City of Hamamatsu Intercultural Profile
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City of Hamamatsu Intercultural Profile This report is based upon the visit of the Council of Europe’s expert team on 5 & 6 October 2017, comprising Ivana d’Alessandro and Phil Wood. It should be read in parallel with the Council of Europe’s response to Hamamatsu’s ICC Index questionnaire, which contains many recommendations and pointers to examples of good practice. 1. Introduction Hamamatsu (浜松市) is a city located in western Shizuoka Prefecture, about 260 kilometers southwest of Tokyo. As of October 1, 2017, the city had an estimated population of 796,114, making it the prefecture's largest city, and a population density of 511 persons per km2. The population was down from a peak of 804,032 at the 2005 census, with the most rural northern district and the city centre accounting for most of that decline. Hamamatsu has a wider metropolitan population of almost one million people, making it the 16th most populous metropolitan area in Japan. The total land area is 1,558.06 km2 making it Japan’s second largest city in surface area. It became a city designated by government ordinance on April 1, 2007. Although Hamamatsu has been settled since ancient times, it began to expand rapidly in the 20th century as an industrial hub. It is very much associated with the rise of the Suzuki corporation, originally founded by Michio Suzuki as a silk-spinning business but which has grown to be the world’s 9th largest producer of motor vehicles. It is also famous as the Japanese centre for the production of musical instruments, with such brand names as Yamaha, Roland, Kawai and Tokai. It has long been known for fabric industry, but most of those companies and factories went out of business in the 1990s. Honda, the world’s largest manufacturer of motorcycles was also founded in Hamamatsu, although it is now headquartered in Tokyo. As of 2010 Hamamatsu Metropolitan Employment Area had a GDP of US$54.3 billion. 2. Background to Cultural Diversity in Japan Historically Japan was a culture which derived its identity and sense of statehood through its isolation from the wider world. It remained willfully closed to foreign influence until the Meiji Restoration of the mid- to late 1800s when trade links were formed. This is not to say that immigration was nonexistent and immigrant enclaves developed in major port cities by the late 1800s. Yet, for the most part, the notion of ethnic and cultural homogeneity was largely accepted and actively promoted by the government as a core axiom of nationhood. Imperial expansion during the Japanese colonial era from approximately 1905 to 1945 brought with it an influx of Korean, Chinese, and Taiwanese immigrants to the Japanese mainland. Korean nationals represented the majority of colonial residents in mainland Japan, peaking at approximately 2 million in 1945. Although not technically considered immigrants at the time because they came from Japanese territories, all former colonial subjects lost their Japanese nationality following World War II and the subsequent signing in 1952 of the Treaty of San Francisco. However, approximately 600,000 Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese nationals remained in Japan. This sizeable contingent includes children born in Japan to foreign parents, considered foreign nationals themselves due to the revocation of their parents’ Japanese nationality. These former colonial subjects and their descendants, known as zainichi in Japanese, comprised the bulk of Japan’s foreign population through the 1980s and continue to make up a significant, although diminishing, proportion of foreign nationals in the country.1 Rapid postwar economic development saw substantial rural-to-urban migration in Japan, where cities expanded considerably. New immigration levels remained low as internal migration and the postwar baby boom provided an adequate supply of labor. By the early 1980s, Japan was highly urbanized, with approximately 60 percent of the population living in densely populated areas. However, the growing urban workforce was no longer sufficient to meet labor demands, particularly for the so-called 3-D jobs (dirty, demanding, and dangerous). These positions typically did not require a high level of skill, were often monotonous, and paid relatively poorly. As such, they carried little appeal to Japanese nationals. Due to the availability of low-skilled jobs, combined with the rising value of the yen and a national government that did not strictly enforce immigration regulations, Japan began to appear more attractive to new immigrants. Immigration policy remained largely unchanged during this period, based on the 1952 Immigration Control and Refugee Act, which intended to discourage long-term settlement of foreign workers. After a marked increase in visa overstays by short-term visitors, the government in 1990 tightened visa requirements and immigration enforcement, while also opening up a new avenue for unskilled workers, primarily of Japanese descent, known as nikkeijin. The foreign share of the overall population has steadily grown, rising from 0.7 percent in 1990 to 1.8 percent in 2016 (see Table below). Foreign Share of Japanese Population (%), 1970-2016 Source: Compiled from Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau. While that proportion is tiny compared to other highly industrialized economies, the population has risen in absolute numbers from just under 900,000 (including zainichi) in 1990 to approximately 2.3 million as of mid-2016—a 160 percent increase, according to official government data. The table below demonstrates that this is a growth rate unmatched by most other highly developed countries: 1 David Green (2017) As Its Population Ages, Japan Quietly Turns to Immigration. Migration Information Source, 28 March. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/its-population-ages-japan-quietly-turns- immigration 2 Immigration to Japan was and remains relatively exclusionary. Children gain citizenship based on their parents’ Japanese nationality rather than by virtue of their birth on Japanese soil (jus sanguinis rather than jus soli). Consequently, zainichi and their descendants can retain foreign nationality even though they may be third- or fourth-generation descendants born and raised entirely in Japan. Incidentally, the Japanese language is undergoing a slow and slight adaptation to take account of growing diversity. Traditionally the Japanese world view would divide humanity into nihonjin (those with Japanese blood) and gaijin (outsiders or aliens). In recent years the more polite gaikokujin (foreign country person) has been introduced into public discourse, but gaijin remains the argot of the street – and is even likely to be applied to someone who has applied for and received full naturalization. Whilst naturalization is becoming more readily available, the path is often regarded as arbitrary and quite strict in nature. The government has taken steps to ease the naturalization process somewhat in recent years, particularly for zainichi. However, there are only about 1,000 new naturalizations each year, compared to approximately 30,000 new permanent resident visas. In other words, the majority of long-term foreign residents in Japan acquire permanent residency rather than Japanese nationality. Until the late 1970s and early 1980s, foreign residents were largely excluded from a number of social privileges enjoyed by Japanese citizens, including access to public housing, national health insurance, and public-sector employment. As the Japanese economy continued to develop, and the country looked to increase its international stature, the government signed onto a number of international conventions and covenants. In addition to bringing Japan more fully into the international community, these agreements also provided greater equality to foreign residents already in Japan. As a result, and also due to considerable lobbying from zainichi communities and a handful of municipalities, national and local governments have removed discriminatory barriers to accessing government services. Foreign residents can join the national health insurance system and receive a pension provided they qualify, and their children can enroll in public schools, though legislators in the National Diet have yet to ratify antidiscrimination policy, and as such discrimination by individuals, perhaps most apparent in access to housing, remains legal. However, the Japanese Diet did pass a law in 2016 to restrict the use of hate speech in public places.2 2 Osaki, Tomohiro (2016) Diet passes Japan’s first law to curb hate speech. May 24, Japan Times. 3 The 1990 revision to the Immigration Control and Refugee Act excluded unskilled laborers in principle, officially permitting visas only for high-skilled work- and family-based visas. However, by allowing entrance (ostensibly to foster “cultural understanding”) to nikkeijin of Japanese heritage, mainly from Brazil and Peru, as well as their immediate families, the revision opened a significant side door to unskilled labor. The nikkeijin population quickly grew throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, peaking at about 375,000 in 2007, or close to 20 % of Japan’s foreign population. A technical trainee program, also implemented in the early 1990s, opened the door even further to unskilled labor. The program allows Japanese companies to employ short-term workers mainly from developing Asian nations, officially to learn about Japanese business practices and technology and bring those insights back to their home countries upon completion of their term of up to three years. In practice, the technical trainee program works as a means of importing cheap labor to complete menial tasks, with little technical knowledge passed on to the temporary worker. Instances of trainees being paid rates below the minimum wage and working for long hours and in unsafe conditions have been documented. In response, the government pledged to closely monitor companies participating in trainee programs and ensure compliance with Japanese labor laws. It has also considerably expanded the program: In 2006, technical trainees represented 3 percent of the foreign population (70,519 trainees), a share that rose to 9 percent (212,510 trainees) in 2016.