7 Examination of the Influences of Global Forest Governance Arrangements at the Domestic Level

7 Examination of the influences of global forest governance arrangements at the domestic level

Coordinating lead authors: Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore

Lead authors: Richard Eba’a Atyi, Ahmad Maryudi and Kathleen McGinley

Contributing authors: Tim Cadman, Lars Gulbrandsen, Daniela Goehler, Karl Hogl, David Humphreys, Shashi Kant, Robert Kozak, Kelly Levin, Constance McDermott, Mark Purdon, Irene Scher, Michael W. Stone, Luca Tacconi and Yurdi Yasmi

Abstract: The ultimate goal of many international and transnational attempts to address global problems is to influence domestic policymaking processes rather than simply to constrain or modify the external behaviour of states. This chapter reviews existing scholarship on the impacts that global forest governance arrangements have had on domestic policymaking processes and decisions. We apply a framework that distinguishes ‘economic globalisation’ – the phenomenon of increasing economic integration – from ‘internationalisation’, in which international and transnational pressures influence domestic policymaking (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). We review the effects of four distinct pathways of internationalisation in shaping domestic policies: international rules; international norms and discourse; markets; and direct access to domestic policy processes. This framework overcomes longstanding debates about whether globalisation forces a ‘ratcheting down’ of domestic standards in a ‘race to the bottom’, or whether increasing economic and political interdependence can create a ‘race to the top’. The application of the framework to cases in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe and North America reveals that economic globalisation is not determinative. Rather, it interacts with other factors (operating internationally, transnationally and/or domestically) that condition its effects. Key lessons emerge from this review on the conditions under which, and interventions through which, the international forest regime has affected domestic forest policies, as well as on the interventions that might be nurtured to influence and nurture future policy development.

Keywords: globalisation, internationalisation, domestic forest policy, comparative public policy, norms, markets. ■

7.1 Introduction influence domestic policies and outcomes, with the aim of identifying the conditions under which they The ultimate goal of many international and trans- shape desired behaviour. national attempts to address global problems is to This chapter reviews existing scholarship on the influence domestic policymaking processes rather impacts that global forest governance arrangements than simply to constrain or modify the external be- have had on domestic policymaking processes and haviour of states. This is certainly the case for forest decisions. We organise this material by applying a governance because, while forest resources lie within framework developed by Bernstein and Cashore state borders, the consequences of their uses or pres- that distinguishes ‘economic globalisation’ – the 111 ervation may have global implications. Recognition phenomenon of increasing economic integration – of this has led recent scholarship to systematically from ‘internationalisation’, in which international explore how international institutions and processes and transnational pressures influence domestic

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policymaking (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). The 7.2 The framework: four path- framework encompasses four distinct pathways ways of international influence that have unique causal logics in shaping domestic policies: international rules; international norms and on domestic policy change discourse; markets; and direct access to domestic policy processes. The distinction between globalisation and in- 7.2.1 International rules ternationalisation overcomes longstanding debates about whether globalisation forces a ‘ratcheting The ‘international rules’ pathway highlights the in- down’ of domestic standards in a ‘race to the bot- fluence of issue-specific treaties (e.g. the Conven- tom’, or whether increasing economic and political tion on International Trade in Endangered Species interdependence can create a ‘race to the top’. Bern- of Wild Fauna and Flora – CITES), trade agreements stein and Cashore (2000) argue that while in some (e.g. the World Trade Organization agreements) and cases economic globalisation has acted as a break to the policy prescriptions of powerful international improving existing regulations and standards, and/or organisations (e.g. the World Bank), whether per- has encouraged companies to locate in ‘regulatory ceived as resting on consent or coercion. The logic friendly’ jurisdictions, it is also a prerequisite for of this pathway is that rules are binding and create a successfully traversing some of the four pathways “pull toward compliance” (Franck 1990: 24) because – such as the markets pathway – that could lead to they came into being by generally accepted rules of higher domestic policy standards or improved prac- right process, regardless of whether they are enforced tices. In other words, economic globalisation is not (domestic factors and politics can influence imple- determinative. Rather, it interacts with other factors mentation and compliance, but the obligation ex- (operating internationally, transnationally and/or ists regardless). Sometimes even non-governmental domestically) that condition its effects. organisations (NGOs) or institutions that include We chose the framework of Bernstein and Cashore non-state representation (such as the International (2000) over the regime effectiveness literature be- Organization for Standardization and forest certifica- cause of the latter’s preoccupation with “hard law” tion systems) can be authoritative sources of rules to emanating from formal international conventions which states or firms commit (Bernstein and Cashore over a specific problem or sector . While there are 2007; Clapp 1998; Meidinger 2006). Systems that some legally binding agreements that address forest are not mandated by states or intergovernmental issues, none have forests as their primary focus and agreements exhibit the logic of the international none address forest issues comprehensively. Thus, a rules pathway when their standards gain broad rec- focus on regime effectiveness is likely to miss other ognition and come to be understood as binding by influences worthy of sustained attention. The chosen firms or other targeted actors that sign on to them framework also permits us to draw on recent theoreti- (Vogel 2008). cal developments and questions with an eye to uncov- ering new relationships and insights. In this chapter we identify important causal trends and identify and 7.2.2 International norms and assess the full range of impacts of international for- discourse est governance arrangements. Section 7.2 presents the framework in greater detail. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 review relevant literature to provide an understand- International norms and discourse can both define ing of whether, when and how one or more of the and regulate appropriate behaviour. Particular norms four pathways have been travelled in the shaping embodied in institutions or informed by broader of domestic forest policies. This review draws on practices of global governance can affect domestic experiences in five regions: Southeast Asia, Africa, policies or lead to policy change. Chapter 4 of this Latin America, Europe and North America. Section report identifies shifts in international discourses 7.5 contains findings and recommendations. around forests; the goal here is to identify, assess and analyse how and under what conditions discourses around appropriate behaviour and particular norms become institutionalised domestically or lead to policy change. Keck and Sikkink (1998) outline a series of strategies that transnational actors can undertake to encourage states to follow norms – the politics of 112 information, symbolism, leverage and accountability. According to Keck and Sikkink’s model, domestic policymaking structures or networks only matter to the degree they cause a ‘boomerang’ effect that

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induces domestic actors to go international to seek 7.2.5 The role of economic allies and bring international scrutiny (ibid.). Global globalisation norms can also be mediated by domestic policymaking structures (Risse-Kappen 1995) or, as Acharya Bernstein and Cashore (2000) hypothesise that the (2004) finds, by the ability of local actors to recon- role of economic globalisation differs according to struct international norms to fit with local norms or the pathway along which influence over domestic to reinforce local beliefs or institutions. policies is pursued. The degree to which economic globalisation creates dependence on foreign markets is a determinant of the effectiveness of the markets 7.2.3 Markets pathway and is often important for the international rules pathway because many international rules result The markets pathway encompasses processes or tac- from attempts to manage economic interdependence. tics that attempt to manipulate, work with or leverage Economic globalisation is not, however, a precon- markets to create domestic policy change. It includes dition for the international norms and discourse or boycott campaigns that target foreign export markets direct access pathways. to put pressure on exporters, certification systems that attempt to regulate or socially and environmentally embed markets directly without state media- 7.3 Economic globalisation of tion, and the use of market mechanisms in general. This pathway, therefore, includes both direct action the forest sector – where transnational actors exert market pressure to change domestic behaviour – and indirect action. In The forest sector is highly globalised. Prices and de- indirect action, certification systems with pre-estab- mand for wood products are affected by global struc- lished standards (for example) may use carrots, such tural changes such as the shift of wood production as the provision of market access, firm recognition and manufacturing from developed to developing and price premiums, as well as sticks, such as the countries (Yasmi et al. 2010). The shift in produc- conferring of negative attention on non-joiners, to tion, especially to China (which in turn imports from influence behaviour. tropical developing countries in Southeast Asia and Africa), has resulted in the consolidation of sawmill industries in many developed countries. It has also 7.2.4 Direct access to domestic led to a reduction in employment in the pulp and policymaking processes paper industry in developed countries, including the United States (Ince et al. 2007). Increasing consumption in developed countries Domestic policies may be influenced along the direct accounts for some of these trends. For example, the access pathway through direct funding, education, United States now imports 25 billion board feet of training, assistance and capacity building, and possi- softwood lumber, up from 12.1 billion board feet 20 bly even by attempts at co-governance through part- years ago, and sales of wood furniture produced in nerships between domestic and international public China has expanded from 20% to 50% of the total and private actors and authorities. Any attempts at market (White et al. 2006). European demand has influence along this pathway must navigate concerns followed a similar trend, with imports from China tri- about sovereignty and risk being viewed as foreign pling between 1997 and 2006 (ibid.). The increasing or international interference. To be successful, non- role of previously unexploited timber from Russia domestic actors must avoid the perception that they has also shaped forest products markets and supply. challenge state autonomy by focusing on altering the The African timber industry is highly dependent on balance of power among existing domestic organised both Asian and European markets (ibid.), the latter interests and their participation in policy networks. of which, as we discuss below, has been the source Transnational actors may accomplish their mission of significant NGO pressure on timber procurement by sharing resources, ideas, knowledge and expertise policies. with existing groups, or by facilitating the creation The drivers of economic globalisation can be of new groups or coalitions. traced, in part, to domestic and international policies that create tax breaks, liberalise export fees, increase free-trade zones and ease restrictions on immigration to further reduce labour costs (Essmann et al. 2007). Another factor is changing technology, which both 113 drives globalisation and offers significant potential for shifting the global forest industry towards sustainability (Auld et al. forthcoming; Essmann et al. 2007).

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7.4 The four pathways can also be found in a number of non-forest-specific agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, CITES and, although perhaps less direct- 7.4.1 International rules ly, the World Trade Organization and regional trade agreements. In addition, recent initiatives to build Context regional Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) agreements and international commitments Despite the absence of a comprehensive forest on forests within the climate-change regime can be treaty, forest-related international agreements and understood as attempts to travel the international institutions have emerged that influence domestic rules pathway. For example, the ‘reducing emis- rules and standards. For example, the International sions from deforestation and degradation’ (REDD) Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), created by concept is likely to lead, eventually, to one of the the International Tropical Timber Agreement, has first sets of rules in international forest governance played a major role in the development of criteria and to have a binding impact on domestic practices such indicator (C&I) for sustainable forest management as land-use change and logging. (SFM). Unlike hard law, however, C&I processes Forest certification is also showing signs of af- aim to define and assess rather than mandate SFM; fecting policy along an international rules pathway, the hope is that such processes will help states to in two ways. First, some systems are seeking rec- develop internal standards, such as when an Indo- ognition for their standards with a status equal to nesian ministerial decree adopted C&I for sustain- other international standards recognised under in- able management of production forests. Although ternational trade law (Bernstein and Hannah 2008). changes in domestic policy do not necessarily mean Second, there are signs that support for forest cer- changes in on-the-ground behaviour, both their in- tification may not just be a result of market pres- fluence on policy development and the question of sure such as boycotts; it may also be based on the whether and when governments can meet their own perception that certification systems themselves are domestic commitments (Chrystanto and Justianto a legitimate authority through which to develop ap- 2003) are important. propriate standards (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Processes (IPF/IFF/UNFF) initiated in the wake Cashore 2002). of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, as well as other international fora such as the Food and Agriculture Impacts on domestic policymaking Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Commit- tee on Forestry, have promoted high-level commit- Impact of international forest soft law on national ment to the monitoring, reporting and assessment policy priorities: Much of the impact of international of SFM. In 1995 the Intergovernmental Panel on soft law has been expressed in the development of Forests issued more than 270 ‘proposals for action’. NFPs. Due to space limitations, we provide illustra- Processes to develop and implement C&I for SFM tions of these impacts from just one region, Latin at the regional level were also initiated (Humphreys America. In Guatemala, domestic policymakers 2006; McDermott et al. 2007; Wijewardana 2008); explicitly justified the introduction and content of currently there are nine such processes, encompass- an NFP by showing that it drew on internationally ing 150 countries and nearly 90% of the world’s agreed concepts “within the international dialogue forests. on forests, particularly the Intergovernmental Panel Arguably, the ‘soft pull’ of the non-binding state- on Forests (IPF) and the Intergovernmental Forum ment of forest principles negotiated at UNCED facil- on Forests (IFF)” (Hurtarte et al. 2006: 35). Such itated the development of national forest programmes concepts included consensual formulation and ap- (NFPs) through Agenda 21, which was also agreed proval; the identification, design and application of at UNCED. Sepp and Mansur (2006) have identified new forest policy instruments (such as the National NFPs as important tools for the implementation of Forest Incentives Program); and monitoring and a Agenda 21’s proposals for action. They also provide multi-stakeholder approach (which included the in- a framework within which countries can “implement troduction of forest policy round-tables in the coun- international commitments to enhance sustainable try’s nine forest regions) (ibid.). forest management following deliberative and par- Like Guatemala, Brazil followed international ticipatory approaches at the national level” (Pülzl norms by developing a national forest plan that and Rametsteiner 2002:1), while also allowing them included extensive stakeholder and cross-sectoral 114 to develop their own forest management priorities consultations and led to important legislative re- (McDermott et al. 2007). forms. New financing instruments were promoted As shown in Chapter 3, international rules that af- for encouraging responsible forest management. fect forests, resources within them, or forest products The Ministry of Environment was charged with de-

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veloping an NFP action plan and the Coordinating Peru, the largest exporter of bigleaf mahogany, has Commission with supporting and evaluating com- made significant changes in forest law, regulation pliance (Alba 2008), which served to meet Brazil’s and trade control with the aim of reducing the im- international obligations for improved monitoring pact of international trade on the conservation of and evaluation. the species. In 1997, following agreements made at and after Trade agreements: While trade agreements are UNCED, the Lepaterique process was initiated to certainly aimed at nurturing economic globalisation, develop C&I for SFM in Central America, with sup- the 2009 United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agree- port from FAO; this process has had a measurable ment* demonstrates how negotiators are inserting policy influence in each of the seven Central Ameri- language to address concerns that trade liberalisation can countries (Blas Zapata 2005). The Lepaterique could come at the expense of forest stewardship. The process includes both regional and national-level Agreement is accompanied by a carefully worded elements. annex (Annex 18.3.4**) that requires Peru to put In Honduras, the Directive Counsel to the Presi- into force the following regulatory and control meas- dent recognises that the Lepaterique C&I process ures: increasing its administrative, monitoring and provides the conceptual framework for the formula- enforcement staff; implementing specific measures tion and evaluation of forest laws and policies as a to reduce corruption; providing criminal and civil means to meeting the country’s international NFP liability for a range of activities that undermine the commitments (Barahona and Eguigurems 2004). sustainable management of Peru’s forest resources; These regional and global processes have had an implementing provisions to combat illegal logging; influence at the forest management unit level, where adopting and implementing specific policies to pro- the government’s technical norms for forest manage- tect tree species listed in CITES appendices; promot- ment have been adapted to the new C&I. Similarly, ing capacity building; and ensuring that the views of Costa Rica’s 1996 forest law and accompanying reg- indigenous groups and other stakeholders are consid- ulations require that forest management plans com- ered in decision-making. Annex 18.3.4 also includes ply with the standards of the National Commission a series of measures for compliance, joint monitoring for Forest Certification, which were set according to and enforcement, including third-party audits of pro- norms developed by global C&I processes (Espinoza ducers to ensure compliance with laws, regulations Camacho 2005).* and verification procedures. Non-compliance could The Convention on International Trade in Endan- lead to the banning of exports, and the entire annex gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: CITES moni- is subject to dispute resolution. The United States– tors and restricts the trade of species facing extinc- Peru Trade Promotion Agreement has already “been tion by, among other things, identifying and listing a driving force to change the Peruvian Forest Law, species banned from international trade (Appendix as well as to introduce other changes that are gener- I) or that require a CITES export permit for interna- ally in line with CITES requirements” (Tomaselli tional trade (Appendix II). The impacts of CITES and Hirakuri 2009:13). There are worries, however, are often region-specific on the basis of the location that the Agreement is worded in such a way that it of the protected species. In Latin America, for ex- ignores the possibility of trans-shipments of illegal ample, several important timber species, including timber through third countries such as Mexico and bigleaf mahogany (which was listed in Appendix China (McClanahan 2010). II in 2003**), have been listed following concerns Most other trade agreements stop short of ex- over illegal harvesting and after scientific research plicitly referencing the forest sector. Some include by international scientific and conservation bodies a reference to environmental concern modelled on (Grogan and Barreto 2005). Such listings have led a side-agreement to the North American Free Trade many producer countries to establish national CITES Agreement (NAFTA), the North American Agree- management authorities, often by adapting legisla- ment on Environmental Cooperation, which created tion (Tomaselli and Hirakuri 2009). For example, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. Like the NAFTA model, however, most bilateral agreements mandate monitoring and promote the * See the Costa Rica National Standard for Sustainable For- est Management, first published in 1998 (updated in 2001 and 2009). * Available at: http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/ameri- ** Timber species listed in Appendix I include Brazilian rose- cas/peru, [Cited 4 Jun 2010]. wood (Dalbergia nigra), Guatemala fir (Abies guatemalensis). 115 Timber species listed in Appendix II include Pacific coast ** http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agree- mahogany (Swietenia humilis), Caribbean mahogany (S. ma- ments/fta/peru/asset_upload_file953_9541.pdf. [Cited 2 hogoni) and bigleaf mahogany (S. macrophylla). Dec 2010].

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effective enforcement of national laws rather than A final potential impact involves the way in create formal international obligations. As a result, which trade rules might evolve to address climate the Dominican Republic–Central America–United change. There is enormous uncertainty in this area, States Free Trade Agreement includes an Environ- but similar issues could arise if, for example, an ment Chapter which states that “each Party shall economically important country decides to intro- ensure that its domestic laws and policies provide duce a border tax on forest products imported from for and encourage high levels of environmental countries with low or no carbon emission standards protection”(Office of the United States Trade Rep- (Hufbauer et al. 2009). resentative 2010). Regional forest agreements and initiatives: In the Trade rules may also have indirect effects when absence of a comprehensive and universal forest con- they delineate acceptable international standards. For vention, an emerging trend among international aid example, certification standards could be subject to agencies, the World Bank and NGOs is to address trade disputes if, when adopted by a country, they forest management and policy through regional proc- are perceived to have been developed in a way that esses. Many of these have been developed under the is inconsistent with requirements for legitimate in- auspices of FLEG processes.* Co-hosted by pro- ternational standards under the Technical Barriers ducer and consumer countries and the World Bank, to Trade Agreement (and its annexes) of the World early FLEG outputs included an East Asian FLEG Trade Organization (Bernstein and Hannah 2008). Ministerial Declaration (Bali, 2001) and ministerial- Trade law and jurisprudence have not been explicitly level declarations in Africa (Yaoundé, 2003), and tested in this area, however. Europe and North Asia (St Petersburg, 2005). Initial Complicating the picture further, other bodies talks were also held in Latin America. As a result of have arisen to define acceptable social and environ- these declarations, a number of projects and initia- mental standards, most notably the International tives were created to promote FLEG at various scales Social and Environmental Accreditation and Label- and in various regions (Brown et al. 2008; Kaimow- ling (ISEAL) Alliance, an umbrella organisation itz 2003; Magrath et al. 2007; Perkins and Magrath of some certification systems (including the Forest 2005; World Bank 2005, 2006, 2007a). Stewardship Council – FSC). The ISEAL Alliance In the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was created to develop agreement on best practices (ASEAN) countries, a regional FLEG process opened for its members and to gain credibility and legiti- the door for new initiatives and experiments within macy for its members’ standards. Its detailed code and across countries (BBC 2007; Brack 2005; Brown of good practices references the Technical Barriers et al. 2008; Cashore et al. 2006; Ching 2007), with to Trade Agreement but goes beyond it by augment- varying levels of involvement of civil-society and ing requirements for the participation of developing forest-sector stakeholders (Thang 2008). countries and an emphasis on production process Many of the FLEG processes focused much of standards in addition to the usual focus on perform- their effort on building greater capacity for the en- ance or product standards. forcement of existing laws (Tacconi 2007), reduc- Meanwhile, the way in which the exceptions for ing contradictory legal regimes, enlisting NGOs to environmental protection written into many interna- monitor on-the-ground activities, and reducing high tional trade agreements are interpreted can determine levels of illegal logging through labelling and market which domestic practices or regulations are accepted access (Brown et al. 2008; FAO and ITTO 2005; as legitimate and which are subject to dispute. A FLEG News 2007). full discussion of relevant rules and controversies is While a thorough review of these regional ef- beyond the scope of this chapter; we note, however, forts is beyond the scope of this chapter, we note that debates around whether production processes – that they, too, rely on soft agreements to promote both product-related and non-product-related – and good forest governance (Byron 2006). For example, product characteristics can be considered in limiting the Bali Ministerial Declaration committed partici- imports could have an impact on forest practices in pating (ASEAN) countries to, among other things, exporting countries. Developing countries in particu- “take immediate action to intensify national efforts, lar have raised concerns over the implications of such and to strengthen bilateral, regional and multilateral rules, which they fear will create barriers to market collaboration to address violations of forest law and access for their forest products; such concerns have forest crime, in particular illegal logging, associated led to the development of strategies to limit link- illegal trade and corruption, and their negative effects ages between trade and environment law. At the same on the rule of law”. Tacconi et al. (2004:15) note that time, the lack of such linkages or hard forest law has “The conference established a regional task force to 116 created an opening for voluntary eco-labelling and certification because they are potentially consistent with international trade rules (Bernstein and Hannah * The following three paragraphs draw on wording from 2008; Joshi 2004). Cashore et al. 2010.

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‘advance the objectives’ of the Declaration, and an ad- two domestic pieces of legislation, which were de- visory group of NGOs and industry was also formed veloped to meet existing international commitments, … The Indonesian Ministry of Forests and CIFOR are among the starkest examples of how hard law volunteered to undertake interim secretariat functions, can indeed shape domestic forest policy. What is and it seems possible that a permanent secretariat may important about these efforts is that developing coun- ultimately develop, should sufficient funding become tries such as Indonesia are fairly hospitable to them available.” A joint statement on FLEG by the govern- because they are aimed at ensuring that products ments of Indonesia and the Philippines in 2005 sup- produced in any particular country conforms to that ported increased attention to, and cooperation among, country’s domestic requirements. On the other hand, ITTO, G-8, ASEAN and other nations in promoting an international legal obligation would challenge, FLEG (Defensor and Fathoni 2005). rather than reinforce, the sovereignty of producer Recognising that the causes of corruption and countries. forest degradation were unlikely to be completely ASEAN has also been active in coordinating addressed through ASEAN cooperation, a range of and expanding commitments to promote SFM. For international actors spearheaded by the European example, member countries committed, in 2007, to Union (EU) turned to the markets pathway in an at- promoting C&I for SFM at the regional and national tempt to promote domestic good forest governance. levels, and to ensuring legality. These processes are EU FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance the basis for region-wide reporting on SFM at the and Trade) initiatives use access to the lucrative EU national level, overseen by the ASEAN Secretariat, markets as an incentive to promote responsible gov- and they also provide for benchmarking. ASEAN ernance in exporting countries. The EU’s main inter- member states share good practices in forest policy, vention to promote these efforts has been in the form including through the exchange of experiences on of negotiations with individual exporting countries in NFPs (Goehler et al. 2009). In 2009, ASEAN nations Africa and Southeast Asia to create voluntary part- committed to a six-year plan to promote the Multi- nership agreements (VPAs) that, arguably, amount Sectoral Framework on Climate Change: Agriculture to de facto binding law. and Forestry Towards Food Security, which promotes The approach of the United States has been to coordination and cooperation in the region. promote domestic good forest governance in export- Regional agreements in Latin America have fol- ing countries by strengthening the implementation lowed similar dynamics. The 1978 Amazon Coopera- of its own international obligations regarding trade tion Treaty promotes “economic, social and environ- in illegal products. To do so it amended domestic mental cooperation” among the Amazon countries. legislation known as the Lacey Act – a longstanding Through the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organi- act prohibiting the trade of wildlife, fish and plants zation (ACTO) it attempts to coordinate economic that have been illegally taken, transported or sold – development and environmental protection across to include timber products harvested illegally in any the entire Amazon Basin (McDermott et al. 2007). country. The EU has followed suit, developing its Progress has been described in terms of the “gradual own similar legislation.* The combination of these joint definition of approaches and policies for the Amazon” (Elias 2004:24); ACTO has not led to many concrete outputs as far as binding agreements and * The United States approach through the 2008 Lacey Act related cooperation and coordination on the region’s amendments, which prohibit the importation of illegally forests (ibid.). sourced wood, is more bluntly unilateral, although the de- In contrast, The Central American Regional tailed provisions may involve collaboration with exporting Convention for the Management and Conservation countries. Under the amendments, importers are required to of Natural Forest Ecosystems and the Development declare the species and origin of harvest of all plants. Penalties of Forest Plantations (‘Central American Forest for violations include the forfeiture of goods and vessels and Convention’) is “the only legally binding, regional imprisonment. The approach has the advantage of putting the instrument focused exclusively on forests [and] es- responsibility for legality on importers, which eliminates the tablishes a relatively comprehensive legal, policy ‘transshipment’ problem of the forest annex approach and the and institutional framework for the forests of Cen- need to target individual exporters. The European Commission tral America” (McDermott et al. 2007; Tarasofsky has since developed a proposal for trade legislation – the due 1999). The Convention encourages the coordination diligence regulation (DDR) – with a similar goal of preventing of national-level forest policies and requires parties the import of illegal wood into the EU from all sources. Un- to establish mechanisms to control the illegal trade of like the United States approach, however, the DDR requires flora, fauna, timber and other forest products. Among only “reasonable assurance” that wood products are legally other things it led Central American countries to take 117 produced (Baumüller et al. 2009). Australia, Japan, and New a common position within CITES in support of the Zealand have all signalled interest in pursuing similar legisla- inclusion of bigleaf mahogany in Appendix II (Mc- tion (McClanahan 2010). Dermott et al. 2007; Tarasofsky 1999).

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Taken together, these initiatives make inroads afforestation effort from 2002–2008 (Galupa et al. into the international trade of illegally logged tim- 2008). However, while there is interest in generating ber, but fall short of a comprehensive multilateral a supply of forest credits through such initiatives, prohibition (Lawson and MacFaul 2010). there are worries about demand, especially because Climate: The advent of REDD and REDD+ current interest is driven by upfront financing (e.g. policies* is increasingly seen as the most signifi- from the World Bank) and not financial returns from cant contemporary opportunity to entice developed investors. Indeed, afforestation credits issued under countries to commit the resources and technical as- the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are not sistance needed for on-the-ground implementation tradable on the EU-ETS nor Canadian compliance of international forest policies. In particular, the markets. However, questions remain as to whether evolution towards REDD+ in international negotia- the compliance market for forest carbon credits will tions on climate change signals a move towards the survive and negotiations regarding REDD+ could consideration of a broader forest agenda. In addi- prove crucial in this regard. tion to the inclusion of a range of approaches to forest management, REDD+ envisages the use of the REDD mechanism to improve access by marginal- 7.4.2 International norms and ised communities to forest resources and to promote discourse indigenous rights. In anticipation of a future agreement, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, negotiated at the 15th session Key developments of the Conference of the Parties to the United Na- tions Framework Convention on Climate Change, In academic debates on environmental, natural- established a Green Climate Fund to support REDD+ resource and forest governance a virtual consensus activities (Appleton et al. 2009). As part of these ef- has emerged that three procedural principles are fun- forts, developing countries were formally requested damental to good governance. They are inclusive- to identify drivers of deforestation; establish national ness (e.g. Belsky 2003; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. forest management systems; develop guidance for the 2008; Esty 2006; Ribot 1995; Tacconi et al. 2008; engagement of indigenous peoples and local com- World Resources Institute 2009), transparency (e.g. munities in monitoring and reporting; and develop Esty 2006; World Bank 2006) and accountability forest reference emission levels that take into account (e.g. Balboa 2009; Keohane and Nye 2003; Kop- historical data and adjust for national circumstances pell 2003, 2005). These principles reflect broader (Cashore et al. 2010). demands for the reform and improved accountability Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia and of international institutions (e.g. Held and Koenig- Vietnam are among the countries actively engaged in Archibugi 2005; Payne and Samhat 2004) as well climate-change schemes through United Nations-led as ‘stakeholder democracy’ that includes ‘collabo- initiatives or bilateral and multilateral agreements ration’ and true ‘deliberation’ among states, busi- related to forests. The rules have yet to be fully de- ness and civil society (Bäckstrand 2006; Vallejo and fined, but influence is already being felt. Forex- Hauselmann 2004). Such normative pressure reflects ample, Indonesia has, through its communication to more general trends in international environmental the Copenhagen Accord, committed to reducing its institutions, treaties and declaratory law, which, since greenhouse gas emissions by 26% against business- the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment in as-usual projections by 2020 (although this would Stockholm, have been promoting increased public amount to a 22% increase over 1990 emissions) participation and transparency at all levels of govern- mainly through REDD. Questions of implementa- ance (Bernstein 2005; Mori 2004). tion remain, however (Maryudi 2009). In advance of Equity is also emerging as a substantive global a formal agreement on REDD (or REDD+), a number norm with respect to resource governance (Aldy et of specific forest carbon offset projects have been al. 1999) and forest governance (Asch 1997; Corbera financed, including through the World Bank’s Bio- et al. 2007; Meller et al. 1996; Nhira et al. 1998; Carbon Fund (Carbon Finance Unit no date). Some Sarin 1995). Put simply, this norm demands con- such projects are at a significant scale: for example, sideration of whether “the costs and benefits of the two forest carbon offset project in Moldova represent proposed policy fall disproportionately on limited approximately 30 000 ha or half of the country’s total groups” (Tacconi et al. 2008). In the case of forests, a closely related phenomenon is a rising norm of granting greater access to forest resources to indigenous 118 * REDD+ is an expanded concept of REDD that also en- and forest-dependent communities. compasses the carbon-sequestration roles of conservation, the Collectively, this wider group of norms can pro- sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of vide benchmarks to evaluate international proposals, forest carbon stocks in developing countries. or provide arguments in support or in opposition to

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them. For example, both Kaimowitz (2003, 2005) and The most prominent example of norm diffusion Seymour (2008) argue that inattention to indigenous is SFM, which is now supported in virtually every and impoverished forest-dependent communities in country in which forests play a key role. Most coun- efforts to promote FLEG and REDD could uninten- tries also now have official goals addressing indig- tionally favour large corporations and powerful elites enous rights and resources in forest governance. In at the expense of poverty alleviation and community Canada, for example, international norms reinforce development. Concerns that this could induce politi- support to expand the role of indigenous peoples. cal instability have led to wide-ranging support for in forest management. Implementing these norms the procedural principles of inclusiveness, transpar- remains a challenge, however. As one Canadian study ency and accountability and the norms of equity and finds, “Aboriginal people generally perceive that for- access in transnational corporations and conservation est management is meeting their expectations related groups alike (The Forests Dialogue 2008). to Environmental Values and SFM better than it is Arguably, the combination of these procedural meeting their expectations related to Aboriginal and and substantive norms is one reason for the recent Treaty Rights, Participatory Decision-Making, and emergence of the principle of subsidiarity, in which Economic Opportunities and Development” (Kant decentralisation is the default mechanism for pro- and Brubacher 2008: 389). moting the fair and just allocation of forest rights Domestic and global policy agendas now also and resources to forest-dependent communities and reflect the strengthening norm against illegal logging. indigenous peoples (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Oram Environmental NGOs and international organisations and Doane 2005; Ribot 2008). Finally we note a nor- such as the World Bank (World Bank 2006) have mative trend, at least since UNCED, towards a view been especially active in promoting efforts against that environmental protection should be compatible illegal logging, as a reaction to the lack of success of with the liberal economic agendas promoted by many other strategies aimed at encouraging SFM. governments, international organisations and mar- Tenure reforms and community involvement in ket players. This favours market-based policies and forest management and governance pursued through instruments, public–private partnerships, privatisa- various schemes (e.g. forest land allocation, joint tion, open markets and free trade (Bernstein 2001; forest management, co-management, community/ Humphreys 2008). social forestry and regional forest agreements) re- With respect to forest management in particular, flect the procedural norms noted above. Households the dominant discourse is the promotion of SFM (see and community groups are also being provided with Chapter 4; Singer 2008). Wang (2004: 211) refers to greater access to forest resources. For example, Lao SFM as a concept with “one hundred faces” because PDR and Viet Nam are in the process of allocating of the many conflicting interests involved in forest forest lands to local communities and households management (Schanz 2004). Nevertheless SFM can (Hodgdon 2008). In Viet Nam, communities are be characterised as the suite of practices aimed at recognised as legal entities eligible to participate in ensuring that the goods and services derived from forest land allocation on the basis of the 2003 land forests to meet present-day needs while at the same law, which also marked the expansion of commu- time securing their continued availability and con- nity participation in forestry in the country (Nguyen tribution to long-term development. In its broadest et al. 2008a, 2008b). In Thailand, the Community sense, the concept encompasses the administrative, Forestry Bill was finally passed in 2007 after years legal, technical, economic, social and environmental of prevarication in parliament (Ongprasert 2008). aspects of the conservation and use of forests. It im- This bill defines the areas in which communities plies varying degrees of deliberate human interven- can be located and the types of forest-management tion, ranging from actions aimed at safeguarding and activities allowed. maintaining forest ecosystems and their functions Community forestry attracted national attention to those that favour specific socially or economi- in Indonesia when the Ministry of Forestry launched cally valuable species or groups of species for the its Hutan Kemasyarakatan (‘Community Forestry’) improved production of goods and services. programme in 2007. The aim of this programme was to give local communities greater access to forests and to provide them with long-term rights; Impacts on domestic policymaking as of October 2010 these efforts had led to increased community management but not ownership rights. Existing scholarship has shown that international Community forestry has also advanced in the Philip- norms have played a role in mobilising certain do- pines over the last 40 years, although recent changes mestic interests over others and shaping problem def- towards larger-scale forestry reveals the fragility of 119 inition and agenda setting (Keck and Sikkink 1998). this effort (Oberndorf 2008). Less work has been done on the exact mechanisms In Africa, Eba’a Atyi et al. (2008: 24) found that through which norm diffusion occurs. “all of the Central African countries have embarked

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on a revision of their forest laws in order to make long-term intensified timber production; it corrected them compatible with the needs of sustainable for- many of the deficiencies of the old regime by drawing est resources management”. Cameroon led the cur- on insights obtained from international debates and rent wave of forest law revisions when it adopted from the Bolivian experience (Smith et al. 2006). In a new forest law early in 1994 and enacted imple- Brazil, the dramatic increase in international inter- mentation decrees in 1995 and 1996; this initiative est in the Amazon and the growing influence of the “inspired” the whole sub-region (Karsenty 2006). international environmental movement, which began Equatorial Guinea reformed its forest law in 1997, in the 1990s, played a significant role in the country’s the Republic of the Congo in 2000, Gabon in 2001, environmental and forest policy reforms (Banarjee the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2002 and et al. 2009; Bauch et al. 2009). the Central African Republic in 2008. These reforms The normative pull from UNCED that – despite introduced new obligations (Eba’a Atyi et al. 2008), no binding agreement – urged the establishment of the most important of which are: the requirement to NFPs helps explain post-UNCED developments in manage production forests based on (sustainable) many European countries. In Norway, for example, forest management plans; the need for the greater UNCED, and especially the Convention on Biologi- participation of local people in forest resource man- cal Diversity, laid the normative groundwork for in- agement, decentralisation and benefit-sharing; spe- creased awareness and concern over the protection cific conservation objectives to be achieved across of old-growth forests and biodiversity (Gulbrandsen national territories; and the requirement to reduce 2003). the negative impacts of resource extraction on forest There is also evidence that global norms may ecosystems through the implementation of regula- shape the regulatory practices of developing coun- tions and guidelines. In all Central African countries. In a review of forest practices regulations in 24 tries the reforms related to the participation of local countries, McDermott et al. (2009) find that identical people, decentralisation and benefit-sharing involve rules for riparian buffer zone protection have been the inclusion of the concepts of community forests, developed in a host of countries with widely varied decentralised communal forests, municipal forests ecological systems (e.g. tropical, temperate and bore- and forest revenue distribution to local government al) and management requirements. They hypothesise entities. In addition to legislation specific to the that “mimetic isomorphism” – in which international management of forest and wildlife resources, most norms find their way into precise and specific policy countries in Central Africa have adopted laws on regulations – may explain such convergence. broader environmental protection. Arguably, norms of subsidiarity and greater local The raising of awareness and reporting of corrup- control also account for the growing acceptance of tion in the sub-region by international NGOs such small and medium-sized forest enterprises (SMFEs), as Transparency International, Global Witness and which are currently being upheld by civil society as Resource Extraction Monitoring have also been key potential instruments of social change and equity. In drivers. Governments in the sub-region wanting to particular, SMFEs and community forest enterprises improve their reputations at the international level are seen as appropriate vehicles for lifting forest- are working with NGOs on initiatives such as inde- dependent communities in developing economies pendent forest monitoring. The results, in practice, out of poverty because they provide meaningful are muted, however, because such initiatives focus employment and serve growing domestic markets mainly on the formal forest industry, which is usu- with value-added goods, and they do so in an ecologi- ally the smallest part of the sector. Moreover, the cally sustainable manner (Molnar et al. 2010). This is influence of international normative discourse may particularly true in countries where forest lands are be limited in countries where there is widespread held publicly and where the socio-economic benefits poverty. In such cases, short-term measures to en- of the dominant mode of business practice – large- sure subsistence may demand a higher priority on scale, concession-based forestry – is increasingly both ethical and sustainability grounds. Caution is being called into question (Kozak 2009). NGOs are therefore warranted in attributing too much power to responding by crafting interventions such as capac- norms and discourse. The pressure of economic need ity-building in business management and market remains an important determinant of policy. promotion that help to provide the enabling condi- International normative discourse on forests has tions in which smaller-scale enterprises will thrive. been influential in Latin America. In Costa Rica, However, there remains a paucity of data surround- for example, the 1996 forest law (Law No. 7575) ing the extent of employment and wealth generated “emphasized a market-friendly approach to forest- by SMFEs and further work is needed, especially 120 ry with a heavy dose of measures drawn from the in developing regions where informal forest-based international conservation paradigm” (Silva et al. economies are commonplace (Kozak 2007). 2002). In Peru, the 2003 forest law introduced radical changes that signalled the government’s interest in

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7.4.3 Markets mostly targeting the clearcutting of old-growth forests, in two of the province’s largest markets, Europe Key developments and the United States.* The provincial government responded in two ways: it announced that it was in Four key trends demark efforts along the markets the process of reforming its rules governing forest pathway over the last 30 years. First, a range of practices; and it lobbied European countries to coun- environmental NGOs, largely located in developed ter transnational criticisms. There is direct evidence countries, championed boycotts and/or targeting that the boycotts had an effect: British Columbia’s campaigns that engaged the purchasers of timber Premier Mike Harcourt acknowledged that the loss products originating in tropical (and, in the case of of markets motivated him to support policy change Canada, temperate) timber-producing countries. Sec- and mobilised domestic interests for policy change, ond, international agencies such as the World Bank although it also coincided with his own domestic have used a ‘carrot’ approach to convince govern- reform agenda (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). A ments to adopt domestic policy reforms ranging from subsequent market-based campaign that focused on the removal of protectionist policies (designed to British Columbia’s Great Bear Rainforest resulted promote employment in the domestic forest sector) in a collaborative agreement between First Nations, to efforts to eliminate corruption. Third, coalitions forest companies, environmental groups and the of environmental NGOs, social activists and the pri- provincial government to preserve vast tracts of vate sector have created market-driven certification old-growth forests and to engage in collaborative systems with which to promote responsible business research into responsible harvesting practices in practices, effectively bypassing domestic regulatory high-conservation-value forests (Natural Resources and land-use policies. Fourth, even larger coalitions Defense Council 2001; Sierra Club of British Co- of companies, activists, governments and aid agen- lumbia 2004). cies have coalesced around market incentives to pro- More recently, boycott and divestment campaigns mote baseline ‘legality verification’ as a means for targeted boreal forest conservation (Scher 2008). reinforcing domestic sovereignty. Covering 566 million hectares, Canada’s boreal forests account for a quarter of all forest remaining globally and form a unique and productive mosaic Impacts on domestic policymaking of interconnected habitats that include forests, lakes, river valleys, wetlands and peat lands, as well as tun- Boycott/targeting campaigns: Transnational envi- dra in its northern reaches. The United States-based ronmental advocacy groups have been successful Pew Charitable Trusts established the International in creating negative impressions of tropical timber Boreal Conservation Campaign to serve as an um- products (Klassen 2003). They appeal to consumers brella organisation for the domestic and international to boycott timber from particular species or places, environmental NGO constituents of a new boreal or that has been harvested in ways deemed unsus- coalition (Scher 2008). Two of these organisations tainable, as part of a moral responsibility to alleviate – the Canadian Boreal Initiative and the Boreal Song- forest destruction. bird Initiative – were also funded by Pew Charitable While it is difficult to tease out the effects of boy- Trusts. The coalition travelled the markets pathway cotts from other market-based approaches or path- to bring attention to the plans of the forest, mining ways, market pressure from boycotts has coincided and oil industries to conduct commercial activities with the adoption, by governments, of forest policy in much of the boreal forests. Simultaneously, it en- responses aimed at safeguarding export-oriented gaged in coalition-building along the direct access forest industries. Wong (1998), for example, found pathway. that ‘no-buy’ pleas helped to reduce timber exports A range of domestic policy reforms consistent from Indonesia to Japan and subsequently helped with the campaign’s objectives have been undertaken account for certain Indonesian domestic forest policy since the launch of the campaign. Between 1999 responses. For example, the government reviewed and 2005, 26.5 million hectares of the boreal forests the performance of logging companies and withdrew were placed under strict protection and an additional their concessions if their forest operations were be- 12.1 million hectares were placed under interim or low a certain standard (Dauvergne 1997). imminent protection (IBCC 2007). In November of Boycotts have also extended to developed coun- 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the tries with temperate forests, most notably Canada, protection of a further 10.3 million hectares in the where boycotts were used in British Columbia in the early 1990s (Bernstein and Cashore 2000) and in 121 boreal forests in the last decade. In British Columbia * The United States accounted for 59% of British Columbia’s a coalition of foreign and domestic environmental forest products export market, the European Union 11% and groups launched a successful boycott campaign, Japan 21% (Natural Resources Canada 1998)

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Northwest Territories. In July 2008, Ontario Premier cy efforts draws on examples of well-intentioned Dalton McGuinty pledged to protect half of Ontario’s efforts by the World Bank to promote improved for- northern boreal forest from resource extraction, an est governance in developing countries. However, area amounting to roughly 26 million hectares, which these examples should be understood in the wider is larger than the land area of the United Kingdom context of the increasingly active role of the World (Boyle 2008; Pala 2010). Soon thereafter, Quebec Bank in environmental policy generally, and forest Premier Jean Charest also announced that half of policy in particular. Quebec’s northern forest would be protected from Given its financial resources, political backing development and resource extraction. These two and expert-driven policies, the World Bank often recent announcements in Ontario and Quebec con- takes a lead role among international agencies, and stitute two of the largest conservation actions in the it has also been at the forefront of promoting neo- history of North America. They push the total area liberal environmental policies. It first explicitly artic- of the boreal forests brought under permanent or in- ulated this view of the environment in the 1992 World terim protection since the inception of the campaign Development Report, which promoted the view that to 23% of the total area (IBCC 2008); an additional economic growth without environmental deteriora- 8% of the area was already under protection. tion could be achieved through market liberalisa- In May 2010 the campaign led to the signing of tion, private property rights and the use of market yet another historic agreement. The Forest Products instruments to change environmentally damaging be- Association of Canada, a trade association that repre- haviour –what it called ‘win–win’ solutions (World sents the majority of logging companies in Canada, Bank 1992). Since then, however, the World Bank announced the biggest forest-conservation deal in has tempered this view with an emphasis on good history. Each of the 21 members of the Association governance and other evolving policies, sometimes will set aside for protection slightly less than half in response to criticisms from members and envi- of the land for which they hold leases across seven ronmental NGOs (Park 2007). The examples below provinces; in aggregate, this amounts to more than focus only on the World Bank’s significant, although 30 million hectares of Canadian boreal forest. In ad- often short-lived, impacts, and sometimes those of dition, Association members have pledged to manage the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in pressuring the remainder of their leases to protect ecologically countries to undertake specific policy reforms. and culturally significant sites and to have their com- In Indonesia, the World Bank insisted that the mercial operations certified by the FSC. In return, country remove its restrictions on raw log exports nine environmental NGOs, including Greenpeace (Goodland and Daly 1996); officials at both the and The Nature Conservancy, have pledged a mora- World Bank and the IMF reasoned that this would torium on market campaigns against the products of promote economic growth and therefore alleviate Association members. poverty (Barr 2001). Recognising the importance Despite these successes, research has shown that, of both the rule of law and development to the al- overall, targeting and boycotts, especially when used leviation of poverty, the World Bank also promoted as the primary source of leverage, have had very un- decentralisation, believing that it would permit even success. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for forest-dependent peoples to share in the prosper- example, transnational actors attempted to use global ity that economic growth promised. The Bank also markets to force policy responses in Latin America undertook a broader effort to promote SFM in In- and other tropical forested regions by threatening donesia by financing several forest-sector projects boycotts of tropical timber. These attempts largely (Dauvergne 2001) and promoted the rationalisation failed, however, due in part to their “limited latitude of the domestic regime to improve the sustainabil- for action” within the international trade regime and ity of forest operations and processing industries. the subsequent threat of trade sanctions from pro- The effort involved three main strategies: improved ducer countries (Bass and Guéneau 2005: 8). Without enforcement of the silvicultural system; increased direct evidence from political leaders, too, it is dif- capture of timber rent; and improved efficiency of ficult to know if boycotts are necessary or sufficient logging operations, processing industries and mar- for policy change, since policy change that appears keting (Barr 2001). Initially the Government of In- to be in response to a boycott may actually be the donesia attempted to minimise the involvement of result of domestic dynamics or action taken along the World Bank in the sector (Gautam et al. 2000), other pathways, which often coincide with market but it became more favourably disposed towards its campaigns. The agreement between the Forest Prod- involvement in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial ucts Association of Canada and environmental NGOs crisis. A bail-out agreement with the IMF required 122 described above is an example of change via a direct the government to adopt the World Bank’s forest access pathway, with the threat of boycotts (the mar- policy strategies (Barr 2001; Dauvergne 2001). kets pathway) providing considerable Also in Southeast Asia, the World Bank promoted Single-agency efforts: Our review of single-agen- greater access and resource rights in the Philippines

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and Cambodia. In both countries the hypothesis driv- world’s forests, poverty alleviation, indigenous rights ing these efforts was that the greater integration of and community participation. This normative under- forests into the local economies of rural communi- pinning may explain the longstanding World Bank ties would create greater local commitment to forest support for FSC-style certification, which represents conservation and SFM. an opportunity to support socially and environmen- In Central Africa, the World Bank has used its tally responsible practices in ways that are consistent structural adjustment programmes and Heavily with the World Bank’s broader neo-liberal goals. Indebted Poor Countries initiative during times of The FSC developed ten (abstract) principles that economic hardship to influence forest policymaking. set the goals of responsible forest management, with For example, Karsenty (2006) argues that it is not concrete criteria detailing policy objectives. These coincidental that Cameroon became the first country principles and criteria are both prescriptive and in the sub-region to adopt a new forestry code and wide-ranging; they address a host of natural resource to undergo a structural adjustment programme. The management challenges, including biodiversity, local World Bank economists who piloted forest-sector water pollution and wildlife protection, as well as reforms in Cameroon acknowledge that: “The eco- community rights and worker protection (Meidinger nomic crisis gave the World Bank and the IMF an 2003).* Specific policy prescriptions are to be devel- opportunity to introduce and support far reaching oped through national or sub-national multi-stake- reforms in the forest sector ... The forest sector was a holder bodies charged with incorporating ecological focal point of three successive adjustment programs and social knowledge into those prescriptions. For ... : the Economic Recovery Credit of 1994 and the certification, the FSC also requires third-party com- second and the third Structural Adjustment Credits” pliance audits of operators. If successful in their bid (Topa et al. 2009: 23). The Bank built a broad coali- to receive certification, operators are awarded with tion of donors and influential international NGOs an eco-label with which to promote their corporate (e.g. the World Wide Fund for Nature – WWF, the image and to meet demand along the supply chain Wildlife Conservation Society, the World Resources for certified products. Institute, the International Union for Conservation of While many companies and forest industries ini- Nature and the Last Great Ape Organization). It also tially baulked at the idea of outside scrutiny of their presented the reforms as a set of conditionalities to forest practices, two discernible trends had emerged be met by the government in order to gain access to by the mid 2000s. First, most industrialised countries international financial support. The Government of in North America and Europe came to embrace third- Cameroon responded by adopting all the proposed party certification; many supported FSC competitors reforms at the regulatory and institutional levels. that emerged in the 1990s, the standards of which However, the results have been unconvincing in some are generally more flexible than those of the FSC. areas – such as community forestry, where “generat- In addition, because these competitor schemes were ing significant income from community forests has initiated by forest-owner and/or forest-industry as- proven difficult” (Topa et al. 2009: 106). sociations, their governance structures have tended to Certification: Certification is a global-supply- downplay the role of environmental groups. Instead, chain-focused institution that may be characterised they give a greater role to producers and to non- as an example of non-state, market-driven global environmental stakeholders and conservation groups governance. The concept was first raised at the in- that are closer to the centre of the political spectrum; ternational level by NGOs in 1989 in the context of partly as a result, such schemes are more limited in ITTO (Elliott 2000; Gale 1998). At first it was met scope than the FSC. This pleases some forest owners, with resistance from tropical producer countries; who feel that FSC requirements are too cumbersome thus, ITTO decided not to endorse any particular and/or too expensive for current markets. Recently, certification system (although it did provide exper- most of the non-FSC schemes have come under the tise and resources to member countries that wished umbrella of the Programme for the Endorsement to pursue certification of their own accord). This, of Forest Certification (PEFC) (Humphreys 2006; combined with a general frustration of many of the Vallejo and Hauselmann 2001). world’s leading environmental groups over the fail- ure of intergovernmental efforts to achieve a binding global forest convention, led WWF to spearhead a * The ten FSC principles are: (1) compliance with laws, inter- coalition of environmental, social and business ac- national agreements, and FSC principles; (2) tenure and use tivists to establish the FSC in 1993 (Humphreys rights and responsibilities; (3) indigenous people’s rights; (4) 2006). community relations and worker’s rights; (5) multiple benefits The development of certification systems tapped from the forest; (6) environmental impact and biodiversity 123 into emerging normative support for win–win so- conservation; (7) management plans; (8) monitoring and as- lutions by simultaneously championing markets, sessment; (9) maintenance of high conservation value forests; the amelioration of environmental functions in the and (10) plantations.

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Figure 7.1 Forest certification by region (PEFC = Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification schemes; CSA = CSA International; ATFS = American Tree Farm System; SFI = Sus- tainable Forestry Initiative; FSC = Forest Stewardship Council). Graph compiled by Ben Blom. Sources: ATFS 2004; FAO 2005; FSC 2010; PEFC 2009; SFI 2010.

Despite individual cases of success, aggregate access to FSC markets in return for a commitment data reveal that, after more than a decade, less than from companies to become certified. It has developed 5% of the global area of certified forests is found in the Forest Market Linking Program to provide as- the tropics, initially the target of many proponents of surances of legality to buyers. In Indonesia, the TFT certification (Eba’a Atyi and Simula 2002). In fact, assists companies who wish to establish chain-of- much of the support for FSC and PEFC certification custody systems in support of specific market re- (and most of the certified forest – see Figure 7.1) is quirements. in North America and Europe, where policy enforce- Transnational actors have also used the markets ment is already relatively strong (Esty and Porter pathway to support consumer–producer networks for 2002) and where, at least on public lands, policies are sustainable timber products and forest certification quite prescriptive Widespread support in developing throughout the region. In particular, WWF facili- countries in general, and in the tropics in particular, tates trade linkages between companies committed continues to be elusive. to achieving and supporting responsible forestry Hence, one of the key issues for generating through its Global Forest Trade Network (GFTN) broader support for certification in developing coun- programme. Such linkages have been established tries has been whether and when private institutions in Mesoamerica, the Caribbean, Bolivia, Brazil and might be able to adapt and respond to new challenges Peru. in ways that either bypass or intersect with intergov- Legality verification: More recently, focus has ernmental and domestic efforts. shifted from certification to promoting baseline gov- One of the first responses to uneven support for ernance through the verification of legality – in many certification was to provide additional incentives to ways reinforcing sovereignty rather than bypassing companies in the tropics, who face greater obstacles it, as certification has attempted to do. Here, we dis- in adopting policies consistent with certification than cuss how three pathways towards policy change have their competitors in developed countries. Numer- intersected to produce innovative effects. ous players have emerged that provide assistance by As Tacconi (2007) notes, NGOs such as the En- 124 linking responsible timber producers and consumers vironmental Investigation Agency, The Nature Con- and by providing support for the verification of legal- servancy and WWF attempted to use the foreign- ity and/or sustainability. For example, the Tropical market dependence of the Indonesian forest sector Forest Trust TFT) works with and gives companies to bring about change to policies concerning illegal

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logging; they sought to organise boycotts of Indo- was the first complete agreement in Southeast Asia nesian timber products in Europe and to influence framed within a TLAS. As Maryudi (2009) explains, markets in China and Japan. Our above discussion the Indonesian TLAS (Standar Verifikasi Legalitas on the international rules pathway discussed how Kayu – SVLK) was submitted to the Ministry of domestic legislation in the EU and the United States Forestry in 2008 following five years of negotia- has increased the international obligations of both by tion under the auspices of the UK–Indonesia Forest requiring greater efforts to reduce imports of illegal Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) wood. This has had the effect of enhancing market Action Plan. The lengthy process was due in part to pressure, potentially setting the stage for improving debates about whether the agreement would merely domestic public policy efforts in developing coun- cover the distribution and trade of timber products tries, which has, in turn, facilitated the direct access or also broader forest management questions such pathway. Hence, understanding how the market path- as planning, implementation and harvesting. Another way might intersect with efforts undertaken along key point of contention, which may reflect differ- other pathways is important to producing effective ing competing interests domestically, was that EU and enduring results. negotiators requested that the third-party verifiers To be sure not all of these intersecting pathways of legality be mutually agreed. The Government of produces uniform results across time or space. The Indonesia acceded to this request in August 2009, EU’s efforts on illegal logging a decade ago can be paving the way for a formal agreement. seen as a reaction to the market pressure exerted by Similar results have occurred in Africa, where the NGOs but these efforts stand in contrast to the limited dependence of the timber sector on EU markets has public policy impact that similar market campaigns been a catalyst for governments, including Ghana have had in Japan and China. Likewise, public policy and the Republic of the Congo, to engage in negotia- responses in Indonesia to EU market pressure were tions with the EU on VPAs. ‘paper’ edicts only. They included Presidential In- These approaches are not a panacea to prob- struction Number 5 Concerning Eliminating Illegal lems of forest governance, and their impacts on the Logging and the Illegal Timber Trade in the Leuser ground remain to be seen. There are also some in- Ecosystem and Tanjung Puting National Park, issued dications that gains from curtailing illegal logging on 19 April 2001; and the Statement of the President may be countered by increases in unsustainable legal of the Republic of Indonesia on Repressive Measures logging(Lawson and MacFaul 2010). Nevertheless, Against Illegal Logging, issued on 24 April 2001 the combination of the markets, international rules (Currey 2001; Tacconi 2007). and market access pathways appear to hold promise However, ongoing market pressure to institution- in ways that a single pathway may not. It is for this alise market incentives led the EU and the United reason that Maryudi (2009: 11) argues that the ap- States to develop formal policies to weed out ille- proval of the SVLK and the signing of the VPA in gal logging. As discussed above, this included the Indonesia appear “to hold potential for working in negotiation (in the case of the EU) of VPAs with tandem with local institutions, to develop a durable individual countries and the passing of legislation and effective institution for reducing illegal logging (in the case of both the United States and the EU) in the country”. that requires importers to show due care in ensur- Corporate social responsibility: Worldwide ing that they are not importing illegal timber. These there is an undeniable trend towards the adoption, developments have led to the emergence of legality by companies of corporate responsibility (CR) prac- verification, in which third-party auditors assess for- tices, motivated by ‘soft’ economic pulls such as est practices to determine whether they meet base- the benefits that can accrue to companies that are line legality requirements. Products that meet those seen as responsible stewards. In the forest sector, requirements obtain a label that importers can use much of this is a logical extension of forest certi- as evidence that they have shown due care in avoid- fication; nevertheless, the range of CR practices is ing the importation of illegally obtained products. now quite diverse (Vidal and Kozak 2008b). Forest Even the more formal VPAs have provisions for companies in Africa and Latin America are adopting the third-party, non-governmental auditing of for- practices related to health, education, training and est practices to verify that companies and govern- community development; Asian companies are more ments are meeting their commitments. The process concerned with emissions control, energy efficiency, is framed within a ‘timber legality assurance system’ and recycling; and North American and European (TLAS) that includes a clear definition of legality, companies are concentrating on SFM (Vidal and verification, independent monitoring, the issuing of Kozak 2008a). licenses, and chain-of-custody control (Lawson and The reasons underlying the adoption of CR prac- 125 MacFaul 2010). tices by forest companies are also diverse, but they The VPA between Indonesia and the EU (Colches- generally seem to revolve around legitimisation and ter 2006), while an understandably cautious process, improved transparency. The aims are to address in-

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creasingly rigorous societal expectations regarding across coalitions; and assisting governments in en- the stewardship of forest resources; demonstrate a forcing or implementing domestic policy commit- commitment to sustainability; and, ultimately, main- ments by providing technical expertise, resources tain market share (Jenkins and Smith 1999; Panwar and incentives. et al. 2006). The multi-dimensional nature of the The evidence below both reinforces and requires phenomenon speaks to the need to disentangle the an expansion of the analysis of this pathway by Bern- market benefits from the normative constructs inher- stein and Cashore (2000). It confirms the attention of ent in the national and company-level environments the original analysis to the role of outside actors in (Vidal and Kozak 2008a). changing domestic policy networks, but adds to it an emphasis on how policy learning can shape domestic politics in unintended ways (Howlett and Ramesh 7.4.4 Direct access to the domestic 2002, 2003; Howlett and Rayner 2006). policy process Impacts on domestic policymaking Key developments Domestic civil society: One of the most intriguing Although perhaps the least studied of the four pathways in which non-domestic organisations affect ways, the direct access of international forest institu- domestic policy is the use of resources from foun- tions and organisations to domestic policy processes dations, environmental NGOs, companies and gov- has arguably had the biggest impact on domestic ernment agencies to leverage or grant more resources policymaking. Direct access captures those processes and staff for existing domestic organisations and/or in which non-domestic financial resources, techni- to create new domestic organisations or coalitions cal knowledge, expertise, training and learning can (Balboa 2009). For example, foundations and en- dramatically shape domestic politics. It works by vironmental NGOs in the United States influenced mobilising societal interests, generating new co- Canadian forest policy in this way, beginning in the alitions or confronting existing ones, and provid- 1980s. Working first in British Columbia and then ing resources for effective and enduring impacts expanding to include the Canadian boreal forests, on domestic governance and policy networks. As these groups combined market-based and direct ac- Singer’s (2008) assessment of the impacts of the cess approaches. The latter included the granting international forest regime in Cameroon, Indonesia of financial resources to environmental NGOs and and Brazil finds, “What makes the strength of the marginalised groups, including First Nation groups, IFR[international forest regime], therefore, is not its which provided them with the staff, time and exper- formal framework or the official negotiations … but tise to become active in the domestic policymaking rather its informal aspects. In particular, principles process. While it is difficult to tease out the causal and policy networks … have transcended spheres impacts of the direct access pathway compared to and contributed to shaping Brazilian, Cameroonian the markets pathway, it seems likely that the direct and Indonesian FRPs [forest-related policies], and access approach increased both the pace and scale vice-versa” (Singer 2008:363). Similarly, informal of forest policy reforms (Scher 2008). policy networks, such as ASEAN’s regional knowl- Direct access strategies have been pursued in de- edge networks, seem to be particularly effective in veloping countries, especially in Southeast Asia. In Asia because of “a cultural aversion to formal insti- Indonesia, a range of non-domestic groups took ad- tutional arrangements and a reflection of an Asian vantage of the fall of the Suharto regime to strengthen style of governance and diplomacy” (Nesadurai and civil society with a view to fostering new ideas and Stone 2000). Unquestionably, a range of internation- interests within domestic policymaking (Okamoto al aid agencies, institutions, NGOs and educational 2001). For example, organisations such as The Na- institutions have travelled this pathway in the last ture Conservancy successfully became involved in 20 years under the auspices of ‘capacity building’, policy networks, partly because of the fragmentation which often works to reinforce, rather than to directly of authority that followed the decentralisation of the challenge, domestic sovereign authority. government administration (Barr et al. 2006). The enormity of this effort and its impacts means A number of donor agencies, including the UK that we can only summarise a few examples through Department for International Development and Nor- which the direct access pathway has shaped and in- way’s Partnerships, as well as transnational environ- fluenced domestic forest governance. It has done so mental NGOs, have actively sought to promote social 126 by providing resources to civil-society organisations, and environmental values in forest management in thus changing the relative influence of different ac- Indonesia. Initially, the focus was on forest prac- tors and domestic policy networks; fostering and tices; illegal logging; democratic decision-making nurturing domestic governance learning networks and forest governance; poverty alleviation among

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forest dwellers; resolving tenurial problems; and in- illegal logging, including spot checks, helicopter creasing local forest management. Recently, many surveillance, regular training programmes for offic- donors have begun to focus on climate-change miti- ers and public awareness campaigns. In Indonesia, gation and adaptation. the Ministry of Forestry has increased the number of There is strong evidence that the direct access forest guards, trained them to prevent illegal logging pathway helped environmental NGOs and interests and, following civil-society demands, enacted the in Indonesia to implant strong environmental and Anti-Money Laundering Act (in 2002) and ratified social protections within the new Indonesian forest the United Nations Convention against Corruption law. Non-domestic organisations sought alliances (in 2006). with local counterparts, research institutions and The direct access pathway has a longer history universities. The Center for International Forestry in Africa than in Southeast Asia. It was not until Research and the country’s two leading forest uni- the early 1990s, however, that forest-focused inter- versities (Bogor Agricultural University and Univer- national organisations began to target forest policy sitas Gadjah Mada) remain the most prominent focal there, as illustrated by developments in the Central points, providing science-based policy inputs. African forest sector. Until the late 1980s, most do- However, the ongoing and dynamic nature of nor projects, including those of the Canadian Interna- these efforts in Indonesia, and the broader market tional Development Agency (CIDA), focused on field forces of economic globalisation, which have re- practices, experiments and inventories. Beginning in sulted in the significant conversion of natural forests the 1990s, however, CIDA’s approach in Cameroon to plantations, mean that this direct access pathway moved towards engagement with the central forest has had mixed results. There have been significant administration. It created an advisory office adjacent challenges in implementing the new forest law, in- to the office of the National Director of Forests and cluding the fragmentation of authority. Thus, even if included in its desired outputs key elements of the le- the involvement of non-domestic actors has helped to gal and institutional forest management framework. influence domestic policy networks, they do not ap- During the first phase of the project, from 1992 to pear to have had a discernible impact on the ground. 1995, Cameroon adopted a new forest law and cre- The private sector remains highly influential, and ated a zoning (land-use) plan for its southern rain- disentangling the interests of business and govern- forests. CIDA’s success in influencing Cameroon’s ment is often difficult. Domestic challenges in the forest policymaking process served as an example implementation of new laws, and the short attention to other donors. By 2000, the minister responsible spans of international donors – who move quickly for forests and wildlife had technical advisors or from one instrument (such as forest certification) to advisory teams from France, Germany, the UK and the next (such as REDD) – have placed sometimes Canada. Currently, all ministers dealing with forests confusing and conflicting demands on government in Central Africa have access to permanent techni- policymakers. Perhaps in part for these reasons, in- cal advisors or advisory projects funded by donor ternational NGOs such as The Nature Conservancy countries. The aim is always to institutionalise newly that have partnered with domestic organisations in introduced forest management approaches through Indonesia appear to have made more headway in laws, regulations or official guidelines adopted fol- influencing local-level governments* than in either lowing policymaking processes. As a result, Singer making changes to land-use policies or influencing (2009:357) found that travelling this pathway led to national-level policies. “a new network … which has determined the main The dominant strategy among environmental direction of Cameroonian [forest resources policy] NGOs is to travel simultaneously on the direct ac- in the last decade.” cess pathway and the markets pathway. For instance, International NGOs also became active. For ex- WWF created a Southeast Asia focus NGO –Traffic ample, WWF has engaged with the Government of – to partner with domestic organisations, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo to enforce government agencies, to help reduce illegal logging policies within forest concessions. The project ad- in the region. dresses the implementation of the forest administra- In contrast to initiatives with a broader focus on tion’s official guidelines governing concession for- SFM, direct access initiatives on the verification of est management. It also reinforces the international legality appear to be gaining in strength and impact. norms and discourse pathway because it incorporates In Peninsular Malaysia, for example, the govern- internationally recognised forest management norms ment has instituted a number of measures to curb such as the African Timber Organization/ITTO principles, C&I for the sustainable management of Afri- can natural tropical forests and some aspects of the 127 * The Nature Conservancy has been active in the Berau Dis- FSC principles and criteria. trict, East Kalimantan, collaborating with the district govern- Direct access strategies have also been under- ment in developing REDD activities. taken by more radical international NGOs advocating

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the banning of industrial timber harvesting in the International assistance agencies such as USAID, Congo Basin. These NGOs develop networks of lo- FAO and the World Bank, along with international cal NGOs that relay their opinions during domestic environmental NGOs, contributed to the dialogue by stakeholder consultation processes. For example, an providing funding, technical information and advice open letter to the minister in charge of forests in the to decision-makers (Pavez and Bojanic 1998). Democratic Republic of the Congo was published In Peru, the government’s interest in improved in April 2008 requesting a “moratorium on new in- forest practices shifted in 2002–03 with the imple- dustrial logging titles” in the country. A group of mentation of the new forest law. With the support of international NGOs – Greenpeace, Global Witness (principally Dutch) development agencies, the then and the Rainforest Foundation – signed the letter Minister of Agriculture brought together a coalition along with a representative of a network of ten lo- of government forest officials and non-government cal NGOs. Similarly, the German-based Rettet den forest stakeholders (Smith et al. 2006). The combined Regenwald organised national NGOs in Gabon to weight of this coalition was able to counteract those oppose, in 1996, the first FSC certificate granted opposed to the new law. The coalition built on and in the sub-region (to the logging company Leroy expanded a round-table of stakeholders to develop Gabon). The certificate was later withdrawn (Eba’a a consensus on the implementation of the new law, Atyi 2006). and presented its feedback and recommendations to Fostering learning across coalitions: An under- the government (Smith et al. 2006). explored impact of international forest governance Regional-level strategies to foster learning, such arrangement is their role in fostering learning across as ‘capacity development’ for knowledge transfer domestic coalitions. For example, the C&I processes and mutual learning processes among peer coun- dominant in the 1990s focused NGOs, governments tries (e.g. Goehler et al. 2009; Goehler and Schwaab and industry organisations on ‘how things work’, 2009), are also being promoted by development which led to a realisation of the importance of col- agencies (Ferroni 2001). In a seven-year regional laborative learning, especially on such complex is- program with ASEAN, for example, GTZ provided sues as forest management. Likewise, development advisory services and financial resources to both for- assistance agencies that support FLEG processes fre- mal intergovernmental bodies, such as the ASEAN quently foster learning among disparate stakehold- Senior Officials on Forestry, and the more informal ers. For example, German Technical Cooperation ASEAN regional knowledge networks. Focused dis- (GTZ) has started to provide funds to numerous local cussions on specific policy interventions were led agencies, including the Indonesian Forest Agency, by the ASEAN Working Group on a Pan ASEAN to carry out research on the impacts of conventional Timber Certification Initiative. These helped to fos- logging as well as trials on reduced impact logging. ter agreement by all ten ASEAN member states on It also provides technical assistance to improve the a regional guideline for phased approaches to for- standard of operations. Another international body, est certification and on the ASEAN C&I for timber the Tropical Forest Foundation, helped to provide the legality (Hinrichs 2009). The EU, GTZ and USAID Government of Indonesia with a scientifically sound supported the working group with technical expertise foundation for reduced impact logging, leading to the and financial resources. development of guidelines for better forest practices In 2008 ASEAN established regional knowledge (Klassen 2003). networks on FLEG and forests and climate change, In Latin America, transnational actors and in- with the primary motive of better informing decision- ternational institutions have influenced and in some makers through policy-oriented research as a precon- cases directly accessed domestic forest policymaking dition for effective policy implementation (ASEAN processes, largely through the provision of resources, 2008, 2009). GTZ played an initiating role, advised knowledge, training and finance. In Costa Rica in the on network management and, together with AusAID mid 1990s, for example, the United States Agency for and the World Bank, provided financial resources International Development (USAID) strengthened for network activities. The regional knowledge net- the historically poorly organized private forestry sec- work on FLEG organised a learning process in which tor with organizational knowhow and funding, es- countries shared their professional views, developed tablishing the Costa Rican Forestry Chamber (CCF). collective wisdom on FLEG, and shared experiences The CCF became the main advocate for the timber about the successes and failures of FLEG policies industry and was a significant stakeholder in the de- (Pescott et al. 2010). velopment of the 1996 forest law (Law No. 7575) It is difficult to establish a cause-and-effect link (ibid.). In Bolivia, one of the key factors in reform between these processes and subsequent change, or 128 was the emergence of political conditions that were to attribute such change to specific capacity-building favourable to democratic participation. As a result, an activities. An evaluation by the World Bank assessed intensive dialogue on forest-sector issues took place the majority of its regional programs as effective with the engagement of many stakeholder groups. and suggested that “even stronger results could be

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achieved if support for regional programs were better the potential to, ‘ratchet up’ policies and behav- developed as an international aid practice” (World iours. The literature on the globalisation of the Bank 2007b). In a similar vein, Birdsall (2004) ar- forest sector is relatively well developed, and the gues that regional public goods in developing coun- literature on forest governance and the political tries, such as forests, are under-funded despite their economy intuitively recognises that the globalisa- potentially high rates of return compared to tradi- tion/internationalisation relationship is complex; tional country-focused investments. nevertheless, few studies address this interaction Recognition of the importance of understanding explicitly. The next step is to explore the con- the impacts of single policy interventions on different ditions under which these counteracting effects pathways is illustrated by the influence of the FLEGT ratchet down standards and lesson enforcement, process in Central Africa. While drawing on the mar- provide incentives for illegal practices, or pro- kets pathway for economic incentives, these efforts duce effects that are beneficial to environmental have also led to considerable direct access interven- quality. There is no consensus in the literature tions such as capacity building and coordination. In on which of the four internationalisation path- preparation for VPAs, for example, the Republic of ways are likely to be most successful. There is a the Congo, Cameroon, Central African Republic and tendency in the literature to move away from a Gabon all initiated efforts to permit independent ob- focus on international rules towards market-based servers to monitor their forest operations. Subse- interventions, but this trend appears to stem more quently, NGOs working to promote transparency, from an analysis of actual policy instruments than such as Global Witness and Resource Extraction from a systemic comparison of the countervailing Monitoring, became involved in forest monitoring effects of each pathway or their interactions with – a sovereign state activity – and their monitoring globalisation. reports were disseminated widely. Cameroon and 3) While we know a great deal about activities along the Republic of the Congo have also worked with each of the pathways, there is still a significant the World Resources Institute to develop interactive gap in knowledge of causality. In other words, forest atlases showing forest concessions, which have very little of the literature explicitly explores the been made available publicly. In the Democratic conditions under which activities or institutions Republic of the Congo, the development of a legal along particular pathways will have their desired framework for forest management and the conver- effects. sion of former logging titles to concessions have been done with notable transparency. At each stage In the remainder of this section, we work inductively of the process the forest administration has worked from our review to offer preliminary propositions consistently with national and international NGOs, for addressing areas identified above where more as well as with technical international donors and work is needed. private-sector partners (Eba’a Atyi et al. 2008). While some of the propositions made below were anticipated in the Bernstein and Cashore (2000) study around which this review was organised, recent 7.5 Findings and conclusions research and evidence suggests important modifica- tions.

The following three broad conclusions emerge from our review: Pathway 1: international rules 1) Domestic effects cannot be studied simply by looking at the international rules pathway, even International agreements affect domestic policy to if one takes into account the fragmentation and the extent that they create binding obligations on institutional complexity of forest governance states through international law. This proposition that arises due to the lack of a comprehensive reflects a standard view of how international law international forest regime. The literature shows works. We saw evidence of it in the case of the United significant effects along the three other pathways. States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement and in ex- Broadly speaking, the direct access pathway amples from CITES. This proposition is a baseline, shows the most widespread effects, both directly however, in the sense that the large literature on and through interactions with activities along compliance and effectiveness suggests that imple- other pathways. mentation and compliance are dependent on a range 2) Globalisation does not always lead to downward of further conditions. Notably, owing to the lack of 129 pressure on environmental and social standards. international forest-focused hard law, non-forest- Its interaction with internationalisation, as defined focused hard-law instruments, and some soft-law here, can push in ways that either do, or hold instruments, are having a much greater effect than

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one might expect. There is little research, however, lated policies, the changing positions of government, on why some instruments have had greater – or have and the dominant ideologies or cultural discourse and the potential to have greater – impacts than others. practices – better account for the success of trans- It is therefore difficult to draw firm conclusions on national campaigns for change. It is also clear from whether particular initiatives – such as REDD+ – are evidence that the learning gained through United likely to have a greater policy impact than existing Nations conferences and processes as well as through instruments. participation in other international organisations has Transnational and/or domestic coalitions for played a role in the dissemination of forest-related change can activate rules in cases of non-compli- international norms and that governments have taken ance. Rules can be become a resource on which their cues from these processes. transnational and/or coalitions of domestic actors Dominant norms agreed to in international fo- can draw when governments do not comply, although rums and promoted by powerful independent observ- the ability to mobilise may vary between domestic ers such as the World Bank are likely to be drawn settings. When mobilisation is possible, groups can upon by governments facing external pressures to publicise non-compliance, pressure governments to change policies. live up to their commitments, and press governments Strategies for change based on international to launch disputes against other countries that do not norms and discourse depend on the moral vulnera- fulfil their obligations. bility of the target state. They also depend on the abil- For countries dependent on trade or foreign capi- ity to engage other states and actors in placing the tal under conditions of increasing globalisation, fear issue on the global agenda, whether by reformulating of losing market share and investor confidence acts current norms and ideas or by introducing new ones. as an added incentive to comply with international Cases in most regions suggest that targeting on moral rules. Again, the United States–Peru Trade Promo- grounds has been an effective strategy, although it tion Agreement provides good initial evidence for is unclear whether this has resulted in long-term, or this proposition, since the promise of market access, the institutionalisation of, policy change. and the threat posed to it by illegal logging, provided a strong incentive for Peru to sign the deal. Similar dynamics underlie FLEGT agreements. It is also notable, however, that many of the reforms necessary Pathway 3: markets for the United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agree- ment were already under way before the agreement Relative dependence on foreign markets and the was struck and could be linked to other pathways success of transnational actors in convincing con- and to domestic pressure. sumers to exercise consumer preferences are key Agreements on international rules with strong determinants of policy influence. Boycott strategies compliance mechanisms are more likely when such give the appearance of short-term success, but long- agreements reflect rules or processes already under term efforts require more enduring forms of non-state way domestically owing to interaction with other authority, such as certification. pathways. Of all the trade agreements between the Hence, the durability of policy responses is con- United States and Latin American countries, the only ditioned upon maintaining transnational pressure. one with strict rules on forests involves Peru, which All things being equal, if pressure is not maintained had initiated reforms in the early 2000s in advance then ‘downward’ measures in response to globalisa- of the treaty. tion are likely. Normative changes in response to such pressures alone are unlikely. In almost all cases, significant Pathway 2: international norms and institutionalisation of change that reflected new discourse forest-related norms has resulted from pressures or activities along a number of pathways and not from boycotts alone. While much of the literature suggests that international norms and discourse have significant influence, little of it addresses why or how particular discourses or norms have been internalised into policy and behaviour. Therefore, the propositions below are suggestive, drawing as much on the theory-based 130 literature as on examples in forestry. For example, they are consistent with Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) argument that ‘dynamic’ factors in domestic politics – such as how proposals for change ‘fit’ with other re-

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Pathway 4: direct access to Acknowledgements the domestic policy process The authors thank Tina Dietrich, Erica Pohnan and Ben Blom for invaluable research assistance, Todd Our review generally found three ways in which the Sigaty for input into the understanding of forest pol- international forest regime influences the domestic icy dynamics in Southeast Asia. We are also grateful policy process through the direct access pathway. to Pia Katila for substantive comments and edits, One was through the provision of financial resources Jeremy Rayner for wonderful effort in chairing this to assist existing civil-society organisations or to help international panel, Alexandar Buck for his positive create new organisations. 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