 August, Japanese r=Onnais­ The low level of Japanese air ac­ sance reported that the enemy was tivity remaine perplexing. The Japa­ massed along the Lupei-Lichuan- nese had a total of about 1,200 air­ Linhsi line ready to resume advance, craft of all types in Manchuria, in­ that about 1,500 trucks were coming cluding a small Manchukuoan element UPfrom the rear, and that the Soviets and the Japanese Air Academy. A1­ had speedily constructed two new most all of the aircraft, however, airfields near Wangyehmiao and were obsolete. Japanese firstline Taipei. Air elements attacked, but fighters in Manchuria had a mexi­ claimed only three tanks. mum speed of only 295 knots, while At noon on 15 August the Imperial Soviet fighters had speeds of 350 to order on the cease-fire was received,

MiOtsry Review MANCNURIAN CAMPAIGN

andall planned air combat operations viet 1st Far Eastern Front, it was were canceled. While ground opera­ not destroyed, and by Japanese esti­ tionscontinued in some sectore, there mate remained two-thirds effective at was no further air action except for its cessation of hostilities. The bulk reconnaissance. of the 3d Ares Army had withdrawn A Japanese Imperial army order, in the face of the advance of the dated 16 August and received 17 Au­ Transbaikel Front without engaging gust, formally directed General Ya­ in combat, and they were concentrated mada to negotiate a surrender. Gen­ in a position to impede the Soviet eral Hikosaburo Hata flew to the field advance and then to join the 1st Area hesdquartere of Marehal Vaeilevsky Army in the Tunghua redonbt area. to arrange the surrender. These ar­ Marshal Malinovsky’s Transbaikel rangements were formalized on 19 Front was the major element in So­ August with a technically effective , viet plans, and packed a powerful date of 25 Auguet, bnt, in fact, were punch—but it hit mostly empty des­ put immediately into effect in most ert, steppe, and mountains. The ca­ areas. pitulation of Japan interceded before So ended the Manchuria campaign. battle between the main forces of the Soviet victory would no doubt have oppOsing sides could be joined. None­ come coon even if the surrender of theless, if there are qualifications to Japan had not precipitated it. But the Soviet record, it also was impres­ the Japaneee forces might have held sive in other respects-to monnt such up the Soviet forces for some weeks a campaign only three months after in their redoubt areas in eoutheaet being bled for four years in Europe Manchuria and northern Korea. represented a major achievement. The bulk of the Kwantung Army In the words of the official Soviet was never committed to battle. Al­ history of the war, “The defeat of though the 1st Area Army in the east the Kwantung Army was a model of had been heavily engaged and driven a real lightning strike, one accom­ out of its main positions by the So- plished by the Soviet armed forces.”

, 61 From Foreign Affa”ra NUCLEARWEAPONS SHARING and “THEGERMAN

W. B. Bader

N THE American effort to cope Of all tbe complex of issues stem­ Iwith the nuclear problems of the ming from these changing nuclear alliance, one theme hae heen domi­ circumstances, however, none has nant: We must somehow devise for proved more vexing than how best to Germany “an appropriate part in the offset tbe 700 midrange ballistic mis­ nuclear defense” of the West, as the eiles (MRBM’s ) that the Soviet Union joint communique of last December’s has pointed at Western Europe. And Johnson-Erhard meeting put it. no other issue illustrates so well tbe Due in large measure to this preoc­ liabilities of allowing a European cupation, public debate ahout nuclear problem of the first order to be por­ sharing within the Atlantic alliance trayed as a “German problem.” has left the universal impression that Over the past few years, tbe North the central problem is how hsst to Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s Su­ satisfy the German daeire for further preme Allied Commander, Europe control of nuclear weapons. All but (SACEUR) has acquired a number lost sight of ie the crucial issue of of pretargeted nuclear systems— how many and what kinds of nuclear British V bombers and tbe PoZarL? weapons are required to defend Eu­ missiles of three US submarines now rope; who makes the decision to use operating in the Mediterranean-ca­ them; and how they shall be deployed. pable of covering some of the mis­ Because it is now both economically sile sites in western Russis which and technologically feaaihle for Eu­ threaten Western Europe. But there ropeans to think ahout developing is a gap in the target coverage, and their own nuclear weapons program, that gap is now covered by non- it is only natural that there are dif­ NATO forces located outside conti­ ferences within the alliance over nental Europe and beyond the control ownership and use of nuclaer weaP­ of SACEUR. ons. At the root of the problem is In 1959, General Norstad, then Su­ European awareness that there may preme Allied Commander in Europe; be alternatives to complete dependence first stated SACEUR’S military judg­ on the United Statas to deter the So­ ment that MRBM’s were required for viet nuclear threat to Europa. the defense of Europe. General Lsm-

62 Miliiry RwiEW NUCLEAR WSAPOflS SHARINS

nitaer, his fmcceesor, has reaffirmed rangemente, and avoid the political thisneed. B-use the strategic neces­ and military disadvantages of deploy­ sity and politkvd advisabSity of put­ ing nuclear missiles on the continent ting ItfRBM’e in Europe has heen of Europe: As to the last objective, seriously questioned on both sides of it should be noted that, for all the the Atlantic, however, no action has talk inEurope about the MRBM gap, beentaken on SACEUR’S request. there ie little enthusiasm anywhere Nevertheless, many European po­ for land-based missilee in “their” litical and mititnry leaders have greet country. confidencein SACEUR, and the com­ klrrltilateralForce mander’s expressed requirement for The various multilateral schemes MRBM’s has raised questions ae to considered by the United Statee, snch boththe military effestivenees and the se the MLF (multilateral force) are availabSity in a moment of crisis of attempts to fulfill the objasthe of the US “external” forsee targeted on providing MRBM coverage without the Soviet miseiles. This uneasiness putting strategic miseilee in Europe. and apprehension have been stimu­ The emphasis on collectively owned lated and exploited by President de and managed nuclear forces is de­ Gaullewho argues that the credibility signed not only to discourage national of our deterrent against a Soviet at­ nuclear efforts, but to help create a tack on Western Europe hae declined framework or model of Atlantic part­ since we became directly thrmtened nerehlp which could be of major im­ by Soviet missiles. portance to the future of European IJSPosition unity. The United States has taken the Although there are strong critice position tha~ although SACEUR’S of this collective approach tu the al­ requirement for an MRBM defense liance’s nuclear problems, the objec­ is fully met by our strategic forsee, tives that the US Government hopee we appreciate the problems of Eure­ to achieve through multilateral nu­ pean political confidence caused by clear management-tbet is, avoiding the NATO nuclear “gap.” further bilateral nuclear arrange­ Consequently, we have sought in ments and avoiding the emplacement eoneultation with our allies to devise of strategic missiles in Euro-are a means of meeting thie “need” which generally accepted by most Americane will also eerve‘to dampen Europenn and Europeane. Nevertheless, in re­ interest in independentnuclear forcee, porthg the nuclear probleme of the eliminate the need for further “two­ alliance, the prees seems abnost en­ key” or bilateral nuclear weapons ar- tirely concerned with eterile ex­ Thie articls was veprinted from changes of cliches about Weet Ger­ the original, publiehed in For& many having a “finger on the nuclear EIGNAFFAIRS,Julu 1966. CoW­ button” and the feasibility of mixed righted @) 1966 by the Couw”l manning. on Foreign Refations, Inc., New In such an atmosphere, any US York. proposal for meeting what we con­ Mr. Bader in staff comndtant sider to he the politisel, not military, to the Senate Foreign Relations need of giving the Europeens greater Committee. influence in nuclear matters wee

Octetier 1900 0s \ .

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SNARING bound to encounter trouble. Our first fulminations. Memories of German such proposal, the ill-fated MLF, was OPPreeeionare too tender and distrust undermined by a“combination of the of the German national character is differences between tbe United States too widespread to permit rational dis­ and most of her alliee as to just how cussion of nuclear eharing withh urgent the project wae, its unfortu­ the alliance if that discussion begins nate image as an answer to the Ger­ with a plea for German nuclear man “nuclear problem,” and tbe “equality.” deadly derieion heaped on the mixed- Nevertheless, German and Ameri­ manning idea. Any new proposale on can officials who insist on the ur­ nuclear sharing seem destined for the gency of enlarging the German role came fate unless we clarify for Our­ eelves and our Europcati allies juet what requirement a collectively owned and managed nuclear force is deeigned to meet, and how urgent that need ie. German Aspirations In the public mind, the collective nuchsar force concept ie designed ‘1 primarily to meet German aspirations to play a greater role in the nuclear affairs of the alliance. Thie identifica­ tion has been stimulated not only by the prese, but by the public and pri­ vate concern of many US officials that Germany will follow France along the path to a national nuclear force if her energies, ambitions, and ti­ nances are not channeled into a col­ lective force. The sense of urgency hae caused attention to concentrate on this iesue, rather than on the more fundamental problem of how best to A nuclear powerpkortat Grmdreimmin. deter the Soviet MRBM threat to gen, West Germany,one of nine schsd­ Europe. ulcd for completion by le6e Our preoccupation with the Ger&an nuclear problem has reinforced sus­ in the nuclear field are apparently picions throughout Eastern and West: prepared tQ pay the political coeta of em Europe that the real US purpose a program of nuclear ebaring adver­ in suggesting nuclear sharing within tised as a means of giving the Ger­ tha alliance is simply to provide a mans nuclear equality withh the convenient way of giving the Germans alliance. Theee costs will include in­ nuclear weapons. Consequently, talk creased French hoetility, the risk that of nuclear sharing immediately turns the Soviete will shatter whatever to the issue of Germany and nuclear hopes remain that German reunifica­ waapmse, eliciting reactions varying tion can be achieved, and the prospect from unessinees to near pathological that the Eaet European countries now

64 MilitaryRSVkW NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHARING

ina process of political and economic join the nuclear club for reasone of diversificationwil) consolidate in the preetige andin order to exert greater face of a German nuclear threat. ircfhtcnce upon the af?air% of the al- Much of this reaction could be Ziunce. AU of the arguments which expected whatever form increased led Britain to decide to develop her German participation took, hut US own nuclear weapone are equallg pressure for rapid eolution and con­ valid from the French pdnt of view centration rm the purely German as­ for France hereelf, and there is no peetof the larger problem of the nu­ reason why other members of NATO clear defense of Europe are guaran­ should not decide to follow euit.* teed to intensify and exacerbate the The logic of this argument hae been reaction. compelling, particularly to Washing­ Economicand Political Stature ton. The specter of a West Germany West Germany’s economic resur­ with an independent nuclear force gence and evidence of growing po­ apparently has so disturbed Washing­ litical confidence, it is argued, indicate ton that it has hardly been questioned that Germany cannot be forever whether the French or British ex­ denied what nations of lesser stature perience has, in fact, any relevance can now obtain. Hence, the United for Germany. It is, perhaps, time that States and the “honest Germans” this question be asked. should move swiftly to give Germany Nuclaar Technology a measure of nuclear participation To be sure, West German advances before the forces of latent German in nuclear technology since 1958 have militarism demand a national nuclear been impressive and help create the force d Zafrmzqcise. impression that the Germans are lay­ Moreover, the argument goes, West ing the foundation for a weapons Germany,ae the most exposed country program. Notable accompliahmenta in Western Europe, is in the uncom­ in recent years include a program of fo~ble position of having to depend nine power reactors scheduled for totally on the US nuclear deterrent completion by 1969, including a 237­ for her defense. Therefore, West Ger­ megawatt plant at Gundreimmingen; mans are particularly vulnerable to a fuel fabrication plant; and a na­ the Gaullist argument that the United tional investment in nuclear energy States will not expose her own cities programs that is now running over to nuclear destruction for the sake of 200 million dollars a year. Germany. As for the physical presence In the ultracentrifuge field, Garman of some 200,000 American troops in scientists were among the pioneers. Germany, these “hostages’’t oAmeri­ However, little hae been heard about can fidelity could be withdrawn at German activity in this field eince any time. October 1960 when it wae announced F. W. Mulley, a British expert on -amid a flurry of newspaper wm­ defense issues and recently appointed ment—that henceforth the work Minister of Aviation, wrote in 1962: would be classified. One ma~ deplore the vn”skeattendant The composib picture of West Ger­ upon a proliferation of nuclear pew­ man prospects in the nuclear field is, er% but it is hardly surprising that * The Politic.of We.ternDefmm,Frwlerhk A. Pmesw, Inc., New York, 1962, DD 79.s0. (Em­ France, for example, k seeking to vhwb added. )

October 11166 66

-“.-+ NUCLEAR WSAPONS SHfiRINfi therefore, one of increasing strength arms for very long, the incentive to and divereity. In a very few years,’ if acquire an assured nuclear weapoos present plans are carried out, West defense is very high. Germany will not only become one of On the other hand, although West the leading commercial competitors Germany is a large country by Euro­ in the nuclear field, but will have the pean standards, with a decentralised capacity to build a bomb in a very industrial and population pattern, her short time and at little cost. physical circumstances are not favor­ But to say that Germany has a able for a nuclear weapons program. strong chance to become a leader in Adequate underground testing siten the nuclear power field is clearly not would be difficult to find, and the the same as saying that the Germans country is too small and crowded to

SoMat ..d Techdt West Germany’sF-204%couldbe meadto deffvernuclearweapon%but their charms of suceeeeagainstSoviet defenseswouldbe Ioiv will press on to nuclear weepone if satisfy the requirements for diepersal the United Statee fails to discover of a fixed missile eystem. And al­ some way of sublimating this very though Weat Germany has the tech­ natural drive. A look at Weat Ger­ nological and economic base tn du­ many’s national circumstance may plicate the nuclear weapons programs help to show thie. of France and Great Britain, does she On the incentive side of the ledger, have the. political incentives? it is true that Germany would be in Alone among the major powers in an extremely dangeroue poeition if Europe, West Germany ie a nation ehe were foreed to defend herself with a strong sense of national griev­ againet the Soviet Union with conven­ ance. The reunificatiorl issue has a tional arms alone. The vest open direct bearing on Bonn’e poeition on northern plain which carried German the acquisition of nuclear weepone, as armies into the Soviet Union can also Foreign Minieter Gerherd Scbr6der eerve ae a gateway for the Soviets indicated in July 1965 when he stated into West Germany. Because West that West Germany was not prepared Germany, either alone or even in con­ to renounce the acquisition of nuclear cert with her alliee, could not hope to weapons until the Soviet Union con­ b@k this channel with conventional sented to Germany’s reunification.

66 Mllitery Review NUCLSAR WEAPONS SNARING

Mr. SchrOder thus brought into To look at the other side of the coin sberpfocus n major German incentive for a moment, euppose West Germany for cresting the option of acquiring did actually decide to build a nuclear a nuclear capability but also for re­ force. If it were to be more than just fraining from doing SO. For the uee­ a prestige symbol, if it were designed fulaeasof the nuclear weepone iseue actually to threeten the Soviet Union, in gaining reunification would almost it would run a h}gh rick of drawing certainly be shattered once Germany a Soviet attack while still in the de­ actuallyeequired weapons. velopment stage. It is at this point that comparison Few countriee would have a more with France breaks down. President precarious ride to a nuclear capability

de Gaulle needed nuclear weapons in than West Germany, exposed as she being to pursue his obj~]ve of reas­ would be to a preemptive Soviet serting French influence on tbe Con­ strike. At the moment, she has five tinent; Germany needs the threat of heavy fighter-bomber equadrons of acquiring nuclear weapons to force F-104’8 which could be used aa deliv­ progress on reunification. West Ger­ ery vehicles, but their chances of suc­ many has serious reservatfona about cess againat Soviet defenses would be a nonproliferation agreement, not be­ very low indeed. West Germany would cause she wanta nuclear weapons, but have to make a great investment in beeauee the Germane do not want to armamente even to come up to the be deprived of the threat of acquiring standard of France’s present nuclear them. force.

October 1960 ; 07 NUCLEAR WEAPONS SNARING

In summary, Germany’s incentives nuclear weapons, they would be WSII to develop an independent nuclear advised to bear in mind that the basic force are clearly outweighed by the ieeue-the nuclear defense of Europe restraints imposed by her special —hae not been resolved. circumstances. But this conclusion Moreover, any deeieion on the nu­ rests precariously on a structure of clear defense of Europe will of neces­ assumptions: that German policy will sity involve Weet Germany; and it be rational; that our commitment to hae been tirgued here that any deci­ defend West Germany will retah eion on the further involvement of some credibility; and that we will not Germany in the nuclear weapons field sacrifice German reunification for an ehould take account of a number of accommodation with the Soviet Union. factors often overlooked in the Amer­ Bargaining Power ican approach to thie emotionally Under these conditions, the Ger­ charged issue. mans are not likely to want their own Two Factors nuclear weepone, for they are surely First, national attitudes toward the aware that noth]rrg would eo perma­ acquisition of nuclear weaponeare the nently solidify the divieion of Ger­ end product of a highly complicated many. What they do want ia the and often shifting array of national bargaining power that the threat of circumstance. To describe the process acquiring nuclear weapons may give of nuclear spread as something in­ them. fectious or organic is highly mislead­ In the rush to give West Germans ing. We are not dealing with a mod- a voice in the management of nuclear ern-day black plague elowly epreadhg affairs within the Atlantilc alliance, its way across the continent of Eu­ let us then ask again whether West rope. Germany is really the France of to­ The doctrine that the arguments morrow in respect to nuclear vwapone. which led France to a nuclear weap­ If their respective national circum­ ons program are equally valid for West stances are as different as they ap­ Germany ie a very questionable one pear to be, then, perhape, we should at best. Weet Germany ie, of course, proceed more elowly before we inad­ concerned about her nonnuclearstatus, vertently excite a nuclear appetite but the arguments for or against nu­ through creating uncertainty about clear weapons are clearly not the same the nature of our commitment to as those” which motivated France- West Germany’s defense and national either in kind or intensity. goals, Equally important, we ehould Second, and obviouely related to the move w-ithall care and deliberation if first point, we muet realize that, un­ we are not to prejudice the chances less the Soviet MRBM menace to Eu­ for a solution to the MRBM problem rope vanishes, Europe will have to in Europe. have an MRBM responee, be it land The problem of nuclear ehsring based or eee based, “one keyfl “two seems deetined to remain with us. keyfl or many “keye” se in the mrrl­ Whatever satisfaction the critics of tilateral eolution. Thie ia West Ger­ the MLF may derive from the dif­ many’s nuclear problem, and one that flcultiee the alliance has encountered is ehared with the reet of Western in devieing a formula for eharing Europe.

Be MilitaryReview NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHARIN6

What is argued here is not that a interest of somehow compensating collectivenuclear force is the best or Germany for France’s defection, to onlyanswer to thie problem, but that rush in with a nuclear-sharing scheme if the nuclear-sharing issue could be devised in Washington and Bonn. portrayedas what it really is—a Eu­ One way of emphasizing the muNi­ ropeanproblem requiring careful and lateral nature of the nuclear problem deliberate attention, not primarily a is to use NATO’s Special Committee German problem demanding an “uf­ established last year and composed of gent” solution—then mnch of the ir­ the Defense Ministers of Belgium, rational and destructive heat will go Denmark, West Germany, Canada, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the Nether­ out of the alliance’s deliberations on lands, the United K]ngdom, and the wherewe go from here. United States. At the moment, this To this end, the emphasis in Amer­ committee has a mandate only to dis- ican pronouncements on nuclear shar­ cues means of improving allied partic­ ing shonld center on the neceeeity of ipation in nuclear policy and planning strengthening the military security and could not otllcially discuss nuclear and political unity of Europ~not on sharing. “satisfying” the Germans by giving Nonetheless, it can serve the pur­ them nuclear “equality:’ presumably pose of establishing an information equality with France and Britain. base on nuclear affairs from which As a first step, we should resist any multilateral discussion of nuclear actionewhich give the impression that sharing will obviously profit. Whatever the United States and West Germahy the means, it ssems imperative to have the responsibility for drawing move the nuclear-sharing issue to up the nuclear-sharing plans. This NATO-wide discussions, thereby less­ will be pafilcularly true now that ening the emphasis put on the Ger­ France has withdrawn her forces man problem. And we can begin to from NATO. Nothing would so preju­ put that problem in perspective by diee the future of the Atlantic alli­ remembering that Bonn ia not Wei­ ance ae for the United States, in the mar—nor ia it Paris.

Ootober1966 89 I Strategic Implications of the Developing Areas

Lteutenent Colonel Lewis D. Overstrset United States Armu

HE sudden emergence of the T Unitad States into the role of. world losdership has forced the mili. tary services to assume new and dif­ ferent raaponsibilitiee. For axmnple, in addition to the requirement of being constantly prepared for tiie usual range of anneal conflict, Gen­ eral Harold K. Johnson, US Army Chief of Staff, stated in the Army 4965 Green Book: A year ago I presented . . . ‘a per­ spective on A?-mzI capabilities’ oe theg related to the broad range of operational demunds that mutd be placed upon our Armed Forcee. I atded my belief thut for ewne time to come ekmwnte of the Armg would continue to be called on for peace­ keeping or stability operati~. Theee Xhoughte reflected a grow. iQ9 r~l~ti~ in the last ten weare that the emplognwnt of militmy forcee of the United States, and par­ timdarlv ite land forcee, is inseparable from political aeticne deeigned to maintain or reetore a cowditioa of etabititv in turbtdent regions of the world. US military forces have been em­ ployed in varioue kinds of stability operations during the postwar period. From small groups of advisors to the

Military R8Vi0W STSATE61C IMPLICATIONS

larger scale commitments in Korea, ports indicated that many of the serv­ Vietnam, and the Dominican Repub­ icemen knew very little about the lic, the serviceman has been used in country and its people and accord­ this all-important role of helping na­ ingly were hot fully eueceseful in tions to manage their countries’ in­ properly influencing the people of that ternal growth. country. MllitsryDeployment There are reasons to believe that Today, there are more than one-half thie is also true in other areas. A 5 million US military personnel de­ December 1966 article by Ruben Sala­ ployed in over 65 nations. Most are zar in the Washington Post reporta in combat and combat supporting on a Vletnameee teacher saying that, unite. About 20,000 are serving in “Americans don’t understand our in­ advisory and training functilone. Al­ tellectual problems.” This statement though alreedy larger than any other wae made in front of two “new mag­ oversees deployment of US troops nificent white modem buildhgs of during peacetime, this figure is likely the University of Hue” which were to increase in direct response to the paid for largely by American money aggressive aCtiWIsof the Free World’e and, according to the report, contained opponents. anti-American students. Without doubt, the American eol­ New Militsry skills dier will continue to respond mili­ Our Nation’s role and its military tarily to thie different form of con­ commitments in teday’e world have flict in the same exceptional manner changed greatly in the ,past two dec­ as in the past. Llkewiee, he will be ades. Aleo, the young men who now properly clothed, well fed, given the compriee onr combat and combat sup­ beet of equipment and military train­ port units are products of a different ing, and sent into the far eernere of era from that of World War II and the world by the most modem meene Korea. Today’s yonng soldier opened of transportation. It would appeer hie eyes into a Free World that is that our military pkumere have “United States centered.” He grew to thought of everything-and no doubt manhood during a period of prosper­ ~ey have. ity in our Nation. He has not per­ Yet when US military forces were sonally experienced war. sent into the Dominican Republic in Because of the changed world sitna­ April and May 1965, wire service re- tion and the role that the United Lieutewant Colonel Lswia D. Ovw­ States commande today, the require­ strset is on the staff of the Corn­ ments of this young eoldler have been mandw in Chief, Pacij?c. He gradu­ altered. He needs epeeial inetrutilon ated from the US AmrwI War College if he is to maeter these altered re­ in Jrme 1966, ia a gradwats of the quirements that include contact and V. S. Arvnu Command and Genere4 communication with a greater varie~ Staff Cohkrge, and hokfa an M.S. from of people and cultures than heretofore the Univereitg of Karwas. He eerved faced by American soldiers. in Europe dum”ng World War II, and waa in Kwsa with the 8th US Arvmp The presence of US military per­ untg his ue.signment in September sonnel can have beneficial social and 1964 to the Owe of the Chief of IW political consequence for both US formation in Wrwhington. foreign policy and the internal dy-

Octeher 1966 ions. A great deal hae been learned beneficial to our Nation and to the about how to influence even underde­ host country, it is necessary that new veloped nations through pressure and military skS1e be developed or oldev persuasion directed at groups and skills be more fully adjusted to cope leaders-in and out of government with the wide range of new relations —who have access to the reine of between our soldiers and the peoples power. of the world. Today’s military pereonnel at all Army civilian and military leaders, levels can serve US political purpose without hesitation, have stated re­ through proper contact with individ­ peatedly that “man is the ultimate uals and groups whose attitudes help weapon,” “people are the Army’s

72 MilitaryROViOW STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS most important asset:’ and “the real the afteraction report on the opera­ strength of our Nation’s landpower tions indicate the succesees that were is in its soldiers.” Concerted effort is achieved. This may be a source of madeto get the most capable and in­ pride to these involved, but it should terested young men into the services. not make them completely satisfied. Thereafter, they are given appro­ There were some aspects of the opera­ priate military training to prepare tion that could have been stronger. themfor their assigned role in today’s Orientation Gap military service. The earliest reports by the Ameri­ CombatReadiness can press on the ground were filed Soldiers soon learn the meaning of on 1 May 1965. Thereaf@r, a steady combat readiness—the target of all stream of news was sent worldwide. Army activities. It receives attention However, US troope on the ground at all levels of command. A readiness received their first command news­ reporting system helps to identify paper seven days after arrival. Ad­ problems within troop commands and ditional information-type materials to promote their solution. REDCAT, were received between three and 13 REDCAPE, and REDCON—terms days later. Thie would appear to be a used to describe readiness category, weakness in one link of the total US reediness capability, and the readi­ effort. It is aknost certain that our ness condition of units—are familiar. troops were essentially uninformed on Plans are made and actions are taken the Dominican Republic and her pao­ at higher levels of command to c~ordi­ ple prior to being sent inte that nate all efforts for developing and country. maintaining the most suitable forces This is not to imply that US troops in the best state of readiness. were not told why they were sent As a result of these actions, the there. That was surely done by unit entire spectrum of Army prepared­ commanders just prior to movement. ness-organization, military training, However, the troops apparently were deploymentof forces, and the develop­ not fully educated and oriented on ment, procurement, distribution, and the people and the country of the maintenance of materiel—is in a high Dominican Republic prior to their state of combat readinese today. sudden landing on that foreign island. Despite this high state of reediness This also appliea to some other over­ for military encounters, there appears eeas areas where US military person­ to be a sizable gap in our stability nel are assigned. operations-in the area of basic hu­ Do we now have informational, man understanding. We need to give orientational, and educational-type increased attention to preparedness material available in each of the areas for actions, within stability opera­ where our forces may be sent? For tions, that do not involve the use of the moat pa~ we do. They are scat­ physical force and, in fact, may serve tered, however, in varioue classified to avoid the uee of our destructive and unclassified forms and studies, military power. and apparently have not been used ef­ Reporta by the American press dur­ fectively in training our soldiers. ing the stability operations in the We could also ask if there is a re­ Dominican Republic in May 1965 and quirement within the Army for train­

October1966 13 \ smAlE61c IMPLICATIONS ing or orientations on overseas areas These include courses at selected prior to leaving the ptates. Again, the service echoole and special orienta­ answer ie ailirmative. All Amy unite tion tours with overseae Military &. and individuals assigned oversees are aiatance Advisory Groups for selected required to have an orientation prior senior officers. These, of course do to leaving the etatea. This initial not provide this education and train­ stateaide familiarization is augmented ing for all officers and enlisted men by a required aeriee of orientatiorte in the eervice. On.the$pot Education An item in The New York !l%nee, dated 5 December 1965, reported that the following “Ten Commandment of War” were iesued to a US Marine battalion in Vietnam: . Wave at all Vietnamese. � Shake hands when meeting peo­ ple whether it be for the first time or upen subsequent meetings. � Respect graves, tombs, and other religious buildhgs or shrines. � Afford normal courtesies such as deference and respect to elders, and respect for authority of the vil­ lage and hamlet officials. o Give the right-of;way on the road and paths wheneve possible. � Treat women wi politeness and respect. } Ainuf Nw* Fen:.=. � Recognice that hand holding US soldiers were militarily prepered for among Vietnamese males is a custom the Dmdniran ftepnblk but were not fully edrmked and oriented en the pee­ of eomradeahipin South VXAnam and ple end the country not an..indication of homosexual tend­ encies subject to ridicule and mockery. once the soldier arrives in the over­ � Keep your word. Be slow to make seas commend and his unit. promisee, but once made do your best Some unita do a fine job in such to keep them. Remember, though, that training and orientations. Many promises involve a command decision. others do not. These orientetiona are Your commander muet Be given an not necessarily designed, however, opportunity b rule in such a matter. to provide the soldier all he needs to � Enter into the spirit of barter­ know about the country and ite peo­ ing without abuse, and respect the ple or how beat to represent the local methods for conducting business. United Stabiw. � Return what you borrow, re­ There are several other kinda of place what you break and avoid un­ training for personnel going over­ necessary ‘liberation of local items” seas, and some are apecitlcally ori­ for your personal or unit’s use. ented toward etabSi@ operations. WhSe this effort to till the orienta­

74 MilitalyRovi8w STAATS61C IMPLICATIONS tion and training gap in stability lighted the need for complete integra­ operationswas apparently needed and tion of our effort. The political, eca­ may be a step in the right dkXion, nomic, sociopsychological, and scien­ it pointedly brings to our attention a tific-technological effort of the United serious weakness in the nonmilitary States must accompany such overt education of the US marine and is military effort. equallyapplicable to the US soldier. Human Undaratanding SimilarRules It is imperative that the eoldier Thie type of makeshift edueation today be trained ta fulfill his impor­ for the soldiere and marines of the tant role in operations which require wealthiest and most advanced nation the use of all elements of national in tbe world falls short of the high power. He must know more about the standards that we establish in the people and the country in which our more tangible military areas. In fact, troope are stationed or may be needed. these “Ten Commandments of War” He must be educated eo that he pro­ are similar to the following points jecte the best possible image of the used by Mao Tse-tung almost four United States. This can be done only deeadesearlier to inetruct hh illiter­ if our eoldiere understand their own ate Chine~ Communist soldiers on country and aleo know about other how to treat people and their prop­ peoples and their countries. Senator erty: J. William Fulbright expreseed the e Replace all doors when you leave need as follows: a honse. Our massive defewee expenditcmee e Roll up and return the straw are an unfortunate necessity, but matting on which you sleep. theg will avail ua little if we fail to e Be courteoue and help out when make an adequate eflort in the field you can. of ideas and human understanding. e Return all borrowed atilcles. Most military training results in @ Replace all damaged articles. maetery of tangible items of military hardware and ~ctics. Other arees of e Be honest in all transactions edueetion and cultural understanding with the peasants. are more elusive, and, patilally be­ e Pay for all afiicles purchaeed. cause of this, they receive Ieeaof the ‘ e Be sanitary, and especially es­ commander’s attention. Also, it ie tablish latrines at a distance from generally accepted that euch educa­ people’s houses. tion is of a civilian nature and, there­ In 1947 the Peeple’s Liberation fore, maybe considered asa fait ao­ Army had, instead of the last two complt. points: The commander is informed if his e Do~t flirt with women. vehicles need repairing or his mess- e Don’tklll prisoners of war. hall needs cleaning. However, before Stability operationa involve more going overseas, he may be completely than the ability tocontrol people and uninformed on whether or not hie their land by the application of armed soldiers will know how to get along might. This was one of the lessons with the people of other nations while learned from the recent operation in stationed in their home territory. the Dominican Republic that high­ What can the services do to elimi­

Octobm1060 STSATESIC IMPLICATIONS nata or minimize this gap? Some ac­ Defense or ae a contracted research tions have been taken through the project by a university or college, tbe various edueetiomil programs, infor­ materials should be produced and mational fields, courses at some serv. published in packet form ready for ice schools, and individual educational uee by the small unit or detachment effort. More positive and organized commander in teaching his soldiers actione are needed, however, if the and their adult dependencewhen ap. military man is to help other people propriate. understand the values of our society. EducationalProgram To be most beneficial, it is eeaential To be of maximum effectiveness, that our soldiers have abetter under­ the educational and orientetional standlng of tbe people and natione coursee should be designad for all where our forces are now stationed service personnel and should: and where they may be required in � Make maximum use of audio­ the future. visual materials to include closed- What Can Be Oone? circuit television when appropriate.. There are four major agencies, in Motion pictures and film strips with addition to the Department of De­ recorded and printed narrations fense, engaged in various forms of should be made into completed packets international activities that fall in for the small unit commander to use the field of education and culture. with a minimum of rehearsal on his These are the Department of State, part. the Agency for International Devel­ � Provide general instruction ap­ opment, the United States Informa­ propriate to all the overseas areas tion Agency, and the Peace Corps. where service personnel are or may What actions san betakenta resolve be stationed. tbe gap in our stability operations? e Be sufficiently detailed to pro­ A first step should be a coordinated vide fully for an understanding and effort by the five major governmental appreciation of the different people agencies to reach agreement on the and their culture. over-all national objastives to be � Provide complete coverage of achieved and the broad concepte that the country and peopl+the attitudes, each should mold to their special beliefs, values, and interests should needs. be explained. Classes and groups Thereafter, the Department of De­ within the eesiety, the family sys­ fense, through the Office of Armed tem, political backgrounds, ideology, Forces Information and Education, educational faciliti~ health and san­ could be the feed point for planning, itation, governmental .pelicies, his­ organizing, and producing the educa­ torical and current relations with tional materiale for the military serv­ foreigners, police powers, and envi­ ices. However, this educational pro­ ronmental and operational difficulties gram can neither be relegated to are areas which must be covered. off-duty time nor to a voluntary-type � Include a useful comparison of aethity if it ia to accomplish the the “American Way of Life” with desired purpose. that of the subject country. This Regardless of whether the materials would include clearly defined guide­ are produced by the Department of lines for the soldier and his family.

76 Military Review STRA1’SSiCIMPLICATIONS

To supplement the educational pro­ he accorded those areas where sol­ gram, specially selected soldiere could diers are most likely to be deployed be grouped and provided with orga­ in stability operations. nised,expense paid, short tours ta the Seleeted soldiers or civilian leaders various countries where our person­ from the developing areas could be nel sre stationed or may be cent. In brought to this country for brief pati]cular, tours to countries of the visits with military persouuel and developing areas of Letin America, unite as well as to historical apots in south Asia, Africs, and the Far East the United States. Thie would provide where we have few military person­ for expanded use of the training pre- nel stationed coukl,whelpus to under­ gram now conducted for selected of­ stand these people better and would ficers of foreigucountriee and would serve as a bssis for them to under­ improve our preparations for stabMy stands. Special consideration should operations.

General William C. Westmerelsnd, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, has established nine rules designed te help the United States win suppert from the Vietnemesewople:

e Remember we are special guests here; we make ne demands and seek ne special treatment. e Join with people: understandtheir life, use phrases frem their Ian­ guage and honor their customs and laws. e Treat women with politeness and respect. e Make personal friends among the soldiers and common people. @ Always give the Vietnamese the right ef way. e Be alert tesecurity andreadyte react with your military skill. Q Den’t attract attentien by loud, rude or unusual behavior. e Aveid separating yourself from the people by a display ef weslth er privilege. e Above all else you sre members ef the US Military Forces on a dif­ ficalt mission, responsible for all your officisl and personal actiens. Reflect honor upen yourseff and the United Ststesof Ameriea.

October1968 77 INCE the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan in 1962, Com­ munistS China has been heavily in­ volved in training technicians and improving scientific research to a~ln her goels.for industrial development. She capitalized on the research organi­ sations and the scientist who had been associated with the, Republic of China (ROC) before the mainland fell into Communist hands. Little was ac­ complished initially, however, since research was poorly planned and her objectives were scattered. In view of this fact, a Scientific Planning Committee wae established in March 1956, and in June of the same year a draft of a 12-year plan

7a MilitcfyReview NUCI.SAR mm

for long-range scientific and technical projeete in that long-range plan would reaenrchand development wea drawn be undertaken jointly by the scientific upwith the assistance of Soviet scien­ forces of the two countries. tists. The main purpose of this pian In 1958 the Chinese Communist re­ was to enable Communist China to gime launched the Grest Leap For­ catch up to the scientific levei of in­ ward movement in an attempt to ac­ dustriaked nations by the end of complish the plan five years ahead of 196’7.To aehleve this objective, the schedule. Many scientists, however, Communist Party specified that: were unenthusiastic and held con­ e The Scientific Planning Com­ tradictory views which actually im­ mittee would be the supreme super­ peded the progreae of the Great Leap visory body for scientific research and Forward. Many ecientista were either development. forced out of their research, or com­ a Military science and civiiian re­ pelled to work in the backcountry or search would he combined. in factories. In some cases, projects e Emphasis would be on the ap­ were even partially euapended. plied sciences. Shift to Agriculture e The Ministry of Advanced Edu­ A series of economic criees forced cation would reshape educational Red China to shift her efforts to guidelines, placing more stress on agriculture, where failures had greatly physiea and technology. affected scientific progrese. In August e Top priority would be given to 1960, when SinO-Sovietrelations were budget allocations t’or scientific re­ at their lowest ebb, the Soviet Union search and development. unilaterally abrogated the Scientific and Technicei Agreement and with­ Major Pointc drew her scientists and technicians, In the fall of 1957, a group of some together with blueprints and techni­ 60 scientists, heeded by Professor Kuo bfo-jo, president of the Red Cbineae cal data. This blow virtually paralyzed the iong-range pian. Academy of Science, went to Moscow for a joint conference with their So­ Communist China then realized that a scientific system biindiy patterned viet counterparts. During the three after that of the Soviet Union-es­ months of that conference, two major points reportedly agreed upon were tablisbment of a greeter number of research inetitutee and facilitiee­ that the Soviet Academy of Science would not work if there were not would make an over-all study on Red enoughwell-trained technician. It bad China’a long~ange plan, and that, in drained away huge financial strength a period of fi~e years, 100 of the 680 from Red China’s shaky economy, and Colonel Ch’iem Cheag h Chief of the also had held beck military advances. Ltiieon O&e of the Chineee Armg New guidelines were established to: Logi.etic8 Command. He ie a graduate e Develop scientists by augmenting of the Chineee WZitarp Acudemy, the ‘the research elements in colleges and Chineee Intelligence School, and the universities. Chirwee At-my Command and Generat e Enlist scientieta and technicians Sta# CoUsge. Colonsl Ch’ien ha had em%n.aive combat experience against from abroad to correct the deteriorat­ the Japanese and Communist forces ing eituation that resulted from aus­ on the China mainland. peneion of Soviet aid.

O~bor 1966 79 ., NUCLEAR TEETH

� Reappraise the scientists who be on a par with those in the advanced had earlier associated with the ROC. countries. The Scientific Planning The Communists changed their at: Committee established in March wzs titude and treatment of these scien­ directly under the Communist Party’s tists radically. Central Committee, and headed by The result was two nuclear detona­ Marshal Chen Yi, to provide guidance tions on the Chinese mainland, the as well as to coordinate and super­ first on 16 October 1964, the second vise scientific research of both a mili­ on 14 May 1965. They revealed for tary and nonmilitary nature. In May 1967 the Planning Committee was re­ organized by merging with the Na­ tional Technological Committee as the State Scientific and Technical Com­ mittee. This organization was the supreme steering body for scientific research and was charged with the missions of? � Coordinating research among all scientific research organizations and developing long-range plans. � Eliminating conflicts and dupli­ cations among the departments of the Academy of Science, the research Marshal ChenYi institutes within universities, and var­ the world to see the grim fact that ions Ministries. Communist China, with her own men � Insuring adequate attention to and resources, could have considerable research for military purposes. success in developing nuclear weap­ . Allocating and employing funds onry. for research and development. To expedite their scientific advance­ . Controlling and harnessing scien­ tists and technician. ment and technological revolution, the Chineee Communists had established Research and Development two types of organizations, one for The Academy of Science had been steering and mordim&inz science and established in November 1960 by technology, the other for scientific re­ merging 22 researeh institutes which search and development. Generally had been set up earlier to control the speaking, the entire setup for devel­ scientist and intellectuals who had opment of science was organizationally not been able to evacuate with the modeled after that of the Soviet Union. ROC when tbe Chinese mainland fell. In January 1956 the Chinese Com­ Included within the Academy of munists fired out a thunderous slogan,\ Science are the departments of biol­ “Grand March to ScienceY decreeing; ogy: geOloaw; physice, chemietry, and that a crash program for the most! mathematics; technology; and philos­ urgent projects in the scientific sleldl ophy and sociology. In 1958 the Chi­ nese Communists, after the pattern Sketches are. from Alice Langler Hsieb% book. C.nmnnnziat Chnta% Strateov {. the Nuclear Era. of tbe Soviet Academy of Science, o 1962.rcm’odtmdby r.emnissi.n of Prent3ee­ Hrdl, III.., Enelewcmd Clil%, New Jerusr. established branch academies of sci-

MilitaIv Review ence in various Provinces and major Reeearch organizatione at colleges citiee ae tha next higher authority and universities, deeigned and set up overall inetiltutes, hut under the con­ by the Academy of Science and the trol of appropriate local Communiet Ministry of Advanced Education, Party headquarters. Once the State started research work in 1956. Be­ Scientific and Technical Committee cause the Communists emphasized was set UP, the Academy of Science military applications of science, cOl- was put under its general supervision Iegee and universities placed their and guidance, although not in direct main efforts on nuclear energy re- subordination. MilitaryScience In October and November 1967 the Soviet satellites, Sputniks I and II, were launched into orbit. In order to cope with modern warfare, the Chi­ neee Communists felt that adequate emphasishad to be placed on military science. Consequently, on 15 March 1958, with full support of the Soviet Union, they established the Academy of Military Science under the Minietry of National Defense. Marehal Yeh Chien-ying wae appointed president. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying Its essential task wae to intensify study on military applications of sci­ eearch. Up to the present, 15 colleges ence and technology. and univereitiea are conducting nu­ The Chinese University of Science clear energy research. Some of these and Technology waa established at institutions already have small eize Peking in 1958 with 30 departments. (eeveral kilowatte) reactors and self- Requirements for admittance were built cyclotrons. strict; only party or Youth Corps The decreaee of per capita income members could be enrolled. Duration and investment largely frustrated at­ of this education was five years. In tempts to apply investment and re­ 1963 there were 1,600 graduatee, sourcee to scientific reeearch and de­ 1,400 in 1964, and 1,650 in 1965. velopment. On the other hand, eince These were all aseigned to the major Communist China wae a totalitarian institutes of scientific reeearch and regime, she could concentrate re­ development. aourcee on areaa of major interest to Since the Communists did not fully attain a particular aim regardless of truet the returned overeeaa ecientiste tbe people’s welfare. or those who had a record of associa­ When the Chineee Communists tion with the ROC, the new graduates started developmentof nuclear energy naturally became the hard core of in 1955, the investment in this field science and technology research etaffe. wae estimated to be only 16 million In addition to their own research US dollare. But when the firet experi­ work, they were responsible for sur­ mental reactor went into operaflon in veillance and rating of their “eldere.” 1958, scientific expenditures rapidly

tIctober1966 NUCLEAR TEETH

grew to 133 million dollars. From 1958 there were at least four nuclear re­ to 1960 the investment was one billion actors on the Chinese mainland. He dollars, and from 1961 to 1964 it was further stated that three of them were 2,2 billion US dollars, According to a in operation and could be applied for conservative eetilmate, the Chinese military as well as for peaceful pur­ Communists must have spent the poses. Information from high-alti­ greateet portion of their budget in tude photoreconnaiseancemade around the developmentof nuclear energy and 1963 revealed a giant nuclear energy rocketry. plant in Lrmchow. Judging from the Huclear Energy extensive area it occupied, it could It was the Italian scientist Bruno be a gaseous diffueion plant. M. Pontecorvo’s arrivel in mainland Analysie of information from vari­ China in August 1953 that sparked ous sources supporta the belief tbet in the interest of the Pekhrg regime in Communist China today there are at the development of nuclear energy. least six reactors, five radioactive ore ‘Chien San-chlang, a French-trained extraction plants, and one gaseous dif­ nuclear physicist, was assigned to fusion plant. oversee the entire project. In April Experimental Reactor 1955 the Chhese Communieteand the The Peking experimental reactor, Soviet Union signed an Agreement on built with Soviet aid, bas been in Development of Atomic Energy for operation eince 1968. It was generally Peaceful Purposes which provided that assumed that before 1960 tbe raw the USSR would aid in building, in materials and products of this reactor the Peking suburbs, an experimental were strictly under Soviet control, nuclear reactor of the heavy water and thue confined only to the field of type. The experimental rezwtor was experimentation. But from 1960 on­ completed in June 1953, and turned ward, since Communist China was no over to the Chhese on 27 September. longer bound by the agreement she From tbie nuclear pile the Chineee had with the Soviets, ehe was free to Communists were able to obtain the use as ehe saw tit the products and first batch of radioactive isotopes, byproduct such as plutonium yielded and from the cyclotron they were able by her nuclear reactore. to obtiln high-energy patilcles for The construction of the gaseous use in nuclear research. At the came diffusion plant at Lanchow was ap­ time, according to the agreement, parently started in 1960 and com­ more than 20 Chinese nuclear phys­ pleted in 1963, at which time the plant icists were handpicked to patilcipate went into operation. Since the separa­ in research work at the Joint Insti­ tion of U 235 from natural uranium tute for Nuclear Research in Dubno, required an enormoue amount of elcc. USSR. tric power, and electric power suflply The Chinese ecientiets thue made in the underdeveloped region of north­ great progress in nuclear physics re­ western mainland China fell critkdly search during the period 1956-59. In short, the Communist regime had to 1960, L]u Shao-cbi, the heir apparent build a hydroelectric plant in tbe and Chairman of the People’s Re­ vicinity of Lanehow on the Yellow public, proclaimed at the Moscow In­ River as a makeshift for supplying ternational Communiet Congress that electric power to the gaeeime diffu-

.82 Militery Review NUCLEAR TEETH sion plant. It is eesumed that the have made remarkable progreee in the Communists have ateo used the reac­ development of nuclear weapone. tor at Lanchow to provide a needed e The Chinese Communist tried to portion of eleetric power for the gase­ take a shortcut. toward the develop­ oue diffusion plant in that area. ment of a hydrogen bomb by produc­ The nuclear reactor in Paotow is tion of U 235. considerably larger in male. Since e Communiet China would have Inner Mongolia is a vast, open steppe serious technical probleme in produc­ region, under no circumstances would ing plutonium. the Communists eink a huge invest­ e It is likely that U 235 produced ment into such an area by eetting up in the Lanchow gaeeous diffusion plant a reactor merely for power-generating wae inefficiently concentrated, with

purposes. It can, therefore, be inferred the result that the Chinese Commu­ that the principal task of the reactor nist had to reeort to the implosion- ie to produce plutonium for the de­ type device inetead of the gun tube velopment of nuclear weapons. type for detonation. Analysis of the fallout preduced by When the Chineee Communiete her first nuclear explosion indicatee mapped out their 12-year plan for the that Communist China must have used developmentof science and technology an implosion-type device in detonat­ in 1956, the delivery system wae ae­ ing U 235. The following technical eigned as one of the major items with conclusion on the development of nu­ a priority below only that of nuclear clear weaponry in Communist China energy. The over-all recket project are worth eerioue eoneideration. was headed by US-edueated Chlen e Technologically epeakbw, they Hsueh-sen, a rocket epeeialiet.

October1963 83 \ NUCLEIIR TEETN

Reliable sources revealed that test had delivered some MtG-21’s to the firing of a ehort-range ballistic mis­ Chinese Communists before 1960, and sile with a range of approximately 300 that the manufacture of MiG-21’s is miles was completed by the 3062d probsbly underway at present. Judg­ Arsenal at the suburb of Sian in 1963. ing from the teehniquee and experi­ It ie now in production. Almost at ence they have acquired over the the same time, tbe Chinese Com­ yeare, the Chinese Communists—with munist S@”enceBulletin disclosed that the knowledge of Chien Hsueh-sen and some institutes within the Academy other top scientists-should not have of Science had made remarkable much difficulty in producing fighter achievement in research work on bombere similar to the ilftG-21, eveu rocket development-euch as eolid without the Soviet aircraft of the fuel, high temperature resisting ma­ latest type. terial, and aluminum alloy. Other In addition, Peking has about 275 sources also reported that the Com­ Soviet-built ZL28 bombers which are munist bad conducted midrange mis. capable of carrying nuclear bombs to ‘sile test firing in 1963, but failed due targete up to 600 miles away. It also to defects in the guidance eyatem, has five 11-28jet transports capable of outer casing material, cooling, and carrying a 15-ton load 4,000 miles. propellant. Thus, most major Asian cities—To­ These achievements obviously were still limited. For this reason, the Chi­ kyo, Manila, Bangkok, Rangoon, New nese Communists had to import from Delh~, Taipei, Saigon, and otherS-­ Britain, France, East Germany, Czech­ may find themselves within Red Chi­ oslovakia, and Japan a great quantity nese nuclear range sometime in 1966. of precision instruments and mate­ It ie auticipatcd that, in order to rials relating to the development of achieve a nuclear weapon system, rockets so ae to solve the dMicult prob­ Communist China will have to invest lems. The Chinese Communists re­ more money in scientific research and main determined to develop the development. This may have either of launching tools for medium-range mis­ two results: it may further decrease silee. economic resources and cause a new Chinese Communist aircraft pro­ crisie; or it may make her the num­ vide another launching system. Ac­ ber three nuclear power, next only to cording to information from US the United States and the Soviet eourcee, the Chinese Communist were Union. “ capable of assembling MiG-15’s, MiG­ With her tremendous manpower 17’s, and MiG-19’8 with Soviet as­ and the relatively untapped resources sistance. After suspension of Soviet in an abundant land maea, Peldng may aid, the Chineee Communists have well become the single force which been confronted with problems not most threatens the entire world. If only in assembling such aircraft, but the free natione still content them­ in providing adequate maintenance for selves with simply ignoring or trying the original ones due to shortage of to argue away this hard fact, they spare parta. may find themselves being swallowed We way assume that the Soviets up by a dragon with “nuclear teeth.”

34 MOitaty llEVieW From Krasnaua ZueztZa (1.JSSR)

This article i.s an adaptation of a speech pre8ented by Marshal Mali­ novsky, Soviet Minister of Defetme, before the Communist Partg of the Soviet Union 28d CongTe88 earlier this gear. It was 8ub8equentlg published in KSASNAYA ZVESOA(USSR) 2 April 1966. The verdon pre8ented here ~8 baeed on a translation which appea?’cd in SUSVIVAL(Great Britain) July 1966. —Editor.

HE imperialists cannot recon­ T cile themselves to the victorious march of the Soviet Union to commu­ niem, the building of socialiem in the people’s democracies, and the epread of the liberation etruggle. They have not rejected the frenzied idea of de­ stroying the Socialist countries by force. The US imperialists rage in pa#]c­ ular; they have taken upen them­ selves the role of saviors of the Cap­ italist system. The ruling circles in the United States are stubbornly whipping up the arms race. They are persistently perfecting their military machine by squipping it with predom­ inantly offensive military meene such as intereontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines armed with Pokwie missiles. Other Western Powers are also tak­ ing an active part in th]s arms race. The leaders in Washington ars trying hard to strengthen the ‘aggressive mil- itary-political blocs, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the forefront. But events show eerious contradictions in the North Atlantic aggressive bloc. Carrying through her colonialist policy, the United States brazenly in­ terferes in the internal affairs of other countries by organizing reac­ $OVIET DEFENSEPOLICY i$ferehalItedionY. Malinoveky,Soeiet Army

Octobsr 1966 p5 SOVIET OEFENSE POLICY tionarycoups and setting up regimes In the last 10 yeare, Bonn’s mili­ suiting herself. The United Statee at­ tary expenditure has amounted to tacks independent states and commits 200,000 million deutsche mark, twice unheard-of atrocities, thus calling as much ae the Hitlerites spent on forth the hatred and condemnation of preparations for World War II. The the whole world. Weet German rulers openly demand Vietnam Conflict approval of their revanchlst policy by The war unleashed“by US imperial­ tbe Western allies and the recognition ists in Vietnam is a serious threat to of West Germany’s hegemony in peace. The transoceanic brigands have NATO on a par with the United turned Vietnam into a kind of firing States, including equal rights in plan­ range for testing all typee of poison ning and use of nuclear weapons. All gases, modern weapons, and military these demands are included in the technology. Bringing tolife themem­ framework of Bonn’s foreign policy. ory of the grim times of fasciam, the Lenin’s Policy Fentagon bosses are subjecting the The Communist Party Central Com­ towns and villages of the Democratic mittee and the Soviet Government Republic of Vietnam to barbarous firmly and consistently implement bombing and are carrying out Nikolai Lenin’s peace-loving policy. scorched-earth tactics in South Viet­ They persistently struggle for the nam. creation of favorable conditions for We are profoundly convinced that building a Communist society in the these invaders will not be able to USSR, developing the world Socialist break the will of the Vietnamese pa­ system, and preventing a new world triots and force them to their knees. war. At the same time, the party can­ The Vietnamese people do not stand not fail to take account of the grow­ alone; on their side are the peoples ing aggressiveness of the imperialist of the Socialist countries-millions powers led by tbe United States. Safe­ and millions of people throughout the guarding the security of all peoples of world. The USSR has given and will the Socialist countriee, it takes all continue to give selfteee and resolute steps to strengthen the defense of the aidtu heroic Vietnam in her just and USSR. courageous etruggle for freedom and The USSR cannot be indifferent to independence. the imperialists’ military prepara­ In relating evente in southeast tions. Under euch conditions, our main Asia, one should not forget Europe. task ie to raise the combat strength The embers of the lest war continue of the army and navy and their pre­ to smolder here, and could kindle the paredness for crushing any adversary fire of a new, nuclear war even more if war is forced upon ue. destructive and catastrophic. The For the Soviet armed forces, the United States is trying to legalize the period since the 22d Party Congress access of West Germany to the nuclear has entailed the solution of many com­ arsenal. On her part, West Germany plex and important problems of mili­ is taking all meseures to become one tary construction. The measures car­ of the leading members of the NATO ried out in that direction have made nuclear club, even claiming leadership it poeeible to increase the reserve of in it. nuclear warheade for various pur-

U Military Review SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY poses and to reinforce sharply the de­ tasks of striking enemy targets on livery equipment of all the armed both sea and land, It includes new nu­ forces. clear submarines equipped with bal­ The Central Committee and the gov­ listic rockets that can be launched ernment have paid close attention to while the vessel is submerged. the development of the strategic The nuclear strength of our long­ rocket forces and nuclear submarines dietance, recket-carrying air force has equipped with rockets. The main ef­ aleo been increased. Simultaneously forts of our military industry have with the improvement of strategic nu­ been subordinated to the rapid expan­ clear weapone has been the develop­ sion of these forcee which are the ment of operational and tactical nu-

l.tarmia Sauege, a Soviet three-stsga intercontinental beflietiemissile.Developmentef strategic rocket forces hae receivedcleee attention. chief means for restraining an ag­ clear weapons, especially those of the grepeor and decisively routing him in land forces and the navy. war. All the latest achievements of Equipping the arme~ forces with Soviet science and technology have conventional weapons has also been been used in perfecting them. expanded in corresponding propor­ A number of basically new types of tions. The tank and motorized infan­ rocket armaments have been created. try divisions have received improved A whole complex of varied strategic armored, artillery, and special equip­ means of warfare has been made op­ ment. In come important respects, Su­ erational in a short time. A large num­ viet tanks are superior to the latest ber of new—and this ie of epecial models in the United States and other importenc~mobile launching inetal­ NATO countries. latfons have been built for the stra­ The armored protection of military tegic rocket forces. personnel againet the lethal effects of We have also created a submarine nuclear weapons has been greatly in­ fleet equipped with rockets which is creased; the mobility and maneuvera­ capable of fulfilling the strategic bility of land forces have increased;

October1968 \87 and communications, engineering, and broadened and strengthened.with the other forces have been further devel­ armies of the member countries of oped. Highly effective new antiair­ the Wareaw Pact. The fundamental craft rocket systems and interceptor qualitative changes which have taken aircraft complexes have been devel­ place in the Soviet armed forces com­ oped. Our defenses iusure the destruc­ pel the Pentagon leadere to assess our tion of any aircraft and many of the military power more soberly and adopt enemy’e rockets. a different approach to their evalua­ The long-range air force has been tion of the balance of military forces improved. Many of the combat air­ which hae developed in the world. craft of the frontline, naval, rocket- People Are Protected carrying, and especially military We stand calmly and confidently transport air forces have been reno­ guarding the peaceful work of our vated. Our airborne assault troops peopl+the more so now that the es­ have been considerably reinforced. tablishment of the “Blue Defense During recent yeare, the results of Belt” of our state has been completed. combat training have been good. The In any event, should the imperialists navy has been equipped with new attempt tn unleash war against the rocket veseele, forces, and the means Soviet Union and other Socialist for antisubmarine defense, especially states, let there be no doubt that our to combat rocket submarines. blow will prove to be devastating to Combat Readiness Increased the war’s organizers. The improvement of technical equip­ The strength of our armed forces ment for the armed forces has been coneists not only in the first-rate ar­ accompanied by increasing their com­ mament at their disposal, but also in bat readiness and raising the level of the morale of the troops, their whole­ military and political training. Army hearted devotion to their people, and and navy personnel are successfully their loyalty to the ideals of the party. mastering the new equipment and The Soviet armed forces possess learning the methods of its use in highly qualified, well-educated officer battle and operations. cadres who are devoted to the party In recent years, the number of long- and government and are, owing to distance voyages by our nuclear sub­ their qualifications, able to lead troops marines has increased five times, in peace as well as war. Our officers, which shows that our sailors can per­ generals, and admirals are the back­ form any military tasks while at sea. bone of the army and navy. An around-the-world voyage wae re­ Much continues to be done in the cently completed by a group of sub­ way of training politically and the­ merged nuclear submarines. All this oretically mature military cadres who makes it possible to say with confi­ are highly qualified and devoted to dence that the Soviet armed forces are their motherland. At present, one out capable of carrying out any military of every four officers in the army and tasks which may be set by the party navy has a higher mititary or special­ and government for the defenee of our ized education. The proportion of en­ homeland. gineering and technological personnel I should like to stress that in recent in the armed forces is steadily years military collaboration has growing.

ila Military Review SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY

The command staff, political bodies, consider an all-round expansion and and party organizations are the Iead­ consolidation of the ties between army ing inculcators of party ideals. They and navy party organizations, polit­ skillfully and purposefully educate ical bodies, and military councils, on personnel in the spirit of Socialist pa­ the one hand, and local party, admin­ triotism, proletariair internationalism, istrative, and trade union organiza­ boundless devotion to their people, and tions, on the other, as one of the main hatred toward the imperialist ag­ methods for enhancing the fighting gressors. capacity of our armed forcee. Our enlisted personnel have a high The Soviet people have surrounded political consciousness and a bound­ their armed forces with deep reepect less devotion to the party and the and care. They regard them as the people. Every day of their service is reliable shield of the homeland. In filled with pereietent training and the this unity with the workers of the will to excel in military and political country lies the inexhaustible source training. of the strength of our army and its As always, Communists lead the superiority over the armies of impe­ way. Communists and Comsomol rialist statee. (Communist Union of Youth) mem­ To strengthen the defenses of the bers are a vaet force iu any army country requires continuous attention “ and navy. They comprise over 80 per­ to the military and patriotic education cent of the armed forces and are the of the Soviet people, especially the bedrock on which the high political youth. Military knowledge must be awareness and morale of the troops widely disseminated, and the citizens are founded. must participate in perfecting the Also, the young men who arrive for civil defense system. The further conscript service in the armed forces strengthening of fraternal ties and are well educated, technologically the unity of the Soviet armed forces knowledgeable, and physically’fit. and the armies of the member coun­ The strength of our armed forces tries of the Wareaw Pact and the en­ is founded on the inviolable-unity of tire Socialiet community must also be the army and people. Therefore, we an object of our unremitting concern.

Octobsr 1966 [89 Military Review CHOOSE YOUR WEAPON

The viewe ezpreeeed in this arti­ counterinsurgency. Throughout the cle are the author’e and are rwt nec­ first two of Mao Tse-tung’s three eeearilg tho8e of the Department of atages of revolutionary war, and even the Army, Department of Defense, to some” extent in the third stage, the or the U. S. Array Command and insurgents are intermingled with often General Staff College.—Editor. innocent civilians and, indeed,may not be distinguishable from them. If the HROUGHOUT centuries of mil- “industrial base” of the insurgency ie T itary history, weaponeere have incountry, these workshops, too, as sought advances in weapon lethality. well as food and other resources, are The “bigger bang per buck” search similarly mixed with those of inno-; typifies this objective in the nuclear cent and loyal civiiians. era. Reasons for Constraint Although not necessarily synony­ A difficult problem of identification mous with enhanced combat effecHlve­ must firet be solved. Even then, as­ nese in every case, the greater lethal­ suming its solution, the use of avail­ ity of each new eyetem enabfed the able weaponry will be constrained for side ueing it to achieve victory more two reasons: if avoidable, the inno­ readily. In the general wars of the past cent should not be harmed; and the century, victory came through attain­ objectives of a counterinsurgency ment of one or more objectives such campaign will be quite different from as the defeat of the enemy’e armed those of a general war bc$ween two forces, destroying the industrial and countries, even though some of the mobilization base supporting those objectives may be, in theory at least, forces, or overcoming the will of either common to both. the armed forces or the homefront ci­ In a war between two countriee, vilians to continue to wage war. each strives to terminate hostilities However, in a counterinsurgency on acceptable terms and with mini. campaign, the objectives are quite dif­ mum expenditure of its manpower and ferent. Much of the weaponry for gen­ other resources. The damage and cas. eral war proves to be ill suited for ualties inflicted on the enemy are a secondary consideration. In the past, Colonel Stanleg W. Dziuban, United even the victor’s expectation of help. Statee ArmzI, Retired, ia with the Eco­ ing the rehabilitation of the van­ nomic and Political Studiee Division quished has not restrained hie use of of the Institute for Deforwe Atwlyeee, maseive military power to achieve the Arlington, Virginia. He -received his Ph. D. in Zntornational Retationa from serlieat victory possible. Columbia Universitst, New York, in The political and psychological ob­ 1955 and gradrmted fwrz the National jectives of a counterinsurgency cam. War College in 1960. While on active paign restrict use of the available mil­ duty, he held vara”ou-saeeignments in itary power. In euch a campaign, op. the United States, North Africa, and erations are designed, to uee a trite Europe. He afso authored the volume, phrase, ‘{to win the heerta and minds Military Relatione Between the United of the people,” including as many in­ States and Canada, 1939-1945, in the surgents ae possible. Injury of the US ARMY IN WoaLDWARII eeriee. He has beow with the Institrkte since re­ innocent and damage to their property , tiring from military service in 1964. must be avoided lest their loyalties

October 1966 dl CHOOSE YOUR WEAPON turn from the government to the in­ surgency. In overcoming the ineurgenta, only that level and khsd of force should be used which will accomplish the mili­ tary and political objective and etill minimise the poetcounterineurgency legacy of hatred resulting from the memories of the dead, the preeence of the maimed, and the deetroction of personal property. Damage to re­ sources also neede to be minimized, not only to avoid increasing the refu­ gee and aid-to-eiviliane prohleme, hut also to minimize the task of poetcoun­ ~erinsurgency rehabilitation and re­ construction. Weaponty Objectives The selection and use of weaponry and tactics should be deeigned to achieve the following ohjedtivee with­ out, of course, undue hixeaee in the cost to the government forcee: � Defeat or capture of insurgent forces while inflicting the fewest pos­ eihle caeuahies. � Avoidance of injury to women and children and to innocent males. � Complete destruction of purely military installation. � Neutralization only of installa­ tion and resourcee ueeful in a peace economy, or limiting damage to the extent neeeesary to deny their use to have been manning a machinegun a the insurgency. few minutes earlier-or the vehicle To inflict higher Ievele of damage spotted on an airfield def6nee ground and casualties will not only hhder the surveillance radar screen which might government’e longer term taeke, but he a farmer and his produce or an it will also risk loss of support and insurgent mortar crew intent o’n at­ sympathy in collaborating and neu­ tacking the airbaee. tral countries. Even when hostile insurgent activ­ The firet problem faced in trying ity ie detected, the insurgents might to use selective and discriminating have commingled themselves with the weaponry and techniques is that of activities of a village or their poei­ identifying and separating the insur­ tione might be adjacent to innocent gent from the innccent. Considerable civilian activity. In cases like these, research and developmental effort hae it may be impossible for government

.92 Why Review CHOOSE YOUR WEAPOH

forces to differentiate between insur­ im! individual or vehicle, whether gent and innocent from a distance. friend or foe, except in the abnormal Even if they can, government forces circumstance when vieually controlled then face the eecond problem of em­ firing-as of a river mine-has been ploying suitable weaponry so that, improvised. If placed along routee in despite the commingling, contiguity, general use, injury to the innocent, and difficulty of identification, the ob­ ae well as to insurgenta, is virtually jectives can be achieved. Available al. certain. ternatives in weaponry have many dis­ Accuracy criminatory and eelective characteris­ The larger the circular error prob­ tics, able (CEP ) of a weapon, the greater PointandMea Effectz the poesibiiity of damage to com­ One consideration ie point versue mingled or contiguous friendly per­ ares effect. When viewed in small- sonnel and facilitilez. The bayonet scale, counterinsurgency operations, thrust or rifle fired at close range may I very few weapons can be used with involve a negligible CEP, bnt that of a point effect, limitilng casualties and practically all ordnance achieved by damagee to a eingle insurgent or a high-performance aircraft is 40 yarde small radiue. In this category may be or more. Delivery of chemical agents placed the bayonet, the rifle and car­ can be subject to the vagaries of bine, the maehhegun, the concussion wind and weather. grenade, aud the small antipersonnel The level of materiel destruction mine like the epike trap. When suit­ can vary considerably. Use of the ex­ ably aimed or delivered, the effect of clusively antipersonnel weapons—such these weapons can be localized on ae emall arme, mines, and chemical practically an individual bzzie. agents-or of herbicides would limit On the other hand, artillery, na­ physical damage to facilities to minor palm, bombs, rockets, and chemical- levels. On the other hand, the larger biological agents are typical of the artillery calibers, and aircraft frag­ many weapone with area effects of mentation and incendiary bombs various sizes. The smaller the area, would, if deiivered accurately againet the more frequently a euitable homo­ suitable targets, produce extensive geneous target can be found for de­ physical damage. feat without nndeeirable coneeqnencee. There are also various levels of per­ Although the larger area weapons sonnel injury. In the case of the chem­ like napalm may be far more efficient, ical agents, this level could range from the probability of homogeneous insnr­ the temporary incapacitation of riot gent targets of theee sizee becomes control and incapacitating agents to smaller and the possibility of un­ zerioue, long-term illness or death wanted damage greater. from othere. As for mechanically pro­ Although most weapons are directed duced injuries, those resulting from during delivery at a previously ac­ the uncontrolled fragments of high­ quired target, some are not. Predom­ exploaive bombs and ehellewould pro­ inant in thie category are antiperson­ duce larger and more complicated nel, antitank, and naval mince, spike wounds with a higher proportion of traps, and similar planted devices. deaths and permanently maimed. Their effect is delivered on the actuat­ The smaller particles of come gre­

Octobsr1966 cd, political, and humanitarian needs tion. The fortified hamlet program of a counterinsurgency situation. successfully achieved thle end in Ma­ In insurgenciee in the near future, laya, but has been only partially suc­ use should be made of thoea weapons cessful in South Vietnam. which fall toward the low-severity [of As a related meaeure, it should be wound indicted), high-dieerimination possible to improve the “labeling” of (capability) end of a spectrum of loyal persons and activities-whatever weaponry already described. ‘l!boee the extent of reparation or mixing weepone toward the high-severity, —by use of identification eysteme low-dkerimination end should be ~PloYing Visual, dSCtroIdC., infrared, avoided if an alternative ia availebla chemical, or other recognition sys­ How much of the spectrum of weap­ tems. onry can be used will be determined Second, uee of the best available

.94 MIlitmyUwisw CHOOSE YOUR WSIIPON systems of target acquisition and for employment than the larger items identification em best exploit the de­ of ordnance. The latter will be needed gree of success attained in the sepa­ for the fewer instances in which large ration and labeling efforts. targets are identified. Here are some principles for use o Where materiel or facilities de­ of available weaponry. Adequate tar­ struction is sought, high explosives get identification is presumed, and would be preferable to napalm or in­ the use of a weapon in one situation cendiary bombs except in casee where may be precluded in another, as when fire effects cannot spread outside the a high-performance aircraft cannot target area. locate ite target in sufficient time to o For defeat of personnel, gre­ use its machineguns: nades, bomblete, and nonlethal tempo­ o Do not use undirected weapons rarily incapacitating chemical agents such as antipersonnel and antitank should be ueed in preference tu hIgh­ CHOOSE YOUR WEAPON lected munitions like grenades and standing and distortion, been placed. small bombs and shells, these chem­ It appears clear that the intent of icala can be used with some discrimi­ the framere of the Washington Treaty nation. Also, their low level of ef­ was to prevent use of lethal and per­ fecte that dieappear in a short time manently or severely incapacitating places them at the low-severity, high­ agents like tbe mustard gas and lewi­ diserimination end of our spectrum. site of World War I. It ie somewhat Since the effecte of these agenta anomalouathat use of the temporarily disappear spontaneously after a short incapacitating agente would be far time, the severity can be considered more humanitarian than the great fire zero, making for a most favorable se- raids of World War II on German and verity-discrimination factor under all Japanese citiee. conditions and even when used with­ In tbe light of the order-of-magni­ out discrimination. These agents best tude superiority of the incapacitating achieve the objectives and also solve agents over other weaponry available the difficult discrimination problem in in counterinsurgency warfare, from counterinsurgency warfare. the humanitarian, political, psycholog­ There are politicolegal questions in­ ical, and military effectiveness view­ volved in use of’ such agents which points, it would appear that US forces have been etudied extensively. Arti­ should make use of them when appro­ cle V of the Washington Treaty of 6 priate. This will require a careful February 1922 sought to prohibit “use program of educating public and of­ in war of asphyxiating, poiaonoue or ficial opinion worldwide. It will also other gases, and all analogoua liquids, require the political determination to materials or devices.” proceed even if all the voices express­ The question of the force of this ing objections are not stilled. It must prohibition-either as a treaty provi­ be realized that some of these voices sion or as a part of international law will inevitably be propaganda. —has been extensively debated. In Wars of revolution appear to be any event, it has been apparent that with us for the foreseeable future. public opinion and political feelings The problems of selectivity, discrimi­ can run high orr the question of use nation, and limitation of etYects— of so-called “gases: into which cat­ largely ignored in past weapons re­ egory even mere riot-control agents search-need much attention in the like tear gas have, through misunder­ future. .

Military Review MILITARY ....--,-,-..-.=7Tpmmy;,”JF.4....,.,4..=.A....*&, , NOTES

UNITED STATES Malaria Drug Communications Network A new antimalarial drug now au­ A major semnent of tbe defense thorized for use among US troops in communications network in Europe South Vietnam can cut in half the has been activated as part of the Eu­ number of men stricken hy the dis­ ropean Tropo-Army system spanning ease according to Army medical re­ a number of Western European na­ searchers. tions. Recent field tests conducted in Viet­ The activation adds more than 1,200 nam by Army researchers show that channel miles to the Army Stra­ diaminodiphenykmlfone (DDS), a tegic Communications Command’e drug long used in treating leprosy, will (STRATCOM’S) worldwide communi­ combat a severe form of malaria which cations complex. The system will sup­ has resisted the usual treatment. port all US forces in Europe and the Troops will be given one 25-milli­ NATO armies. gram pill each day and continue to It ties in communications from Leg­ take the pills for one month after leav­ horn, Italy, through the Italian Alps ing southeast Asia. up to Bremerhaven, Germany, and Soldiers receiving the drug who still from Heidelberg to within a few miles contract malaria should now be able of Paris. to return to duty in two or three “Tropo” signifies tropospheric scat­ weeks instead of six or eight weeks ter, a method of long-range radio as before. Chances of a relapse, ac­ transmission where signals are de­ cording to the researchers, are ex­ flected off a layer of the atmosphere pected to be cut from 40 to four per­ to an over-the-horizon receiving sta­ cent. tion.—DOD release. In 1965 malaria caused a loss of 63,035 man days in Vietnam.—Army Super Searchlight News Features. The Air Force is testing the Air­ borne General Illumination Light ‘F-111A’ Flies At Mach 2.5 (AGIL) as a possible substitute for An Air Force F-111A fighter illumination parachute flares. The sys­ bomber has flown at a speed of Mach tem employs two hanks of 14 high- 2.5-equivalent to 1,446 knots-dur­ intensity lights.—DOD release. ing a high-speed teet run. During other tests, F-111’s have exceeded Mach 1.2 at extremely low levels and have taken off and landed in less than the required 3,000 feet. —News release.

October1966 MILITARY NOTES

Air-CushionVehicle

Three Navy air-cushion vehiclee are being nsed to patrol the extremely shallow coastal waters along the Vietnam coast in eearch of craft carrying smnggled Viet Cong supplies. The air-cushion vehiclee travel at epeeds in excess of 50 knots over water, march, mud, land, and enow on a thick cushion of air forced downward beneath the craft by a horizontally mounted fan. It appears to ride only a few inches above the surface, but the hard bottom of the craft actually travels on a cnehion of air more than four feet thick. The 39-foot craft ie manned bv an officer and three enlieted men.—US Navy release.

New Air Conditioner Training Centers Waste heat from the exhaust of Almost 700,000 young Americans tnrbine engines will be put to use by will pass throngh the Army training the Army to power a radically new air system during Fiscal Year 1967. Thk conditioning system now under devel- is more than double the number in opment at the Engineer Reeearch and 1965. Development Laboratories. Cnrrently, 15 training centers are The new system -will be used with operating. Twelve are full-sc@e basic the ArmY’s miseile fire control vane training centers, and three are lim­ and eimilar mobile shelters that are ited to advanced individual training, linked to gas turbine generators which Women’s ArmY Corps training, and power their electronic eqnipment. conscientious objector training. According to reporte, the system In 1965, when the Army trained will cnt fuel consumption by 40 per- about 300,000 individuals, 11 training cent while reducing the eize and centers were operating. Seven of these weight of the equipment by 30 per- were basic training centers.—US cent.—Army News Features. Army release.

.98 Military Review % MILITARY NOES

‘M551 General Shuidan’ Landhtg Fiald Tests The Army’s newest tlghting ma­ An instant landlng field for heli­ chine, the M551—better known as the copters ,and ehort and vertkml takeoff General Sheridun weapons system— and landing aircraft is being tested has rolled off the production line. in by the Air Force. During teats, a Cleveland, Ohio. chlorinated polyester resin formula­ The fast-moving General Sheridan, tion reinforced by fiberglass was which can reach speeds up to 45 miles sprayed over the desert floor in 30 per hour, mounts a 152-millimeter minutee. Vehicles and helicopter used launcher that fires conventional the surface without causing damage rounds and guided missilee (MR, Jan or Permanent deformation.-DC)D ra­ 1964, p 96) .—Army News Features. leaee. ReplaceableTrack Shoe

US’ AmII The tank on the left is fitted with the new T14i?track while the vehicle at right has the current standard track An experimental track shoe aesembly, the T142, which may double the eervice life of tracks on the M60Al tank, is being developed by the ArmY. The development will make it possible to replace individual rubber pads on the track shoe, to reverse the track shoe. assembly or the pads to equalize wear, and to remove the rubber pads to allow the steel grousers to function as cleats on soft ground or snow. The standard track, tbe T97E2, muet be replaced as a unit. It cannot be reversed, and ite rubber road pads cannot be removed. Replacement of the standard track ia necessary after approximately 2,200 miles of use.—US ArmY relaaae.

October1966 \ 99 MILITARY NOTES

Buoyant Body Armor mote Maneuvering Unit (ZLWU) which Buoyant body armor has been de­ has been laboratory tested. The AMU veloped by the Navy’s” Clothing and is worn on the astronaut’s back for TexMe Laboratory in Bayonne, New both propulsion and environmental Jersey. It is undergoing tests in Viet­ control. The RMU is designed for re­ nam for protection against explosive mote operation by a crewman inside ordnance and for buoyancy in water. a spacecraft. Conventional body armor weighs With the DMU, an astronaut could eight pounds or more, while the tested assemble a station in space, repair armor weighs less than three pounde, a space vehicle, or perform other tasks. the weight of a standard life pre. In unmannedmissions, the DMf7 could server.—DOD release. be guided remotely by an astronaut inside a space vehicle and might in­ Space Maneuvering Unit clude inspection of satellites and space Developmentof a Dual-Purpose Ma­ neuvering Unit (DMU) which can be vehicles, rendezvous, assistance in ‘worn by a apace pilot or operated by docking, and tranefer of space equip- ment.—US Air Force release. ‘Walleye’ Weapon Technical evaluation of the Navy’s Walleye, described as a “television­ guided glide weapon,” is underway. at

Technobm Week Artist’e concept of Dusl-Purpose Maneu­ vering Unit

remote radio and television signals has recently been started by the Air Force. The dual-purpose unit will combine the best features of the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU) used dur­ ing the Gemini 9 fl]ght and the Re­

“100 MilifaryReview MILITARY NOTES

Reserve Fleet The Navy is releaaing 25 C-4 type Merchant Marine. The C-4 cargo cargo ships from the reserve fleets. ships being offered are at least 21 The ships will first be offered to years old, but have been described as the Military Sea Transportation Serv- in “good” condition. They were used ice to transport military supplies to as troop carriers during World War southeast Asia. Then they will be used II and the Korean War.—DOD re- to “update” the cargo fleet of the lease. FloatingRepairBase

‘T~-”-E-~a: ‘– ‘­ CH-47A Chinook helicopter landing on the Corpus Christi Bag with a load of combat. damagedaircraft parts

The Corpus Christi Bag, the Army’s struments, electronics, armament, avi­ first floating aircraft maintenance onics, and other fields. ship, ia supporting US forces in Viet­ A closed-circuit television system nam from Camranh Bay. on board expedites the flow of data The 5%-foot Military Sea Trans­ from the ship’s technical library to portation Service vessel ie equipped other parte of the vessel. The library to repair all types of Army aircraft contains more than 600,000 items of flying in Vietnam. The 305 techni­ information on repair and mainte­ cian aboard the ship are trained for nance of Army aircraft.—Newa re­ work in sheet metal, hydraulics, in­ lease.

Octeber1966 101 i NorSr Viobram Airlii Armorad Parsonnal Carrier The Soviet Union is using more The BTRi$OPB armored personnel than 100 large transports in her air­ carrier is the latest member of the lift to North Vietnam. Some of the Soviet Army’s B7’R60 family. Com­ aircraft fly the airlift route nonatop pared with the open and closed-in ver­ to Hanoi or Nanning, a Cmonmnist sion% it features a lightly armored Chinese airfield near the border of revolving turret with an automatic North Vietnam. In addition to small weapon which ia believed to be a arms and ammunition, the aircraft 14.6-millimeter gun. haul large mortars, gune, radar equip­ The vehicle ie reportedly equipped ment, and air defense miesilee.-News with infrared driving and firing lights. item. —News item.

102 Militarylk.view MILITARY NOTE3

FRANCE Submarine Fleet ‘Mirage’Aircraft West Germany’s submarine program France’s Air Force wilIreceive 362 cane for the construction of 30 sub­ Mirage aircraft by the end of 1966. marines, six of which are to be used Tactical units will receive 150 Mirage in the antisubmarine role. III-E interceptors, 50 Mirage III-C The submarine fleet will consist of fighter bombers, 50 Mirage 211-R re­ three squadrons and a training group. connaissance aircraft, and 50 two-seat The only equadran now operational, Mirage 111-B’s. the lst, has four submarines. By mid­ 1967 this squadron will be equipped Production of the Mirage III-V, a with 10 to 12 submarines. vertical takeoff aircraft, is scheduled The 2d Squadron will have six sub- . for 1967-70.—News item. marinee for antisubmarine warfare Naval Forcsa and the 3d Squadron 12 submarine. At the beginning of 1966, thetotaI Each squadron is to have ite own sub­ tonnage of France’s warships was marine tenders. 320,000 tons. Included in thie tatal West Germany’s combat submarines were three aircraft carriere, 64 “de­ will displace about 450 tons and have stroyers, and 19 submarines. eight torpedo tubes. The antisubma­ Under construction are three rine craft will d]splace 800 to 900 tons. guided-missile frigates of the Suflren The construction program should be class which are to be armed with completed in 1970.—News item. Masurca and Makfon missiles. COMMUNIST CHINA Three nuclear-powered submarines SouNr Sea Command areto be the nucleus of France’s stra­ A South Sea Command was estab­ tegic naval force. Each will carry 16 lished by Communist China in 1965 miesiles, comparable to the US Polun”s, when the US troop strength was in­ with an eetimated range of between creased in South Vietnam. It em­ 1,800 and 2,500 miles.—New& item. braces the Canton and Kunming mili­ tary zones in tbe Provinces of Kwang­ ~EST 6ERMANY tung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, ‘lARC’s’ For The ‘Bundesvsehr’ and Hunan. The West German Defense Miriistry has placed an order in the United Under this commandare six armies, Staten for 200 LARC-5’S and 60 each with an estimated strength of LARC-15’.9 for the amphibious units 40,000 men; eight air force divisions with an estimated total of 1,000 air-~ of the BwuZeewehr.-News item. craft; an unknown number of air de­ Aff flefeme Weapon fense diyisions whose equipment in­ A contract for the development of cludes surface-to-air missiles; a few a new armored eelf-propelled air de­ marine units; and some engineer and fenze weapon system has been awarded seeurity forces. Total strength of the by the West German Defense Pro­ command is estimated to exceed 400,­ curement Office to a consortium of 000 men. German manufacturers. Three of the armies-the 40tb, 42d, The weapon system will mount twh and 47th—were part of the 4th Field Hiepmw Suisa 30-millimeter guns.— Army Group which took part in the News item. Korean War.—News, item.

Octeber1246 103 MILITARY NOTES

AUSTRALIA GREAT BRITAIN ReconnaissanceRole Fur ‘F-111A’ ‘Martel’ Missile Australia is to use. the US-built First detaila of the Martel (Missile ~-lllA strike aircraft in an advanced Antiradar and Television), a new gen. reconnaissance role. The Minister for eration air-to-surface precision tac­ Air in Auetralia saye the F-111A Wi]l tical strike miesile jointly deeigned completely revolutionize the Royal by Great Britain and France, have Australian Air Force (RAAF) recon­ been released. naissance capability. Jfurtet is claimed to be the first Twenty-four F-111’s are scheduled air-to-surface tactical miseile in the for delivery to the RAAF in late 1968. Free World which offere a real standoff Two yeare after delivery, six of the capability. This feature gives a new element of surprise in attack, together w’ith a high degree of invulnerability to the launching aircraft. Designed to function in an elec­ tronic countermeasure environment, Martel is interchangeable, depending on mission requirement. The antira­ dar version has an all-weather attack capability and can operate against multiple targete, The television ver­ sion flies toward the target area ati­ Intora”iatomatically, with final guidance by the weapon’s operator. aircraft will be returned to the United States to be fitted for reconnaissance The missile’e weapon-support facili­ work. ties can cope with either version.— News release. The reconnaissance modifications will not affect the planes’ striking Hovercraft power since they can be reconverted Orders for the development and for the strike role within a few hours. construction of two prototype hover­ —News release. craft, one designed as a fact patrol ‘Oberon’Class Submarine boat and the other as a logistics sup­ The keel of the Ovens, Australia’s port craft, will be placed with a Brit­ third of four Oberen class submarines ieh manufacturer by the Ministry of on order, has heen laid at a shipyard Defense in Great Britain. in Scotland. Launching is scheduled Military tests of hovercraft’ in the in 1968. Far East and Canada have been en­ The Royal Australian Navy’s first couraging. Arrangements are now be­ Oberon class submarine; the Oxley, ing made to equip a British Army will be commissioned at the end of unit with SRN-6 hovercraft for serv­ 1966, and the eeeond, the Otcuav, is ice in the Far East early in 196’7.The scheduled to be launched this year SRN-6 ia a larger version of the (MR, Sep 1963, p 106) .—News re­ SRN-5 which oarries 20 passenger at lease. 7S knots.-News release.

164 Militars Review MILITARY NOTES

ITALY BEL61UM Marine Corps Armored Car Italy’s marine corps, formerly A new lightweight, wheeled, ar­ known as Piedimonte.se Fanti d; Me mored’ reconnaissance vehicle, desig­ rina (eoldiers of the navy) and which nated the FN4RM/62FAB, hae been wae disbanded more than 50 years ago, developed by Belgium. One version will be reactivated thle ywr. mounts a 90-millimeter cannon in its Reforming the corpe with the name turret, and the other a 60-millimeter of “marines” ie part of Italy’s pro­ gram to bring her armed forces into line with allied sea forces in the Med­ iterranean.—News item. UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC &areNaval Baae The government of the United Arab Republic has allotted 120 million dol­ lars for construction of a harbor and naval baae at Gaza. Work on the project ie scheduled to hegin this year. According to the report, the first phase of construction ie expeeted to be completed in 1969, and the last phase in 1973.—News item. mortar and two machheguns. The lat­ ter version is primarily for guerrilla­ PAKISTAN * warfare. ‘T54’ Tanks The vehicle weighs approximately Communist China recently supplied eight tons, is powered by a 130-horee­ Pakistan with an unknown number of power six-cylinder engine, has four- T54 battle tanka. It ie not known wheel drive, a maximum epeed of just over 60 miles an hour, and a range of action of about 350 miles.—Newe item. SWEDEN BottomlessOil Tank A bottomless oil tank made of poly­ ester resin has been successfully tested in Sweden. The gigantic plastic

SoMat u-d Tech”Sk bell, which holds ahout 90,000 gallons, is anchored in the sea. whether the tanka were built in Com­ Since water and oil do not mix and munist China or the Soviet Union. oil is lighter than water, a tank bot­ The tanke, firet displayed in a mil­ tom ie unnecessary. In contrast to itary parade in March 1966 in Rawal­ conventional storage tanke, there is pindi, are of the B type which has a no loss through evaporation and no smoke discharger but no infrared danger of explosion due to the forma­ equipment.—Newa item. tion of gas.—News item.

October 1986 MILITARY NOTES

CANADA Hydrofoil

Rezwblic .Md Cmymnzti.n Artist’s concept of the Royal Canadian Navy’s new hydrofoil escort ship in foi]borne position

A 200-ton, 150-foot Royal Canadian struts. that are combined to form the Navy antisubmarine warfare ship bow and main foil systems. scheduled for launching late this year The bow foil, which provides 10 will introduce a radical design for percent of the ship’s lift when it is large oceangoing vessels—a fixed, sur­ foilborne, consists of two foil units face-piercing hydrofoil system per­ mated to a center strut that takes mitting speeds up to 60 knots. the place of a conventional ship’s rud­ The ship, designated FHE-400 (for der. The main foil is made Up of a Fast Hydrofoil Escort), will be named combination of large, winglike foils HMCS Bras d’Or. The FHE-400 con­ and struts. cept combines aerodynamic and ma­ Propellers mounted at the main foil rine engineering designs for the strut interssstion provide the thrust ship’s hydrofoil system which is com­ for foil-borne hydrofoil speeds.—News prised of huge, winglike foils and relsase.

Militcry Review MILITARY .’.,. .,. .,, . . . . BOOKS

COMPONENTS OF CrEFENSE POLICY. Edited THE HILT OF THE SWORO. The Career of by Oavis B. Bobrow. 445 Pages. Rand fdc- Peyton C. March.By EdwardM.Coffman.346 Nally & Co.,Chicago,Ill., 1965.$3.95 paper­ Pages. The University of Wisconsin Press, bound. Madison,Wis., 1966.$10.00. BY LTC GEORGED. EGGERS,JR., USA BY LTC JOSEPHD. HYNES,USA Dr. Bobrow has compiled and ed­ The title is drawn from the World ited a representative group of 26 es­ War I allegory of General John J. says on defense policy analysis. In Pershing and the American Expedi­ his view, the major aspects of defense tionary Forces as the point of the policy analysis fall into four broad sword, and General March, Chief of categories: strategic context, defense Staff, and the home organization as policymaking, strategic alternatives, the hilt. This book is a biography of and quality control. a relatively little-known but important The four eesays which comprise the figure in the Army who served as strategic context portion of the book Chief of Staff during 1918-21. survey the present international en­ Although obscured by the publicity vironment with specific emphaeie on g~ven General Pershing, General the USSR, Communist China, NATO, March was instrumental in galvaniz­ and the nonaligned nations. ing the war effort and establishing The papers on defense policymak­ the supremacy of the Chief of Staff ing analyze the diverse policy’ roles of and the general staff system. Gen­ Congress, Department of Defense ci­ eral March’s viewa of the Army Gen­ vilian leadership, military profession­ eral Staff and how it should f unc­ als, scientists, and the general public. tion closely parallel the Army’s cur­ The section on strategic alternat­ rent staff structure. ives contains excellent coverage of Based largely upon papers and in­ nuclear deterrence, conflict limitation, terviews heretofore unpublished, this gnerrilla warfare and counterinsur­ work throws new light upon the con­ gency, civil defense, and arms control flicts which arose between the Chief and disarmament. of Staff-who was a brigadier gen­ Finally, four articles depict the eral commanding artillery nnits in the character of the basic elements of American Expeditionary Forces when quality control: information, ration­ tapped for the Chief of Staff post— ality, flexibility, and innovation. and General Pershing. This book hae value for the profes­ Mr. Coffman, Aseistant Professor sional military reader bscause of its of History at the University of Wis­ insight into the complexities inherent consin, has produced a scholarly biog­ in the theory and practice of defense raphy which is a noteworthy addition policymaking in the mid-1960’s. to World War I literature.

October1966 , 107 MILITARY BOOKS

O.DAY BEACHES REVISITED.By PatriceBmrs­ DUTY, NONOR, COUNTRY: A History ef West sel. 210 Pages. Doubleday & Cm., Inc., Peint. By Stephen E. Ambrese. Ferewerd by Garden City, N. Y., 1665.$4,85. Dwight O. Eisenhower.357 Pages.The Jehns ItepkhrsPress, BaltJmere,Md.,1606.$6.00. In this compact volume, the author describes how the Allies broke through BY LTC HARSYJ. MAIHAFER,USA the German seawalI defenses to begin In this latest West Point history, their conquest of Nazi Europe. Illus­ Stephen E. Ambrose describes the trated with maps and photographs, Military Academy with objectivity this book ie a handy reference work. and scholarship. It differs from simi­ lar histories by concentrating on the TNE DAY OF THE AMERICANS. By Nerin E. Military Academy’s difficulties as well Gun. 317 Pagss. Fleet PublishingCerp.,New as its triumphs. Yerk, 19BB.$6.95. Tbe book begins with the early BY LTC CARLF. BAeR!ELL,USA struggles for recognition, moves An eyewitness account of German slowly through the various etages of concentration ezmps in general and West Point development, and traces Dachsu in particular. It describes the skillfully the influence of Thayer, dramatic etory of the liberation of Mahan, Partridge, Church, Delafield, Dachau by the 42d and the 45th In­ MacArthur, and others. fantry Divisions of the US Army. The While the organization is generally hletory of Dachau is traced from its chronological, the later chapters—ar­ opening in March 1933 as a model ranged functionally—are, perhaps, the prison to accommodate 5,000 political most interesting. Especially recom­ prisoners through April 1945 when mended is the section on Douglas Mac- it had become an overcrowded, typhus- Arthur, with its description of the infested camp of 35,000 starving ci­ conflict between the innovating young vilian and military prisoners of many superintendent and the powerful, u]­ nationalities, religions, and political traconservative academic board of the beliefe. early 1920’s. By the day of liberation, Dachau bad accumulated the “hostages of THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL KEITEL. honor” who numbered some 137. They Chief ef the German High Cemmand 193B­ included Leon Blum, Premier of 1645. Edited With an Introduction and France; Kurt von Schuschnigg, Chan­ Epilogue by Walter 66rlits. Translated by ceJtor of Austria; and General Franz Oavid Irving. 286 Pages. Stein & Day, New Halder, Adolf Hitler’s Chief of Staff. Yerk, 1B65. $7.95, Heinrich Himmler stated that this BY LTC LrJrzDE A. ARARIPE, group of prisonere of honor, “are Brazilian Army worth more than a whole Armored Written while in confinement be­ Divieion.” The author follows the lives fore his execution”as a war criminal, of a number of these important per­ the author dwells on tbe background sonages after their liberation. of Germany’s annexation of Austria This is an unemotional and factual and Czechoslovakia; the campaigns accounting of man’s inhumanity to against Poland, France, and the So­ man as practiced in Hitler’s concen­ viet Union; and the last days of the tration camps. Third Reiah.

.108 MiOtwyReview MILITARY BOOKS

AN INTRODUCTION TO MAN ANO HIS DE­ THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. NC Status and VELOPMENT. BY Oavid Rodnick.433 Pages. Prospects. Edited by Edgar S. Frrrniss,Jr. Appleton.Century.Crofts, Inc., New York, 162 Pages. Ohio State University Press, 1966.$3.95. Columbus, Ohio, 1665.$4.75. BY JOHN R. CAMERON BY COL CORNELIUS M. SCHMELSLE, Drawn together in this volume are USA most of the threads of man’s knowl­ The North Atlantic Treaty Organi­ edge of himself and his society. zation was formed 16 years ago to This is not a sociology textbook. stave off a Communist menace which Rather, it embodies a multidiscipli­ threatened to engulf all of Europe. nary approach drawing on research The alliance, since its inception after produced by all branches of the social Wdd War II, has been part of the sciences. Dr. Rodnick chronicles the crisis that it was designed to meet. emergence of man and the rise of the This volume, consisting of a series first stages of civilization. of essays by distinguished personali­ This primary civilization was re­ ties, examines the crieis in light of placed by the current secondary civ­ the altered circumstances existing in ilization of science and technology. the world today. In time, it will be replaced by a ter­ The contributors offer a number of tiary civilization, one of automation, solutions for the problems faced by with poverty abolished and living and NATO. All authors feel that political educational standards at high levels. cooperation within the alliance is es­ It will be an age where problems may sential, and actions taken must be in be solved as quickly as they are raised. stages which ultimately will achieve This brief glimpse of the future new unity within NATO. is a fitting capstone to a long and ex-. THE ROMAN CONOUEST OF 6RITAIN A.O.43. tensive discussion of man’s society. 57. By Donald R. Oudley and Graham Web­ This book provides a valuable ori­ ster. 216 Pages. OuFour Editions, Chester entation for the beginning reader in Springs, Pa., 1965.$6.00. the field of social sciences.- From it he can determine the course of his BY LTC ROBEItTE. MILLER, USA future studies. The Roman Emperor Claudius un­ dertook a military campaign in A.D. MILITARY 6E06RAPHY. By Louis C. Peltier 43 to attempt what Julius Caesar had and G. Etsel Pearcy. 176 Pages. O. Van been unable to achieve almost 100 Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, H. J., 1966. years earlier~the conquest of Brit­ $1.65 paperbound. ain. BY CPT JAMESN. SNAOEN, USAR This book details the course of Essentially a condensed treatment Roman operations in Britain during of the extent and content of modern the period A.D. 43-57. It covers the military geography, the book describes overt and guerrilla warfare during how geography may be used in the the years when the Claudian concept conduct of military affairs and ex­ of limited conquest was in effect, The plains how various environments place result ie a book which should.appeal limits on the exercise of military equally to the student of archeology power. and to the student of military hietory.

October1966 106 MILITARY BOOKS

PRISONER ON TNE KWAI. By Basil Peaceck. BEGINNINGS OF THE COLO WAR, By Martin 291 Pages.William Biackwood& Seias,Ltd., F. Herz- 214 Pages.IndianaUniversityPress, Edinburgh and London, Eng,, 1966. $S.50. Bloomington,Ind.,196B.$4.95. BY MAJ DONALDS. MAHLBERG,USA BY MAJ FRANCISA. IANNI,USA Although of limited value to a The cold war has become so much student of military affaire, Prisoner a fixture of the international scene on the Kwai afforde interesting and that many of us have forgotten just entertaining reading to anyone curi­ how it started. In this short and ous ahout the life of a prisoner of easily read book, the author telle the war held hy the Japanese in Thailand diplomatic story of the early months and Burma during World War IL of 1945 when relations between the The author, a former British officer, Soviet Union and her Western allies traces his experiences ae a prisoner changed from wartime comradeship from the time of his capture at Sin­ to peacetime rivalry. The major begin­ gapore until the Japanese eurrender. nings of the cold war are concieely summarized and highlighted. “THE LIOOELL HART MEMOIRS. Tbe later Rather than providing neat, clear- Years, Volume IL Foreword by B. H. Liddell cut answers to tbe question of re­ Hart. 334 Pages. 6. P. Putman’s Sons, New sponsibility for the start of the cold York, 1965.$7.50. war, this book shows that no simple BY MAJ ANTHONY P. DE LUCA,USA answers are possible. Its virtue is In thie volume, B. H. L]ddell Hart that it does not expound a thesis, but covers the years immediately preced­ attempts to show exactly what hap­ ing Great Britain’s entry into World pened. War 11 when he served as military It is an excellent refresher of im­ correspondent for one of his nation’s portant facts and the sequence of leading newspapers. The years 1937­ events of the period. 39 were marked by continued attempts by the author, acting as unofficial THE BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIGHORN. BY advisor to the War Minister, to re­ Mari Sandoz. 191 Pages.J. B. LippincottCo., form tbe army and to gain recogni­ Philadelphia,Pa,, 1966.$4.50. tion for the purpose of ite existence. BY MAJ BARTON M. HAYWARD, USA As in Volume I, the stress is on the This volume is one of the GREAT continued struggle for an acceptance BATTLES OF HISTORY series. The late of the concept of armor forces. With Miss Sandoz has created a work so the approach of World War II, the convincing that one is almost able author, recognizing a weakness in to taste the dust and hear the whine Britain’s air defense system, adde to of bullete. hie strnggles by pushing for a reor­ The author has been unusually kind ganization and expansion of the air to Major Marcus A. Reno, a most defense forces. maligned man. The motivations which This book can best be described as led Custer and his command to their a detailed recording of a “struggle tragic deaths are developed with the for a professional principle” by a man accuracy that only a writer so inti­ who was highly instrumental in estab­ mately connectsd with the history of lishing new rules for future warfare. the plains can give.

.110 Military Review MILITARY BOOKS

NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA. Oiversity BEtNNO THE GREAT WALL. An Appraisal of and flnity.By 6erhard Masrrr.278 Pages.The Mao’s China. By Lorenz Stucki. Translated MacmillanCO.,Naw York, 1988.$5.95. by Jean Steinberg. 154 Pages. FrederickA. BY LTC WALTERJ. FAUSTINI, Praaget, Inc., New York, 1985.$4.85 cloth- Brazilian Arnty bound. $1.95 paperboard. This book traces the evolution of BY COL DOUGLAS P. HARPER, USA nationalism and revolution in Latin Here is a perceptive and well-writ­ America. ten account of a Swiss journalist’s The anther—who immigrated to observations and impressions of many South America seeking refuge from aspects of present-day life in Com­ the nationalism of Nazi Germarry— munist China. gives the background of each of the Mr. Stucki’s findings are that, 17 Republics, and points out some fat. despite undeniable progress in some tors that make up the nationalistic areas, tbe Communistshave turned the movements in Latin America. Chinese mainland into a huge reser­ Revolution is the search for social voir of conformity in which history is advancement, and its gods are to give distorted, the mind controlled, and the the nations ‘“the necessary minimum individual debased. of political and social cohesion, with­ out which no body politic can survive.” THE MISSILE CRiSIS. By Elie Abel. 220 Pages.J.B. LippincottCo.,Philadelphia,Pa., Sometimes, the solutions are not in and New York, 1986.$4.95. the’ Anglo-Saxon pattern of democ­ racy. The responsibilities and roles of BY LTC NORMANT. STANFIELD,USA the United States, both active and in The Cubsn missile crisis of Octo­ the form of a “Yankeephobia,” are ber 1962 is of distinct interest to properly assessed. military readers because it is recog­ nized as one of the prime watersheds AUSTERLITZ, The Story of a Battle. By of the cold war. As such, students of Claude Afanceron.Translatedby George Un. national strategy wiil find The Mis­ win. 318 Pages. W. W. Norton ~ Co., New sile Crisis an excellent reference York, f8S8. $5.%. source for this confrontation between BY MAJ VLADIMIRA. POSPISIL,USA the two major nuclear powers. In this book, Claude Manceron re­ The strategic problems and consid­ creates Austerlitz minute by minute, erations which faced President John hour by hour. Tbe reader becomeg a F. Kennedy, plus the reasons for the privileged witness, first in the head­ various decisions made, are described quarters of the Emperors as they pre­ and recorded by a reporter in a re­ pare to trap Napoleon’e Grand Army, porter’s style, on an hour-by-hour and and then in the bivouac of Napoleon day-by-day basis. where his plan, elaborated bit by bit, In the future, historians will be changes the trap into a countertrap. able to analyze this crisis in ite total Using contemporary documents, context ae a major event of the cold memoirs, letters, orders of battle, and war, but, pending this undiscernible other pertinent material, the author future treatment, this book stands as takes the reader to the battlefield and an exceilent, readable, and detziied then along the route of retreat. report.

Octoberle66 Itl \ MILITARY BOOKS

THE AGE OF THE BA~LESHIP 1890-1322.By THE ART OF VICTORY.The life and Achieve. lieutenant Commander Brayton Harris, ments of Field Marshal Stworov 17294S00. United Statas Naval Reeerve~212 Page; By Philip Longworth.350 Pages. Holtj Rine. FranklinWatta, Inc.,New York, 19S5.$5.95. hart & Winston,Inc.,New York, 1965.$7.50. BY LTC MICHAZLM. IWtYCZKO,USA BY LTC PAULO A. F. VIANA, Brazilian Army In his contribution to the group of Watts’ hietoriee of the US Navy, the The book describes Field Marshal author covers in clear, eazy-to-reed Suvorov’s campaigns in Poland, Tur­ language the problems faced and met key, Italy, and Switzerland, and how by the US Navy from the last decadee the Ruesian forces achieved success of the 19th century to the years fol­ through his revolutionary ideas on lowing World War I. The title is some­ warfare, emphasis on training and what a misnomer inasmuch as the physical fitness, stress on mobility, “battleship” occupies only a small part and concern for the troops’ welfare. of the central theme of the author’s presentation. THE UNFINISHED EXPERIMENT. Democracy in the Dominican Republic.By Juan Bosch. Thk work provides an interesting 23B Pages. FrederickA. Praeger, Inc., New overview of the period. It suffers some­ York, 1CB5.$5.95. what by the lack of documentation and a bibliography, particularly in cov­ BY COL PAULL. BOGEN, USA ering controversial issues. The book This book is subtitled Democracy is recommended for light reading. in the Dominican Repablic. It might better be described as a commentary THE 6REEK CIVIL WAR 1C44.1B49.By Edgar on the lack of democracy in the Do­ O’BallarrceWith a Foreword by the Honor­ minican Republic from May 1961 to able C. M. Woodhouse.2S7 Pages.Frederick May 1964. While there is a chrono­ A. Praeger, Inc., Naw York, 19B6. $7.50. logical sequence, the chaptere are also BY MAJ CHARLES L. MCNEILL, USA commentaries on selected subjects and This volume is a thorough examina­ groups. tion of the eventa and personalities Much of the book is written in an of the Greek Civil War, 1944-49. autobiographical vein. The prejudice, The guerrilla war waged by the bias, and anecdotal reference normally Communist-led National Popular Lib­ found in autobiographies are inter­ eration Army (&’.LAS) was almost spersed in the commentary and in es­ successful, but when US aid enabled says on a number of varied political, the government forces to take the economic, and sociological subjects. initiative, the insurgenta’ defeat was Dr. Bosch has done an excellent job guaranteed. There were other factors of presenting bis analysie of the se­ contributing to this defeat such as cial structure of the Dominican Re­ the closing of the Yugoslav frontier public. He also generalizes from hk te the guerrillas and the split in Com­ analysis and shows the relationship munist leadership. of the situation in that country to This book is well worth reading, for other Latin-American nations. it clearly reveals that Communist- Thie is a valuable treatize for the inspired insurgency can be defeated etudent of developing areas and for if the Free World stands firm. the military scholar.

112 MMtaryReview