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VU Research Portal On the design of reliable and scalable networked systems Hruby, T. 2016 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Hruby, T. (2016). On the design of reliable and scalable networked systems. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 29. Sep. 2021 References [1] ASLR: Leopard versus Vista. http://blog.laconicsecurity.com/ 2008/01/aslr-leopard-versus-vista.html. [2] ARM - big.LITTLE Processing. http://www.arm.com/products/ processors/technologies/biglittleprocessing.php. [3] Killing the Big Kernel Lock. http://lwn.net/Articles/380174/. [4] Network transmit queue limits. http://lwn.net/Articles/454390/. [5] D-Bus. http://dbus.freedesktop.org. [6] The Heartbleed Bug. http://heartbleed.com/. [7] httperf. http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/linux/httperf/. [8] The unveiling of kdbus. http://lwn.net/Articles/580194/. [9] Intel’s "Knights Landing" Xeon Phi Coprocessor Detailed. http: //www.anandtech.com/show/8217/intels-knights-landing- coprocessor-detailed. [10] libevent. http://libevent.org. 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In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Confer- ence on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, OSDI’10, Berkeley, 136 CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS CA, USA, 2010. USENIX Association. [39] Silas Boyd-Wickizer, M. Frans Kaashoek, Robert Morris, and Nickolai Zel- dovich. Non-scalable locks are dangerous. In Proceedings of the Ottawa Linux Symposium, Ottawa, Canada, July 2012. [40] Miguel Castro, Manuel Costa, Jean-Philippe Martin, Marcus Peinado, Perik- lis Akritidis, Austin Donnelly, Paul Barham, and Richard Black. Fast Byte- granularity Software Fault Isolation. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGOPS Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, 2009. [41] Andy Chou, Junfeng Yang, Benjamin Chelf, Seth Hallem, and Dawson En- gler. An Empirical Study of Operating Systems Errors. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP ’01, 2001. [42] Austin T. Clements, M. Frans Kaashoek, Nickolai Zeldovich, Robert T. Mor- ris, and Eddie Kohler. 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[46] Lorenzo Cavallaro Cristiano Giuffrida and Andrew S. Tanenbaum. We Crashed, Now What? In Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Hot Topics in System Dependability, 2010. [47] Francis M. David, Ellick M. Chan, Jeffrey C. Carlyle, and Roy H. Campbell. CuriOS: Improving Reliability Through Operating System Structure. In Pro- ceedings of the 8th USENIX Conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, 2008. [48] Tudor David, Rachid Guerraoui, and Vasileios Trigonakis. Everything you always wanted to know about synchronization but were afraid to ask. In Pro- ceedings of the Twenty-Fourth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Prin- 137 ciples, 2013. [49] Tudor David, Rachid Guerraoui, and Vasileios Trigonakis. Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Synchronization but Were Afraid to Ask. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, 2013. [50] Willem de Bruijn, Herbert Bos, and Henri Bal. Application-Tailored
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