Towards a Model for Grounding Semantic Composition
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Mind and World: Beyond the Externalism/Internalism Debate
Research Proposal Mind and World: Beyond the Externalism/Internalism Debate Sanjit Chakraborty Research Scholar Department of Philosophy Jadavpur University Background For the last few years the concept of the natural kind terms has haunted me. My main concern has been regarding the location of the meaning of these terms. Are meanings of the natural kind terms in the head or in the world? This question has been the most pressing in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Language. I have realized that we cannot separate mind from the world. I had in the beginning only a layman‟s conception regarding mind, meaning and the world. When I entered the field of philosophy inspired by Hilary Putnam, I found that semantic externalism is a vexing issue involving a vast area. The location of content is at the core of the metaphysical debate regarding internalism and externalism in the sense that internalists believe that mental proprieties are intrinsic only if they preserve across world identity of internal replicas. Externalism is opposed to this thinking. For externalists, mental properties are in many cases dependent on physical or social environment. The linguistic strategy also maintains a difference between internalism and externalism regarding the mental content. Descriptivism focuses on general terms that consist in descriptive content and leads to mode of presentation of reference through sense. Besides, the causal theory of reference refutes descriptivism to ensure that there is a causal chain of reference between words and 1 objects that help us to identify agent‟s thought through an identification of its relation with external environment. -
THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM Stevan HARNAD
Physica D 42 (1990) 335-346 North-Holland THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM Stevan HARNAD Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA There has been much discussion recently about the scope and limits of purely symbolic models of the mind and abotlt the proper role of connectionism in cognitive modeling. This paper describes the "symbol grounding problem": How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other meaningless symbols? The problem is analogous to trying to learn Chinese from a Chinese/Chinese dictionary alone. A candidate solution is sketched: Symbolic representations must be grounded bottom-up in nonsymbolic representations of two kinds: (1) iconic representations, which are analogs of the proximal sensory projections of distal objects and events, and (2) categorical representations, which are learned and innate feature detectors that pick out the invariant features of object and event categories from their sensory projections. Elementary symbols are the names of these object and event categories, assigned on the basis of their (nonsymbolic) categorical representations. Higher-order (3) symbolic representations, grounded in these elementary symbols, consist of symbol strings describing category membership relations (e.g. "An X is a Y that is Z "). Connectionism is one natural candidate for the mechanism that learns the invariant features underlying categorical representations, thereby connecting names to the proximal projections of the distal objects they stand for. -
The Symbol Grounding Problem ... Remains Unsolved∗
The Symbol Grounding Problem ::: Remains Unsolved∗ Selmer Bringsjord Department of Cognitive Science Department of Computer Science Lally School of Management & Technology Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) Laboratory Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) Troy NY 12180 USA [email protected] version of 082613NY Contents 1 Introduction and Plan 1 2 What is the Symbol Grounding Problem? 1 3 T&F's Proposed Solution 5 3.1 Remembering Cog . .7 4 The Refutation 8 4.1 Anticipated Rebuttals . 10 Rebuttal 1 . 11 Rebuttal 2 . 12 5 Concluding Remarks 12 References 15 List of Figures 1 A Concretization of the SGP . .5 2 Floridi's Ontology of Information . .9 ∗I'm indebted to Stevan Harnad for sustained and unforgettable discussions both of SGP and Searle's Chinese Room Argument (CRA), and to Luciano Floridi for teaching me enough about information to realize that SGP centers around the level of semantic information at the heart of CRA. 1 Introduction and Plan Taddeo & Floridi (2007) propose a solution to the Symbol Grounding Prob- lem (SGP).1 Unfortunately, their proposal, while certainly innovative and interesting, merely shows that a class of robots can in theory connect, in some sense, the symbols it manipulates with the external world it perceives, and can, on the strength of that connection, communicate in sub-human fashion.2 Such a connection-communication combination is routinely forged (by e.g. the robots in my laboratory (by the robot PERI in Bringsjord & Schimanski 2003) and in countless others, and indeed by robots now on the market), but is rendered tiny and insignificant in the vast and towering face of SGP, which is the problem of building a robot that genuinely understands semantic information at the level of human (natural) language, and that ac- quires for itself the knowledge we gain from reading such language. -
Holism and Compositionality
Holism and Compositionality Francis Jeffry Pelletier 1 Introduction A brief acquaintance with the web shows that the terms ‘holism’1 and ‘compositionality’ are used in many different fields, both academic and non-academic. And given any two academic fields, it is usually not obvious that the terms mean the same to the practitioners. Even just within philosophy and linguistics it seems that rather different conceptions are in play when we read any two different authors. We start, therefore, with a brief survey of some of the senses in which these terms are used. A little later we will make some more careful remarks about the notions. 1.1 Two Kinds of Compositionality A recent interdisciplinary conference revealed that there are (at least) two different things that are thought of when the issue of compositionality is considered. One concerns a (generalized) notion of “what is a complex item (of my theory) made of?” Here are a few places where this notion arose: Prototypes: Current prototype theory says that a prototype is a structure that has a number of attribute-value pairs. A question of interest in this area is: Given that prototype-1 has a structure [A: value-a; B: value-b; . ] and that prototype-2 has the structure [C: value-c; D: value-d . ], is the prototype of the “combined prototypes” (that is, the conceptual combination of the two proto- types) made up only from the material in the two component prototypes, that is, from the attribute-value pairs that are in one or the other of the prototypes? 1 ‘Whole’, and presumably also ’hole’, is derived from the Greek . -
Compositionality and the Metaphysics of Meaning
“This is not the first time such a view has been put forward. If it could be worked out in detail, so rigorously that not the smallest doubt remained, that, it seems to me, would be a result not entirely without importance.” - Gottlob Frege University of Alberta Compositionality and the Metaphysics of Meaning by Jeffery Fedorkiw A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Philosophy ©Jeffery Fedorkiw Fall 2011 Edmonton, Alberta Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms. The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis and, except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatsoever without the author's prior written permission. Dedicated to Helen Fedorkiw Abstract The principle of compositionality states that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its con- stituent parts and the way those parts are combined. Jerry Fodor has argued that semantic productivity and systematicity requires compositionality and that compositionality requires atomism about semantic values. Atomism is here the thesis that there are simple meanings which are assigned to grammatical terms completely inde- pendent of any other (i.e. -
Artigo Moderate Holism.Indd
ARTIGOSARTIGOS MODERATE HOLISM: ANSWERING TO CRITICISM AND EXPLAINING LINGUISTIC PHENOMENA* DOI 10.18224/frag.v28i2.6061 KÊNIO ANGELO DANTAS FREITAS ESTRELA** Resumo: neste artigo tenho o objetivo de apresentar uma versão do holismo semântico proposta por Henry Jackman (1999a, 1999b, 2005 e 2015) intitulada “holismo semântico moderado”. Defenderei que esta versão moderada do holismo, além de responder grande parte das críticas atribuídas ao holismo semântico tradicional (como a tradução, o desacordo, a mudança de opinião e comunicação), também se faz extremamente útil para explicar a ocorrência de diversos fenômenos linguísticos, como, por exemplo: a vagueza e a polissemia. Palavras-chave: Fenômenos linguísticos. Holismo semântico. Semântica. Holismo moderado. MEANING HOLISM1 eaning holism is a theory that is related to the meanings attributed to words and their relations to other words in a language. Th is theory supports the mutual in- Mterdependence of all items of linguistic knowledge in a way that, for example, to understand the meaning of a specifi c expression is necessary to understand a large sector of the language in question or even the language for completeness. Often holistic theories are derived from a more general holism that has to do with the holism of mental or cognitive * Recebido em: 16.11.2017. Aprovado em: 04.05.2018. Th is paper is the result of a research sponsored by Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científi ca y Tecnológica (Conicyt), agency of the government of Chile. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Henry Jackman for the criticisms, comments and suggestions made in this text. I would also like to thank José Tomás Alvarado, my advisor, for the sug- gestion of the subject discussed here and for all the support during my Ph.D. -
Semantics As Syntax
Semantics as Syntax William J. Rapaport Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Department of Philosophy, Department of Linguistics, and Center for Cognitive Science University at Buffalo, The State University of New York Buffalo, NY 14260-2500 [email protected] http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/∼rapaport/ August 16, 2016 Abstract Let S, T, be non-empty sets. The syntax of S (or T) is the set of properties of, and relations among, the members of S (or T). The ontology of T (or S) is its syntax. The semantic interpretation of S by T is a set of relations between S and T. Semantics is the study of such relations between S and T. Let U = S [ T. Then the syntax of U provides the semantics of S in terms of T. Hence, semantics is syntax. 1 The Chinese room shows what we knew all along: syntax by itself is not sufficient for semantics. (Does anyone actually deny this point, I mean straight out? Is anyone actually willing to say, straight out, that they think that syntax, in the sense of formal symbols, is really the same as semantic content, in the sense of meanings, thought contents, understanding, etc.?) [Searle, 1993, p. 68] My thesis is that (suitable) purely syntactic symbol-manipulation of a computational natural- language-understanding system’s knowledge base suffices for it to understand natural language. [Rapaport, 1988, pp. 85–86] Does that make any sense? Yes: Everything makes sense. The question is: What sense does it make? Stuart C. Shapiro (in conversation, 19 April 1994) 1 Syntax vs. -
9. Quine's Meaning Nihilism [Corretto] (222-229)
Quine’s Meaning Nihilism: Revisiting Naturalism and Con- firmation Method Sanjit Chakraborty Abstract: The paper concentrates on an appreciation of isn’t ever about meaning. What is cited are passages that display W.V. Quine’s thought on meaning and how it escalates Quine’s “Duhemianism”, that is, the view that our bodies of sci- beyond the meaning holism and confirmation holism, entific theory confront “recalcitrant” experiences as wholes. thereby paving the way for a ‘meaning nihilism’ and This is a form of holism—calls it “evidential holism”, but it doesn’t concern meaning.1 ‘confirmation rejectionism’. My effort would be to see that how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts him to the indetermi- 2. Naturalism and its consequences nacy thesis of meaning. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a per- Quine, (I suppose) was the first philosopher who probably son who is aware of linguistic trick can be the master of used the term “naturalism” from an empiricist point of referential language. Another important question is that view holding that science serves a standard paradigm for how could Quine’s radical translation thesis reduce into all knowledge. He considers the idea of ‘First Philosophy’ semantic indeterminacy that is a consequence of his con- as an imprecise issue. In fact, for Quine, ‘naturalism’ is firmation method. I think that the notion and the analysis not a separate claim that can be regarded as a foundation of meaning became hopelessly vague in Quine’s later of the sciences, but it is just like a proclamation about the work. -
Modelling Cognition
Modelling Cognition SE 367 : Cognitive Science Group C Nature of Linguistic Sign • Linguistic sign – Not - Thing to Name – Signified and Signifier – The semantic breaking is arbitrary • Ex. The concept of eat and drink in Bengali being mapped to the same sound-image NATURE OF THE LINGUISTIC SIGN -- FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE The Sign • Icon – In the mind – Existence of the ‘object’ – not necessary • Index – Dynamic connection to the object by blind compulsion – If the object ceases to exist, the index loses its significance • Symbol – Medium of communication THE SIGN: ICON, INDEX AND SYMBOL -- CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE Symbol Grounding Problem and Symbolic Theft • Chinese-Chinese dictionary recursion • Symbolic representations (to be grounded) • Non symbolic representations (sensory) – Iconic – Categorical THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM -- Stevan Harnad Symbol Grounding Problem and Symbolic Theft • Symbol Systems – Higher level cognition – semantics • Connectionist systems – Capture invariant features – Identification and discrimination • Sensorimeter toil • Symbolic theft Symbol Grounding and Symbolic Theft Hypothesis– A.Cangelosi , A. Greco and S. Harnad A Computer Program ? • Computer Program –Searle – Chinese Room – Missing semantics – Compatibility of programs with any hardware – contrary to the human mind – Simulation vs. Duplication Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program? -- John R. Searle Image Schema • A condensed description of perceptual experience for the purpose of mapping spatial structure onto conceptual structure. An Image Schema Language – RS Amant, CT Morrison, Yu-Han Chang, PR Cohen,CBeal Locating schemas in a cognitive architecture An Image Schema Language – RS Amant, CT Morrison, Yu-Han Chang, PR Cohen,CBeal Image Schema Language • Implementing image schemas gives us insight about how they can function as a semantic core for reasoning. -
Quine's Revolution: Epistemological Holism in Science and Philosophy
Quine’s Revolution: Epistemological Holism in Science and Philosophy David Paul Boaz To be is to be the value of a bound variable. —W. V. Quine “On What There Is”: Quine’s Ontological Relativity. Willard Van Orman Quine (1908– 2000) is considered by many in the philosophy trade to be the most important American philosopher of the 20th century. His Ontological Relativity (indeterminacy of reference, indeterminacy of translation) is the thesis that ontology—”what there is”—is relative to language, that is, to the subjective deep background reality assumptions in our individual and collective “web of belief” as it arises and is instantiated in language. (Epistemology is how we know what there is. There are no objective facts, only linguistic meanings.) In his seminal “Ontological Relativity” (1969) Quine develops his thesis that when a theory postulates its existent entities in a given language—its “object language”—it does so by translating its theory’s propositions (statements) about those entities into a more inclusive “meta-language,” langue (Saussure), or background matrix or web of prior assumptions and beliefs. The ontological status of entities or objects of the object language are relative to and supervene or are dependent upon the intersubjective prior cognitive “coordinate grid” that are the assumptions and beliefs of the meta-language into which they are translated. Unfortunately, through ontology is minimized, Quine’s personal ontological flavor is Physicalism. It’s all just physical, which explains his epistemology, namely empiricism and naturalism. Quine was never able to shake the imperious physicalist doctrine of his early teacher Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle of the Logical Positivists. -
Understanding Meaning and World
Understanding Meaning and World Understanding Meaning and World: A Relook on Semantic Externalism By Sanjit Chakraborty Understanding Meaning and World: A Relook on Semantic Externalism By Sanjit Chakraborty This book first published 2016 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2016 by Sanjit Chakraborty All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-9103-7 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9103-5 To my Gurudev Hilary Putnam, Who taught me how to love philosophy a little more... Without whom not! CONTENTS Acknowledgements .................................................................................... ix Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Chapter One ................................................................................................. 7 The Internalism-Externalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy of Language and Mind Introduction (1.1) Contemporary Debate: Internalism Verses Externalism (1.2) Descriptivism of Frege and Russell (1.3) Putnam’s and Kripke’s Theses on Reference (1.4) Putnam on Externalism Concluding Remarks Chapter Two ............................................................................................. -
Semantic Holism Author(S): Nuel D
Semantic Holism Author(s): Nuel D. Belnap Jr. and Gerald J. Massey Source: Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 67-82 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20015479 Accessed: 28/05/2009 15:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic. http://www.jstor.org NUEL D.