CSCAP REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK

2020 COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION EDITOR IN THE ASIA PACIFIC Ron Huisken Adjunct Associate Professor, Established in 1993, the Council for Security Cooperation Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the premier Track Two Australian National University organisation in the Asia Pacific region and counterpart to the Track One processes dealing with security issues, namely, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Kathryn Brett Plus Forum. It provides an informal mechanism for Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University scholars, officials and others in their private capacities to discuss political and security issues and challenges facing the region. It provides policy recommendations to EDITORIAL PANEL various intergovernmental bodies, convenes regional and international meetings and establishes linkages with Anthony Milner institutions and organisations in other parts of the world CSCAP Australia to exchange information, insights and experiences in the Ric Smith area of regional political-security cooperation. CSCAP Australia Philips Vermonte CSCAP Indonesia Jusuf Wanandi CSCAP Indoensia

Front cover image Source: Jan Huisken, EPA, ASEAN Secretariat, LETTER FROM THE Dong-A Ilbo, and Andrew Harnik. CO-EDITORS On behalf of CSCAP, we are pleased to Back cover image present the CSCAP Regional Security Source: Jan Huisken Outlook (CRSO) 2020. Inaugurated in 2007, the CRSO volume is now in its fourteenth year.

The CRSO brings expert analysis to bear on critical security issues facing the region and points to policy-relevant alternatives for Track One (official) CSCAP thanks the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific and Track Two (non-official) to advance multilateral regional security Affairs, The Australian National University, for their cooperation. support for this publication The views in the CRSO 2020 do Designed and printed by CanPrint Communications, not represent those of any Member Canberra, Australia. committee or other institution and are the responsibility of the individual authors and the Editor. Charts and images in the CRSO 2020 do not ISBN: 978-0-642-60698-3 necessarily reflect the views of the chapter authors. Copyright © 2019 by CSCAP www.cscap.org Ron Huisken and Kathryn Brett REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020

CONTENTS

Regional Security Outlook 4 Introduction – Ron Huisken 9 United States – Siddharth Mohandas 13 China – Wu Xinbo 16 Japan – Yoshihide Soeya 20 India – Sana Hashmi 23 Russia – Alexander Lukin 27 EU – Alice Ekman 30 ROK – Choi Kang 34 Australia – Brendan Taylor 37 Indonesia – Dewi Fortuna Anwar 41 Thailand – Pongphisoot Busbarat 45 Malaysia – Cheng-Chwee Kuik 49 Singapore – William Choong 52 Philippines – Aileen San Pablo Baviera 56 Vietnam – Le Dinh Tinh 60 New Zealand – B.K. Greener 64 Myanmar – Zeyar Oo 68 Cambodia – Chheang Vannarith 72 Laos – Sulathin Thiladej

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The Regional Security Outlook 2020: A prolonged US-China two-step has left us questioning interdependence Ron Huisken many take solace in the belief that the world’s nuclear arsenals present a formidable barrier to major power war. This contention has merit but must be twined with the reality that, for the first time in history, these weapons may have given humankind the capacity to make a mistake from which it cannot recover. Given the further reality that humankind tends to make all the mistakes available to it, the exclusive effect of nuclear weapons must be to reinforce our collective determination to navigate these challenging times using July 31, 2019. Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He (right) with US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer accommodation and compromise plus (third left) and US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin (second left) in Shanghai. Credit AP. a frank assessment of everyone’s role in getting to where we are. Just a year ago, the CSCAP Outlook gains since World War 2, not least, The present clash between the US highlighted what it termed ‘the in much of East Asia. It may be more and China is arrestingly sharp and end of ambiguity and denial’ about accurate to say, however, that the deep not only because the stakes whether the United States and fundamental question that the contest are so high and the parties so China saw themselves as engaged has exposed is whether dependable profoundly different – most critically, in an adversarial contest for global agreement is possible on the range perhaps, in terms of philosophies pre-eminence. Over the course of of tools and mindsets that states can on governance – but also because 2019, the rivalry between these two legitimately bring to the competition. it has been brewing over several mega-states remained a primary If the answer is yes, interdependence decades of increasingly intimate and cause of the deepening division and will continue to be accepted and complex interaction. In 1944-45, antagonism that characterised the welcomed; if not, then some when the US had a uniquely clean international system. Most of the significant degree of disengagement slate to put the broad management of papers assembled in this edition of will be seen as indispensable to the international affairs on a new footing, Outlook confirm this judgement. national interest. President Roosevelt insisted – over China’s singular fusion of We should not be too surprised or objections from the UK and USSR authoritarian governance and a dismayed by this development. who had particular interests in Tibet market economy (dubbed ‘state Rapid and significant change in the and Xinjiang respectively – that capitalism’) is being viewed by the distribution of power have ranked China be among the select group of US and others as fundamentally as the supreme challenge for the major powers that would be tasked incompatible with traditional notions international community throughout with special responsibilities for the of fair and productive competition. recorded history. It is not easy to maintenance of international order Opinion and assessment have tended get it right and to preserve stability and stability. Within a few years, to focus on the so-called ‘rules- and peace. Although history never Mao Zedong’s communist movement based order’ as the primary arena really repeats itself, too many broadly had seized power in China, entered of dispute, despite this order having comparable episodes in the past into an alliance with the USSR and fostered spectacular and widespread have ended in major wars. Today, joined it in endorsing North Korea’s

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Deng maxim about being patient and keeping a low profile into the major public policy theme of peaceful rise (later, peaceful development). For nearly a decade, until towards the end of the Bush administration in 2008, Beijing’s incessant message was that its economic and political revival would not disrupt or threaten the fortunes of other states, a pledge based in part on lessons learned from an exhaustive examination of the experience with rising powers in the past. As the Clinton administration drew October 1, 2019. National Day Parade, Xi, Jiang, Hu. Credit Ng Han Guan / AP. to a close it was characterising China as a ‘strategic partner’, whereas the invasion of the South in June 1950. energies on building a functioning Republican presidential candidate in The US and China were the principal economy. The accelerating success of 2000, George W. Bush, contended that combatants in that conflict, emerging this transformation, linked strongly China was a ‘strategic competitor’. as bitter enemies. China and the to a receptive US market, has become This stark contrast can be traced USSR essentially left the US to cope the stuff of legends. The expectation back to the break-up of the Soviet with the inconclusive aftermath that these economic practices would Union in 1991, thrusting the US into of the Korean War but then also have a wider liberalising influence the condition of unipolarity. The end experienced the complete collapse of – more a hope than a precondition of the Cold War led spontaneously their own bilateral relationship by for continuing to facilitate China’s to a strong and persistent public 1959-60. More than a decade later, economic revival – were sharply demand in America for a major ‘peace in 1972, came the spectacular US- deflated in June 1989. Almost dividend’, including sharp reductions Chinese accommodation, splitting the coincidently, the USSR allowed the in US forces stationed overseas in communist side of the Cold War and Berlin wall to be breached and its Europe and Northeast Asia. Many enlarging the strategic space within partners in the Warsaw Pact to make analysts had marvelled at the which China could manoeuvre in their own choices, a process that durability of the bipartisan consensus comparative safety. culminated in the spectacular break- in the US that sustained its costly up of the USSR itself in December and dangerous global security After Mao’s death in 1976, China’s 1991. These events effectively marked posture. Here was an early and clear new paramount leader, Deng Xiao the end of the special US-China sign that the American public was not Ping, took the country down the relationship forged in 1972. only aware of this burden but eager road of ‘reform and opening up’ – to seek relieve from it. Moreover, the or away from Socialist planning The US basically persisted with White House in 1991-92 was disposed toward a market economy attached the posture of engaging China and to respond favourably to this public to the global trading community. relations were rebuilt over the course pressure. President George H.W. Taking China down this path took of the 1990’s but arguably never Bush began to speak of a ‘new world great courage and skill. A key regained the qualities of tentative order’ and of a minimalist future US plank of Deng’s political platform partnership from the 70’s and 80’s. military posture – ‘just enough’, he was the notion of a ‘window of The Clinton administration in its said, to meet its security obligations – strategic opportunity’ – an external second term acknowledged China’s that would leave room for significant environment that was reliably stable major power status and urged it reductions in prevailing expectations because of the US-Soviet nuclear to also accept the responsibilities of future military expenditure. stalemate and China’s favourable associated with that status. China location between the superpowers appeared to respond positively to this At the same time in the Pentagon, (effectively a recipient of US extended positioning and its implications. In however, an entirely different US deterrence) – that made it ‘safe’ for collaboration with American think- response to the end of the Cold the Party to focus its resources and tankers, Beijing developed a famous War and the advent of unipolarity

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document because Cheney was now Vice-President of the United States and Wolfowitz the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Second, it represented a strikingly abrupt but considered conceptual revolution in America’s security outlook that its authors regarded as already a decade late, even as they recognised that its implementation would again be deferred. Finally, China would have begun to think hard about how the trajectory of its re-emergence might be complicated by this new predisposition in Washington. But then came 911 and the fateful propensity to place regime change in Iraq at the heart of America’s response. Also in 2001, China completed the arduous process of qualifying for membership of the January 7, 2009. President George W. Bush (centre), meets with (from left) former President WTO, a platform for the continued George H.W. Bush, President-elect Barack Obama, and former Presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy prodigious growth in its GDP and Carter in the Oval Office. exports to magnitudes that dwarfed was taking shape. Informed by presidential elections of 2000 when a earlier export-led economic miracles neoconservative thinking, Secretary conservative think tank re-issued a in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. of Defense Richard Cheney and version of it as a potential Republican The transformation in China’s a senior official, Paul Wolfowitz, policy guideline. economic capacities that these were instrumental in crafting a There is little doubt that President circumstances helped to facilitate posture that contended (a) that the Bush was made familiar with and was fed, 15 years later, into the widely- circumstances demanded that the US attracted to the thrust of this security shared view that the US had failed overtly declare its intention to lead posture – in June 2002 he asserted utterly to anticipate that stoic the world and to preserve the liberal that ‘America has, and intends to adherence to its traditional posture of global order it had been instrumental keep, military strengths beyond enabling emerging economies to have in creating , (b) that the US should challenge … limiting (international) privileged access to US markets might declare its intention to preserve rivalries to trade and other peaceful prove unsustainable in the case of unassailable military superiority, and pursuits’. In addition, the first China. By 2002-03, however, Beijing (c) it should be a priority to preclude major security policy document was again sensing that a further in all regions of importance to the prepared by the new administration ‘strategic window of opportunity’ lay US the emergence of a hostile major – the Quadrennial Defense Review ahead, allowing the state to pursue power capable of harnessing the released in early October 2001 – its priority objectives without undue full capacities of that region (initial constituted a sweeping pivot to Asia concerns about complications on the drafts of the proposal cited Germany to address the emerging challenge foreign and security policy fronts or a and Japan as indicative historical from China, utterly demoting concerted effort to change the ground examples). The authors deemed this Europe and the Near East that had rules on trade. agenda to be within US capacities and for decades outweighed the Asian strongly supportive of US interests. In retrospect, it seems that China theatre. Although this intent was A draft of this document was leaked resolved to drive through the ‘window swept aside by the attacks on 911, in 1991 and provoked widespread of opportunity’ – that the vagaries QDR 2001 remains relevant to the outrage within and beyond the US. It of democracy and Islamic terrorism present narrative for several reasons. was disowned by the White House as had conspired to keep open for more First, it had the same intellectual a wholly internal Pentagon document, than a decade – with all deliberate impetus as the 1991-92 Pentagon and then vanished until the speed and using the full panoply of

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its mammoth Belt and Road Initiative The abrupt reconfiguration of US in 2013 (although its grandeur policy objectives effectively drew a has initially been diminished by line under the posture of engagement modalities for project selections and of China that had endured since 1972. implementation that were seen as Washington was characteristically deficient in terms of transparency, transparent, declaring the era of accountability, and engagement selfless US leadership of the liberal with partners, issues that President international order, including Xi in April 2019 promised would assuming primary responsibility to be addressed); and in 2014-15, the counter international terrorism, to frantic construction of seven new be over. Instead, the US would again islands in the South China Sea focus its full attention and energies ahead of an international tribunal on competition with rival major assessing the merits of competing powers, above all on the perceived June 29, 2019. G20 in Osaka Japan. President national claims in this body of ocean. comprehensive challenge, particularly Donald J. Trump joins Xi Jinping, President of the Some of these created islands now from China but also Russia, to ‘shape People’s Republic of China, at the start of their bilateral meeting. Credit Official White House host significant military capabilities, a world antithetical to US values and Photo by Shealah Craighead / Flickr. helping to propel China’s historical interests’. claim to virtually all of this sea space Despite the divisiveness of the Trump – a claim alleged to date back more era, this newly declared confrontation policy options open to it. It stepped than 1000 years – into perhaps the has significant bipartisan support. past a deliberate effort by the Bush major dark cloud over the ‘China It is initially (since mid-2018) being administration in 2004 to offer China dream’ of national rejuvenation. greater recognition of its new status played out primarily as a ‘trade war’, in world affairs, sensing that the These are some of the key trends and alongside negotiations seeking to ‘responsible stakeholder’ proposal developments of the post-Cold War construct a bridge that will reliably was skewed toward China sharing era that shaped the US presidential span the stark asymmetries in more responsibility rather than more elections in 2016 and the breath- the instincts of and policy options power. When the Global Financial taking victory of Donald Trump. After available to the two sides in the Crisis of 2008-09 dealt a further body 18 months of boisterous, divisive and arenas of trade and technological blow to US standing in the world, somewhat incoherent posturing on innovation. that window was thrown wide open, what Make America Great Again More than a year of negotiations bringing into consideration outcomes actually meant and where it had have been inconclusive. They have that had seemed to fall far over the come from (much of it directed at neither confirmed nor precluded that horizon and enticing China to strive America’s allies and friends and the stark differences between China even harder to take full advantage involving a haemorrhaging of US and the US on the principles and of these fortuitous circumstances. A soft power comparable to that which practice of governance can be bridged sustained effort over both terms of occurred over the period 2002-08 to sustain constructive economic the Obama administration to get new under the Bush administration), entanglement. By November 2019, understandings on some of China’s the administration towards the as Outlook went to press, the most distinctive trade policy practices (the middle of 2018 swung its attention likely outcome was an indefinite so-called structural issues, including unambiguously toward China. pause on new tariffs and agreement the subsidisation of state-owned China’s domestic agenda in the years to defer consideration of the so- enterprises, intellectual property leading up to 2017-18 involved a called structural issues. Perhaps protection and forced technology comprehensive campaign to reaffirm the most promising outcome of transfers) was deflected and deferred, the absolute authority of the Party. these negotiations is the stronger but contributed nonetheless to an This objective was firmly extended appreciation on both sides, first, that overt ‘rebalancing’ of US economic, to include the business and trade any agreement will require difficult foreign, and security policy in 2011-12 community, sharpening the sense concessions and, second, that if a to present a more concerted defence that the Chinese model of state deal is not achieved or proves to of US interests in the broader Asia capitalism was structurally skewed to be incapable of sustaining mutual Pacific region. China then launched preclude open and fair competition. confidence in an equitable trading two stunning geopolitical initiatives: relationship, either or both sides

7 CSCAP may look to de-coupling the two the trends highlighted here. More Finally, Outlook has in the past urged economies – prioritising security particularly, it is unlikely that they ASEAN to more directly exploit its and sovereignty considerations would contest what appears to be privileged role in hosting the key East and minimising economic the most important conclusion to be Asian multilateral security processes interdependence. The costs of such drawn from it, namely, that for long- to press the major powers to step up a move could prove calamitous, not standing reasons both states share the quest for durable solutions to simply in economic terms but also in deep responsibility for the prevailing the issues generating division and terms of a heightened risk that the state of affairs between them. hostility. ASEAN centrality and being bilateral relationship writ large will in the ‘driver’s seat’ cannot remain There is a further dimension of become darker and more dangerous, as concepts with a special meaning today’s international scene that a progression that would inevitably linked exclusively to the origins and warrants particular attention. suck in many other states. Economic evolution of the ASEAN Regional We have now seen many years of and security interests cannot be Forum since 1994. These concepts discussion about the scale of the rigorously compartmentalised, they also have a literal meaning that transformation in the distribution overlap and intersect. ASEAN has been somewhat reluctant of economic, military, and political to embrace. This year, however, has The ambitious Regional weight in the international seen two important steps in the right Comprehensive Economic Partnership system and its significance for the direction – the direction of greater – seven years in the making – was ‘international order’ – that body transparency and the protection finalised and its conclusion announced of norms, principles, laws, and of multilateralism. The first was in the margins of the ASEAN and regulations that has evolved to Singapore Prime Minister Lee’s East Asia Summits in Bangkok in manage the intersection of states address to the Shangri-La Dialogue November 2019, both confirming and beyond their sovereign borders. in June 2019. The assessment and consolidating the status of these fora There is a detectable undercurrent diagnosis he offered was insightful as consequential regional gatherings. in this discussion that, as this and refreshingly direct. This is an How this milestone accomplishment international order has been or is example that the ASEAN chair could might play into the US-China in the process of being overtaken, consider following in respect of the trade dispute is difficult to gauge. the visible or tangible evidence of East Asia Summit and the ASEAN The conclusion of RCEP, because its existence should be regarded as Regional Forum. The second was it includes China, may loosen the so much obsolete clutter. This is an ASEAN’s assertive step, at the ARF logjam in the US-China negotiations. exceedingly foolish perspective on the in Bangkok in June 2019, to take Although the US-China agenda seems international order – a perspective the increasingly popular but also significantly more generic, there may perhaps most conspicuous in recent controversial regional descriptor of be elements in RCEP that suggest times in the field of nuclear arms ‘Indo-Pacific’ and position it within new ways of looking at some issues control – and one that political leaders the traditions of the regional security on the US-China agenda. India was need to ensure gains no further processes it had pioneered. a founding participant in the RCEP traction. Whatever one’s views on the negotiations but declined to join the extant international order, one has a pact at the last moment, expressing responsibility to recall the enormity of concerns about the vulnerability the events that preceded and inspired Ron Huisken of major sectors of its large (and its creation. There can be no appetite Adjunct Associate Professor, Strategic & potentially massive) economy to to risk repeating these events in order Defence Studies Centre, ANU Chinese imports. A US-China trade to create an opportunity for a new agreement may well tip the scales and designer to replicate something close give India sufficient confidence to sign to what we already have. Clearly, on to RCEP. the same discipline must apply to the authors of the current order. That This is a necessarily selective and order may have a significant inbuilt subjective account of the primary capacity to adapt and renew itself currents in world affairs over the but there has to be a willingness to past several decades. Many readers consider more overt mechanisms would recast the story in major ways. to effect necessary adaptation and It is unlikely, however, that they revision. would discount all or even most of

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The New Normal: Rising US-China Competition and Uncertainty in Asia Siddharth Mohandas

January 30, 2019. White House. US Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, senior staff and cabinet members meet with Chinese Vice Premier Liu He and members of his delegation for trade talks. Credit Andrea Hanks / Flickr.

After three years of the Trump real record and answered largely in foreign policy. At the same time, administration, we can start to move the affirmative. No longer do we need however, US allies and partners beyond the many questions the to ask what Trump might do, we can in Asia have not been spared the election of Donald Trump provoked look at what he has actually done. administration’s severe gaze. Even to some preliminary answers. Was he where allies have successfully What we find is that the Trump truly willing to risk a massive trade managed Trump administration administration has fundamentally war with China? Would he really demands, unpredictable new shifted the US-China relationship follow through on rhetoric questioning gambits on trade and security have in a more competitive and even the value of alliances and existing left foreign capitals off balance. On confrontational direction. US trade deals? Would he actually North Korea, the White House’s policy focus on China extends far embrace North Korean dictator Kim commitment to pursuing diplomacy beyond trade to encompass a range Jong-un? What were once concerned has appeared firm but there are signs of economic, security, technology, and somewhat speculative questions that Pyongyang is growing impatient and ideological issues that are now about how disruptive Trump would with the pace of progress. Hanging increasingly at the centre of American be can now be compared against a over all of this is what promises to

9 CSCAP be a bitter and acrimonious political mutual recrimination between the economic, and domestic policies – season in the United States as two sides accompanied by start-and- was closely studied for signals about the country heads to the polls in stop efforts to restart stalled talks. As whether continued confrontation November 2020. This, then, is the of this writing, a ‘phase one’ deal that was the White House’s intention or new normal in Washington’s Asia rolls back some US tariffs in return whether there were in fact limits to policy – rising confrontation with for Chinese purchases of American Washington’s new, more assertive China and uncertainty throughout agricultural products seems possible. approach. Pence did offer some the rest of Asia regarding the extent However, a comprehensive trade deal reassuring words, saying, ‘the United of escalation, its impact throughout that resolves Washington’s structural States does not seek confrontation the region, and whether the political complaints about the Chinese with China’ and that the goal of winds will shift. economy is highly unlikely. administration policy was not to decouple the United States and The greatest risk to the security The Trump administration also China. But, arguably more tellingly, outlook in Asia in the year ahead is significantly expanded the scope of the vast majority of the content of that the changes we have seen in US-China competition to include Pence’s speech was an extension US Asia policy cannot be managed technology trade and investment – of his 2018 remarks. He castigated effectively either in Washington or in most notably by putting in place a China for its industrial policies, the region. Specifically, while there is ban on selling critical US components cyberespionage, and intellectual widespread justification and support to Huawei and launching a global property theft – also critiquing for a tougher US policy approach campaign to shut the company US companies for ‘kowtow[ing]’ to toward China, the challenge for both out of 5G infrastructure efforts. the Chinese Communist Party for Washington and Beijing will be to The US Commerce Department market access. He criticised China’s find a new framework that prevents is further set to issue regulations activities in the South China Sea necessary competitive policies from banning the export of ‘emerging and East China Sea. He denounced totally undermining the security and foundational’ technologies to China’s treatment of its own and economic benefits of US-China China. The Trump administration citizens, particularly in Xinjiang. He relations. For allies and partners ramped up its criticism of China’s reaffirmed US support for Taiwan and throughout the region, the question is human rights record, particularly proclaimed US support for protestors how to deal with the unpredictability with respect to Xinjiang and Hong in Hong Kong. In short, Pence spent of an increasingly distracted and Kong, and sanctioned Chinese far more time identifying areas of depleted Trump administration. And officials responsible for repression disagreement than agreement. on North Korea, while Washington’s in Xinjiang as well as Chinese pursuit of diplomacy has been a technology companies that have aided If continued confrontation is the likely welcome change from ‘fire and fury,’ surveillance there. The White House shape of US-China relations in the policymakers must remain prepared has announced plans for a major arms year ahead, even in the event of a to deal with a sudden return to sale to Taiwan. Washington regularly small trade deal, the danger for the tensions. condemns the Belt and Road region is that this process could spiral Initiative and promotes US and allied into unrestrained and destabilising US-China: A New Era of Competition. funding alternatives. And, opening competition. To be clear, the 2019 featured a parade of tough, even a new front in US-China relations, relationship needed to be rebalanced unprecedented actions by the Trump the administration has denounced and there is widespread support administration against China. After Chinese efforts to influence US public in the United States for a more levying tariffs on $250 billion USD opinion and is aggressively engaging reciprocal US-China relationship. worth of Chinese goods at the end in counterespionage efforts. The sum Indeed, this is one of the few areas of of 2018, Donald Trump promised total of these actions has been to bipartisan consensus in Washington, to tariff an additional $300 billion confront China in almost every aspect with leading Democratic members of products – nearly the entirety of its policies. of Congress joining with Republican of China’s exports to the United colleagues in proposing legislation States – if a trade agreement was Thus, US Vice President Mike Pence’s designed to push back on China. The not reached. Negotiators had seemed October 2019 speech on US-China challenge for Washington and Beijing close to striking a deal in May 2019 relations – a sequel to his speech a is to find some way to preserve but, in the White House’s telling, year earlier that provided the Trump stability in the overall relationship China walked away from the table. administration’s comprehensive as it becomes more competitive, to Since then, there has been much indictment of China’s foreign,

10 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 maintain global economic growth been satisfied and it will continue to country. The Trump administration is that depends on trade and integrated press allies and partners on a range reportedly demanding a 500 percent supply chains, and to find ways to of issues, in turn putting pressure on increase in South Korea’s payment, cooperate on common challenges Washington’s diplomatic standing in promising a high stakes and highly such as climate change. As the two Asia. contentious negotiation with the sides retreat to their corners and potential to break the alliance. South Korea provides a striking mutual trust plummets, there is little example of the ups and downs of Japan’s experience has been similar evidence that this is happening. dealing with Trump’s Washington. to that of South Korea. Tokyo Allies and Partners: Uncertainty Seoul successfully renegotiated the has concluded a ‘phase one’ trade Reigns. For US allies and partners, Korea-US Free Trade Agreement agreement of its own that appears the challenge has been how to making some largely cosmetic to have mollified Washington and manage a mercurial president concessions while giving Trump the held off – for now – Donald Trump’s and a more unconstrained United appearance of a ‘win’. This successful threat to levy tariffs on all Japanese States that demands support for defusing of a complex trade issue auto exports. However, Japan too its China policy, changes in trade has not been matched, however, has to renew its Special Measures flows, and greater contributions in the security realm. Just a year Agreement in 2021. The US-South to mutual defence. Asian capitals after concluding a previous pact, the Korea talks will set a precedent for have responded with a variety of United States and South Korea are US-Japan discussion and it could be a negotiating gambits and some have renegotiating a Special Measures worrisome one. Against this backdrop, had some success in striking deals Agreement that determines the extent Japan-South Korea relations with Washington. But there is no of Seoul’s funding contribution for the have deteriorated over a dispute sign that the administration has presence of US troops based in the concerning reparations for wartime

Jun 30, 2019. President Donald J. Trump and Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong Un in Freedom House at the Korean DMZ. Credit Shealah Craighead, White House / Flickr.

11 CSCAP forced labour and Washington has remaining who can restrain the may come after. A major concern is appeared to be largely a bystander in president’s impulses. that North Korea may take more the process. The US alliance system provocative action in 2020 – whether North Korea: Pursuing Diplomacy in Northeast Asia – the linchpin of a return to long-range missile testing for Now. A third risk to the security America’s regional security presence – or perhaps even a resumption of outlook in Asia in 2020 is a rapid is under unprecedented pressure and nuclear testing. With diplomacy return of tensions between the further strain constitutes a major risk seemingly discredited, it would be no United States and North Korea. in 2020. surprise if the United States swung Donald Trump’s unprecedented back sharply in response and tensions The trajectory of US-India step of meeting with North Korean again spiked. relations has been positive across leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore administrations since 2000 and there in June 2018 was largely welcomed There is little question that the has been continued warmth under in the region – despite misgivings Trump administration has met its Trump and Indian Prime Minister about what exactly the United goal of disruption in foreign policy. Narendra Modi. However, a series of States would gain from the meeting Growing US-China confrontation disputes – over trade and e-commerce, – because it marked a decisive break characterises almost every aspect India’s plans to purchase S-400 from the threats of ‘fire and fury’ of the bilateral relationship and, missiles from Russia and oil from of the previous year and allowed crucially, this approach has Iran, and New Delhi’s strategy for concerns about imminent conflict bipartisan support in the United 5G expansion – have all combined to on the Korean Peninsula to recede. States. Allies and partners must create an atmosphere of uncertainty However, the diplomatic spectacle prepare for abrupt new shifts in in the bilateral relationship. of the Trump-Kim summit quickly security relations and trade. US- Similarly, while US-ASEAN relations devolved into an impasse between North Korea relations have swung have been for the most part stable, the two governments as working level from threats of war to reality-TV countries in Southeast Asia have still talks proceeded fitfully. Washington diplomacy and could yet swing back had to deal with unpredictable trade demanded immediate and concrete to tension again. The most pressing actions and erratic diplomacy by the steps toward denuclearisation while question at this stage is whether administration. Trump skipped the Pyongyang has demanded far- these disruptions are temporary or East Asia Summit for the second reaching sanctions relief – both have more fundamental. The evidence of year in a row and the most recent been disappointed. This resulted in the past year is that instability is not summit featured the lowest-level the failed Hanoi summit in February a passing phenomenon but the new American delegation ever, feeding 2019 where Trump walked away from normal against which all regional perceptions of American distraction the table, citing Kim’s failure to make capitals must plan. and retrenchment. Countries across meaningful concessions. the region are teetering on the edge The situation since Hanoi has been of recession as the US-China trade an unstable equilibrium. North war grinds on. Even as Washington Siddharth Mohandas Korea has broken its self-imposed Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for New touts its concept of a free and open moratorium on missile testing, American Security and former Principal Indo-Pacific and supports maritime Deputy Director of Policy Planning at the launching a number of short-range rights in the South China Sea, US Department of State missiles. The Trump administration countries such as Vietnam have found has responded largely by downplaying themselves unexpectedly threatened the significance of the missile tests with or subjected to trade actions. and stating its continued interest What all of the foregoing issues have in diplomacy. This has not mollified in common is uncertainty about US Pyongyang and North Korean officials intentions and staying power. While on a number of occasions have stated a perennial concern among nervous that the Trump administration US allies and partners, these have must produce concessions by the taken on a greater force as the end of 2019 or face unspecified Trump administration operates more consequences. There is, however, little erratically – particularly in the face of evidence that the White House has a impeachment – and it is evident that diplomatic plan in place to manage there are few if any senior officials the situation or a plan for what

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Sino-US strategic competition and Asia-Pacific security Wu Xinbo Throughout 2019, the single most technology and even cultural and also raised the prospect of conflict, important development impacting educational exchanges, seriously intended or not, with the People’s on Asia-Pacific regional security straining the overall bilateral Liberation Army (PLA) in this region. has been the intensifying strategic relationship. While the Trump On the Taiwan issue, the Trump competition between China and administration utilises the trade administration is also pushing the United States. As enunciated war as an important leverage in the envelope more boldly. For the in its reports on National Security pursuing strategic rivalry with China, pro-Taiwan influence within the Strategy and National Defense Beijing senses a determination on administration, Taiwan stands as a Strategy released respectively in the part of Washington to reorient uniquely important source of leverage December 2017 and early 2018, the its entire China policy towards a in the US strategic competition Trump administration defined China more competitive and confrontational with China. For those who want to as a major competitor/rival and stance. In fact, the trade war pressure China on trade and other jumpstarted strategic competition and the approach the Trump issues, Taiwan serves as a useful with Beijing. The year of 2019 administration has adopted have and convenient card. Moreover, as witnessed the full play of Trump’s brought China’s trust towards the US Taiwan enters the next campaign new strategy towards China: the to a historical low. On the security season, Washington favours the protracted and expanding trade front, Washington has been trying incumbent leader Tsia Ing-wen and war, the rising standoff in the South to exert more pressure on Beijing in is willing to take necessary measures China Sea and in the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea by conducting to promote her chances. In August, the unfolding of the US Indo-Pacific more active and provocative Freedom Washington announced the sale of strategy and the prospect of the US of Navigation Operations (FONOS), 66 F-16V fighters to Taiwan worth a deploying intermediate-range missiles strengthening its military presence, total of $8 billion, the single largest in the Western Pacific. encouraging the involvement of its arms deal in the history of US arms allies and partners, and promoting The trade war with China launched sale to the island. Washington also security cooperation with surrounding by the Trump administration in keeps strengthening US-Taiwan countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, July 2018 quickly escalated to an ties by increasing all kinds of Indonesia, etc. Determined to employ unprecedented level and extended cooperation and exchanges with the cost-imposing strategy towards into 2019. Characterised by Taipei. The most provocative action China and to be more risk-taking in escalation, intermittent negotiation taken by the Trump administration the South China Sea, the US military and stalemate, the trade war spilled is that US Department of Defense’s has not only increased tensions but over into the fields of investment, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report treats

China unveiled its new H-6N long-range strategic bomber with aerial refuelling capability at the National Day military parade held in Beijing on October 1, 2019. Credit DEFPOST.

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Taiwan as a ‘country’, which signals has been actively seeking to deploy in China and ASEAN countries should a deliberate attempt to shift the the Asia-Pacific region intermediate not compromise ‘the third party’s US policy from ‘One China’ to ‘One range missiles (conventional but also interests’ in South China Sea. China, One Taiwan’. Indeed, Taiwan’s likely nuclear) so as to augment its Moreover, China continues to make internal political development and deterrence capability vis-a-vis China. efforts to improve ties with its two the evolving US Taiwan policy are Should this occur, it will seriously major neighbours, India and Japan. coalescing to foment a serious crisis in undermine the strategic stability in In October 2019, Chinese President Xi the Taiwan Strait. the region and stir up a new round of Jinping went to India for the second arms competition. To be sure, China informal summit meeting with Indian In June 2019, the Pentagon released is unlikely to join the US and Russia Prime Minister Modi, following the US Indo-Pacific Strategy in negotiating a new version of INF their first informal summit meeting Report which outlined the goals treaty. Beijing may instead respond in China in 2018. The two leaders and approaches of the doctrine. by further building up its missile agreed to expand bilateral cooperation The document defines China as a arsenal and even reconsider the while managing their differences revisionist power and asserts that ‘no-first-use’ position in its nuclear more cautiously. President Xi also ‘[t]he Indo-Pacific increasingly is doctrine. plans to visit Japan in the spring confronted with a more confident of 2020, as Sino-Japanese relations and assertive China that is willing Confronted with the ever-growing remain on a positive trajectory. to accept friction in the pursuit of strategic competition launched by a more expansive set of political, the Trump administration, including To be sure, for many regional economic, and security interests.’ the forging ahead of its Indo-Pacific countries, US allies and partners Indeed, the US Indo-Pacific strategy strategy, Beijing has responded by alike, it is not desirable to choose sets China as the primary target, taking a series of measures to dilute sides between US and China. While with its strategic design and means and offset the impact of US actions. some of them have to maintain close of implementation having a matching First and foremost is the deepening security ties with Washington, they focus. The quadruple cooperation of security cooperation with Russia. also need to keep robust economic among the US, Japan, Australia and In addition to conventional forms ties with Beijing. In fact, as China India (QUAD) serves as the backbone of arms transfer and joint military becomes more influential in regional of the strategy, aimed at dealing with exercises, China and Russia seek affairs, forging comprehensive China’s naval activities from the to promote mutual military action relations with China is a must. Just Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and coordination. For instance, in as Singaporean Prime Minister on the one hand, and competing with July 2019, Chinese and Russian air Lee Hsien Loong noted at the 2019 China’s Belt and Road Initiative on forces held their first joint aerial Shangri-La Dialogue, ‘In a new Cold the other. In addition to QUAD, the patrol in Northeast Asia, involving War, there can be no clear division US also stepped up efforts to engage two bombers from each side. It is between friend and foe.’ In response South Asian countries such as Sri reported that Russia is also helping to the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh China create its missile early warning ASEAN released a paper outlining its as well as the Pacific Islands, in an system. Meanwhile, China has own vision of the Indo-Pacific concept, unvarnished endeavour to check been actively pushing forward the stressing the ongoing need for China’s expanding ties with those negotiation with ASEAN member ASEAN centrality and inclusiveness, countries. states of the Code of Conduct (COC) and underlining its reservation in the South China Sea, in an earnest toward the intention behind Compared with Obama’s Rebalance effort to stabilise the situation in Washington’s strategic initiative. The to Asia strategy, the Indo-Pacific the region and improve relations ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific strategy launches geo-political and with ASEAN countries. Beijing also proposed to seek cooperation geo-economic competition with China expressed the hope that negotiation with other regional members in four in a much broader geographical of the COC be concluded by 2021. areas, i.e., maritime cooperation, context, while pinning down China In July 2019, all parties concerned connectivity, UN Sustainable as the major target also pushes many finished the first reading of the Development Goals 2030, and countries in the region to choose sides Single Draft Negotiating Text of the economic development, suggesting between Washington and Beijing. COC, marking a major step forward that ASEAN and China can continue As the US formally withdrew from in the COC consultations, in spite to cooperate in many fields, as they the Treaty on Intermediate-Range of Washington’s repeated warning have already done over the years. Nuclear Forces (INF), Washington that the COC negotiation between Growing Sino-US discord has also

14 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 cast a shadow over their coordination denuclearisation and the building of in both bilateral and regional and cooperation in dealing with the a permanent peace mechanism on contexts. Bilaterally, the two parties Democratic People’s Republic of the peninsula, the lack of well-tuned should keep the growing strategic Korea (DPRK) nuclear issue. Since coordination between the two most competition healthy and benign, as the first Trump-Kim meeting held in important external players only bodes a malign rivalry will inevitably lead Singapore in June 2018, Washington ill for the future. to antagonism and overt conflict. has turned to diplomatic engagement Regionally, they should avoid drawing The Asia-Pacific has entered a with Pyongyang to advance the goal lines and encouraging members of period of profound changes set off of the DPRK’s denuclearisation, yet the region to split into rival camps, by shifts in the power balance as with little progress so far. On the otherwise the economically most well by adjustments of strategy and other hand, ties between Beijing and dynamic region will gradually lose policy settings by regional players. Pyongyang have warmed up quickly its momentum for growth and Managing major power competition following Kim Jong-Un’s first visit integration. Third, the most urgent and dealing with hot spot issues top to China in March 2018. To some issue for China-US security relations the regional security agenda, while extent, the improved atmosphere is crisis avoidance and management. Sino-US interactions hold the key. and growing exchanges between As noted above, the risk of a serious To be sure, competition between the two countries renders Beijing crisis and conflict over either the Beijing and Washington will continue more influence over Pyongyang, South China Sea or Taiwan is to unfold and likely intensify, and encouraging the latter to continue growing against the backdrop of an the challenge for both countries as to freeze nuclear and long-range overall relationship that is strained well as the entire region is how to missile tests, and to seek progress and characterised by historically low manage such rivalry. Here are some in negotiations with Washington in levels of trust. It is important that suggestions. First and foremost, improving DPRK-US ties as well as the US conducts FONOS in South it is imperative for China and the pursuing denuclearisation on the China Sea with more caution rather US to delineate the boundary of Korean peninsula. Nonetheless, than more provocation, and refrains their competition. For one thing, compared with the first year of from crossing the red line of ‘One robust economic ties benefitting both the Trump administration when China’ policy while enhancing ties countries should not be decoupled Beijing and Washington pursued with Taiwan. For any crisis avoidance or seriously downgraded, as some robust and effective coordination and management effort to succeed, hawkish people in the Trump team and cooperation on the North good communication at the strategic have advocated. It is very likely that Korean issue, since 2018, the level and effective management at China will emerge as the world’s quality of Sino-US interactions the tactical level are indispensable. largest economy over the coming has plummeted as serious frictions Yet, as overall relations between decade, so restricting economic arose in their bilateral ties. Given Beijing and Washington fell from relations with China under the logic the fact that a long and bumpy road cooler to freezing, there has been a of relative gains will only cause the lies ahead for the DPRK’s complete notable shortage of communication US to lose tremendous business and exchanges between both the opportunities. Moreover, although two national security teams and economic interdependence does senior defence personnel, while crisis not necessarily prevent contention management mechanisms are not from occurring between countries well coordinated. Needless to say, (actually close economic ties tend to such a precarious situation needs to be a major source of frictions), it does be redressed as soon as possible. raise the cost of conflict and therefore can act as a useful buffer. For Sino- US relations, vigorous economic exchanges have been an important Wu Xinbo strategic pillar and should be Professor & Director, Center for American preserved for the long-term interests Studies Dean, Institute of International Studies Fudan University of both countries and many others, even though they are undergoing September 25, 2019. Haiyang Shiyou 982. a tough period of rebalancing. Beijing has deployed a new oil rig in the Second, China and the US should disputed waters of the South China Sea. Credit Weibo / SCMP. exercise strategic self-restraint

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Indo-Pacific: From Strategy to Vision Yoshihide Soeya

November 4, 2019. Bangkok, Thailand. Heads of State and Government of the Member States of ASEAN, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, gathering at the 22nd ASEAN Plus Three Summit. Credit ASEAN.

The concept of Indo-Pacific has now released his concept of a ‘security Vietnam in November 2017. Since become a catchphrase of the times, diamond,’ a network of allies then, both Tokyo and Washington a reference point in discussing formed by Japan, the United States, began to use the term ‘Free and Open regional politics and security. It Australia and India, and clearly Indo-Pacific (FOIP),’ as a strategic is not clear, however, that there intended to counterbalance China. concept directed against the Chinese is widespread agreement in the This initial move has come to be BRI launched by President Xi Jinping region on its scope or its role vis-à- regarded, rightly so, as the baseline of (originally as ‘One Belt One Road’) in vis rising China in general and its Abe’s regional outlook and Japanese 2013. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in strategy, including Abe’s version At some point in 2018, however, particular. Australian intellectuals of Indo-Pacific. In August 2016 the Japanese government stopped were among the first (around 2010) at the Sixth Tokyo International calling FOIP a strategy and re- to introduce the concept of Indo- Conference on African Development labelled it as a vision. In mid-2019, Pacific and depicted it essentially (TICAD VI) held in Nairobi, Prime the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of as inclusive, embracing both China Minister Abe declared, ‘Japan bears Japan summarised the principles of and India as the central causes of the responsibility of fostering the the FOIP vison into three domains: 1) the rising importance of the Indian confluence of the Pacific and Indian promotion and establishment of the Ocean. Thus, the Pacific Ocean to Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a rule of law, freedom of navigation, its east and the Indian Ocean to place that values freedom, the rule and free trade; 2) pursuit of economic its west have come to be seen as an of law, and the market economy, free prosperity (by improving connectivity integral region, Indo-Pacific. In this from force or coercion, and making it in three areas: physical connectivity initial conception of Indo-Pacific by prosperous’. through quality infrastructure; Australia, Japan and China were both US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson people-to-people connectivity through treated as key players, making their followed suit in October 2017, with a education, training and friendship; difficult bilateral relationship a factor substantial reference to ‘Indo-Pacific’ and institutional connectivity of uncertainty for the stability and in his address at the Centre for through harmonisation and common prosperity of the broader region. Strategic and International Studies rules including EPA/FTA); and 3) At about the same time, in December in Washington D.C. The following commitment to peace and stability 2012, Japanese Prime Minister month, President Donald Trump (by such means as capacity-building, Shinzo Abe came back to power also used ‘Indo-Pacific’ in his speech humanitarian assistance and disaster for the second time, and promptly to the APEC summit in Da Nang, relief, anti-piracy, counter-terrorism,

16 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 non-proliferation, and peacekeeping Pacific had embraced China as an Accordingly, the Abe administration operations). integral part of a broader region. began to take a more conciliatory stance toward China’s BRI as Thus, the Japanese vision of FOIP This brings us to ASEAN, which well. In fact, if joint infrastructure had distilled into a virtual re- adapted the ‘ASEAN Outlook on projects in third countries are to be branding of the long-held Japanese the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)’ in June realised, they are likely to fall in the regional policies that had evolved 2019. ASEAN has typically seen areas of overlap between BRI and during the three decades since the Chinese BRI and the US (and FOIP initiatives, quite a welcome the end of the Cold War. These Japan)-led FOIP as strategically development for countries, such regional policies have emphasised and geopolitically conflictive and has as those in Southeast Asia, who the principle of multilateralism with made it clear that it has no interest felt torn or sandwiched by these a view to creating a rule-based and in preferring one over the other. The competing programs. In recent non-exclusive regional order through AOIP has turned out to be essentially times, there have also been quiet promoting relations of functional a re-affirmation of the ASEAN-way but important signs of movement cooperation with primarily, if not and of the principles it brings to bear in the Abe administration’s stance exclusively, ASEAN and its member in organising multilateral cooperation toward the Asian Infrastructure states. in the Indo-Pacific region. Quite Investment Bank (AIIB). In October typically, the document ends with One important trigger for this shift in 2019, Former Prime Minister Yukio a sentence stating that: ‘Strategic the Japanese approaches toward the Hatoyama, an advocate of an East discussions on this matter and Indo-Pacific theatre is a set of moves Asian Community, was replaced practical cooperative activities can be by regional countries to present their by Takatoshi Kato, a former Vice- pursued at ASEAN-led mechanisms own responses and approaches toward Minister of Finance for International including, among others, the EAS, the the newly emerging ‘Indo-Pacific’ Affairs in the Ministry of Finance, ASEAN Plus One mechanisms, ARF, concept. As early as 2014, India under as a Japanese member of the AIIB’s and ADMM-Plus.’ the Narendra Modi administration International Advisory Panel. announced the ‘Act East Policy,’ a Japan’s decision to rename the FOIP Reportedly, the nomination of Kato sharpening of its former posture of strategy as a vision coincided with was endorsed by the Prime Minister’s ‘Look East’,’ to advance the country’s the warming up of Japan’s relations Office beforehand. interests in East Asia. South Korea with China. This was no accident. The Another summit between Abe and under the Moon administration also main purpose behind recasting the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on declared its ‘New Southern Policy’ in FOIP was to signal Japan’s interest November 4, 2019 in Bangkok paved 2017, which is very much ASEAN- in improving relations with China, the way toward further improvement centred in conception and focused an objective that Xi Jinping shared in the bilateral relationship. In their on cooperation. It was no secret that after consolidating his position in the meeting, Abe and Li agreed that South Korea was not very comfortable Chinese power structure. the two governments would step up with the idea of Indo-Pacific, In October 2018, Shinzo Abe paid preparation for a planned state visit partly because of Seoul’s natural an official visit to China for the first by Chinese President Xi Jinping to preoccupation with North Korea time in seven years as Japanese Japan next spring. Reportedly, Tokyo and the Korean Peninsula, but also Prime Minister. Abe said to Xi, ‘I and Beijing will work on a declaration because of its perceived anti-China want to start a new era for Japan and that will consolidate these gains to be flavour, especially as articulated by China with Mr Xi,’ and Xi Jinping issued during Xi’s visit in 2020. Japan and the United States. in turn told Abe that the bilateral In the meeting with Li in Bangkok, As to its implications for China, relationship was now ‘back to a Abe also raised several politically almost all the countries in the Indo- normal track.’ Prior to meeting Xi, sensitive issues, including the Pacific region have been pursuing a Abe met with Chinese Premier Li demonstrations and related turmoil in nuanced policy toward China. India, Keqiang, and they agreed to create Hong Kong and the recent detention for example, views China somewhat a ‘new framework’ to cooperate in and disappearance of a Japanese ambivalently, both as a strategic rival joint infrastructure projects in third professor. While there were 13 and as a key power to be engaged countries such as in Southeast Asia Japanese nationals still detained by for the stability of the bilateral and strengthen cooperation across China on espionage charges, this 14th relationship as well as that of the a wide range of fields ranging from case of a scholar was unprecedented region. As implied at the outset, the finance to innovation. and was already leading to some initial Australian conception of Indo-

17 CSCAP reluctance on the part of Japanese Somewhat in contrast to Japan-China To make things worse, in October China specialists and other scholars relations, Japan’s relations with 2018, the South Korean Supreme to visit China even for academic South Korea have been trapped in a Court ruled that Japan’s Nippon Steel purposes. downward spiral during the last few & Sumitomo Metal Corporations had years. Quite ironically, the agreement to pay compensations to South Korean These examples illustrate that, even on the comfort women issue workers for forced labour during the setting aside China’s assertive claims announced in December 2015 by the war. The Abe administration contends in the East and South China Seas, Foreign Ministers of Japan and South that the Supreme Court’s ruling is the bilateral relationship between Korea has turned out to be the trigger in violation of the 1965 ‘Agreement Japan and China remains contentious for a vicious cycle in the relationship on the Settlement of Problems and awkward. It appears, however, between the Abe administration and Concerning Property and Claims,’ that these contentious issues are the newly established Moon Jae- which stipulates that the issue of such being swept under the rug for the in administration. President Park claims between the two governments time being by the leaders in Tokyo Geun-hye was impeached by the and their nationals is ‘settled and Beijing. This is because they Constitutional Court in March 2017 completely and finally’.’ Tokyo is thus have bigger tensions and issues with and was removed from office. Upon claiming that Seoul is responsible for the United States, mostly related winning the election and ascending correcting the inconsistency between to economic and trade negotiations. to the presidency in May 2017, the court ruling and the diplomatic Since these frictions are not likely President Moon Jae-in virtually agreement. While the principle of to be eased anytime soon, the delegitimised the comfort women separation of power is important momentum of improvement in agreement. The implementation of for any democracy, the Japanese relations between Japan and China the agreement has been suspended argument goes, the same principle is also likely to be sustained for some and the entire framework is in limbo. should oblige the executive branch to time to come. take independent measures on the basis of the agreements between the two governments. May 5, 2019. South China Sea. USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110), transits through international waters with INS Kolkata (D 63) and INS Shakti (A 57), JS Izumo (DDH 183) and JS Murasame (DD 101), and BRP Andres Bonifacio (PS 17). Credit Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

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Irritated by the lack of response Despite these somewhat promising from the South Korean side for moves, Abe’s fundamental stance some time, Japan took steps in that the ball is in the South Korean July 2019 to remove South Korea court appears quite unshakable. It from its list of ‘White countries’ is hard to see where the basis for that receive preferential treatment a solution might be found. In the to facilitate trade. South Korea meantime, GSOMIA will actually promptly reciprocated this action lapse on November 22 unless the Blue and then, in August, announced its House gives a second thought to its decision to terminate the General earlier announcement. It appears that Security of Military Information Washington is pressing Seoul hard to Act (GSOMIA), thus extending the reverse its decision before that date, friction into the domain of security/ pushing President Moon into a corner. defence and the endemic tensions with North Korea. Inevitably this vicious spiral fuelled nationalistic sentiments and rekindled bad Yoshide Soeya Professor of Political Science, Faculty of memories, compounding the difficulty Law, Keio University of recovering the ground lost. Despite, or perhaps because of, this deepening vicious cycle, there have been a few attempts toward the end of 2019 to keep the windows of dialogue open between the leaders. South Korean Prime Minister Lee Nak- yon visited Japan on October 22-24, 2019, to attend Emperor Naruhito’s enthronement ceremony held on October 22. Lee met with Abe and handed over a letter from President Moon. The meeting was the highest- level dialogue since tensions flared up after South Korea’s Supreme Court ruling in October 2018. Then, on November 4 in Bangkok, despite earlier speculation that Abe may refuse to meet Moon during the annual ASEAN-related leaders meetings, they conferred with each other for about 10 minutes, reportedly in a friendly manner. On the same day, National Assembly Speaker Moon Hee-sang visited Japan, and announced his plan to introduce a bill to the South Korean National Assembly to establish a fund (out of donations from both Japanese and South Korean firms as well as their citizens) with which to compensate the South Korean victims of forced labour during the colonial period.

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Modi 2.0 and India’s Regional Security Outlook Sana Hashmi soar high, and thus it is wiser to en- sure proximity with Washington and endure the likely bumps created by the somewhat unpredictable Trump administration. A rather surprising change in the foreign policy apparatus in Modi 2.0 was the induction of S. Jaishankar, former foreign secretary of India, as the new External Affairs Minister. Known for his in-depth knowledge, decades of foreign service experience, and a panache for hands-on diplo- macy, Jaishankar is already being credited with bringing a new style to Indian foreign policy, a style charac- terised as steadier or more sure-footed and less attracted to ambivalence and fence-sitting. This is manifested in India’s decision to continue buying

June 28, 2019. G20, Osaka. India Prime Minister Narendra Modi participates in a trilateral weapons from Russia, $14.5 bil- meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Donald J. Trump. lion USD worth Russian-made weap- Credit Shealah Craighead, The White House / Flickr. ons have been ordered in the past one year. Jaishankar’s outreach to The Narendra Modi-led National During Modi’s first term, there was the strategic community in the US in Democratic Alliance (NDA) returned a sense of unease about how to deal September 2019, Modi’s decision to go to power with a thumping majority with China and the US, both of ahead with the Mamallapuram infor- in the 2019 General Election. Modi which kept sending contrasting sig- mal meeting with Xi Jinping, and a 2.0, as it is popularly termed, is nals to New Delhi. With China, the more confident and firm response to marked by a strong element of Doklam standoff and the Wuhan Turkey and Malaysia’s criticism of In- continuity with noticeable features of informal summit happened within dia’s Kashmir policy are all indicative change in foreign policy. a year. The US termed India’s asso- of India’s new avatar. ciation with its Indo-Pacific posture New Delhi’s strategic consider- as ‘pivotal’ but also kept discred- The Neighbourhood First policy is ations and regional and global prior- iting India (alongside China and regarded as the Modi government’s ities are increasingly shaped by its others) with regards to bilateral trade flagship policy initiative. Inviting the ability to steer its relations with the issues, including a threat to impose SAARC leaders to Modi’s 2014 swear- two major powers-China and the US. duties. Modi 2.0 seems more secure- ing-in ceremony was one of the first However, India is still trying to ful- ly poised to deal with unpredictable steps to showcase India’s outreach ly settle its short and long-term developments in Chinese and Amer- to its immediate neighbours, including relationship trajectory with both ican foreign policies. An emerging Pakistan. However, India-Pakistan Beijing and Washington. This is in feature of India’s policy vis-à-vis the ties have consistently deteriorated contrast with India’s ties with the oth- two superpowers is to work towards over the past few years and, in partic- er two major powers, Japan and maintaining good workable ties with ular, have compelled India to respond Russia, which have remained stable China while moving forward with its firmly to Pakistan’s state-sponsored and positive, contributing to a more relations with the US. With China’s terror activities. Since then, India’s confident foreign policy approach on persistent support of Pakistan, it is neighbourhood policy has been nec- the part of the policy community in becoming clearer in New Delhi that essarily approached as a ‘SAARC mi- New Delhi. relations with Beijing are not likely to nus one’ enterprise. The focus is now

20 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 shifting to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Eco- nomic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), with an aim to expedite the connectivity initiatives and establish it as a ro- bust regional organisation. Evidently, the ‘SAARC minus One’ approach emerged for the first time in 2016 when the BIMSTEC leaders were invited for the BRICS outreach sum- mit in Goa. In May 2019, BIMSTEC leaders were invited to Modi’s second swearing-in ceremony. To show his government’s commitment towards India’s neighbours, Modi undertook visits to the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bhutan in the first few months of his return to the Prime Minister’s of- fice. September 25, 2019. Exercise Malabar. SASEBO, Japan. INS Sahyadri (F 49), USS McCampbell (DDG 85), JS Samidare (DD 106) and JS Chokai (DDG 176). The ships were in India’s regional security outlook port for Exercise Malabar. Credit US Pacific Fleet / Flickr. is shaped by China to a large ex- The informal format of recent meet- with China at different levels and tent. While the Modi government has ings between the leaders of India and through various channels, including been consistently firm in dealing with China has added a new dimension to the Modi-Xi informal meetings. While Pakistan, it is the Chinese support to India-China relations by providing a it is true that the Mamallapuram Pakistan that makes India’s regional mechanism to arrest frequent deteri- summit did not lead to any substan- security situation challenging. Chi- oration in ties. The Wuhan Summit tial outcome (e.g. a breakthrough on na’s criticism of India’s decision to re- arose out of a desire to ease tensions the boundary dispute), it must be voke Article 370 in Jammu and Kash- on the boundary issue. Also, China’s kept in mind that one or two infor- mir has given a stronger international acceptance of Masood Azhar UNSC mal meetings are not enough to re- dimension to India’s regional security listing was heralded as an outcome solve all the outstanding problems challenges. India-China relations are of the Wuhan spirit. Similarly, the between the two Asian giants. What marred by several bilateral irritants: second informal summit at Mamal- these dialogues are meant to do is A protracted boundary dispute, trade lapuram took place after the crisis to ensure that there are open lines imbalance, China’s tough stand vis-à- over developments in Kashmir. The of communication between the two vis India at the UN and the Regional two countries are also trying to work countries. With the third summit al- Comprehensive Economic Partnership together in stabilising Afghanistan ready announced, the efficacy of such (RCEP) negotiations. These make and to contribute to the Afghan-led informal summits needs to be kept un- good ties with China a matter of com- peace process. der review as part of the mutual quest pulsion rather than a choice. There is to find solutions to their outstanding The idea behind the informal sum- hardly any progress on the boundary disputes. dispute. Two informal summits and mitry is to encourage free-flowing 21 rounds of dedicated boundary talks discussions on managing differences. The strategic challenges posed by Chi- have led to little progress. Recent In addition to the Shanghai Coop- na have given the hawks in India suf- trends suggest that these irritants are eration Organisation (SCO), the ficient reasons to pitch for greater mil- likely to persist with the outlook for two countries already have several itary and strategic cooperation with a break-through on the boundary dis- structured bilateral fora and a trilat- the US and its allies. As China looms pute remaining bleak. Deadlock on is- eral mechanism that includes Russia. large in New Delhi’s strategic calcu- sues such as the Belt and Road Initia- However, these fora have not contrib- lations, it is listening more closely to tive (BRI) are also likely to endure. In uted much in bridging the differences increasingly convergent interests and April 2019, India, for the second time, between India and China. Neverthe- concerns expressed in capitals across did not send any representative to the less, there is a clear understanding in the Indo-Pacific. The September 2019 Belt and Road Forum. the Indian corridors of power that it meeting of the foreign ministers from is imperative to continue dialogue the four Quad countries—Australia,

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India, Japan and the US—on the with ASEAN, to also advance ties with in the history of Indo-US relations. sidelines of the UNGA should be seen individual Southeast Asian countries. India has shown its willingness to in that context. It was the first time in The first-ever trilateral naval exercise work closely with the US. The vis- recent years that such a gathering (September 2019) involving Singapore it proved significant in confirming was officially termed the ‘Quadrilater- and Thailand, and providing greater understanding between Modi and al Security Dialogue’. Earlier, India strategic thrust to ties with Indonesia Trump. Second, India is finally show- had been hesitant about upgrading and Vietnam are part of this objec- ing its commitment to the Quad. and institutionalising the Quad. The tive. Similarly, President Ram Nath Agreeing to participate in the first September meeting has signalled a Kovind’s October 2019 visit to the Quad meeting of the foreign minis- greater willingness among the four Philippines showcases India’s willing- ters was a sure sign of this commit- countries to work together to make ness to reach out to potential strate- ment. The dialogue has the potential the Quad a promising multilateral gic partners in the region. to work as an effective institutional strategic platform for India and its and strategic deterrent. Third, despite Institutionalising policy priorities and partners, including the US. differences with China, there is a re- engagements with different regions is alisation in India that dialogue with The Indo-Pacific region is particularly another new feature of India’s region- China should not be discontinued even exposed to China-driven uncertain- al strategic agenda. To accommodate if China keeps overlooking India’s ties and challenges to extant norms Russia in India’s Act East agenda, concerns. Fourth, India’s neighbour- and a rules-based order. Having Modi launched the ‘Act Far East’ hood policy remains a cornerstone for said that, it must be kept in mind policy in September 2019 during the its regional strategic and diplomat- that the Indo-Pacific construct is not Eastern Economic Forum meeting, ic outlook, but it is also clear that In- just about containing China. The and pledged a $1 billion USD Line of dia will engage Pakistan only when foundations of the Indo-Pacific have Credit to Russia’s resource rich Far the latter completely refrains from en- been shaped by the strategic and East region. India has also launched gaging in state-sponsored terrorism normative interests of a plurality of the ‘Think West’ initiative for en- against India. On Pakistan-sponsored member states disposed to protect a gaging Persian Gulf states; ’Connect terrorism, India’s policy has shifted liberal and rules-based international Central Asia’ for advancing ties with from ‘zero tolerance’ to an assertive order. While the Quad is perceived as the Central Asian region; and the Fo- response, which was manifested in a strategic counterweight to China, rum for India-Pacific Island Coun- India’s surgical strikes on terrorist India’s idea of the Indo-Pacific is much tries (FIPIC) for the Pacific Island training camps along the line-of-con- more inclusive. The intent of India’s countries. Meanwhile, India’s policy trol in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir endorsement of ASEAN centrali- towards the Indian Ocean region is (PoK) in 2016. ty in the Indo-Pacific is to position also being re-energised. With the the Indo-Pacific as a new inclusive SAGAR Mala initiative, India has With regard to its wider regional regional construct that is not directed been trying to give its Indian Ocean strategic outlook, India’s engagement against any country. ASEAN contin- region policy an institutional angle. with the Indo-Pacific region seems to ues to be the fulcrum of India’s idea of India is working closely with France be guided by ‘maximising convergence the Indo-Pacific construct. Together, to ensure a stable and peaceful Indian and minimising divergence’ vis-à-vis India’s Neighbourhood First and Act Ocean region. Such an engagement both its partners and rivals. New East policies form the core of India’s seems more probable with the French Delhi’s delicate handling of the US regional strategic outlook. While President Emmanuel Macron’s and China, and fostering stronger countries from Southeast Asia, East announcement of a three-pronged ties with Japan, Australia, Russia, Asia, and Oceania comprise the geo- security partnership with India in the France, and the ASEAN region clearly graphic scope of the Act East policy, southern Indian Ocean. demonstrates a new boldness and the neighbourhood first policy includes discipline in respect of its regional Under Modi 2.0, India seems more the countries of the Indian sub-con- positioning and protecting its policy confident in dealing with its for- tinent as well as the Indian Ocean maneuverability to meet its strategic midable regional security agenda. littorals. and diplomatic objectives. Several considerations have been To bolster ties with countries under particularly important in this regard. the rubric of Act East policy, Modi vis- First is the bolstering of Indo-US ties. ited South Korea and Japan in 2019. Modi visited the US to participate Sana Hashmi Another noticeable aspect of India’s in the UNGA meetings in Septem- Consultant, Ministry of External Affairs, Act East Policy is that it is attempt- ber 2019 and the ‘Howdy Modi’ event Government of India, 2016-19; Taiwan ing, alongside developing relations will go down as a diplomatic victory Fellow, 2020

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Russia’s Approach to Security Architecture in the Asia Pacific Alexander Lukin

April 29, 2019. Qiu Yanpeng (C, R), chief director of ‘Joint Sea-2019’ exercise from the Chinese side and deputy commander of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, declares the opening of the Sino-Russian exercise in Qingdao, east China’s Shandong Province. Credit Xinhua / Li Ziheng

Russia and the Asia Pacific have The following four major factors have Immediately after the collapse of the undergone tremendous changes over influenced the evolution of post-Soviet Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy the past 20 years. While Russia was Russian policy towards the Asia largely disregarded its immediate passing through various stages of Pacific: neighbours in a push to improve market reforms and democratisation – relations with the West and join the 1. The objective of achieving and reassessing its regional and global ‘common European home’. While greater integration into the objectives and roles – China’s economy official representatives of the Russian world economy; was growing rapidly and Japan was Foreign Ministry did not articulate a struggling with a long recession. 2. New principles and approaches lack of interest in fostering relations On the international front the WTO in Russian diplomacy, including with the East, they emphasised came into existence, APEC developed an emphasis on multilateral Russia’s Western connection and their into an influential organisation, the approaches in dealing with issues desire to make Russia a good citizen 1997 Asian financial crisis shook the and problems; of the Western community. However, region, Russia experienced a crisis in the Russian government soon had 1998, and the entire world fell into a 3. Recognition of the distinct to change its attitude. Speaking at recession. All of these brought about interests and orientation of the Chinese Association of People’s a new set of conditions in the world, Russia’s Asian regions; Diplomacy on January 27, 1994, with the result that Russia embarked 4. A more pragmatic and dynamic Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said, on a new policy of opening up towards pursuit of economic and strategic ‘The realisation of Russian interests the Asia Pacific. objectives. not through confrontation but through cooperation with the outside

23 CSCAP world allowed us in many respects agreements providing the basis For this reason, the countries of the to rediscover for ourselves a whole for what is already emerging as region need to develop a normative number of Asian states’. If in 1993 the a strong economic partnership. basis for their relations. Russia is Asia-Pacific region was officially rated Efforts have also been made to ready to contribute to this process. sixth among Russia’s international strengthen relations with Japan. It is also interested in supporting priorities (after relations with the And the dialogue with the two collective efforts for combating CIS, arms control and international Korean states represents a international terrorism, drug security, economic reform, and historic initiative for restoring trafficking, the proliferation of WMDs, relations with the US and Europe), active Russian diplomacy with and international crime. To this end in 1996 Foreign Minister Yevgeny both strategic and economic aims it is essential to create multilateral Primakov promoted it to the third in the Korean Peninsula. structures for regional security position (after the CIS and Eastern because attempts at achieving The new Russian approach to Asia Europe). security based exclusively on a bipolar was summarised by President system of blocs undermines the There were practical reasons for this Vladimir Putin in an article published possibility of securing a real peace. ‘rediscovery’. For the new Russia, just before the APEC Bangkok Security in the Asia Pacific should not achieving greater integration into the summit in October 2003. Expressing be narrowly defined in military terms world economy was a principal means satisfaction with the APEC members’ but should be seen as a complex set of transition to a market-based, decision to accept Russia as a member of conditions in the countries of the democratic system. In the Asia Pacific in 1998, he stated: region that promote their economic this has meant increased trade, Russia is a reliable political growth and internal stability, and that investment, and interaction with and economic partner. This will ensure their access to international neighbouring countries such as China, become more obvious and accepted. markets, new technologies, and Japan, the two Koreas and Mongolia, That not a single serious global investment. as well as more distant ASEAN or interregional problem can be members. The defining concept was to After 2014. The Asia Pacific region solved without Russia’s active and form a system of security to support gained added importance for Russia equitable participation, moreover, the system of economic cooperation. after the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 contrary to its interests, is a led to a worsening of relations with In the Asia Pacific, Russia applied its geopolitical reality now. This is why the West and the imposition of new diplomacy in the following areas: Russia’s course is secured in its anti-Russian sanctions. Whereas foreign policy conception on the 1. Constructive support for Russia previously focused on the active development of interaction in stability and security to ensure a West politically and, especially, all vectors of the Eastern and Asia- stable external environment; economically – primarily the EU Pacific regions. Kipling’s well-known market – its trust in Europe as an postulate, which seemed to be 2. A shift from its virtual non- economic partner has now been unshakeable in the past of ‘West is involvement in the Asia-Pacific undermined. The APR states, West and East is East’ is outdated. economy prior to 1992 to the however, have not been as hostile These vectors are equal for Russia. pursuit of a wide-ranging policy towards Russia. Even Japan, a US of promoting international trade Russia’s stable economic growth in ally, participated only half-heartedly and investment in East Asia and the first decade of the 21st century in the sanctions and South Korea the Pacific; and growing differences with the rejected them outright despite intense 3. A desire for membership in all West made the Asia Pacific one of pressure from Washington. China, existing regional cooperative the main strategic areas for Russian Russia’s main foreign trade partner structures and forums of regional diplomacy. The goal was to ensure since 2010, expressed understanding integration; lasting peace and stability in the for Russia’s actions and a readiness region and to create a solid basis to provide economic and political 4. A focus on the development for meeting modern challenges that support. What’s more, the anti- of strong, mutually beneficial transcend state borders. In Moscow’s Russian sanctions have had no bilateral relations with key view, to make these positive processes influence whatsoever on Moscow’s countries in the region. irreversible, states of the region and relations with India and the ASEAN Dialogue with China has been the international community must states. wide-ranging and intensive, step up their efforts to resolve the with a number of important region’s most urgent problems.

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July 23, 2019. Snapshot of footage released by China of joint bomber patrol with Russia. Credit Alert5.

These factors have led Russia to take American States, and the African of the talks in 2009. In 2010 Russia greater interest in the Asia Pacific Union – that would involve all or proposed to launch a ‘dialogue on and step up activity there. Moscow’s most of the states of the region. Even issues of forming a new security official position is that the region though these organisations do not and cooperation architecture in the requires new security architecture. always cope with the security threats region’ within the East Asian Summit Of course, it would have to be a in their regions they can at least (EAS). According to Russian Center comprehensive mechanism based on carry out joint efforts to eliminate or for Strategic Research expert Anton decisions of the UN Security Council. mitigate them. Nonetheless, Russia Tsvetov, ‘The set of characteristics As a Russian Academy of Sciences believes that any plan to create that make up this system changes expert Alexander Fedorovskiy argues such a security structure in the Asia from speech to speech, but is usually in a volume, based on the proceedings Pacific would be unrealistic unless said to be based on principles of of a Russo-Japanese conference in it was based on cooperation and collectiveness, multilateralism, security mechanisms in the Asia coordination with the international equality, inclusiveness, openness, Pacific published in 2014 by the organisations that already exist in non-alignment and indivisibility’. academy’s Institute of World Economy the region, such as ASEAN and its In the real world Russia’s initiative and International Relations, although numerous related structures, the is embodied in a series of working- the UN is frequently criticised Shanghai Cooperation Organisation level workshops on the regional as ineffective, it has managed to (SCO), the CSTO, and APEC. The security architecture. Overall, shepherd international cooperation positive influence of the Russian- Russia believes that ASEAN and its on some occasions. For example, the Chinese rapprochement that led to mechanisms should be central in the five regional players – the US, China, the establishment of the SCO as well security-related efforts of the various Japan, Russia, and South Korea – as a number of other international countries and organisations in the with the backing of the SC, managed groups – BRICS foremost among region. As Russian Foreign Minister to take concerted measures against them – also play a significant role. In Sergey Lavrov put it, answering the implementation of nuclear missile this respect there were high hopes media questions in Ho Chi Minh projects in North Korea. Similar for the Northeast Asia Peace and City during the Russia-Vietnam successes, however, are few. Security Mechanism that Russia conference of the Valdai Discussion coordinated and that emerged in 2007 Stability in the Asia Pacific could Club on February 26, 2019, as one of five working groups from the suffer from the fact that it lacks six-party talks on the North Korean ‘a reliable architecture of equal and the type of security structures that nuclear issue. But this idea had to be indivisible security here needs to exist in other parts of the world – shelved after North Korea pulled out be built by joint efforts, taking into such as the OSCE, Organization of

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account the balance of interests of The Indo-Pacific Region Concept. political and naval processes’ which all countries in that region and on The Indo-Pacific concept grew out undermines the ASEAN-centricity of the basis of the UN Charter and of several separate ideas that had the formats that have been created other principles of international evolved over the past decade. The in that region’. Russia believes law, including, of course, exclusively reason for this is that the wording of that such ‘Indo-Pacific’ bloc-like peaceful settlements for disputes the Indo-Pacific doctrine clearly refers thinking might not only take on an and the non-use of force or threat of to a bloc. According to the US Defense anti-Chinese character eventually force. ASEAN is a solid foundation Department 2019 ‘Indo-Pacific but also begin to address politics for building such security and Strategy Report’, its stated objective in eastern and southern Eurasia, cooperation architecture, which has lies in ‘strengthening and evolving thus fundamentally undermining created many useful mechanisms US alliances and partnerships into the Russian conceptual approach to around itself. a networked security architecture… cooperation in Greater Eurasia. deterring aggression, maintaining Russia contends that the region Thus, Russia envisions the future stability, and ensuring free access to requires a new security architecture security architecture of the APR as common domains’. The US strategy to address the numerous threats emerging from the interaction of is obviously aimed against a rapidly facing it. These include such supra- existing structures. In this, ASEAN rising China and its ‘One Belt, One regional challenges as the nuclear would play the central role and Road’ initiative through which Beijing problem on the Korean Peninsula, Russia’s cooperation with ASEAN allegedly ‘seeks Indo-Pacific regional bilateral and multilateral territorial and China would play a supporting hegemony in the near-term and, disputes, as well as terrorism, drug role. At the same time Moscow feels ultimately global pre-eminence in the trafficking, cybercrime and other that the US is undermining regional long-term’. It also describes Russia as types of cross-border crime, such security with its efforts to maintain a ‘revitalised malign actor’. as piracy, illegal migration, and its alliances in the region and to use territorial disputes. These problems Henceforth, the ‘Quad’ will be called them to create anti-Russian and anti- must be resolved through general upon to manage Asian affairs under Chinese groups and alliances. agreement by taking the views of all Washington’s leadership. This parties into account without any one arrangement is clearly intended country or group of countries holding to bring India, with its enormous Alexander Lukin a monopolistic right to make the only economic and human potential, Head, International Laboratory on World ‘right’ decisions. Thus, Moscow holds into the US orbit — particularly Order Studies and the New Regionalism, National Research University Higher that the confrontational bilateral considering Delhi’s difficult School of Economics, Russia alliances the US has maintained relationship with Beijing. As another since the Cold War with Japan, US Department of Defense document South Korea, and Australia are emphasised, engagement with India now counterproductive and used to is the ‘central axis’ in Washington’s pressure or, at times, isolate other strategy for expanding US military actors. With the world moving partnerships and presence ‘in the arc towards multipolarity, the US and extending from the Western Pacific its allies use these tools in an effort and East Asia into the Indian Ocean to preserve their global domination region and South Asia’. and the moment of unipolarity that Naturally, Moscow is extremely resulted from the collapse of the unhappy about the bloc-like character Soviet Union – hampering the rapid of the Indo-Pacific concept and the development of other Asia Pacific fact that it excludes both Russia and states inasmuch as it poses a threat China. Speaking at the International to their interests. The US has actively Valdai Club in Vietnam on February pursued this goal, first through 25, 2019, Sergey Lavrov described the the TPP promoted by President Indo-Pacific Region as an ‘artificially Obama, and now under Trump – who imposed construct’ with ‘the far- withdrew from the TPP – with the reaching context of containing China’. so-called ‘Quadrilateral Security He also called it ‘a clear attempt Dialogue’ (or ‘Quad’) between the US, to get India involved in military- Japan, Australia, and India.

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US-China competition: Europe as a responsible stabiliser? Alice Ekman

October 2, 2019. Presentation of Letter of Credence (LoC) by H.E. Igor January 21, 2019. 22nd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting. Credit ASEAN Driesmans, Ambassador-Designate of the European Union to Secretary- Secretariat / Flickr. General of ASEAN Dato Lim Jock Hoi. Credit ASEAN Secretariat / Flickr.

Two years after the beginning of diametrically opposed positions on and both consider that they are fully trade tensions, US-China rivalry the South China Sea as well as on entitled to promote their values and is becoming a long-term trend that the Korean peninsula. Tensions systems abroad. If the international Europe has to face and take into are also particularly strong over promotion of liberal democratic consideration in its foreign policy Taiwan in the wake of presidential values is not something new for the orientations and positioning. Even elections, as Beijing has always US, it is rather new that China – if a trade deal was to be signed, considered reunification a priority under the Presidency of Xi Jinping other areas of friction between and a domestic issue on which the – positions itself as an example Beijing and Washington would US should have no say. Although the other countries can learn from. remain. Technological competition situation is different, Hong Kong is China has been particularly active was already emerging before also an area of further divergences in promoting ‘socialism with [local] trade tensions and has accelerated between Washington and Beijing. characteristics’ since the beginning of following the dispute over Huawei’s Tensions are likely to endure, as the Xi Jinping’s presidency. It has done so 5G network. China’s tech companies local population is divided and part of through the development of regional – in particular those that are now the population remains worried about forums, media content, training listed on US Commerce department’s the political and legal status of Hong programs targeting developing and Entity List – are increasing their Kong and the overall sustainability emerging countries under both its R&D investments in an attempt of the ‘One country, two systems’ ‘South-South cooperation’ and ‘Belt to reduce their dependency on US framework. China considers the Hong & Road’ frameworks. According components, but also European and Kong issue as a top national priority, to a 2019 Ministry of Commerce other foreign sources. If dependency and that the US and other foreign training program catalogue, the aim is likely to remain in the short term, countries have already engaged in far of these initiatives is to promote China aims – in the long term – too much ‘interference in Hong Kong China’s governance model and at more technological autonomy affairs’ (MFA spokesperson, August- encourage foreign officials to follow and leadership, and the central September 2019). a reform trajectory inspired by government is supporting this aim China’s ‘experience’. Beyond China’s Competition is also becoming both politically and financially. international discourse, Beijing is increasingly political and ideological. developing concrete infrastructure As the same time, geopolitical The first and second largest and technological projects under the competition has become stronger economies in the world have ‘Belt & Road Initiative’ label, that are in the Asia-Pacific region, where developed very different political modelled on projects it has developed both China and the US have systems on their national territories,

27 CSCAP on its own territory (special economic infrastructure and technological development of new concrete projects zones, Internet/telecommunication offers, such as Huawei’s 5G mobile in this framework. Some are still at networks, smart city packages, etc.). network. There has been no uniform an early stage of implementation response to these calls. Most notably, (such as the EU-Japan strategic The nature of the domestic debates EU member states have addressed partnership agreement of April in both countries also indicates that differently the Huawei case based on 2018), with more concrete projects the US-China rivalry is a long- their national contexts, priorities and to be identified and pushed forward. term trend. In Washington, despite security risk evaluations. Asia is an increasingly strategic the divisive atmosphere, there is a region for the EU, as recent policy significant bipartisan consensus in This being said, the transatlantic plans indicate: Strategy on India in respect of China. Even if diverging alliance has not come into question 2018; Strategic outlook on China in views exist on the ultimate aim and in the present context it 2019; and the ASEAN-EU Plan of of the sanctions being imposed on remains a robust structure. A strong Action 2018-2022. The broader Asian Chinese companies – some advocating convergence of views between region, including central Asia, is also a full economic ‘decoupling’ while Brussels and Washington exists becoming an increasingly important others consider that a trade deal regarding China’s domestic and area of cooperation for the EU in the could avoid this extreme option – foreign policy orientations. In its framework of its connectivity strategy both the Republican and Democrat 2019 Strategic outlook on China, adopted in September 2018. An EU- sides perceive China as a major the EU has formally characterised Japan agreement on connectivity has threat. In Beijing, the traditional China, simultaneously, as a been signed in September 2019, and resentment against the West within ‘cooperation partner, a negotiating similar bilateral agreements could be the Communist Party of China, often partner, an economic competitor in signed with other Asian countries in tempered by pragmatism since Deng pursuit of technological leadership, the coming years. Xiaoping’s era, has been expressed and a systemic rival promoting publicly and vocally in words that alternative models of governance’. If the EU, in contrast to some of have not been heard since the Mao Both Washington and Brussels also its member states, has so far not era. The official line is to accept no agree that access to the Chinese adopted the ‘Indo-pacific’ concept, ‘lesson’ or criticism from Western market remains too limited for it has nonetheless decided to countries – most particularly the US foreign companies, and that this significantly reinforce its security – and to systematically fight back by lack of reciprocity in terms of market engagement in the region, and to criticising the other side, whether at access should be addressed once do so in a more operational way. official or non-official levels. At this for all. If divergences exist between Under its ‘Security in and with point in time, US-China tit-for-tat Brussels and Washington, these Asia’ program, the EU is seeking exchanges have become particularly relate more to the way challenges to enhance its engagement with emotional and tense – including at should be addressed (use of sanctions partners in Asia in five priority areas: track 1.5 and track 2 levels, such as or not) than to the assessment of maritime security, counterterrorism, the one observed during the 2019 challenges themselves. Europe is now cybersecurity, non-proliferation/ editions of the Shangri-La Dialogue considering its own way of interacting disarmament, and hybrid threats. in Singapore and the Xiangshan with China. In the maritime security area, the forum in Beijing. Tensions have now EU plans to reinforce cooperation A new trend that is emerging in reached such a point that it is hard to within its bilateral relationships with this context is the reinforcement of anticipate a ‘cooling down’ of bilateral India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of EU-Asia ties, in particular between exchanges anytime soon. Korea and Vietnam, as a complement the EU and countries in Asia who to multilateral cooperation, and In this context, Europe has been wish to diversify their political and additional to the recent reinforcement receiving mixed messages. China has economic ties in order to reduce by several member states of their been trying a ‘rapprochement’ with their dependency on either the US bilateral security ties with several Europe, underlining transatlantic and China and certainly to, as far Asia-Pacific countries. divergences (on the Iran nuclear as possible, avoid having to ‘choose’ deal, climate change, multilateralism between the two rivals. The basis US-China tensions have intensified in broader terms) and potential has been laid, as the EU itself has discussion on the EU’s ‘strategic areas of EU-China convergence. signed strategic partnerships with autonomy’. Critical questions relate Washington has been calling on its several Asian countries in recent not only to the potential reduction European allies to be wary of China’s years, providing scope for the of dependency in the security and

28 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 defence sector – it will take time for and the system of governance that it Alice Ekman the EU to move towards a higher level values. The EU will be less inclined Senior Asia Analyst and CSCAP-EU of autonomy in this domain – but to engage in or accept the discourse coordinator, European Union Institute of also to the technological sector – from on the weaknesses of Europe, and Security Studies (EUISS) green energy to telecommunications, more likely to engage in supporting and developing the ability of the EU globally the core values that have and EU member states to reinforce motivated its creation, and still and merge R&D efforts in this sector. remain the driver of both its internal and external decisions. It is also more The ‘strategic autonomy’ discussion likely that the EU will take part in also relates to the EU’s ability to the global debate on the so-called promote its interests more rapidly (economic) ‘inefficiency’ of democratic and efficiently in bilateral and governance systems, particularly as multilateral settings. The general the EU has recovered from the global impression in Brussels is that the financial crisis and Euro debt crisis. It EU, and Europe as a whole, has is likely to become more assertive on been punching far below its weight the topic in both its communications and that it is now time for a more and positioning as a normative power, ambitious, but also more efficient, particularly at the multilateral foreign policy in Asia and beyond. level. The EU plans to position Reinforcing the EU’s economic itself as a more active supporter of leverage is one of the orientations multilateralism, at a time when the discussed, as the Eurozone remains a US has partly withdrawn from it, and very important market for both China China has been trying to fill the void, and the US. The EU is the largest but with forms of multilateralism not trading partner of both China and fully aligned with the EU’s vision. the US – in 2018, one-third of all EU trade was with the US and China. The EU now has the ambition to Reinforcing the internationalisation of consolidate its power status, and the Euro is also on the agenda. position itself more clearly and efficiently, not only as an economic Another general impression in and normative power – which it Brussels is that it is time to abandon already is – but also as a power the posture of self-denigration and in the technological, political doubt. For too long, it has been and geopolitical dimensions. The fashionable within and outside the essential precondition for EU’s power EU to highlight the weaknesses of EU positioning is a strong political institutions, of the European market, will to do so. The new European of EU member-states coordination, Commission, labelled as a ‘geopolitical including in regional dialogues in commission’ by its President Ursula Asia. China has been active on this von der Leyen, has already expressed front, underlining the so-called such will. The appointment of the ‘weaknesses’ of Europe, and pointing new commission, although not as at Brexit, and the Yellow Vest smooth as initially planned, has phenomenon in France alongside the come in good time. All in all, 2020 is migration and security issues over the likely to be a crucial year for EU-Asia continent. relations, with a new EU team in The present geopolitical context is place, and a new geopolitical context encouraging Europe to seize more that more than ever requires strategic opportunities – including through a responses. diversification of its ties with Asian partners – but also to be more robust in the defence of both its interests

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The Security Outlook of the Republic of Korea Choi Kang

January 2019. Ex-Del to Korea. Visit to DMZ – Special tour of the Arrowhead Ridge. Credit Ministry of National Defense. Republic of Korea.

The spectre of a revival of the Cold a rising China by engaging in a range technology supremacy. Washington War seems to loom over the Korean of economic and military initiatives. has firmly pressed its allies and Peninsula. On the one hand, the More specifically, the Trump partners to ban the use of Huawei’s broader security environment in the administration implemented the Indo- equipment in building 5G networks region is becoming more uncertain Pacific Strategy to counter President in their countries for cyber-security than ever with the escalating Xi’s aggressive foreign policy under reasons. Washington also expressed strategic competition between the the Belt and Road Initiative. While concerns about the potential security United States and China, worsening the Obama administration took a risks associated with Chinese tech relations between the Republic of passive and reactive foreign policy firms, including drone maker DJI Korea and Japan, and strengthening towards Beijing, Trump appears to which accounts for nearly 90% of the ties between Pyongyang and Beijing. take a more aggressive approach than world’s drone market. On the other hand, however, the his predecessor in deterring China Beijing appears to want at least an credibility of America’s alliance from destabilising East Asia. interim deal with Washington. In the commitments is being called into Accusing China of unfair trading early stage of the trade war, China question with Trump’s ‘America First’ practices, Washington imposed high was busy finding ways to mitigate foreign policy. South Korea is now tariffs on Chinese imports last year. the effect of US tariffs. With Trump’s at a crossroads between a historic Beijing, in response, also imposed domestic scandals and some warning success and a catastrophic failure, tariffs on some US goods, triggering signs of a US recession, however, that is, a choice that will determine a trade war between the world’s two Beijing now seems more disposed to the future of South Korea. largest economies. With no signs withstand the pressure of the trade The United States is seeking to of trade tensions easing, the two dispute with Washington. It also enhance its efforts to balance against countries have begun a war over makes political sense for Trump to

30 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 look for an interim deal and suspend wartime forced labour in October countries. The restoration of normal a further round of tariff increases on 2018. bilateral relations still seems a long Chinese goods, as he needs to appease way off. Tokyo considered that Seoul should American farmers ahead of the 2020 have been more determined to resolve North Korea and China are election. the forced labour issue and adopted strengthening their bilateral ties in It is very hard to imagine, however, the hard-line response of removing the wake of the US-China strategic that both the United States and South Korea from its ‘whitelist’ of competition and the ROK-Japan China will be prepared anytime soon trusted trading partners. This further dispute. The intensifying US-Sino to conclude a final, comprehensive inflamed anti-Japanese sentiment in competition has enlarged North deal on trade. Although temporarily South Korea, leading to the boycott Korea’s strategic value to China. seeking to compromise with China, of Japanese products and services While Trump and Kim Jong Un have the Trump administration is likely to while Tokyo elected not to respond had two summits and one meeting, push China again in the process of, or to Seoul’s belated offer to resolve Kim and Xi have met five times, after the 2020 presidential election, the issue via bilateral diplomatic including Xi’s visit to North Korea for as its tough-on-China approach channels. the first time since his inauguration. draws bipartisan support from the North Korea-China cooperation in The South Korea-Japan dispute got US Congress. Bearing in mind the the military domain appears to be worse with Seoul’s decision on August US commitment to balance against a gathering momentum. 22 to terminate an intelligence- rising challenger, prolonged tensions sharing pact with Tokyo, called In August, Kim Su-gil, director of between the United States and China the General Security of Military the General Political Bureau of would seem to be a likely prospect. Information Agreement (GSOMIA). the Korean People’s Army (KPA), The current intensifying competition While Tokyo expressed ‘extreme visited China and met with Miao between Washington and Beijing regret’ over the decision, the greatest Hua, director of the political affairs reduces Seoul’s space for diplomatic concern and disappointment was department of China’s Central manoeuvring. Washington has probably felt in Washington, given the Military Commission. Kim Su-gil reportedly requested Seoul’s support American commitment to ROK-US- said that the two sides reaffirmed for its Indo-Pacific Strategy and to Japan trilateral security cooperation their ‘commitment to continue to take part in its sanctions on Huawei, in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear develop and upgrade the friendly while Beijing hints at further threat and a rising China. Little and cooperative relations between economic pressure on South Korea if wonder that Seoul’s termination of the militaries of DPRK and China to it accepts Washington’s proposal. The its involvement with the GSOMIA a higher level according to the noble intensifying US-China competition arrangement has increased intentions of the supreme leaders deepens a dilemma for Seoul, which Washington’s distrust of the Moon of the two countries.’ In his return wants to strengthen its military administration. visit to Pyongyang in October, Miao alliance with the United States and Hua also hinted at a higher level of The ongoing row between South expand economic cooperation with military cooperation between the two Korea and Japan presents a China at the same time. countries. This may imply Beijing’s favourable strategic environment to intention to strengthen cooperation Sharing values of liberal democracy Pyongyang, making it more complex with North Korea now that it has and a market economy, South Korea, and challenging to tackle the North a viable nuclear capability. Simply and Japan, despite their historical Korean nuclear problem. Washington put, Pyongyang’s interests to secure animosity, have continued to develop appears to be actively engaged in support from China have coincided security cooperation. The two US efforts to settle the current standoff with Beijing’s interests to win over allies contended with the Communist between Seoul and Tokyo before North Korea to keep Washington in threats during the Cold War and November 23 when the current check. have been working closely together GSOMIA expires. The South Korean to address North Korea’s nuclear government also sent Prime Minister A China-backed North Korea threat since the end of the Cold Lee Nak-yeon to Tokyo to attend the appeared to be taking a harder-line War. Despite this record, however, emperor’s enthronement ceremony on stance in denuclearisation talks with relations between the two countries October 22, in the hope of facilitating the United States in the second half of have deteriorated rapidly since South a breakthrough on re-starting a this year. It called for Washington to Korea’s Supreme Court ruling on bilateral dialogue between the two present a new method of calculation

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June 30, 2019. US President Donald Trump meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the DMZ separating the two Koreas, in Panmunjom, South Korea. Credit Reuters. and warned that it might otherwise more cautious approach towards the Korea (USFK) to as much as $5 billion resume intercontinental ballistic North. That said, however, President USD, which is much higher than missile (ICBM) tests, which could put Trump’s approach to alliances the estimated cost of maintaining pressure on President Trump ahead remains a serious challenge to the USFK. Furthermore, Trump has of the 2020 presidential election. By a ROK-US alliance. Washington’s characterised ROK-US combined new calculation method, Pyongyang excessive demands for military military exercises as a ‘total waste seemed to refer to how its bargaining burden-sharing is politically stressful of money’. Trump seemly assigns chips – such as dismantling the for South Korea. little importance to ROK-US military Punggye-ri nuclear test site – would exercises or to the bilateral alliance Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy trade off against relief from United in maintaining peace in the region as undermines not just the ROK-US States sanctions against North Korea well as to contending with China. alliance but the entire US alliance and/or the suspension of joint ROK- system. The recent withdrawal of US Trump’s approach to the ROK- US military exercises. Considering forces from Syria and Turkey’s attack US alliance may raise doubts the US commitment to maintaining on the Kurds has allowed renewed within South Korea about the US sanctions on Pyongyang until it takes doubts about American leadership and commitment to its security and send concrete steps to denuclearise, it is credibility to echo through its global the wrong signal to Pyongyang. hard to see another US-North Korea network of alliances. Looking at a rift between Seoul summit being held in the near future. and Washington, North Korea may With regards to the ROK-US continue to pursue its revisionist While there has been a rift within alliance, the Trump administration strategy, rather than committing itself the alliance over the coordination is reportedly pushing for Seoul to to the path of ‘final, fully verifiable of policies toward North Korea, the drastically increase its contribution denuclearisation’. Moon administration is now taking a to the cost of stationing US Forces

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South Korea’s foreign policy seems Seoul must also approach to have lost its sense of direction. strengthening cooperation with its Just last year, in 2018, Seoul was neighbours in a manner consistent filled with hope for North Korean with its national interests and values denuclearisation and, with North and create an environment in which Korea, establishing a permanent its neighbours need South Korea. peace regime on the Korean As for the alliance with the United Peninsula. What a difference a year States, Seoul must strengthen it while can make. The country now faces an avoiding exclusive reliance on it. unprecedented situation in which Strengthening the ROK-US alliance relations with all of its neighbours is the best way for Seoul to insulate have worsened sharply. In terms itself against inappropriate foreign of the values which South Korean interference. foreign policy must embody and With regard to its policy towards promote – the principles of liberal China, Seoul should promote democracy, market economy, and economic cooperation while showing human rights – these are difficult its firm commitment towards the to discern in the nation’s recent denuclearisation of North Korea. activities. It also needs to restore bilateral With regard to its policy towards relations with Tokyo while settling the North, Seoul appears to be the ongoing history disputes. Active preoccupied with improving inter- cooperation with neighbouring Korean relations and to have almost countries would enlarge Seoul’s lost all influence over the North diplomatic footprint and enable it to Korean nuclear affairs. The net result regain its influence over North Korean is that Pyongyang is striving to break nuclear affairs. out of diplomatic isolation and win acceptance as a nuclear weapons state, while Seoul is busy restoring relations with its neighbours. Choi Kang Acting President, Asan Institute for Policy South Korea will face a watershed Studies moment in 2020. The circumstances Seoul will have to contend with include the uncertainty generated by the US presidential election, US- North Korea talks, ROK-US defence cost-sharing talks, the transfer of wartime operational control, the US-Sino strategic competition, and the ROK-Japan dispute. To manage these multi-layered challenges and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul must first reaffirm the denuclearisation of North Korea as its pre-eminent objective, subordinating all other political goals. No other country will help South Korea unless it assigns clear priority to North Korea’s denuclearisation. Denuclearising North Korea, therefore, must take priority in South Korea’s diplomacy over all other agendas for the future of the nation.

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Still the Frightened Country: Australian anxieties in a contested Asia Brendan Taylor

February 18, 2019. Indian Ocean. The Los Angeles-class attack submarine USSSanta Fe (SSN 763) sails in formation with Royal Australian Navy Collins class submarines HMAS Collins, HMAS Farncomb, HMAS Dechaineux and HMAS Sheean, as an Australian MH-60R Seahawk helicopter flies overhead in the West Australian exercise area. Credit RAN photo by LSIS Richard Cordell.

In 1979, the prominent public servant Rather than looking anxiously of European settlement in the late Alan Renouf started his retirement northward, Canberra during this time eighteenth century. Those early by publishing one of the classic seemed increasingly determined to settlers, small in number, inhabited Australian foreign policy texts: The find its securitywith an increasingly a large resource rich continent. Frightened Country. In this book, dynamic Asia. They felt acutely what the eminent Renouf argued that Australia is an Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey But Australia’s security outlook anxious nation, a country that saw has characterised as the ‘tyranny of today is again becoming much darker more dangers than opportunities in distance’ – not really knowing if their and apprehensive. Like many other the Asian region to its north. This great and powerful British protector American friends and partners, was why Canberra had traditionally would come to their aid should they Donald Trump’s disdain for alliance tended to cleave to a great and be subject to the colonial ambitions relationships has contributed powerful friend, Renouf believed; of one of Europe’s other major significantly. To be sure, Australian firstly Great Britain in the period powers. Indeed, by the mid-1850s, Prime Minister Scott Morrison prior to the Second World War, and Sydneysiders watching anxiously over seems to have struck a chord with the United States thereafter. the horizon for French or Russian America’s mercurial 45th president. ships had erected Fort Denison – Australia seemed finally to find This is especially significant against a small structure which the late its feet only a decade after Renouf the backdrop of Trump’s tense first Coral Bell once described as a ‘toy published The Frightened Country. telephone exchange with Morrison’s stronghold’ – at the mouth of Sydney While the alliance with America predecessor, Malcolm Turnbull. Harbor. It remains there today as a remained intact after some But Trump’s alliance antipathy tourist attraction. momentary wobbles, Australia feeds a deep Australian fear of emerged as a more confident, activist Canberra’s most recent bout of abandonment. This anxiety has middle power during the heady days strategic anxiety pre-dates Trump. been felt from at least the period of the Hawke-Keating government. It started to manifest around half a

34 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 decade ago, just as regional tensions that Canberra should ‘cut the tag’ military power 1,200-1,400 kilometres were rising in the East and South with America, adopting a more closer to Australia. Rumours that China Seas. Australian policy elites at independent foreign policy posture China might seek to establish similar that time worried increasingly about toward Asia. In similar vein, former facilities in the South Pacific have the prospects of alliance entrapment, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans caused further angst. There were more so than abandonment. In a called for ‘less America, more Asia, reports in April 2018, for instance, question reminiscent of one famously more self-reliance and more global that China intended to build a naval asked of Foreign Minister Alexander engagement’ in Australian foreign base in Vanuatu. Although Beijing Downer during an August 2004 trip policy. and Port Vila swiftly denied these to China, Defence Minister David rumours, US Vice President Mike Longstanding Australian anxieties Johnston was quizzed during a live Pence announced at the November came into sharpest relief in February television interview in June 2014 2018 APEC Summit in Port Moresby 1942, when waves of Japanese over whether Australia’s ANZUS that America, Australia and Papua aircraft bombarded a largely commitments would apply in an New Guinea had agreed to jointly defenceless Darwin in the biggest East China Sea contingency where develop the Lombrum naval base on and deadliest single attack in the America intervened. Like Downer, Manus Island. history of the continent. These air Johnston responded technically that raids continued for almost two years, No country other than the United they wouldn’t. leaving a deep impression on the States has the capacity at present A host of Australian commentators Australian strategic psyche. Yet such to pose a physical military challenge put this case in significantly stronger fears of direct military attack are to the Australian continent. terms, suggesting that Canberra gradually re-emerging, as evidenced Nevertheless, fears that Australia should be seeking to distance itself in a new book published by the former could be subjected to greater levels of from the American alliance due to senior Australian defence official strategic coercion are also growing. In its rising entrapment risks. What turned academic, Hugh White. How his June 2017 keynote address to the was particularly significant about to defend Australia was published in Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, such statements was who was 2019 and has generated considerable for instance, Turnbull called for an making them. Former Australian debate. White’s central thesis is that Asia ‘where big fish neither eat nor Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser Australia can no longer confidently intimidate the small’. described the alliance as a rely upon its alliance with the US Canberra’s answer to avoiding a ‘dangerous’ strategic tie, one that and needs to restructure its military Thucydidean Asia where ‘the strong was inhibiting Canberra’s ability to to be able to defend the continent do what they will while the weak engage effectively in Asia and that against attack from a major power, suffer what they must’ has been Australia would be better off without. such as China. This would involve the so-called ‘rules-based order’. Paul Keating, another former significantly more submarines and Australia’s 2016 Defence White Australian Prime Minister, asserted fighter aircraft, but also selling the paper referred to this concept no less three highly vulnerable air warfare than 56 times. This has remained a destroyers that have only recently constant in Australian foreign and been added to the Australian security policy during the period inventory. White’s plan has a 20- since. Addressing her first Shangri- 30 year window, keeping in mind La Dialogue in June 2019, for that this is the period during which example, new Defence Minister Linda defence planners generally make Reynolds observed: ‘Sustaining and capability decisions given the time strengthening shared rules, norms needed to implement these. and institutions is vital. This is how Australia’s rising invasion anxieties we can prevent conflict and address have been prompted primarily by security threats’. China’s growing ability to project Anxieties regarding Chinese influence its military power further south. August 4, 2019. AUSMIN 2019. Senator the within Australia itself are also on the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, According to another leading strategic rise. This influence, or what some US Secretary of State Pompeo, Secretary of commentator, Paul Dibb, Beijing’s Defence Mark Esper, and Senator the Hon Linda commentators have gone so far as military outposts in the Spratly Reynolds CSC, Minister for Defence. to describe as outright interference, Credit Nathan Fulton / DFAT Flickr. islands have already brought China’s

35 CSCAP is alleged to be occurring across a previous year. Likewise, 74 percent behove Canberra to revisit seriously variety of domains, including in the of Australians felt that their country the technological lead time needed political sphere via donations, in the was ‘too economically dependent’ upon to acquire a nuclear capability. cyber realm and through the Chinese China, while 49 percent saw foreign Likewise, the eminently sensible misuse of University research interference as a ‘critical threat to ASPI analyst Rod Lyon argues that collaborations. In December 2017 Australia’s vital interests’. Australia should acquire a nuclear a high-profile Labor Party Senator, weapons capability, provided its Somewhat paradoxically, despite Sam Dastyari, resigned from the strategic environment becomes these growing anxieties, the Australian Parliament following sufficiently dark, US extended Australian public remains allegations that he had supported nuclear deterrence disappears increasingly less supportive of higher Beijing’s South China Sea stance and completely, and a domestic consensus defence spending. Recent work by provided counter-intelligence advice on going nuclear can be arrived at. respected political scientists Danielle under Chinese duress. Subsequently, Chubb and Ian McAllister, for To be sure, there are compelling on 28 June 2018, the Australian example, reveals a populace unlikely reasons for Canberra not to go down Parliament passed two major pieces to support growth in the Australian the nuclear path. To do otherwise of counter-interference legislation defence budget. Indeed, their analysis would contradict Australia’s – the National Security Legislation suggests that public support for longstanding commitment to nuclear Amendment (Espionage and Foreign higher defence spending is now the non-proliferation and arms control. Interference) bill and the Foreign lowest it has been since at least the Public support for an Australian Influence Transparency Scheme bill. 1970s. nuclear bomb would likely not be This legislation was presented as forthcoming. And even if it were, groundbreaking and potentially as Most leading Australian strategic Australia presently lacks the a model for other governments to commentators take a different view. technical wherewithal to develop and, follow. While technically country The Australian Strategic Policy more importantly, to deliver such neutral, Beijing was very much its Institute’s (ASPI) Peter Jennings, a weapon. Taking this route would implied target. for example, argues that the defence also seriously alienate Australia budget needs to grow from its current Allegations of growing Chinese from its American ally, upon whom it level of around 2 percent of Gross interference have entered the continues to depend for intelligence Domestic Product (GDP) to reach Australian public consciousness and defence technology access. For 2.5 or 3 percent. In How to Defend via mainstream media, including these reasons, even White neither Australia, White proposes an even a controversial book by public expects nor urges Canberra to bigger funding increase, suggesting intellectual Clive Hamilton ultimately acquire nuclear weapons. that a figure somewhere in the entitled Silent Invasion: China’s vicinity of 3.5 to 4 percent is called Nonetheless, the fact that this Influence in Australia, as well as for. debate is even occurring should in several episodes of Four Corners give Australia’s Asian neighbours – a longstanding current affairs However, perhaps the most considerable pause. As major power television series. Consistent with controversial contribution of White’s competition returns to this region, this, Australian public attitudes are most recent book is his suggestion deep-seated Australian anxieties are growing demonstrably more anxious that Canberra consider the question once again coming to the fore. As regarding China – notwithstanding of whether Australia should acquire these resurface, Australia’s foreign the fact that Australia boasts a a nuclear weapons capability, just as and defence policies could move in Chinese diaspora numbering 1.2 it did during the 1960s. White is by some unexpected and potentially million, around half of which were no means a voice in the wilderness. alarming directions. These trends will born in the People’s Republic of Moreover, it is again important to bear careful monitoring. They show China (PRC). The results of the note who else is making this case. that Australia remains the frightened Lowy Institute’s 2019 poll on For instance, Paul Dibb – so often at country. Australian attitudes to the world, for loggerheads with White on a range instance, showed a significant drop of other strategic issues – concurs. in previously positive sentiments Growing uncertainties regarding towards the PRC. Australians’ trust the credibility of America’s nuclear Dr Brendan Taylor in China dropped to 32 percent in Professor of Strategic Studies, Strategic umbrella and China’s expanding and Defence Studies Centre, Australian this poll, down 20 points from the military capabilities, Dibb believes, National University

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Regional Security Outlook: More continuity than change in Indonesia’s security posture Dewi Fortuna Anwar the primary threats to Indonesia’s security as stemming from within and in myriad forms, including separatist movements, communal conflicts and contending ideologies (communism, Islamism) that sought to replace the pluralist national ideology, Pancasila. To overcome this multitude of internal challenges, the New Order government developed the concept of national resilience, a holistic and comprehensive approach to security that prioritised political stability, economic development, and social equity over the development of conventional military capability. Externally, throughout the New Order period, Indonesia emphasised June 26, 2019. First Defence Dialogue. Deputy Minister of Defence, Senior Lieutenant General Nguyễn Chí diplomacy and regional cooperation Vnhị welcomes Secretary General of the Indonesian Ministry of Defence Vice Admiral Agus Setiadji in Hà Ni.ộ with neighbouring countries to Credit VNA / VNS. develop regional resilience. The positive interplay of national and Indonesia has undergone political system, there has been more regional resilience was the main fundamental changes in its political continuity than change in Indonesia’s reason for Indonesia’s strong system in the past two decades as security outlook and preferred means commitment to ASEAN. A cohesive well as many changes of government. of engaging with its external strategic ASEAN would prevent open conflicts For 32 years Indonesia was ruled by environment. between its member-states, and President Suharto under the army- Since its early years, Indonesia has act as a bulwark against external dominated New Order government, developed a number of strategic subversion and interventions, which came to an end with Suharto’s doctrines that effectively constitute allowing member states to devote resignation amidst the Asian the country’s strategic culture. These their energy and scarce resources to financial crisis on 20 May 1998. doctrines include the concept of a internal development. As economic Since then Indonesia has undergone total people’s war, the archipelagic development was considered critical a long process of democratisation outlook, and the concept of national for political stability and security, and several changes of government resilience. Indonesia also has a free Suharto’s foreign policy was also as the presidential term is now and active foreign policy doctrine mostly geared towards obtaining limited to a maximum of two five- which forbids the country from economic benefits, particularly year terms. The military is now entering into any military alliances securing export markets, loans and barred from being involved in politics or hosting a foreign military base foreign investments from likely and is supposed to be primarily on its territory. After suffering partners. responsible for external defence colonialism and foreign interventions, while internal security is mainly the Notwithstanding Indonesia’s Indonesia has developed a strong responsibility of the police, which has political transformation from sense of nationalism and a deep- been separated from the military. authoritarianism to democracy in rooted suspicion of major powers’ Nonetheless, despite the substantial the past two decades and the ending intentions. The New Order transformation in Indonesia’s of the military’s dual-function role, government (1966-1998) regarded

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Indonesia’s mostly inward-looking military build-up occurring in several might and assertive policy in the strategic culture has not really countries in the Asia-Pacific region, disputed South China Sea, which changed. For Indonesia, internal funded by their growing economies, is impinges on Indonesia’s exclusive security threats and challenges have also mentioned as a matter of concern economic zone around the Natuna continued to be regarded as the should this lead to an arms race and islands, have raised concerns in more immediate and present danger a security dilemma. Jakarta. The need to manage than external ones. The most recent relations with China, maximising Concomitant with its perennial Indonesian Defence White Paper, the potential benefits and mitigating preoccupation with domestic issued in 2015, distinguished between the attendant risks, is arguably priorities, Indonesia continues real and not-yet real threats. The real the most important driver shaping to emphasise the importance of threats which demand immediate Indonesia’s regional outlook and a peaceful, stable, and conducive attention comprise a wide range of policy initiatives. The second driver external environment as a mostly non-traditional security issues for change is India’s economic rise, prerequisite for its own internal including terrorism and radicalism, its eastward oriented policy, and development. Although it is no separatism and armed rebellions, its growing weight as an Indian longer articulated as frequently as natural disasters, border violations, Ocean power, all of which have made during the New Order, the mutually piracy and theft of natural resources, Indonesia pay more attention to reinforcing concept of national and communicable diseases, cyber- India for both economic and strategic regional resilience, of strengthening attacks and espionage, as well as reasons. Third, the return of great the internal capacity of a country the trafficking and misuse of drugs. power rivalry, in particular the to withstand all manners of shocks Lately, under President Joko Widodo rivalry between the United States on the one hand, and close regional (Jokowi) the military has again been and China, which has the potential cooperation to build mutual trust and allowed to play a more active role to destabilise regional peace and deepen functional ties on the other, in internal security, such as dealing stability, is naturally of great concern has continued to inform Indonesia’s with counterterrorism and natural to Indonesia as well as ASEAN as a regional security outlook. disasters, reflecting the seriousness whole. Fourth, the Asian financial of these two problems for Indonesia Changes in the strategic environment crisis and the emergence of various in the aftermath of several terrorist have nonetheless led to important transnational and non-traditional attacks and major natural disasters. shifts in Indonesia’s regional policy security threats that have affected and the management of relations countries across regions have shown The 2015 Defence White Paper with major powers. Of particular that the wellbeing of Southeast Asia regards armed conflicts or note, has been the shift from seeking cannot be separated from that of its conventional wars between states as to insulate Southeast Asia from neighbouring subregions. Fifth, the among the not-yet real threats and harmful external influences by growing importance of the maritime thus unlikely to affect Indonesia in keeping the major powers at bay, domain, particularly for geostrategic the foreseeable future, though the to one of active engagements of the and geo-economic reasons, has given country still had to be alert to such major powers and widening the more saliency to Indonesia’s position possibilities. There are, however, locus of regional activities, while still as an archipelagic state straddling concerns about the growing threats of ensuring the strategic autonomy the Indian and Pacific oceans. proxy wars that can destroy countries and centrality of ASEAN. There where external forces exacerbate Indonesia’s security outlook and are at least five factors that can be internal divisions and foster civil foreign policy towards the immediate regarded as drivers of this policy wars, as in the case of a number region and beyond can be analysed change. First, the emergence of China of Middle Eastern countries. In from the perspective of its status as a new economic superpower has looking at the Asia-Pacific strategic and role as a middle power. Many transformed Indonesia’s perception environment, the White Paper observers consider Indonesia of this country from an ideological highlighted three areas of concern, as an ascendant middle power, threat to an important economic namely China’s economic and signalled by its return to political partner. The two countries have military policies, the United States’ stability and new credentials as the become comprehensive strategic strategy as the incumbent regional world’s third largest democracy, its partners and China is now power in seeking to cope with China’s renewed economic growth marked Indonesia’s top export destination rise, and the territorial disputes in by its membership in the G20, as and source of investment. At the the South China Sea. In addition, the well as its foreign policy activism. same time, China’s growing military

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June 23, 2019. Opening Ceremony of the 34th ASEAN Summit. This summit endorsed the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific. Credit ASEAN Secretariat / Flickr.

Borrowing from Alexander Wendt’s and emphasise low politics (without challenges in the wider Asia-Pacific characterisation of anarchy (1999), excluding high politics) thereby region mentioned above, Indonesia Tanguy Struye de Swielande (2019) providing more scope for middle was at the forefront in promoting distinguishes three different types power statecraft, such as bridge- the development of a more inclusive of middle powers, Hobbesian, building, cooperation and mediation. regional architecture based on Lockean, and Kantian. According to ASEAN centrality, by widening the From Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Wendt the Hobbesian, Lockean, and membership of the East Asia Summit presidency (2004-2014) to Jokowi’s Kantian anarchies are characterised (EAS) to foster dialogue and ensure first term (2014-2019), Indonesia’s respectively by international a dynamic equilibrium between the regional security outlook has relationships of enmity, rivalry, various major powers. Indonesia also been decidedly Kantian in nature. and friendship. Thus, according to signed strategic partnerships with all Yudhoyono was noted for saying de Swielande, Hobbesian middle of the key regional players, including that Indonesia’s foreign policy was powers view regional structures China, India, the United States, based on the concept of ‘one million and processes as fundamentally Japan and Australia. Ahead of the friends, zero enemies’, and while this anarchic and base their policy on current discourse on the Indo-Pacific, tagline is no longer in use, Jokowi’s power politics, pessimism, security in 2013 Indonesia’s then foreign foreign policy has also been based vigilance, alliances, a narrow minister Marty Natalegawa proposed on the premise that Indonesia does interpretation of national interests, the signing of an Indo-Pacific Treaty not have any external enemies. and the priority of high politics. of Friendship, similar to the ASEAN Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia played Lockean middle powers regard regional code of conduct – the Treaty an active role as a Kantian middle regional structures and processes as of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in power, taking the lead in various less anarchical and their priorities Southeast Asia – to foster peaceful regional initiatives within and are a mix between high and low relations between countries around beyond ASEAN to promote regional politics. Kantian middle powers the inter-linked Pacific and Indian dialogue and cooperation. Faced view the world more positively as oceans. with the many opportunities and disorderly rather than anarchic

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While the Yudhoyono government the possible marginalisation of looked down upon by other countries. harboured grand visions and norm- ASEAN in the face of other Indo- Jokowi has stressed that ministers setting ambitions in dealing with the Pacific initiatives, such as the US must follow and execute the vision wider Indo-Pacific region, Jokowi and Japanese Free and Open Indo- of the president and vice president, has mostly taken a more pragmatic Pacific (FOIP) concepts – propelled not pursue their own individual approach and prioritised economic Jokowi and foreign minister Retno visions. It remains to be seen to diplomacy to obtain concrete Marsudi to push for the acceptance of what extent Prabowo’s more strident economic gains. With his vision of the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific nationalism will colour Indonesia’s making Indonesia into a Global (AOIP) that is open and inclusive. security outlook, particularly in Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), which The AOIP, endorsed by the ASEAN relation to the major powers. At necessitates engaging in major Summit in June 2019, is aimed at his first hearing in parliament as infrastructure projects to improve promoting habits of dialogue and defence minister, Prabowo reiterated connectivity, Jokowi has been cooperation in mostly low politics that Indonesia’s defence strategy eager to attract foreign investment, areas, reflecting Indonesia’s Kantian is based on total people’s war, not including through participating in middle power perspective on Indo- just on its conventional military China’s Belt and Road Initiative Pacific security dynamics. capability which he characterised (BRI) and the China-led Asian as still lagging behind that of other Jokowi’s second term cabinet Infrastructure Investment Bank countries. These comments would was formed in late October 2019 (AIIB). At the same time, the suggest that Probowo is likely to and besides the usual division of Indonesian government has also been reinforce Indonesia’s mainly inward- spoils among the political parties careful to avoid excessive dependence looking strategic culture. that supported him, the cabinet on any one country and to diversify appointments also reflect the its sources of foreign direct government’s preoccupation with investments (FDI). Asian countries internal security challenges, have become the main source of FDI Dewi Fortuna Anwar particularly radicalism and Research Professor, Center for Political to Indonesia, with the top five in separatism. Tito Karnavian resigned Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences the past few years being Singapore, as the chief of police and has been Japan, China, Malaysia and South appointed as home affairs minister, Korea. The US is ranked sixth as a the first time in Indonesian history source of FDI. Around three quarters that a police officer has held such a of Indonesia’s trade (exports and position. Similarly, for the first time imports) is also conducted with Asian since the fall of Suharto, the minister countries. for religious affairs is a retired Indonesia’s thickening economic ties army general. Retno Marsudi has with countries in the Indo-Pacific been retained as foreign minister, region further strengthens its desire signalling continuity in Indonesia’s to see the region remaining peaceful foreign policy stance, particularly and stable. While during the first in respect of a focus on economic few years of his first term, Jokowi diplomacy and a commitment to see prioritised bilateral relations that can the AOIP being more widely accepted yield immediate results, the rising and implemented. The appointment discourse on the Indo-Pacific with of Prabowo Subianto, who has several contending visions prompted twice run against Jokowi for the the Indonesian government again to presidency, as minister of defence, take the lead in promulgating a joint however, has brought a measure ASEAN response and exercising its of uncertainty into Indonesia’s middle power statecraft. Concerns security outlook. In his presidential about the growing polarisation campaign, Probowo displayed a brought about by the US-China rather xenophobic perspective in rivalry – with consequences that castigating Indonesia as a weak included mounting pressures on country highly vulnerable to external other countries to take side and exploitation and intervention, and

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Opportunities amidst the US-China power competition: A renewed engagement of regional stakeholders in mainland Southeast Asia Pongphisoot Busbarat Managing the rise of China has been competition may, on the one hand, strength has been felt across the a significant policy challenge for most result in a situation where countries region in the past two decades, countries in Southeast Asia. As a in the region are forced to choose especially on the mainland subregion. rising power, China has increasingly sides. On the other, such a situation China has become the top trading asserted an active role, especially means that the region has become partner of many Southeast Asian in East Asia. The role of China is more strategically important and economies, especially Thailand, inevitably contesting the United carries more weight in great powers’ Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. States as the region’s major power calculation. It is readily inferred from Although Chinese direct investment that has provided the region with both China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the region remains behind many stability and prosperity since the (BRI) and the US Free and Open traditional investors such as Japan end of the Second World War. The Indo-Pacific (FOIP), that Southeast and the US, it has increased in recent strategic contestation between the Asia is located in the epicentre of years especially in Cambodia, Laos, two major powers has intensified in their geostrategic calculations. While Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV). recent decades, as manifested in the the maritime domain of Southeast As a result of the US-China trade current trade conflict between the two Asia remains the centre of attention war, Chinese firms are also expected countries. due to tensions in the South China to relocate to Southeast Asian Sea between China and Southeast countries especially Vietnam and The US-China power competition in Asian claimant states, continental Thailand. China is pushing its BRI the region has tested many countries Southeast Asia has also witnessed a strategy vigorously in Southeast in the region as to how they can subtle but significant development Asia, especially continental Southeast sustain effective hedging strategies. stemming from this major power Asia. China has designated the China’s economic attractiveness has competition. China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor tested the capacity of Southeast Asian as one of the six economic corridors states even to speak with one voice let China’s recent move in continental within the BRI. Within this corridor, alone act in unison. This intensifying Southeast Asia. China’s economic

July 11, 2019. Bangkok, Thailand. 13th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting. At its conclusion, the Ministers adopted and signed the Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Sustainable Security. Credit VNA.

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Beijing is attempting to consolidate traps, trade imbalance, and excessive whole. The disagreement on the text its leadership by nurturing mini- economic dependence on China. of the joint statement during the lateral cooperation to streamline These potential problems also have 2012 ASEAN Summit in Cambodia infrastructure and development politico-strategic implications. Close regarding China and the South projects under the Lancang-Mekong cooperation with China can drift from China Sea disputes also points to how Cooperation (LMC) body. China has desirable to necessary if domestic China’s influence affected the group’s a prominent presence in this area, political stability is deemed to be at unity. with ongoing major projects such as stake. China’s political and economic Responses from the US. The the Kyaukpau seaport in Myanmar, influence is already preeminent in increasing role of China in Southeast the Kunming-Vientiane highspeed Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Asia has stimulated more engagement railway in Laos, and many investment Beijing’s endorsement of the military on the part of other regional powers. projects in Cambodia. Although coup in Thailand in 2014 supported The region has witnessed renewed some plans were delayed by domestic a significant deepening of relations US interest in the region under its circumstances in partner countries, between the two countries, an effect Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) such as the Thai-Chinese highspeed that continues to this day. The same program. In mainland Southeast railways in Thailand and China- group of Thai military leaders are still Asia, the US has refreshed the Lower backed East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) in power but now modestly disguised Mekong Initiative (LMI) as a foreign in Malaysia, they are now on track. by the general election in March policy tool to reengage with that 2019 as a democratic government. Despite enjoying economic benefits subregion. This can be seen clearly Therefore, mainland Southeast Asia from maintaining good ties with from the remarks by US Secretary of can be viewed as a pro-Beijing bastion China, risks and downsides have State Mike Pompeo during the LMI within ASEAN. This inevitably also been exposed, including debt meeting in August 2019 in Bangkok. and directly affects ASEAN as a

February 12, 2019. Thailand. Cobra Gold Exercise 2019. Soldiers with 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, secure a landing zone with their Royal Thai Army counterparts as Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawks move to the next lift location at Phitsanulok Province. Credit US Army.

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He stressed the US commitment to public impact program as well. In Japan has reframed its commitment play a positive role in the Mekong addition, the US will hold an Indo- to mainland Southeast Asia through region through LMI projects Pacific conference on strengthening the Japan-Mekong Cooperation. The ranging from teaching English, the rule-based governance of ministerial meeting on 3 August 2019 developing clean drinking water, transboundary rivers in December in Bangkok, demonstrated Japan’s improving sanitation, and improving 2019. Collectively, these initiatives intent to align its foreign policy with infrastructure sustainability. are indicative of the importance of the US FOIP program. This was made mainland Southeast Asia to the US particularly clear in the plans for the Pompeo explicitly addressed FOIP program. Mekong subregion outlined in the difficulties associated with China’s Tokyo Strategy 2018. Japan considers dam building, blasting riverbeds, More engagement from other regional that the Mekong region, because it extra-territorial patrolling, and stakeholders. The role of China links the Indian and Pacific oceans, writing new rules to govern the river. and the US in mainland Southeast is ideally situated geographically He announced that the US together Asia has galvanised other regional to benefit from the realisation of a with its partners would roll out a stakeholders to pay more attention FOIP. Japan seeks to support regional number of activities such as allocating to the subregion. Japan is at the connectivity and peace and stability $14 million USD to assist the Mekong forefront of this trend. Although in the subregion. Japan is also countries in combating transnational Japan is not new to the subregion committed to supporting the existing crimes. Together with Japan, it will and has played a significant role in subregional mechanisms especially develop regional electricity grids with its economic development over many the Mekong River Commission (MRC) an initial fund of $29.5 million USD. It decades, the intensifying US-China and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya- will also support a new Mekong water competition has also re-energised Mekong Economic Cooperation data-sharing platform and a new LMI Japan’s interest.

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Strategy (ACMECS) to address issues Japan, South Korea, United States, South China Sea remains unstable of common concerns such as water Australia, China, and India are now and could well deteriorate further. Yet, resource management, climate change Development Partners under the there are many ongoing developments and development priorities. ACMECS and thereby committed to taking place in continental Southeast finding the best model to mobilise Asia that may offer a more optimistic South Korea has indicated that it funds for project execution under the scenario, a scenario characterised by shares this interest in deepening its master development plan. The MRC is deepening cooperation. engagement with Southeast Asia. Its well-placed to take the lead on water ‘New Southern Policy’ (NSP) under The US-China competition in the resource management issues based on President Moon Jae-In has designated region has been instrumental in its decades of experience and expertise Southeast Asia as another major creating an environment where in this field. Although China remains priority in its foreign policy, and views Southeast Asia attracts more attention an observer in the MRC and not the Mekong subregion as a cornerstone from regional stakeholders to further bound by the decisions taken by the within it. Mainland Southeast Asia their engagements. Mainland organisation, its participation as an has become an important part of Southeast Asia is an important area ACMECS Development Partner will, South Korea’s foreign policy primarily in which this phenomenon is evident. at least indirectly, help align China’s for economic reasons. Korean foreign Regional stakeholders, especially objectives with those of the MRC. investment in the subregion is quite the US, Japan, and South Korea, prominent. Seventy per cent of Korean The relative depth of Thailand’s have renewed and deepened their FDI to ASEAN is directed at CLMV economy has allowed it to offer its cooperation alongside that occurring countries. Korea ranks among the top expertise as a hub for technical through existing regional mechanisms. three investors in CLMV countries assistance, education, and training in The developments referred to above accounting for 15% of the FDI inflow collaboration with other traditional are only part of the story. Other to the group. donors. Such collaboration enables significant regional stakeholders Thailand to function as a springboard trying to engage more with the As with Japan, South Korea organises in providing or channelling funds subregion include India through its approach to the subregion under to third countries and offers all its Act East Policy and the Bay of the label Mekong-ROK Cooperation. participants the prospect of making Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Although Korea was previously programs more responsive to needs Technical and Economic Cooperation reluctant to refer to FOIP, it has and accomplishing more with the same (BIMSTEC). recently shown stronger support for it. resources, be they financial, personnel At a US-ROK summit in June 2019, These developments are significant or other. Currently, Thailand’s South Korea declared that it would as they encourage an inclusive and development agency works closely aspire to harmonious cooperation open regionalism that will benefit with several donors, both bilateral between its New Southern Policy/ the region. Even though competition and multilateral, and under the Mekong-ROK Cooperation and the leads to some overlap, the assistance partnership framework of trilateral US FOIP program. In this connection, flowing into the less developed CLMV cooperation such as the Colombo Korea and the US are funding a joint countries will surely narrow the Plan. Donors include Canada, France, project to enhance the effectiveness development gap between the new Hungary, Japan, Korea, Sweden, of satellite imagery in assessing flood and the old members of ASEAN. Singapore, Switzerland, UNDP, and drought patterns in the Mekong Without the assistance of regional UNFPA, and UNICEF. As most of basin. stakeholders, the achievement of the trilateral arrangements target the ASEAN Economic Community Besides the arrangements each the CLMV countries, Thailand’s role plan would have been more difficult. regional stakeholder uses to engage can be seen as a bridge between its Ultimately, a more prosperous ASEAN with mainland Southeast Asia, a own foreign policy objectives, existing will help ensure the wellbeing of its further positive sign is their expressed regional mechanisms and other people, and more dependably underpin support for the existing cooperation regional stakeholders. the peace and stability of the whole mechanisms in the subregion. The Southeast Asia has become a focal region. revitalisation of Thailand’s initiated point of strategic competition between ACMECS as a subregional framework the US and China. Concerns and for streamlining their development worries about this power struggle cooperation in mainland Southeast degenerating into conflict tend to loom Pongphisoot Busbarat, PhD Asia will help ensure the harmony a Fellow in the Institute of Security & large, especially as the situation in the across the separate arrangements. International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

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Mapping Malaysia in the Evolving Indo-Pacific Construct Cheng-Chwee Kuik

July 31, 2019. ADMM Plus, Kuala Lumpur. EWG participants on the HADR Exercise 2019 received a brief visit from Malaysian Defence Ministry Secretary- General Datuk Seri Mohd Zuki bin Ali. Credit Malaysia Military Times.

Malaysia appears to be absent from it, captures not only the smaller state’s given the country’s decades-long the regional discourse on the ‘Indo- deeper vigilance towards the growing activism on regional affairs especially Pacific’, a construct that is reshaping great power competition but also its during the Mahathir 1.0 years from the Asia-Pacific affairs and regional ongoing fluid, fragile, and uncertain 1981-2003 (e.g. promoting EAEG order. At a time when powers near political transition at home. Malaysia and later APT, as others pushed for and far are placing greater attention went through an unprecedented APEC), one would expect Putrajaya on Southeast Asia – a battleground for change of government in May 2018, under Mahathir 2.0 to take an the discourse – Malaysian leaders and when the Mahathir-led Pakatan active and open stance on important officials have largely been silent on the Harapan (PH) coalition pulled off a regional ideas such as the Indo- issue. While Malaysia joined fellow surprising electoral victory, defeating Pacific. Moreover, given the country’s member states of the Association of Najib Razak’s Barisan Nasional geographical centrality – Malaysia is Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in (BN) coalition and ending the United a converging point between the Indian adopting the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Malays National Organisation Ocean and the Pacific Ocean – one Indo-Pacific’ in June 2019, it did not (UMNO) 61-year of stranglehold on would expect Malaysia to leverage on issue any statement that explicitly power over the country. the emerging geostrategic construct refers to the Indo-Pacific. The Foreign to extend, diversify, and multiply its Malaysia’s relative silence on the Ministry’s Foreign Policy Framework developmental and strategic links to Indo-Pacific is puzzling to some of the New Malaysia: Change in the wider world across the two vast analysts in and out of the country. Continuity, a document officially ocean regions. Given its sovereignty claims over the launched by Prime Minister Mahathir South China Sea, one would expect Some observers attribute Malaysia’s Mohamad in September 2019, made the smaller state to embrace the silence on the Indo-Pacific to the PH no reference to the term. Indo-Pacific because of the concepts government’s domestic preoccupation Unpacking Malaysia’s quiet stance on associated goals of upholding a rules- and internal power struggle. Some the Indo-Pacific is key to reflecting its based order, ensuring freedom of blame it on bureaucratic inertia. security outlook for 2020 and beyond. navigation, and preserving a stable Yet others describe the silence as This is because the response, or lack of regional balance of power. In addition, a deliberate strategic choice on the

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external construct it is an emerging reality that is of increasing relevance and significance to all ASEAN members. Proponents of the latter go further by suggesting that the Indo-Pacific should be conceived of as a modern term with local historical roots, including Malaysia’s pre- modern history. Some trace this root as far back as the Malacca Sultanate in the 15th century, when the Malacca entrepot, halfway between the major international sea route, attracted traders from Arabia, Africa, Persia, Europe, and India along the present- day Indian Ocean as well as those from China in the present-day Pacific Ocean. Third, on potential implications, different opinions have been September 30, 2019. Celebes Sea. Exercise Tiger Strike. Captain Michael Harris, commanding officer USS Green Bay (LPD 20), Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) Lt. Gen. Dato’ Wira Zambrose bin Mohd expressed over whether and to what Zain, Army Field Eastern Commander, Rear Adm. Fred Kacher, commander of Expeditionary Strike extent the Indo-Pacific construct Group 7, and Lt. Col. William Jacobs, commander of troops, 3rd Marine Division. Credit USN Anaid will present a challenge and/or an Banuelos Rodriguez, Flickr. opportunity to Malaysia and the part of the weaker state to distance First, on terminology, some insist region. While some are concerned itself from the perceived dangers on the continued use of the term about its possible impacts on ASEAN of mounting great power rivalry. ‘Asia-Pacific’, whereas others centrality and big power entrapment Like the majority of Southeast prefer a selective usage of ‘Indo- others are more optimistic. The latter Asian countries, Malaysia views Pacific’ depending on the contexts argues that, by now, it is clear that it as unnecessary and undesirable (e.g. referring to Indo-Pacific as a the Indo-Pacific discourse – both to adopt a high-profile position geographical term, but avoid it when the Quad and the ASEAN versions on the Indo-Pacific, an externally the intent is to refer to a geopolitical – is becoming a reality that adds constructed term that might affect strategy; embracing ASEAN Outlook layers of dynamics to the Asia- ASEAN centrality and undermine its on the Indo-Pacific but staying distant Pacific security landscape. In light inclusivity norm. An open and rigid from the Quad’s version of the Indo- of this development Malaysia should position is deemed unwise because it Pacific ‘strategies’). At the same time, leverage the Indo-Pacific trend, so will increase the risks of entrapping some advocate the use of ‘Asia-Pacific- long as it is developed along the the nation and the region into big- Indo’ or ‘Pacific-Indo’ over ‘Indo- parameters of the ASEAN Outlook, power conflict as the US-China Pacific’, on the grounds that Asia- which stresses ASEAN’s inclusivity rivalry grows. Pacific has been and will continue principle, the group’s centrality to be a more important area than in regional cooperation, and its Despite the official silence there the Indian Ocean to Malaysia. The commitment to be an honest broker have been debates and discussions United States, China, Japan, Korea, vis-à-vis competing interests and among policy and research circles and nearly all ASEAN members are powers. Some have advocated that about the meanings, drivers, and in the Pacific region. Malaysia act as a ‘bridge’, or ‘gateway’ possible directions of the Indo-Pacific. between the two Ocean regions, for These discussions, however loose and Second, along the outside-in and the concurrent pursuits of regional at cross-purposes, have gradually inside-out dimensions, one school of stability, security, and national formed the still-mixed opinions of how thought holds that Indo-Pacific is an development over the long run. best to place Malaysia on the map external term invented by outside of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct. The powers for their own interests, Three rationales emerge in debates revolve around three issues: whereas another school emphasises highlighting Malaysia’s potential to that even though the term is an play such a role. They are Malaysia’s

46 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 geography, its longstanding regional After all, Southeast Asia is at Southeast Asia as well as wider East activism, and the multi-ethnic the centre of the Indo-Pacific and Asia, multilaterally, minilaterally, country’s domestic and developmental Malaysia the centre of Southeast and bilaterally. needs in an increasingly uncertain Asia. As a country with two separate For some, it is these past innovative environment. territories – the Peninsular Malaysia initiatives and cumulative activism at on the eastern edge of the Indian The first rationale is based on the the regional and sub-regional levels Ocean as well as Sabah and Sarawak nation’s strategic location and that form the second rationale for on the western edge of the Pacific geographical circumstances. Not Malaysia’s potential role as a bridge Ocean – the country sits in the only that Malaysia is a bridging link or gateway between the Asia-Pacific middle of the two most dynamic ocean between the Indian and the Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. regions of the contemporary world. Oceans, it is also the connecting This horizontal centrality is further This envisaged (and resurrected) land between mainland Eurasia and enhanced by Malaysia’s vertical role connects the nation’s past (the maritime Southeast Asia, a region convergence. Malaysia is a maritime Malacca Sultanate’s unique inter- endowed with rich and diverse nation with continental roots. It regional centrality) with its present resources. Geography and resources is uniquely situated between the and future. During the Cold War, are both a blessing and a curse, Asian continent to the north and its Malaysia played an instrumental regardless of the country’s own maritime neighbours to the south. role in promoting the earliest form preferences. These were among the of Southeast Asian regionalism, reasons that attracted the wave of Malaysia’s self-perception of i.e. the Association of Southeast European colonisation and Japanese geographical centrality is not new. Asia (ASA) and the Malaysia- occupation in the past. Big-power Back in July 1965, two years after Philippines-Indonesia (Maphilindo). politics will continue to manifest the formation of Malaysia (and Although the two groupings were in the 21st century. These include eight years after the independence short-lived, they set the stage China’s militarisation in the South of Malaya), the new nation’s first for the establishment of ASEAN China Sea versus the US Freedom prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1967 as the non-communist of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) published an article in Foreign Southeast Asian states sought and the Quad members’ respective Affairs titled ‘Malaysia: Key Area in post-Konfrontasi reconciliation. Indo-Pacific strategies, China’s Belt Southeast Asia’, noting that Malaysia Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman, and Road Initiative (BRI) versus is the only country that is both part of the then acting foreign minister, Japan’s Partnership for Quality mainland Asia and at the same time envisaged in 1966 a ‘regional Infrastructure (PQI), and other part of the vast archipelago stretching association’ embracing all Southeast likeminded countries’ respective westward from the Philippines Asian nations. Subsequently, in connectivity schemes. Each of these and New Guinea to Sumatra. Thus the wake of the declared intention dynamics affects Malaysia’s present Malaysia is not only a bridge between of the Western powers to reduce and future interests just as directly continental and island Asia but also their commitment in Southeast as does regional tranquillity and the gateway between the China Sea Asia, deputy prime minister Tun order. However, the current century and the Indian Ocean. By virtue Razak and Dr. Ismail proposed is also an era of interdependence of this position Malaysia is of vital the idea of the ‘neutralisation of and connectivity-building. Together, importance to both Southeast Asia Southeast Asia’. The idea eventually these present both challenges and and the world. resulted in the fundamental shift in opportunities to smaller states like Geography, accordingly, has been a Malaysia’s external strategy from Malaysia provided that strategic prime basis for Malaysia’s security alliance to non-alignment, after diversification (rather than outlook and regional activism. Tun Razak assumed leadership in dependency) and power competition Working with neighbours from 1970. It also led to Malaysia-China (rather than conflict) are the order of Southeast Asia and beyond, Malaysia normalisation in 1974, paving way the day. under successive leaderships has for the other ASEAN member states Leveraging on Malaysia’s actively initiated and institutionalised to establish relations with China geographical centrality for wider a number of regional proposals across one after another over the period connectivity-building is therefore seen diplomatic, development, and defence 1975-1991. These policy directions as a backbone of the nation’s response domains. Over time, these initiatives were continued by Razak’s successors to the Indo-Pacific construct. have shaped the institution-building Tun Hussein Onn (1976-1981) and and community-building processes in Mahathir, who worked with their

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ASEAN counterparts in advancing Abdullah Ahmad Bawadi (2003- Speaking at a closed-door forum national and regional interests in 2009) and Najib Razak (2009-2018). at the Center for Strategic and the face of the rapidly changing Abdullah proposed in 2004 to host International Studies (CSIS) in developments in Indochina and in the inaugural East Asia Summit Washington, DC in September 2019, great power relations. (EAS). The proposal materialised the Home Minister Muhyiddin Yassin in 2005, when 16 countries (the 13 envisaged Malaysia playing a primary During the post-Cold War era, member countries of APT plus India, role in bridging the Pacific and the Mahathir promoted initiatives that Australia, and New Zealand) gathered Indian Ocean regions. Such a role leveraged Malaysia’s geographical in Kuala Lumpur to kick start the would involve building partnerships centrality, bridging regions EAS, an ASEAN-led mechanism that with countries in the two regions to (including sub-regions), building expanded to include the United States spur domestic, regional, and global shared interests (and communities), and Russia in 2010. economic growth, and binding these and binding countries together nations through institutions that in institutionalised settings. The Of course, the institutionalisation of promote shared prosperity, shared ASEAN Plus Three (APT) informal each of these institutions (including security, and shared identity. The summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, the creation of the ASEAN Defence minister stressed that for global which replaced the unsuccessful East Ministers Meeting [ADMM] in 2006) peace and security to be sustained, Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG, were the results of multi-player and all nations had to acknowledge the later renamed East Asian Economic multi-sector dynamics, however, importance of protecting the security Caucus, EAEC) proposal, has been Malaysia’s activism – aided by of their neighbours and partners. institutionalised as an ASEAN-led its geographical centrality – has mechanism that serves to bridge been instrumental and arguably Malaysia’s upcoming inaugural Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. catalytic. The same can be said for Defence White Paper describes the It enabled the countries from both ASEAN-minus mechanisms in the nation as a bridging linchpin between sub-regions to forge collective action development and security arenas. the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean to weather the East Asian financial Examples include the 1993 Indonesia- regions. Such a role underscores crisis, deepening interdependence, Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle three core messages: (a) the principles and reshaping the discourse of ‘East (IMT-GT); the 2004 Eyes in the Sky of non-alignment (Malaysia is not Asia’ (once understood as Northeast (EiS) initiative that expanded into siding with any power); (b) inclusive Asia) to encompass both Northeast the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP); cooperation (Malaysia is open to and Southeast Asia. Mahathir’s and the 2016 Trilateral Cooperative collaborate with any country on 1995 proposals for the Singapore- Arrangement (TCA). MSP and the basis of realistic objectives and Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) and the TCA are both minilateral security mutual benefit); and (c)shared ASEAN Mekong Basin Development processes, on the edge of the Indian security (security is sustainable only Cooperation (AMBDC) bridge the and Pacific oceans respectively. when security is shared, where the maritime Southeast Asian nations interests of nations are integrated All of the abovementioned initiatives, of Malaysia and Singapore with all through interdependence and once regularised and institutionalised, mainland Southeast Asian countries identity-building). serve to bridge, build, and bind, and China, via building missing links adding layers of cooperation to the and double-tracking railways with regional architecture. These, in turn, an eye to develop a Pan-Asian rail have generated cumulative dividends network that binds regional countries Cheng-Chwee Kuik for regional stability, security, and Associate Professor and Head, Centre for together. The annual SKRL Special national development. Asian Studies, Institute of Malaysian Working Group (SWG) meeting, and International Studies, National created in 1996, served to promote This is where the third rationale lies, University of Malaysia (UKM) rail connectivity among seven ASEAN leveraging Malaysia’s geographical countries and China long before the centrality and regional activism for term ‘connectivity’ entered into the wider connectivity-building between lexicon of regional cooperation. the two dynamic ocean regions and, simultaneously promoting the Malaysia’s activism in bridging multi-ethnic country’s domestic and cooperation among countries across developmental needs, especially in an different regions was continued environment of mounting uncertainty. by Mahathir’s successors Tun

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Singapore: The blessedness of (not) making choices William Choong Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2019, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong called on China and the United States to reach a strategic accommodation amid their festering dispute over trade, technology and other issues. If the trade disputes are negotiated purely on their own merits, the two sides’ negotiators would be able to September 26, 2019. Changi Naval Base, Singapore. US Navy Sailors and representatives of ASEAN member state maritime forces during the maritime exercise. Credit US Indo-Pacific Command / Flickr. resolve the impasse. If either side decides to use trade rules to ‘keep Things Fall Apart. The strategic established power, did not try to the other down,’ and the other side conundrum mapped out by Mr Lee pre-empt Japan in 1904. America did concludes that this is being done, the underscores a deeper malaise in the not strike out at rising Japan in 1941; consequences will be ‘very grave,’ said Asia-Pacific. To paraphrase W.B. neither France, Russia nor England Mr Lee. Yeats, the regional order is falling against Germany in the 1930s. While there is no ‘strategic apart. As Gideon Rachman, the Continuous Contestation. The inevitability’ about a Sino-US Financial Times columnist, put it, low likelihood of a contemporary confrontation, such a face-off would be America’s military pre-eminence and Thucydides Trap, however, does ‘nothing like the Cold War,’ he added. diplomatic predictability can no longer not mean that there would not be The crux of the Sino-US problem was be taken as a given; at the same time, continuous contestation between the lack of strategic trust; he called on China is no longer willing to accept a China and the United States. One of both sides to reach an accommodation, secondary role in the region’s evolving the roots of the contestation arises and at the same time, to get their security system. from the fact that Washington domestic publics to accept it. The US, The ructions in the Sino-US refuses to cede primacy. Indeed, the Mr Lee stressed, needed to forge a relationship have led some to predict new-fangled ‘free and open’ Indo- ‘new understanding’ that will integrate that there would be a contemporary Pacific strategy – with the enshrined China’s aspirations within the ‘current replay of the Thucydides Trap, principles of freedom of navigation, system of rules and norms.’ Both whereby an upstart Athens was pre- respect for international law and would need to work together to revise empted by the resident power, Sparta. maritime security – is seen by many the world system. as a euphemism for maintaining the Historical analogies are difficult to The keynote by the Singapore premier US-led regional order. apply. To begin with, historians such was widely followed around the as Arthur Waldron argue that no such China is not working to upend the world, given the nature of the Sino- trap exists in the Greek text of the US-led system, which has worked to US impasse, and the need for smaller History of the Peloponnesian War. its benefit, in particular in the areas countries to adapt and evolve their For Sparta, pre-emption would have of liberalisation of trade and global policies amid the growing schism been an alien concept, but war was supply chains. One assessment is between China and the United States. not. When Athenians forced their that China’s proposal of an ‘Asia for Singapore’s policy position is also hand, Spartans ended up victorious. Asians’ formulation is an indirect way worth watching, given that the island In addition, the more contemporary of keeping the United States out of republic is a major strategic partner of historical record does not attest the region. Put differently, China’s the United States and a close economic to status quo powers challenging strategy is to weaken US alliances, partner of China. emerging powers. Russia, a long- erode American centrality in China’s

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better terms for projects, and in rare instances, termination. China has also managed to gain leverage over ASEAN via what one scholar terms as a strategy of coercion- inducement. This has accentuated the power gap between China and ASEAN, and undermined Southeast Asian states’ confidence in the grouping. May 31, 2019. IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. US Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan hosts According to Huong Le Thu, China’s a multi-lateral meeting with Asian nations: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the coercive behaviour hews to Thomas Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Credit US DoD photo by Lisa Ferdinando. Schelling’s observation that the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, periphery and eventually create a new Despite America’s heavy involvement can induce compliant behaviour. regional order with China at the core. in the region, the Trump Administration’s approach to the China’s positioning of the HYSY- One major focus of the contestation is region – in particular, its withdrawal 981 oil rig 120 nautical miles off ASEAN. The 10-nation grouping has from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Vietnam’s coast in May 2014 created the world’s third-largest population and emphasis on bilateral trade deals a tangible threat of escalation to open (650 million) and a GDP of $2.8 at the expense of multilateral ones – confrontation and constituted the trillion, making it the world’s fifth- has not inspired confidence. And while worst crisis since Beijing’s occupation largest economy. ASEAN is also Washington has trotted out a $113 of Mischief Reef in 1995. During the behind a long list of multilateral million connectivity initiative, the incident, however, ASEAN largely entities that are critical to stability challenge would be helping American remained reserved and referred to it in the Indo-Pacific, including the businesses identify bankable projects as a ‘current development in the South ASEAN Regional Forum, the East and facilitating joint ventures between China Sea.’ Similarly, at the 50th Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence American companies and their ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) Plus. regional counterparts. 2017, Southeast Asian leaders resisted To its credit, the US has courted highlighting China’s militarisation of ASEAN assiduously as an economic While the military and security artificial islands in the South China and strategic partner. The grouping dimensions of the China-ASEAN Sea, despite their impact on regional ranks fourth, after Canada, Mexico relationship are still relatively stability. and China as a goods export market underdeveloped, China has been for the US, and ranks as the top quite successful at enveloping The blessedness of (not) making a destination for American investment ASEAN into its economic sphere of choice. China’s growing economic in the Indo-Pacific. According to a influence. Bilateral trade hit $600 prowess and its astute blend of report by the East-West Center, billion in 2018, and in the first half coercion and inducement has led to ASEAN has to date received $329 of 2019 China became ASEAN’s many smaller countries in the Indo- billion in American investment – more second-biggest trading partner Pacific to avoid stark choices in the than US investment in China, India, overtaking the US for the first time ensuing geopolitical joust between Japan and South Korea combined. since 1997. There is a China-ASEAN China and the United States. In Given ASEAN’s strategic geographical free trade agreement, and both essence, individual countries in position between the Indian Ocean sides are working on concluding the ASEAN have adopted an equidistant and the Pacific Ocean, the US has also Regional Comprehensive Economic position between the US and China. engaged ASEAN in the military and Partnership, which includes another Not surprisingly, ASEAN has shunned security arenas. The US is part of all six countries. While Beijing’s Belt and endorsing the US-led FOIP strategy the above multilateral processes and Road Initiative has been criticised in its entirety; rather, the grouping has worked with ASEAN countries as a ‘debt trap,’ a recent study by the has noted that its approach to the to boost their maritime security International Institute of Strategic Indo-Pacific would be inclusive and capabilities via the Southeast Asia Studies showed that Southeast Asian not aimed at any particular power (it Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative countries have generally responded is quite clear that the US-led FOIP and the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security to the BRI in a cautious but positive has an element of balancing the Initiative. manner, with responses ranging from rise of China). President Jokowi of agreeing to some projects to seeking Indonesia has stressed that ASEAN’s

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Indo-Pacific concept should turn influence of foreign (in particular, were partners in the Trans Pacific ‘potential threats into cooperation,’ and Chinese) actors in domestic politics, Partnership (until Trump withdrew ‘potential conflict into peace.’ In this and Australian naval vessels were the US from the pact). Singapore-US sense, ASEAN, as it has always been, challenged by Chinese ships in the ties are so close, that one US official remains strategically non-aligned South China Sea in April 2019. The noted that the Philippines, a formal in the ensuing competition between same applies to Japan, which has US ally, acts more like a partner, China and the United States. leveraged the FOIP strategy to balance while Singapore is a partner that acts the rise of China. Yet, Japan has like an ally. At the same time, Sino- The limited nature of the US-ASEAN sought to work with China on regional Singapore relations have never been maritime exercise conducted in infrastructure projects under the Belt better. Singapore is China’s top foreign September 2019 is no surprise and and Road Initiative. investor, a firm supporter of the Asian simply highlights the grouping’s Infrastructure Investment Bank inclination to avoid sending the wrong Singapore and the narrowing plank. and of the Belt and Road Initiative. signals to Beijing about Southeast The festering geopolitical competition The two governments have formed Asian countries joining a US-led between China and the US has only partnerships to develop three projects China-containment arrangement. increased the pressure on Singapore in China: Suzhou Industrial Park, the Collin Koh, writing in the South China to ‘choose a side.’ As founding prime Chongqing Connectivity Initiative and Morning Post, said that the US- minister Lee Kuan Yew used to say, Tianjin Eco-city. ASEAN maritime exercise underscored when elephants fight, the grass is ASEANs tendency toward inclusivity trampled; yet, when the pachyderms Unsurprisingly, Singapore does in any major power engagement. The make love, the grass also tends to not want to be caught in any inclination to have one’s cake and eat suffer. In fact, Singapore’s current countervailing coalition, led by the US it at the same time – that is, depend inclination not to take sides between or otherwise, against China. Speaking on the United States for security the two major powers has a long to the Washington Post in September guarantees, and on China for economic history. Speaking to the Asahi 2019, Mr Lee Hsien Loong noted that growth – has been replicated by other Shimbun in 2010, Mr Lee Kuan Yew US allies and partners are so ‘deeply regional countries as well. Essentially, said Singapore had never sought to enmeshed’ with China that forcing many of them have sought to avoid conscribe (zhiheng) China. Rather, them to dissociate from Beijing would stark choices by holding on to a double Singapore sought to effect a balance be a ‘challenging strategic stance to hedge. They hedge against China’s (pingheng) in the Pacific, based on make’. rise by seeking American guarantees. the presence of American power. This does not mean that Singapore But they also hedge against American To paraphrase Lord Palmerston, can avoid making a choice indefinitely. decline or withdrawal by seeking Singapore does not deem itself to have The renewal of the 1990 Singapore-US Chinese economic opportunities. permanent friends in the US and MOU could lead to China asking for China; it only pursues pro-US and pro- Speaking in January 2019, formal access to Singapore facilities by China policies when such policies are Christopher Pyne, then defence Chinese warships. In a Taiwan Strait judged to be in the republic’s interests. minister of Australia, highlighted contingency, Singapore might be asked Australia’s role as being able to talk In 1978, the US Navy used Tengah by the US to provide resupply and to both China and the US ‘openly and Airbase for long-range flights over the access to US naval ships going from frankly.’ Said Mr Pyne: ‘We regard Indian Ocean. After the US military the Persian Gulf toward the Strait. the US as our closest ally in the world, was booted out of Philippine bases This would put the Republic in a but we don’t believe we need to choose in the early 1990s, Singapore offered quandary. As a US Navy admiral has between security (US) and prosperity the US access to naval facilities described it more vividly – Singapore (China) … sovereignty and prosperity at Changi Naval Base – a direct is walking on a narrowing tightrope don’t need to be linked in terms of their recognition that that the US military between the two powers. In the relationship with the great powers presence is beneficial for regional meantime, however, kicking the can in the region.’ The double hedge is stability. In September 2019, the down the road makes strategic sense. evident in Australia’s approach to US and Singapore renewed a 1990 China. China is Canberra’s top trading memorandum of understanding which partner and major destination for allows US military aircraft and naval Australian exports of iron ore and vessels to use facilities on the island. William Choong Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow in coal. Yet Australia has not shied away The two countries signed a landmark Asia-Pacific Security at the International from passing legislation to limit the free trade agreement in 2003 and Institute for Strategic Studies

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Maritime security woes haunt the Philippines, but no pivot redux Aileen San Pablo Baviera Three years or midway into the ASEAN and China also continued Not only were Chinese actions not Duterte administration’s term of to work towards the conclusion of being restrained by the ongoing office, both internal and external a regional code of conduct, making diplomacy or international legal security concerns remained incremental progress on a single draft decisions, it appeared that in prominent in the consciousness of negotiating text. the context of a spiralling power Philippine officials and security competition with the United States However, the incontrovertible facts experts. Regional security anxiety (fuelled by trade and technology remain: China has permanently was particularly acute with respect to wars), and domestic power politics in impacted the geophysical as well the immediate surrounding maritime China (where Xi Jinping is driving a as the security environment in areas of the Philippines: the disputed deepening of centralised CCP control Southeast Asia through its massive land features and waters of the of his Party-state), the Chinese were island construction and ensuing South China Sea to the west, and the becoming increasingly nationalistic, military build-up on some of these Sulu-Celebes Sea to the south and ambitious and assertive. Thus, both artificial islands since 2014. It southwest of the country. the BCM and the ASEAN-China maintains a constant presence near negotiations which were intended In relation to the South China areas occupied by other claimant- to be proactive agenda-setters in Sea where the main concern for states, mobilising both civilian shaping new directions for relations the Philippines has been China’s and military vessels in assertions with China, may now run the expansive claim, developments in of sovereignty and effectively risk of achieving little more than the last year point to potentially preventing some countries (not only legitimising a new status quo in even greater difficulty in the future the Philippines but also Vietnam and Southeast Asia that allows China’s management of this longstanding Malaysia) from undertaking resource recent past behaviour to essentially issue. On the positive side, Manila exploitation in the disputed areas. go uncontested. and Beijing have regularly convened China also continued to reject the a bilateral consultative mechanism 2016 PCA arbitration ruling that In the Philippines, developments (BCM) that is exclusively intended determined many of its actions to be in 2019 led to a more serious for dialogue and consultation on illegal infringements of Philippine rethinking of the merits of President issues arising from the SCS disputes. maritime rights under UNCLOS. Rodrigo Duterte’s ‘pivot to China’,

52 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 even within the administration. Throughout the year, there were However, even if Chinese enthusiasm The most pronounced among these also frequent reports of Chinese for infrastructure cooperation may developments was an incident in June vessels navigating through and have been dampened by domestic where a Chinese vessel collided with in Philippine waters, including economic woes aggravated by the and destroyed an anchored Philippine several warships and the Liaoning trade war with the US and a visible fishing boat, tossing 22 fishermen (China’s aircraft carrier) passing slowdown in the roll-out of the into the sea then leaving them to through Sibutu and Balabac straits Belt and Road Initiative, Manila their fate (luckily, a Vietnamese in southern Philippines, where the remained hopeful that Duterte’s boat came to the rescue). This led to Sulu and Celebes Seas intersect. Also gamble would pay off, at least for the a spike in anti-China public opinion reported were Chinese surveys being Philippine economy. While individual that the government in Manila could conducted within the Philippine EEZ security and foreign affairs officials not ignore. The owner of the Chinese without prior notification; the Chinese and experts publicly criticised vessel subsequently apologised and coast guard blocking a resupply China, the top economic leaders some compensation was offered by a mission to the Philippine navy and the president himself remained local fishing association in China, but outpost on Second Thomas Shoal; and deferential in tone towards China and these did not come until some months a series of incidents (denounced as upbeat about the relationship. later in the run-up to Duterte’s ‘illegal’ by the Philippines) in which On the security front, however, planned visit to China, when the about 600 ships swarmed Philippine- Manila was not taking any chances. Chinese government attempted to held Pag-Asa island (Thitu) and ease the tensions. nearby Sandy Cay over a three Major moves towards defence month period. Even as these practices modernisation and capability building ratcheted tensions, talks with China under Horizon 2 of the Armed Forces on joint development of oil and gas modernisation program (covering the resources in the contested Reed Bank years 2018-2023) in fact indicate a proceeded apace and, as ASEAN’s changing mindset in Manila; there is current country coordinator for now a seriousness and urgency that dialogue with China, the Philippines was not there before. Horizon 2 aims reflected the importance ASEAN May 14, 2019. South China Sea. The US to acquire more equipment specifically Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf (WMSL 750), attached to the early conclusion of the for external defence. Although left, moves in formation with the Philippine ASEAN-China Code of Conduct in the threats to territorial integrity and Coast Guard vessels Batangas, centre, and South China Sea. Kalanggaman during an exercise. Credit US criminality were the justifications cited for modernisation, there was Pacific Fleet / Flickr. In stark contrast to China’s energetic also cognisance that ‘the rise of new political-security posturing in the powers and the relative decline of the Philippines’ neighbourhood, and old’ was causing geopolitical shifts despite frequent high-level official and producing challenges to global exchanges, China’s support for the order, according to one Presidential Philippines’ ambitious infrastructure speech. development program, branded as ‘Build Build Build!’, made very Consistent with Duterte’s move slow progress and seemed to have toward an ‘independent foreign little impact on relations thus far. policy’ and diversification of security Questions therefore arose in the partners, new defence cooperation public mind about whether the agreements are being signed or much-touted rewards from closer explored. These include agreements economic ties with China would, with Russia on naval cooperation, indeed, be forthcoming and whether nuclear energy, and Russian support the Philippine move to downplay the for light firearms manufacturing in arbitration ruling in exchange for the Philippines; purchases of radars, Chinese loans and investments had anti-tank weapons and UAVs from been worth the enormous political Israel; and an information sharing cost. agreement on non-military shipping between the Indian Navy and the

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Philippine Coast Guard, among would trigger activation of the Mutual numbers of people originally from others. An inaugural Philippines- Defense Treaty. Mindanao who have settled in Sabah Japan Defence Industry Forum was or North Borneo since the 1960s, Duterte remained vocal and resentful also held in 2019. The Philippines but also in the Lahad Datu invasion of US and other countries’ criticism declared support for the amendment by Sulu sultanate loyalists in 2013, of his human rights record pertaining of Japan’s Self Defense Forces Act and the more recent spate of kidnap- to the war on drugs. Interestingly, that will allow Japan to export for-ransom activities by the Abu however, during a visit to Russia he defence equipment, and Japan has Sayyaf and related groups victimising called the United States ‘a close friend started turning over excess defence Malaysian, Indonesian and even of the Philippines’. He likewise used equipment to the Philippines, albeit Vietnamese nationals. the occasion of his Russia visit to only spare parts for Huey helicopters affirm that the Philippines continued But the reverse is also true. The thus far. to uphold the values of freedom and defeat of Islamic State/Daesh in the Aside from new cooperation liberalism, signalling that this visit to Middle East resulted in a spike in agreements and procurement Russia did not at all signify a break extremist influence and activity in talks, the Philippines continued to from the West. This was in sharp Southeast Asia. Some fighters are strengthen training cooperation with contrast to his first visit to China in feared to have returned to Indonesia, traditional partners. Recent exercises 2016 when he signalled the ‘pivot to Malaysia and Singapore, while with the US include air defence and China’ by announcing a ‘separation’ others sought to continue their ground threat reaction training, from the United States. On the trade jihadist struggle for a caliphate in combined maritime operation war between China and the United places where governance has been exercises were held in the Sulu Sea States, Duterte explained at the traditionally weak, including in with Australia, and multilateral ASEAN Summit in Thailand that Muslim Mindanao. The five-month amphibious landing exercises were the Philippines was not taking sides. siege of the city of Marawi in 2017, conducted with both Japan and the The independent foreign policy stance led by the local ISIS-affiliated Maute US. was becoming less about a pivot to group, demonstrated the fragile China and more about diversification conditions in southern Philippines, Concerns about the credibility of partnerships while strengthening as well as the capacity of extremists of US defence commitments, defence capabilities in anticipation of to wage urban warfare. Long steeped even to longstanding allies like continuing maritime security threats in counter-insurgency strategies the Philippines, continued to be and challenges. waged in the Philippine countryside, expressed. Defense Secretary Delfin the Armed Forces of the Philippines Lorenzana called for a review of The other major regional security now faces the challenge of building the decades-old Mutual Defense concern from a Philippine perspective the capacity to cope with armed Treaty, saying that the vagueness is the spread of terrorism and violent conflict in major population centres, of the treaty provisions could cause extremism. Domestically, peace with and working with like-minded ‘confusion and chaos during a crisis’. the Moro Islamic Liberation Front states to break up the regional and He was especially concerned about (MILF) in Muslim Mindanao seems transnational criminal networks that how the treaty will cope with China’s to have been finally brought within feed violent extremism. so-called grey zone tactics. reach through the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. Counter-terrorism cooperation Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Of course, the government still faces between the Philippines, Malaysia Locsin Jr. resisted these calls to immense governance challenges and Indonesia has a long history but review the agreement between Manila before it can ensure sustainable more recently, in 2016, it acquired and Washington. ‘In vagueness lies development and dependable security a strong maritime dimension with uncertainty — a deterrent. Specificity for this conflict-torn region. the implementation of the Trilateral invites evasion and actions outside Cooperative Arrangement (TCA). the MDT framework,’ Locsin argued. One lesson the Philippines can draw TCA allows the three countries The debate was not resolved but from past experience is that failure to conduct intelligence sharing, was somewhat mitigated by US to contain conflict within one’s own coordinated maritime patrols, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s borders creates spill over tensions joint air missions over an area of public reiteration in Manila of US and vulnerabilities in the country’s common interest in the Sulu and assurances that any armed attack on relations with neighbouring states. Celebes (Sulawesi) Seas. A drastic Filipino forces in the South China Sea This is evident not only in the huge decline in Abu Sayyaf kidnapping

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April 5, 2019. South China Sea. Exercise Balikatan. USS Wasp (LHD 1), manoeuvres alongside the Philippine navy landing platform dock ship BRPTarlac (LD 601) and offshore patrol vessel BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PS 16). US Navy photo Daniel Barker / Flickr. incidents followed the signing of the On each of these fronts, cooperation is Aileen San Pablo Baviera agreement, mainly attributable not needed to preserve regional security Professor, University of the Philippines to the agreement per se but to more and stability. ASEAN, with its & President, Asia Pacific Pathways to effective control and prevention extended cooperation arrangements, Progress of border movements unilaterally potentially remains a major platform imposed by Philippine and Malaysian for the management of these security authorities in their respective areas challenges. The Duterte government’s of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the promotion of a more diversified and scourge of terrorism can only be omni-directional foreign policy – defeated through cooperation with including preservation of traditional neighbouring countries as well as alliances – may be exactly what is other external actors who share this needed to foster the agility that the major global concern. huge uncertainties in the external environment seem to demand. In sum, like many other countries Ultimately, however, the only reliable in the region and the world, the guarantee – whether of foreign policy Philippines is having to adjust autonomy, territorial integrity, or to the new geopolitical realities security against external armed of an assertive China, escalating threats and internal destabilising contestation between the two biggest forces – is a government that takes powers (and the country’s major the development of its defence and economic and security partners); security capabilities seriously. and the still significant and evolving threat from violent extremist groups.

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Trends and Trenches in the Indo-Pacific: A Southeast Asian View Le Dinh Tinh The expanding competition between the two greatest economies on earth has reached level four of intensity. The two sides repeatedly say they are neither enemies nor adversaries. On the one hand, they no longer see each other as partners as they did in the Obama years. On the other, the term ‘rivalry’ means that, although competition now outweighs cooperation, compromise is by no means completely ruled out. The reason for possible (and desirable) cooperation is quite simple: common interests arising from economic interdependence and transboundary threats such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and cyber security. In terms of impact, the state of Sino-US rivalry serves as a foundational consideration for other nations across the region in framing their national security strategies.

July 12, 2019. ADMM Plus. Vietnamese Minister of Defence General Ngo Xuan Lich talks with ASEAN Second, globalisation, once considered Secretary General Lim Jock Hoi. Credit PAN. an inevitable and irreversible characteristic of the international ASEAN and Vietnam, as middle power entities, view the Indo-Pacific region system, has encountered questions, with Southeast Asia at its very centre as having become one of the most doubts and pushback. Free trade, a outstanding areas of political, economic and strategic significance. This signature feature of globalisation, commentary argues that the increasingly complex external environment is no longer taken for granted. The inclines regional countries toward more nuanced strategic planning processes World Trade Organization (WTO) including the propensity to both reduce dependency on major powers as well as has come under pressure as more build up internal capacities to adapt to change. questions have been raised about its capacity to craft new agreements Looking at the big picture, there have been arguably five major trends and its ability to manage and resolve shaping the regional security landscape in the last several years and into the disputes. The United States under foreseeable future. First, major power competition has become more acute with Trump, at best gives the WTO the correspondingly major consequences, some unintended and unpredictable. Most benefit of the doubt, and at worst, notable is the increased Sino-US strategic competition. The cliché has long been wants to rewrite its rules. According that Sino-US relations are characterised by elements of both cooperation and to Trump’s hard-line trade negotiator, competition. This has changed and, today, this relationship can be portrayed as Robert Lighthizer, various capitals follows: in the region from Beijing to Seoul to Hanoi are facing a judgement 1 2 3 4 5 day on US demands for free and Cooperation Cooperation More Rivalry Adversary fair reciprocal trade. The question and Competition - of equitable trade is unfolding competition Less amid rising anti-globalisation cooperation movements sparked by widening

56 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 income gaps, social unfairness, and happened mostly between the United ultranationalism keep posing serious ultranationalism. The basic elements States, Russia and China, today threats to different places in the of globalisation such as the Internet they seem to occur between any region. and mobility of people are still there pair of countries. Notions of unity All these trends put regional countries but now vie with the great digital and a collective will to democratise in the situation of being compelled firewalls and steel walls are being international relations have turned to change and adjust their security built in China and the United States into luxurious or idealistic concepts strategies. This even applies to great respectively. rather than common practice as the powers. The United States under the world travels back to the future. Third, the fourth industrial Trump administration will continue Adding to the veto-wielding P5 in the revolution, a favourite state-of-the-art to operationalise its Free and Open Security Council is as unlikely as is catchphrase of both politicians and Indo-Pacific strategy whereas China the empowerment of the elected ten technocrats, is sweeping across the pushes forward the Belt and Road (E10). One path to democratisation continents with new realities being Initiative. The notion that these has been multilateralism. While born such as the internet of things, great powers are on a collision course the spirit of multilateralism has blockchain, big data, and artificial has been circulated in the policy not died, many of its forms, such intelligence. Like most revolutions, communities of both countries. Rather as multilateral institutions, are however, it produces different impacts than greater caution, however, we increasingly challenged by great in different places. It appears more have seen the two sides toughen their powers promoting their own schemes beneficial than detrimental for the positions and resort to measures such as the US Free and Open Indo- more advanced nations of Japan, hitherto unthinkable. For instance, Pacific strategy and China’s Belt Australia and the Republic of Korea. the enormous tariffs they impose on and Road Initiative. For now these Other catching up countries such as each other have created economic schemes pose questions rather than Malaysia and Singapore have mixed risks not only on themselves but also provide answers to the economic results whereas the smaller nations other countries. Given the scale of and security needs of impacted of Laos and Timor Leste face the risk this competition and other factors countries. The propensity of the of being stranded and falling further such as ‘black swans’, unpredictability major powers to prefer bilateralism behind. Even if these less developed in the international system increases and even unilateralism is growing countries make sensible decisions despite the fact that we today have stronger. Take the United States it will take some time for them to much more information and data withdrawal from various multilateral join the tech club. Another serious and science than before. And because commitments such as UNESCO and issue emerging out of this revolution of the amplified unpredictability, INF or China’s continued denial of the is the digital divide. This divide, regional countries opt for strategies tribunal award rulings in the case of which used to refer mostly to the that favour safe bets over risk-taking, the Philippines in 2016. technological gaps between nations, or digging trenches rather than now also points to the technological Fifth, both traditional and non- opening the gates. curtain or decoupling, potentially traditional contemporary security Against this backdrop, risk avoidance separating nations into fragmented challenges require more, not less, and management strategies featuring technomic eco-systems. Whether a national resources to tackle. No hedging and omni-directional country adopts the 5G capacities durable solutions are in sight for any diplomacy have become more developed by Huawei or by a Western of the regional security flash points attractive. Hedging strategies are country will likely lead to unintended such as the Korean peninsula, East helpful in the sense that regional consequences, including geopolitical China Sea, South China Sea, India- countries can promote their ties with ones. China border dispute, and cross both the United States and China Taiwan-strait relations. Cybercrimes Fourth, the democratisation of without raising the eyebrows of either cost the region billions of dollars international relations, once touted of them. A common observation is every year. Water security issues in as a promising trend following the that many countries are doing their the Mekong river basin are inflicting end of the Cold War, is now curbed best to keep or to obtain security more severe damage on downstream by the return of power politics and assurances from Washington while countries, namely Cambodia, Laos, even hegemonic tendencies. The maximising their economic linkages Thailand, and Vietnam. Climate United Nations Security Council with Beijing. But that pathway change is an escalating threat presents a striking example. Where alone is no guarantee for regional (according to the United Nations) the divisions and stalemates once countries to mitigate the adverse while terrorism, extremism, and

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September 4, 2019. Gulf of Thailand, AUMX. USS Montgomery (LCS 8), RSS Tenacious (71), UMS Kyansittha (F-12), BRP Ramone Alcaraz (PS16), KDB Darulaman (OPV-08), and Vietnam Corvette HQ-18. Credit US Indo-Pacific Command / Flickr. effects of the Sino-US competition. step up cooperation with one another. A discussion such as this must also What if the United States asks This ‘horizontal’ cooperation is a examine how countries view the regional countries to step up security way of lessening the pressure from available multilateral mechanisms cooperation by, for example, allowing major powers. In fact, these middle in the evolving regional security more warships to dock in each other’s powers have a lot to offer each other. architecture. In this regard, there ports? Prime Minister Mohamed Vietnam-Korea bilateral trade, for are at least three important points to Mahathir of Malaysia has said he instance, is expected to soon reach consider. First, absent an overarching wants to see more commercial ships, $100 billion USD, a number that security arrangement that ensures not warships, sailing in the region. exceeds Vietnam’s trade with Russia peace and stability for the whole What if China offers more projects and many other European countries region, ASEAN aspires to enhance under its Belt and Road Initiative and combined and even Vietnam’s trade its role and centrality against the addresses the major shortcomings with the United States. Amid the contingency that such an overarching identified in the modalities of project tension between the United States arrangement begins to take shape. selection and implementation? As and China over 5G networks, The East Asia Summit is still the a result, regional countries have to Vietnam opted for Ericsson as its pilot only forum for leaders to discuss combine a hedging strategy with program in Ho Chi Minh City. At the the strategic issues in play in the omni-directional diplomacy. In order same time, smaller nations such as region. The Shanghai Cooperation to avoid excessive dependence on Brunei and the Solomon Islands have Organization does not have the either the United States or China, fewer choices and are more likely to United States whereas the Quad countries such as India, Japan, Korea, be forced to choose sides. does not include China. Second, in Australia, Indonesia, and Vietnam promoting its role, ASEAN must

58 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 address formidable challenges express their views on topics that however, that the challenges to the from the above-mentioned tension interest or concern them. During the association become more acute with between the major powers. ASEAN stand-off between China and Vietnam regard to the central role it wants centrality, as long argued by former in the waters surrounding Vanguard to play in the construction of the Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Bank in the South China Sea, one regional security architecture. The Natelagawa, must be earned. It could easily see the strong reactions major powers have shown more has become increasingly difficult, from Vietnamese Facebookers or Zalo interest in promoting their own ways, for example, for ASEAN to reach (a locally developed platform) users. the impact of which is different from consensus on the South China Sea one country to the other. Whether The new capacity of domestic issue. Third, in addition to ASEAN, for ASEAN as a whole or individual audiences to involve themselves the region also has other competing members such as Vietnam, the need in policy development and (and in some cases, complementary) for independent strategic thinking implementation, coupled with the multilateral arrangements such as and planning can be expected to grow turbulence of regional affairs is APEC, SAARC, Shangri-La Dialogue, stronger into the indefinite future. forcing regional governments to US-led mechanisms (FOIP, Quad, further streamline their decision- Lower Mekong Initiative, RIMPAC), making processes. Good, or at least and China-led mechanisms (BRI, better, governance has turned into a AIIB, SCO, Xiangshan Forum). A Le Dinh Tinh compulsory requirement rather than PhD, Acting Director General, Institute new reality is dawning for ASEAN just a policy aspiration. For example, for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies as it explores the interplay of these Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam when the Trump Administration mechanisms, particularly whether imposed additional tariffs on Chinese points of intersection impede or goods and services, a number of support effective multilateral businesses diverted their investment outcomes. In response to this outlook, into third countries such as Malaysia ASEAN has recently adopted another and Vietnam. This, in turn, required set of principles called the ASEAN Malaysia and Vietnam to improve Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) to their ability to absorb this redirected help it navigate between major power capital and to address quickly the rivalry. These principles are mainly other issues associated with making adapted from the Treaty of Amity new businesses a reality. Quicker and Cooperation and other existing decision-making has become a new instruments for the purpose of giving criterion in strategic planning. ASEAN more flexibility and leeway in dealing with the major powers. In sum, the trends facing the region this year are not starkly different Regional governments are also trying from the recent past. It is, however, to make sense of the implications of noteworthy that some of the trends the intertwining of the proliferation of are getting sharper. One of those is technology and the diffusion of power the increased rivalry between the in their domestic political arenas. United States and China. Another In the long run, despite inevitable is the swifter and wider impact that resistance from conservative forces, the fourth industrial revolution representative democracy will have to has on every walk of life. In terms give way to participatory democracy. of response, the countries other In the most recent elections in the than the United States and China region, for example, in Indonesia have stepped up cooperation and or Thailand, the next generation coordination among themselves to (NextGen) has surged to political reduce their dependence on either prominence, putting the ‘old guard’ on of the major powers. ASEAN has notice. An effective tool used by this been able to shield itself from the generation is social media. Hundreds turbulence and to retain some of millions of people in the region perspective on where it is and where possess social media accounts and it needs to go. It remains the case,

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A Security Outlook from New Zealand B.K. Greener The Sino-US relationship continues New Zealand’, significant words In the same month as signing the to constitute the main geopolitical for a government that continues to MoA, Defence Minister Ron Mark interest for New Zealand security emphasise a values-based foreign spoke at the Shangri La dialogue commentators. When this key policy approach. about the importance of other bilateral relationship falters key security relationships. Here Concerns about China’s role have further, evidenced by the increasing he asserted that ‘Supporting and been further embellished in 2019. In uncoupling of their economies and the continuing to strengthen ASEAN is May, accusations by Professor Anne- public castigations of China delivered vital to promoting regional resilience, Marie Brady from the University in October by Scott. P. Brown, the US and the ADMM-Plus remains of Canterbury that the Chinese Ambassador to New Zealand, New New Zealand’s principal forum for Communist Party (CCP) is actively Zealand pundits grow increasingly multilateral defence engagement pursuing United Front Work inside anxious. Interestingly, in response in Asia’. The Ministry of Foreign New Zealand were laid before the to such tensions, those pundits still Affairs’ Strategic Intentions (2019- Justice Select Committee Inquiry into often view the ASEAN-based regional 2023) document also outlines a Foreign Interference. In September, architecture as an important option substantial range of initiatives an investigative report asserted that for managing security in the region, relevant to ASEAN partners. the Chinese NZHerald was effectively even in the face of unprecedented These include: a counter-terrorism controlled by the CCP. Clashes uptake of the US-driven concept of engagement strategy for South East between pro-Hong Kong and pro- the Indo-Pacific. In addition to this Asia (2019-2022); implementing the Beijing sympathisers in Auckland enduring geopolitical focus, however, Singapore Enhanced Partnership; that same month similarly increased other security concerns – particularly and developing cyber-security apprehension about Beijing’s humanitarian aid and disaster relief capacity building in South East Asia intentions in the region and at home. (HADR) due to climate change, an (and in the Pacific). Notably, the increased interest in the women Despite rising sensitivities, however, document also suggests that MFAT peace and security (WPS) agenda, the New Zealand authorities have will continue to develop relationships need to tackle right wing extremism continued to seek opportunities in South East Asia and South Asia to (RWE), and emergent information for positive engagement. In June enhance New Zealand’s capacity to domain issues – are increasingly 2019, Minister of Defence Ron Mark prevent mass maritime arrivals – a important security considerations. signed a new Memorandum of venture (controversially) allocated Arrangement Concerning Defence $25million in the 2019 Budget. Much security commentary in Cooperation with China’s Minister New Zealand focuses on the Sino- ASEAN thus remains predominant of National Defence, General Wei US relationship or on the rise of in New Zealand’s official security Fenghe. The MoA recognised an China. The 2018 Strategic Defence narrative, even with increased intention to maintain dialogue, to Policy Statement (the ‘Statement’) recognition of the US Indo-Pacific build understanding and to promote had signalled a more outspoken strategy. International commentators positive links, noting a strength approach to talking about China in noticed that the Defence Minister’s of relationships in humanitarian the region. The Statement noted that speech at Shangri La both mentioned assistance and disaster relief and defence relations with China have the phrase Indo-Pacific and international peace cooperation strengthened, and that China has stressed an enduring emphasis on activities. This sentiment was then upheld much of the rules-based order ASEAN – moving away from his reinforced by substantive Chinese but also that China sought to increase previously exclusive emphasis on engagement in the NZDF’s table-top engagement through an alternative the ‘Asia Pacific’. New Zealand is Exercise (TTX) Cooperative Spirit model of development, a model devoid therefore also, in some ways, clearly held in Auckland in late August 2019. of liberal democratic values. Direct demonstrating its alignment with Focusing on HADR and WPS, the mention was also made of China the US and other members of the TTX provided a safe space for defence having ‘views on human rights and ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence grouping (UK, diplomacy between New Zealand and freedom of information that stand Australia and Canada). China as well as other invited actors. in contrast to those that prevail in

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September 23, 2019. New York City. President Donald J. Trump participates in a pull-aside with New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern. Credit Shealah Craighead, White House / Flickr. Indeed, although at times touted as Australia has also been carefully preferred option). It is noteworthy ‘anti-Trump’, Prime Minister Jacinda tended. Despite some concerns about that such purchases clearly enable Ardern’s meeting with President Australia’s treatment of New Zealand continued interoperability with Trump in late September 2019 was citizens, its deportation and refugee Australia and the US. In terms remarkably unremarkable. Track 1 incarceration policies, and its current of other prospective purchases, and Track 1 ½ diplomatic discussions stance on climate change, it is clear the navy is likely to receive a new with the US have been pursued from all official documents and Loading Platform Dock vessel with with vigour over the last two years. from popular commentary that the greater cargo capacity and the ability Official foreign policy statements and defence and security relationship with to function in harsher sea-state academic commentary continue to Australia remains paramount. Recent situations to complement existing emphasise the need to ensure that the decisions to purchase particular frigate, offshore and inshore patrol US remains engaged in the region. platforms, for example, were clearly vessels as well as dovetailing in with This is despite deep concern about a made in close consultation with partner capabilities. number of President Trump’s foreign Australian counterparts. A spectre was raised this year, policy priorities, such as his stance Significant new acquisitions however, when both of New Zealand’s on climate change and trade, and is announced in 2018-19 included two frigates, Te Mana and Te Kaha, reflective of a longer-term perspective. replacements for the P-3 Orions (with were out of service whilst being Parallel to this ongoing engagement a smaller number of P-8 Posiedon refitted. This prompted Professor with the US, New Zealand’s most aircraft) and the C-130 Hercules (with Rob Ayson, a frequent commentator important bilateral relationship with the Super Hercules named as the on defence matters from Victoria

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a Pacific Defence Gender Network with much reference to the need to ensure meaningful participation of Pacific women at all levels in security matters, is an important development. In mid-2019, New Zealand also launched Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, the first international mission to explicitly reference New Zealand’s commitments to the WPS agenda. Increased uptake of the WPS agenda is an important addition to a more comprehensive approach to security, as is an increased awareness of the threats posed by violent extremism, April 2, 2019. Beijing. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern shake hands particularly right wing extremism before their meeting at the Great Hall of the People. Credit AP. (RWE). University, to suggest both that the number of army personnel is New Zealand suffered a horrific this was convenient timing (as New to be increased from 4,500 to 6,000 terrorist attack on March 15, 2019. Zealand might have been asked to reflects these concerns. The potential Fifty-one people died and many more support US interests in the Persian purchase of an ice-strengthened were injured in white supremacy- Gulf, a request which would have patrol vessel also both reflects motivated shootings at the Al Noor been unpopular with much of the New Zealand’s increasing concerns Mosque and the Linwood Islamic New Zealand public), and to ask a about protecting Antarctic interests Centre in Christchurch. Prime rhetorical question about whether (already evidenced by the earlier Minister Jacinda Ardern called this or not these frigates may be the decision to purchase a new RoK-built one of New Zealand’s ‘darkest days’. last of their kind to serve in New vessel, the HMNZS Aotearoa), and The event resulted in the passing Zealand’s navy. This latter comment frees up other capabilities to offer of a new Arms Amendment Act earned a retort from Euan Graham, support at home or in the Pacific. (2019) in April aimed at prohibiting an Australian-based commentator, Strong concerns about rising HADR semi-automatic style weapons and who suggested that New Zealand demands are noted in numerous a subsequent government buy-back must only be considering not government documents, such as scheme targeted at removing such replacing the frigates because New the 2018 Statement and the DCP19 military-grade firearms and their Zealand is no longer ‘doing strategy’. as well as a specific 2018 Climate relevant ammunition from circulation. Arguably, however, New Zealand is Crisis: Defence Readiness and A Royal Commission of Inquiry was reconceptualising ‘strategy’ as not Response report, and in more popular initiated to investigate what security just encompassing geopolitics but commentary. and intelligence agencies knew or rather recognising that likely futures could or should have known, whilst in There is also an increased awareness necessitate the ability to conceive of October new Police Armed Response of the diversity of problems that a broader spectrum of diverse threats Teams (ARTs) were also being trialled can emerge in such situations. within that rubric. in three locations (controversially, as Interest in the WPS agenda has also New Zealand Police have traditionally Firstly, aside from maintaining increased in 2019, as evidenced by been unarmed). interoperability with traditional the TTX noted above. WPS requires partners, in an era of increasing recognition of the complexity of This event highlighted the under- frequency of natural disasters, contemporary security challenges, recognised threat of violence from New Zealand authorities are particularly in the Pacific region RWE, emphasised the unregulated concerned about needing to respond where human security concerns are nature of online interaction as well as concurrently to more than one prevalent. Hence, the joint New bringing into focus the relationship event. This is clearly outlined in Zealand-Samoa hosting of a regional between virtual threats and potential the Defence Capability Plan 2019 Pacific WPS Summit in August 2019, events in real life. The perpetrator (DCP19). The announcement that and the concomitant launching of had disseminated a manifesto via

62 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 social media and then live streamed Pacific Reset is now well underway, the event on Facebook Live. On 15 with a new Ministry of Defence policy May, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern on Advancing Pacific Partnerships and French President Emmanuel launched in late October among Macron therefore brought together its most recent manifestations. a group of world leaders and major Diplomatic posts in Stockholm and tech companies in Paris to adopt Dublin are also to be opened, new the ‘Christchurch Call’. The idea architecture with a post-Brexit United was that countries, companies and Kingdom is being refashioned, and organisations supporting the Call Japan, Germany, India and Indonesia would commit to a set of collective are receiving additional attention. actions to help eliminate terrorist and New Zealand’s aid budget has violent extremist content online. The been boosted by an additional $842 Global Internet Forum to Counter million over five years, and much Terrorism (GIFCT), created in 2017 hope is being placed in the new trade by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, avenues, particularly in Japanese YouTube, and initially chaired by markets, being forged under the Google, also declared that it would new Comprehensive and Progressive become an independent organisation Trans-Pacific Partnership that came with an executive director, into force at the end of 2018. supported by dedicated technology, In the current environment, New counterterrorism and operations Zealand commentators emphasise an teams. Although such companies increasingly challenging geopolitical were criticised for not releasing situation overlaying a region beset data after a shooting on 9 October by a range of non-traditional security in Halle, Germany, it is notable that issues. The recent emphasis from Facebook has scheduled meetings in New Zealand security authorities New Zealand in November to assess has therefore focused on the need to options for handling harmful content prioritise flexibility, adaptability and online. the ability to respond to concurrent Such non-traditional security events. measures will be increasingly important in managing potential threats in future years. This is recognised in formal and military B.K Greener Politics, Massey University, New Zealand terms by the DCP19 which introduces an entirely new ‘Information Domain’ within the NZDF to stand alongside the traditional arms of maritime, land and air. As in many other parts of the world, this is reflective of a new emphasis on the need to engage in new or resurgent security realms, those of cyber and space. Moreover, in an era of complexity, New Zealand authorities are clearly seeking to more actively engage state and non- state actors to help bolster national, regional and global security. These impulses have also encouraged a revitalisation of New Zealand’s broader diplomatic presence. The

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Myanmar’s National Security Challenges Zeyar Oo

Rohingya Refugees. Rohingya children watching an awareness film about health and sanitation near Tangkhali refugee camp in Ukhiya. Credit InnoEnergy / Flickr.

Since regaining its independence left little scope to leverage its location. circumstances will inevitably impact in 1948, Myanmar has endured its neighbours as well. The current political context in essentially constant internal armed Myanmar is extremely complex with In broad terms, Myanmar’s national conflict. Despite being resource numerous key actors generating security infrastructure has been rich, these stresses, compounded competing and complicated dynamics shaped by four main factors: politics, by the missteps of successive that constitute a weak and unstable economics, social issues, and administrations, have led the foundation for effective governance. diplomatic relations. This analysis country to fall into a deep chasm of The persistent reality of internal confirms that Myanmar’s complex and political and ethnic disunity and for armed conflict and the associated stressful domestic circumstances also its development to lag behind other weakening of the country’s economic, profoundly complicate its national countries in the region. Additionally, social and political infrastructure security outlook. Myanmar currently despite its strategic location – have constituted a long-term faces a wide range of pressing issues, Myanmar constitutes the bridge challenge to national security. including: internal armed conflicts between South Asia and South East Equally, of course, because it between the Myanmar Armed Asia and abuts both China and India occupies a geopolitically strategic Forces (the Tatmataw) and Ethnic – Myanmar’s internal difficulties have space, Myanmar’s fragile security Armed Organisations (EAOs); the

64 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 peace building process among the actors in Myanmar’s peace process, affairs; the government’s exclusion Government, the Tatmataw and need to see diversity as a reality of Rakhine stakeholders from its EAOs; the ongoing Rakhine crisis; and potential strength and continue decision making processes; and the constitutional contention between building peace within and beyond government’s failure to consult and the Government and the Tatmataw; the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement coordinate with the Rakhine people nationalistic sentiments and religious (NCA) framework. in general, in determining economic tensions; economic hardships; the priorities in their home state. In recent years, the Rakhine crisis potential spread of terrorism and has become a flashpoint drawing In view of the ongoing peace process, violent extremism, natural disasters global attention and threatening the Tatmataw and the AA should and climate change; the prevalence of national security. Four major refrain from continuous fighting and illegal drugs and narcotics especially issues in the Rakhine crisis remain consider further engagements for along the border areas; daunting unresolved. First, the delays in the peace through informal channels, inadequacies in the education and repatriation of refugees currently including avenues for dialogue. health sectors; and contentious in Bangladesh’s refugee camps. The latter should put an end to its diplomatic relations with some Second, the Arakan Rohingya aspirations for a confederation, an neighbouring countries. Salvation Army (ARSA) and its unlikely and unacceptable demand, The ongoing civil conflicts have been radicalisation of vulnerable refugees. and instead consider formally joining the primary root cause of Myanmar’s Third, the severity of socio-economic the other EAOs in pursuing a political current political difficulties and a underdevelopment in Rakhine State. solution. A proper designation for the major hindrance to establishing a Fourth, the ongoing fighting between AA as an armed group should also be peaceful and prosperous nation. the Tatmataw and the Arakan Army considered by the government and the There are over twenty EAOs in (AA), an armed ethnic group in Tatmataw as another option to stop Myanmar, a larger number than any northern Rakhine State. the escalation of fighting in Rakhine other state has had to deal with. The State. In response to the coordinated attacks emergence of these EAOs is a legacy on 24 police outposts launched by There are also rising concerns among of the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy ARSA in August 2017, Myanmar the international community on the from the colonial era that left deep security forces conducted an area risk of exploitation of the vulnerable ethnic sentiments of discrimination clearance operation resulting refugees by terrorist organisations and segregation. The current in the exodus of over 700,000 seeking to radicalise them, especially National League for Democracy refugees to Bangladesh. The if the repatriation process is delayed (NLD)-led government has been delay in the repatriation process further. These concerns have been making strenuous effort to halt these not only puts further pressure on fuelled by major recent terrorist internal conflicts and put the nation Myanmar, but also creates both events in the wider region, notably on a path of peace and national national and regional security Marawi in the Philippines in 2017 reconciliation. At the present time, concerns due to the possibility of and the deadly church bombings there is a discouraging impasse in recruitment of vulnerable refugees in Sri Lanka in 2019. With this in the peace dialogue led by the Union by terrorist groups. Rather than mind Myanmar should develop a Peace Dialogue Joint Committee simply pressuring Myanmar, the comprehensive national plan for (UPDJC) and the next round of the international community should countering terrorism and violent 21st Century Peace Conference has support Myanmar’s efforts in extremism. Recognising its resource also been delayed. repatriating the refugees to mitigate constraints and limited experience It is believed that the dogmatism of such security threats. In the absence in dealing with jihadist terrorist some parties in the peace dialogue of any proper action, the possibility threats, Myanmar should focus on has damaged mutual trust and of radicalisation of vulnerable the promotion of its engagement with confidence, resulting in a political refugees by extremists remains. regional partners through bilateral stalemate. Despite the Tatmataw’s Equally, however, Myanmar should and multilateral mechanisms such offer to extend its unilateral ceasefire, recognise that the emergence of the as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ continued fighting in Rakhine State AA in 2009 and its ongoing success Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), the and some northern areas indicates in new recruitment could have been ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and that a dependable peace in Myanmar triggered by the following factors: the the East Asia Summit (EAS). In a may still be a long way off. The government’s neglect of local Rakhine promising initiative, the Tatmataw Tatmataw and the EAOs, as the main sentiments concerning the state’s will co-chair with Russia the ADMM-

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August 9, 2019. Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. Pacific Disaster Center final workshop. Credit Pacific Disaster Center / Flickr.

Plus Expert Working Groups (EWGs) stakeholders such as religious and and constitute a significant source of on Counter Terrorism for the period community leaders will have to step financing for their organisations and 2020-2023. up their efforts to prevent further their militias. Preventing the spread incidents of socio-religious unrest and of narcotic drugs is an urgent and Myanmar’s 2008 constitution grants conflict. important task for the incumbent significant power to the Tatmataw. administration, as it is a deeply This has resulted in a rather tenuous Like other countries in the region, rooted problem in Myanmar. The power-sharing arrangement between Myanmar is disaster-prone and government continues its strenuous the military and the democratically has been increasingly affected by efforts at narcotics eradication, elected NLD government, with the natural disasters. This has become including nationwide crackdowns latter having practically no control an important avenue of regional on producers and distributors, yet over the state security apparatus. cooperation, with Myanmar drug production and subsequent Coupled with the growing political working with regional countries trafficking continues to rise. Without tension between these political through ASEAN platforms such the participation of the EAOs, even entities stemming from attempts as ASEAN Coordination Centre large-scale anti-narcotics operations at amending the military drafted for Humanitarian Assistance on will have little effect on production constitution, the country’s defence Disaster Management (AHA Centre) and trafficking. The continuation of and security affairs have suffered and ASEAN Agreement on Disaster armed conflict enables drug lords from a lack of unity and coordination Management and Emergency to maximise the production and at the leadership level. Response (AADMER). Since the distribution of drugs and challenges military is a key institution in Myanmar is home to a range of both national and human security. disaster response and relief, the diverse peoples with different Tatmataw plays a critical role when The violence and instability that cultures, traditions and religions, natural disasters strike. The lack of has been endemic to Myanmar since which can be practiced freely coordination between the Tatmataw, independence has inescapably also according to the 2008 Constitution. the responsible civilian agencies had drastic consequences for the However, in recent years, social and the local communities, however, nation’s capacities in the fields of unrest and religious conflict due has more often than not, created education and health. These factors, to nationalist sentiments have unnecessary delays and problems. which cannot be further developed become more frequent in Myanmar’s in this brief comment, also weigh communities and have gradually The production and distribution heavily in any assessment of national become a political issue threatening of narcotics in Myanmar also security. its national security. Contemporary creates a challenge, given the weak social networks provide scope enforcement of rules and regulations In the sphere of international for political opportunists to in Myanmar. Narcotic drugs and relations, Myanmar continues to fuel nationalist sentiments for opium are mainly cultivated and place importance on its diplomatic political gain. The government and produced in EAO controlled areas relations with neighbouring countries.

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The relationship with China in In recent years, cooperation between a smooth implementation of the particular is vital. Myanmar shares Myanmar and India has significantly repatriation process, whether it is its longest border with China, which increased in all sectors and at various bilateral or assisted by the concerned is the country’s biggest trading levels. While China is establishing UN agencies. Consequently, partner and investor and a strategic Special Economic Zones, including the situation is likely to result partner who has traditionally the Kyaukphyu deep seaport, in a growing distance and more supported and defended Myanmar accessible to Indian Ocean as part of misunderstanding between the in the face of international pressure, the Belt and Road Initiative, India two countries, leading to further especially from the United Nations is implementing the Kalatan Multi- delays in the repatriation process and Western countries (particularly Modal Transit Transport Project that may heighten the security risk the United States). China also connecting by sea the eastern Indian to the region, as well as to the two possesses considerable influence over seaport of Kolkata with the Sittwe neighbours. the EAOs residing along Myanmar’s seaport in Myanmar, as part of its Observing all the aforementioned borders and plays a critical role Act East Policy. These activities factors, Myanmar’s national security in the nationwide peace process. reflect the opportunities that flow has been challenged directly and Myanmar’s relationship with China from Myanmar’s geostrategic location indirectly by its complex and has always been a priority for while also illustrating the vigilance complicated political environment successive governments including it must exercise in dealing with these and compounded by ongoing the Tatmataw. Despite the continued rising powers. Myanmar has long armed conflict, an impasse in the suspension of the mega-dam project maintained a foreign policy principle peace process, the Rakhine crisis, in conflict-prone Kachin State, of non-alignment and neutrality. This constitutional contention, socio- newly ambivalent public sentiment has been effective in preventing the religious tension, and diplomatic towards China and the incumbent country from getting entangled in relations with its neighbour. As government’s favourable relations great power rivalries but sustaining these issues are intertwined and with the West, Myanmar’s highly this posture can be expected to interconnected, the government must asymmetric bilateral relationship become even more challenging in the be tactful and forward-looking in with China remains strong. China, future. addressing each of them. Avoiding of course, exercises the influence it As a consequence of the Rakhine misunderstanding, mistrust, has on Myanmar politics in pursuit crisis, Myanmar’s most immediate misinterpretation, misconception of its own strategic interests but it and acute foreign policy challenge and mistreatment (the so-called 5Ms remains the case that any erosion of is to manage its relationship with guideline for policy development and Chinese interests will have significant Bangladesh. Both countries have implementation) constitutes sound consequences within Myanmar. harshly accused the other of lacking advice for the future of Myanmar. the political will to carry out the

requirements for the repatriation of refugees. Myanmar and Bangladesh signed an agreement on repatriation Zeyar Oo Adviser, Defence and Security, Myanmar as far back as November 2017. Yet its Institute of Strategic and International implementation has been hampered Studies by ongoing delays. Bangladesh is politically benefitting from the situation, praised as a humanitarian country by the international community, while Myanmar’s national image continues to be damaged by biased-Western media and undue international pressure despite its utmost efforts to proceed with repatriation. From a security perspective, Bangladesh’s energetic lobbying for international diplomatic Nay Pyi Taw with Uppatasanti Pagoda in the support in the face of Myanmar’s background. Credit m.n.81 / Flickr. Rakhine crisis will further impact

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Water Security in the Mekong Region and Policy Interventions Chheang Vannarith The Mekong region is an emerging growth centre as well as a strategic frontier in the Indo-Pacific due to the dynamic involvement of major powers. The geopolitics of resource management and security, especially transboundary water resources, is becoming more complex. The Mekong River is in danger. Unsustainable and unfair management of transboundary water resources and weak regional institutions are the key geopolitical political risks facing the Mekong region. The rapid construction of hydropower dams along the mainstream of the Mekong River is drastically changing the ecological, geopolitical and socio-economic landscape of the Mekong region. August 21, 2019. 17th Meeting of the Vietnam – Cambodia Joint Commission on economic, cultural, scientific and technological cooperation held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Co-chaired by Vietnamese The existing regional institutions, Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh and Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Prak Sokhonn. including the Mekong River Credit Tran Thua. Commission, are failing to provide holistic and effective solutions to the emerging security threats stemming Growing demands for energy and have been plain for a long time but from the mismanagement of these revenues are driving riparian resource nationalism and geopolitical water resources. This paper contends countries to pursue policies that competition have diluted sensible that the outlook for Mekong River threaten regional food security responses and allowed risks to management is quite bleak and and stability. The race to build escalate. proposes several policy interventions hydropower dams is having colossal Among the responses to these evolving to address the water security issue. impacts on the ecology, fishery sector, circumstances was a Council for sediment flows, and food security. Hydropower Dams. The Mekong River Security Cooperation in the Asia Eleven new dam projects on the main is the world’s 12th longest river. In Pacific (CSCAP) working group on stem of the river have been planned. terms of biodiversity it is second only water security established in 2011. A number of studies have confirmed to the Amazon River, and it supports The resulting CSCAP Memorandum that, in the absence of transboundary Tonle Sap Lake, the world’s largest of January 2014 stressed that impact assessment and coordinated freshwater fishery. The river runs security of water resources was planning, these projects have the across six countries, provides critical critical to regional security and potential to result in a water and food resources sustaining the livelihood that water-related disputes could security crisis. and food security of more than 60 damage regional cooperation and million people (Chinese, Burmese, Water Resource Security. Many integration. It suggested that Laotian, Thai, Cambodian, and factors are driving up the demand for regional governments subscribe to Vietnamese). The mismanagement water, including population growth, the principles of international law of this transboundary water resource urbanisation, industrialisation, on water usage and management, and other related resources has been intensive agriculture development, adopt a ‘holistic, multi-sectored and a source of escalating tension among and energy demand. The complexity integrated approach’ to addressing the riparian states and communities and interdependence of the issues water security, and embrace as its economic and strategic value and interests associated with a preventive diplomacy measures in continues to rise. resource such as the Mekong River order to avert water disputes.

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Any examination of water resource water resources. ASEAN should work into solutions that benefit everyone. management in the Mekong region closely with the MRC in creating The statement from the 3rd MRC will expose the lack of strategic trust knowledge systems on integrated Summit in April 2018 captured this – seen in the limited transparency water resources management as objective as follows: ‘transboundary and reluctance to share information this is of great importance to the cooperation and coordination – among the riparian countries. management and prevention of among riparian countries and the Distrust remains a key constraint in resource-driven conflicts. open and meaningful involvement promoting regional cooperation and of all stakeholders are essential Connecting Security Issues. Water, developing regional solutions. Lack to minimise the negative impacts energy, and food security are of political trust leads to tensions and and optimise the benefits of water intrinsically connected. As economies conflicts. In addition, the region does infrastructure and other economic develop, competition across sectors not have effective mechanisms and development projects’. – for example, the food and energy institutional capacities to prevent or sectors – using water will intensify. Connecting ASEAN with the MRC. mitigate resource-driven tensions. Demand for water, food and energy ASEAN has two mechanisms to Water resource security in the in the Mekong region is on the support the less developed economies Mekong region is inescapably of direct rise, while economic disparities in the Mekong region, namely the relevance to ASEAN. The resource- incentivise short-term responses in ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development driven conflicts in the Mekong production and consumption that Cooperation (AMBDC) and the region will harm cooperative and undermine long-term sustainability. Initiative for ASEAN Integration friendly relations among countries Shortages of those resources could (IAI) which is concerned with in the region and impact directly on cause social and political instability, development and poverty reduction ASEANs ongoing community-building geopolitical conflict and irreparable through investing in infrastructure aspirations. environmental damage. development, agriculture, human resources, and energy. The Policy Interventions. To address To promote sustainable management initiatives also aim to protect the emerging issues deriving from the of the water resources, development environment and promote tourism, unsustainable ‘management’ of the projects in the Mekong Basin, trade, and investment. However, Mekong River, a holistic approach especially hydropower dams, must these initiatives lack synergies and grounded in connectivity needs to be have scientific, cross-boundary impact coordination with the MRC. developed and implemented. assessment studies. These studies should include an environmental The ASEAN vision 2025 does not Connecting Knowledge. Transparency assessment that deals with have a clear policy on water security, and the institutionalised sharing of identifying, predicting, evaluating, except some policies relating to the data and expertise is fundamental to and mitigating the biophysical, social, development of ‘resilience to climate building trust and confidence and to and other relevant effects of proposed change, natural disasters and other supporting informed policy decisions. projects and physical activities, prior shocks’, the improvement of ‘national Data sharing, especially in the dry to major decisions and commitments and regional mechanisms that season, is crucial for equitable water being made, and a social impact address food and energy security resources management, including assessment concerned with issues’, and the enhancement of the development of an early warning estimating the social consequences policy coordination and capacity to capacity to assist in managing natural of specific policy and government ‘conserve, develop and sustainably disasters such as flood and drought. proposals. manage marine, wetlands, peatlands, Exchanges of experts and engineers biodiversity, and land and water Connecting Stakeholders. Multi- among the countries sharing the resources’. ASEAN should include stakeholder dialogue helps reconcile Mekong River needs to be promoted water security in its community vision different interests and reach and further improved. Upper and and raise the profile of water security consensus solutions. A multi- Lower Mekong countries need to in the political security agenda of stakeholder approach is a process create an open channel of information ASEAN and its member states. of trust building and collaboration sharing. Institutional connectivity between between the actors. The process needs ASEAN and MRC needs to be to ensure that different stakeholders Data management, including data enhanced in order to generate better have the opportunity to articulate collection, storage, and analysis, is policies through multi-stakeholder their concerns and the views of the vital to effective management of the dialogue and greater coordination. actors are heard and integrated

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project, regardless of the long-term consequences for the other member countries, and irrespective of its predicted ecological impact on the basin. Implementing Preventative Diplomacy. The riparian governments must provide scope for the exercise of preventive diplomacy aimed at minimising the impact of existing conflicts and preventing new ones. Voluntary briefings on the development of water resources and its usage should be further encouraged. An early warning system based on existing mechanisms needs November 7, 2019. MRC’s 8th Regional Stakeholder Forum in Vientiane. Credit Mekong River Commission. to be developed to help prevent the occurrence and escalation of conflicts. ASEAN should encourage its member Mekong region, particularly as major Early and effective policy states to ratify the Convention on the powers have involved themselves in interventions are critical. In Protection and Use of Transboundary the region quite robustly in recent order to prevent water conflicts Watercourses and International years. Moreover, efforts to narrow along the Mekong River, it is Lakes, and the Convention on the the development gap will be hindered necessary to strengthen existing Law of the Non-Navigational Uses if there is no effective mechanism to regional institutions, particularly of International Watercourses. All manage the differences arising from the MRC. It is also necessary to the stakeholders identified in these unfair and unsustainable usage of the strengthen existing dialogues and remarks need to work closer together water resource. negotiation through more openness, to develop a Mekong basin-wide Mechanisms have been established transparency, and participation from development strategy, sustainable to facilitate regional cooperation relevant stakeholders. For example, hydropower development pathways, and sustainably manage water China, an important ASEAN dialogue and alternative energy development resources. These include the partner and MRC observer, needs pathways in order to reduce the Mekong River Commission (MRC), to be a part of that process, as does adverse impacts of the hydropower Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), Myanmar, which is now negotiating dams. Moreover, regional-national Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, Japan- membership in the MRC. policy coordination and synergies Mekong Cooperation, Korea-Mekong need to be strengthened, especially Developing a Code of Conduct. The Cooperation, Lower Mekong Initiative the policy integration between the Agreement on Cooperation for the (LMI), and Lancang-Mekong regional plans and the national water Sustainable Development of the Cooperation (LMC). Unfortunately, resources planning of the riparian Mekong River Basin, adopted on these regional mechanisms lack countries. April 5, 1995 lays out the principles synergy and coordination, leaving and norms of regional cooperation Strengthening Regional Institutions. much room for improvement. in managing the river basin. Weak regional institutions are The Mekong River Commission, the However, only four lower Mekong the key constraints in addressing most important regional institution countries (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand transboundary regional issues. dealing with water resource and Vietnam) are signatories to ASEAN does not have effective management, does not have effective the agreement. The agreement mechanisms to manage differences enforcement mechanisms. MRC includes some key components that and to mitigate conflicts stemming enables non-binding consultations, could be incorporated into a future from water resource management information gathering, facilitation, code of conduct for the Mekong in the Mekong region. It needs to and policy coordination. It leaves all river basin, including measures to be noted that ASEAN’s unity and member countries free to legally move prevent or mitigate any harmful centrality are directly affected forward with their hydro-development effects of activities in the basin, and by geopolitical competition in the

70 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 state responsibility for damages. Chheang Vannarith Concerning freedom of navigation, the President of Asian Vision Institute (AVI), agreement states ‘the Mekong River Cambodia shall be kept free from obstructions, measures, conduct and actions that might directly or indirectly impair navigability, interfere with this right or permanently make it more difficult’. The Agreement, however, lacks compliance and dispute resolution provisions. A Code of Conduct for the Mekong River should be considered. The Code should consist of three main components: confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy, and dispute settlement mechanisms. Hotline communication, early warning, and using the ‘good offices’ of diplomacy, which can be created under ASEAN auspices, are all familiar tools that could play a vital role in preventing resource-driven conflicts between the riparian countries. Established tools and mechanisms enable early intervention which is often the key to success. Unsustainable development and management of the Mekong River, especially the construction of hydropower dams along the mainstream of the river, has caused significant damage to the Mekong basin’s biodiversity and darkened the outlook for local communities whose livelihood is in some way dependent on the river. The riparian governments need to enhance their working relationships as well as their partnerships with key stakeholders, including the private sector and civil society organisations, in order to develop a holistic solution to the complex issue of water security. Collaboration and partnership among these different stakeholders is vital to the sustainable management of this crucial regional resource.

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A Lao perspective on the security outlook in the Asia Pacific Sulathin Thiladej the two most powerful states – the US and China and the relationship between them. The relative decline of the US and the rise of China in the region means that the key challenge for the Asia-Pacific is sustaining a dynamic equilibrium between these powers. Over the past few decades several states in the Asia-Pacific have implemented policies through both bilateral and multilateral frameworks to foster peace, independence, friendship and cooperation to create a favourable environment for their March 23, 2019. Laos and Malaysia. Mohamad Sabu (right) exchanging momento with General national development. However, Chansamone after signing the MoU on greater bilateral defence cooperation in Kuala Lumpur. given the complexities in the region, Credit Malaysia World News. including significant elements of cooperation as well as competition, it Since the end of the Cold War, peace, changed profoundly and challenges is tricky for countries to pursue such security and stability have been have increased both in scale and policies. This includes Laos’ relations the cornerstone policy aspirations complexity. In the midst of the with China and Vietnam, both of for almost all states of the Asia uncertainties in today’s complex whom are the most vital strategic Pacific because this was recognised world the Asia Pacific, while partners for Laos’ interests. When as the essential precondition for continuing to flourish, is being these countries experience a clash cooperation and development. confronted by myriad challenges. of interests, as is the case in the Aspiring to stronger cooperation and For example, the issues of nuclear South China Sea, it places Laos in development had naturally been weapons on the Korean Peninsula, an awkward position, analogous to a further encouraged by the rapid Taiwan independence, the South prisoner’s dilemma. economic growth achieved by some China Sea, and the intensifying regional states, including Singapore, strategic competition among the The geostrategic competition between South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. major powers, have all turned out the Indo-Pacific strategy and Belt These success stories were often to be wickedly complex. In many and Road Initiative (BRI) is a described as ‘economic miracles’ and countries, this has triggered increases distinctive difficulty for small states had become development models for in military budgets to support the like Laos. The BRI is able to attract states across the world. Embedding acquisition of advanced weaponry, more attention than the Indo-Pacific habits of cooperation included increasing the risk of military strategy does from the Asia-Pacific regional security initiatives ranging confrontations. In addition, the non- region. For example, ASEAN has its from Track II to Track I diplomacy to traditional security challenges such as own Indo-Pacific vision, which it set provide channels of communication, economic insecurity, drug and human out in ASEAN outlook on the Indo- discussion, and consultation to avoid trafficking, and climate change are Pacific. Basically, the development military confrontation. These positive also formidable. Both traditional of the Indo-Pacific concept into a outcomes on both the economic and and non-traditional security issues strategy is the latest response by the security fronts inclined some scholars are posing real threats to regional region’s major powers to the rise of to claim that the 21st century would security, provoking regional states China. Basically, it seeks to encourage be the age of Asia-Pacific region. to look harder for ways to address and facilitate the US playing a or minimise them. However, the key leading role in counterbalancing Over the years, however, the regional determinants of regional security and China’s assertiveness in the Asia- and international environment stability are the policies pursued by Pacific. In fact, however, the US may

72 REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020 be reluctant to take on such a role. by rising China. With China’s Pacific. However, for some states, The recent ASEAN-led summits assertiveness in the economic, the details in the RBO frameworks in Bangkok were conducted in the military, and diplomatic dimensions remain ambiguous, contentious, absence of the US President and Vice in the Asia-Pacific, the conditions and even rejected because they are President, indicating the subordinate of a new balance of power in the not considered to be aligned with position of the Asia-pacific in US region are beginning to take shape. national interests. There have been strategy. Given the relative decline A rising China signals a shift away various perspectives regarding in the US role in regional security, from an America-centric security the RBO’s concepts and structure. there is a great opportunity for China architecture. However, China is some While some countries claim that to develop its economic and military distance from maturing into a true the RBO should be an international ties and attain regional hegemony. In superpower comparable to the US. variant of a domestic legal system that sense, China is re-crafting the Recent assessments of their relative which requires policing, courts, strategic environment in the region power, which seek to gauge the and punishments, many countries and thereby compelling states to influence states extract from their argue that enforcing international recalibrate their relations with China. physical resources and capacities, rules is an entirely different matter This is changing the balance of power illustrate that China still lags behind and that international rules can in the Asia-Pacific region. the US in terms of military capacity, take shape through a variety of resilience, defence networks and channels. International rules cannot Apart from that, the decline of cultural influence. Nevertheless, the be imposed, compliance must stem the US and the rise of China are growing influence of China in the from consensus on their legitimacy. eroding or undermining ASEAN’s region is confirming its likely future Moreover, the RBO should be in centrality and coherence. ASEAN, as dominance over the US, which is in alignment with the UN Charter a driver for cooperation in the Asia- relative decline. as respecting sovereignty and Pacific, is losing momentum as the territorial integrity, non-aggression, region’s centre of gravity shifts from With the ongoing power shift the peaceful settlement of disputes, and Southeast Asia to China. China’s region will tend to shift from the old non-interference in each other’s rise has unsettling consequences order – an order of partial or soft internal affairs. The UN charter’s for ASEAN centrality, creating new hegemony – to an emerging order values are upheld in international tensions and uncertainties that likely to be more unipolar (that is, relations regarding the promotion threaten to break ASEAN’s solidarity China centric) than multipolar. of cooperation amongst states and and coherence. This is clear from This shift towards a new regional regions. This includes the cooperation China’s growing clout in advancing its order in the Asia-Pacific is causing within ASEAN member countries claims in the South China Sea (SCS) new security alignments amongst in which they firmly adhere to the dispute with rival ASEAN claimants states across the region. The role of a principles of the UN charter. (notably Vietnam, Philippines weakening America in the Asia-pacific and Malaysia). This dispute has region will be determined by how There were attempts to promote the endured despite some agreement on states respond to the rise of China. notion of a rules-based community confidence-building measures and on- The behaviour of China, therefore, long before the western powers led going negotiations to conclude a code will be the vital factor shaping the a resurgence of the concept. Yet, of conduct. If the current pressures new balance of power in the Asia- ASEAN members did not consider persist into the future, ASEAN’s Pacific. RBO as comparable to a domestic centrality and coherence will be sorely legal order – the RBO had no courts With the US’ declining role in the tested and we could see the further or punishments for non-compliance. region it can be inferred that most splitting of ASEAN into, effectively, ASEAN recognised that the main states in the region will not be able China and US camps. A recent study enforcement mechanisms for RBO are to refuse or deflect China’s influence. shows that a majority of the people pressures within the group or region In recent years a Rules Based in several ASEAN member countries and self-discipline. Order (RBO) in the Asia-Pacific has favour China over the US and that been a topic of discussion. Such an However, as China’s rise is an increasing number of ASEAN’s order is expected to be a valuable compounding the complexity of citizens view China as the most means of guiding and regulating regional affairs the principles need influential country. the behaviour of states in the to be adjusted to adapt to the new The US as the predominant power region, especially in the increasingly environment of rapidly changing in the region is being challenged competitive environment of the Asia challenges. The RBO frameworks,

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common understanding of ‘order’ and of the means to maintain that order that are acceptable. In brief, there are a number of pressing major challenges to the collective interests of Asia Pacific states, notably the changing regional security architecture, but the most critical by far is ensuring stable and constructive relations between China and the US. The prescription for dependable security in the Asia Pacific is ensuring that the US and China do not fall into a Thucydides Trap and to evolve a new model September 5, 2019. Sontirat Sontijirawong, Thailand’s minister of energy (second from right) witnesses of major-power relations through a signing ceremony for an MoU on clean energy. Laos, Malaysia and Thailand have agreed to expand amending the RBO in respect of a trilateral power deal, under which Lao electricity will be sold to the Malaysians via the Thai grid. Credit RFA. fairness, inclusiveness and mutual benefit. therefore, need to be reviewed and improve governance at the national renewed to widen and strengthen and regional institutional levels. their capacity to support a sustainable Embracing good governance to build regional security regime. a state of law will be essential for Sulathin Thiladej achieving RBO development. PhD candidate, School of Advanced It is likely that ASEAN is the only International and Area Studies, East vibrant regional institution that can Furthermore, China per se has been China Normal University, Shanghai and formerly Division Director, Institute play a central role in shaping the conditionally supportive of the notion of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign RBO, as ASEAN is regarded as being of preserving international order. Affairs, Laos in the driver seat of multilateral China recognised a US presence in security processes in the Asia-Pacific. the Asia-Pacific as well as its leading Thus it is time for ASEAN to step-up role in international affairs as long and reconsider taking a leading role as it was in line with the UN charter in developing in a more rigorous RBO and universally accepted norms for the entire region rather than just governing international relations. In its own membership. that sense, China would agree with the basic concept of the RBO. Chinese Beyond ASEAN, other major reservations regarding the US notion countries including Australia, of the RBO would largely evaporate if Japan, India, the US or even China the rules were clear and if there was are integral elements of jointly an accepted process to determine how building the RBO with ASEAN. For the rules would be policed. instance, the issues of governance and embodying the rule of law in In the past, we have seen multiple multiple states in the Asia-Pacific states, including China, cooperating remain challenging. This includes to reform and adapt the international weak government institutions. With system to changing circumstances. the region’s diverse political systems A rising China can and should play and institutional cultures, dealing a greater role in refreshing and with governance issues has become updating the RBO concept. Above difficult since it requires strenuous all, the order should not be dictated efforts to determine appropriate unilaterally by the major powers approaches or strategies applicable in alone. All states in the Asia-Pacific particular state contexts. The major must have the opportunity to countries can assist smaller states to participate in ensuring that we have a

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CSCAP STUDY GROUPS CSCAP PUBLICATIONS Study Groups are CSCAP’s primary mechanism to generate CRSO Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) analysis and policy recommendations for consideration by The CRSO is an annual publication to highlight regional governments. These groups serve as fora for consensus building security issues and to promote and inform policy relevant and problem solving and to address sensitive issues and outputs as to how Track One (official) and Track Two problems ahead of their consideration in official processes. (non-official) actors can, jointly or separately, advance CSCAP currently has active study groups on the following regional multilateral solutions to these issues. themes – CSCAP Memoranda Ongoing study groups: CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of • Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Study Groups approved by the Steering Committee and • Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG) submitted for consideration at the Track One level. • Developing Cyber Norms of Behavior & Confidence Building Measures for the Asia Pacific CSCAP General Conference Reports Since 1997, the biennial CSCAP General Conference, is designed to be an international forum where high CSCAP MEMBER COMMITTEES ranking officials and security experts from the Asia CSCAP membership includes almost all of the major countries of Pacific region meet every two years to discuss security the Asia Pacific and also includes the European Union: issues of relevance and to seek new ideas in response to Australia evolving developments in Asia Pacific security. The forum Brunei is usually attended by approximately 250 participants; Cambodia making it one of the largest gatherings of its kind. Canada Through its publications, CSCAP’s recommendations China have been well received by the ASEAN Regional Forum European Union (ARF). India Indonesia Japan Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Malaysia Mongolia Myanmar New Zealand The Philippines Russia Singapore Thailand United States of America Vietnam Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Associate Member)

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