UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

‘They Have Presupmtiously Opposed the Department in Many Ways’: Kainai Leadership

and Indian Act Band Government, 1880-1920

by

Colin C. Buchanan

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JUNE, 2008

© Colin C. Buchanan 2008 

    ISBN:978-0-494-44382-8    



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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines colonial relations in Canada by investigating the imposition of Indian Act band government in western Canada with specific reference to Kainai (Blood) systems of leadership and authority in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. The research for this thesis is comprised of archival research that investigates the development and implementation of the band government provisions under the Indian Act and a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with elders and other authorities from the Kainai (Blood) and Piikani (Peigan) First Nations regarding systems of leadership and authority, decision-making, and the operation of band councils. The Indian Act system of band council government, which remains an important but little studied aspect of Canadian Indian policy, was designed to displace traditional forms of Aboriginal leadership with an elected Chief and council and implicitly sought to undermine Aboriginal political systems, circumscribe Aboriginal autonomy, and subject Aboriginal peoples to an increasingly oppressive administrative control. As such, band government can be situated as a part of a colonial enterprise that sought to recreate the lives and circumstances of Aboriginal peoples. The theoretical perspective for this thesis is derived from the anthropology of colonialism which maintains that past colonial practices have continuing social and political consequences and focuses attention on the cultural dimensions of the colonial encounter. In this regard, Indian Act band government, reflecting the enduring projects of governance of protection, civilization, and assimilation, can be understood as a colonial institution that strove to restructure political relations within Aboriginal communities and place Aboriginal peoples more firmly under the regulatory authority of Canadian state agencies. Nevertheless, Indian Act band government remained, at least partially, an Aboriginal institution as well. Aboriginal peoples participated in band council elections. Chiefs and Band Councillors brought their own conceptions and expectations about leadership and authority to these positions and often worked to improve conditions on the reserve, advance grievances, and challenge Indian Affairs policy. It is asserted that band government, as a contested institution, became a site of struggle that both Indian Affairs officials and Aboriginal leaders attempted to invest with their own conceptions regarding the proper exercise of political authority in First Nations communities. With respect to the Kainai during the early reserve era, although informal elections that conformed to the terms of the Indian Act were held to replace Chiefs that had died, it would appear that traditional means of selecting leaders were still important within the community. After the turn of the 19 th century, Indian Affairs officials exhibited a greater willingness to influence the selection of Chiefs and often allowed vacancies to stand in abeyance if they disapproved of the candidates. During this period, the Kainai Chiefs became embroiled in a series of political confrontations that essentially represented efforts to resist the regulatory intrusions of the Indian Affairs administration and exert a measure of political autonomy. Kainai leaders used their positions as elected Chiefs to confront and challenge Indian Affairs regarding the disposition of lands and resources on the Blood reserve and more broadly to engage department officials in a debate over the nature of leadership and political authority on the Blood reserve.

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Acknowledgements

The completion of a Ph.D. thesis is a daunting task and during the process of researching and writing this thesis I came to depend upon the assistance, support, and encouragement of many people. First, I must thank the staff of the several archival repositories where I conducted research. At the National Library and Archives Canada, the staff in the

Documents Consultation Room were courteous and efficient in retrieving the numerous files I requested, Sean Darcy and the other Archivists I consulted were of great assistance in helping me sort through the complexities of the RG 10 filing system, and ATIP officers Mary Jane Jones and Lana Merrifield were extremely accommodating in processing my request for documents under the Privacy Act. Dennis Madill and Carla

Frankow of the Claims and Historical Research Branch of Indian and Northern Affairs

Canada facilitated access to pertinent INAC files that yielded key documents. I found the

Reading Room at the Glenbow Archives in Calgary an especially conducive place to work and Jim Bowman, Doug Cass, and the other staff at the Reference Desk there were always obliging in response to my many queries. Due to the restricted amount of time I had available, a satisfactory search of the John Maclean fonds at the United Church

Archives in Toronto would not have been possible without the assistance of the staff person whose name I unfortunately never learned. Once I discovered that I could order

RG 10 microfilm reels through interlibrary loan, I pestered the staff at the Document

Delivery Service desk at the University of Calgary’s MacKimmie Library with what seemed (at least to me) an interminable number of requests, which they filled in a timely and attentive fashion.

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I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the efforts the Department of

Anthropology has made to extend a sense of collegiality towards its graduate students.

During the duration of my Ph.D. program I have been included in the academic and social life of the Department and all faculty members have been tremendously supportive on both an academic and a personal level. Even those not directly involved in my program have taken an interest in both my scholarly development and personal life, offering the kind of encouragement and support that is invaluable in working towards the successful completion of a Ph.D. thesis. In this regard, I need to convey my genuine appreciation to my friends and colleagues in the fictive ‘Graduate Student Caucus’—

Tony Sorge, Allan Dawson, Catherine Fisher, Julie Teichroeb, Jan Markley, Patrick

Patterson—as well as other graduate students—Lark Lindholm, Sarah Turner, Siegrid

Deutschlander, Lily Pang, and Ahn Ly—who’s conversation and commiseration provided a welcome stimulus to, or at times a respite from, my academic pursuits. And I would be remiss not to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of the support staff in the

Department of Anthropology during the course of my program: Monika Davidson, Julie

Boyd, Susan Moisik, Myrna Haglund, May Ives, and Jill Ogle.

I am of course grateful for the financial support received in the form of a

University of Calgary Silver Anniversary Graduate Fellowship, a Province of Alberta

Graduate Fellowship , Graduate Research Scholarships, Department of Anthropology

Bursaries, as well as graduate research and teaching assistanceships.

I owe an especially large debt of gratitude to my supervisory committee, all of whom unhesitatingly assumed larger roles when circumstances suddenly made it necessary to restructure my committee. Alan Smart readily stepped into the position of

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supervisor and provided calm and judicious guidance; Sarah Carter volunteered to take a more active role and offered perceptive comments on several drafts; and Doyle Hatt remained a touchstone throughout and may not even realize how important his reassurances were when I felt as though my program was in jeopardy. I have also benefited greatly from the astute commentary offered by Gerald Oetelaar of the

Department of Archaeology and Noel Dyck of Simon Fraser University, the external examiners on my defense committee. My sincere thanks to each one of you.

I must also offer my profound and heartfelt thanks to the Kainai and Piikani individuals who honoured me by agreeing to participate in this research. Narcisse Blood and Marie Smallface Marule both took a special interest in this project, encouraging my pursuit of the research, facilitating contacts with other knowledgeable individuals, and giving generously of their time. Francis First Charger, Frank Weasel Head, Pete

Standing Alone, and Reg Crowshoe all kindly agreed to be interviewed, sharing their perspectives, helping me understand Blackfoot cultural and political dynamics, while patiently correcting my misapprehensions. This thesis benefited immensely from their involvement and from the conversations I had with other Blackfoot and Aboriginal peoples. Any shortcomings are entirely my own.

Finally, I have to thank my family, although there is no way I can adequately express my gratitude for the love and support I’ve received along the way. My parents,

John (Bucky) and Chris Buchanan, have been unwavering in their support of any endeavour I have undertaken, no matter how unlikely. My wife’s parents, Robin and

Fran Farquhar, have always been enthusiastic supporters of this adventure. But without a doubt, the demands of a Ph.D. program have required more from my immediate family

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than anyone else and it is to them that I owe the greatest debt of gratitude. My children

Ryan and Hayley filled my off hours with laughter and kept me grounded; my wife Kathy served as friend, confidant, sympathizer, and task master and kept me on track. I never would have arrived here without her.

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Dedication

To Kathy, with all my love

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Table of Contents

Approval Page ...... ii Abstract ...... iii Acknowledgements ...... iv Dedication ...... viii Table of Contents ...... ix List of Figures ...... xi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...... 1 What is Band Government? ...... 5 Literature on Band Government ...... 8 Research on Canadian Indian Administration ...... 17 Literature concerning Blackfoot-speaking Peoples ...... 25 Methodology ...... 30 Theoretical Perspective ...... 37 Outline of Chapters ...... 46

CHAPTER TWO: ELECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE INDIAN ACT ...... 52 Band Government Legislation ...... 56 Band Government Provisions of the Gradual Enfranchisement Act ...... 60 The Electoral Provisions of the Indian Act ...... 62 Indian Advancement Act ...... 66 Election Provisions in the 20 th Century ...... 71 Conclusion ...... 77

CHAPTER THREE: APPLICATION OF THE ELECTIVE SYSTEM ...... 80 Application of the Elective System in Eastern Canada ...... 84 Resistance to the Elective System ...... 91 Hayter Reed and the Elective System in Western Canada ...... 93 Renewed Interest in the Election of Chiefs in Western Canada ...... 107 Elections Policy in 20 th Century ...... 116 Conclusion ...... 129

CHAPTER FOUR: KAINAI SYSTEMS OF LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT ...... 133 Annual Cycle ...... 135 Bands and Clans ...... 138 Societies ...... 144 Leadership ...... 148 Blackfoot History to 1880 ...... 157 Pre-history ...... 160 Dog Days ...... 162 Horse Days ...... 164 Fur Trade ...... 170

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Missionaries ...... 172 Early Reserve/Treaty Period ...... 176 Treaty 7 ...... 179 Conclusion ...... 183

CHAPTER FIVE: KAINAI LEADERSHIP AND BAND COUNCIL ELECTIONS . . 185 Leadership in the Early Reserve Era ...... 188 Challenges to Kainai Leadership ...... 198 Chiefs at Treaty and Band Leadership during the Early Reserve Era ...... 204 Elections and Band Leadership ...... 216 Transition to a New Generation of Leaders ...... 226 Vacancies on Band Council ...... 239 Conclusion ...... 244

CHAPTER SIX: KAINAI BAND COUNCIL CONFRONTATIONS WITH INDIAN AFFAIRS ...... 247 Meeting Between the Kainai Chiefs and Agent Hyde ...... 247 Attempts to Secure a Surrender of a Portion of the Blood Reserve ...... 251 Attempts to Depose Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf ...... 263 Further Attempts to Secure a Surrender of a Portion of the Blood Reserve . . . . 272 Greater Production Campaign and Blood Memorial ...... 282 Conclusion ...... 292

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION ...... 294

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 307

APPENDIX A: Blood Band Annuity Paylists, 1877-1883 ...... 326

APPENDIX B: Schedule of Blood Chiefs, 1899 ...... 331

x

List of Figures

FIGURE 4.1 Map of Blackfoot, Blood, and Peigan Indian Reserves ...... 182

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Crop Eared Wolf, Kainai Head Chief since 1900, after having been in failing health for some time, died in April, 1913. In reporting the death to the Department of Indian

Affairs, W. J. Hyde, Indian Agent on the Blood reserve, related that Crop Eared Wolf endorsed a successor for Head Chief.

Before dying he wished his son Shot Both Sides to be appointed Head Chief in his place. If it meets with the departments approval, seeing that it is Head Chief that is to be elected, I think it would be preferable to hold an election, and allow the tribe to vote on it and so express their wishes on the subject 1.

With the approval of senior Indian Affairs officials, a meeting of band members was called and an election that was consistent with the election provisions of the Indian Act was held for the position of Head Chief. The results of this meeting, as reported by

Agent Hyde, ratified the late Head Chief’s request.

I held a meeting with the electors on the Blood reserve to-day and they unanimously elected Shot both Sides [sic] for the position of Head Chief. Judging from the speeches, the Indians were largely influenced by the wishes of the late Crop Eared Wolf and besides Shot Both Sides was the better canvasser than the other aspirants 2.

This apparently unprepossessing transition of Kainai Head Chiefs is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, it occurred at a time when the Kainai, like many First Nations on the Canadian prairies, were undergoing a transition in which traditional leaders, who had for the most part earned their status and position in society prior to making treaties and settling on the reserve, were giving way to a new generation of leaders who did not have access to the systems of prestige, honour, and wealth of the previous generation and

1 Hyde to McLean, April 16, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, file 773/3-5. 2 Hyde to McLean, May 16, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, file 773/3-5.

2 were required to demonstrate their leadership qualities and win the support of the community in other ways. It was significant, therefore, that Crop Eared Wolf was succeeded by his son Shot Both Sides in the position of Head Chief. In the pre-reserve era, leaders rose to prominence by building a reputation through displays of generosity, courage, and wisdom. Although leadership positions were not necessarily hereditary, it was not uncommon for a son to succeed his father as leader. The sons or other close relatives of a Chief were in a position to amass the necessary wealth, acquire the traits esteemed in leaders, and rise to a position of distinction (The Blackfoot Gallery

Committee 2001:22; Dempsey 1982:97). Further, while a Chief may often have designated his choice for successor, those considered unworthy by other band members would not attract a sufficient following and would not be recognized as a Chief. That

Shot Both Sides succeeded to the position of Chief after having been nominated by his father and with the acclaim of the band would seem to indicate that many of the same mechanisms for selecting leaders continued to operate among the Kainai well into the reserve era and that leaders continued to employ many of the same strategies for mobilizing community support.

It is also noteworthy that the Agent recommended that the choice of Head Chief be confirmed through an election sanctioned by Indian Affairs and that the department endorsed this action. Quite simply, Indian Affairs had no legal authority to be involved in the selection of Kainai leaders. Treaty 7 is silent on the issue of the selection of Chiefs and the exercise of political authority, apart from stating that a maximum of 15 Minor

Chiefs would be paid as such under treaty (Morris 1971[1880]:370). While the Indian

Act did contain provisions for the election of Chiefs, these sections did not at that time

3 apply to the Kainai. This distinction may require some clarification. From the time that they settled upon their reserve, the Kainai, like all Treaty Indians in Canada, lived under the strictures of the Indian Act and the regulation of the Department of Indian Affairs.

While the Indian Act contained provisions for the election of Chiefs, the terms of the

Indian Act stipulated that the elective system could only be applied to a particular community with the explicit approval of the Privy Council obtained through an Order-in-

Council. While the application of the elective system on the Blood reserve by Order-in-

Council was contemplated from time to time, this step was not taken until after World

War II. In the early years of the 20 th century, the Indian Affairs administration had developed a preoccupation with Aboriginal leadership and began to encourage the selection of leaders through elections convened by the Department of Indian Affairs officials. During the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, informal elections that largely conformed to the electoral provisions of the Indian Act were regularly held among First

Nations on the Canadian prairies, even in the absence of official legislative approval.

Encouraging Aboriginal peoples to participate in municipal style institutions was seen as part of the progression towards ‘civilization’. In particular, the Indian Act system of elected band government was designed to displace traditional forms of Aboriginal leadership with an elected Chief and council. Canadian officials regarded traditional

Aboriginal political organization as primitive, rudimentary and beholden to ancient superstition. As well, Aboriginal leaders frequently garnered the enmity of government officials by opposing government policies. The express intention of elections and the restricted band government endorsed under the Indian Act was to train Aboriginal peoples in the operation of more ‘advanced’ political institutions, undermine traditional

4 systems of political authority, and to place Aboriginal leaders under more direct departmental control.

Prior to taking treaty in 1877, the Kainai had dynamic, well-integrated political organizations that served to order and regulate their internal and external relations. The

Chiefs that made Treaty 7 have been widely recognized as astute leaders who strove to preserve the political autonomy and cultural integrity of their peoples, and their successors continued this struggle against an increasingly oppressive Indian Affairs bureaucracy that sought to undermine and alter their political systems. From the early

20 th century onward, many First Nations in the Canadian prairies were required to conform to the band government provisions of the Indian Act despite the fact that there was no basis in law for the application of these measures until after World War II. As with most other First Nations in Canada, the institution of the band council became prevalent among the Kainai in part because the Indian Affairs administration insisted on dealing with Aboriginal peoples through these bodies. However, band councils remained contested institutions in many Aboriginal communities and the extent to which traditional forms of leadership and governance have endured requires more thorough examination.

This thesis conceptualizes band government as a colonial project of governance that sought to affect the social and moral regulation of Aboriginal peoples, examines the development and implementation of the elective system in western Canada, and explores the interaction between Indian Affairs officials and Kainai leaders in the early 20 th century in order to assess the consequences for Kainai systems of leadership and authority. Despite the geographical, political, and economic constraints imposed by having been restricted to reserves and being subject to the paternalistic management of

5 the Indian Affairs administration, it is possible to discern a continuity between pre- reserve and post-reserve systems of leadership and authority. More specifically, it is asserted that band government, as a contested institution became a site of struggle that both Indian Affairs officials and Aboriginal leaders attempted to invest with their own conceptions regarding the proper exercise of political authority in First Nations communities. Kainai leaders, by employing traditional political practices within the context of Indian Act band government, engendered new political meanings as they strove to manipulate the institution to their own ends in an effort to preserve their political autonomy and cultural integrity.

What is Band Government?

Within the Canadian Indian Affairs administration, the term band has a meaning quite distinct from that widely accepted in the anthropological literature. Whereas anthropologists tend to regard bands as small, mobile kin-based groups with informal leadership and flexible social organization (Leacock and Lee 1982:7) the Indian Act defines bands as administrative and bureaucratic units for which the Crown administers land and money on behalf of a designated body of Indians recognized as such under the

Indian Act (Leslie and Maguire 1978:65). Essentially, the Canadian government regards

Indian bands as legal entities under federal legislative authority whose members retain certain entitlements and liabilities. There are currently 633 recognized Indian bands in

Canada, although many bands are now formally replacing the term band in favour of First

Nation (Canada. INAC Communications Branch 2004).

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Presently, nearly every First Nation or band recognized under the Indian Act has an elected band council and the elective system of band government has been operating in some Aboriginal communities for more than a century. The first band government legislation appeared in 1869 and this later became the basis for the electoral provisions of the Indian Act of 1876. Band government legislation provides the legal mechanisms for the election of band councils and under the terms of the legislation, a Chief and a specified number of Councillors may be elected on the approval of the Superintendent

General of Indian Affairs. The electoral provisions of the Indian Act stipulated that

Chiefs and Councillors were to be elected for three year terms by the male members of the band over 21 years of age and that bands were to be allowed one Chief and two head men for every two hundred people. Elected band councils were granted limited powers to pass by-laws for such matters as the upkeep of reserves and the maintenance of public health, and all council decisions were subject to the approval of the Superintendent

General. Conceived with the aim of cultivating Euro-Canadian political conventions among Aboriginal peoples under the watchful gaze of Indian Affair officials, band government was considered an essential component of the department’s program for the civilization and assimilation of Aboriginal peoples. By allowing elected Chiefs only limited influence in reserve governance, band government was designed to undermine traditional leadership and place elected Chiefs under the direction of Indian Affairs officials. More broadly, band government can be situated as a part of a colonial enterprise that sought to recreate Victorian society and Imperial institutions in colonial settings, which ultimately necessitated reforming relations of and with Aboriginal peoples.

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But it also needs to be emphasized that band government was, at least in part, an

Aboriginal institution as well. Aboriginal peoples participated in the elections sanctioned by Indian Affairs. Aboriginal leaders held positions as Chiefs and Councillors and in these positions sat in council with Indian Affairs officials to discus matters important to their bands, signed band council resolutions and other legal documents on behalf of their bands, had limited direction over the expenditure of band funds, worked to improve reserve economies, pursued grievances against Indian Affairs administration, challenged departmental policy, and sought to exert a measure of political autonomy. In serving as

Chiefs and Councillors within the Indian Act elected band government, Aboriginal peoples brought their own conceptions of leadership and the exercise of authority to the institution and their followers brought their expectations regarding the responsibility and character of leaders. In subtle yet forceful ways, Aboriginal leaders and the people they represented engaged the institution of elected band government, endeavouring to turn it to their own ends and serve their own purposes, imprinting the positions of Chiefs,

Councillors, and the band council with their own conceptions of leadership and authority.

This is not to deny the considerable impacts of the Indian Affairs administration and the band government policy in particular on Aboriginal leadership and systems of governance. Yet it would be inapt to suppose that simply introducing elected band government into Aboriginal communities could suddenly eradicate cultural practices and systems of political organization that had been operating for generations. Band government needs to be understood as more than an oppressive measure imposed upon

Aboriginal peoples by an authoritarian government bureaucracy; it must be

8 comprehended as a dynamic institution shaped by the thoughts, actions, and aspirations of those subject to its regulation as well the agendas and intentions of those in power.

Within Aboriginal communities, elections may be understood as highly contentious activities and the band council as a site of struggle, as a site of, in John and

Jean Comaroff’s (1992:236) turn of phrase, “challenge and riposte” in which both colonizer and colonized attempt to inscribe Aboriginal leadership and the band council with meanings and expressions related to their own goals and objectives. Indian Affairs certainly sought to recast Aboriginal leadership through the imposition of elected band government, but Aboriginal leaders also attempted to turn band government to their own ends, invest the institution with their own conceptions, and inscribe it with their own practices. In this way, band government was made in practice as competing conceptions of leadership, authority, and rule found expression on the shifting terrain of colonial domination. As Comaroff and Comaroff remind us, the imposition of the dominant is never total or complete as the subject populations continually engage and debate the terms of their own domination (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:259). The developments related to band government on the Canadian colonial frontier represent a practical means of producing history as contested categories and meanings were received, challenged, and changed.

Literature on Band Government

It is somewhat surprising, especially given the prominence of self-government in the

Aboriginal rights debate, that band government has received relatively little attention in the academic literature. Apart from reference in a handful of academic accounts,

9 government research reports, and commissioned inquiries, band government has remained largely unconsidered. Indeed, in a recent review essay Ken Coates identifies band councils as, among other themes, a particularly important direction for future research (2000:113). Despite having been identified as one of the three principal areas of concern of the Indian Act (Leslie and Maguire 1978:51; Holmes 2002:16), band government is often simply mentioned briefly in connection with the Indian Act, or noted tangentially as an institution that reinforces government programs of civilization and assimilation. The few sources that address band government more substantively tend to provide a piecemeal picture without contemplating its overall impact within the larger context of the colonial processes which have conditioned the relations between

Aboriginal peoples and Canadian society. All too often, studies of Canadian Indian administration and policy have made only passing reference to the electoral provisions of the Indian Act, usually commenting that these were intended to displace traditional

Aboriginal leadership and to train Aboriginal peoples in the operation of simple liberal democratic institutions. The following assessment offered by historian and government researcher Wayne Daugherty is fairly typical.

No matter how imperfectly the election provisions were utilized, however, the fact that they existed led imperceptibly to the political acculturation of the Indian people. As the older generation passed on, the three year elective system provided a basis for political activity for the new generations, acclimatized to life under the new conditions (1980:80).

The implicit assumption here, and more generally within the literature on band government, is that the Indian Act elected band councils under the supervision and guidance of the Indian Agent inevitably supplanted traditional forms of governance in most reserve communities and that traditional political organizations were eroded and

10 brought under the paternalistic authority of the Indian Affairs administration. These assumptions, however, have remained largely unsubstantiated and it is necessary to explore in greater detail the development and implementation of band government legislation and the particular historical experience of individual Aboriginal communities with band councils.

A number of scholars have mentioned elected band councils in their writings.

Noel Dyck (1991:52, 91), for instance, refers to band government in connection with the concept of coercive tutelage, noting that band councils were intended to serve as instruments of federal wardship. Olive Patricia Dickason (1997:259, 294) offers some consideration of the implementation of the elective system within a more general examination of the Indian Act. James Frideres (1998:345-46) briefly remarks on band councils as exercising restricted delegated powers under federal supervision. In her discussion of the suppression of Aboriginal ceremonies, Katherine Pettipas (1994:39, 65,

72) comments on the attempts to undermine traditional forms of leadership and dismantle the tribal or communistic system through the imposition of band government. Robert J.

Surtees (1988:90), in an overview of Indian policy for the Handbook of North American

Indians, Vol. 4, remarks on the connection between Enfranchisement and elected band councils and asserts that elected band councils sought to remove traditional or hereditary leaders as an obstacle to government initiatives. Legal scholar R. H. Bartlett (1988:19-

20) notes the insignificance of band councils as decision making bodies and points to a lack of analysis concerning Aboriginal perspectives on the implementation of band government. A slightly fuller account of band government is offered by J. R. Miller

(2004:68-77). In a broader discussion of Aboriginal self-governance, Miller outlines the

11 origins of band government legislation, which he describes as a notorious system of regulations devised to interfere with First Nations’ management of their own political affairs, and recounts several examples of Aboriginal resistance to the imposition of

Indian Act band government.

Vic Satzewich and Linda Mahood (1994) move beyond mere description of band government legislation in an article entitled “Indian Affairs and Band Governance:

Deposing Indian Chiefs in western Canada”, offering a concerted examination of the application of elected band government provisions among prairie reserve communities in the late 19 th century. They sketch the main features of band government legislation before turning to a consideration of the department’s use of the band government provisions to discipline recalcitrant leaders in the West and depose those who challenged its authority. They argue that while the elective system was primarily intended to train

Aboriginal peoples in the operation of simple democratic institutions, it also inadvertently served to politicize Aboriginal peoples. Ultimately, the elective system fell out of favour in western Canada, they maintain, as Indian Affairs officials, confronted with elected

Chiefs and Councillors who challenged department authority and resisted government policy, began to depose uncooperative Chiefs and appoint more amenable individuals for indefinite terms. According to Satzewich and Mahood, elected band government faltered on an inherent contradiction: Aboriginal leaders, elected through participatory democratic processes to supposedly represent the interests of their constituents, were nevertheless subject to departmental supervision and control and expected to support government initiatives.

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Robin Jarvis Brownlie (2003) devotes an entire chapter to the band council in her study of the paternalistic role of the Indian Agent in administering Indian Affairs policy in southern Ontario during the interwar period. Brownlie describes band councils as the

“convenient handmaidens of DIA policy” (2003:xv), designed to displace traditional

Aboriginal leadership function as an extension of the Indian administration in Aboriginal communities. Despite the efforts of elected Chiefs in the Georgian Bay region to transform the band council into a forum that would allow greater control over local affairs, the elected band council offered little real political authority. These individuals— returned soldiers and other prominent leaders—pressed for concessions on land, resources, and band funds, but they soon discovered that the elected band council represented an ineffectual platform to pursue grievances and rights (2003:56-57). This institution was strictly circumscribed by the Indian Act and consistently undermined by the Indian Agent. In the communities studied by Brownlie, Aboriginal leaders rarely remained in office for more than one term. In her estimation, the band council contributed to the destruction of indigenous systems of governance and offered

Aboriginal peoples negligible control of their own political and economic affairs.

Perhaps the most sophisticated treatment of band government appears in Tribe

Under Trust , an ethnography of the Blackfoot tribe by Lucien Hanks and Jane

Richardson Hanks (1950). This research, which Dyck (2006:81) praises as innovative and perceptive, provides a nuanced exploration of how the social, economic, and political circumstances on the Blackfoot reserve have been shaped by the paternalistic management of the Indian Affairs administration. Based on fieldwork conducted on the

Blackfoot reserve in the late 1930s and early 1940s, this work outlines a brief history of

13 the Blackfoot reserve since Treaty 7, investigates the surrender of reserve lands, the operation of the reserve economy, considers changes in Blackfoot social organization, and argues that coercive policies have undermined Blackfoot self-determination and perpetuated a general malaise and dissatisfaction among reserve residents.

With respect specifically to the issue of band government, Hanks and Hanks

(1950:124-46) examine the political system of the band in some detail, contrasting traditional Blackfoot political organization with the political relations that endure on the reserve under the elective system. Hanks and Hanks briefly delineate how Chiefs acquired a following in the pre-reserve era and described changes to the exercise of authority and the ways in which Chiefs were chosen after settling on the reserve. They noted that this system endured relatively unchanged during the first decades of reserve life, but that over time as the band structure from the pre-reserve era dissipated and reformed itself, new patterns of leadership emerged. Related to these changes, the need for leaders to establish an honourable war record gave way to an expectation that leaders would demonstrate success in new economic enterprises such as farming and ranching.

Nevertheless, they asserted that “the original, basic, social organization continued with the responsibility on the shoulders of a wealthy and generous head-man who protected the interests of his followers and concerned himself with their welfare” (Hanks and

Hanks 1950:128). They then proceed to describe the selection of Chiefs and operation of the band council, outlining responsibilities under the Indian Act, how band council meetings were conducted, and the confusion regarding the jurisdiction of Chiefs. They note especially conflicts that arose between the Indian Agent and the Blackfoot band council over the management of affairs on the reserve and the ultimate powerlessness

14 against the Agent (1950:131). Overall, they draw a picture of the Chiefs and band council of the Blackfoot reserve in which Aboriginal leaders struggled with the expectations of band members, the seemingly arbitrary authority of the Indian Agent, and the frustration of attempting to exert greater control over their own political and economic affairs with little real authority to manage band resources. While the research for Tribe Under Trust was conducted some 60 years ago, it remains a valuable work that offers considerable ethnographic insight. However, since Hanks and Hanks conducted their research, vast quantities of Indian Affairs administrative documents have become available through the National Archives of Canada and the present study has taken advantage of this source. Research into these documents have confirmed many of Hanks and Hanks’ observations and have also permitted examination of the actions of Kainai

Chiefs with respect to diverse Indian Affairs policy initiatives. Consequently, it has been possible to consider as well the ways in which Aboriginal leaders have sought to assert a measure of political autonomy within the constraints of the Indian Act system.

A more contemporary treatment of elected band government is provided by

J. Anthony Long and Menno Boldt (1987). They argue that the imposition of elected band government under the Indian Act was designed to habituate Aboriginal peoples to routines and practices of Euro-Canadian political institutions as well as suppress traditional Aboriginal political organization and governing processes. Reviewing the results of elections that occurred between the late 1960s and mid 1980s on the Blood and

Peigan reserves in order to contemplate how elected band government may have affected traditional leadership selection practices, they assert that many band members feel that elected band councils are of limited use as representative political institutions and that

15 elected Chiefs and Councillors are not accountable to the band. The primary function of band councils, in their estimation, was to advance Indian Affairs policy and to facilitate implementation of department programs. They conclude that the Indian Act elected band government was at variance with traditional Kainai (Blood) and Piikani (Peigan) leadership systems, which were based on communalism, egalitarianism, and consensus and has served not only to undermine traditional leadership selection processes based on merit and reputation but also to erode accountability and responsibility of leaders to band members.

In addition to the academic literature, there are a number of other sources that consider elected band government under the Indian Act. Of these, the most thorough description can be found in a government research paper entitled Indian Government under the Indian Act prepared for the Treaties and Historical Research Centre,

Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, by Wayne Daugherty and Dennis Madill

(1980). Intended as a discussion paper to assist policy makers and researchers, it offers a detailed account of successive amendments to band government legislation and the exercise of band council powers. Another research report produced by the Treaties and

Historical Research Centre considers band government provisions among an extended explanation of the historical development of Indian Act legislation (Leslie and Maguire

1978). While each of these represents an excellent resource, they remain primarily descriptive and offer little consideration regarding how band government provisions were received within Aboriginal communities.

Finally, two major government-sponsored inquiries into the conditions of

Aboriginal peoples in Canada have commented upon band government. Published nearly

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30 years apart the Hawthorn Report (1967) and the Report of the Royal Commission on

Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) (1996) both undertook a comprehensive survey of the social, political, and economic circumstances of the Aboriginal population and made extensive recommendations. The Hawthorn Report maintains that Indian Act band government persisted in Aboriginal communities not because it was particularly useful in addressing local government needs, but rather it fulfilled bureaucratic and administrative requirements for Indian Affairs (1967:178). Meanwhile, in elaborating the prohibitions and restrictions that the Indian Act placed upon Aboriginal peoples, RCAP (1996:285-

86), describes how the elective band council system propagated under the Indian Act gave sweeping powers to Indian Affairs officials to control Aboriginal political affairs as a means of undermining traditional Aboriginal governance structures.

Overall, the literature on band government stands as rather thin and superficial.

In the few instances where it has been addressed, it is often mentioned as an aside in more substantial considerations of government Indian policies. More generally, band government tends to be characterized, on rather cursory evidence, as an institution that served to displace Aboriginal leaders, erode Aboriginal political systems, and consolidate the regulatory authority of Indian Affairs over Aboriginal communities. There has been no comprehensive investigation of the development and implementation of the band government provisions of the Indian Act and little consideration as to how these were received and experienced by Aboriginal peoples. Band government has simply not been the subject of sustained critical investigation and there remains a need to examine the development of the band government policy, the application of band government to

17

Aboriginal communities, and the consequences of band government in the broader context of colonial relations in Canada.

Research on Canadian Indian Administration

The present study may also be more generally situated within a larger body of scholarship concerning the administration of Indian Affairs in Canada. Until comparatively recently, the history of Indian administration and policy in Canada was simply not the subject of academic debate 3. Beginning in the 1970s, however, anthropologists, historians, and other social scientists have begun to more fully explore the place of Aboriginal peoples in

Canadian history and explicitly consider the systemic administrative and institutional oppression that Aboriginal peoples have endured (Dyck 1990:45). Within anthropology, land claims, the rise in Aboriginal political activism, the Constitutional recognition of

Aboriginal rights, and conflicts over land and resource provoked new approaches which have attempted to examine the external forces of capitalism and colonialism as agents of change in Aboriginal communities and consider the social and political processes by which Aboriginal peoples are linked to the agencies and institutions of the Canadian state

(Usher 1993:112-13; Asch 1983:203). Consequently, there has been a growing anthropological concern with governance issues, including the historical development of federal Indian administration, the politics of Aboriginal representations to the nation-

3 Apart from some self-congratulatory pieces by Duncan Campbell Scott (1914, 1914a, 1914b), the long serving Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, a short series of laudatory articles by Alan G. Harper, who was angling for a job with the American Bureau of Indian Affairs (1945, 1946, 1947), a chapter in a book by John E. Hodgetts—whose pithy title ‘The Whiteman’s Albatross’ still resonates— (1955), and the previously mentioned ethnography by Hanks and Hanks (1950), there had been few substantive investigations into Indian Affairs in Canada prior to the 1960s. This literature was supplemented in the 1960s by a few sharp critiques by William Dunning (1962, 1964), an undervalued contribution by Forrest LaViolette (1961), and the Hawthorn Report (1966; 1967), which until the publication of The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in 1996, remained the most comprehensive investigation of the contemporary circumstances of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

18 state, and the processes of policy making (Dyck 1990:45). These developments coincide with a critical reassessment of Aboriginal peoples as active participants in the making of

Canadian history and reassessing the social and political dynamics of the historical engagement of Aboriginal peoples with Euro-Canadians (Carter 1999:9-10). This trend was first manifest in scholarship on the fur trade, but soon was apparent in other areas as well and there has since developed an approach to Native history that, while fully acknowledging the differential power relations, recognizes that Aboriginal peoples were active in shaping the social, economic, and political relations in which they participated.

By about the mid-1970s, studies that took Indian policy and administration as their primary subject began to appear. The most influential of these early works would have to be John Tobias’ (1983) article ‘Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline

History of Canada’s Indian Policy’ 4. In a concise turn of phrase, Tobias neatly encapsulates the basic tenets underlying much of Canadian Indian policy and administration. This short article, ubiquitously referenced in practically every work that addresses the history of the administration of Indian Affairs in Canada, has provided an analytic framework for discussing the history of Canadian Indian policy. Other significant works from this period include edited collections by D. A. Muise (1977) and

Richard Price (1979). The former, the product of a symposium hosted by the National

Museum of Man, brings together papers from several emerging scholars, Arthur J. Ray,

Robin Fisher, John Tobias, and John Taylor among them, who were pursuing new approaches to Native history, focussing on the Native experience and the how the actions and attitudes of Native people had important consequences for missionary activities, the fur trade, and Indian policy. The contributions to the latter volume, incorporating

4 Originally published in 1976 in the Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology

19 documentary sources and interviews with Elders, patiently elucidate the profound sense of betrayal Aboriginal peoples of Alberta have regarding Treaties 6, 7, and 8. They assert that these Treaties need to be comprehended in the spirit in which they were negotiated, as sacred promises based on trust and mutual respect, and not just the words in which they were written. Each of these works considers the historical development and implementation of Indian policy in Canada and provides a foundation for a more serious analytical treatment of the subject.

More recently, a number of more detailed studies of particular aspects of Indian

Affairs policy have more rigorously analyzed individual policies and practices of the

Department of Indian Affairs. The department’s agriculture policy, the pass system, the prohibition of Native ceremonies, residential schools, and the Indian Affairs administration itself have all been reassessed to incorporate some conception of the involvement of Aboriginal peoples on historical events. Three studies may be cited as exemplary of this trend. Sarah Carter (1990) dismantles one of the enduring axioms of

Canadian history, the notion that plains Indians, as hunters, were indisposed to take up farming. Illustrating the complex and complicated relations between the Canadian government and Aboriginal peoples in Saskatchewan, Carter shows that Aboriginal peoples were eager to make the transition to agriculture, but that this desire was constantly thwarted by obstructive government policies. Indian farming initiatives were routinely plagued by insufficient supplies or shoddy equipment, inadequate technical instruction, and indeterminate, and at times pernicious, policy (1990:94-100, 229-35). In rejecting the premise that Aboriginal peoples were unsuited to farming, Carter reveals

Aboriginal peoples as struggling to assert their autonomy against oppressive government

20 policies. In a similar vein, Katherine Pettipas (1994) investigates the attempts of the

Indian administration to suppress religious rituals, especially the sun dance, beginning in the 1890s. The Indian administration believed that Aboriginal ceremonialism undermined their policy objectives and prohibitions were aimed at eroding political independence and cultural integrity. She forcefully argues that, while Aboriginal peoples were able to evade and resist prohibitions to an extent, the effects of the coercive measures taken against Aboriginal ceremonialism should not be underestimated.

Focussing primarily upon the experience of the Plains Cree, Pettipas reveals that although they strove to maintain their religious traditions, challenging the law in court and performing them subversively, the prohibitions lead to significant modifications in their performance. Nevertheless, Aboriginal ceremonialism persisted and, despite changes in duration and content, ceremonies have continued as a relevant part of Aboriginal life.

Finally, Jill St. Germain (2001) meticulously considers the enduring myth of Canada’s benevolent treatment of Aboriginal peoples in contrast with that of the United States in a comparison of the treaty making practices of the two countries. Rejecting demography, economics, and geography as causative factors, St. Germain focuses on the active role of the treaty negotiators and Aboriginal participants, as well as the influence of missionaries and other outsiders, in determining treaty policy and shaping relations between Natives and non-Natives. Her discussion reiterates in detail that Canadian policy, far from sagacious, was reactive and irresolute and that pressure from Aboriginal peoples forced

Canadian authorities to expand the treaty terms beyond the narrow limits originally proffered (2001:161). St. Germain underscores the discrepancy in the understanding of the treaties held by both side—the Canadian authorities saw them primarily as

21 extinguishing title, while Aboriginal signatories believed they were symbolic of an abiding relationship and a commitment to provide support. Each of these studies have contributed to an emerging literature that provides insight on not only the circumstances in which Indian policy was conceived and implemented, but also Aboriginal actions within this context. Increasingly, a history of the settlement period is being elaborated that conceives of Aboriginal peoples as acting in pursuit of their own interests and objectives, as both shaped by and shaping Canadian Indian policy.

Meanwhile, over roughly the same period, Canadian anthropologists began to investigate the administration and management of Aboriginal peoples by the federal government with greater alacrity (Dyck 1990:45-46, 2006:83-84). While anthropological interest in the administration of Aboriginal peoples by the federal authorities had been growing since the late 1950s 5, the release of the White Paper by the Government of

Canada in 1969, which galvanized a nascent Aboriginal political activism, caused the extensive impact of the regulatory apparatus on the Aboriginal population and the complex relations of Aboriginal peoples with agencies of the Canadian state to become a primary focus of anthropological research. In recent decades, anthropological research has provided insight into issues such as the subjection of Aboriginal peoples to coercive

5 Three studies from this period which prominently address the administration of Indian Affairs are The Indians of British Columbia (1958) by Harry Hawthorn, Cyril Belshaw, and S. M. Jamieson, Social and Economic Change Among the Northern Ojibwa (1959) by R. W. Dunning, and The Struggle for Survival: Indian Cultures and the Protestant Work Ethic in British Columbia (1961) by Forrest LaViolette. Hawthorn and Belshaw, both anthropologists from the University of British Columbia, along with the economist Jamieson, commissioned by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, produced the first major examination of the social and economic circumstances of Aboriginal peoples following the 1951 revision of the Indian Act and their critique of the failures of federal Indian policy and specific recommendations to improve the conditions of Aboriginal peoples influenced subsequent research. Dunning’s ethnography offers a perceptive analysis of how the Ojibwa of Pekangekum have been able to maintain considerable cultural integrity despite the increasing predominance of economic subsidies in the community provided through Canadian government. LaViolette, focusing on conflicts over the Potlatch law and land title in British Columbia, elaborates upon Aboriginal peoples’ concerted attempts to resist the administrative impositions made upon them.

22 bureaucratic regulation, analyses of public policy making, Aboriginal political activism, land claims, and Aboriginal rights. For example, Michael Asch (1984), following the entrenchment of undefined Aboriginal rights in the 1982 Constitution Act, tackles the complex issue of the status of Aboriginal peoples in Canada. In so doing, Asch offers a careful explanation of self-determination and inherent rights from the perspectives of

Aboriginal political organizations, considers and convincingly argues that special political accommodations for Aboriginal peoples can be reconciled within the principles of Canadian liberal democracy. The collection of papers presented in Indigenous Peoples and the Nation State (1985), edited by Noel Dyck, develops the conceptual theme of the

Fourth World politics and considers the formal and informal means by which disenfranchised indigenous populations encapsulated within institutional processes and structures of nation-states make representations to governments. Another contribution by

Dyck (1991) considers the implicit assumptions that condition relations between

Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada and buttress Indian administration.

Dyck argues that premises regarding Aboriginal incapacity and the supposed superiority of Euro-Canadian cultural forms found administrative expression in programs of coercive tutelage which have endeavoured to effect a moral transformation of Aboriginal peoples.

However, despite the repressive measures aimed at them, Aboriginal peoples have demonstrated a resolve to retain their cultural identity by engaging in direct and indirect forms of resistance. In The White Arctic , Robert Paine’s (1977) edited collection, framed around the concepts of ‘welfare colonialism’ and tutelage, contributors examine interpersonal encounters through which the relationships between Inuit people and Euro-

Canadian administrators in the Canadian Arctic are managed and consider how the goal

23 of assimilation that underpins these relationships determines Inuit realities. Richard

Salisbury (1986) traces the response of Cree in northern Quebec to massive hydroelectric development on their traditional lands and the sudden transition from a trapping and subsistence economy to new economic circumstances following the negotiation of the

James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement in 1975 and the formation of the Cree

Regional Authority as the primary administrative body through which the changes were managed. For Salisbury, the establishment of a Cree region or homeland as a discrete locus for administrative and cultural activities in which the Cree have exerted local control over the planning and decision-making, represents the key to securing their future and identity. James Waldram (1988) provides a striking account of the consequences for hydroelectric development for three Aboriginal communities in northern Manitoba and

Saskatchewan in which he finds startling parallels to 19 th century treaty making process and the expropriation procedures for present day hydro development. Just as the making of the numbered treaties in the Canadian west has proven pyrrhic for Aboriginal peoples, hydroelectric development on Aboriginal lands have been marked by deceit in the negotiations, the failure of government agencies to discharge their legal responsibilities to protect Aboriginal interests, the disadvantaged position of Aboriginal negotiators, and inadequate compensation. Sally Weaver (1981), meanwhile, offers a carefully researched account of the development of the Trudeau government’s 1969 White Paper on Indian policy. Her analysis, based on interviews with senior bureaucrats and government documents, reveals how the conflicting agendas of government agents served to discredit and marginalize Aboriginal peoples in the policy making process. Despite having sought consultation from Aboriginal leaders, in the final instance the bureaucrats and politicians

24 remained unshaken in their resolve that they were better able to determine the best interests of Aboriginal peoples. In revealing the convoluted process of policy-making,

Weaver demonstrates the enduring inequitable power and paternalism that characterize

Aboriginal-government relations. Each of these authors have been at the forefront in contemplating the social and political dynamics of the relations between Aboriginal peoples and Euro-Canadians. By developing notions such as ‘welfare colonialism’

(Paine 1977) and ‘coercive tutelage’ (Dyck 1991), anthropologists have provided insight into the relations between Aboriginal peoples and Euro-Canadians, the degree to which

Aboriginal existence is determined by intrusive administration, and representations of

Aboriginal peoples to the nation-state.

However, there remains a need to more fully consider the circumstances and contexts in which Canadian Indian policy of the late 19th and early 20th century was developed and deployed. While the situation has improved somewhat since Carter

(1990:13) observed that the comprehension of Aboriginal societies as creative in their adaptations to changing circumstances seems to have abruptly ceased when historians turned their attention to the reserve era, it is still the case that scholarship on the administration of Indian Affairs in the first half of the 20th century remains underdeveloped (Coates 2000:112). In this regard, John Leslie (1999:3-4) has characterized the history of the Canadian Indian administration in the early to mid 20 th century as a black hole that scholars have not adequately addressed. Several recent studies have begun to address aspects of Canadian Indian policy in this period. Laurie

Meijer Drees (2002) details the historical development of the Indian Association of

Alberta and their fight for Aboriginal land rights, changes to the Indian Act, recognition

25 of treaty rights, and the right to retain cultural traditions, which took place against a backdrop of repressive federal and provincial policies. Jarvis Robin Brownlie (2003) provides an account of the pervasive administrative control wielded over Aboriginal peoples by Indian Agents, to whom she accords a fundamental role in a system which oppressed and marginalized Aboriginal peoples, and discusses in some detail Canadian

Indian policy in the interwar period. Mary-Ellen Kelm (1998) rejects the widely held premise that Aboriginal peoples were inherently sick and vulnerable and considers the effects of colonization on the health and healing of Aboriginal peoples in British

Columbia in the first half of the 20 th century. Kelm portrays Aboriginal peoples as actively attempting to confront disease and manage health within their communities, articulating practices and beliefs that incorporated aspects of both Western medicine and traditional healing. Similarly, Maureen Lux (2001) examines the social determinants of health and illness among Aboriginal peoples on the Canadian plains, arguing that

Canadian Indian policy, perpetuating economic destitution, cultural dislocation, and starvation, was largely responsible for Aboriginal ill-health, rather than the claimed genetic inferiority or slovenly personal habits. Studies such as these are broadening our understanding of Canadian Indian policy and administration in the early to mid 20 th century, clearly refuting the idea that this was a period in which little of substance occurred.

Literature concerning Blackfoot-speaking Peoples

There exists a robust academic literature concerning the Blackfoot-speaking peoples. In addition to popularized accounts produced around the turn of the 19th century (Grinnell

26

1892; McClintock 1910), early ethnographic observations were offered by the Reverend

John MacLean (1895), a Methodist missionary who lived among the Kainai for approximately ten years. Clark Wissler was the first professional anthropologist to work among the Blackfoot and in collaboration with D. C. Duvall 6, a Piikuni from the

Blackfeet Reservation in Montana, produced a series of articles detailing Blackfoot material culture, religion, mythology and social organization (1910, 1911, 1912, 1913;

Wissler and Duvall 1908). In the late 1930s, under the direction of Ruth Benedict, a number of graduate students undertook field work. The work of Jane and Lucien Hanks

(1950) has been mentioned previously. Ester Goldfrank produced two short monographs on Kainai social organization (1943, 1945), and Oscar Lewis (1942) completed a historical piece on the Blackfoot. Following World War II, John Ewers, who served as the curator of the Museum of the Plains Indian in Browning, published extensively on the

Blackfoot, including The Blackfeet: Raiders on the Northern Plain (1958) which provides a syncretic overview of Blackfoot history and culture and endures as the most comprehensive treatment to date. Hugh Dempsey easily stands as the most prolific contributor to the field. Dempsey, the former curator of the Glenbow Museum and who married into a prominent Kainai family, has written abundantly on Blackfoot history and ethnography. His contributions range from historical accounts (1994), bibliographies

(1989), biographies of prominent leaders (1980, 1972), an authoritative contribution on the Blackfoot to Volume 13 of the Handbook of North American Indians (2001), and a myriad of journal articles. Hana Samek (1987) offers a rare comparative study, contrasting the experiences of the Blackfoot peoples under Canadian and U.S.

6 Duvall, the son of a French Canadian labourer and a Pikuni woman, received some formal education , was fluent in both English and Blackfoot, and from all accounts was a skilled linguist and ethnographer (Kehoe 1995:xi)

27 administration and concluding that despite differences in orientation, both countries pursued a determined, though ineffectual, assimilation policy.

Several Ph. D. dissertations have appeared in recent years. Keith Regular (1999) asserts the Blood reserve represented an undervalued economic force in the regional economy and provides a detailed examination of the complex economic associations that obtained between the Kainai and the local settler population between 1880 and 1930.

David Smyth (2001) re-examines the role of the Blackfoot in the fur trade during the late

18 th and early 19 th centuries and, in contrast to much earlier scholarship, asserts that the

Blackfoot were rational, practical and astute participants in the fur trade, pursuing coherent strategies that enhanced their best interests.

The work of Keira Ladner, which focuses on Blackfoot understanding and experience of politics, deserves special attention. Ladner’s Ph.D. dissertation When

Buffalo Speaks: Creating an Alternative Understanding of Traditional Blackfoot

Governenace (2000) is concerned with many of the same issues and themes as is the present thesis. Ladner, whose work relies heavily on her conversations with Blackfoot

Elders, strives to define what she terms Blackfoot Nationalism with the aim of producing de-colonized approaches to governance that seek to understand Indigenous political traditions from within, from the vantage point of indigenous thought, in order to reconcile pre-colonial, non-state indigenous governance with Western intellectual understandings.

In doing so, Ladner elaborates in some detail upon the organizing principles of Blackfoot government and how these are expressed in a unique set of institutional relationships embodied in bundles, societies, and clan leadership. She offers a compelling argument that the Blackfoot developed complex and enduring governmental structures which

28 effectively organized political relations, directed complex tasks, punished offenders, and mediated disputes. Blackfoot governance, she observes, is primarily derived from

Blackfoot experience with Creation and is ultimately grounded in the natural order.

In seeking to understand Blackfoot political institutions from within, how these were conceptualized, and how Blackfoot governance was effected in practice, Ladner’s work in many ways overlaps with my own. The present study is also concerned with understanding the internal dynamics of Blackfoot political systems in order to comprehend how leadership and governance were conceptualized in the early reserve era and the understandings and expectation the Kainai brought to their interactions with

Indian Affairs officials who, in ways that parallel Ladner’s critique of political science exclusion of Aboriginal governance structures, misunderstood the nature of Blackfoot political organization. However, there are also important points of divergence with

Ladner that need to be mentioned. Ladner reifies the notion of Blackfoot Nationalism, tending to portray it as something that exists outside and apart from historical and cultural influences and defined largely in opposition to political science and theories of the state.

As she describes it, pre-colonial indigenous governance appears essential and irreducible.

Rooted in an ecological context, it appears fixed and timeless until the advent of the colonial encounter. This is not to deny the existence of a Blackfoot Nationalism, or imply that Blackfoot speakers have no concept of themselves as a nation. However, from conversations that I have had with Elders and other knowledgeable Blackfoot persons, I am working from a standpoint that sees Blackfoot governance as expressed in systems of leadership and authority as less bounded, less circumscribed and more adaptive, more susceptible, like all human systems, to the dynamics of history and culture. Whereas

29

Ladner seeks to rescue Blackfoot Nationalism from the confines of Western Euro-centric traditions, I conceive of my own efforts as attempting to situate Blackfoot systems of leadership and authority within a colonial context and understand how they were shaped in a reciprocal process in which both Blackfoot leaders and state agents were active participants.

There are a growing number of collaborative works in which Blackfoot peoples themselves are immediately involved in the production of the publication. The True

Spirit and Original intent of Treaty 7 (Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council 1996) gathers testimony from Blackfoot, Stoney, and Tsuu T’ina Elders to uncover oral history on the negotiation of Treaty 7 and the implementation of the treaty terms that followed. The

Elders assert that the treaty was viewed as a peace treaty that was negotiated to ensure their continued economic security and cultural existence. This perspective is contrasted with an assessment of primary historical documents and academic accounts by Walter

Hildebrandt and Sarah Carter. For Nitsitapiisiinni: The Story of the Blackfoot People

(The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001), the companion book to a permanent display at the Glenbow Museum, a committee of Blackfoot Elders shared knowledge of Blackfoot world-view, oral histories, and beliefs, in order to elucidate Blackfoot conceptions of history, culture, land, and creation. Recently, Alison K. Brown and Laura Peers (2006) presented 33 photographs taken on the Blood reserve in 1925 to members of the community in order to comprehend how the images were viewed and understood by the

Kainai. The result is a masterful collaboration that discusses the context in which the photos were produced, the social conditions and historical relations that pertained at the time, and intimations of resistance to assimilative pressures.

30

Finally, there are a number of works that offer commentary by Blackfoot peoples themselves. Mountain Horse (1979) offers reflections on Kainai life during the early reserve years, as does Calf Robe (1979). Working collaboratively with anthropologist

Fraser Taylor (1989), Pete Standing Alone, a Kainai band member, active ceremonialist, and former band councillor, reflects on his life experiences and comments more broadly on Kainai history, culture, and contemporary Kainai life. Produced in conjunction with the Kainai Board of Education, Kitomahkitapiiminnooniski : Stories From Our Elders

(Zaharia and Fox 1995) contains interviews transcribed in both English and Blackfoot with more than 200 Kainai Elders who offered insight into their childhood experiences, residential school life, family relationships, clan affiliations, work life and occupations and other experiences. Reg Crowshoe and Sybille Manneschmidt (2002) delve into the historical, cultural, and ceremonial contexts underlying the Blackfoot Circle Structure and demonstrate how traditional teachings can be adapted to decision-making processes in contemporary circumstances. Betty Bastien (2004) situates the foundations for a unique Blackfoot epistemology in the reciprocal relations of kin, community, and creation and elucidates Blackfoot ways of understanding and experiencing the world.

Methodology

The research for this thesis is comprised of two major components: first, an investigation of the development and implementation of the band government provisions under the

Indian Act and second, ethnographic research regarding the operation of Blackfoot systems of leadership and authority and how band government was understood and experienced by the Kainai. The first component consists primarily of archival research,

31 while the second was accomplished through a series of semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable Kainai and other Blackfoot individuals.

Within anthropology, historical and archival materials are increasingly being used to provide comprehensive historical appraisals of the cultural processes that are the central concern of anthropological investigation. Mary Des Chene asserts in no uncertain terms that archival research is an ethnographic enterprise and that, far from serving merely as a supplement to more conventional fieldwork, it is entirely possible to conceive of eminently anthropological projects being conducted entirely within the archives

(1997:76-77). Indeed, Des Chene maintains that the archives can be productively conceptualized as a field site. Archival research may be regarded as ethnographic to the extent that it is concerned with the study of meaning created by human beings in particular historical and cultural settings and attempts to construct politically and socially situated accounts, descriptions, interpretations, and representations of human experience.

It is possible, in a process akin to taking and transcribing field notes, to glean anthropological insights about past events and cultural practices by treating both documents and their authors as interlocutors.

Caroline Brettell (1998:515) notes that while there are no mechanistic formulas for archival research, anthropologists would be wise to employ the same criteria used by historians to assess and evaluate sources. This consists of critically examining the social position of the observer, their aptitude and abilities, attitudes that may influence observations, what is included, what is omitted, the motivation for creating the document, the structural setting in which it was made use of, the purposes it served, and its narrative style. Further, it should be expected that anthropologists would interrogate archival

32 documents from an ethnographic perspective—bringing to bear notions of culture, ethnocentrism, power relations, culture contact and the colonial encounter—to discern the cultural understanding of the writer and assess the salience of the cultural representations made. Above all, historical documents need to be anchored in the social, political, and cultural contexts within which they were produced, as well as the contemporary contexts in which they are reinterpreted. These records need to be examined in light of past and present perspectives and with an awareness of the contemporary concerns and priorities through which they are evaluated (Brettrell 1998:518). As Jennifer S. H. Brown and

Elizabeth Vibert assert, the facts contained in historical documents are socially constructed, shaped by the cultural forces pertaining when they were originally created and the current circumstances in which they are analyzed and understood (1996:x).

However, Brown and Vibert also warn against the naïve hope that simply situating documents in a context, like putting cake in a pan, will provide a sufficient mould for analysis. Context itself needs to be read as text, as material that, no less than written documents, requires analysis and interpretation (Brown and Vibert 1996:xx).

Researchers are encouraged to comprehend context as a subjective construction arising out of the processes of historical and ethnographic explication, which in turn generates new contexts.

Such a historical anthropology examines cultural expression and political processes across time and, as Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff maintain, is “dedicated to exploring the processes that make and transform particular worlds” (1992:31). Since the 1970s and 1980s, in what may be deemed a historic turn in anthropology, historical processes and historical consciousness have become subjects of anthropological study as

33 diachronic and processual approaches are employed to explain cultural dynamics (Ortner

1984:158). As anthropologists have increasingly attempted to situate local systems within broader social and political processes in which they are implicated, there has been a more sophisticated use of historical sources and, consequently, greater sensitivity to the contested production of texts, the multiple ways of knowing the world expressed within them, and the processes by which personal acts become social facts (Comaroff and

Comaroff 1992:34).

The records for the Department of Indian Affairs are collected in the RG 10 record group held at the National Archives of Canada and these records represent a rich source of primary material and ethnographic data. In the years following Confederation, there was an extraordinary escalation in the information being collected by the department. By way of example, in 1867 the official account for Indian Affairs comprised a single paragraph within the Annual Report for the Department of Crown

Lands. By 1880, Indian Affairs had been established as an independent branch within the

Department of the Interior and its Annual Report covered some 310 pages which included reports from the Indian Superintendents in each province, reports from individual agents, detailed schedules and returns detailing the condition of the Indian population, and selected correspondence on matters of interest. Further, during this period there was a dramatic increase in Indian department correspondence and records, a considerable portion of this related to the execution of the numbered treaties and the extension of administrative authority over Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian west.

Even the most pedestrian aspects of departmental business were subject to administrative scrutiny and by the early years of the 20th century, departmental files had swelled

34 exponentially as department officials sought to regulate practically every facet of

Aboriginal life.

Within the RG 10 record group, there are extensive records relating to both elections on Indian reserves and the activities of Chiefs and Councillors. With respect to the former, the department created elections files for most bands, while the latter are contained in files of various topics. There were few election files prior to the late 1870s, however, beginning in the 1880s and 1890s the department opened a large number of election files, including for most bands in western Canada. In the 1910s there was another sharp increase in the number of election files opened, indicating a greater interest in band government on the part of federal administrators, Aboriginal communities, or both. The archival research conducted for this thesis examined the elections files in order to trace the early expression of this policy among bands in eastern Canada, the implementation of band government among bands in western Canada in the late 19 th century, and a more detailed consideration of leadership within the context of band government among the Kainai. In particular, the archival research focussed on how band government was put into practice, discrepancies between directives issued by officials in

Ottawa and reports from local agents regarding the operation of band government, how the band government provisions were received by Aboriginal peoples, the effects upon

Aboriginal leadership, and how Aboriginal remonstrance may have influenced band government implementation.

With respect to the ethnographic research, the objective was to gain insight into how Blackfoot systems of leadership and authority are conceptualized and comprehended and how band government has been historically understood and experienced on the Blood

35 reserve. The objective has not been to establish a consensus on what ‘actually happened’, but to provide an ethnographic perspective on the operation of band government in a particular community and a historical context in which to understand issues of governance and colonial power. A number of individuals from Kainai, Piikani, and

Siksika First Nations have kindly consented to participate in this research and in all I interviewed 12 people, several of them more than once, who are honoured for their wisdom regarding Blackfoot history and cultural practices. These individuals have demonstrated their expertise in a variety of capacities: some have served as leaders in their communities, several participated as cultural advisors on the Blackfoot Gallery

Committee which directed the production of the permanent Blackfoot exhibit at the

Glenbow Museum, one is the Executive Director of the Oldman River Cultural Centre, and several are involved with the Kainai Studies program at Red Crow Community

College. Many of the people interviewed are active ceremonialists and considered Elders within their communities.

I conducted semi-structured interviews focusing on questions of leadership and the operation of band councils. Following an interview guide that asked questions regarding Blackfoot systems of leadership and authority, how individuals came to be recognized as leaders, what characteristics or qualities were valued in leaders, what was expected of them, what issues they dealt with, what was their relationship with the Indian

Agent and Indian Affairs, how band councils were organized and operated, and how traditional systems of leadership and governance may have been incorporated into band council government, these interviews frequently evolved into open dialogues with individuals elaborating on issues they considered important. In keeping with the

36 protocols established in the required Ethics Approval for this thesis, informed consent was obtained orally from all participants and the research conformed to both the

University of Calgary Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving

Humans and the Tri-Council Policy Statement—Ethical Conduct for Research involving

Humans, Section Six, Research Involving Aboriginal Peoples, Part B. Good Practices. A list of individuals interviewed who consented to have their names used in this thesis appears in the Bibliography.

During the initial stages of research, several communities in Treaty 4 (southern

Manitoba and Saskatchewan), Treaty 6 (central Saskatchewan and Alberta), and Treaty 7

(southern Alberta) were considered for investigation, but the Blood Tribe, or Kainai

Nation emerged as the best choice for the focus of research. First, the archival record contained depth and detail. Informal elections were held within the community beginning in the 1880s and the annuity paylists provided evidence of transitions in leadership and the shifting composition of local Kainai bands. The RG 10 elections files offered insight into the emerging tensions over the selection of Chiefs within the community as well as with Indian Affairs officials. There were also records relating to a series of political confrontations over Indian Affairs policies in which Kainai Chiefs engaged department officials over leadership. Finally, there was a degree of correspondence between the archival and ethnographic material. Plainly stated, several reputable individuals from the Kainai Nation expressed their interest in the project, encouraged my pursuit of the research, and made themselves available to participate in interviews and discuss the history of their community. This research benefited

37 immensely from their involvement and I believe has resulted in a richer, more nuanced account.

Theoretical Perspective

This thesis derives its theoretical perspective from the anthropology of colonialism. The anthropology of colonialism is an emerging area of investigation that explores the cultural dimensions of the colonial encounter. Maintaining that past colonial practices have continuing social and political consequences, this approach seeks to understand colonialism as a cultural project that has shaped and continues to shape relations between

European and Indigenous societies (Thomas 1994; Dirks 1992). Taking colonial discourse analysis and post-colonial theory as a point of departure, the anthropology of colonialism focuses on many of the same objects of study and draws inspiration from common theoretical perspectives, but diverges in a number of methodological imperatives and analytical objectives. Essentially, the anthropology of colonialism advances a critical historical anthropology which takes up the challenges of literary and critical theory that regards colonial representations as ideological constructs, yet grounds its analysis in terms of local social relations and particular institutional forms. Beginning from the premise that the colonial encounter has transformed cultural relations in both metropolitan and colonial settings in ways which served to reify the heterogeneous lived reality of the colonized and erase the social and historical consequences of colonial conquest, the anthropology of colonialism seeks to explore how colonialism embodies, in addition to military, political and economic domination, a cultural project of control

(Dirks 1992:6). Recognizing that colonialism was not simply the outward expansion of

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European discovery and conquest, but rather a series of processes by which the categories of metropole and periphery were formed and given substance in the first place, this approach explores the complex ways in which cultural concepts and categories reinforce and express power.

A working outline for such an historical anthropology is provided by Jean

Comaroff and John Comaroff in their landmark Of Revelation and Revolution (1991). In sketching the history of the non-Conformist mission among the Tswana of Southern

Africa, Comaroff and Comaroff call for a new historical anthropology that broadens analysis by examining the beliefs, attitudes, values, customs, and routines of both colonizer and colonized and take into account internal conflicts and complexities that shaped relations in specific locations. Their declared intention is to “engage in an anthropology of the colonial encounter to reveal the structures and processes by which some people come to dominate others” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:xiii). Accepting the precepts that historical meaning is contingent and that power is indeterminate,

Comaroff and Comaroff locate their investigations in the interplay between structural constraint and situational contingency that obtain in the local working out of the global impulses of European colonial expansion. Rather than an indomitable force, colonialism entails a complex response to assertions of economic, political, and cultural domination, that is, a long conversation between colonizer and colonized (1991:313). Comaroff and

Comaroff focus on how different kinds of meaning were produced in particular material contexts and how social and cultural worlds are made (1991:38-40).

In this regard, it needs to be emphasized that the ‘otherness’ of the colonized was neither inherent nor stable and that colonial differences had to be assiduously defined and

39 maintained. Pursuits as diverse as missionary activity, government legislation, bureaucratic administration, the organization of the division of labour, literary accounts, ideals of social comportment, gender proscriptions, the regulation of marriage and family arrangements all served to regulate cultural practices and order social categories to legitimize moral precepts and maintain cultural boundaries. For example, the legal and moral regulation of Aboriginal peoples perpetuated under the Indian Act can be regarded as an extension of the Canadian social, political, and economic systems and institutions into a colonial setting that has necessitated reforming the relations of and with Aboriginal peoples to produce new cultural domains and terrains of inclusion and exclusion.

Because these distinct forces oscillate between global systems and local struggles, it is necessary to conceive of metropole and colony as a single analytic field (Stoler and

Cooper 1997:4). Thus, those interested in pursing an anthropology of colonialism need to move beyond restricted investigation of political, ethnic, economic, and religious issues among colonized or marginalized peoples and recognize the dichotomy of colonizer and colonized as politically constructed, examining these “as a historically shifting pair of social categories that need to be explained” (Stoler 1992:321). In order to more fully understand the complexities of colonialism, it is necessary to interrogate colonizers and their communities with the same scrutiny as has conventionally been applied to the colonized.

In this vein, Nicholas Thomas argues that colonialism has too often been comprehended as a “transhistorical logic of denigration” and seeks to articulate how colonialism can be examined as inscribed or reformulated by colonial subjects, that is, how it may be conceived of as a practically mediated relation. To accomplish this he

40 advocates an anthropology of colonialism that recognizes that colonialism has always been a cultural process, that its excursions and idealizations have always been imagined and mediated through structures of meaning and forms of colonialist self-legitimation

(1994:2-3).

Thomas contends that colonialism should be viewed as a culture like any other and he attempts to formulate an anthropology of colonialism that offers deeply contextualized and historically informed analyses in order to discern the multifarious aspects of its operation. Proposing a mid-range theory, Thomas charts a course “between the Scylla of mindlessly particular conventional colonial history, which fails to move beyond the perceptions of whichever administrators or missionaries are being documented and the Charybdis of colonial discourse theory, which totalizes a hegemonic global ideology” (1994:60). Thus, moving between flights of high theory and the miring detail of empirical description, Thomas elaborates an ethnography of colonial projects that accepts the presence of pervasive constitutive ideologies, but substantiates these in practice, in their effective implementation, operation, and execution, and in their moments of success and failure (1994:60). Acknowledging a debt to Pierre Bourdieu,

Thomas suggests that the concept of colonial projects can mediate between the disjunctures of discourse and agency to provide a productive analytic tension that moves between ideological configurations and their moments of reformulation and contestation in practice. Neither strictly discursive nor exclusively practical, colonial projects may be regarded as socially transformative endeavours that are local in application, but also bound up in enduring historical determinants (1994:105-06). Culturally and strategically complex, colonial projects entail tactical transformations of prior discourses, shaped by

41 their historical, political, and cultural contexts. While some of these ventures may have been global in scope, they were at the same time disparate and discrete and different colonial agents—missionaries, administrators, and settlers—although they may have shared a number of basic assumptions, all undertook distinctive projects and enacted them in unique ways. Colonialism’s culture, rather than expressing a unified, coherent logic, is best comprehended as series of projects composed of various narratives, routines, and practices derived from historical formations and enduring into the present

(1994:171).

Derek G. Smith (2001:255) has recently offered some observations on adapting the notion of colonial projects to the administration of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

Derived from Foucauldian notions of governmentality, Smith explains that projects may be regarded as a pervasive set of ideas and activities that select and construct social objects with the aim of delimiting ideals of comportment and conduct. Briefly, governmentality may be understood to mean the ‘rationality of government’ and refers to the ways in which practices of governance are conceptualized and how activities of governance are articulated and enacted in the exercise of political authority.

Governmental rationality takes as its objects the conduct of individuals and the condition of the population and distributes the effects of power in such a manner as to order and arrange the lives and circumstances of citizens and subjects (Gordon 1991:3). Colonial administration reflects projects, programs, techniques, and strategies which enlivened specific rationalities of government and by which colonial relations were shaped. In this sense, colonial projects may be discerned in specific events and initiatives influenced by

42 persistent historical formations and are reflected in a variety of ventures perpetuated by state agencies and other social actors.

Smith argues that the abiding tenets of Canadian Indian policy outlined by Tobias

(1983), protection, civilization, and assimilation, may be usefully reconceptualized as colonial projects. Conceiving of protection, civilization, and assimilation as projects encourages investigators to interrogate them historically, as politically and culturally complex processes expressed as distinct, but interrelated policies and practices at different historical moments. This approach seeks to understand the ways in which protection, civilization, and assimilation were negotiated and contested categories, how they were enacted in specific settings, how meanings and understandings changed, and how they were elaborated in practice. Arguing that protection, civilization, and assimilation have all been continuously present throughout the entire history of Canadian

Indian administration, Smith elaborates upon the basic strands of what he defines as the protection project, the civilization project, and the assimilation project (Smith 2001:256-

257). The protection project embraces ideas of Aboriginal demoralization and cultural disintegration and perpetuates the physical and social separation of Aboriginal peoples from Euro-Canadian society. The civilization project relates to the social transformation of Aboriginal peoples effected through disciplinary regimes developed around

Christianization and citizenship. Finally, the assimilation project endeavours to dismantle First Nations as corporate entities and reorient individual relations to the agencies and institutions of the Canadian state. Conceiving of protection, civilization, and assimilation as colonial projects in this way illuminates how these notions serve to mediate relations between Aboriginal peoples and Canadian society and encourages us to

43 view them as part of larger global processes that correspond with practices in other colonial settings. Finally, examining these historically contingent relations as colonial projects emphasizes the socially transformative and objectively interested nature of diverse programs and activities by examining the historical and cultural context of the representations of colonial knowledge and their realization in practice. The administration and management of Aboriginal peoples in Canada would seem particularly suited to analysis as a colonial project in that it entails a range of different initiatives and programs that are based upon enduring historical presumptions regarding the nature and prospects of Aboriginal peoples. Moreover, it is the principal domain in which

Aboriginal/state relations are expressed in practice and represents a site of contestation and negotiation. Essentially, this approach to Aboriginal/state relations would strive to produce a historical ethnography of Canadian Indian administration which explores how

Aboriginal peoples were constituted as the objects of colonial knowledge and how Indian

Affairs policies and programs were conditioned by Aboriginal interests and agendas not fully comprehended by Indian Affairs administrators.

When culture is taken as a site of intervention, dislocation, and struggle, a new terrain of analysis reveals itself. Viewing colonialism as a cultural project of control underscores the intimate connection between culture and colonialism and elucidates the complex interplay between modes of colonial organization and the production of cultural forms. “Colonialism can be seen both as a historical moment—specified in relation to

European political and economic projects in the modern era—and as a trope for domination and violation. Culture can be seen as both a historically constituted domain of significant concepts and practices and as a regime in which power achieves its ultimate

44 apotheosis” (Dirks 1992a: 4-5). Brought together in this way, colonialism and culture can be understood as a new domain in which the history and effects of power can be critically investigated. While in no way denying the material effects of colonial violence and exploitation, focussing attention on cultural dimensions of regulation and control provides entry points to consider how social categories and identities are interpreted, accepted, inverted and redeployed by individuals living in colonial circumstances (Stoler and Cooper 1997:7). Moreover, if colonialism is regarded as a cultural formation, then the corollary is that culture is a colonial formation, implicated in colonial conquest and the development of bourgeois society. Europe was as profoundly affected by its imperial adventures as were those in the colonies. Just as European culture was given new political meanings in the colonial social order, colonial cultural configurations were received and reconstituted in Europe (Stoler 1992:321). Privileging culture as an object of knowledge and a mode of regulatory power reveals its formation in relation to colonial histories. Colonialism can thus be conceived of as an investigation of the politics of

Empire as well as an inquiry into the cultural politics emanating from relations of power and production of knowledge.

Elaborating upon insights offered by both conventional approaches to colonialism within anthropology and post-colonial theory, the anthropology of colonialism attempts to examine the diverse aspects of the colonial encounter, bringing the expressions and practices of both the colonizer and colonized into the same analytical field. Recognizing that colonialism was as much a cultural process as a political or economic one, this approach seeks to understand the intricate ways that cultural categories were shaped and imbued with meaning in the colonial context, becoming the locus for assertions of power

45 and control. In this regard, Thomas (1994) suggests that conceptualizing colonial relations as projects negotiates between global ideologies and particular practices and situates analysis in the discursive agency of individuals in specific circumstances. An approach to Aboriginal/state relations derived from the anthropology of colonialism seeks to comprehend the inchoate and indeterminate nature of many Indian policy initiatives, the influence of Aboriginal peoples on Indian administration, and strives to examine the elaboration of colonial power in explicit ethnographic and historical detail. Elected band government represents one aspect of the pervasive attempts to remake the lives and circumstances of Aboriginal peoples. Band government was originally conceived of as a means of training Aboriginal peoples in the operation of a simple municipal style institution, with the belief that traditional forms of Aboriginal political organization would inevitably be displaced by Euro-Canadian institutions. Ultimately, band government was an intrusive institution of surveillance and control as Aboriginal leaders were subjected to more intensive regulatory control by Indian Affairs officials and band councils were circumscribed political bodies with limited power. However, as with other aspects of Canadian Indian policy such as Enfranchisement and residential schools, band government was transformed in practice into a site of struggle as both administrators and

Aboriginal peoples sought to inscribe the institution with their own meanings and understandings. From this perspective, traditional Aboriginal systems of leadership and authority can be understood to have persisted within the context of Indian Act band government as Aboriginal leaders sought to manipulate the institution of band government to their goals and objectives.

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Outline of Chapters

Chapter II provides an historical overview of the band government provisions that appear in Canadian Indian legislation, reviewing the origins and subsequent revisions of this policy. Situating the band government provisions within the abiding colonial projects of assimilation and civilization, it is asserted that they arose out of the government’s preoccupation with Enfranchisement, attempts to dismantle the communal relations that pertained in Aboriginal societies and a desire to erode traditional Aboriginal leadership.

Chapter III examines the implementation of the elective system among various bands in Canada. The application of the elective system in eastern Canada is reviewed prior to a consideration of the use of the band government provisions among First

Nations in the prairie region. After abandoning Hayter Reed’s policy to dispense with

Chiefs and Headmen whenever possible, department officials in the late 1890s started to demonstrate greater interest in Aboriginal leadership and the election of Chiefs in western

Canada. To this end, a variety of initiatives were pursued before settling on a policy of electing Chiefs for life pending good behaviour. Although senior department officials developed elected band government with specific objectives in mind, in practice the pursuit of the policy was piecemeal and haphazard, especially in western Canada.

Nevertheless, band government remains an important measure in the colonial disciplining of Aboriginal peoples, and fits neatly with the prevailing direction of Canadian Indian policy.

Chapter IV provides a historical context for later discussions of Kainai leadership in the early reserve era, elaborating upon Blackfoot social and political organization and the systems of leadership and authority common in band societies such as the Kainai.

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The Blackfoot peoples and their ancestors developed flexible yet resilient political institutions uniquely suited to the exigencies of life as bison hunters on the northern plains. Leadership was grounded in systems of authority manifest in bundles, all- comrades societies, and Chiefs, each with a distinctive role in guiding and situating decision-making processes in Blackfoot society. Consequently, the qualities most valued in Blackfoot leaders were knowledge, experience, strength of character, and generosity and leaders were expected to provide for the welfare of their followers while, maintaining the social order by settling conflicts, adjudicating disputes, and mediating relations with other bands. Non-coercive and dependant largely upon personal suasion, leadership among the Blackfoot peoples was informally structured, situational, and strove to achieve consensus. Leaders were almost always senior men related to most band members through kinship and respected for their war record, hunting prowess, oratorical skills, and generosity. This chapter also examines some of the post contact influences on systems of leadership and authority. Leading up to the reserve era, a series of epidemic diseases, participation in the fur trade, missionary activity, the whiskey trade, and the abrupt decline of the bison herds precipitated dramatic changes in Blackfoot society and had consequences for systems of leadership and authority. With the making of Treaty 7 and settling on the reserve, band government became a site of struggle as both Indian Affairs administrators and Kainai leaders invested the institution with their own conceptions regarding the exercise of political authority on the reserve.

Chapter V examines the Kainai leadership in the early reserve era and discusses the elaboration of the elective system on the Blood reserve by Indian Affairs and subsequent attempts to influence the selection of Kainai leaders. After settling on the

48 reserve, Kainai leaders were subject to the limitations imposed by a sedentary existence on the reserve and the coercive administration of Indian Affairs officials. As incumbent

Chiefs died they were replaced through informal elections—new Chiefs were ‘elected’ in accordance with the terms of the Indian Act—but it would appear that traditional means of selecting leaders were still important within the community. Chiefs remained individuals of status and influence within the community and were looked to by band members to provide support, guidance, and to ensure the continued welfare of the band.

Divisions within the community began to appear as department officials increasingly sought to influence the selection of leaders. From the 1910s onwards the department allowed vacancies created through death or resignation of Minor Chiefs to stand in abeyance by refusing to authorize elections. By the 1920s, Kainai leadership and the band council had become a site of struggle as both Kainai leaders and Indian Affairs officials sought to use the institution in order to exert and regulate political authority among the Kainai.

Chapter VI argues that the Kainai Chiefs became embroiled in a series of political confrontations that fundamentally represented efforts to resist the regulatory intrusions of the Indian Affairs administration and exert a measure of political autonomy. Perhaps the most prominent of these issues was the attempt to secure a surrender of a portion of the

Blood reserve and the subsequent attempts to have Head Chief deposed under the terms of the Indian Act. Kainai leaders used their positions as elected Chiefs to confront and challenge Indian Affairs on the disposition of lands and resources on the Blood reserve and more broadly to engage department officials in a debate over the nature of leadership and political authority on the Blood reserve.

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Drawing upon both archival and ethnographic research, this thesis contributes to both Native historiography and the anthropology of colonialism by providing a historical context for a largely overlooked aspect of the administration of Aboriginal peoples in

Canada, the band government provisions of the Indian Act. As mentioned previously, band government has not been the subject of a concerted scholarly treatment and this thesis examines in detail the development of elected band government legislation within the Department of Indian Affairs in the late 19 th century, situating it within the prevailing assumptions that impelled Canadian Indian policy. As the political systems of Aboriginal peoples came to increasingly preoccupy Indian Affairs administrators in the late 19 th century, band government was conceived as an ideal tool for directed culture change and as such represents an institution that reinforced and expressed colonial relations. This thesis also contributes to specifying the circumstances and contexts in which Canadian

Indian policy was implemented by offering a concise appraisal of the introduction of band government with a specific focus on the experience of First Nations in western

Canada. In practice, band government initiatives were often random and inconsistent and the characterization of band government as an institution that inevitably and completely displaced Aboriginal political systems must be questioned, especially given the insistence of a number of First Nations that they be allowed to retain elected Chiefs as a right under treaty. In this regard, this thesis considers in some detail the experience of the Kainai with band government in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries in order to explain how

Kainai Chiefs confronted and challenged Indian Affairs officials over the administration of reserve lands and resources and in the process entered into a debate over the nature of leadership and the exercise of political authority in the reserve context. In this manner,

50 the Kainai through their actions effectively established band government as a site of struggle as they utilized traditional systems of leadership and authority to address current issues and strove to recast band government with their own political meanings and objectives. Finally, this thesis, in situating particular routines, practices, and procedures of band government within the larger context of unfolding colonial relations, illustrates the historical processes which have undermined Aboriginal autonomy, as well as the means by which these were resisted and challenged, and provides insights on the cultural dimensions of the colonial encounter in the development and implementation of the band government policy.

Finally, a note on terminology. With respect to ethnonyms, Kainai, Siksika, and

Piikani have been used throughout to refer to the Blood, Blackfoot, and Peigan respectively and Blackfoot peoples has been used to refer to these three groups collectively. Binemma (1996) adopts a convention of referring to the Siksika, Kainai, and Piikani by their proper ethnonyms and the term Blackfoot to identify these peoples collectively. Smyth (2001) makes a case for the use of the term Niitsitapi, which he reported was in vogue on Blackfoot Nation websites. However, Betty Bastien (2001) asserts that Niitsitapi denotes Aboriginal people in general and that Blackfoot-speaking people are referred to as Siksikaitsitapi. Alternatively, Smyth also uses the term

Blackfoot-speaking peoples. The Blackfoot Gallery Committee offers the further distinction of identifying Ni-tsi-ta-pi-ksi as meaning all indigenous peoples of North

America, Sao-kitapiiksi denoting Aboriginal peoples of the Plains, and Nitsi-poi-yiksi as speakers of the Real Language, that is Blackfoot peoples (The Blackfoot Gallery

Committee 2001:3-4). The synonymy produced by Douglas R. Parks for Dempsey’s

51 contribution to Volume 13 of the Handbook of North American Indians (2001:622-27) does not offer any clarification of the matter. Blackfoot speakers themselves tend to use both ethnonyms and English translations depending on context, so will speak of the

Kainai, Piikani, and Siksika in one instance and Blood, Peigan, and Blackfoot in another, as well as commonly using the term Blackfoot to refer generally to the three divisions of

Blackfoot-speaking peoples, as in ‘Blackfoot country’ to denote their traditional territory

(Greg Smith, personal communication, October 21, 2003). Given the lack of consensus on the matter, even among Blackfoot speakers themselves, the ethnonyms of Siksika,

Kainai, and Piikani have been used throughout to refer to the Blood, Peigan, and

Blackfoot respectively, while the term Blackfoot peoples has been used to refer to these three groups as a whole. Where English versions of these names appear in historical documents, these usages have been preserved. As well, when referring to proper place names, such as the Blood reserve or Peigan reserve, the English versions of the names have been allowed to stand.

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CHAPTER TWO

Elective Provisions of the Indian Act

The Acts framed in the years 1868 and 1869, relating to Indian affairs, were designed to lead the Indian people by degrees to mingle with the white race in the ordinary avocations of life. It was intended to afford facilities for electing, for a limited period members of bands to manage, as a Council, local matters . . . . Thus establishing a responsible for an irresponsible system, this provision, by law was designed to pave the way to the establishment of simple municipal institutions. (William Spragge, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1871)

Band councils persisted in Indian communities, not because they were perceived as responding to important local government needs, but because the government insisted on dealing through them—indeed it had to deal through some formally constituted body (Hawthorn Report 1967:178 original emphasis).

Prior to Confederation, the political customs of Aboriginal peoples garnered little more than passing interest from Colonial authorities. After Confederation, however, the governance of Aboriginal communities increasingly came to occupy Canadian government officials. From an early date, Canadian Indian legislation featured provisions for the election of Chiefs and band councils which sought to displace traditional forms of Aboriginal leadership with a Chief and council elected by the male members of the band under the authority of the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs.

Ostensibly designed as a means of tutoring Aboriginal peoples in the operation of municipal systems, elected band government served to enhance the control of Indian

Affairs officials over Aboriginal peoples and effectively limited Aboriginal participation in the governance of their own communities. These measures were incorporated into the

Indian Act of 1876 and have continued to figure prominently in Canadian Indian legislation ever since. By the turn of the 19 th century, elected band government had been

53 unilaterally imposed upon all bands in the eastern provinces by Order-in-Council, while bands in Manitoba, British Columbia, and the North West Territories were routinely treated as though the elective provisions were in force.

Liberal democratic institutions were seen as a hallmark of civilization and a benchmark of progress and the introduction of elected band councils was thus considered to be a means for advancing ‘civilization’ and promoting the eventual assimilation of

Aboriginal peoples (Daugherty 1980:1). Canadian officials believed that Aboriginal peoples could be transformed through programs of directed culture change and exposure to Euro-Canadian mores and values and band government was promoted as one of various initiatives that sought to achieve the cultural, material, and spiritual progress of

Aboriginal peoples. If band government became a site of struggle in Aboriginal communities, it was because it was impelled in the first instance by a set of colonial assumptions about the nature of Aboriginal political systems and the capacities of

Aboriginal peoples. The premise behind the band government provisions of the Indian

Act was that Aboriginal political systems were crude, puerile, and inept. Band government responded to a perceived need for a more suitable form of political organization within Aboriginal communities. It also subjected Aboriginal peoples to more pervasive administrative control and represents an attempt to fundamentally recast

Aboriginal political relations. In order to explore the effects of band government and

Aboriginal responses to these initiatives, it is necessary to consider the legislative development of the band government provisions of the Indian Act within the Department of Indian Affairs in the late 19 th century. Unfortunately, a concise examination of the band government policy does not exist within the academic literature. The intent of the

54 present chapter is to offer an overview of the development of the band government provisions of the Indian Act and the imperatives it embodies.

Elected band government was predicated on notions of social advancement and may be regarded as part of a pervasive endeavour to remake the lives and circumstances of Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Ideas of moral and cultural evolution were woven throughout all aspects of Canadian Indian policy in the 19 th century and were reflected in the long standing mission to civilize and assimilate the Aboriginal population on the part of Canadian authorities (Furniss 1999:12). These endeavours presumed Aboriginal incapacity—the inability of Aboriginal peoples to comprehend their own interests and to act on their own behalf—and federal legislation such as the Indian Act established

Aboriginal peoples as wards of the state to be civilized and assimilated to the Euro-

Canadian polity. Canadian officials believed that Aboriginal peoples could be transformed through programs of directed culture change and federal Indian policy actively sought to achieve cultural, material, and spiritual progress (Smith 2001:257-258;

Kulchyski 1993:24-25). This complex of legislation and moral regulation, sometimes referred to as the policy of the Bible and the plow, embodied both religious and secular thinking of the time and was dedicated to raising those perceived to be unenlightened savages up on the scale of civilization (Milloy 1999:25; Nock 1988:71). Elected band government represents a politically and culturally complex colonial project aimed at controlling, restricting, and managing the Aboriginal population. As such, the elective system exhibits elements of all three of the projects of colonial governance—the protection project, the civilization project, and the assimilation project—elaborated upon by Smith (2001:257) and was implicated more broadly in other administrative routines,

55 programs, and strategies aimed at reforming the lives and circumstances of Aboriginal peoples such as Enfranchisement, treaties, and the reserve system. Ultimately, band government became a medium through which colonial relations were enacted and negotiated.

Elected band government served as a protection project by linking ideas of cultural demoralization to perceptions of Aboriginal political disintegration and sought to establish a separate political institution for Aboriginal peoples under the direction of

Indian Affairs officials. Convinced that Aboriginal political systems were simple and ineffectual, elected band government was to provide a vocational governing structure for

Aboriginal communities. It represents a civilization project in that the explicit intention was to displace traditional Aboriginal leadership and train Aboriginal peoples in the customs and conventions of basic municipal institutions. The objective was to discipline

Aboriginal peoples in Euro-Canadian political routines through participation in elections and band councils and eventually prepare them for the political franchise as Canadian citizens. Finally, elected band government constituted an assimilation project by attempting to reform both Aboriginal political organization and cultural relations within

Aboriginal communities with the goal of eroding traditional forms of social and political organization, undermining communal relations, and reorienting political authority while encouraging conformity to Euro-Canadian standards and values. The underlying intent of elected band government was to implicate Aboriginal peoples more directly with regulatory agencies of the state and to incorporate them into the Canadian body politic.

Taken together, band government may be posited as a cultural project of control that sought to impose categories through which colonial agents attempted to dominate

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Aboriginal peoples by delimiting and then redefining Aboriginal social and political practices in accordance with Euro-Canadian norms.

Band Government Legislation

The provisions for elected band government initially appeared in a piece of legislation entitled An Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians and the better management of Indian Affairs in1869 and have remained remarkably constant since that time. This

Act conferred extensive powers upon the Superintendent General and by extension the

Department of Indian Affairs by granting it the administrative authority to manage the activities of band councils. The policy of elected band government reflected general notions of human progress and social evolution current at the time. Prime Minister John

A. Macdonald, in his capacity as Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, remarked on the development of municipal institutions for Aboriginal peoples, stating that the aim was to habituate Aboriginal peoples to Euro-Canadian political institutions in order that they may be more readily assimilated.

It is hoped that a system may be adopted which will have the effect of accustoming the Indians to the modes of government prevalent in the white communities surrounding them, and that it will prepare them for earlier amalgamation with the general population of the country 1.

Despite numerous revisions to the Indian Act, including an extensive revision in 1951 in which many of the more blatantly repressive measures were dropped, band government under the Indian Act endured as an institution that permitted only restricted by-law making powers under the close supervision of Indian Affairs officials. It was not until

1 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1881:xlvii

57 the 1960s and 1970s that band councils constituted under the Indian Act began to exercise greater authority over their own affairs.

It was no coincidence that the provisions for band government first appeared within a piece of legislation promoting Enfranchisement. Dissatisfied by the lack of progress towards the goals of civilizing and assimilating Aboriginal peoples, Colonial officials embarked on the Enfranchisement policy, which assumed that Aboriginal peoples could be recognized as colonial citizens only when they had embraced ownership of private property. In the attempt to more immediately render Aboriginal culture to

Euro-Canadian ideals, Enfranchisement embodied the colonial projects of civilization and assimilation by endeavouring to erode communal relationships among Aboriginal peoples so that autonomous individuals could then be integrated into the colonial social order. In

1857, the Colonial legislature for the United Province of Canada passed An Act for the

Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes of the Canadas , which declared that any Indian male over 21 years of age and free of debt, literate in English or French, having received a basic education, and of a good moral character could, on the approval of the Governor-

General, renounce his Aboriginal identity and assume all the duties and responsibilities of full citizenship. It has been wryly observed that a good portion of the Euro-Canadian population of the time would not have met such criteria (Tobias 1983:42-43; Smith

1975:xviii ). After a three year probation had been served, applicants would receive title in fee simple to 20 hectares of reserve land and a share of band funds. The intended effect was to be a steady erosion of Aboriginal culture and the inexorable incorporation of Aboriginal peoples and Indian reserves into the Canadian body politic (Milloy

1983:58).

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John S. Milloy (1983) contends that the 1857 Civilization Act represented a fundamental change in Canadian Indian policy. To that point, the civilization program had never contemplated the notion that Aboriginal peoples would become colonial citizens (Hodgetts 1955:210). Rather, Indian policy had sought to produce self-reliant,

Christian Indians entrenched upon discrete tracts of Indian land. Enfranchisement, however, clearly advanced the erosion of Aboriginal communities as the ultimate objective of Indian policy. “Thereafter, the goal, full civilization, would be marked by the disappearance of those communities as individuals were enfranchised and the reserves were eroded, twenty hectares by twenty hectares” (Milloy 1983:59).

Government officials believed that by encouraging Aboriginal peoples to forsake their cultural traditions and seek Enfranchisement, communal bonds would be weakened and

Aboriginal peoples would embrace individual land holding and private enterprise and eventually be absorbed into Euro-Canadian society. The response of Aboriginal peoples to Enfranchisement was reserved at best. Aboriginal leaders were opposed to any scheme to partition collectively held reserve lands and tribal councils were accused of subverting the program by refusing to allocate title to communal land to Enfranchisement applicants.

Opposition to Enfranchisement was so pervasive that at Confederation, ten years after the

Civilization Act was first passed, a mere handful of Aboriginal peoples had applied for

Enfranchisement and only one candidate was accepted (Dickason 1999:225). Although

Aboriginal peoples were acutely aware of the profound social and economic changes with which they were confronted and were eager to adopt education, agriculture, and a sedentary lifestyle, they would not accept these at the expense of their traditional cultures. Aboriginal peoples actively endeavoured to preserve and enhance customary

59 lifeways within a settled agricultural context (Milloy 1983:60). Enfranchisement clearly stands as a colonial project that incorporates elements of the civilization project and the assimilation project in that it sought to dismantle Aboriginal communities as it promoted the fragmentation of Aboriginal lands in order to individuate Aboriginal peoples and establish their primary social and political commitments to the Canadian state. As such,

Enfranchisement represents an institution that establishes new social categories that reinforce and express colonial power.

Elected band government was expressly developed to remedy the perceived failings of the Enfranchisement program. Indian department officials reasoned that through participation in municipal institutions, Aboriginal peoples would be induced to assume the responsibilities of citizenship and conduct themselves in correspondence with

Euro-Canadian ideals of individual self-interest. Traditional Aboriginal leadership was, with some justification, believed to be an impediment to Enfranchisement. Department officials accused Aboriginal leaders of using their influence to dissuade individuals from applying for Enfranchisement and for refusing to allocate reserve lands to

Enfranchisement applicants (Milloy 1983:61). As the main pillar of the civilization program, Enfranchisement had been a constant disappointment to the government since its inception. It had simply not produced Aboriginal citizens amenable to private property and civic responsibilities. For Indian policy to be successful, department officials believed that it was essential for traditional Aboriginal political organizations to be abolished and replaced with an institutional structure that would subject bands to more direct departmental control (Milloy 1983:61-62). From its earliest incarnation, band government was envisioned as a vehicle for directed culture change. By encouraging

60 individual initiative and the procurement of private property at the community level, band government was intended to succeed in civilizing and assimilating Aboriginal peoples where Enfranchisement had not. Essentially, band government offered a redeployment of the ideological constructs underpinning Enfranchisement, extending the attempts to regulate and reform Aboriginal social forms into a new cultural terrain.

Band Government Provisions of the Gradual Enfranchisement Act

The Gradual Enfranchisement Act covered various items for the management of Indian

Affairs, mainly the regulation of the land and property of Enfranchised Indians. Under

Sections 10 through 12 of the Gradual Enfranchisement Act, which outlines the provisions of the electoral system, authority was vested in the Governor General to direct and manage Aboriginal political organization. The Superintendent General of Indian

Affairs, on the authority of the Governor General, was empowered to unilaterally apply the elective system to any band deemed sufficiently advanced, to order that elections be held, and to remove Chiefs for “dishonesty, intemperance, or immorality” 2. This power to depose Aboriginal leaders would become a favoured means by which Indian Affairs officials attempted to control Aboriginal leadership and manage Aboriginal political activities. The band government provisions of the Gradual Enfranchisement Act also stipulated that, under the supervision of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Chiefs and

Councillors were to be elected for three year terms by the male members of the band over

21 years of age and that bands were to be allowed one Chief and two head men for every two hundred people. This legislation also conferred limited by-law making powers upon band councils, which covered such mundane matters as care of public health, the

2 S.C. 1869, c. 6.

61 repression of intemperance and profligacy, the prevention of trespass by cattle, the construction and maintenance of roads and public buildings, and the establishment of pounds and appointment of pound keepers. Chiefs were also given the capacity to identify band members for Enfranchisement. The authority of band councils was further limited by the fact that all rules and regulations passed by the band councils were subject to the confirmation of the Governor General 3. Thus, the authority of the Department of

Indian Affairs, exercised through the office of the Governor General, was always paramount to that of the band councils (Daugherty 1980:2). Life Chiefs—that is Chiefs selected through traditional customs of the band, often referred to as Hereditary Chiefs in department correspondence, were to be permitted to continue serving until death, resignation, or deposal by the Governor General. The terms for band government that appeared in the Gradual Enfranchisement Act established a precedent that was perpetuated in future legislation and corresponded to the imperatives of the colonial projects of civilization and assimilation by seeking to reform the political organization of

Aboriginal peoples and binding them more closely to agencies of the Canadian state.

Reflecting inherent assumptions regarding the primitive nature of Aboriginal social and political practices on behalf of the colonial administrators and the perceived need to train

Aboriginal peoples in more advanced social forms, the band government provisions perpetuated cultural concepts and categories that served to reinforce and express colonial power relations. These would be salient features of all future iterations of band government.

3 S.C. 1869, c. 6.

62

The Electoral Provisions of the Indian Act

The election provisions of the Gradual Enfranchisement Act were, with a few minor changes, incorporated into the Indian Act of 1876, the guiding document for Indian policy into the 20 th century. Subject to frequent amendments and revisions, the Indian

Act has implicated Aboriginal peoples in a pervasive snarl of oppressive government regulation that has constrained Aboriginal self-determination. A comprehensive piece of legislation containing over 100 separate sections, the Indian Act delineated three primary areas of interest: lands, membership, and local government (Leslie and Maguire

1978:51). Each of these areas were reflected in relevant sections concerning the management and allocation of reserve lands, status, membership and Enfranchisement, and the election of Chiefs and band councils. The Indian Act also retains the general tenor of pre-Confederation Indian legislation by relegating Aboriginal peoples to a distinct legal category, establishing them as wards of the Canadian state, and denying them the most basic rights and privileges. In almost every section, the Indian Act served to undermine Aboriginal self-determination and constrain Aboriginal autonomy. By endeavouring to regulate and manage Aboriginal economic, political, and cultural relations, the Indian Act represents a central plank in the civilization and assimilation projects of the Canadian government. The Indian Act reflects comprehensive attempts to inculcate Euro-Canadian values and habits and to fundamentally restructure the communal relations that pertained within Aboriginal societies.

The Indian Act bestowed pervasive discretionary powers upon the Superintendent

General of Indian Affairs, subjecting Aboriginal peoples to an authoritarian bureaucratic regime. Indian Affairs officials were granted an extraordinary degree of management

63 and control over Aboriginal peoples and were empowered to determine what was in their best interests and act on their behalf. No conduct was too insignificant to escape administrative scrutiny and the Indian Act conveyed extensive powers for the supervision of virtually every facet of Aboriginal life, including residence on reserves, personal movements off reserve, the production and sale of agricultural produce, the education of children, religious and ceremonial observations, political practices, the expenditure of personal and band funds, and the management of reserve lands and resources. The autonomy of Aboriginal peoples was increasingly restricted as they were inhibited from exercising any real authority or responsibility over their lives and were rarely consulted on matters that concerned them. This legislation has sought to suppress Aboriginal culture and inculcate the values of the dominant society, assimilating Aboriginal peoples to Euro-Canadian religious beliefs, political systems, concepts of property, and social norms. Here the Indian Act can be regarded as a colonial project that, in seeking to direct, manage, and control even the most mundane details of Aboriginal life, subjected

Aboriginal peoples to unprecedented institutional regulation as an intensely administered population (Smith 1993:47).

The inclusion of the election provisions in the new Indian Act, appearing as

Sections 61 to 63 under the heading ‘Chiefs and Councillors’, elevated band government to a new level of prominence and inevitably resulted in their wider application.

Incompetency was added to the grounds for which a Chief or councillor could be deposed, although no definition as to what constituted incompetency was offered, providing the department with an arbitrary standard with which to attack traditional leadership (Daugherty 1980:3). This section also stipulated that to be considered valid,

64 elections must take place at a full meeting of the band, must include a majority of eligible voters, and be conducted in the presence of the Indian Agent 4. Finally, Section 62 of the

Act provided that the Governor-in-Council, as opposed to the Governor General, was empowered to order that elections be held or to depose Chiefs, a move which brought the regulation of band councils under the authority of the Privy Council. The election provisions of the Indian Act amended and slightly expanded the by-law making powers of the band council, but these remained limited in scope and subject to the confirmation of the Governor-in-Council. In addition to the by-law areas that were included in the

Gradual Enfranchisement Act, the by-law powers allowed band councils under the Indian

Act were expanded to include allocating reserve land to individual band members and keeping registers of such locations. This reflected the department’s abiding interest in encouraging the individual ownership of reserve lands as part of the Enfranchisement policy.

Leading up to the turn of the century, Indian Affairs continued to tinker with the band government regulations, making a series of minor changes. In 1879, such items as the protection of sheep, the suppression of noxious weeds, and the ability to fine or imprison band members for transgression of by-laws were added to the list of by-laws available to band councils 5. These by-laws were of course still subject to the veto of the

Governor-in-Council. Administrative changes to the Indian Branch in 1880 required extensive revisions to the Indian Act and the election provisions, now appearing as sections 72 to 74, were modified to restrict the number of Chiefs in any one band to six and the number of Councillors to 12, apparently to limit the number of individuals with

4 S.C. 1876, c. 18. 5 S.C. 1879, c. 34.

65 which the department was required to interact. As well, life Chiefs were prohibited, in an attempt to further diminish their influence, from exercising any political power unless they had been duly elected under the provisions of the Indian Act. The by-law provisions were also altered to allow band councils to stipulate the religious denomination of the schoolteacher on the reserve and to require the penalties levied by the band council for transgression of the by-laws require a conviction before a Justice of the Peace 6. These changes, while minor, were in keeping with the overall thrust of the band government policy, which was to circumscribe Aboriginal leadership within a government structure that allowed little real political authority under the direction of Indian Affairs officials.

By 1886, further revisions to the Indian Act caused the election provisions to again be re-numbered, and these now appeared as Sections 75 and 76. Section 75 was changed to allow the Governor-in-Council to declare an election invalid if fraud or gross irregularities were found to have occurred, the assumption clearly being that these infractions would be committed by Aboriginal peoples rather than department officers 7.

In 1894, Section 75 was again amended to make deposed Chiefs and Councillors ineligible to stand for re-election for a period of three years 8. The following year, Section

75 of the Act was once more revised to make it possible to depose both life Chiefs as well as elected Chiefs under the terms of the Act, that is for immorality, dishonesty, and intemperance, and incompetency. This provision was imposed on all bands, whether or not the elective system had been formally applied to them or not 9. This represents a subtle yet important initiative. While no treaty or agreement conveyed the power to

6 S.C. 1880, c. 28. 7 R.S.C. 1886, c. 43. 8 S.C. 1894, c.32. 9 S.C. 1895, c. 35.

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Indian Affairs to interfere in Aboriginal political organization, the department arbitrarily and unilaterally assumed the power to depose Aboriginal leaders, a power they used with impunity, especially in western Canada during the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. By

1906, the Indian Act, which had been subject to a long series of almost annual revisions, had become unwieldy and internally contradictory under the weight of recurring amendments and a major consolidation was undertaken (Johnson 1984:13). The electoral provisions became Sections 93 to 98, but were not further amended at this time.

Indian Advancement Act

Coincidental to the development of the electoral provisions of the Indian Act was an initiative by the federal government that resulted in the passage of the Indian

Advancement Act in 1884. This Act, developed during a period when federal authorities were pursuing a policy of aggressive civilization and increasing pressure was being exerted upon Aboriginal peoples to abandon tribal customs, represented a more concerted effort to establish municipal institutions within Aboriginal communities (Madill

1980:14). Despite the presence of provisions for the elective system in the Indian Act, government officials were evidently desirous of a more refined legislative instrument for the management of Aboriginal political affairs than was provided by the Indian Act.

John A. Macdonald, in his dual capacity as Prime Minister and Superintendent General for Indian Affairs, commented in 1880 that there was a need for a “better system for managing their local affairs than the one which at present prevails among them” and explained that the participation of Aboriginal peoples in simple municipal institutions,

67 under the supervision and guidance of department officials, would prove sufficient to acquaint them with the responsibilities of representative government.

It is thought that a council, proportionate in number to the population of the band, elected by the male members thereof, of twenty-one years and over, and presided over by a functionary similar to the Reeve of a Township, might answer the purpose; or in its initiatory stage the council might be presided over, with better results by the local Indian Superintendent or Agent 10 .

The perceived need for better management of Aboriginal politics was entirely on the part of the Indian Administration and the impetus for the Indian Advancement Act emanated from a desire to intensify and enhance the regulation of Aboriginal communities. It is noteworthy that Macdonald suggested that band councils might effectively be presided over by local Indian Affairs officials, indicating that this legislation was primarily focussed on regulating Aboriginal political routines. This initiative can be firmly situated as a colonial project that brought Aboriginal leadership more directly under the supervision of federal authorities and disciplines Aboriginal peoples in the political routines of the dominant society.

Macdonald took a personal interest in this legislation and the Indian Advancement

Act was developed in a series of memoranda and correspondence between the Prime

Minister and Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Lawrence Vankoughnet. In July of 1880, Vankoughnet issued a circular to Indian Agents and Superintendents across the

Dominion, soliciting their opinions regarding the proposed scheme.

With a view to the further advancement of the Indians of the Dominion in intelligence and civilization, it is contemplated to establish as far as practicable, with their consent, a system of Municipal government for the Bands sufficiently developed to justify the conclusion same would probably be attended with success.

10 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1880:8

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The idea is to constitute on each reserve an elective Council for the Management of the local affairs of the Band owning the same. Said Council to consist of Representatives from the various sections of the reserve presided over by one holding a position similar to that of a Reeve or Mayor of a white Municipality who would be elected by the whole community.

The department would be glad to know from you what Bands of Indians within your Superintendency are, in your opinion, fit to assume intelligently the responsibilities involved in such a system as well as briefly your views generally in respect thereto, the probability its being attended to with success of established. 11

The overwhelming majority of responses to Vankoughnet’s circular offered little encouragement. For instance, Edgar Dewdney, Indian Commissioner for the North West

Territories, Manitoba, and Keewatin, asserted that only one band in his jurisdiction was in his opinion fit to adopt the elective system. 12 Few of the Indian Agents or

Superintendents who replied to the circular thought that bands in their agencies were either willing or able to adopt municipal systems. Of those bands that were deemed likely candidates, most that had the proposal presented to them had rejected it, asserting their desire to retain the hereditary system as permitted under the Indian Act (Madill

1980:19; Leslie and Maguire 1978:84). Nevertheless, Vankoughnet was not deterred and even claimed in an 1881 memorandum to Macdonald that there was general support for the initiative.

A number of Superintendents and Agents responded in favour of the scheme, and consider that it would materially aide in the promotion of the civilization of the Indians as well as regulating matters upon the different reserves. 13

After consulting with the Department of Justice, Vankoughnet was of the belief that existing legislation would not be suitable for this purpose and that a new law was required. This course of action met with Macdonald’s agreement. A hand written

11 Vankoughnet, July 19, 1880, NAC RG 10, Vol. 2116, File 22155. 12 Dewdney to Vankoughnet,, NAC RG 10, Vol. 2116, File 22155. 13 Vankoughnet to Macdonald, November 9, 1881, NAC RG 10, Vol. 2116, File 22155.

69 marginal notation on an early draft, signed by Macdonald stated: “I think a Bill had better been prepared” 14 .

Consequently, in 1884 the government passed An Act for conferring certain privileges on the more advanced Bands of the Indians of Canada, with the view to training them in municipal powers , short titled the Indian Advancement Act. Similar in design and intent to the electoral provisions of the Indian Act, the Indian Advancement

Act contained several notable differences. Band elections were to be held annually and reserves were to be divided into electoral wards. It also stipulated that six Councillors were to be elected irrespective of the population of the reserve and that these six

Councillors would themselves choose the Chief from among their number. With respect to by-law making powers, the Indian Advancement Act provided band councils with the same limited authority as under the Indian Act to make laws for the care of public health, the repression of intemperance and profligacy, the prevention of trespass by livestock, the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, fence lines, the repression of noxious weeds, and the selection of the denomination of school teachers. The Indian

Advancement Act also allowed band councils to levy property taxes on band members and to subdivide the reserve and distribute land to band members 15 . Within departmental correspondence, the election provisions of the Indian Act became known as the three year system, while the Indian Advancement Act was often referred to as the one year system.

Two minor revisions were made to the Indian Advancement Act in 1886. The first gave the department authority to repeal the application of the Act in any case where it was not operating to the satisfaction of the department. The second amendment

14 NAC RG 10, Vol. 2116, File 22155 15 S.C. 1884, c. 28.

70 permitted the Indian Agent to cast the deciding vote in the event of a tie in a band council election 16 . Another amendment passed in 1890 provided for a nomination meeting to be held under the direction of the Indian Agent one week prior to election day (Daugherty

1980:21). When the Indian Act underwent major revisions in 1906, the Indian

Advancement Act was incorporated as Part II of the Indian Act. At that time a clause was added to give the Superintendent General authority to depose any councillor who was proved “to be a habitual drunkard or living in immorality, or to have accepted a bribe, or to have been guilty of dishonesty or of malfeasance of office” 17 . This incorporated into the Indian Advancement Act the power to depose band Councillors that had long been a feature of the electoral provisions of the Indian Act, with the notable difference that it was simply the Superintendent General rather than the Governor-in-

Council who was empowered to depose the councillor from office. Since there was no requirement to go through the formality of obtaining an Order-in-Council, Chiefs could be more easily deposed under the Indian Advancement Act. From that point on, however, department officials rarely resorted to the Indian Advancement Act, and it was rescinded by Order-in-Council in the 1951 revision of the Indian Act (Daugherty

1980:22).

While superficially similar to the election provisions of the Indian Act, the Indian

Advancement Act intensified the oppressive nature of band government by removing it from the cumbersome structure of the Indian Act, vesting greater authority in the

16 While Moore (1978:90) argues that this move reflected the exercise of increased departmental authority over local affairs on reserves, Daugherty (1980:20) asserts that since this power would only be exercised in rare instances, it seems to be a dubious means of increasing the control of the Indian Agent over band Councils. However, this represents perhaps the least democratic means of resolving a deadlocked election and typifies the general trend to increase the authority of department officials over all facets of Aboriginal life. 17 R.S.C 1906, c. 81.

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Superintendent General, and placing additional constraints upon band councils by limiting their terms to one year. Further, department officials clearly envisioned the two as representing a successive progression and that over time bands would pass from the three year system of the Indian Act to the one year system of the Indian Advancement

Act 18 . Ostensibly designed for the more advanced bands in eastern Canada, the Indian

Advancement Act was never widely adopted (Tobias 1983:45; Surtees 1988:90). During the time it was in force, only about a dozen bands accepted its provisions. Aboriginal peoples were wary of the degree of regulatory control wielded by the Agents over band councils and remained reluctant to assume any form of local government that would erode traditional systems of governance (Leslie and Maguire 1980:90). Many bands also expressed concern regarding the increased authority of Superintendent General and declared a reluctance to submit themselves to the possibility of taxation. By the 1890s, the Indian Advancement Act had proved a dead letter and although it continued to operate in a few communities, it remained fairly marginal both as a means of encouraging

Aboriginal peoples to adopt municipal institutions and as a tool of coercive management by the department.

Election Provisions in the 20 th Century

During the first half of the 20 th century, the electoral provisions of the Indian Act endured with only slight modifications. Following the consolidation of the Indian Act in 1906, the general thrust of Canadian Indian policy was to strengthen the discretionary power of department officials over Aboriginal peoples (Johnson 1984:13). The prevailing image of Canadian Indian administration during this time is one of a moribund organization that

18 Vankoughnet to Reed, June 3, 1892, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3875, File 90674.

72 developed few new initiatives and undertook arbitrary and inconsistent regulation of existing policies. John Tobias (1983:48-51), for instance, maintains that the policy of aggressive civilization was a spent force by 1900 and that Indian Affairs up to the Second

World War was directionless, lacking any clear policy or administrative coherence 19 .

While it may be true that during this era Indian Affairs suffered from neglect within the federal government bureaucratic structure and was characterized by mismanagement and contradictory initiatives, Aboriginal peoples nevertheless continued to be subject to coercive regulation and forceful attempts to eradicate their culture. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that following the First World War, Indian Affairs attempted to more vigorously enforce existing policies (Pettipas 1994:212). Further, it is possible to identify several unique dimensions to the administration of Indian Affairs in the early 20 th century. First, the department, especially in western Canada, consistently pursued the alienation of reserve lands 20 ; second, the department sought to alleviate administrative costs by using land sales and band funds to pay for programs as well as attempting to devolve responsibility for service delivery to the provinces (Barron 1988:33); and finally, as Meijer Drees has recently argued (2002:75-77), by the 1930s, Indian Affairs officials were seeking new approaches for economic and social development in order to make

Aboriginal peoples self-sufficient, primarily from a reserve base. These initiatives conform to the general policy direction established in the 19 th century, give little consideration to Aboriginal aspirations, and embody the premises of the civilization and

19 E. Brian Titley (1986) and J. R. Miller (1989:220) subscribe to this position as well. 20 Frank Oliver as Minister of the Interior instigated an aggressive surrender campaign within the department. Many of the surrenders taken at this time are now under consideration as Specific Claims. Also Soldier Settlement issues.

73 assimilation projects by endeavouring to effect the social transformation of Aboriginal peoples and to restructure Aboriginal communities.

During this period, several changes to the Indian Act served to impinge on the autonomy of band councils and further enhanced the discretionary authority of the

Superintendent General over the political and economic affairs of Aboriginal communities. Band councils, exercising only limited powers to begin with, experienced increasing difficulty in retaining local autonomy in the face of legislative restrictions enacted not only by Indian Affairs, but by provincial governments as well. As department officials exercised ever greater authority over Aboriginal communities, the decision making powers of band councils became more circumscribed. Indian Affairs administrators increasingly regarded band councils as little more than consultative bodies, which undermined the authority of Aboriginal leaders (Madill 1980:45; RCAP

1996:285-86). The regulatory authority vested in the Superintendent General was delegated to Indian Agents who used their administrative power to conduct the daily business of the reserve, isolating the Chiefs and council from economic and political decisions affecting the band. Department officials generally regarded the primary function of band councils to assist in promoting and implementing Indian policy and many Agents regarded Chiefs as a nuisance which bands would generally be better off without 21 .

A series of amendments passed in 1918 increased the authority of the department to direct the affairs of bands. The first amendment authorized the Superintendent General to authorize the expenditure of band funds without the consent of the band in cases where

21 Graham to McLean, March 22, 1923, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7936, File 32-102; Faunt to Scott, January 18, 1923, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt 1.

74 the refusal of the band to do so would in the opinion of the Superintendent General be inimical to the progress or welfare of the band. Such a draconian measure was believed necessary because, according to Duncan Campbell Scott, Superintendent General of

Indian Affairs, some bands through “delusion, misapprehension, or hostility” were obstructing progress and opposing department policy by refusing to authorize the expenditure of band funds for necessary improvements. He did note, however, that there was no intention of depriving band councils of authority to make expenditures that would be of permanent value to the band 22 . A second amendment allowed the Superintendent

General to lease uncultivated reserve lands without a surrender from the band. This amendment, which was associated with the Greater Production Campaign, a measure to increase agricultural production during war time, permitted the Indian Commissioner control over reserve lands irrespective of the disposition of the band council. Finally, the

Superintendent General was given authority to impose by-laws on bands for taxation, control of dogs, and protection of sheep. While bands had the powers to make such by- laws, the department felt that too often band councils were unable or unwilling to deal with these issues themselves and it was necessary for the department to take such measures in order to address complaints from neighbouring municipalities (Madill

1980:52). These measures subject band councils to greater discretionary authority and conform to the general trend within Indian policy to instigate more concerted efforts to force assimilation through coercive regulation.

During the interwar years, a few minor amendments were made to the election provisions of the Indian Act. In 1934, Section 167 of Part II of the Indian Act, formerly the Indian Advancement Act, was amended to give the Governor-in-Council the authority

22 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1918:20

75 to unilaterally divide reserves into electoral sections. Then, in 1936, several amendments were made to the electoral provisions under both Part I and Part II of the Act. Section

174 of Part II was altered to stipulate that Councillors must not only own a house on the reserve, but reside there as well. The election provisions of Part I of the Act, Section 96, were altered to the effect that the Indian Agent was empowered to cast the deciding vote in the event of a deadlocked electoral ballot. A new section was also added that outlined the Indian Agent’s duties at band council meetings. Under the terms of the new Section

99A, the Indian Agent was directed to preside at meetings of council and record minutes, regulate procedure, adjourn the meeting, report all by-laws and other band council decisions to the department, advise the band council of their powers and duties. The

Indian Agents were specifically prohibited from voting at band council meetings 23 .

These provisions had been long standing components of the Indian Advancement Act and served to further consolidate arbitrary authority in the hands of the Agent and subject band councils to more stringent regulatory control. No further amendments were made to the electoral provisions until the Indian Act was revised in 1951 (Daugherty 1980:68).

The revised Indian Act of 1951 represented a major overhaul of the existing legislation. Over 50 of the more repressive sections were deleted, such as those banning the potlatch and other give-away dances, compulsory Enfranchisement, restrictions on

Aboriginal political organizations, and prohibitions on raising money and hiring lawyers to pursue grievances against the government. The authority of the Minister was considerably reduced, limited to a supervisory capacity in many areas, although a veto power was retained over some issues. The new Indian Act attempted to more precisely define Indian status, make Enfranchisement easier to obtain, and permit local band

23 S.C. 1936, c. 20.

76 councils to exercise greater responsibilities (RCAP 1996:312). However, despite these innovations, the new Indian Act remained largely unchanged in its goals and objectives.

The primary aim remained assimilation, under the mantle of ‘full citizenship’, and

Aboriginal peoples continued to live under an oppressive bureaucratic structure.

The new Indian Act did enhance the powers of local government and confer increased authority upon band councils with respect to the management of reserve lands, administration of band funds, and expanded by-law powers (Dickason 1997:305). The election provisions now appeared as Sections 73 through 86 of the new Act and these mandated that elections were to be by secret ballot and granted Aboriginal women the privilege of voting in band council elections for the first time. The term of office was set at two years and the terms for removing a Chief or councillor from office were refined.

The arbitrary terms for deposal were deleted and death, resignation, or conviction of an indictable offence became the reasons to declare an office vacant, although the Minister still had the authority to declare an individual unfit to hold office if they had been convicted of an offence, absent for three consecutive meetings, or found guilty of corruption or malfeasance in connection with an election (S.C 1951 c. 29 S. 77). Band councils now had increased access to their band funds and were able to spend them, with some significant restrictions, at their own discretion. Significantly, band funds could now be used to fund land claims. Within two years of the passage of the new Indian Act in 1951, 263 bands were holding elections under the terms of the Act. Despite the fact that the election provisions of the 1951 Indian Act represented the most drastic revision since these measures were first introduced, they really resulted in few changes of any significance and, as with other aspects of Indian policy, the basic objectives of

77 civilization and assimilation remained largely unaltered. Indeed, band councils remained largely ineffectual with little power over the management of lands and resources apart from the ability to refuse to consent to land surrenders (RCAP 1996:285). Essentially, the premise behind band government—that Aboriginal political practices remained underdeveloped and that Aboriginal peoples required oversight and guidance in community government—remained unchanged since it was first introduced in 1869.

Band government remained a restricted political institution designed to tutor Aboriginal peoples in the protocols of municipal systems under the supervision of Indian Affairs officials and in this way continued to define and maintain Aboriginal peoples in colonial relations. Chiefs and councils possessed little real authority and most of the power of management and control of the daily business of the reserve rested with the Indian Agent and Indian Affairs officials. The fact that many Aboriginal peoples remained suspicious of the new band government provisions is attested to by the fact that many communities were hesitant to adopt the new system and several outright rejected the elective system when it was put to a vote of the band.

Conclusion

The elected band government provisions of the Indian Act and the Indian Advancement

Act represent a colonial project that is immediately bound up with the prevailing imperatives of Canadian Indian policy for the civilization and assimilation of Aboriginal peoples. Based upon a series of assertions that aver the moral and cultural inferiority of

Aboriginal cultural practices, band government imposed categories through which colonial agents sought to effect colonial domination. Derived from the same impulse that

78 produced the Enfranchisement legislation that sought to dismantle Aboriginal communities as corporate entities by fostering ownership in severalty in order to reform communal relations, band government was similarly designed to fundamentally reform the relations which sustained Aboriginal communities. By electing Chiefs and

Councillors under the supervision of Indian Affairs officials, band government was intended to erode the authority of traditional leaders while training Aboriginal peoples in the operation of simple municipal institutions and ultimately producing Aboriginal citizens amenable to civic responsibilities. The first legislative expression of band government appeared in 1869. These provisions, which specified that Chiefs and

Councillors were to be elected for three year terms by the male members of the band over

21 years of age and delimited restricted by-law making powers for band councils, were incorporated wholesale into the Indian Act of 1876 and have served to regulate the activities of band councils ever since. According to the band government provisions of the Indian Act, band councils operate under the regulatory authority of the

Superintendent General (now Minister) of Indian Affairs and all band council resolutions are subject to approval or veto of the department. The department also had the power to summarily depose Chiefs for incompetency, dishonesty, intemperance, or immorality.

Leading up to the turn of the 19 th century, Indian Affairs administrators tinkered with the band government provisions, enhancing the authority of the Superintendent General and further restricting the ability of band councils to effectively govern Aboriginal communities. In 1884, the federal government passed the Indian Advancement Act, which was similar in most respects to the band government provisions of the Indian Act, but limited the terms of Chiefs and Councillors to one year, divided reserves into

79 electoral wards, restricted the band council to six members, and empowered council to levy taxes and allocate reserve lands to individual band members. The Indian

Advancement Act, which was envisioned as a successive step from the band government provisions of the Indian Act, vested greater authority in the Superintendent General and placed additional constraints upon band councils. Conceived as a more refined government structure to which band councils would eventually succeed, the Indian

Advancement Act achieved only limited application.

In the 20th century, the electoral provisions underwent few modifications, but these conformed with the general direction of Indian policy at the time, enhancing the authority of Indian Affairs officials over Chiefs and band councils. The elected band government provisions that appeared in government legislation, from their earliest incarnation, perpetuated the colonial projects of civilization and assimilation by endeavouring to reform the political relations of Aboriginal peoples and bring them more firmly under the regulatory apparatus of Canadian state agencies. Throughout the late

19 th and early 20 th centuries, revisions and amendments to these provisions successively worked to increase the authority of Indian Affairs officials to intervene in the political organization of Aboriginal peoples and to place Aboriginal leaders under increasingly coercive regulation. Moreover, in its implicit endeavour to re-order social categories in a way that sought to define and delimit Aboriginal political routines, band government represents an institution that reinforced and expressed colonial relations.

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CHAPTER THREE

Application of the Elective System

In spite of the enthusiasm with which Indian Affairs officials pursued the development and refinement of the elective provisions of the Indian Act during the late 19 th century, in actual practice, elections and band government were implemented in an indiscriminate and irregular manner. The department adopted no coherent strategy nor were any specific instructions issued to Agents and, as a consequence, a considerable degree of inconsistency pertained with respect to the application of the elective system. In eastern

Canada, where it was envisioned band government would be readily embraced, a few

First Nations adopted the elective system, but many remained largely indifferent to it. By the end of the 19 th century, the aversion of First Nations to band government prompted the federal government to unilaterally apply the elective provisions to a large number of bands in Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick. While the architects of the elected system clearly considered it a measure to be directed in the first instance to ‘more advanced’ bands in eastern Canada, elected band government was an important measure in western Canada as well and represents an important element of the civilization and assimilation projects of the Canadian government. Although formal legal application of the elective system by Order-in-Council did not generally occur in western Canada until after World War II, Indian Affairs officials routinely followed the strictures of the band government provisions of the Indian Act in administering bands in the prairie provinces and often managed band councils as though they had been formally constituted under the

Indian Act. In this manner, a nascent form of band government began to be elaborated

81 among Aboriginal peoples in western Canada. This practice essentially engendered the forms of colonial regulation of Aboriginal political arrangements propagated by the

Indian Act and increasingly subjected Aboriginal leaders to a greater degree of governmental authority. Indian Affairs officials, without any legal authority, assumed the ability to appoint Chiefs and Councillors, to refuse to acknowledge candidates of which they disapproved, and to remove leaders from office. However, it would be wrong to conceive of band government as simply an instrument of management and control.

Aboriginal leaders actively participated in band government, shaping the institution through the expression of their will and intent. In asserting Aboriginal conceptions regarding the proper exercise of political authority and the management of Aboriginal communities, Aboriginal leaders were able to, at least in part, reframe band government as an institution through which they could confront and engage colonial relations. The efforts to convince Aboriginal reserve communities in western Canada to dispense with the positions of Chiefs and Headmen in the 1890s, as well as the Aboriginal peoples insistence on retaining a specified number of Chiefs and Councillors as a right under treaty indicates that Aboriginal leaders were effectively able to deflect and transpose attempts at political domination as well as the importance Aboriginal peoples attached to these positions. Long before its official application in western Canada, band government was developing as a contested institution through which the categories of colonial rule were contested and challenged.

In an early statement on the elective system, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald explained that the main purpose of the legislation was to mitigate the authority of

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Aboriginal leaders and impose a degree of conformity over Aboriginal political institutions.

[I]intended to meet the difficulty connected with the more advanced bands of Indians whose self-government is now carried on in council, where they can discuss matters affecting their communities and where the chiefs have the principal power. In some of the more advanced communities the Indians are advanced to all intents and purposes, and it is thought well that there should be something more than a mere informal council where they cannot speak authoritatively 1.

Taking direction from Macdonald, a number of commentators (Tobias 1975, Satzwich

1995, Surtees 1988) have subsequently described the elective system as a measure primarily intended for the bands in eastern Canada, which government officials regarded as more ‘advanced’, due to more sustained contact with the settler population, greater exposure to colonial projects of governance, and apparent adoption of Euro-Canadian cultural institutions and practices. At the time, government administrators, missionaries, and humanitarians, and others who concerned themselves with the prospects of

Aboriginal peoples in Canada, possessed an abiding faith that Aboriginal peoples could be reformed through programs of directed culture change. These found expression in the policies of the Bible and the plow and were manifest in such programs as

Enfranchisement, residential schooling, the reserve system, land holding in severalty 2, and farming initiatives, which sought to erode Aboriginal cultures and transform

Aboriginal peoples into a regulated and ordered colonial population. Taken together these activities can be conceptualized as the policy of aggressive civilization (Smith

2001:257-58). The implicit premise behind these endeavours was that Western civilization represented the apex of human social and moral development, that Aboriginal

1 House of Commons. Debates . 2nd Session, 5th Parliament Jan 29, 1884 p. 67. 2 The severalty policy attempted to fragment communally held reserve lands by assigning exclusive allotments to individual band members.

83 culture was primitive, irrational, and inferior, and that Euro-Canadians had a perceived moral obligation to raise the Aboriginal peoples on the scale of civilization (Buchanan

2006:95-96). Canadian Indian policy in the 19 th century embodied notions of human progress and social evolution propounded in contemporary anthropological theory, which elaborated ranked stages of social development progressing from savagery, through barbarism, to civilization, and actively sought to eradicate Aboriginal culture and inculcate Euro-Canadian customs and habits (Carter 1990:212-13; Kuper 1988:5). Under this rubric, the moral and social advancement of Aboriginal peoples was predicated upon abandoning their cultural traditions. Aboriginal peoples were considered ‘advanced’, therefore, to the degree that they adopted Christianity, a sedentary agricultural existence,

Western dress, industriousness, thrift, and patriarchal gender relations. Conversely, those that maintained traditional beliefs, participated in Aboriginal ceremonialism, continued to live off the land by hunting and trapping, declined to send their children to residential schools, and generally resisted Indian Affairs policies were regarded as remaining in a primitive state. This premise found expression in the band government initiatives which in effect sought to impel a series of social and political transformations among Aboriginal peoples by replacing Aboriginal political conventions with those of the dominant society.

Before the turn of the 20 th century, formal application of the elective system by

Order-in-Council was almost exclusively restricted to bands in Ontario, Quebec, and the

Maritimes. However, it should be kept in mind that the department canvassed all Agents,

Inspectors, and Superintendents across the country when developing the Indian

Advancement Act. Further, the department was willing to employ the elective system in the west when it was considered expedient to do so and required the leaders of western

84 bands to conform to the provisions of Section 75 (later Section 93) whether it had been officially applied by Order-in-Council or not. Even though the band government provisions were not officially applied to most bands in western Canada, the department freely made use of these provisions, especially in ‘electing’ leaders or in deposing leaders of which they disapproved.

Application of the Elective System in Eastern Canada

Despite the belief among department officials that ‘more advanced’ bands in eastern

Canada would eagerly embrace the elective system the introduction of the elective system into these communities often proved contentious 3. In many cases, band members resented being made subject to the intrusive authority that the Indian Act conferred upon department officials, because they considered it inimical to traditional forms of governance. For example, in response to departmental pressure to adopt the elective system, the Confederacy Council of the Six Nations declared to Prime Minister

Macdonald in 1879 that they were more than capable of serving the interests of the band and thus they had no need for band government. "[W]e frame our own laws, rules, and regulations, suitable for our advancement as well as our welfare" (as cited in Daugherty

1980:6). Other bands expressed concerns that by consenting to the elective system they would be forced to accept an arbitrary limit on the size of the band council. The Oneidas of the Thames 4, according to the Agent, were opposed to the elective system because they did not want to see an erosion of their position and power.

The Oneida band of the Thames has not yet adopted the mode of electing chiefs as laid down in the late Indian Acts, a majority of the band when the matter has

3 MacInnes to McGill, February 28, 1946, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7115, File 1/3-5, pt. 1. 4 Now known as the Onyota'a:ka (Oneida) First Nation, with a reserve near London, Ontario.

85

been up for consideration always voting against it. The chiefs all therefore having been appointed according to their old rules, and are supposed to be life chiefs at least they think so, and are unwilling to consent to the manner of election laid down by the Indian Act as they fear a number of themselves would be left out in the cold if the new method was adopted 5.

Even where bands were prepared to accept the elective system, conflicts often arose over the control exercised by Indian Affairs officials. Still other bands were largely ambivalent to the elective system and department officials were unable to generate sufficient interest among band members to make elections practicable.

Initially, only a small number of bands in eastern Canada officially came under the elective provisions of the Indian Act. The first band to officially adopt the elective system was the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte 6 in the early 1870s (Torok 1972:33). In

1877, the elective system was also sanctioned for the Chippewa band at Walpole Island 7 and Moravians of the Thames 8 by Order-in-Council. In a few other cases, the department unilaterally applied the elective system by Order-in-Council in instances where the traditional leader had died, mandating that a replacement be chosen through election 9.

The department consistently dismissed complaints about elected band government, assuming Aboriginal peoples were simply unable to recognize the advantages conferred

5 Isadore to Vankoughent Dec. 13, 1888, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3875, File 90299. 6 The official name for this band remains Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte, but they also refer to themselves as the Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory. Their reserve is located on the north shore of Lake Ontario east of Belleville. There is no surviving election file for this band, however, Deputy Superintendent General William Spragge noted in the Department’s Annual Report for 1871, that with the exception of the Mohawk of the Bay of Quinte, no band had applied for authority to hold an election (cited in Daugherty 1980:2). Anthropologist C. H. Torok reported that an informant asserted that in adopting the elective system the majority of the band “sold out to the government” (1972:32). Torok explains that while life Chiefs continued to serve on a shadow council, deprived of executive power, interest and membership steadily declined. Today, however, the Longhouse is a vibrant political institution within the various Mohawk communities in Canada, often in conflict with the ‘Indian Act’ band council. 7 Now known and Walpole Island First Nation. 8 Now known as the Muncee-Delaware Nation. 9 O.C. April 10, 1877, O.C. October 28, 1881, O.C. February 14, 1891, O.C. September 23, 1892, NAC RG 10, Vol.7920, File 32-1.

86 by the elective system (Bartlett 1988:18). Deputy Superintendent General Spragge cited

Aboriginal incapacity to explain their reluctance to accept the elected band government.

The seeming apathy . . . may be accounted for from the fact that the Indian mind is in general slow to accept improvements until much time is consumed in discussion and reflection. And it would be premature to conclude that bands are averse to the elective principle, because they are backward in perceiving the privileges which it confers (as cited in Bartlett 1988:18).

It did not seem to occur to department officials that many Aboriginal peoples refused to accept an invasive system that denied any meaningful political autonomy and placed

Aboriginal leaders under the direct control of government agents. In any event, by the mid 1890s, the elective provisions of the Indian Act had been officially applied by Order- in-Council to relatively few bands.

Band elections were, however, being held during the 1880s and 1890s in a number of communities in Ontario and Quebec that, although not authorized by Order-in-

Council, apparently received the tacit sanction of the department. For example, prior to

1885 the Chippawas of Rama 10 followed Aboriginal custom in selecting leaders. Chief

Joseph Benson Nangasiming, with the sanction of the community, had succeeded his father as life Chief in 1858. In 1884, a new agent was appointed to the Rama Agency and he seems to have of his own accord initiated annual elections following the terms of the

Indian Advancement Act. Beginning in 1885, Agent McPhee forwarded annual election returns to the department, which were simply confirmed by the department without comment 11 . The fact that these elections were being held without authority or sanctioned by Order-in-Council did not much concern the department until 1894 when Agent

McPhee was suddenly upbraided for having held elections without obtaining

10 Now known as Chippewas of Mnjikaning First Nation. 11 NAC RG 10, Vol. 7928, File 32-24, pt 1.

87 authorization from the department. In explaining himself, McPhee asserted that he held the elections in compliance with the terms of the Indian Advancement Act, which he claimed the band had been operating under for years 12 . Although this Act was never made applicable to the Rama band, Agent McPhee, perhaps having read the terms of the

Indian Advancement Act, had proceeded to hold elections, not comprehending that an

Order-in-Council was required for its official application.

The elections for Councillors for the Rama Band were for years held by the Agent without authority from the department, and in accordance with a system of which he apparently was the author 13 .

In 1895, Rama was one of the bands identified in a comprehensive Order-in-Council applying the three year elective system to 55 bands in Ontario and Quebec and from 1896 on, this band held regular elections every three years.

Such informal elections occurred among other bands in Ontario and Quebec, but were by no means ubiquitous. In response to a departmental circular issued in October of

1888, Indian Agents and Superintendents in Ontario and Quebec reported that some bands were electing Chiefs, while others evidently had both Life Chiefs and Elected

Chiefs, and still others retained only Hereditary or Life Chiefs 14 . The Maniwaki 15 ,

Caugnawaga 16 , Beausoleil 17 , Manitoulin Island 18 bands were all electing chiefs and

Councillors in the 1880s. The department routinely authorized and confirmed these elections despite the fact that in no case had Section 75 of the Indian Act been applied by

12 McPhee to Reed, May 22, 1894, NAC RG10 Vol. 7928, File 32-24, pt 1. 13 McNeill to Reed, September 29, 1896, NAC RG 10 Vol. 7928, File 32-24, pt 1. 14 NAC RG 10 Vol. 3875, File 90229. 15 Now known as Kitigan Zibi Anishinabeg First Nation. 16 Now known as Kahnawake Mohawk Territory. 17 Now known as Beausoleil First Nation. 18 Now known as Wikwemikong First Nation.

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Order-in-Council 19 . In at least some of the communities that were holding these informal elections, traditional or life Chiefs were often elected. For example, the Indian Agent for the Chippewas 20 and Munceys of the Thames reported that several of the Head Chiefs for these bands were long established as leaders and had then been subsequently confirmed as Chiefs in Indian Act elections.

The department will observe that Joseph Fisher and John French of the Chippewa and William J. Waddilive of the Muncey band, although re-elected about 2 years ago, have been members of the council for a long term of years and . . . before 1876 were appointed according to their old Indian rules, and since then by election in terms of the Act 21 .

The application of the elective system in eastern Canada during this period seems to have depended on nothing so much as the inclination of the Indian Agent. That is, elections occurred because the Agent went to the trouble to hold a vote. The bands that accepted the elective system may have done so for a variety of reasons. They may simply not have attached much importance to the matter, considering it to have little bearing on the operation of their political systems. Factionalism may have been a factor as individuals that were not traditional leaders sought recognition as Chiefs under the Indian Act in order to enhance their status and political influence within the community. Finally, some communities may have perceived some material advantage to band government, regarding it as a forum through which they could advance their interests. The tacit acceptance of the elective system, however, should not be taken to imply that traditional systems of governance were immediately displaced. Many bands, meanwhile, through

19 Vankoughnet to White, March 13, 1888, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7926, File 32-18; Logue to Macdonald, August 26, 1884, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7921, File 32-5. 20 Now known as Chippewas of the Thames First Nation. 21 Isadore to Vankoughent Dec. 13, 1888, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3875, file 90299.

89 distrust, lack of inclination, or preference for their own systems of governance rejected the elective system and retained traditional leaders.

In 1895, the election provisions of the Indian Act were imposed upon several bands without their consent or apparent consultation at the insistence of Hayter Reed,

Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Believing that resistance to the elective system was rooted in indifference, rather than opposition to the intrusive authority of the department, Reed expressed a determination to expand the number of bands that came under its provisions.

Some of the bands . . . manifest a lack of desire for further improvement, and do not care to avail themselves of the machinery provided by the ‘Advancement Act.’ There seems to be generally too much inclination to take advantage of such exemptions as special legislation has necessarily provided for the protection of Indians in the earlier stages of evolution, and to shrink from assuming the responsibility of full citizenship. It will be the department's earnest endeavour to trace to their sources the causes productive of this apathetic attitude, and to provide the necessary incentive to further progress 22 .

A certain amount of exasperation had developed within the department regarding the lack of interest Aboriginal peoples were showing in the elective system and department officials began to consider ways in which to remedy the situation (Daugherty 1980:5).

During the late 19 th century, Canadian authorities were developing increasingly aggressive policies of directed culture change and colonial projects of governance were directed at the Aboriginal population with the aim of destabilizing Aboriginal cultural systems and incorporating Aboriginal peoples into the Canadian social order (Smith

2001:259). Elected band government, as a policy that embraced the imperatives of the civilization and assimilation projects, sought to erode Aboriginal political systems, inculcate the political routines of the dominant society, and implicate Aboriginal peoples

22 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs. Annual Report 1895:xviii.

90 in a more intensive administrative regulation. If Aboriginal peoples would not willingly avail themselves of the band government provisions, they would be forcibly imposed.

Seeking to systematize the election procedures, Reed had the year previous sent a circular to all the Agents and Superintendents in Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New

Brunswick, soliciting information about whether Chiefs and Councillors had been elected or appointed and the length of term they were to serve. When it came to light that a good number of bands in eastern Canada were informally following the elective system, Reed pressed for Section 75 of the Indian Act to be applied to these bands by Order-in-Council, since, he argued, they were following the elective system anyway. Subsequently, Section

75 was unilaterally applied to 42 bands in Ontario, six in Quebec, and seven in New

Brunswick in 1895 23 . Finally, in 1899, the department expanded the application of the elective system by securing a comprehensive Order-in-Council applying Section 75 of the Indian Act to all bands in Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia 24 .

Daugherty (1980:6) points out that this Order-in-Council inadvertently included two bands that were under the Indian Advancement Act and two bands that were to continue under the hereditary system with the sanction of the department. Bands in north western

Ontario under Treaty 3, although technically included in the comprehensive Order-in-

Council, were also exempted from its terms as they were not considered sufficiently advanced because they continued in many respects to follow a traditional existence, providing for themselves through hunting and trapping, moving seasonally throughout their territories, and generally not undergoing wholesale conversion to Christianity.

23 Reed to Daly, June 5, 1895, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920, File 32-1. 24 O.C. 766, May 16, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920, File 32-1. This Order-in-Council applied only to the bands living within the provincial borders of Ontario and Quebec as they existed at that time and therefore would not have applied to bands such as the James Bay Cree living in more northerly regions later incorporated into the two provinces.

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Thus, apart from bands in north western Ontario, regular three year elections under

Section 75 of the Indian Act were occurring in most First Nations communities in eastern

Canada by the turn of the 20 th century 25 .

Resistance to the Elective System

There was, of course, active resistance to the introduction of the elective system in some communities. The Six Nations were one of the ‘advanced’ bands that the architects of band government had in mind when developing the legislation. However, as noted earlier, they proved averse to abandoning their traditional Council, rebuffing the department's repeated recommendations to adopt the elective system. The department implicitly recognized the Six Nations Confederacy Council as a strong, well organized political body that responded to the needs of the community by granting Council’s request to be exempted from the comprehensive Order-in-Council that applied the elective system to all bands in Ontario in 1899. While there existed a faction on the reserve known as the ‘Dehorners’ that lobbied the Department of Indian Affairs to depose the hereditary council and implement the elective system, the vast majority of band members supported the hereditary council (Trevathick 1998:32-33; Weaver 1994:243).

However, pursuit of outstanding claims and opposition to several government programs 26 by the Confederacy Council brought them into direct conflict with Indian Affairs and growing rancour made even routine business difficult (Weaver 1994:248). According to

Scott Trevthick (1998:107-09), members of the Confederacy Council, embarrassed the

25 A review of the Indian Affairs elections files NAC RG 10, Vols. 7921 to 7932, Files 32-5 to 32-33 bears out the fact that triennial elections were conducted in these communities and the results of the elections were subsequently confirmed by the Department. 26 In particular, the Six Nations Council objected to draft registration, the Soldier Settlement Act, and involuntary enfranchisement.

92 government, having obtained an audience in London before King George V and an appearance before the League of Nations to lobby for recognition of Six Nations’ special status, which led to the removal of the hereditary council and the imposition of an Indian

Act Band Council government. In 1924, despite continued strong support for the

Confederacy Council within the community, Superintendent General D. C. Scott obtained an Order-in-Council deposing the life Chiefs and applying the one year system found in

Part II of the Indian Act to the Six Nations. The first elections for council were held in

October of that year (Trevathick 1998:103-106; Weaver 1994:248-49).

Meanwhile, in St. Regis 27 , the elective system was introduced after three hereditary Chiefs were deposed in 1887 by an Order-in-Council under Section 75 of the

Indian Act for the mismanagement of band funds, despite the fact that those provisions had never been officially applied to the band (Daugherty 1980:39-40). This move to depose the life Chiefs was an affront to a significant portion of the band and the operation of the elective system at St. Regis was plagued by conflict and irregularities as band members continually agitated for a return to the old hereditary system (Stone 1975:381-

82). An attempt to disrupt elections in 1899 led to the occupation of the council house, resulting in a confrontation with Dominion police in which a band member was shot and killed. As a result of these events, the elective system was indefinitely suspended in 1902 and a vote on whether to resume elections held in 1904 was soundly rejected by the community. Nevertheless, the department resumed elections in 1908 and regarded the elected band council as the official governing body on the reserve. However, there was continuing opposition to the elected council and support for traditional Mohawk chiefs remained strong (Daugherty 1980:39-43; Stone 1975:381-82).

27 Now known as the Mohawks of Akwesasne.

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By the close of the 19 th century, the elective system had been officially applied to bands in eastern Canada. Conforming to the abiding tenets of Canadian Indian policy, band government was unilaterally applied to most bands in eastern Canada because it was believed that opposition to the measure was largely rooted in Aboriginal intransigence 28 .

Failing to understand why Aboriginal peoples balked at band government, Indian department officials responded as they had when the Enfranchisement policy met with resistance, by more aggressively pursuing its application. In seeking to establish uniform political routines within Aboriginal communities, regulate cultural practices, and order social categories, band government was an institution that reinforced and expressed colonial power. The degree to which this was the case was revealed by the fact that the department was willing to meet resistance to band government with force. Ultimately, band government was aimed at civilizing and assimilating Aboriginal peoples by perpetuating conformity with Euro-Canadian political institutions.

Hayter Reed and the Elective System in Western Canada

While Deputy Superintendent General Hayter Reed may have endorsed the blanket application of Section 75 of the Indian Act to bands in eastern Canada in 1895, he had no intention of extending the elective system to bands in Manitoba and the North West

Territories 29 . It was Reed’s firm conviction that not only were these bands too

‘primitive’ to take up the elective system, but that Chiefs and Headmen were in fact a hindrance to the department’s objectives and that these leadership positions should be abolished entirely. Born in Ontario, Reed served with the militia in Manitoba prior to

28 O.C. 766, May 16, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920, File 32-1; Canada. Department of Indian Affairs. Annual Report 1895:xviii. 29 Reed to Forget, October 28, 1895, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-6.

94 joining the Indian department in 1881 as Indian Agent at Battleford. He quickly rose through departmental ranks, serving as Assistant Indian Commissioner from 1884-1888,

Indian Commissioner 1888-1893, and finally as Deputy Superintendent General of Indian

Affairs from 1893 to 1897. He strove unrelentingly to destroy what he called “the tribal or communist system” and to promote thrift, industry, and self-reliance (Carter 1990:142-

43; McCord Museum Reed Papers). Like many of his contemporaries, Reed believed that the cultural advancement of Aboriginal peoples would occur only when Aboriginal ideals of communal ownership and reciprocity were replaced by individual enterprise and private property. Such an endeavour, as a corollary of the assimilation project, would inevitably necessitate that existing forms of Aboriginal social and political organization be destabilized and dismantled and that primary associations of Aboriginal peoples be with the agencies of the Canadian state. To this end, Reed, in the 1880s, while serving as

Assistant Indian Commissioner and then subsequently as Indian Commissioner, advocated policies that would strike at communal systems and impress upon Aboriginal peoples the advantages of ownership in severalty and the value of labour 30 . In addition to policies such as the pass system, work for rations, and peasant farming that restricted individual movement, promoted self-reliance, and restricted economic activity, Reed also endorsed initiatives that sought to eradicate Aboriginal leadership.

Reed considered Aboriginal leaders an unwarranted nuisance and he advocated that the positions of Chief and Headman be abolished among Aboriginal peoples in western Canada. In Reed’s opinion, Aboriginal leaders simply expressed frivolous grievances and made extraneous demands upon department officials. He believed that

30 Reed earned for himself the epithet ‘Iron Heart’ for his insistence on a work for rations policy no matter how desperate people’s condition. (Titley 1986:14-16; Carter 1990:144).

95 suppressing Aboriginal leaders would compel band members to interact directly with

Indian Agents and Instructors without the constant intervention of the Chiefs. Following the North-West Rebellion of 1885 31 , Reed authored a ‘Memorandum Relative to the future management of Indian Affairs’, a draconian manifesto that called for punitive measures to be levelled against those bands he identified as disloyal and for repressive policies like the pass system and work for rations to be more broadly applied. With respect to Aboriginal leadership, Reed recommended that bands which had participated in the Rebellion be dealt with severely.

[T]he tribal system should be abolished in so far as it is compatible with the treaty, i.e., in all cases in which the treaty has been broken by rebel tribes, by doing away with chiefs & Councillors, depriving them of medals and other appurtenances of office 32 .

Deputy Superintendent General Vankoughnet observed that this action would benefit the department by undermining traditional leaders and the affected bands would likely break up as followers dispersed to other bands that had retained their Chiefs. This suggestion met with the approval of Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, who commented in a marginal notation that “this must be done carefully so that the Chiefs may not be able to raise a hostile feeling among their Indians against the department” 33 . Clearly, Indian

31 In the spring of 1885, discontent among Metis and Aboriginal peoples in the North-West Territories, fuelled by the indifference of a distant federal government, erupted in a series of violent clashes. After Metis leader Louis Riel proclaimed the provisional government of Saskatchewan, the Canadian government dispatched a military force under Major General Frederick Middleton to suppress the Rebellion. Although Aboriginal leaders expressed mounting anger over unfulfilled treaty promises, most did not support the Rebellion and expressed a commitment to abide by the treaties. Despite a sense of panic among the settler population over a general Indian War, only a small number of Cree bands took an active part in the fighting. During the height of the conflict, in an incident that became known as the Frog Lake massacre, Indian Agent Thomas Quinn, two Catholic priests, and six other settlers were killed by a militant faction of Big Bear’s band. Once the Rebellion was put down, and Riel was executed (as were eight Cree were for their part in the Frog Lake massacre), three prominent Cree leaders, Big Bear, Poundmaker, and One Arrow, and dozens of other Crees were sentenced to jail terms ranging from three to 14 years. For a fuller account of the North-West Rebellion see Beal and McLeod 1994 and Stonechild and Waiser 1997. 32 Reed, no date, circa August 1, 1885, NAC, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3710, File 19550-3. 33 Vankoughnet to Macdonald, August 17,1885, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3710, file 19550-3.

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Affairs officials regarded Aboriginal leadership as an impediment to their endeavours to restructure Aboriginal societies by dismantling collective organization in favour individuals primarily oriented to the department and other government agencies. A resilient Aboriginal leadership not only challenged and confronted department officials on matters of policy, but also served to reinforce Aboriginal identity. Strong Aboriginal leaders would of necessity need to be undermined in order to advance colonial projects of governance.

Not all the leaders of bands that had participated in the Rebellion were imprisoned or executed; some who had received no punishment under Canadian law were dealt with punitively by the department. Vankoughnet took Reed’s advice and ordered the persecution of Aboriginal leaders who took part in the Rebellion.

[T]he Indians that took any prominent role in the uprising should be treated in such a manner by the Dept. notwithstanding any leniency that may have been shown by the Courts of law as to clearly demonstrate to them and other Indians that the Dept. marks practically with its disapproval the acts of which they have been found guilty 34 .

Steps taken against leaders that the department identified as disloyal included having their annuities withheld, being stripped from band lists, being removed from reserve lands, and having their followers amalgamated with other bands (Stonechild and Waiser

1997:231). In this regard, in 1912, some 27 years after the North-West Rebellion, Agent

Sibbald in the Onion Lake Agency of Treaty 6 gave the cautious opinion that the department might consider reinstating Chiefs and Councillors for the Frog Lake, Onion

Lake, Kehewin, and Cold Lake Bands 35 .

34 Vankoughnet to Dewdney, October 28, 1885, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3710, file 19550-3. 35 These Bands had been directly implicated in the Rebellion and had been stripped of Chiefs and Headmen by the Department.

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Another reason in favour of these Indians having chiefs and Councillors is because the deprivation of them has always been looked upon by the members of the different bands as a punishment for having taken part in the rebellion of 1885; and the fact of again allowing them to have their own chiefs and Councillors, would in my opinion, be a means of proving to them that the part they took in it is now forgotten, which could have a good effect 36 .

In addition to attacking leaders that had taken part in the Rebellion, Reed also advocated that other venerated individuals be undermined, calling for “the careful repression of those that become prominent among them by counsilling (sic) medicine dances and so on” 37 . Such measures in the early reserve era inevitably undermined the standing and influence of leaders and made it more difficult to maintain a following (Dion 1979:79-

80).

Originally proposed as a measure to punish bands that were judged in the eyes of the department to have been disloyal during the North-West Rebellion, Reed soon expanded his notion of abolishing Chiefs and Headmen into a general policy to be applied to all bands in the North West Territories, regardless of their allegiance (Carter

1990:145; Tobias 1975:93-94). Upon being elevated to Indian Commissioner in 1888,

Reed forcefully lobbied the department to do away with all formal leadership positions among Aboriginal peoples in western Canada and began to promote an informal policy of eliminating Aboriginal leaders through attrition by refusing to appoint or recognize a successor upon the death of a Chief or Headman. In Reed’s mind, traditional leaders were fickle, fretful, and wary, too often impeding department initiatives. In his annual report to the Department of Indian Affairs in 1889, Reed asserted that the absence of

Chiefs enhanced the ability of department officials to further the goals of Indian policy.

36 Sibbald to McLean Dec. 10, 1912, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3940, File 121698-15. 37 Reed, no date, circa August 1, 1885, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3710, file 19550-3.

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[T]he lapse of the office, when old chiefs and headmen have died has greatly benefited some of the bands—except in certain circumstances, the influence of the old chiefs has not been found to be beneficial. To begin with, they are naturally conservative, and even when themselves convinced that the only hope for their people is in following the path of industry, they are compelled, in order to retain their influence over the lazy and intractable, to become against their better judgement, the mouthpiece for the ventilation of imaginary grievances and the presentation of utterly unreasonable demands. The agents find that when the Indians are deprived of their chiefs, are compelled to seek the advice of their instructors, a marked change for the better is soon observed 38 .

Nor was Reed any better disposed to newly chosen leaders, as he considered that the role of Chief in and of itself tended to perpetuate what he called the “communist system” and mitigated against individual initiative. If Chiefs were removed from office, he reasoned, department officials would enjoy unmediated access to individual band members and would be better able to implement Indian policy. Reed believed that once deprived of leadership, band members would inevitably turn to Indian Affairs officials for guidance 39 .

While Reed held Chiefs and Councillors in ill-regard, he nevertheless requested in

1887 that the department authorize an election for the Cowessess 40 band, a mixed band of

Plains Cree and Saulteaux, who made Treaty 4 under Chief Little Child and had settled on a reserve in the Qu’Appelle Valley. This action is curious, given Reed’s stance on the matter, but might be explained by the fact that this band was considered to have remained loyal to the government during the Rebellion and Reed had not yet begun to apply his policy more generally. In any event, the department duly secured an Order-in-Council applying the three year elective system to this band and Reed casually reported on the results of the election. By 1891, however, Reed staunchly opposed any perpetuation of the elective system among bands in western Canada and actively sought to discourage

38 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs. Annual Report 1889:166. 39 Reed, no date, circa August 1, 1885, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3710, File 19550-3. 40 Now known as Cowessess First Nation.

99 bands from electing leaders (Daugherty 1980:29). Elections, Reed maintained, tended to be disquieting for the ‘less advanced’ bands in western Canada. He also felt that unqualified candidates were often elected and that elected Chiefs too easily succumbed to the will of the majority instead of acting in what he believed to be the best interests of the band 41 . Reed advocated that the system of elections be immediately suspended among western bands and that no new Chiefs or Headmen be appointed as the current generation of leaders passed away. When the Chief and Headmen of Cowessess band came up for re-election, Reed, who had endorsed the application of the elective system in the first place, lobbied for the elective system to be rescinded altogether for this band.

Vankoughnet, however, still considered the election of leaders to represent a tangible benefit and would not entertain the notion of discontinuing the elective system.

I have to inform you that the elective system of chiefs is not compulsory; it is only introduced into a Band when recommended by the Indian Agent and when in the case of the NWT that recommendation is supported by the Indian Commissioner. In the older provinces the system works satisfactorily and to revert to that of life chiefships in Bands where the elective system prevails would be a retrograde step that the department could not recommend 42 .

This exchange reveals not only the tension that existed between department officials over the regulation of Aboriginal political systems, but also the fact that colonial projects of governance often gave rise to diverse, even contradictory, initiatives. As Ann Laura

Stoler (1992) reminds us, colonialism was never a unified, monolithic force and colonial projects were often marked by disruptions, disjunctions, and discord as agents imagined and implemented colonial projects differently. The tension here between Reed and

41 Reed to Vankoughnet, February 17, 1891, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3911, File 111404. Of course, these same criticisms could as easily be levelled against the liberal democratic institutions of the dominant society, as Reed himself acknowledged. 42 Vankoughnet to Reed, Feb 27, 1891, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3911, file 111404. Only the first page of this letter is on file, however the entire passage can be found as a hand-written marginal notation on Reed to Vankoughnet, February 17, 1891.

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Vankoughnet over the retention of Chief and Headmen among Aboriginal peoples in western Canada was not a debate over the merits of the civilization and assimilation of

Aboriginal peoples, rather it was concerned with how best to reach that goal. This kind of friction between administrators speaks to the inherent contradictions that are often evident in colonial projects and, in particular, the indiscriminate way in which department officials pursued band government.

The opportunity for Reed to further his agenda for abolishing Chiefs and

Councillors came in 1892 when members of the James Smith’s 43 band, Duck Lake

Agency, Treaty 6, requested that the life Chiefs and Councillors be removed from office and new officers be elected under the triennial system. Reed instructed the local Agent to try and convince the band to get along without Councillors. Reed’s actions, however, were questioned by Vankoughnet, who not only was amenable to applying the elective system to this band, but advised that “the department is not prepared to adopt the idea of doing away with Chiefs and Councillors of Bands” 44 . Clearly stung by the rebuke, Reed responded with an exhaustive explanation of his position on the issue, maintaining that in his experience, Chiefs and Councillors perpetually frustrated department officers. No factor, he asserted, had done more to sustain the cultural autonomy of Aboriginal peoples than the perpetuation of Aboriginal leadership.

[I]f there be any one thing which mitigates more strongly than any other against the inculcation of individualism, it is the preservation of Chiefs and Councillors, whose presence strongly tends to foster the tribal spirit and to keep alive in the Indian the feeling that he belongs to a distinct race, with habits, customs, and interests different from those of the White Man 45 .

43 Now known as the James Smith Cree Nation, located near Melfort Saskatchewan. 44 Vankounget to Reed, May 3, 1892, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3875, File 90674. 45 Reed to Vankoughnet, May 11, 1892, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3875, File 90674

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While conceding that it may have been beneficial to the department to embrace Chiefs and Headmen during treaty negotiations and in the early reserve era, they now, in his opinion, represented an obstacle to the influence of department officials over individual band members. Aboriginal leaders, in order to maintain their influence frequently, and in

Reed’s view, maliciously incited opposition to the objectives of the department among band members. Maintaining that elections tended to have insidious effects and that

Aboriginal leaders were the source of friction, Reed asserted that the continuing recognition of Aboriginal leaders was inimical to the department’s goals.

[S]o long as the existence of Chiefs and Councillors is encouraged, we will be largely undoing with one hand what we are surely, if laboriously accomplishing with the other 46 .

Simply put, Reed’s concerns reflect the fact that Chiefs and Councillors, at least to a degree, were able to resist administrative impositions and retain a measure of political autonomy. If the department would not consent to the outright abolition of Chiefs and

Councillors, he urged Vankoughnet to at least consider not replacing Chiefs and

Councillors who died unless directly requested to do so by band members.

Vankoughnet stated in no uncertain terms that the department would not entertain the notion of inducing Aboriginal peoples to dispense with their Chiefs. Moreover, in elaborating upon the rationale for the elective system, Vankoughnet revealed that it was regarded as an important element for civilizing and assimilating Aboriginal peoples.

You have started with an altogether erroneous idea, that as a first step towards enfranchisement, the Dept. proposed to induce the Indians to dispense with their Chiefs. It had and has no such intension. Enfranchisement can only follow a long course of training on habits of civilization. [Illegible word] will result in individual Indians attainting to such an advanced condition as to be safely trusted with the full exercise of the rights of citizenship. The retention of Chiefs and Councillors as representatives of their respective bands will, it is believed, not be

46 Reed to Vankoughnet, May 11, 1892, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3875, File 90674.

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antagonistic to the eventual accomplishment of the emancipation of the Indians from their present condition, more especially if the triennial system, and later on that contemplated by the Indian Advancement Act, be gradually introduced, and while although at first the successful working of either system must be attended with considerable difficulty, nay even failure in some instances, the same is calculated when the Indians thoroughly understand it and have learned to appreciate it to naturally advance and benefit them as a people 47 .

Vankoughnet’s commentary is especially noteworthy because it clearly linked elected band government to Enfranchisement and to notions of cultural and moral advancement that were endemic to the civilization and assimilation projects. Participation in simple municipal institutions, by training Aboriginal peoples in the customs and conventions of

Euro-Canadian society, would gradually foster changes at both individual and community levels. Essentially, elected band government was conceived to be an indispensable measure to condition Aboriginal peoples and re-order Aboriginal communities.

Reluctantly, Reed deferred to Vankoughnet and relented in his attempts to convince the

James Smith band to dispense with Chiefs and Councillors. However, no effort was made to extend the triennial system to the band, in spite of the desire of the band for elections and the department’s unambiguous directive with regard to the elective system.

When Reed succeeded to the post of Deputy Superintendent General in 1893, he could pursue unopposed his desire to do away with Chiefs and Headmen in western bands and moved quickly to make this the official policy of the department. This policy was made explicit when the department declined to authorize regular triennial elections that had been requested by the Cowessess band, which had officially come under the provisions of Section 75 of the Indian Act by Order-in-Council.

The Agent has been informed that he should take no action in this matter until he received proper authority, and that unless very strong reasons exist for this election being held, it is not likely that such authority will be granted, it being the

47 Vankoughnet to Reed, June 3, 1892, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3875, file 90674.

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policy of the department to do away, as far as possible with Chiefs and Headmen 48 .

In pursuit of this goal, Reed sent out a circular in 1895 to seek the opinions of senior department officials in western Canada as to the possibility of gradually abolishing the office of Chiefs and Headmen. Support for Reed’s initiative was qualified at best. For instance, Ebenezer McColl, Inspector of Indian Agencies for Manitoba, expressed the view that such a measure would not be possible as Aboriginal peoples would inevitably regard it as a violation of treaty.

[I]n my opinion it would be impossible under existing circumstances to abolish the position of Chiefs, especially those who had been appointed at the time that the treaties were made with them as they would inevitably create an undesirable excitement among the Indians, and would be construed as a violation of the agreement made with them 49 .

Reed insisted that it was not the desire of the department to break faith with the Indians, rather that they should be reasoned into the advisability of dispensing with their leaders.

Reed instructed that Agents “do their utmost to induce the Indians to quietly adopt this system” and indicated that elections to fill vacancies would only be authorized in cases where the band absolutely refused to renounce their right to have leadership positions filled 50 . The department’s policy on the matter was succinctly outlined in a letter from A.

N. MacNeill, Assistant Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, to E. J. Bangs Farmer-in- charge at the Stoney reserve, Treaty 7.

I beg to inform you that the policy of the department is to reduce rather than increase the number of Chiefs and Head Men, and when vacancies occur they should not be filled unless the department is compelled by Treaty stipulations to consent to the same being done, as past experience has taught the department that the Indians get along much better without Chiefs or Head men and there is less difficulty in dealing with the Indians when there are no Chiefs or Head men to

48 Forget to Reed, February 14, 1894, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3911, File 111404. 49 McColl to Reed, May 7, 1895, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121637. Original emphasis. 50 Reed to McColl, May 17, 1895, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121637.

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raise objections and place obstacles in the way of the department and its officers 51 .

As Chiefs and Headmen died, it was Reed’s preference that these positions remain vacant, effectively implementing the policy of abolishing Chiefs and Headmen as

Aboriginal leaders were lost though attrition. Such an endeavour would not only serve to remove a serious impediment to projects of governance, but also permit the department to insinuate a greater degree of regulatory authority over Aboriginal communities

As Indian Agents in the North West Territories attempted to comply with this policy, however, they frequently found Aboriginal peoples unwilling to dispense with leadership positions. One of the objections commonly reported by Indian Agents was over the loss of the extra annuity payments due Chiefs and Headmen under treaty 52 .

A. E. Forget, Assistant Indian Commissioner, recognized that the desire of Aboriginal peoples to retain these leadership positions was legitimate, but suggested this difficulty could perhaps be mitigated by making an annual distribution of tea and tobacco to band members as an inducement to forgo Chiefs and Headmen.

As these positions cannot lawfully be abolished without the consent of the Indians and the latter cannot reasonably be expected to give such consent without some quid pro quo I would suggest that the Indian be offered in exchange for relinquishment of their treaty right in this respect presents of tea and tobacco for an amount equal to the sum which would otherwise be paid to the chiefs and Headmen, the same to be augmented every third year by the cost of triennial clothing 53 .

51 MacNeill to Bangs, August 4 1897, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3941, File 121698-19. 52 Under the terms of the numbered treaties, Chiefs received $25 per annum and Headmen received $15. All other band members received $5. Additionally, both Chiefs and headmen were entitled to receive a suit of clothes every three years. 53 McDonald to Forget, May 16, 1894, NAC RG 10,Vol. 3911, File 111404. This quote appears on this letter as a hand-written marginal notation by Forget. Daugherty (1980:32) suggests that Forget’s reasoning was mistaken in his belief that leadership positions could not be abolished without the consent of the Indians because, he argues, the elective system had been applied by Order-in-Council and could be rescinded by the Privy Council at any time. It is true enough that an Order-in-Council applying the elective system could be appealed, but it does not follow that such a step would be sufficient to abolish Chiefs and Headmen. Correspondence on this file indicates that the Department was certainly operating under the

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Reed was adamant that the department should not supply the Indians with so-called trifling items which he believed they should secure for themselves and insisted that there was no mechanism within the parliamentary appropriations to do so. Nevertheless, in recognition that Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian west were entitled to Chiefs and

Headmen, Reed was willing to make concessions to bands that would agree to finally and completely extinguish this right. Bands in the Birtle Agency in Treaty 2, the Carlton

Agency in Treaty 6, and the Crooked Lakes Agency of Treaty 4, were all offered cattle and wagons if they would agree to dispense with Chiefs and Headmen 54 . In actual fact, agricultural implements were promised under treaty and were due to the bands irrespective of any other consideration. The department had no right to use these items as an inducement, which simply demonstrates the extent of the arbitrary and authoritarian rule exercised by the department in the pursuit of colonial projects of governance.

All of the bands approached with inducements of cattle and wagons flatly refused the offer. They commonly asserted that by abolishing the positions of Chiefs and

Headmen they would not only suffer materially in the loss of annuity payments and triennial clothing due to Chiefs and Headmen, but more importantly they would be blamed by future generations for bartering away their legacy in return for a few paltry items. The members of Cowessess band, for example, steadfastly resisted the concerted efforts of the Agent to do away with their Chiefs and Headmen.

premise that the band would revert to the hereditary system. In any event, in such matters (i.e elections, land surrenders, etc.), the Department proved reluctant to acting against the wishes of a majority of band members. 54 Reed to Forget, October 28, 1895, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-6; Forget to Reed, February 12, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7937, File 32-107; Reed to Forget, August 18, 1894, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3911, File 111404.

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My offer of commuting for anything like two or three wagons, they would not consider at all, and in fact they would hear nothing but having the terms of the Treaty carried out. . . .

Their stock argument was that they were asked to forgo a very definite advantage in the money paid the Chief and Headmen and the triennial clothing . . . Another argument strongly urged against doing away with chief and headmen was that posterity would blame them for giving away definite rights 55 .

Further, when pressed to dispense with Chiefs and Headmen, Aboriginal peoples commonly insisted on retaining leadership positions as a right under treaty. The Valley

River band, Birtle Agency, cited the terms of Treaty 2 in pressing for the recognition of their Chief 56 . In asserting a right to additional Minor Chiefs, Chief Chiniquay of the

Stony band in Treaty 7 presented an actual copy of the treaty to the Agent to justify his claim 57 . As mentioned, the Cowessess band insisted that the treaty guaranteed them a

Chief and Headmen.

[T]he Indians of Cowessess band No. 73 claim they were promised a Chief and Headmen at the time of the Treaty and they requested me to state to you that they do not wish the terms of the Treaty interfered with. They are perfectly civil and orderly but quite firm in their request for a new election 58 .

A similar declaration was made by the Mistawasis 59 band of the Carleton Agency in

Treaty 6. In October 1896, they presented a Memorial to the Governor General stating that the Department of Indian Affairs, in contravention of the terms of Treaty 6, had refused to sanction the man the band had chosen to replace the late Chief Mistowasis.

It was understood when the treaty was made that every band over twenty families were entitled to have one Chief and four Councillors. We would therefore respectfully ask that this portion of the treaty be carried out by the appointment of the Chief elected by the band 60 .

55 McDonald to Forget, September 10, 1894, NAC RG 10 Vol. 3911, File 111404. 56 Forget to Reed, October 17, 1895, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-6. 57 Bangs to Reed, August 4, 1897, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3941, File 121698-19 58 McDonald to Forget, June 9, 1894, NAC RG 10 Vol. 3911, File 111404. 59 Now known as the Mistawasis First Nation. 60 Memorial, September 22, 1896, NAC RG 10 Vol. 7937, File 32-107.

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This assertion that the recognition of the appropriate number of Chiefs and Headmen represented a treaty right demonstrates not only that Aboriginal peoples regarded these positions as politically important, but also that from an early date Aboriginal peoples had a definite conception regarding the scope and content of the treaties, regarding them as binding covenants that secured their continued material and cultural existence.

Reed was clearly aware that this policy was of questionable legality, admitting that the department was unable to force bands to dispense with their leaders.

[T]he department has never disputed the validity of the claim of the Indians to have such appointments made and consequently if the power of suasion has been exhausted and they still insist, they must be allowed to exercise their right 61 .

While Reed was forced to reluctantly authorize elections for any band that insisted on their right to Chiefs and Headmen, no steps were taken to formally apply Section 75 of the Indian Act to these bands by Order-in-Council. Rather the terms of Section 75 were followed in holding elections and for determining the number of Chiefs and Headmen to which each band were entitled, irrespective of the numbers of Chiefs and Headmen acknowledged in the treaties. In this practice, the department replicated the situation that pertained in eastern Canada prior to 1895 where a number of bands began electing leaders informally under the terms of the Indian Act.

Renewed Interest in the Election of Chiefs in Western Canada

Reed’s star had begun to wane by the time the Laurier Liberal government was elected in

1896. While patronage was an entrenched feature of Canadian politics at the time and a purge of civil service personnel was usually attendant upon a change of government, it

61 Reed to Forget, September 3, 1896, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7937, file 32-107.

108 was unusual for an official as highly placed as Reed to be removed. Reed’s overbearing nature and authoritarian administrative style had won him few allies and he was unceremoniously forced from office in 1897 (Hall 1977:129; Carter 1990:238). At this time, siginficant administrative changes occurred within the department, most notably the elevation of J. D. McLean and Duncan Campbell Scott to Secretary and Accountant respectively, the most senior positions in the department below the Deputy

Superintendent General 62 . The fact that the Reed’s immediate successors as Deputy

Superintendent, James A. Smart and Frank Pedley, had little experience with Aboriginal peoples or departmental procedures, coupled with the ongoing tendency to centralize the department’s operations essentially consolidated considerable authority in the hands of

McLean and Scott, who enjoyed increasingly responsibility for department policy and protocol (Titley 1986:17). While both Reed and Vankoughnet had personally overseen practially every aspect of the department’s operations, Smart and Pedley remained aloof from the daily business of the department and were content to allow McLean and Scott to oversee routine department transactions (Hall 1977:129-130).

With Reed’s departure, the policy of eliminating Chiefs and headmen in western

Canada was quietly abandoned by the department (Daugherty 1980:34). Indeed, it appears that there was a renewed interest in the systems of leadership within western bands among department officials. Satzewich and Mahood (1994:44) argue that the experience with the elective system among eastern bands caused the department to pursue the elective system in the west with greater trepidation. Certainly, there was some concern expressed in departmental documents over the fact that elections provided opportunities for Aboriginal leaders to express grievances against the department and air

62 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs. Annual Report 1897:520.

109 complaints about Indian policy and administration 63 . Nevertheless, in the late 1890s and early 1900s, department officials were not at all averse to implementing the elective system among western bands. The department issued a pair of circulars to all Agents and

Inspectors in Manitoba and the North-West Territories inquiring about Chiefs and

Headmen in western bands, undertook measures to consolidate practices with respect to elections, and assigned a member of headquarters staff the responsibility for elections correspondence and maintaining a register of Chiefs and Headmen. However, during this time, department policy in this regard remained fairly tenuous and it was only by the end of the first decade of the 20 th century that the policy with respect to elections in western

Canada became entrenched through practice.

In any event, the department began a review of the political organization of

Aboriginal peoples in Manitoba and the North West Territories. In 1897, J. D. McLean,

Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, sent a circular out to all the Indian Agents and

Inspectors in Manitoba and the North West Territories requesting that the department be furnished with the names of the Chiefs and Headmen in each band, with a view to publishing this information in the department’s Annual Report 64 . The collection and dissemination of this information marks a significant reversal of the policy followed under Reed, which was reluctant to recognize the Chiefs and Headmen in any way. It may also be that the department was compiling this information in anticipation of a general reformulation of policy with regard to Aboriginal political organization among western bands. The department issued another circular the following year to all

63 McKenzie to Laird, May 11, 1900, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3940, File 121698-9; Cory to McLean, February 16, 1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3940, File 121698-13; Laird to McLean, August 19, 1902, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3940, File 121698-15. 64 Circular, July 12, 1897, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920. File 32-1, pt 1

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Superintendents, Inspectors, and Agents across the country asking that the information published in the 1897 Annual Report be confirmed as correct and that the department be informed of any changes to the list of Chiefs and Councillors 65 .

Further evidence that the Aboriginal leadership was receiving increased consideration was reflected in the assignment of the elections file to H. C. Ross, the senior second class clerk in the department. Ross was responsible for a variety of duties, including printing, French translation, proof editing the department’s Annual Report, as well as other special tasks, and maintaining records with respect to the election of Chiefs and Councillors was added to his duties in 1899 66 . In a memo on his personnel file, Ross described his duties as keeping a record of all elections of Chiefs and Councillors, attending to all correspondence in connection with elections, remaining conversant with the electoral provisions of the Indian Act and the Indian Advancement Act, and keeping abreast of departmental procedures with respect to elections which were not provided for by the Acts 67 . Although Ross was not senior enough to dictate policy, he soon became an authority on elected band government and contributed to policy formulation and was even dispatched to conduct elections in the difficult cases of Caugnawaga (Kahnewake) in 1903 and St. Regis (Akwesasne) in 1906 68 . Detailing Ross to the elections file represented a significant measure, for it demonstrated that the department considered the issue important enough to dedicate resources to it, was desirous of more consistent administration, and was prepared to pursue the policy more vigorously.

65 Circular, September 26, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920. File 32-1, pt 1. 66 McLean to Stewart, March 1, 1899 NAC RG 10, Vol. 2206, File 41359. 67 Ross, January 20, 1903, NAC RG 10, Vol. 2206, File 41359. 68 Ross to Pedley, July 19, 1906, NAC RG 10, Vol. 2206, File 41359; Ross to Pedley, July 29, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 2206, File 41359.

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At the time, the department had just unilaterally applied the elective provisions of the Indian Act to all bands in Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick by

Order-in-Council, and this perhaps prompted a re-evaluation of the department’s policy with regard to bands in western Canada. Ross, after examining the information contained in the replies to the department’s circular on the subject of Chiefs and Headmen in each band, remarked that several different systems were evident in Manitoba and the North

West Territories.

With reference to the subject of the system of chieftainship in Manitoba and the North West Territories, I beg to remark that on an examination of the conditions under which the present chiefs obtained office reveals the fact that no uniform system has been followed: in many cases the position is hereditary; in other instances chiefs were appointed by the Hudson’s Bay Company or by missionaries, for life or at least without any limit on time; in other cases appointments were made or confirmed at the time of treaty; other chiefs have been appointed by the department; while in a few instances the elective system had been followed 69 .

In addition to depicting the department’s ad hoc approach to the selection of leaders among western bands, Ross also revealed the prevailing attitude towards Aboriginal political authority within the dominant society. In all of the instances Ross cites,

Aboriginal leaders were confirmed in their position by Euro-Canadian authority, whether

Indian Affairs officials, treaty commissioners, missionaries, or Hudson’s Bay employees.

The existence of Aboriginal political systems, it seems, were given little consideration in the absence of Euro-Canadian authority. Essentially, elected band government was conceived of as a colonial project to bestow political institutions upon peoples who they believed lacked any form of political organization.

Ross advocated that Section 75 of the Indian Act should be applied to all bands in

Manitoba and the North West Territories by Order-in-Council, arguing that once

69 Ross to McLean, March 29, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920, File 32-1, pt. 1.

112 authority was obtained through Order-in-Council, the department could then selectively allow for the utilization of the elective system in instances of which they approved. This suggestion was further discussed with David Laird, Indian Commissioner for Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, who was asked whether the scheme might resolve the uncertainty that existed with respect to the election of leaders in Manitoba and the North

West Territories 70 . Although Ross’ suggestion was never acted upon it demonstrated that the department was seriously considering exerting more direct authority over Aboriginal leadership and more intensive administration of the political organization of western bands, perhaps in connection with the blanket application of the elective system to all bands in eastern Canada in 1899.

Moreover, department officials came to concede the futility of attempting to induce bands to forgo their rights to Chiefs and Councillors. Commissioner Forget remarked that the inducements offered to bands were insufficient to convince them to forgo their claim to have leadership positions filled and that the department should proceed to endorse leaders.

I would say that inducements similar to those held out to the Valley River band in the Birtle Agency have been repeatedly offered to the Carleton bands and strong efforts made to get them to waive their claim to the filling of the vacancies referred to, but without result, and I therefore think that nothing further would be gained by again approaching them on the subject and that it will be as well to sanction the holding of elections on the same terms as laid down in the case of the Peigan Band 71 .

Forget’s comments could represent a tacit rebuke of Reed’s parsimony. Forget had previously suggested that western bands would be unlikely to forgo their right to Chiefs and headmen without some reasonable quid pro quo and as a senior department official in

70 McLean to Laird April 14, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3940, File 121698-12. 71 Forget to Reed, February 12, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7937, File 32-107.

113 the North West Territories, he struggled to implement the policy under Reed’s restrictive administrative guidelines. Moreover, Forget’s suggestion was made hard on Reed’s departure and if nothing else reflects a clear shift in orientation on the question of leadership in western bands.

In any event, there was some ambiguity in the department’s approach to the application of the elective system for bands in western Canada. At about this time many bands in western Canada began informally electing Chiefs and Councillors following the band government provisions of the Indian Act 72 . Satzewich and Mahood (1994:45) assert that the most common practice in the west was for the Indian Agent to simply appoint a

Chief or councillor for an indefinite term, subject to the confirmation of the department.

In actual fact, the process for appointing leaders in the west was somewhat more involved than they suggest and the routine adopted evolved over a period of time. As Daugherty

(1980:58) notes, the system of indefinite appointment was inconsistently applied across the west, with a number of bands allowed to operate informally under the strictures of the three year system. Between 1898 and 1900, several different bands in Manitoba,

Saskatchewan, and Alberta were recorded as electing Chiefs and Councillors for three year terms. In addition to the St. Peter’s and Cowesses bands that had been operating on the three year system since the 1880s, bands in the Birtle Agency in Treaty 2, Norway

House Agency, Treaty 5, Carlton and Edmonton Agencies in Treaty 6, and the Piikani in

Treaty 7 were in the late 1890s all acknowledged to have elected Chiefs and Councillors

72 A review of the election files reveals that a considerable number of files were opened between 1897 and 1899 as elections were held to fill vacancies that had accrued to the ranks of Chiefs and Councillors among bands in Manitoba and the North West Territories. See NAC RG 10, Vols. 3939 to 3944, Files 121698-2 to 121698-34.

114 for a period of three years, following the dictates of Section 75 of the Indian Act 73 . In none of these cases, however, does it appear that the Chiefs and Councillors acknowledged to have been elected, were required to stand for re-election at the end of the initial three year term. This does not seem to have been a purposeful undertaking on the part of the department; rather it appears that Agents, in the absence of guidance from the department, simply neglected to hold subsequent elections.

By the turn of the 19 th century, the department was far more disposed to allowing bands in western Canada to fill vacancies for Chiefs and Headmen than it had been under

Reed. While it often still remained incumbent on band members to request that their choice of successor be recognized by the department, such requests were routinely acceded to by the department 74 . In most cases, the department, usually in the person of

Secretary J. D. McLean, authorized a meeting of the band to choose a successor in conformation with Section 75 of the Indian Act. In 1898, the department took the important step of issuing formal instructions regarding the procedure to be followed in holding elections among western bands.

Nominations of candidates should be received by the Agent for one hour immediately preceding the opening of the Poll and any nomination offered after the expiration of the hour must be rejected. The election should be by open voting and should be held subject to the provisions of Sec. 127 of the Indian Act. Those entitled to vote shall be male members of the band of the full age of twenty-one and upwards and the vote of the majority shall determine the election. Each vote offered by a duly qualified voter must be recorded in the Poll Book under the name of the candidate for whom the vote was given. At the close of the Poll it will be his duty to add up the number of votes cast for each candidate and as soon thereafter as possible announce the result. He should then forward the

73 McLean to Forget, August 25, 1898, NAC RG 10 Vol. 3939, File 121698-6; Sifton, January 30, 1900, NAC RG 10 Vol. 3940, File 121698-10; McNiell, to Forget, January 25, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3940, File 121698-16; Laird to McLean, March 6, 1903, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3941, File 121698-23; McNeill to Forget, February 22,1898, NAC RG 10 Vol. 7937, File 32-107 74 The Indian Affairs election files for bands in western Canada contained on NAC RG 10, Vols. 3939 to 3944, Files 121698-2 to 121698-34 and NAC RG 10, Vols. 7936 to 7941, Files 32-102 to 32-145 are replete with examples of such action.

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Poll Book to the department through you when, if no protest against the election is received, the candidates who received the majority of votes will be confirmed in the positions to which they shall have been respectively elected 75 .

Similar instructions were given for elections to be held by the Agent at the Peigan

Agency 76 . Neither the election provisions of the Indian Act, nor the Indian Advancement

Act contain any such regulations and evidently these procedures were formulated within the department exclusive of the legislation. Clearly, McLean and other senior department officials were seeking to standardize the selection of leaders among Aboriginal peoples in western Canada and had begun to develop a more systematic approach. However, the department did not consistently enforce these regulations and these procedures were applied indiscriminately by the agents in the field. In some instances, adhering to the election provisions of the Indian Act, the election of Chiefs and Headmen for a three year term was authorized, while in others appointments for an indefinite term were confirmed.

In the latter case, the prevailing logic within the department was that a three year appointment conforming to the terms of the Indian Act would allow for the formal application of the elective system by Order-in-Council at a later date without the trouble of first having to secure the resignation of the incumbent Chiefs 77 . Department officials tacitly acknowledged that bands in western Canada were entitled to retain leaders of their own choosing, but refrained from implementing the elective system by Order-in-Council.

Rather, the department, despite efforts to develop a standard set of practices, continued to operate largely on a provisional approach, with no uniform policy on the matter.

75 McLean to Forget, June 4, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-6. 76 McNeill to Forget, January 25, 1898, NAC RG10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-16. 77 McLean to Laird April 14, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3940, File 121698-12.

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Elections Policy in the Early 20 th Century

By the end of the first decade of the 20 th century, general practice regarding selection of leaders in western Canada coalesced into a set of more or less standard procedures. The department continued to sanction elections for Chiefs and Councillors to be held in conformity with the Indian Act, but no longer authorized a three year term 78 . Rather, leaders were routinely confirmed for an indefinite period pending good behaviour.

Elections were held to fill vacancies caused through death, resignation or deposal. These elections conformed to the elective provisions of the Indian Act, which allowed the male band members over 21 years of age to vote in a meeting of the band to choose a successor, subject to the confirmation of the Superintendent General. Additionally, the department invoked Section 93 (formerly section 75) of the Indian Act to depose leaders deemed unfit to hold office. Although these elections to fill vacancies took place with some regularity, they were by no means ubiquitous and often it appears they were primarily at the discretion of the local Indian Agent. Leadership positions regularly remained unfilled through neglect or indifference on the part of the Agent. At other times the department withheld authority to hold an election because they did not approve of the likely choice of the band. It was not uncommon for a band to repeatedly request that they be allowed to elect a Chief or headmen 79 . While there was no pervasive attempt to formally implement the elective systems among western bands, there was nevertheless a general coherence with the election provisions of the Indian Act when selecting or

78 Such action is ubiquitous on the Indian Affairs election files for bands in western Canada. See NAC RG 10, Vols. 3939 to 3944, Files 121698-2 to 121698-34 and NAC RG 10, Vols. 7936 to 7941, Files 32-102 to 32-145. 79 Chief Kamiyostotin and Ahtakakoop Band Council to Smart, March 31, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7937, File 32-107; Grant to Laird, February 11, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3940, File 121698-12.

117 appointing Chiefs and Headmen as the department endeavoured to establish a consistent set of procedures an the matter.

Another innovation with respect to codifying and controlling Aboriginal leadership was the production and distribution of a form that the department called a

‘Declaration of Office’. These forms are remarkable documents in that they attempt to delimit the duties and responsibilities of Aboriginal leaders and secure a commitment to uphold government policy. Fears of Aboriginal insurrection still lingered in the department and among the Canadian public and these Declarations required Aboriginal leaders to swear allegiance to the Crown, to accept the laws and regulations of the

Government of Canada and report any breach of these laws by band members to the authorities, to work to advance the interests of the band both morally and financially, and to fulfill duties of office 80 . The suggestion that Chiefs and Headmen should be required to take such an oath was first advanced by J. A. Markle, Indian Agent, Birtle Agency,

Manitoba, who forwarded a sample form to the department for approval when conducting an election among the Waywayseecappo 81 band of Treaty 4. Markle was frustrated with the lack of cooperation he had received from the Chief and council in enforcing the ban on liquor on the reserve and felt that obtaining signed declarations from them would encourage greater diligence in upholding Canadian law and following the instructions of the Agent 82 . Both A. E. Forget and McLean enthusiastically endorsed the idea and hastened to apply it more broadly. Markle’s form was redesigned and immediately distributed in a circular to Agents across in Ontario and Quebec 83 . Declarations of office

80 Declaration of Office, no date, circa July 2, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920, File 32-1, pt 1. 81 Now known as Waywayseecappo First Nation, located northwest of Brandon Manitoba. 82 Markle to McLean, July 8, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-6. 83 Circular, July 2, 1898, NAC RG 10 Vol. 7920-1, File 32-1.

118 were soon routinely required of Chiefs and Councillors in both eastern and western

Canada regardless of whether the elective provisions of the Indian Act were in effect or the length of appointment. By 1900, Declaration of Office forms were ubiquitous and can be found in literally all Indian Affairs elections files. Even into the 1940s,

Declarations of Office were required of newly elected Chiefs and Councillors.

The Declaration of Office forms were designed to impress upon Aboriginal leaders their duties and responsibilities as determined by the department—upholding the law, assisting the Agent to enforce the Indian Act, and implementing Indian policy. The initiative reflected a desire on the part of the department to formalize and institutionalize the position of Chief, to entrench it more precisely within the colonial order. Chiefs and

Councillors were considered officers of the Crown, but subordinate in every respect to the Indian Agent. That the department deemed these declarations advantageous, indeed necessary, shows that there was considerable tension between Indian Affairs officials and

Aboriginal leaders over the role and function of Chief. Department officials perceived

Chiefs to be under their direction and that their primary responsibility was to the administration and management of their bands. Agents, especially those from a military background, held a hierarchical view of authority and expected their directives to be followed (Carter 1990:143; Hanks and Hanks 1950:50-51). They wanted Chiefs to exert authority over their followers, enforce departmental regulations, and keep band members in line. Authority in Aboriginal communities, however, was typically more diffuse and egalitarian. Aboriginal leaders were expected to provide for their followers and ensure the continuing health and prosperity of the band 84 . Traditionally, leaders who ignored the concerns of their band members and attempted to impose their will soon found

84 Aboriginal concepts of leadership and authority will be discussed further in Chapter IV.

119 themselves without a following. Inevitably, conflicts arose as department officials demanded the assistance of the Chiefs in implementing civilization and assimilation policies and Aboriginal leaders resisted measures to erode Aboriginal culture and assimilate Aboriginal peoples to the dominant society.

From the mid-1890s onwards, the department accepted regulations and by-laws passed by bands in western Canada that had not had the elective provisions of the Indian

Act officially applied to them by Order-in-Council. These by-laws dealt with the same range of issues extended to bands under the elective provisions of the Indian Act. That the department was prepared to consider and confirm such by-laws submitted by bands not officially under the terms of the Act reveals that they were willing to sanction the perpetuation of the elective system in practice if not in actual fact 85 . Each of these measures—the standardization of election procedures, the Declarations of Office, and the endorsement of by-laws—represents an increasing consolidation of practices and procedures with respect to elected band government among western bands and reflects attempts by the department to formalize the institution and assert a greater degree of control and management over Aboriginal leaders by imposing an increased degree of administrative scrutiny. By endeavouring to bring about a transformation of Aboriginal political customs in this way, band government increasingly developed as an institution through which colonial relations were enacted and negotiated.

In the face of these increasing constraints on their leadership and attempts to restructure the nature of the position of Chief, Aboriginal leaders continued to assert political authority, advance grievances, and strive to retain their cultural and political autonomy. The efforts to ensure that the position of Chiefs and Headmen officially

85 Jackson to Minister of Justice, May 7, 1943, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7151, file 1/3-10.

120 recognized by the department was clearly important in this endeavour, as evidenced by the representations made by a delegation of Aboriginal leaders in 1911. Composed of individuals from the Qu’Appelle, Crooked Lakes, Pelly, and Portage La Prairie Agencies in Treaty 4, this delegation met with Frank Oliver, Superintendent General of Indian

Affairs, as well as Frank Pedley, Deputy Superintendent General, 86 and made representations regarding fulfillment of treaty promises and the management of the reserves, including issues such as education, support of the aged and infirm, agricultural assistance, trespass on the reserve, surrenders, and band funds (Carter 1990:256). One of the grievances aired was a complaint that leadership positions to which they were entitled were routinely being left unfilled and that in refusing or neglecting to provide for the election of new leaders, the department had broken the principles of the treaties. Loius

O’Soup, from the Cowessess band, related that as a young boy he was present when

Treaty 4 was negotiated and remembered well the promises made by Treaty

Commissioner Alexander Morris, including the fact that each band was entitled to a Chief and four Headmen. According to O’Soup, this obligation had not been maintained and many bands were without Chiefs and sufficient numbers of Councillors 87 . Oliver responded that with respect to Chiefs and Councillors, the department was concerned with securing the right men for these positions, but later equivocated on the number of

Chiefs and Headmen provided for by Treaty 4. Using somewhat tortured logic, Oliver told the delegation of Aboriginal leaders that while the Treaty did promise a suit of clothing for each Chief and up to four Headmen every three years, it made no specific commitment to the number of Chiefs to which each band was entitled.

86 McLean and Scott also attended these meetings. 87 Dept. of Indian Affairs Notes, January 24, 1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 4053, File 379203-1; McLean to Cory, March 2, 1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3940, file 121698-13.

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The promise as to triennial clothing has no reference to the number of chiefs and headmen to be allowed each band, but was simply a restriction as to the number for whom clothing would be provided in case any band should have more than four headmen 88 .

This appears to be an arbitrary pronouncement in as much as it was inconsistent with the department’s position in other cases which seemed to imply that the treaties specifically promised a set number of Aboriginal leaders 89 . Moreover, Oliver, presenting an argument advanced in a memo by Ross, explained that the department adhered to the election provisions of the Indian Act in determining the number of Chiefs to which a band was entitled and more importantly, followed the Indian Act for removing

Aboriginal leaders from office.

The principle that the department has been following in the western provinces has been not to allow bands to have a larger number of chiefs and headmen than the proportion provided for under section 93 of the Indian Act, namely, one chief for each band, and one headman for every 100 Indians or fraction of that number, although the three year elective system and the Indian Act has not yet been applied to bands in the West. But chiefs and headmen in those provinces are appointed to office for a indefinite period and are only deposed by an Order of His Excellency the Governor General in Council for the reasons stated in the 96 th section of the Indian Act, namely dishonesty, intemperance, immorality, or incompetence 90 .

Essentially, the department had assumed discretionary power over Chiefs despite the fact that there was no provision in the treaties to interfere with Aboriginal leadership and department officials were aware that in western Canada, in the absence of the official application of the elective system by Order-in-Council, the authority of the department over Aboriginal political organization was uncertain at best. Nevertheless, department officials were not reticent about using this power, routinely deposing Chiefs and

88 Oliver, January 30, 1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 4053, File 379203-1. 89 McLean to Faunt, July 19, 1920, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt 1. 90 Oliver, January 30, 1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 4053, File 379203-1.

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Councillors.91 During the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, some 30 Chiefs in the prairie region were deposed by Indian Affairs, often on tenuous grounds 92 (Martin-McGuire

1998:xix). Indeed, many Agents mistakenly came to believe that they had the authority to summarily dismiss Chiefs and Headmen 93 .

The representations made by the Treaty 4 delegation in 1911 concerning Chiefs and Headmen would appear to have prompted two actions within the department. First,

Ross, the in-house expert on elections, penned a lengthy memo entitled ‘System of

Election or Appointment of Chiefs and Councillors in the various Provinces’ which assessed the progress of the elective system among bands across Canada. With regard to the operation of the elective system in the prairie provinces, Ross asserted that:

In Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta the system followed for a number of years has been appointment for an indefinite period, which practically means for life or until a chief or councillor becomes unfit to hold office, in which case he may be deposed by Order-in-Council 94 .

Essentially, vacancies, as they occurred through death or deposal, were filled by appointment and individuals served for life at the discretion of the department.

Typically, these appointments were made upon the recommendation of the Indian Agent who forwarded the name of the band’s chosen candidate, nominally elected in accordance with the elections provisions of the Indian Act, to the department for approval. Ross noted the exceptions of the Cowessess band in Saskatchewan, that had been placed under the three year system by Order-in-Council in 1887, and the St. Peter’s band, that had been

91 Orders-in-Council deposing Chiefs and Headmen can be found on nearly all of the Indian Affairs elections files for bands in western Canada. See NAC RG 10, Vols. 3939 to 3944, Files 121698-2 to 121698-34 and NAC RG 10, Vols. 7936 to 7941, Files 32-102 to 32-145. 92 By way of example, in the 1920s, the Head Chief on the Peigan reserve was deposed on the advice of the Indian Commissioner Graham because he “spends most of his time driving around the country in his car.” Graham to McLean, October 15, 1929, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7938, File 32-116, pt. 1. 93 Wilson to McLean, November 11, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 94 Ross, February 11,1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920, File 32-1, pt. 1.

123 allowed to hold triennial elections although not officially under the Act 95 . Ross also explained that the department had in practice routinely treated the bands in these provinces as though they were under the provisions of the Indian Act for the purposes of determining the number of Chiefs and Councillors to which a band was entitled, even though Section 93 had not been officially applied to these bands 96 .

Second, a circular bearing the same date as Ross’s memo was sent to all Agents requesting that the department be informed immediately when vacancies occur in the ranks of Chiefs and Councillors through death, resignation, or otherwise 97 . Responses to this circular indicate that in many cases, leaders had died some years previous without any move to nominate a successor, lending credence to the contention of the delegation that vacancies were being left unfulfilled either deliberately or through neglect. The fact is that the department did not always have an accurate grasp of just who was serving as

Chiefs and band Councillors and how these individuals came to the position. In responding to the allegations made by the delegation of Aboriginal leaders, Ross revealed that the department’s records were badly out of date 98 . Prompted by concerns raised by

Aboriginal leaders, the political organization of western bands was again receiving the attention of the department. However, the application of the elective system in western

Canada was not pursued by the department in any systematic way. Rather, the approach continued to be piecemeal and haphazard, with elections conforming to the elective provisions of the Indian Act being held to fill vacancies created when Chiefs or Headmen

95 The Peguis band, formerly the St. Peter’s band, was officially placed under the triennial elective system by Order-in-Council in 1915. 96 Ross, February 11,1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920, File 32-1, pt. 1. 97 Copies of this circular are contained on practically all of the Indian Affairs elections files for bands in western Canada. See NAC RG 10, Vols. 3939 to 3944, Files 121698-2 to 121698-34 and NAC RG 10, Vols. 7936 to 7941, Files 32-102 to 32-145. 98 Ross, January 26, 1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 4053, File 379203-1.

124 died. Of note, at about the same time, there was another sharp increase in the number of election files opened by the department, especially pertaining to bands in western

Canada. This indicates an escalation of activity with respect to the elections of Chiefs and band Councillors and corresponds more generally to the more vigorous pursuit of existing Canadian Indian policy in the early 20 th century. Not coincidentally, this period represents the height of attempts to effect the civilization and assimilation of Aboriginal peoples through practices of coercive regulation. The department aggressively pursued measures such as the surrender of reserve lands, compulsory Enfranchisement, residential school attendance, prohibitions of Aboriginal ceremonialism, directing the use of band land and resources, and controlling the expenditure of band funds. Attempts by Indian

Affairs officials to expand and consolidate management of Aboriginal political activity through the perpetuation of elected band government reflects yet another aspect of aggressive civilization.

The situation with respect to elections persisted largely unchanged through the interwar years. Although there is some evidence that the department was considering formalizing the application of the elective system in western Canada through a blanket application by Order-in-Council, as had been done in eastern Canada in 1899, no real progress was made toward this goal. Elections to fill vacancies continued to be held quite commonly. These did not however receive the unqualified support of department officials. Indian Agents often complained that elections served no useful purpose and

Indian Commissioner W. M. Graham, the leading department officer in western Canada, held Aboriginal leaders in poor regard, frequently asserting that bands in western Canada

125 would often be better off without Chiefs or Councillors 99 . In terms that echo those of

Reed from 30 years previous, Graham suggested that Aboriginal leadership be eliminated through attrition.

I am of the opinion that in many bands chiefs and Councillors are of very little service to the department and the appointment of successors to deposed officers is in many instances undesirable 100 .

The parallels to Reed’s attempts in the 1890s to abolish Chiefs and Councillors among bands in western Canada are striking, demonstrating that disparaging attitudes towards

Aboriginal leaders and tensions with respect to the band government policy endured within the department. The fact that senior officials continued to advocate that

Aboriginal leadership be eradicated through attrition reveals that band government was motivated by ideals of colonial domination in that it was to serve the interests of the department to effect forms of regulatory authority that would perpetuate social and political transformations in Aboriginal communities. Grahams’ comments indicate that band government remained a site of struggle in that Aboriginal leaders did not conform to the department’s expectations and used their positions to assert their own precepts regarding leadership and the political management of their communities. Band government also continued to be marked by division and discord within the Indian

Affairs administration as various actors expressed competing conceptions regarding the implementation and execution of the policy.

In practice, the department continued to adhere to the dictates of the Indian Act in allowing bands to choose leaders, although they reserved for themselves the right to

99 Graham to McLean, March 22, 1923, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7936, file 32-102; Graham to McLean, July 7, 1928, NAC RG 10,Vol. 7936, File 32-105, Graham to McLean, January 24, 1927, NAC RG 10,Vol. 7936, File 32-106, McLean to Ogletree, May 16, 1925, NAC RG 10,Vol. 7936, file 32-127. 100 Graham to Scott, November 24, 1926, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7936, File 32-128.

126 decline to confirm the appointment of any particular leader so chosen, if the recommendation of the Agent was not forthcoming or if the department had reason to doubt the individual’s commitment to department policy.

[T]he opinion expressed by Indian Commissioner, Mr. W. M. Graham, that in many instances the Indian bands are better without Chiefs has been found to be quite true, but the desire of the department is not to deprive the Indians of a Chief or of Councillors when men suitable for the position can be selected by them.

The matter is left to the judgement of the Indian Agent who being in close contact with the Indians of the bands under his supervision should be able to judge whether such and such a candidate selected by the band can be recommended as suitable person to hold such a position, and as you have been advised before, no appointment will be made unless strongly recommended by yourself 101 .

In many cases, the department simply declined to authorize elections because they did not approve of the candidates that would likely be elected. This action served to isolate leaders that opposed department policy, undermine Aboriginal political autonomy, and enhance the control of Indian Affairs over Aboriginal communities.

While the elections conducted among western bands during this period may have conformed to the provisions of the Indian Act, in the absence of an authorizing Order-in-

Council, the department understood them to be fundamentally different. McLean explained that the department had always been guided by the provisions of the Indian Act with respect to the election and deposal of Chiefs and band Councillors, but the fact that many bands had not had Section 93 officially applied by Order-in-Council permitted the department to exercise considerable latitude in these appointments.

According to a ruling given some years ago by the Department of Justice concerning the interpretation of the meaning of these sections of the Indian Act it appears that when a band is under the three year elective system the Indians have a right to ELECT their Chief and Councillors and the department has no authority to dismiss them except by Order-in-Council for dishonesty, intemperance,

101 McLean to Ogletree, May 16, 1925, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7939, File 23-127.

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immorality or incompetency (Sec. 96). Bands under the advancement part of the Indian Act are governed by the clauses relating to elections in that part of the Act. In the western provinces where the bands are neither under the three year elective system nor the advancement part of the Act, the department has retained jurisdiction over the election of chiefs and they are only SELECTED or nominated by the member of the band and APPOINTED for an indefinite period on the recommendation of the Agent. In such cases the selection is confirmed or rejected on the recommendation made to that affect by the Agent or the Inspector 102 .

The department essentially reserved for itself the right to refuse to appoint any candidate of which the Agent did not approve. In actual fact, the department was keenly aware that the Indian Act did not convey authority over the councils of bands that were not lawfully under the elective system by Order-in-Council. Commenting on the situation in a 1944 circular sent to Inspectors of Indian Agencies in western Canada that reviewed department policy on the matter, H. W. McGill, Director of Indian Affairs, indicated that a careful review of the relevant sections of the Indian Act revealed that the department had no authority to interfere in either the selection of Chiefs or to obstruct the appointment of Chiefs in bands that were not officially under Section 93 of the Indian

Act.

It should be clear from the foregoing that the department has no authority to select chiefs or Councillors or to reject those Indians properly chosen for the office by Band custom, although that “right” has been exercised in the past, and it has no such right under the elective system 103 .

Nor was this recognition that bands selecting leaders by local custom were technically beyond the purview of the Indian Affairs and entitled to any leaders they chose a new revelation within the department. Officials dating back to Hayter Reed were aware that they had limited authority to interfere in Aboriginal political customs or to deprive

Aboriginal communities of leaders. Nevertheless, the practice of following the forms and

102 McLean to Graham, October 2 1924, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7939, file 32-127. Original emphasis. 103 Circular, April 14, 1944, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7115, File 1/3-5, pt. 1.

128 procedures of the elective provisions of the Indian Act prevailed in western Canada throughout the first half of the 20 th century. As T. L. R. MacInnes, Secretary, Indian

Affairs, acknowledged during a reassessment of the elections policy for bands in western

Canada, “although we were aware that the Act was silent on the question we had assumed authority over the proceedings for practical administrative reasons” 104 . Essentially, the imperatives of the colonial projects of civilization and assimilation to undermine

Aboriginal leadership and incorporate Aboriginal peoples into the Canadian body politic took precedence over administrative requirements or points of law. Throughout the early

20 th century, Aboriginal peoples in western Canada were subject to increasingly forceful measures of coercive regulation. While in many areas, the administration of Indian

Affairs officials displayed erratic management and ambiguous initiatives, the ideology that motivated Indian policy in the 19 th century endured and existing policies were more vigorously pursued. Band government was one such policy. While Indian Affairs officials were aware that without the official application of the elective system by Order- in-Council, there was really no basis to justify interference with the selection of Chiefs and Councillors. Regardless, Indian Affairs officials insisted on conformity with the provisions of the Indian Act, both for the selection of Aboriginal leaders and the operations of band government, which, assertions of administrative expedience aside, served to perpetuate constructs that attempted to refashion Aboriginal cultural relations and perpetuate administrative authority over Aboriginal peoples.

104 MacInnes to McGill, June 1, 1946, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7115, File 1/3-5.

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Conclusion

The application of the band government provisions of the Indian Act was undertaken in an inconsistent manner by Indian Affairs officials. In eastern Canada, where it was envisioned that First Nations would readily avail themselves of the elective system, only a few bands expressed any interest in adopting the institution. While the elective system was by the 1890s operating in a number of communities in Ontario and Quebec, it had not, except in a few instances, been formally applied by Order-in-Council. To that time, the operation of band government was largely contingent on the inclination of the Agent.

The indifference Aboriginal peoples displayed towards these measures caused federal authorities to unilaterally apply the elective provisions of the Indian Act to all bands in

Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia by Order-in-Council in 1899.

The pursuit of band government in western Canada was even more equivocal.

While elections were authorized for a few bands in Manitoba and the Northwest

Territories in the 1880s and officially applied to the Cowessess band by Order-in-Council in 1887, this practice was reversed when Hayter Reed became Deputy Superintendent

General in 1893. Reed had long maintained that Aboriginal leaders were an impediment to department objectives and advocated that the positions of Chiefs and Headmen be abolished altogether. Although fully cognizant that the department had no authority to summarily remove Aboriginal leaders, Reed refused to authorize election of Chiefs and

Headmen unless Aboriginal peoples insisted on it as a right under treaty, instructed

Agents to convince bands to dispense with Chiefs and Headmen, and offered inducements of material goods such as wagons and cattle that were already due First

Nations under the treaties. Aboriginal peoples for their part insisted on retailing Chiefs

130 and Councillors as a right under treaty. When Reed was removed from office in 1897, the department quietly abandoned the policy of abolishing Chiefs and Headmen and exhibited a renewed interest in the political organization of Aboriginal peoples in western

Canada. Elections to replace vacancies to the ranks of Chiefs and Headmen were routinely authorized by the department and some consideration was given to applying the election provisions of the Indian Act to all bands in Manitoba and the North West

Territories by Order-in-Council. Formal instructions were issued Agents in western

Canada detailing the procedures to be followed in conducting elections and there was also evidence that the triennial system was authorized, although not officially applied by

Order-in-Council, for a number of bands in western Canada. At about this time the department also began to require Chiefs and Councillors to sign Declarations of Office which articulated the expectation that they would act as officers of the Crown and conform to dictates of the Indian Act in executing their duties. As well, Indian Affairs officials routinely used the terms of the Indian Act to depose Chiefs and Councillors.

However, no uniform policy with respect to band government was ever instituted and a review of the situation by a department official revealed Chiefs holding office under various kinds of authority, including achieving status through traditional means, having been confirmed at the time of treaty, appointment by the department, and under the elective system. In effect, the forms and structures of band government were elaborated among First Nations in western Canada, promoting more intensive governmental regulation aimed at transforming Aboriginal political systems and ultimately reconciling

Aboriginal communities to the dominant society.

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By the early 20 th century, a more or less consistent practice for the selection of

Chiefs and Headmen in western bands had emerged. Elections under the terms prescribed by the Indian Act were held to replace vacancies caused through death, deposal, or resignation, and leaders were confirmed by the department for an indefinite period pending good behaviour. However, department officials were not above refusing to recognize elected leaders of which they did not approve and not infrequently allowed positions to stand vacant for several years. Bands in western Canada were routinely treated as though the elective provisions of the Indian Act were in force for the purposes of determining the number of Chiefs and Headmen to which a band was entitled and for conducting elections. The department had assumed discretionary power over Aboriginal leaders and utilized the band government provisions of the Indian Act to depose Chiefs even though these did not actually apply to most bands. However, it is important to remember that band government was a contested institution and that Aboriginal leaders invested it with their own conceptions and contentions regarding the exercise of political authority and attached considerable importance to the positions of Chiefs and Councillors as witnessed by the active resistance to attempts to abolish these positions in the 1890s and the insistence of the 1911 Treaty 4 delegation that the department had broken faith by allowing leadership positions to stand vacant. The participation of Aboriginal peoples in band government inevitably served to transpose the institution in practice as they strove to engage and negotiate the terms of colonial domination.

Throughout the first half of the 20 th century, the department continued to expand and consolidate the administration of Chiefs and band councils, dramatically increasing the number of communities that held elections and subjecting Aboriginal leaders to more

132 intensive regulation. The issue of unilaterally applying the three year elective system of the Indian Act to bands in western Canada, which was first suggested by Ross in 1899, continued to percolate among senior officials in the department into the interwar period.

By the early 1940s department was making active preparations for the official application of the elective system to bands in western Canada, when a series of Orders-in-Council were prepared to apply the elective system to a large number of bands in Manitoba,

Saskatchewan, and Alberta. These were never promulgated because of conflicting advice from agents in the field and the pending revision of the Indian Act. It was not until after the passage of the revised Indian Act in 1951, in which the elective system was thoroughly reformed, that the elective system achieved general application in western

Canada.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Kainai Systems of Leadership and Authority in Historical Context

Over the millennia that they have occupied the northwestern plains, the Blackfoot and their ancestors developed a sophisticated form of political organization that respected the autonomy of independent and self-regulating bands. In contrast to the assertions of early observers, who often regarded the Blackfoot as lacking political institutions, the

Blackfoot peoples had resilient yet flexible systems of leadership and authority to regulate internal relations among themselves and external relations with other groups they encountered. These systems have demonstrated both a remarkable flexibility to adapt to changing social and political situations and a considerable resilience to retain essential cultural traits and preserve their political autonomy. This chapter provides a historical context for later discussion of Kainai leadership and considers the social and political organization of the Blackfoot peoples that the Kainai shared with the Siksika and

Piikani as well as the systems of leadership and authority common in band societies.

Traditional leadership among the Blackfoot peoples can be characterized as non-coercive, consensus-driven, and based largely on personal influence. Leaders were expected to both provide for welfare of band members and maintain order and individuals respected for bravery, intelligence, and generosity inevitably gathered a following around them.

The inherent flexibility of Blackfoot systems of leadership and authority facilitated consensual decision-making and ensured that individuals of demonstrated ability rose to leadership positions, and allowed for adaptation to changing circumstances.

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With respect to Blackfoot history, Crowshoe and Manneschmidt (2002:6) identify five distinct periods: pre-historic times, dog days, the horse days, early reserve/treaty period, and early 20 th century. Blackfoot social and political systems have their origins in the distant past, developed in the nomadic bison hunting adaptation of the Blackfoot peoples and their ancestors and realizing its fullest expression in the horse days, when mounted Blackfoot bands followed the great bison herds on the northwestern plains, circa

1740 to 1870.

Crowshoe and Manneschmidt (2002:76) remark that the dog days and the horse days, which are both characterized by dependency on the bison, are sometimes collectively referred to as the buffalo days. During the dog days, Blackfoot peoples followed the bison herds in an annual cycle and developed sophisticated methods for hunting bison on foot using pounds or jumps that required the organization of a considerable number of people, while retaining the ability to adapt to fluctuations in resources. The Blackfoot peoples experienced a cultural fluorescence in the pre-reserve era before a series of crises compelled the Blackfoot to abandon their nomadic hunting lifestyle and adopt a sedentary existence on reserves (Bear Robe 1994:41). The acquisition of horses and firearms precipitated increases in personal wealth, a greater degree of social differentiation, and an intensification of social and ceremonial institutions. Towards the end of the horse days, participation in the fur trade, the effects of epidemic diseases, the damage wrought by the whiskey trade, the influence of the missionaries, the disappearance of the bison herds from the northern plains, and the negotiation of Treaty 7 all had significant effects for Blackfoot systems of leadership and authority. The Blackfoot peoples assert that they have lived on the northwestern plains

135 since creation and the social and political systems of the Blackfoot reflect a depth of habitation to the region. Despite the significant changes that irrevocably altered the social and political circumstances of the Blackfoot peoples, during the reserve era and into the 20 th century, Blackfoot leaders strove to maintain their cultural integrity and preserve a measure of political autonomy.

Annual Cycle

In addition to representing the primary staple for the Blackfoot peoples, the bison furnished practically all the material necessities of life and their way of life was intimately tied to the movements and tendencies of this animal (Crowshoe and

Manneschmidt 2002:6; Bear Robe 1994:42). The seasonal round of the Blackfoot closely followed the migrations of the bison herds and the bison occupied a central role social and ceremonial institutions. The flesh of the bison was considered superior to all other fare and was referred to as nitapiksisako , or real meat (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee

2001:47-48). Clothes, storage containers, tools, utensils tipi covers, and other utilitarian items were all fashioned from bison hides, bones, and horns (Dempsey 2004:276). Like all Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the northwestern plains, the Blackfoot hunting bands were well attenuated to the annual migration patterns of the bison and moved throughout their territory to optimize plant and animal resources (Binnema 2001:37; The Blackfoot

Gallery Committee 2001:40).

While there is some debate over the migration patterns of free-roaming bison herds, current thinking holds that in the past the bison followed a predictable pattern of movement throughout their range. Generally, bison dispersed into small primary cow

136 and calf herds and separate bull herds during the lean seasons and later congregated into large combined herds approaching the mid-summer rut (Kehoe 1993:90). As large herds of bison began to form on the open plains, the disparate Siksika, Kainai, and Piikani bands would each gather together in their respective divisions for the communal bison hunt, the Sun Dance, and visiting. The Sun Dance was the major ceremonial event of the year and served to ritually confirm and consecrate the place of the Blackfoot peoples in the world.

The Ookaan renews peoples connection to Natosi, the sun and giver of life. As the people all camp together, this is also a time when the sacred societies undertake their ceremonies. Over the course of two or three weeks, ceremonies are performed to re-establish the Blackfoot people’s relationship with all of Creation and their right to live here (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:33).

During this time, ties of kinship and friendship were renewed, war and raiding expeditions were undertaken, and berries were gathered and dried (Binnema 2001:43).

“The summer rendezvous looked like a combination of fair and pilgrimage sites.

Gambling, racing, singing, flirting, exchanges went on day and night. Ceremonies were conducted, adjudication of disputes performed and alliances negotiated” (Kehoe 1993:93;

1995:xiv). During the festivities there were transfers of medicine bundles, dances and songs performed by societies, gambling, horse races, counting coup. People with sacred power were asked to bless newborns, sanctify pipes and other ceremonial items, and pray for good health (Taylor 1989:20). These aggregations brought together thousands of people and allowed the separate divisions of the Blackfoot peoples to maintain a sense of community and revitalize social and civic institutions. Following the Sun Dance, the bands would remain in large camps if the buffalo herds were large enough, otherwise they would disperse to hunt on the open prairies.

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By autumn, individual local bands would begin to disperse and prepare for winter.

People gathered berries as they came into season, cut new lodge poles, prepared winter clothing, and most importantly, laid in a supply of pemmican and dried meat (Binnema

2001:45). The fall buffalo hunt, which employed pounds or jumps even into historic times, was the time when dried meat and pemmican were made for winter consumption.

Before the first snow fall, local bands would seek out winter camps along wooded river bottoms that provided shelter, access to fuel, and fodder for horses. Camps were established several miles apart along a reach of river. Winter camps were moved only if timber or forage became exhausted, and then usually only a short distance away.

Sporadic buffalo hunting continued through the winter, although bison often became so lean by late winter that it provided insufficient nourishment and Blackfoot hunters showed a decided preference for cows, young calves and foetuses during this season, sometimes taking only the tongues and backfat from mature animals (Binnema 2001:51).

Long winter nights provided opportunities for all night ceremonies, story telling, and singing (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:42). Early spring was often a lean season, as dried food reserves were depleted and buffalo began to drift away from the river bottoms were the winter camps were located and snow cover made pursuit difficult.

Bison jumps and pounds were used more in the winter and early spring when the herds gathered in the broken country most suited to jumps and pounds. Spring also marked the commencement of a new ceremonial cycle. Thunder Medicine bundles and Beaver

Bundles were opened and songs sung and prayers given to ensure the success and survival of the people over the coming year (Binnema 2001:49; The Blackfoot Gallery

Committee 2001:42). Once the snow cleared in the spring, small groups followed small

138 scattered buffalo herds on the open prairies (Dempsey 2001:609). In the spring and early summer, prairie turnip and camas roots, important sources of starch, were gathered.

Those in dire need could depend on their kin or allied groups for assistance (Binnema

2001:41). This annual pattern endured for thousands of years as people on the northwestern plains adapted to the seasonal availability of resources (Vickers 1994:6).

While the importance of bison to subsistence cannot be overstated, various other species also contributed to subsistence. Deer, antelope and big horn sheep were hunted for meat and hides. Porcupine, squirrels, and rabbit would be used as a food source in times of scarcity. Waterfowl would be taken on occasion and eggs were collected when convenient. Fish was typically regarded as unpalatable and resorted to only in the face of starvation. The diet was supplemented with berries and edible roots, which supplied needed carbohydrates and other nutrients. Saskatoon berries, bull berries, cranberries, pin cherries, raspberries, strawberries, prairie turnip, camas root, and bitterroot were all collected in season (Duke 1991:62-63; Dempsey 2004:276). Other plants were used for medicinal purposes. Only Native tobacco was cultivated, being planted in small plots and left untended until ready to harvest.

Bands and Clans

The basic social and subsistence group among the Blackfoot was the band or clan. Elders relate that it was the wolf that taught the Blackfoot people to live together as wolves do in packs which, led by a mature male and a female pair, hunts cooperatively and raises its young together (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:20). The system of band organization is probably as old as the Blackfoot peoples themselves and has been

139 maintained from the distant past and into the reserve era. The Blackfoot lived and camped, hunted and socialized, together in inclusive groups that often brought together three or more generations. These sub-groups within the Kainai, Siksika, and Piikani were invariably based on an extended family nucleus and represent the functional unit through which social, political, and economic activities were organized (Dempsey 1982:94; Bear

Robe 1994:46). These extended family sub-groups are sometimes called clans by

Blackfoot speakers, and indeed this term was also current among 19 th century ethnographers. However, the standard anthropological definition of clans typically refers to a corporate descent group usually associated with settled village communities in which exact genealogical relationships between members cannot be precisely stated. Typically, clan members claim descent from a common ancestor, often identified as a non-human being, and membership is acquired at birth and retained for life. Clans generally have totemic associations and usually have strict rules about exogamous marriage, residence, and access to land and/or resources. As well, different clans often retain distinct religious rituals and ceremonial responsibilities. As Crowshoe and Manneschmidt (2002:78 ) point out, these features are absent among Blackfoot clans and the extended family sub-groups more closely resemble what the anthropological literature describes as bands. Notably, some Blackfoot speakers also use the term band (Bear Robe 1994:45).

There is a fairly strong anthropological consensus regarding the nature of band societies 1. Associated predominantly with nomadic hunter-gatherer societies, bands tend to be composed of small, unstratified social groups in which there are minimal differences of wealth and power between individuals. Most often based on bilateral

1 Within the anthropological literature the term band denotes a social and political unit, which as mentioned in Chapter I, is distinct from the conception within Canadian Indian policy and legislation of a band as a legal and administrative unit

140 kinship connections, bands are characterized by flexibility of social and political structures which permit fluidity of band membership in adaptive response to social and ecological factors (Leacock and Lee 1983:3-13; Earle 2002:944). There is a common pattern of seasonal fission and fusion, where related groups come together in large gatherings of several hundred, or perhaps thousands, of people to exploit abundant resources, to socialize, and for ceremonial purposes and then disperse into smaller groups of usually one or more extended families during leaner seasons. Band societies also typically display egalitarian patterns of sharing, an emphasis on cooperation in conjunction with respect for individual autonomy, and reduced importance of material accumulation.

This resonates with the descriptions of clans or bands offered by Blackfoot speakers. The Blackfoot, like other groups of Aboriginal peoples inhabiting the northern plains, were organized in a loose amalgamation of hunting groups or bands that spent most of the year in separate camps scattered across their territory (Crowshoe and

Manneschmidt 2002:15). Among Blackfoot bands, membership was fluid and flexible and there were frequent changes in both number and composition of bands. Individuals were free to take up residence with another group, so long as they respected and cooperated with their new band mates (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:20).

According to Blackfoot commentators, bands resembled large extended families which tended to vary in both size and membership, and periodically reformulated alliances and associations with other bands. As residential groups comprised of several extended families related through the maternal or paternal line, bands were generally exogamous, but only because most members were related to each other. There was no restriction on

141 marriage between unrelated band members (Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council 1997:84;

Bear Robe 1994:46). All bands were named, but names were not self-selected. Rather, bands were usually given a name that reflected some significant incident, characteristic, or event, and names were not necessarily complimentary (Taylor 1989:14). Band names were more like nicknames and often changed in accordance with changes in leadership or to mark an important event.

In the buffalo days, the number of bands constantly fluctuated as new bands periodically formed and old bands disbanded, with periodic redistribution of band members and rearrangement of bands occurring due to population depletions through war losses and epidemics, or alternatively through population growth (Crowshoe and

Manneschmidt 2002:15; Ewers 1958:97). Bands might join together, separate, or move to another region due to pressures of intragroup conflict, availability of resources, or simply to visit with friends and relatives. Bands that became too large tended to split in two under different leaders. Conversely, bands that suffered significant reductions through disease or warfare were often absorbed into larger bands. As well, bands experiencing an extended period of scarcity or bands unable to agree on an acceptable successor upon the death of a Chief may have been forced to dissipate as members left to join other more successful or established bands (Ewers 1958:96; Taylor 1989:14).

Quarrels and personal animosity also contributed to movement of people between bands and the poor were especially susceptible to change band affiliation as they moved to other bands that appeared more affluent (Ewers 1955:248; Bear Robe 1994:46).

As Dempsey (1982:95) has asserted, the flexibility in size, structure and movements of bands were the keys to its success. The fluid nature of band society

142 permitted members to change affiliation with relative ease and the movement of individuals between bands was largely determined on the basis of economic and social factors. For instance, a band that enjoyed a measure of prestige and status because of its reputation in raiding, success in hunting, or astute political leadership, would in all likelihood, attract young men to join its ranks either through marriage, as the relative of a woman marrying into the band, or as an attendant to a man of status (Dempsey 1982:96;

Bear Robe 1994:46). This flexibility permitted Blackfoot bands to be highly adaptive to fluctuations in resources and effectively deal with personal conflicts and other social tensions. In times of scarcity, those bands that were not able to secure adequate sustenance could call on their kin, both fictive and biological, in other bands for assistance or individuals might leave to join other more successful bands, ensuring a beneficial distribution of available resources (Binemma 1996:2-3).

Following the transition to an equestrian culture, Blackfoot bands became larger and more flexible. These larger bands did not consist exclusively of extended family members and due to the fact that non-relatives were frequently resident, intermarriage within the band became more common. Changes in band affiliation also occurred with greater regularity (Dempsey 1982:96; Ewers 1955:316). While the ethnographic record from the 19 th century often described Blackfoot bands as patrilocal, in actual practice it appears that Blackfoot bands were ambilocal as a couple could decide to reside in either the husband’s or wife’s family’s band, depending on several considerations. Dempsey

(1982:95) related several instances in which a newly married couple decided to reside with the wife’s band, the husband becoming a recognized member of the band.

Additionally, when marrying into a band, a woman might bring her younger brother with

143 her. Crop Eared Wolf, who became Head Chief of the Kainai, joined Red Crow’s band in this manner.

Following Helm (1965), Theodore Binnema (1996:2) finds it useful to distinguish between the local band and the regional band in discussing Blackfoot social organization.

Local bands usually comprised several families, connected through senior males who were closely related or perhaps hunting partners. Within bands there was little formal ranking and leadership was informal. Beyond the recognition of a nominal headman or

Chief, there was little institutionalized authority and few restrictions on personal autonomy. Social ranking was based on the size of the horse herd owned, ownership of medicine bundles, and success in raiding and war (Duke 1991:59; Bear Robe 1994:47).

Age graded warrior societies served to fulfil judicial and policing roles and strengthened ties of solidarity across bands, as did religious rituals, gaming, and feasting. Membership would regularly fluctuate in response to abundance of food sources, interpersonal antagonisms, and individual preferences, but overall local bands usually retained a fairly stable core of close relatives of the Chief. The core of a band may have been an extended family, but it invariably included non-family members as well (Ewers 1955:248).

Typically, nuclear families occupied separate tipis, which could usually accommodate 8 to 12 people. While some authorities claim that within the local band encampment, tipis were arranged in a circle with pride of place being accorded the band Chief, Blackfoot

Elders have stated that within local band encampments, tipis were not arranged in a circle or any set arrangement, other than facing east so that morning prayers could travel to the rising sun (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:23).

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Regional bands, on the other hand, represented an affiliation of local bands brought together in a community through common bonds of kinship, shared experiences, social and ceremonial activities, and inter-band political councils (Binnema 1996:2).

Among the Blackfoot peoples, local bands of the Sisksika, Kainai, and Piikani began to congregate into their respective regional bands in early summer for the communal buffalo hunts as well as to trade, feast, gamble, socialize, facilitate courting and marriages, revitalize social and political institutions, and participate in the Sun Dance and other religious ceremonies. These activities served to renew a sense of community and sustain mutual identity within the regional bands (Crowshoe and Manneschmidt 2002:15-16;

Kehoe 1995:xiv). At the summer congregation of the regional band, local bands would retain their cohesion within a larger circle, occupying a designated place within the circle.

This is a pattern that still endures (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:20).

Membership in age grade and military societies and ceremonial societies cut across local band lines and had an integrative function in perpetuating ties of unity and cohesion within the regional band. This seasonal aggregation brought together a series of relatively autonomous local bands into a broader regional band necessary to effectively exploit the abundant resource of the large summer bison herds as well as serving to reinvigorate the communal Blackfoot social and political institutions and participate in the ceremonial activities attendant on the Sun Dance.

Societies

The various ceremonial and military societies were an integral feature of Blackfoot culture and individuals usually belonged to several societies during their lifetime.

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Membership in these organizations cut across band affiliation and ties of kinship, promoting solidarity within the broader regional band. Often referred to as all-comrades societies, these institutions had specific functions or responsibilities and leaders within the societies were regarded as Chiefs (Crowshoe and Manneshmidt 2002:16). Military societies, in addition to combat, defence, and other activities related to warfare and raiding, also served internal policing functions, especially during times when the regional band came together. “Some of the functions or responsibilities carried out by the societies include serving as police, settling disputes, punishing offenders, rehabilitating offenders, directing the hunt, and engaging in both defensive and offensive military or para-military pursuits” (Ladner 2000:130). The exercise of such regulatory authority was largely restricted to special occasions such as the communal bison hunts or the Sun

Dance gatherings where societies such as the All Brave Dogs Society and Black Soldiers

Society maintained order in the camp and ensured compliance to societal norms (Bear

Robe 1994:43). For instance, a moratorium on hunting was often declared by the Chiefs and enforced by the all-comrades societies in order to prevent an over-zealous hunter from stampeding the bison herd. Anyone caught violating this order was stripped of his possessions, his horses confiscated, and his tepee, clothes, and riding gear destroyed

(MacLean 1895:254-55).

Although important, these police functions were of less significance than the religious and ceremonial commitments of societies. Members of these societies participated in annual ceremonies and renewals each year at the summer gathering and societies also served important civil, administrative, and spiritual functions and occupied a central place in maintaining the social order (Ladner 2000:130; Wissler 1913:376). The

146 responsibilities and obligations of the members of the various societies fluctuated throughout the year with different societies performing functions at different times.

Essentially, the ceremonial and military societies among the Blackfoot were fraternal associations of mutual support and shared responsibility that concerned themselves with upholding religious rituals, social norms, and political ideals. Membership in societies was based on an enduring series of spiritual commitments and served to establish connections beyond band membership or kin ties (Ladner 2000:130; Crowshoe and

Manneshmidt 2002:16). These societies operated under the nominal direction of the political Chief or war Chief as the situation warranted.

Blackfoot societies were age graded, featuring progressive membership with transfers usually occurring every four years. Young men would be initiated into a society with their age mates and, when they reached the appropriate age, this group would transfer into the next most senior society which had been vacated by older age mates who had similarly moved on (Crowshoe and Manneshmidt 2002:16; Wissler 1913:365). The more senior societies were usually more serious in purpose. Introductory levels served to initiate young boys/men into society life and demanded few ceremonial or political commitments. However, one’s duties and obligations increased as an individual progressed through the various societies. These societies were primarily male fraternal societies, although sponsorship or participation of a female relative was often required and there did exist examples of female societies, like the Buffalo Women’s Society among the Kainai (Crowshoe and Manneshmidt 2002:16; Ladner 2000:131-32).

Membership in a society reflected personal interests and aspirations and while there was certainly a fixed ranking of the societies, individuals did not necessarily follow a linear

147 progression through them. Different individuals joined different societies at different times of their lives. Older men of recognized wisdom and experience would sometimes remain members of junior societies in order to instruct and train new initiates, while young men of demonstrated potential may be invited to join a more senior society in order to receive valuable knowledge and experience. In this way, an individual’s character and accomplishments was recognized through membership in various societies.

Societies were essentially a succession of ceremonial transfers and initiation into societies represented a religious obligation to carry through (Wissler 1913:435).

Societies evidenced some change over time and there is some discrepancy over the names and the number of societies that existed during the early reserve period. Kainai Elder

Pete Standing Alone has related that while some societies such as the Horns or the Brave

Dogs have existed for as long as anyone can remember, others were relatively short lived or for various reasons have experienced several name changes (Taylor 1989:132). Mike

Mountain Horse (1979:64), a Kainai band member and veteran of the First World War, identified eight different Kainai societies current at the turn of the 19 th century: The

Horns, Eagles, Black Police, Dogs, Flies, Crazy Dogs, Pigeons, and the women’s society that he called the Buffalos. Anthropologist Clark Wissler (1913:369), working in the first decade of the 20 th century, recorded six different societies: the Horns, Dogs, Raven - bearers, Black-soldiers, Braves, All-brave-dogs, and Mosquitoes. Meanwhile, anthropologist Esther Goldfrank (1945:40-41), who conducted field work among the

Kainai in the late 1930s, has listed eight societies: the Horns, Siezers, Crazy Dogs, Crow

Carriers, Black Seizers, Braves, Brave Dogs, and Pigeons. Pete Standing Alone (Taylor

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1989:132) has corroborated the existence of most of the societies listed by historical observers and mentions several others that formed and disbanded during his lifetime.

The all-comrades societies cut across local band lines, provided material and spiritual support structures, and helped guide and sustain Blackfoot systems of leadership and authority.

Leadership

In the horse days, prior to settling on the reserve, leadership among the Blackfoot was contingent on the continuing support of band members and leaders could be divested of authority if that support was withdrawn. Non-coercive and dependant largely upon personal suasion, leadership was judged primarily on one’s ability to provide for band members. Leaders were almost always senior men related to most band members through kinship and respected for their war record, hunting prowess, oratorical skills, and generosity (Dempsey 2001:609). In addition to ensuring the welfare of the band members, leaders were expected to maintain the social order and provide for the peace within the band by settling conflicts, adjudicating disputes, and mediating relations with other bands.

The leaders of the Blood were chosen on the basis of their experience and knowledge. They were also chosen for their compassion and integrity. An important quality for leadership was a willingness to help or advise anyone who asked for assistance. Leaders were not chosen for what they promised but rather for what they had done in the past. Leaders made decisions for the benefit of the whole tribe, such as when to go hunting or when to move camp (Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council 1996:83-84).

Band leadership was loosely organized around senior men, leading warriors, and other esteemed individuals. While anyone could speak in council, membership was usually by

149 invitation and council members were invariably drawn from military societies. Band councils were informally structured, met as needed, and engaged in fluid and protracted discussions that sought to achieve consensus.

Anthropologists have identified a number of key features with respect to leadership in different band societies around the world. Leadership in band societies can be characterized as authoritative, as opposed to authoritarian, with knowledge, experience, strength of character, and generosity being the personal attributes most often valued in leaders. Band leadership is largely situational, with those recognized as possessing the necessary abilities coming to the fore in different circumstances. In the absence of coercive authority, leaders employ persuasion to rally support or organize certain tasks and any leader seen to be overstepping their bounds risks losing followers as people move to other bands or align themselves with other leaders (Silerbauer 1982:29-

30). Decision-making in band societies tends to be by consensus, whereby decisions affecting the band as a whole are made through discussions involving all adult members, although the opinions of the most respected individuals usually receive greater deference.

Consensus does not imply unanimity, but reflects the responsibility each band member accepts in consenting to a decision. When there remains no significant opposition to a proposed course of action, consensus is effectively attained and the fact that all band members acknowledge their agreement confers legitimacy upon a decision. Those unable to reconcile themselves to the consensus of the band are free to withdraw. Thus, band politics tends to be facilitative rather than forceful, striving to achieve communal goals, accommodating dissent, and encouraging cooperation (Silerbauer 1982:34; Lee 1982:45).

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Ladner (2000:139) argues that leadership and authority among the Blackfoot was comprised of three distinct features: leaders, bundles, and societies, each with specific functions of governance. Bundles established and consecrated guiding principles for

Blackfoot society and Ladner likens bundles to a constitution, providing a structure for the exercise of leadership and authority and stipulating spiritual and philosophical tenets for decision-making (Ladner 2000:141). Providing the philosophical framework upon which Blackfoot systems of authority rested, bundles defined and enabled Blackfoot systems of leadership and authority. “They were both literally and metaphorically the centre of the okahn and the place from which knowledge, ceremony, structure, balance, philosophy, and power originated” (Ladner 2000:127). The societies, on the other hand, were where the moral and jural precepts received from the bundles were put into practice.

As interdependent and autonomous organizations, the various age grade and military societies served to codify and transmit important teachings, to impart discipline and order to Blackfoot society, and to support and validate governing structures and decision- making processes. “Bundles provided the framework, foundation, and philosophy and direction for governance. The societies were charged with operationalizing the teachings of the Bundles, teaching, guiding, and disciplining the nation, and seeing to the nations’ and the Confederacy’s continued existence by providing good leadership and making good decisions” (Ladner 2000:141). Finally, leaders were responsible for facilitating the decision-making process and ensuring that an agreed upon course of action was followed through. Guided by the teachings provided by the bundles and the principles enacted by the societies, it was contingent upon the leaders to ensure the continued survival of the band and the welfare of their followers (Ladner 2000:141-42).

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Bastien (2004:14) mentions that among the Blackfoot certain people have always been distinguished because of special traits or unique abilities, such as healing powers, abilities to commune with bison or other animals, outstanding war records, physical prowess, or success in hunting. The special attributes of distinguished persons were regarded as gifts from the Creator and these individuals were considered to have a responsibility to unselfishly use their gifts to sustain relationships of mutual dependency between all people, society, and the natural order. Typically, leaders rose to prominence based on personal merit achieved through hunting, raiding, and gift-giving and the qualities venerated in leaders were knowledge, experience, strength of character, and generosity 2. Those aspiring to positions of leadership worked assiduously to demonstrate bravery in warfare and raiding, intelligence in council, and munificence in hosting feasts and gift-giving (Ewers 1955:246). Such efforts would win the respect and devotion of fellow band members and increasingly people would look to such an individual for guidance and council, for leadership and one exercising this leadership would be regarded as a chief.

In the olden days to become a Chief, he didn’t say anything – people noticed him for what he did . You have to live it before you are recognized. You have to practice leadership qualities. First you have to be a warrior, a provider, generous. The overall Chief is recognized by all the clans – that is the way a person becomes Chief (Pete Standing Alone cited in The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:22).

Leaders rose to the position because they had consistently demonstrated leadership qualities. They eschewed excessive behaviours like anger, hostility, jealousy, and spite, and were concerned foremost with the survival of their band and the welfare of the people. No leader could expect to retain followers unless he was generous, a good

2 Jane Richardson interview with Pitoxpikis (Sleigh) via Mary Royal (interpreter), August 25 and 30, 1938, GA M-8458-3, pp. 39.

152 provider, and had demonstrated leadership in warfare and raiding (Ladner 2000:104;

Dempsey 1982:97). Often leaders also achieved renown as ceremonialists, orators, and diplomats. Not every leader would possess all of these attributes, but it would be unlikely for an individual to rise to a position of leadership if he did not excel in one or more of these areas.

The status of a band was largely dependant upon the prowess of its leader and often reflected the Chief’s character and personality (Bear Robe 1994:45). In general, the position of Chief was a laborious and frequently a thankless task with few material advantages attached to it. Although Chiefs were usually accorded a measure of deference and consulted on important matters, they had to support themselves in the same manner as the other band members. While a Chief was entitled to wear the warrior's headdress of eagle feathers, the ceremonial clothing worn by all distinguished warriors on important occasions, and to carry an eagle wing fan, a Chief seldom dressed better than the majority of the male members of his band (Bear Robe 1994:44-45). Chiefs remained in their positions so long as they offered sound judgements and effective leadership. Some leaders retained their status most of their lives, while others served only briefly before people transferred their allegiance to more capable individuals (Taylor 1989:14).

While leadership was not necessarily hereditary, it was quite common for the band leadership to be passed down to a relative. Often a Chief was succeeded by a son, brother or brother-in-law. Band leadership tended to stay within certain families largely because children learned values and behaviours important for leadership from their adult relatives. It was usually the case that the men of standing and influence in a band were closely related and the sons and younger male relatives of leaders were afforded the

153 opportunity to observe the daily routines and responsibilities of leadership, meet leaders of other bands, and to engage in political activities (Dempsey 1982:97; The Blackfoot

Gallery Committee 2001:22). Sometimes an aging leader might publicly endorse his chosen replacement.

Although a reputation as an exceptional warrior may have been an indispensable pre-requisite for becoming a Chief, generosity was equally if not more important. Care of all band members was widely acknowledged as the primary responsibility of the Chief and failure to adequately provide for his following would seriously jeopardize his leadership (Ewers 1958:40). Generosity was demonstrated by providing food or horses for those in need, unstinting hospitality in the hosting of feasts, and the liberal distribution of tea and tobacco for visitors. Wealth in and of itself was not a condition for leadership, but it would be difficult for an impoverished individual to meet all the social and economic obligations of an aspiring Chief. Those able to maintain large herds of horses would be able to support several wives and many children and attendants. With this pool of labour wealthy men would be able to garner and process greater numbers of bison, maintain, feed and equip several large lodges, acquire desired trade goods, afford ceremonial and age grade pledges, acquire the appropriate ceremonial regalia, put on feasts, and give sustenance and support to those in need (Ewers 1958:96; Bear Robe

1994:48). The welfare of all band members, and especially the poor, had to be a concern of the Chief and if it was felt that better opportunities were available in other bands or with other leaders, band members would readily switch their allegiance 3.

3 Jane Richardson interview with Pitoxpikis (Sleigh) via Mary Royal (interpreter), August 24, 1938, GA M-8458-3, pp. 13-14.

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Any leader who became overbearing or self-serving would soon find he had no following as band members would leave to join other bands. Lacking any coercive authority, Blackfoot leaders instead relied on persuasion to rally support or organize certain tasks. Leaders retained their positions only so long as they retained the personal attributes that brought them to prominence in the first place (Wessel 1982:59-60; Bear

Robe 1994:45). Wise leaders carefully weighed the advice, opinions and experience of all band members and especially sought the counsel of the Elders. The knowledge and spiritual support of the bundle holders was also indispensable as these people had strong connections with the spirit world and could call on spirit beings for their help. A leader’s decisions had to respect the opinions of all band members and a wise Chief made important decisions in consultation with the Elders (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee

2001:21-22; Narcisse Blood, personal communication, March 20, 2004).

Important matters were discussed at length and decisions were reached by mutual agreement. Decision-making was an inclusive process that gave all concerned individuals an opportunity to express their opinions (Ladner 2000:106). Typically, leaders would gather with other prominent men within the band, or with other band leaders if the regional band was gathered together, to form a council that would deliberate on matters at hand. Runners would keep people informed about discussions and convey the thoughts of the people in order to achieve a consensus. “The men smoked, drank tea, and discussed matters in an informal way, usually resolving any problem by consensus rather than by decree” (Dempsey 1982:97). If consensus proved elusive, the matter would be left aside for the time being or the dissenting parties would simply split off from the band.

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There were no overriding leaders of the Siksika, Kainai, or Piikani, rather each

Chief was simply the leader of his own band and leadership varied according to circumstance (Hildebrandt and Carter 1996:241; Bear Robe 1994:44). However, when several bands gathered together, the most influential band leader usually received the deference of the other leaders and was recognized as the foremost Chief of the regional band. This individual won his position through the deference and respect of the other

Chiefs and did not wield ultimate authority over other Chiefs or band members, but guided or directed deliberations as circumstances required. The leading Chief held little formal authority and this position was only really of any significance during the times that several bands were gathered together. Beyond the summer congregation of the regional bands, there was little to differentiate the leading Chief of the regional band from other local band Chiefs (Ewers 1958:97). In fact, it was often the case that no single individual emerged indisputably as the most prominent or influential Chief.

Several leaders heading large factions and exerting influence over a number of local bands may appear nearly equal in stature. In such instances, it would have been more appropriate to speak of several Head Chiefs (Dempsey 1980:81; Ewers 1958:248).

The council of the regional band was composed of the local band Chiefs and usually only met during the main summer gathering. As with the local band council, regional councils would similarly strive to achieve consensus through discussion. In exceptional circumstances, when momentous issues confronted the regional band as a whole, a council of all the local band Chiefs might be convened (Dempsey 1980:81).

Such was the case in 1875 when Blackfoot leaders met in the Hand Hills to discuss encroachment on their territory and produce a petition to be presented to the Canadian

156 authorities prior to meeting with treaty commissioners (Hildebrandt and Carter

1996:240).

There is a commonly noted distinction between war Chiefs and peace Chiefs or civil Chiefs. The former were said to organize the defence of the band when under threat and to lead warriors in warfare and raiding, while the latter were described as leading the band in times of peace and took a leading role in council meetings, resolved conflicts, and hosted important visitors (Ewers 1958:39; Maclean 1895:251). Certainly, pre- eminent warriors were influential people and were expected to provide leadership in times of conflict. “Leaders of the military societies had the obligation to protect their camps from enemy attack and were regarded as Chiefs, as they had control over all situations pertaining to policing, hunting, and moving camp” (Crowshoe and

Manneschmidt 2002:16). Wissler (1911:25) was of the opinion that this distinction between war Chiefs and peace Chiefs was overstated. He asserted that there was no indication that such distinct leadership roles existed among the Blackfoot peoples.

Rather, some Chiefs possessed reputations as exceptional war leaders and were sought out in times of conflict. Kainai informants maintain that, especially in the pre-reserve era, peace Chiefs and war Chiefs each had distinct leadership roles and were integral and inherent elements of Kainai systems of leadership and authority (Pete Standing Alone, personal communication, February 18, 2005; Frank Weasel Head, personal communication, November 18, 2004). In any event, leadership structures were somewhat flexible, allowing individuals with the appropriate skills to come to the fore. If another individual was acknowledged to have superior hunting skills or more experience leading warriors in battle, these individuals would be looked to for leadership in those situations.

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This flexibility in leadership allowed different individuals to contribute unique skills and experiences in different situations and to engage the whole band in the practice of leadership and decision-making without undermining the acknowledged band Chief

(Ladner 2000:105, The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:22). Moreover, it was not unheard of for an individual to be a leader in a military society with a reputation as a war

Chief, as well as demonstrating exceptional judgement and wisdom and be deferred to as a band leader or civil Chief.

Blackfoot History to 1880

By the time the first European traders ventured onto the northwestern plains in the mid to late 18 th century, several different Aboriginal groups habituated or ventured into the region on a regular basis. The Blackfoot, the T’suu T’sina (Sarcee), the Plains Cree, the

Assiniboine, the Shoshone, Crow, Kutenai, and Gros Ventre all at least partially utilized this territory (Vickers 1991:5, 26-30; Grieser 1991:52-54). Although earlier scholarship asserted that the Blackfoot peoples arrived on the northwestern plains only fairly recently, it is now generally accepted in the academic literature that they have occupied the region for a considerable period of time (Dempsey 2001:604). The Blackfoot peoples had obtained European firearms and manufactured goods at least 20 years prior to their first encounters with Hudson’s Bay Company traders and had not only acquired horses, but become formidable mounted warriors, occupying an extensive territory bounded by the North Saskatchewan River to the north, the Yellowstone River in the south, by the

Rocky Mountains in the west, and the Sweet Grass hills in the east (Bastien 2004:9;

Kehoe 1995:xiii). While there was of course a continual shifting of territories and group

158 movement, occasioned by the vagaries of trade, diplomacy, and war between different

Aboriginal groups as they pushed for control over territory and resources, Blackfoot peoples were the primary occupants of the region during the historic period (Duke

1991:56; Bear Robe 1994:41).

The Blackfoot peoples consider themselves to be of shared ancestry and were, it is commonly acknowledged, a single people at some point in the past. By the mid to late

18 th century, when definite record of the historic Blackfoot appears in traders and explorer’s journals, they had established three politically distinct divisions, sharing common language, culture, and ceremonies. These divisions were the Siksika

(Blackfoot), the Kainai (Blood), and the Piikani (Peigan). The division of the Blackfoot peoples into three interdependent and autonomous groups occurred gradually over a period of time as bands or small collectives of extended families established separate summer camp circles. These divisions may have been established for reasons to do with mutual defence or territorial responsibilities (Ladner 2000:63). Some commentators, in recognition of the fact that the Piikani appear to have been in the process of dividing into two separate groups during the historic period identify four divisions, with the Piikani split into the Aamsskaapippiikani or the South Peigan in Montana, the Aapatohsipiikani or North Peigan now located in southern Alberta (Bastien 2004:9; Ladner 2000:64). In addition to sharing common language, culture, social institutions, and religious ceremonies, these separate groups maintained close bonds through kinship, intermarriage, and enduring military alliances against common foes (Ewers 1958:5; Smyth 2001:12-15).

While the Kainai, Siksika, and Piikani functioned as separate and distinct groups, they

159 nevertheless retained a shared identity and a cohesive sense of themselves as closely related peoples.

The term Blackfoot Confederacy has been widely applied to the Blackfoot- speaking peoples, but its applicability has been questioned by some in light of the fact that Kainai, Siksika, and Piikani were politically independent and functioned as autonomous entities. Wissler (1910:7), expressed the opinion that there was no evidence of an integrated political organization that would justify the use of the term Confederacy.

Oscar Lewis more directly questioned the appropriateness of the term Confederacy in describing the political and social dynamics that pertained between the Blackfoot peoples in the historic period, noting that they lacked any form of over-arching authority and rarely coordinated their political, economic, or religious activities. He instead maintained that the appellation was a construct of the fur traders (Lewis 1942:68). John Ewers, whose 1958 The Blackfeet remains the most comprehensive general history of the

Blackfoot peoples, does not use the term Confederacy in relation to the Blackfoot. More recently, David Smyth’s (2001:23-27) meticulous research found no reference to the term prior to the 1870s and traces its origin to popular accounts of travellers and adventurers, many of whom may have had no direct contact with the Blackfoot peoples. Smyth asserted that without wishing to undermine the complexity and integrity of indigenous

Blackfoot political organization in the pre-reserve era, the concept of Confederacy implies a level of concerted political action between the Siksika, Kainai, and Piikani that does not seem to have existed. Smyth points to a lack of consensus, even among

Blackfoot speakers themselves, about the composition of the Confederacy. He suggests the term Blackfoot alliance, which includes long time allies the Tsuu T’ina and Gros

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Ventre, to refer to the enduring mutual cooperation that existed between these different peoples. Similarly, Binnema (1996:5) maintains that the term Blackfoot Confederacy should be avoided as inaccurate and potentially confusing. Binemma proposed that the term Blackfoot be used to refer to all three groups collectively and Siksika, Kainai, and

Peigan individually.

This qualification of the term Confederacy by scholars resonates with the explanations of Blackfoot Elders on the Blackfoot Gallery Committee.

In the past we were not united in any alliance. However, because the three divisions often supported one another, many white people referred to us as the Blackfoot Confederacy. Today we have developed a formal political alliance to address common grievances with the Canadian and United States governments and to find ways of keeping our culture alive (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:4).

Despite close ties between the Siksika, Kainai, and Piikani, there was little coordinated political activity between these groups. Each had its own separate and independent social and political institutions. The leaders, band systems, age grade societies, religious and ceremonial complex, communal buffalo hunts and annual Sun Dance of each group were autonomous. None of the Siksika, Kainai, nor Piikani were beholden to an over-riding authority, nor was there a joint council or sustained, coordinated political organization between the different Blackfoot-speaking peoples. They retained a profound connection and a sense of themselves as a people, but each were independent and politically distinct.

Pre-history

Archaeological evidence suggests that the Blackfoot and their ancestors inhabited the region between the North Saskatchewan and Bow Rivers for at least two centuries before contact (Kehoe 1995: xii-xiii; Duke 1991). During this time, as a pedestrian people with

161 limits on their mobility and the size of hunting range they were able to effectively utilize, the Blackfoot occupied a more restricted territory. After acquiring guns and horses, the

Blackfoot peoples undertook a southward expansion of their territorial range into an area formerly inhabited by the Kutenai and the Shoshone, but left sparsely populated by a small pox epidemic (Dempsey 2004:290). Having developed an efficient bison hunting subsistence adaptation and dynamic social, political, and religious institutions, these peoples thrived in this region (Kehoe 1995:xii-xiii, Smyth 2001:172).

In their own belief system, the Blackfoot assert they have inhabited the region since the dawn of creation. They maintain that they have always lived on these lands, which were provided for them by the Creator. This territory contains the sacred places where ceremonies, bundles, and visions were received and the Blackfoot claim that they are connected to the land by ceremonies and stories of Creation, which affirm their right to exist there (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:40, 49; Frank Weasel Head, personal communication, November 18, 2004). A Blackfoot Creation story was recorded by Wissler and Duvall while doing ethnographic fieldwork on the Blackfeet Reservation in Montana in the early 20 th century.

During the flood, Old Man was sitting on the highest mountain with all the beasts. The flood was caused by the above people, because the baby (a fungus) of the woman who married a star was heedlessly torn in pieces by an Indian Child. Old Man sent the Otter down to get some earth. For a long time he waited, then the otter came up dead. Old Man examined its feet but found nothing on them. Next he sent Beaver down, but after a long time he also came up drowned. Again, nothing was found on his feet. He sent Muskrat to dive down next. Muskrat also drowned. At length he sent the Duck (?). It was drowned, but in its paw it held some earth. Old Man saw it, put it in his hand, feigned putting it on the water three times, and at last dropped it. The above people sent rain and everything grew on the earth (Wissler and Duvall 1908:19).

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Variations of this creation story also appear in Bastien (2004:8), Crowshoe and

Manneschmidt (2002:55), and Taylor (1989:22-23). According to Bastien (2004:9), the

Blackfoot Creation story and the other legends and tales about the exploits of Napi, the

Old Man, are situated in definite locations within Blackfoot traditional territory and not only explain the origins of Blackfoot peoples and how they came to live as they do, but also underscore the intimate connection of the Blackfoot to the natural world. “The basic belief system of the Siksikaitsitapi [Blackfoot peoples] includes belief in the spiritual nature of the sun, constellations, birds, animals waterfowl, etc. and their ability to communicate some of their sacred knowledge to humans” (Bastien 2002:11). According to Ladner, Blackfoot belief systems are grounded in their experience with and understanding of Creation, which affirms the interrelatedness of all beings in a unified circle of life. The teachings of Creation contained within Creation stories and individual experiences of Creation serve to exemplify the place of the Blackfoot peoples in the world and how best to exist within it (Ladner 2000:83; The Blackfoot Gallery Committee

2001:10). The Creation stories, which often reference existing places in Blackfoot territory, reaffirm the long standing occupation of the land by the Blackfoot people and their intricate connection to the land and the human and non-human beings that exist there.

Dog Days

The Blackfoot refer to the time before they came into possession of horses as the dog days. In the dog days, the Blackfoot travelled seasonally throughout their territory on foot in small hunting bands, with dogs as the main beasts of burden, following the bison

163 and pursuing their seasonal social and ceremonial activities (Bastien 2004:13). During this time, people would have been more limited in their mobility and accumulation of personal effects by the weight of what a dog could pull on a travois, which has been estimated at about 75 pounds, and 20 to 30 dogs would be needed by each family to move camp (Reeves 1990:170). Dogs were regarded as respected companions, possessing a spirit and consciousness and were attenuated to the spirit world (Bastien 2004:13). Prior to the acquisition of the horse, pedestrian peoples may have followed a more modified seasonal round, locating closer to secure water sources in the summer months and perhaps gathering in somewhat larger encampments during the fall and winter to use buffalo pounds and jumps (Vickers 1994:6). Hunting bison on foot in this manner required effective cooperation and coordination of band members and bands would have been large enough for successful hunting and to defend against attack, but small enough to adapt to scarcity of game or other pressures (Crowshoe and Manneschmidt 2002:6).

Ewers (1958:9) has estimated Blackfoot pedestrian bands to encompass 20 to 30 families and contain perhaps 100 to 200 people in total.

In pedestrian times, since individuals would not have as readily had the ability to enhance status through the accumulation of prestige items, there would have been less social differentiation between band members. Consequently, there would have been less importance placed upon distribution of property through gifts and feasting. Lodges would almost certainly have been smaller than in the historic era and individuals would have had fewer personal possessions (Bastien 2004:13; Ewers 1958:96). It is unclear whether summer encampments were as large during the pedestrian era. There is little evidence of large summer gatherings in the archaeological record, leading to speculation

164 that more limited mobility and difficulties in provisioning for a large group may have restricted gathering together (Binemma 2001:44). Many enduring Blackfoot social, political, and religious institutions were established during this time. Age grade societies, medicine bundles, the Sun Dance ( Okan ), systems of leadership, and prevailing gender roles all had their origins in the pedestrian era (Crowshoe and Manneschmidt 2002:6-7).

During this time the Blackfoot developed stable, well adapted cultures, with complex social and ceremonial institutions integrated with an annual cycle revolving around bison migrations and the Sun Dance.

Horse Days

The ethnohistorical record generally agrees that the Blackfoot first obtained horses in the early years of the 18 th century, but Betty Bastien (2004:14) also notes that there are stories among the Blackfoot that tell of earlier experiences with the horse. Horses were considered to be derived from sacred sources and to possess supernatural powers. The horse (re)appeared on the Great plains in the early to mid-17th century, quickly diffusing through plains Aboriginal societies, reaching the northern plains by the early 18th century

(Milloy 1988:25; Fowler 1996:6-8). The account from David Thompson, the HBC trader and explorer who wintered with a Piikani band in 1787-88, relating that the Blackfoot first encountered horses when they engaged mounted Shoshone warriors in battle, has been oft cited (Lewis1942:11; Ewers 1958:21; Dempsey 2001:607). The Blackfoot first obtained horses for themselves through either trading in the extensive Mandan-Hidatsa trade system or raiding from the Shoshoni and others who possessed them (Crowshoe and

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Manneschmidt 2002:7). In any event, the Blackfoot definitely possessed sizable herds of horses by the mid 18 th century (Kehoe 1995:xvi).

At about the same time, the Blackfoot obtained firearms from the Cree and

Assiniboine, who controlled the trade with the Hudson’s Bay and Northwest Companies

(Milloy 1988:120; Crowshoe and Manneschmidt 2002:7). Since bow and arrows remained more accurate and more efficient for hunting than guns, especially from horseback, guns were important primarily in warfare. (Fowler 1996:6; Smyth 2001:201).

Firearms tipped the balance of power in inter-group conflicts. Prior to receiving guns from the Plains Cree, the Blackfoot were being pressured by the Shoshoni, Flathead and

Kootenai. However, once armed, the Blackfoot soon routed these groups from the northwestern plains (Milloy 1988:13; Kehoe 1995:xvi). By the turn of the 18 th century, the Blackfoot had become a formidable military power on the northwesern plains and had embarked on a territorial expansion to the south and west.

The advantages of horses over dogs as pack animals scarcely need stating and acquisition of the horse and firearms occasioned a number of significant changes in

Blackfoot culture. “The horse provided the mechanism and the opportunity to accumulate wealth. It also generated more time for social, recreational, and ceremonial activities” (Bastien 2004:15). Mobility was greatly increased and people could range more broadly than before, enjoying greater and more frequent interaction with both other

Blackfoot bands and other Aboriginal groups on the plains (Bastien 2004:15). People could travel farther to attend summer gatherings and congregate in larger numbers, encouraging the development of wider kinship networks as well as the intensification of social and ceremonial practises (Fowler 1996:9; Binnema 1996:8). Patterns of camp

166 movement and travel routines were also affected by the need to find adequate forage and to move camp when a location was grazed out.

With the transition to an equestrian culture, hunting became more efficient, which significantly increased the food supply. Mounted hunters could kill more bison more reliably, which meant not only that more people could be supported, but that more people were needed to butcher the meat and process the hides. It has been suggested that the incidence of polygamy increased because more labour was needed to process buffalo hides and cure meat, which in turn led to larger families and individual tipis (Duke

1991:67). Hunting strategies also changed as it was now possible for individuals or small groups to run down bison on horseback, meaning less reliance on communal hunting strategies (Crowshoe and Manneschmidt 2002:7). While hunting bison from horseback became widely practiced, it did not entirely displace the use of jumps and pounds, which remained in use until the end of the pre-reserve era. Similarly, the dogs were retained as companions and beasts of burden (Duke 1991:67).

The development of an equestrian culture also changed the nature and intensity of warfare and raiding among the Blackfoot, which quickly became an important means to increase wealth and social status. Warfare, which had certainly occurred between Plains groups previously, was greatly intensified and became more important as a means of accumulating wealth and prestige. Massed, pitched battles were abandoned in favour of short swift mounted charges, ambush, and raiding (Milloy 1988:8; Fowler 1996:9).

Warfare, raiding, and the capturing of horses took a much more prominent place in social and political status. These activities embodied the spiritual and physical attributes lauded in Blackfoot society, requiring physical stamina, bravery, audacity, and spiritual rectitude

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(Bastien 2004:16). Through capturing horses and counting coup, Blackfoot warriors could enhance their prestige and advance their social and political fortunes. A warrior’s exploits would often be recounted on ceremonial occasions or during other special events

(Taylor 1989:18). Consequently, military societies assumed greater significance, as these served to cement alliances that obliged individuals to participate in raiding and war parties and establish an organization to defend the camp in the event of attacks

(Crowshoe and Manneschmidt 2002:8).

The acquisition of horses and a greater food supply allowed more pronounced differences in wealth and status to emerge. Individual hunters were acknowledged to own their kill, rather than dividing it equally among all participants as had previously been the practice. Social differentiation became more pronounced as wealth in horses became a primary determinant of status and prestige (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee

2001:44). Those with large herds of horses were not only more productive hunters, they would also receive additional bison meat and hides by loaning horses to individuals who lacked good buffalo runners for hunting. This surplus could then be converted to prestige through generous redistribution to those in need (Fowler 1996:9, Wilson 1996:379).

Wealth also increased the prevalence of polygamy as the most successful hunters required the labour of additional women to process a greater number of hides. A tendency for larger families was established and the dominance of males in a society of hunters and warriors affected gender roles, diminishing the status of women (Crowshoe and Manneschmidt 2002:8).

There is, however, some debate over gender roles during the historic period.

Ladner (2000:54) has recently maintained that even during the height of male dominated

168 raiding and warrior societies, women retained considerable individual autonomy, participated in economic and ceremonial life, and in some cases were recognized as powerful warriors and became leaders of all-comrades societies. Historical documents make no reference to women Chiefs and none of the individuals to whom I spoke knew of any examples of women as political leaders until the first women were elected to the

Kainai band council in the 1960s. In the pre-reserve era, a gendered division of labour obtained among the Kainai in which male activities centered upon hunting, raiding, and defense of the camp and women’s roles focused on child rearing and maintaining the camp, although it is important to acknowledge the contributions of both men and women were valued (Crowshoe and Manneschmidt 2002:17; Blackfoot Gallery Committee

(2001:24-26). Lewis (1941) described the ‘manly-hearted’ woman, who defied convention and acquired significant wealth, was socially aggressive, sexually assertive, and participated in typically male activities such as hunting and raiding. There is no denying that women fulfilled important ceremonial roles in Blackfoot society and served as essential intermediaries with the spirit world. According to Kehoe (1983:67) the four most important Blackfoot ceremonies were derived through women’s intercessions.

Moreover, the Sun Dance, the central Blackfoot ceremonial event, must be sponsored by a virtuous woman in response to a vision or to fulfill a vow. This Holy Woman accepts a series of ritual obligations, including acquiring and caring for the Natoas (Sun Dance

Bundle), fasting, and the distribution of sacred buffalo tongues and is regarded as personally responsible for the success of the Sun Dance (Taylor 1989:19-20; Dempsey

2002:616). Bundles also required the participation of women. They were usually transferred to a married couple who both were required to learn the associated songs and

169 ceremonies and were together regarded as bundle keepers (Crowshoe and Manneschmidt

2002:20). Women cared for the bundles when not in use and during ritual activities bundles had to be opened by women who then handed the sacred objects to the men leading the ceremonies (Kehoe 1983:68). In Blackfoot society, women exerted influence in other ways as well. As band members, women could speak before council and like all band members, their opinions would be taken into account. Women also filled formative roles as teachers, passing on traditions and knowledge, especially to the young children in their care. Pete Standing Alone has related that in the modern context, the term ‘chief woman’ was applied to women who attained a position of merit such as councillor, administrator, head nurse, or other form of leadership.

The horse was believed to be a sacred animal and was incorporated into all aspects of Blackfoot life, including social customs and religious rituals (Bastien

2004:15). The horse became a medium of exchange in the transfer of ceremonial bundles, and increased the frequency of transfers and the ties between different medicine societies. “Wealth in the form of horses and increased food supply, led to the expanding of the ceremonial structure and a complex medicine bundle system” (Raczka 1979:10).

Horse wealth also led to the escalation of purchasing membership in ceremonial societies, acquiring sacred bundles, or performing religious rites (Duke 1991:67). The initiation of age grade and military societies was purchased through gifts of horses and served to intensify and escalate participation in these activities.

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Fur Trade

The Blackfoot engaged in a continent wide trade for flint, ornamental shells and other utilitarian and ceremonial items well in advance of the arrival of Europeans.

Archaeological evidence seems to indicate that processed meat from large kill sites may have been transported and traded with other Aboriginal peoples for food stuffs they were not able to produce themselves as well as utilitarian and ornamental goods (Kehoe

1995:xiv-xv; The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:54). The Blackfoot were certainly aware of the presence of European traders by the early 18 th century and acquired

European trade goods through the Cree and Assinibione, but direct Blackfoot participation in the fur trade did not commence until the late 18 th century when the first trading posts were established proximate to Blackfoot territory (Smyth 2001:172; Taylor

1989:25). Dried buffalo meat, pemmican, wolf and bear skins, and bison robes were traded in great quantities. The Blackfoot participated in the trade based on the

Saskatchewan and Missouri river basins to the east, as well as the transmontane trade to the west conducted on the Snake and Columbia Rivers. As the intensity of the Canadian fur trade on the high plains began to wane about 1830, the American Northwest trade began to increase in Blackfoot territory. To that point relations with American traders had been marked by conflict and bloodshed, but by the mid 19 th century the simmering hostilities with American traders and trappers on Blackfoot lands had dissipated and independent American traders established trading posts along the Missouri River, enticing Blackfoot bands away from the Hudson Bay Company posts north of the border.

A substantial trade in buffalo robes developed at Fort Benton and supplying the

Blackfoot with a wealth of manufactured goods, especially firearms (Duke 1991:58;

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Kehoe 1995:xvi). Participation in the trade for bison robes represented an increased source of wealth for the Blackfoot. Horse herds increased exponentially, with herds of over 100 head not uncommon and as many as 500 being recorded (Dempsey 2001:618).

Fur traders misunderstood Blackfoot systems of leadership. They did not comprehend the flexible and often task oriented nature of leadership and believed that the heads of trading parties were leaders with pervasive authority over all tribal members.

The traders tended to bestow considerable gifts upon these men in the belief that they exercised control over other tribe members. The differential access to these desired trade goods and the traders’ treatment of these individuals over time impacted traditional leadership roles and began to formalize relations between the fur traders and those they regarded as leaders among the Blackfoot. Some of these individuals were identified by the traders to the Canadian and American authorities as having sovereign power over their people and being able to speak for and enter agreements on their behalf. “Our people’s traditional authority was undermined and the authority of a single spokesman was enhanced” (The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:57). In this way, some

Blackfoot leaders were elevated to a more formal position based on Eurocentric perceptions of authority.

For instance, the Hudson’s Bay Company frequently established trading captains, who were individuals who led groups of hunters to the trading posts. In return for bringing their followers and their furs to trade, some leaders were rewarded with additional gifts of clothing, alcohol and tobacco, which served to formalize and fix flexible systems of leadership. These leaders, receiving material support from the

Hudson’s Bay Company, wielded an unparalleled degree of control over the trading

172 relations of their followers and appear to have become strong and influential leaders who sought to enhance their standing by increasing the number of men under their auspices

(Morantz 1982:494-97). More generally, the participation in the fur trade increased the importance of diplomatic and trade relations. The ability to maintain secure access to desired trade goods became an important attribute for Chiefs. Blackfoot leaders had long been expected to serve as intermediaries with other groups and the bartering abilities of

Chiefs with the Hudson’s Bay Company traders became more significant, as those winning more favourable trade terms were accorded greater respect and acquired larger followings (Smyth 2001:422-23).

Missionaries

Missionization occurred more slowly on the Canadian plains than in other regions and even into the 1870s, missionaries had only made tentative incursions among the

Blackfoot (Grant 1984:143; McGrady 2001:313). This difficulty was due in no small part to the self-sufficient bison hunting culture, which afforded substantial autonomy and affluence almost to the time of the treaties. The strength of Plains Blackfoot and political institutions and cultural identity, affirmed through a vibrant ceremonial system were major obstacles to missionary advance. Missionaries first encountered the Blackfoot in the mid 19 th century, but had little real impact on Blackfoot social and religious systems until the reserve era. By the 1890s, Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries were present on the Blackfoot, Blood, and Peigan reserves (Grant 1984:161). Initially,

Blackfoot peoples regarded the missionaries who came among them as individuals with distinct spiritual powers and accorded them respect as ‘holy people’ with a special

173 connection to the spirit world (Narcisse Blood, personal communication, October 21,

2004). More dedicated missionary activity began in 1865 when Father Albert Lacombe, perhaps the most prominent missionary to work in the region, began to travel and work among the Blackfoot peoples on a consistent basis. Lacombe became well respected among the Blackfoot for his kindness and generosity, winning the friendship and confidence of several leading men, although he was perhaps less successful at winning converts (Hanks and Hanks 1950:1-9; Grant 1984:147). While missionaries routinely claimed to have won converts to Christianity, such as the much heralded deathbed baptism of Siksika Chief Crowfoot, the nature of these conversions is open to debate.

While missionaries attracted interest in their teachings and people facing starvation and epidemic diseases often made ready supplicants, wholesale conversions were rare.

Bishop Tache commented on the ephemeral nature of Aboriginal conversions when he stated “nearly all of them, Christian or Infidel retain their social customs” (cited in Milloy

1988:104). Many Aboriginal peoples clearly adopted what they found uplifting or inspirational about Christianity and incorporated it into, or along side of, Aboriginal belief systems (Carter 1999:76-77; Lux 2001:104).

Prior to the establishment of reserves missionaries focussed their endeavours on teaching the gospel, trying to curtail the endemic intertribal warfare, and ministering to the sick and dying during outbreaks of epidemic diseases. Despite expressing admiration for some aspects of Aboriginal culture and concern for the well-being of the people they worked among, missionaries generally perceived Aboriginal peoples as benighted primitives in need of moral salvation and practical guidance (Carter 1984:29; Grant

1984:150). Missionaries embraced an ideal of progress that presumed the innate

174 superiority of Western civilization and posited Aboriginal culture as savage, rudimentary, and inferior. To the missionaries’ way of thinking, the Blackfoot peoples and other plains Aboriginal peoples were improvident, indolent, and only concerned in satisfying their immediate needs. Their mission was as much about civilization as Christianization.

In addition to attempting to gain converts, missionaries in western Canada self- consciously strove to foster a spirit of industry among Aboriginal peoples, encouraging

Aboriginal peoples to locate in permanent settlements, sow crops, and adopt the mores of

Victorian society (Carter 1984:34-35). In a very real sense, they regarded themselves as preparing Aboriginal peoples for the coming wave of Euro-Canadian settlement, saving them from their own backwardness, ridding them of their pagan beliefs and aberrant customs, and serving as enlightened guardians of Aboriginal peoples as their future in the emerging western Canadian society was entrusted to more capable hands (Carter

1984:41).

To this end, missionaries working in the region were recruited by the government to prepare the Blackfoot peoples and their allies for the coming of the NWMP, to explain the treaty process, and to act as interpreters during the negotiations (Hildebrandt and

Carter 1996:240; Lux 2001:104). Individuals like Father Albert Lacombe, Father

Constantine Scollen, and Reverend John McDougall had long advocated treaties and reserves for the Blackfoot. These individuals were instrumental in promoting Treaty 7 among the Blackfoot and, consciously or not, essentially worked as colonizing agents in removing Aboriginal peoples from the land and preparing the region for settlement and development (Grant 1984:154; Carter 1999:76-77). There persists a feeling among

Blackfoot that the missionaries were trusted because they represented themselves as holy

175 people, but that they betrayed that trust in the negotiations for Treaty 7 and subsequent dealings with the Canadian government. There is lingering suspicion of the motives of the missionaries in encouraging the Blackfoot to accept the treaty in 1877 and many feel that the missionaries acted in their own best interest, rather than the interest of those they were supposed to be working for (Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council 1996:157).

During the early reserve era, missionaries courted prominent Aboriginal leaders among First Nations across the Canadian prairies, seeking not only to convert them to

Christianity, but to gain their confidence. Aboriginal leaders were seen as powerful individuals whose cooperation was necessary in order to win converts among Aboriginal peoples. Missionaries tended not to comprehend the nature of leadership and authority in

Aboriginal communities and regarded Chiefs as possessing a pervasive and hierarchical authority over their followers. As individuals with a connection to the sacred, a relationship with a missionary could serve to bolster the status of a Chief or other prominent individual and thus serve to formalize the position. Missionaries identified leaders to treaty commissioners at treaty time which also led to a formalization of the position of leader and a greater objectification of the leader and his role within Blackfoot society. The central endeavour of the missionaries to bring Christianity and civilization to Aboriginal peoples can be understood as a colonial project to remake the lives and circumstances of Aboriginal peoples, eradicate Aboriginal religions, and promote Euro-

Canadian ideals of conduct and behaviour which served to undermine elements of

Blackfoot culture and destabilize traditional systems of leadership and authority.

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Early Reserve/Treaty Period

The final decades of the pre-reserve era were a time of turmoil and instability for the

Blackfoot peoples. Epidemic diseases, hostilities with American citizens and the U.S. cavalry, and the harrowing effects of the whiskey trade combined to undermine Blackfoot social and political systems and left the Blackfoot peoples susceptible to pressures from both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal outsiders. During this time, Blackfoot culture came under increasing pressure as the population fluctuated dramatically and dwindling bison herds combined with the waning of the fur trade in the region caused economic instability. Social and religious institutions came under pressure and the influence of the

Chiefs began to wane (Crowshoe and Manneschmidt 2002:8; Dempsey 2002:291).

Pressures of Canadian and American westward expansion also impacted the Blackfoot peoples. In the immediate pre-reserve period, the Blackfoot became embroiled in a series of changes beyond their control.

Successive waves of epidemic diseases swept through all plains Aboriginal peoples between the late 18 th and mid 19 th century, debilitating the population. Small pox, scarlet fever, and measles epidemics occurred regularly and resulted in the deaths of thousands of Aboriginal peoples on the plains (Kehoe 2005:3; Dempsey 2002:291).

Prevalence of disease was exacerbated by bands concentrating at trading posts and meeting in raiding parties and outbreaks spread rapidly (Taylor 1989:25-26). It is estimated that the small pox epidemic in 1870 alone was responsible for the death of as many as 2000 Blackfoot people out of an estimated total population of perhaps 7,000

(Dempsey 2004:60). Such dramatic population decrease inevitably caused social and political instability. Some bands became depleted beyond the point of sustaining

177 themselves and dissolved to join other bands. The Blackfoot peoples experienced disruption to established social networks and marriage patterns, had more difficulty supporting themselves, and were less able to repel those trespassing on their territories.

Following the making of a treaty in1855 with US officials, American settlers began to come into Montana territory. The settlers’ disregard of the boundaries of the

Indian territory stipulated in the treaty and the failure of the US government to implement the terms of the treaties led to conflicts with Blackfoot bands in the area (Taylor

1989:26). A vicious cycle of depredations in Montana Territory during the 1860s between primarily Piikani and Kainai bands and traders, trappers, miners, and settlers encroaching on Blackfoot lands became known as the Blackfoot War. Ultimately, the

U.S. Cavalry was dispatched to ‘chastise’ the hostile bands, culminating in the Baker massacre of 1870, in which 173 Piikani, mostly women and children, were killed by the

U.S. Cavalry under the command of Major Eugene Baker (Dempsey 2002:18-20; Ewers

1958:250). This event effectively ended armed confrontation between the Blackfoot peoples and US settlers.

The height of the whiskey trade was relatively brief, but it inflicted horrific consequences for the Blackfoot. During the late 1860s and early 1870s American traders, operating out of Fort Benton, took advantage of the absence of authority on the Canadian side of the international boundary and established a series of unlicensed whiskey forts in the heart of Blackfoot territory. The whiskey trade reached unprecedented proportions and wrought unmitigated havoc among the Blackfoot and other Aboriginal groups there

(Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:61). Contemporary commentators attributed scores of deaths to liquor, fatal drunken brawls, revenge killings, death by exposure, violence

178 and abuse, impoverishment and starvation. Some individuals traded everything, including their tipi covers and horses to obtain alcohol and were then unable to hunt or provide for themselves. Systems of leadership and authority broke down. Several prominent Chiefs died in brawls or when attacked by drunken band members. Surviving

Chiefs were often unable to influence or convince their followers to either refrain from alcohol or curb the violence among the young men (Dempsey 2002:222).

As demoralizing as these events were, however, the demise of the great bison herds that were the basis for the Blackfoot existence was an unparalleled catastrophe for the Blackfoot. It was clear to all that the great herds had been dwindling for years.

Even so, many were unprepared for how quickly the last of the bison disappeared.

Canadian officials had confidently predicted that sufficient bison herds would endure for at least ten years following the 1877 treaty. By 1879, many of the Blackfoot bands undertook their final expedition into Montana to hunt bison and began to return in 1880 impoverished and starving. Between 1879 and 1881, as many as 1000 Blackfoot peoples may have died from starvation. With the failure of the main staple, the Blackfoot became dependent upon government rations for survival (Samek 1987:38-40; Dempsey

1980:124). Bastien (2004:18) remarks that the intensification of bison hunting with the horse and guns and the participation in the bison robe trade fundamentally shifted sacred relationships between the Blackfoot and the natural world. The bison were long held to be gifts from the Creator and the hunting of bison for commercial use tragically undermined the ceremonial and subsistence alliances with the bison, fundamentally altering the Blackfoot connection to the sacred. Bastien relates that it is believed that the

179 cultural dislocation the Blackfoot experienced in the late 19 th and 20 th centuries was inexorably connected to the violation of natural laws.

Treaty 7

This series of crises and the impending arrival of settlers into Blackfoot traditional territory made Blackfoot leaders desirous of negotiating a treaty with the federal government (Brown and Peers 2006:16). Treaty 7 was made on September 22, 1877 at

Blackfoot Crossing, the site of the present Siksika First Nation. The formal terms of the treaty ceded about 50,000 square miles of land between the Red Deer and South

Saskatchewan Rivers and the American border, almost all of present day southern

Alberta. In return, First Nations peoples received $12 per person at the time and a $5 annual annuity payment, reserve lands amounting to nearly 3385 square kilometres and promised to provide livestock, farm implements, and seed. There are of course differing views on both what occurred during the treaty negotiations and the meaning of the treaty itself. For the Canadian government officials, the treaties primarily represented a legal instrument for land conveyance, securing the surrender to whatever rights and title

Aboriginal peoples may have held to the land in order to pave the way for Euro-Canadian settlement and development of the region. Treaty 7 followed the precedents of the earlier numbered treaties, which Canadian officials envisioned as an expeditious means to initiate the assimilation of all Aboriginal peoples (Hildebrandt and Carter1996:197).

While the negotiations for treaty 7 were conducted with solemnity, the Canadian officials did not regard Blackfoot leaders as partners of equal standing in the negotiations, attested to by the fact that the text for Treaty 7 was prepared in advance. With reference to the

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American experience, Catherine Price (1994:455-56) explains that American treaty commissioners failed to fully comprehend the fluid and intricate nature of Lakota politics and invariably ascribed near autocratic powers to the prominent individuals they identified as Chiefs. Their expectation, which was shared by their Canadian counterparts, that they would negotiate with a single individual who would be able to make absolute and binding decisions and enforce coercive sanctions was consistently frustrated by the diffuse political authority of Aboriginal leaders. Hildebrandt and Carter (1996:242-43) convey some of the ambiguity with respect to Blackfoot leadership at the Treaty 7 negotiations. Although no single individual could be regarded as the paramount leader of all Aboriginal peoples participating in the treaty negotiations, the Canadian authorities favoured Crowfoot because he advocated a more diplomatic approach and dealt with him as though he held supreme authority over all Blackfoot peoples, including the Kainai and the Piikani, which were politically autonomous. Elevating Crowfoot to a superior position in this way not only distorted the nature of political authority among Blackfoot peoples, but alienated other prominent leaders such as Red Crow (Bear Robe 1994:44)

Blackfoot Elders maintain that the Blackfoot leaders who made treaty and the

Blackfoot people themselves had a very different conception of what the treaty meant.

According to the evidence provided in The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7

(Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council 1996) the treaty was regarded first and foremost as a peace treaty that acknowledged amity with the NWMP and a willingness to establish a relationship with the Queen. Entering into treaty negotiations, Blackfoot leaders were primarily concerned with encroachment on their lands by Metis and Cree hunters and

Euro-Canadian settlers, protection of the bison herds from wanton destruction, and to

181 continue in their way of life. They were prepared to share the land with Euro-Canadian settlers, committed to ending warfare and raiding against other First Nations, and readily accepted rations and treaty payments. The Blackfoot had no conception of the treaty as a land surrender. Even if the concept was raised by the Canadian negotiators, it could not possibly have been adequately translated (Goodstriker 1996:23). In the intervening years much debate has ensued over the meaning of the treaty and the implementation of the treaty terms. Oral tradition relates that Aboriginal leadership made the treaties because they believed that it primarily represented an agreement to share the land with the newcomers and promised peace, money, education, cattle, agricultural assistance, hunting and fishing rights, and protection of the bison. “That they could continue to hunt freely and would be taken care of by the Queen were considered the big promises” (Hilderandt and Carter 1996:290).

The Treaty did little to alleviate the immediate crisis the Blackfoot peoples found themselves in. Many bands followed the last of the bison south to Montana and by 1879 many Blackfoot bands were destitute and starving (Taylor 1989:28). The treaty made no mention of the Indian Act and its implications and Blackfoot leaders did not comprehend that by making treaty, accepting rations, and settling on reserves they were placing themselves under Canadian sovereignty (Taylor 1989:28; Narcisse Blood personal communication, October 21, 2004). In the minds of the Blackfoot peoples and their leaders such as Crowfoot, Red Crow, and Eagle Tail, the act of making treaty with the

Canadian authorities in no way impeded their ability to govern themselves under their own systems and laws (Bear Robe 1994:2) Once the Kainai, Siksika, and Piikani took up permanent residence on their respective reserves, however, they were placed under the

182

Red Deer

Calgary Blackfoot Indian Reserve (Siksika)

Peigan Indian Reserve (Piikani) Lethbridge

Blood Indian Reserve HEWAN (Kainai) SASKATC ALBERTA BRITISH COLUMBIA MONTANA Blackfeet Reservation

Fort Benton

Map of Blackfoot, Blood, and Peigan Indian Reserves provisions of the Indian Act and subjected to increasing regulation and control by Indian

Affairs officials (Brown and Peers 1989:18). As mentioned earlier, attendant on these initiatives were projects of civilization and assimilation which undertook to remake the lives and circumstances of Blackfoot peoples, which attacked communal relations and cultural practices and attempted to impose Euro-Canadian ideals of work, family, thrift, and individual self-reliance.

The Canadian government wished to establish a collective reserve for the Kainai,

Siksika, and Piikani at Blackfoot Crossing, the site of the present Blackfoot reserve. The

183

Kainai, however, requested and were granted a separate reserve, located between the

Belly and St. Mary’s, an area they had long frequented and had often held their Sun

Dance there (Taylor 1989:30). Individual Kainai bands and families began settling there in 1880 and the Blood reserve was officially surveyed in 1883 4. In the early years on the reserve, settlement tended to concentrate along the western portion of the reserve, as the

Kainai congregated in bands and family groups along the wooded bottoms of the Belly

River (Regular 1999:35). The Blood reserve comprises an area of 1400 square kilometres, although the Kainai have long disputed the location of the southern boundary of the reserve, claiming that Red Crow was promised all the land between the Belly and

St. Mary’s Rivers south to the international boundary. By making treaty and settling on reserves, Blackfoot peoples embarked on a new era. Seeking to ensure for themselves a measure of security and undertake a transition to a new way of life, the Blackfoot peoples were subject to an alien administration and struggled to preserve a measure of cultural autonomy against the increasingly vigorous exercise of paternalistic authority.

Conclusion

In order to consider the operation of Kainai systems of leadership and authority under the imposition of Indian Act band government during the early reserve era, it is necessary to first understand the enduring political and social organization of the Blackfoot peoples in the buffalo days. As bison hunters on the northern plains, the Blackfoot peoples and their ancestors developed political institutions well suited to the necessities of their nomadic bison hunting culture. Leadership was based on merit and leaders were most often senior

4 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1880:80-81; Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1883:83

184 men related to most band members through kinship, respected for hunting skills, oratory, and generosity. The primary function of band leaders, in addition to ensuring the welfare of the band members, was to maintain the social order and provide for peace within the band by settling conflicts, adjudicating disputes, and mediating relations with other

Blackfoot bands and outsiders. Systems of leadership and authority remained flexible to permit individuals with the appropriate skill, experience, and knowledge to come to the fore in different situations. Decision-making emphasized achieving consensus and leaders consequently lacked coercive authority over their followers, relying on persuasion to rally support or organize certain tasks. During the historic period, the Blackfoot acquired horses and firearms, experienced increases in wealth and an intensification in ceremonial and social institutions, began to participate in the fur trade, suffered the effects of epidemic diseases, encountered missionaries, and were devastated by the loss of the bison. Each of these events had specific consequences for systems of Blackfoot leadership and authority, yet Blackfoot politics nevertheless maintained the core values of generosity, respect for individual autonomy, non-coerciveness and these endured into the reserve period. Although the Treaty 7 made no mention of leadership or political systems, Indian Affairs officials began to interfere in Blackfoot political systems as

Canadian authorities began to undermine existing leadership systems through the imposition of the terms of the Indian Act. Inevitably, band government became a site of struggle as both Kainai leaders and Indian Affairs officials sought to inscribe the institution with their own concepts and meanings in order to exert a measure of political authority over the reserve.

185

CHAPTER FIVE

Kainai Leadership and Band Council Elections

When Red Crow died on August 28, 1900 he had been a pre-eminent leader of the Kainai for 30 years and, as a party to the making of Treaty 7, recognized as a Head Chief of the

Blood Tribe by the Department of Indian Affairs. Red Crow was among the last generation of Blackfoot leaders to have risen to prominence in the pre-reserve era, achieving status through traditional means in the nomadic equestrian bison hunting culture. As a young man, Red Crow participated in raids against the Crow, Cree,

Assinibion, Shoshone, and Nez Perce, compiling a distinguished war record in the process. Descended from a line of influential leaders, Red Crow became leader of the

Fisheaters, one of the more powerful local Kainai bands, following the deaths in quick succession of his uncle Seen From Afar and father Black Bear (each of whom had been

Chief) in the 1869 smallpox epidemic (Dempsey 1980:78; Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal

Council 1996:28). In the turbulent years prior to the making of Treaty 7, Red Crow galvanized several other local bands together under his leadership, and became leader of one the most important factions among the Blackfoot peoples. By 1877, Red Crow was one of the most influential Blackfoot Chiefs and he was an important participant at the negotiations of Treaty 7 and as Wilton Goodstriker, an eminent Kainai historian, has asserted that “no treaty could have been negotiated without his presence and approval”

(Goodstriker 1996:28). In the early reserve era, Red Crow in many ways led the transition to a new way of life, encouraging the Kainai to assert autonomy and self- reliance. He was one of the first on the reserve to begin farming, quickly developing the

186 largest farm on the reserve and competing with local ranchers for NWMP haying contracts. Red Crow also became one of the most successful ranchers on the reserve after taking advantage of an offer to obtain cattle in exchange for horses in 1894. While he remained an active ceremonialist throughout his life, Red Crow accepted the presence of missionaries because he believed the education they offered would benefit the Kainai.

Generally regarded as a steady and responsible leader by government authorities, Red

Crow proved uncompromising in resisting oppressive measures, notably the attempted suppression of the sun dance. When he died in 1900, Red Crow had guided the Kainai through the difficult first decades on the reserve and was respected by the Kainai for his wisdom and leadership (Sam Red Crow in Zaharia and Fox 1995:50; Ada Red Crow in

Zaharia and Fox 1995:67)

The death of Red Crow was reported to the department by Indian Commissioner

David Laird, who requested that he be authorized to appoint a successor when next visiting the Blood reserve. This action was approved by Secretary J. D. McLean and

Laird subsequently advised that at a council meeting of the Blood band held in his presence, Crop Eared Wolf was identified as the unanimous choice to succeed Red Crow as Head Chief of the Upper reserve. The Agent was instructed to present Crop Eared

Wolf with the Treaty medal that Red Crow received at the making of Treaty 7, signifying his status of Head Chief 1. As discussed in the previous chapter, although prior to settling on the reserve leadership positions were not necessarily hereditary, it was not unusual for a son to succeed his father as leader. This could only occur, of course, if the son had the necessary traits for leadership and won the general approbation of the band members.

1 McLean to Laird, September 11, 1900, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3; Laird to McLean, October 24, 1900, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

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Individuals not held in high regard could not retain the support of followers. The unanimous support of Crop Eared Wolf as Head Chief is a strong indication that he enjoyed general support among the Kainai and that traditional means for selecting leaders remained important in the community. When Commissioner Laird gathered the adult male members of the Blood band together in order to elect a successor to Red Crow, the band members affirmed their support for Crop Eared Wolf, who had received the endorsement of Red Crow and had already been confirmed as leader in the eyes of the

Kainai (Frank Weasel Head, personal communication, November 18, 2004; Narcisse

Blood, personal communication, March 20, 2004).

Red Crow and the Kainai Chiefs that made Treaty 7 and continued to serve as leaders during the early years on the reserve had achieved their status by demonstrating the qualities valued in leaders in the pre-reserve era. By distinguishing themselves in warfare and raiding, displaying sound judgement, demonstrating generosity, prominent men gathered a following about them and came to be regarded as Chiefs. While the transition to a sedentary lifestyle on the reserve and the restrictive administration of

Indian Affairs inevitably had effects upon Kainai social and political systems, to a considerable extent pre-reserve era systems of authority and leadership remained important among the Kainai. Band members continued to expect their leaders to be generous, accommodating, and to facilitate consensus. Ultimately, a leader was still judged on his ability to provide for his followers. Moreover, pre-reserve methods by which leaders mobilized support and galvanized a following, as well as the exercise of political authority continued to be pertinent in the early reserve era. As the leaders that rose to positions of prominence in the pre-reserve era began to pass on, however, the

188 selection of leaders became a site of contestation as department officials began to insist upon appointing or electing Chiefs in conformity with the elective provisions of the

Indian Act, even though it was fully understood that the Kainai were not formally under the provisions of the Act. To be recognized as Chiefs by the department, new leaders were required to be ‘elected’ under the terms of the Indian Act and, after the turn of the

19 th century, had to sign a Declaration of Office. However, inherent ideas about Kainai leadership and authority were not easily displaced, as evidenced by the fact that Red

Crow was succeeded as Head Chief by Crop Eared Wolf, his adopted son, who in turn was succeeded by his own son Shot Both Sides. As well, at least some Chiefs continued to embody pre-reserve leadership qualities and employ traditional strategies to consolidate support and retain a following. Thus, rather than being displaced by the imposition of the elective system, it may be possible to discern a continuity of Kainai systems of leadership and authority within the context of Indian Act band government.

Leadership in the Early reserve Era

In discussing changes in leadership and governance systems that occurred on the

Blackfeet Reservation in Montana in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, Thomas R.

Wessel (1982:61) maintains that the erosion of traditional tribal society and political systems began almost immediately after the Blackfeet settled on the Reservation in

Montana starving and destitute in 1884 after the failure of the buffalo hunt. He asserts that leadership was transformed from a position based on merit to one of status as federal authorities controlled access to resources, institutionalized methods of social control, and appointed hereditary replacements to leaders that died. “Leadership, rather than

189 identifying merit became frozen without a method of identification for the future”

(Wessel 1982:61). He goes on to describe how in the early 20 th century an emerging generation of leaders among the Blackfeet, deprived of the traditional avenues of achievement, struggled to transform a “tribal society, organized around personal relationships and meritorious leaders, into a political community, bound by shared political interests that commanded loyalties to new symbols and identified leaders with status” (Wessel 1982:60). To Wessel’s way of thinking, a strong demarcation can be made between the pre-reserve and post-reserve systems of leadership. Pre-reserve leadership was based on merit and personal relationships while post-reserve leadership came increasingly to be institutionalized, marked by a codified status and the formation of a cohesive community bound together by common political ideals (Wessel 1982:70).

Without a doubt, the transition to a sedentary lifestyle on the reserve exerted considerable pressures on the leadership and governance systems of the Kainai, Siksika, Piikani, and other plains First Nations in Canada and the U.S. The absence of traditional means for displaying merit, dependence on rations, and attempts by federal authorities and missionaries to interfere in the political culture, all served to undermine the authority of

Blackfoot leaders. However, despite these pressures, it is not at all clear that there is an obvious disjuncture between pre-reserve and post-reserve systems of leadership and authority. Many of the same qualities continued to be valued in leaders and leaders continued to employ many of the same strategies for mobilizing community support.

Furthermore, bundles, all-comrades societies, and traditional systems of authority continued to have important roles in the exercise of political authority. Indeed, in the

190 case of the Kainai it is possible to discern a continuity in systems of leadership and authority in the context of Indian Affairs administration and management of the reserve.

In the early years after settling on the reserve, the Kainai adapted themselves with few changes in social and political structure. Leaders that had risen to prominence in the pre-reserve era retained their status and influence, systems of authority continued to endure, and all-comrades societies remained active. Individual local bands retained their coherence as people tended to settle in the places chosen by their respective Chiefs in separate camps along the Belly River, just as though they were separating into winter camps, and band identity continued to play an important role in the life of reserve residents (Taylor 1989:312; Dempsey 1982:103; Blackfoot Gallery Committee

2001:70) 2. While the transition to a sedentary life and the control exerted by Indian

Affairs officials placed constraints on Kainai leadership, the system of local band leadership endured during the early reserve era and Chiefs retained many duties and responsibilities from the pre-reserve era. Chiefs still continued to have considerable influence in directing the economic activities of the band by allocating goods and organizing labour. With respect to the Siksika, Hanks and Hanks (1950:126) have noted that Chiefs were “more than ever a distributor of necessities, dispensing not only food among the needy members of his band, but also tobacco, blankets, clothing, and materials for building shacks. All his possessions were at the disposal of his band.” As in the pre- reserve era, when Chiefs would loan horses to someone in order to hunt bison and then receive a portion of the kill in payment, now a Chief might loan out horses and implements to an industrious individual for farm labour, hauling, or to cut hay, and the

Chief would receive payment in kind, labour, or cash. In the early reserve years, the hay

2 Hanks and Hanks (1950:126) noted similar tendency among the Siksika.

191 racks and wagons supplied by Indian Affairs under the terms of treaty were commonly given to Chiefs, who would then loan them to individual band members, receiving a portion of the hay collected, cash or labour in return. At treaty time, Chiefs were also responsible for the allocation of treaty money.

Then at treaty time, each clan sat behind his clan leader, who would get up as his name was called out. He would get all his clan’s treaty money which he would distribute to each family (Mary Blackwater in Zaharia and Fox 1995:2).

Chiefs often organized labour to cut timber, build houses and barns, or to work in the gardens for the benefit of the entire band and directed the distribution of items supplied under treaty (Hanks and Hanks 1950:127; Goldfrank 1945:39). In addition, Chiefs were still expected to provide for the destitute and elderly and hospitality and generosity continued to be indispensable leadership traits. A Chief’s home remained the site where people gathered and hospitality was expected and furnished; it was incumbent upon the

Chief to provide food, tea, and tobacco to visitors, deal with disputes and grievances between band members, and intercede with the Indian Agent, the N.W.M.P., and missionaries on behalf of band members (Frank Weasel Head, personal communication,

March 17, 2005).

The early years on the reserve were harsh and difficult for the Kainai. With the sudden disappearance of the bison herds, the Kainai went almost overnight from a self- sustaining and independent existence to utter destitution. Whatever misgivings Kainai leaders may have had in making Treaty and settling on the reserve dissolved in the face of starvation and the Kainai accepted the rations provided by the Canadian authorities

(Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council 1996:69-70; Crop Eared Wolf 1968). The absence of the bison impoverished the landscape both materially and spiritually and with the

192 transition to settled life on the Blood reserve, many of the routines and practices of pre- reserve life were no longer possible. The seasonal hunts no longer took place, raiding and warfare were prohibited, and attempts were made to restrict the Sun Dance and other ceremonial gatherings (Bastien 2004:19). Disease flourished in the tiny poorly ventilated cabins in which most people now lived and tuberculosis, measles, and other contagious diseases caused considerable death among reserve residents (Blackfoot Gallery

Committee 2001:69-70; Dempsey 1978:24). Elders relate that the rations provided the

Kainai were insufficient and often not fit for consumption. “Sometimes the food was rotten. The beef and pork were often spoiled and the flour full of weevils” (Blackfoot

Gallery Committee 2001:71). Others maintained that rations were deliberately poisoned by Agency employees and poor rations were blamed for deaths of people on the Blood reserve (Treaty 7 Elders 1996:161).

On the reserve, the Kainai came under the regulatory control of Indian Affairs officials and experienced interference by colonial forces in daily activities as Indian

Affairs officials exerted increasing control over social conditions and economic pursuits of the Kainai (Brown and Peers 2006:18; Bastien 2004:19). As on other reserves,

Canadian authorities began to inaugurate programs of aggressive civilization (Smith

2001:258-59) that sought to eradicate Kainai culture and impose Euro-Canadian values.

Initial attempts by Indian Affairs to foster farming and animal husbandry were plagued by insufficient funding, unqualified personnel, and cumbersome administration (Samek

1897:70; Brown and Peers 2006:22). The seed, cattle, and agricultural implements that had been promised under treaty were either supplied in insufficient amounts or were simply not delivered (Treaty 7 Elders 1996:148; Dempsey 1978:26). Only a few of the

193 cattle promised under treaty were delivered to the Kainai and although a number of band members maintained garden plots and raised potatoes, turnips, and oats, grain farming suffered setbacks as early frosts often destroyed grain crops before they could be harvested 3 (Dempsey 1997:16). Confined to the reserve and dependant upon government rations, a general malaise, the result of starvation, disease, and cultural dislocation, inevitably took hold of many of the people (Bastien 2004:21).

By the turn of the 19 th century, most of the Blood reserve residents were dependent upon rations supplied by the government. To this point, the reserve economy remained moribund, with few opportunities for band members to secure a livelihood 4.

Ownership of horses continued to be the primary determinant of wealth and status among the Kainai. Even after the disappearance of the bison, horses remained prized possessions and a medium of exchange among the Kainai, especially with respect to ritual transfers. Individuals owning substantial herds of horses were accorded considerable prestige, which could be mobilized to political or social ends. Although practically all Kainai were in need of rations, horse owners could afford ceremonial purchases, prestige items, and to make distributions of gifts (Goldfrank 1943:19; Samek

1987:80). In the pre-reserve era, horse wealth, measured in possession of actual horses, or the conversion of horses into prestige goods and ceremonial items, was the primary determinant of status and this norm continued into the reserve era. Although this wealth was unequally distributed, access remained fluid and it was possible for a poor man to improve his prospects by acquiring horses through raiding. After settling on the reserve, however, a sedentary existence and the curtailment of horse raiding served to restrict

3 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1881:83; 4 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1898:128

194 access to horses. Those who already had sizable horse herds maintained or grew their wealth through natural increase. These individuals were able to afford to meet the ritual costs associated with acquiring sacred bundles, purchase memberships in societies, and began to form a social elite. In general, those poor in horses had fewer opportunities and found it more difficult to get ahead.

With the distribution of cattle in 1894 to a few of the prominent men, including

Chiefs Red Crow, Crop Eared Wolf, and Minor Chief Blackfoot Old Woman, the Kainai cattle industry took hold. Other individuals with horses to trade followed this lead and by

1906 the Blood herd stood at 7500 head 5 (Taylor 1989:32). Most of those who acquired cattle established a good income for themselves. While cattle introduced a new source of wealth, this did little to change the prevailing social order of the reserve, since the poor were effectively excluded from participating as only those with horses to exchange were issued cattle and the developing cattle industry operated largely within pre-reserve values

(Goldfrank 1943:20). An increasing number of individuals took to other forms of enterprise to realize an income. Haying, coal mining, and working for neighbouring farmers and ranchers, and the developing sugar beet industry in the Mormon communities east of the Blood reserve supplied increasing opportunities for employment 6

(Regular 1999:203-05). While horse wealth continued to be important, an emergent class of enterprising individuals that, unable to acquire prestige in traditional means, began to amass relative wealth in a developing cash economy that began to rival the established horse economy (Goldfrank 1943:21; First Charger 1998:6).

5 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1906:166. 6 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1900:196.

195

In the early years of the 20 th century, per capita income rose dramatically on the

Blood reserve and more individuals earned more money (Taylor 1989:32-33; Regular

1999:323). The cattle herd continued to expand during this time and farming operations inaugurated under Agent R. N. Wilson, who purchased steam tractors to break new land, saw several band members start farming 7. The farmers were primarily younger men who had graduated from residential school and lacked access to horse wealth (Dempsey

1997:55). Deemed the ‘working element’ by the Agent, these individuals welcomed the opportunity provided by farming. Incomes on the reserve rose rapidly as many of the poorest individuals who had few prospects elsewhere took advantage of the program 8.

The new farming program found its strongest supporters among those with little horse wealth and the established cattle and horse owners remained resistant to changes that could restrict their livelihood and status 9. Even the non-farmers were able to supplement their income through mining coal, haying, or picking sugar beets and the period from the turn of the century to 1920 represented an era of relative prosperity on the Blood reserve

(Regular 1999:205).

The successful farmers had the largest and most reliable source of income on the reserve and social discrepancies began to appear as they purchased modern farm implements, automobiles, new homes, and other consumer goods. A degree of animosity became manifest between this developing social elite and other band members, with the former somewhat derisively referred to as the ‘Upper Ten’ (Dempsey 1986:84; Brown and Peers 2006:24). Those with large horse herds remained among the most prominent

7 Wilson to McLean, April 2, 1906 NAC RG 10, Vol. 4024, File 290240-1. 8 Wilson to McLean, October 8, 1906, NAC RG 10, Vol. 4024, File 290240-1; Wilson to McLean, December 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 4024, File 290240-2. 9 Maylor, April 18, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 4024, File 290240-1; Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1907:169; Dempsey 1997:55.

196 individuals on the reserve and ceremonialist continued to command respect, but the successful farmers increasingly came to amass a certain amount of material wealth and to dominate the economic activities on the reserve 10 (Dempsey 1986:84). Horse wealth continued to be important among the Kainai and those with horses participated in traditional ceremonial exchanges, but access to cash income was gaining importance as a measure of status.

By 1920, this period of relative prosperity had come to an end, as successive vicious winters, coupled with falling commodity prices and injudicious administration devastated both the farming operations and cattle industry on the reserve (Brown and

Peers 2006:23; Regular 1999:250). Only a small portion of the reserve was under cultivation and per capita income was less than $45 (Dempsey 1986:40; 62; Samek

1987:116-17; First Charger 1998:6). While a number of Kainai had achieved a level of success in farming and ranching, others became frustrated by the combination of crop failures and the intransigence of Indian department officials and abandoned these enterprises (Dempsey 1978:26; 1997:86). Almost everyone on the reserve subsisted on rations, supplemented by what they could hunt and trap and by what they could grow in garden plots. Beef and bannock comprised a large portion of the diet and the ethic of sharing among the Kainai remained an important means of ensuring the distribution of sufficient food and other scarce commodities among the poorer members of the community (Brown and Peers 2006:24). The small shacks and cabins on the reserve were slowly being replaced by more standard houses, however, these were too often overcrowded, squalid, and contagious diseases remained more prevalent among the

Kainai than in the non-Native community (Lux 2001). Those without permanent housing

10 Medicine Hat Weekly News, February 4, 1908 on NAC RG 10, Vol. 4024, File 290240-1.

197 tended to live in tents and tipis, migrating seasonally to where rations were being distributed, where there was work to be had, or camping next to the houses of relatives 11

(Kate Shade in Zaharia and Fox 1995:18; Dempsey 1997:86).

According to Dempsey, three distinct classes had developed on the Blood reserve by the early 1920s. There were older people who adhered to traditional beliefs and customs and had a meagre existence dependant almost entirely on rations, the ex-pupils, many of whom were leading farmers and favoured contemporary dress and participated in secular and church sponsored activities, and a generation in between who had grown up on the reserve, but had not been to school; they spoke almost no English, and actively participated in the societies and traditional ceremonies (Dempsey 1986:63). Schisms formed between factions described in departmental records as ‘progressives’ and

‘traditionalists’. This division in many ways can be seen to express growing tensions between younger band members who for the most part remained outside the established horse economy and looked to farming as an opportunity to improve their economic and social prospects and older, established band members who retained an abiding interest in the customary horse economy and traditional pursuits. The former had often been to boarding school, spoke English, favoured contemporary dress, and were at least nominally Christians. The farmers, with some justification, were perceived as receiving favoured treatment from the Agency office. On the other hand, the latter group largely represented a faction of band members who were heavily invested in the social and economic status quo. These individuals tended to speak little or no English, preferred traditional attire, participated in all-comrades societies, and remained active ceremonialists. To an increasing extent, these divisions, along with those attendant on

11 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report Part II 1914:71.

198 religious denomination and residence were supplanting local band membership as a source of association and identity among the Kainai.

Challenges to Kainai Leadership

The social and economic changes occurring on the Blood reserve inevitably had consequences for systems of leadership and authority. Chiefs continued to be seen as having a responsibility for the welfare of their followers, but had greater difficulty in acquiring goods for redistribution. The provision of food, which had previously been a fundamental criterion of providential leadership, was now largely the domain of the ration house, where every band member had the same access to the same rations

(Goldfrank 1945:39). Wider access to desired commodities also served to alter Kainai systems of leadership. Whereas previously, preferential trading relationships that some leaders had enjoyed at least partially restricted the availability of blankets, cloth, utensils, and other manufactured items, these could now be readily purchased from local merchants. The Indian Agent had the power to withhold rations, access to land, cattle, money, and other resources, and could seriously impede the ability of a leader to fulfil his responsibilities to his followers and maintain his position (Narcisse Blood personal communication, February 18, 2005; Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:69). As one of

Dempsey’s informants remarked, “the Agent had a lot of power in those days and could make life miserable for a man” (Dempsey 1997:69). These changes presented new challenges to stable leadership and began to alter systems of leadership and authority.

With warfare, raiding, and hunting effectively closed as avenues to demonstrate leadership qualities, participation in ceremonial societies and purchasing bundles gained

199 increased popularity as a means to demonstrate importance and status. Ritual accomplishments and ownership of sacred regalia offered a traditional means of establishing a reputation and those in a position to sell gained increased wealth that could then be invested in further ceremonial purchases or invested in give-aways, both of which raised the stature of the participant (Hanks and Hanks 1950:25). In this way, Kainai leaders in the reserve era continued to affirm their status in a traditional manner.

At the same time, the growing importance of the cash economy and material wealth as a determinant of status meant that those with access to a cash income inevitably gathered people around them, attracting followers away from established leaders.

Individuals who were generous with surplus agricultural produce or income earned from other sources tended to acquire a following, albeit usually smaller than those of the pre- reserve era (Hanks and Hanks 1950:23, Francis First Charger, personal communication,

December 15, 2004). While the universal availability of rations had diminished the necessity for a Chief to be provider for his people, generosity remained an important leadership trait, but such distributions tended to circulate among a narrower range of close relatives (Goldfrank 1945:16). New leaders who attained status by non-traditional means emerged and interference in Kainai leadership systems from Indian Affairs officials encouraged this trend. Younger men who had attended residential school, sometimes referred to as the ‘school boys’, were considered ‘progressive’ by Indian department officials and often received material and moral support of the Agent, which inevitably served to bolster the campaign of those school graduates who aspired to become Chiefs 12 .

12 Wilson to Laird, May 5, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3; Laird to McLean, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3; Wilson to McLean, November 11, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

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As well, Kainai systems of leadership and authority were affected by interactions with government officials, who often misunderstood the role of Chiefs in Kainai society.

Indian Affairs officials, members of the N.W.M.P., and court officers tended to believe that the Chief represented formal judicial authority and assumed that Chiefs held a degree of coercive power over other band members. The Declaration of Office that the department routinely required Chiefs to sign clearly indicates that the department regarded Chiefs as officers of the Crown and expected Chiefs to enforce Canadian laws, uphold department policy, and ensure the compliance of band members. Crop Eared

Wolf and other Kainai Chiefs that took up their positions after 1900 all signed

Declarations of Office 13 . Kainai Chiefs had long been relied on to settle disputes and grievances and this continued in the years after settling on the reserve. As one of Jane

Richardson Hanks informants explained, “that is the main reason for having a chief, to settle things” 14 . However, this role became more formalized under the influence of Euro-

Canadian legal and judicial institutions. Chiefs were expected to maintain order by ensuring compliance with Euro-Canadian laws, reporting law breakers to the proper authorities 15 . The Indian Act required that the approval of the Blood band be obtained for some actions such as the sale or lease of reserve land and Indian Affairs officials tended to invest Chiefs with the executive authority to approve these transactions. While the position of Chief came to be invested with more formal authority than had previously been the case, the Indian Agent and the N.W.M.P. remained the final arbiter on the reserve (Hanks and Hanks 1950:127).

13 October 17, 1900; June 27, 1905; March 21, 1906; November 23, 1906; November 28, 1911; NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3 14 Jane Richardson interview with Pitoxpikis (Sleigh) via Mary Royal (interpreter), August 24, 1938, GA M-8458-4, p. 69. 15 Markle to McLean, July 8, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-6.

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According to John Maclean (1895:257), a Methodist minister who worked on the

Blood reserve in the 1890s and published a number of ethnological reports, the method for selecting Chiefs had experienced a degree of modification during the early reserve period. Since settling on the reserve, a man aspiring to become Chief would make himself known through various endeavours or by proposing popular or innovative measures. Rather than publicly expressing a desire to become Chief, however, an informal campaign rallied around a potential candidate. Supporters would proceed to lobby other band members, pressing the claims of the aspiring Chief and extolling his abilities or accomplishments. Individuals garnering general approval within the community and the endorsement of the other Chiefs would on an opportune occasion be brought to the attention of the Indian Agent, or perhaps the Inspector, as the band’s official choice for Chief. If this selection met with the approval of Indian Affairs officials, the new Chief would be recorded as Chief on department records, given a new suit of clothes, and paid the appropriate annuity. The process of rallying band members and winning support, as described by Maclean, seems to have clear continuities with the pre-reserve era where individuals of demonstrated ability gained a following who then mobilized broader support among band members until they were acclaimed to the position by general assent. The sanction of Indian Affairs officials, however, was also now necessary for a Chief to be recognized as such by the department, which was interested in installing individuals that they considered to be ‘progressive’ as Chiefs who were supportive of Indian Affairs policy and willing to assist the Agent in achieving the goals of the department. It was not uncommon for an individual nominated by the consensus of band members to be rejected by the Agent as unprogressive or unfit 16 . This

16 Dilworth to McLean, December 21, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

202 also afforded the supporters of a rival candidate an additional opportunity to press their claim.

While the criteria for leadership were undergoing some significant changes, many of the leaders chosen in the 1880s and 1890s had attained status in the pre-reserve days.

Most would have had a war record and have participated in horse raids, would have been members of the appropriate all-comrades societies, and have demonstrated generosity, resolve, and sound judgement (Narcisse Blood, personal communication, October 21,

2004; Francis First Charger, personal communication, December 20, 2005). In the early years of the 20 th century, however, many individuals aspiring for leadership positions would not have had the opportunity to demonstrate merit in the pre-reserve era and were forced to demonstrate their capacities in other ways. In this regard, Hanks and Hanks, commenting on the selection of Chiefs among the Siksika in the early years of the 20th century, mention that there were some strong parallels with the ways in which individuals demonstrated leadership qualities in the pre-reserve era. Foremost among these was a commitment to work tirelessly for the welfare of the band as a whole (Hanks and Hanks

1950:133). Before an individual could become Chief, it was necessary to first build a reputation as considerate and concerned for the well-being of all band members, which was in turn contingent upon amassing sufficient material wealth in order to exhibit success and strength of character and willing to lend assistance to fellow band members as well as defend the interests of the people. “Thus the old pattern hinging on the chief’s ability to provide for his followers has been modified into a role of good neighbour, counsellor, and planner for the welfare of the reserve as a whole” (Hanks and Hanks

1950:130). Inevitably, an informal campaign would build up around those seen as

203 possessing the proper qualities for leadership, quietly building support through casual discussions and informal meetings.

Throughout the early reserve period, Kainai leadership and political systems faced considerable challenges. The transition to a sedentary lifestyle and the paternalistic regulation imposed by the Indian Affairs administration perpetuated a number of restrictions on both Kainai leaders and the exercise of political authority. Many traditional forms of attaining merit were suddenly closed as avenues to leadership. The disappearance of the bison and dependence on government rations diminished the Chiefs’ status as a provider for his followers and it became more difficult for Chiefs to sustain large bands. Programs of aggressive civilization sought to erode Kainai culture and beliefs and undermined systems of authority. Interference by Indian Affairs officials in the selection of Chiefs prevented some individuals from being acknowledged as Chiefs which permitted new leaders who had not acquired merit in the traditional manner and were considered by Indian Affairs officials to be more ‘progressive’ to emerge. This promoted divisions between younger industrial school graduates who were beginning to acquire considerable income in the developing agricultural and cash economy and the older men who attained standing and prestige in the traditional horse economy and ceremonial societies. These experiences led to changes in how leaders sought to mobilize support and galvanize a following. However, it would be inaccurate to presume that a radical break with pre-reserve systems of leadership and authority suddenly occurred once the Kainai settled on the reserve. Chiefs remained in their position as local band leaders and their followers maintained many of the same expectations as they had during the pre-reserve era. Chiefs were expected to be generous, to be concerned for the welfare

204 of their followers, and to protect their interests. Chiefs remained important in directing and allocating goods and labour on the reserve, settling disputes between band members, and working for the welfare of all band members. Even in a settled reserve context, a

Chief who failed to demonstrate traditional leadership traits would inevitably lose status and respect in the eyes of band members and be reduced to a weak and ineffectual leader.

The pressures exerted during the early reserve era challenged Kainai leadership and inevitably resulted in changes to Kainai political practices. Through both the intervention of Indian Affairs officials and the assertions of various Kainai contenders for leadership positions, a struggle was developing over the exercise of political authority on the Blood reserve.

Chiefs at Treaty and Band Leadership during the Early reserve Era

Treaty 7, which was concluded in 1877, recorded two Kainai Head Chiefs, Red Crow and

Rainy Chief, who were identified as the Head Chiefs of the South Bloods and North

Bloods respectively. The names of nineteen other Kainai leaders appear on the treaty as well (Dempsey 1988:21). Further, the text of the treaty also committed the federal government to pay annuities to two Blood Head Chiefs and up to 15 Blood Headmen or

Minor Chiefs.

Her Majesty also agrees that next year, and annually afterwards forever, she will cause to be paid to the said Indians, in cash, at suitable places and dates, of which the said Indians shall be duly notified, to each Chief, twenty-five dollars, each minor Chief or Councillor (not exceeding fifteen minor Chiefs to the Blackfeet and Blood Indians, and four to the Piegan and Sarcee Bands, and five Councillors to the Stony Indian Bands), fifteen dollars, and to every other Indian of whatever age, five dollars; the same, unless there be some exceptional reason, to be paid to the heads of families for those belonging thereto (Text of Treaty cited in Morris 1971 [1880]:370).

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Hanks and Hanks have noted that at the Treaty 7 negotiations, the treaty does not contain the names of every Chief present and not every Chief who made treaty received a medal, emblematic of their status as Chief. Chiefs who had received medals were selected somewhat arbitrarily, while others simply were not acknowledged during the ceremony

(Hanks and Hanks 1950:20-21). Further complicating matters was the distinction made by Canadian officials between Head Chiefs and Minor Chiefs, a distinction that had no real precedent among the Kainai or other First Nations party to Treaty 7. While certain

Chiefs such as Crowfoot and Red Crow were widely acknowledged among the Blackfoot peoples as being more influential, there was no formal hierarchy among Blackfoot Chiefs and no one Chief held a position of dominance or authority over other Chiefs

(Hildebrandt and Carter 1996:241; Bear Robe 1994:44). Each Chief was responsible to his followers and made decisions based on his perception of his local band’s best interests. Chiefs conferred on matters of common interest, talking an issue over until a consensus was reached, or at least until the views and opinions had been fully expressed

(The Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:21-22; Ladner 2000:106).

The identification of Head Chiefs by the treaty commissioners at the Treaty 7 negotiations was, therefore, a product of the misconception of the nature of leadership in

Aboriginal societies on behalf of the Canadian authorities and the exigencies of the treaty process. At the Treaty 7 negotiations and in the early years settling on the reserve, the

Canadian authorities showed a distinct preference for dealing with one leader whom they believed exerted absolute authority over all members of the regional band. Canadian officials had established the precedent of recognizing Head Chiefs and Minor Chiefs in the negotiation of earlier Treaties and imported that model to Treaty 7 as well (Laird in

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Morris 1971:252). Treaty Commissioners commonly requested First Nations to nominate spokespersons and then invested these individuals with authority to make decisions on behalf of the entire First Nation 17 . Prior to the Treaty 7 negotiations, the Chiefs, band divisions, and leading families were identified for the treaty commissioners by Jean

L’Heureux, a disgraced former Jesuit who, posing as a priest, had lived among the

Blackfoot for 20 years (Laird in Morris 1971:253; Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council

1997:56). The information provided by L’Heureux was indispensable to the treaty commissioners not only for identifying the most important Blackfoot leaders, but also for confirming their perceptions regarding Blackfoot social organization and leadership.

Essentially, the treaty commissioners were anxious to identify the leaders of the largest factions among the Blackfoot peoples, believing these individuals had the power to make and enforce binding decisions.

During the treaty negotiations, the treaty commissioners commented on Blackfoot leadership and band organization, noting that it would be expedient to accede to the insistence that these should not be interfered with.

The organization of the Blackfeet bands is somewhat different from that of the Saulteaux and Crees. They have large bands with head and minor Chiefs, and as they preferred that this arrangement should remain unchanged, the Commissioners gladly acceded to their desire, as expense would be saved to the Government in clothing, were Councillors and head men not named (Laird in Morris 1971 [1880]:262).

Nevertheless, the recognition of Head Chiefs and Minor Chiefs by the treaty commissioners, while derived from an appreciation that different Blackfoot Chiefs possessed different degrees of status and influence, inaugurated a more rigid and inflexible form of leadership. Moreover, the identification of two Kainai Head Chiefs

17 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1871:28; Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1875:xx; Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1876:lv

207 represents an arbitrary division made by the treaty commissioners of the Kainai into the

“North Bloods” who historically had traded with the Hudson’s Bay Company, and the

“South Bloods” who traded with the American Traders, despite the fact that by that point the Kainai were trading almost exclusively with American traders (Dempsey 1980:114).

Similarly, the Siksika were separated into three separate factions, referred to as the South,

North, and Middle Blackfoot Camps, each of which was recognized as having a Head

Chief. Two Kainai Head Chiefs were acknowledged, for the North and South Blood

Camps respectively; and the Piikani were confirmed as having one Head Chief. The

Middle Blackfoot Camp appears to have dispersed very soon after settling on the reserve, following the death of Heavy Shield, who had been recognized as the Head Chief when the Treaty was made 18 . From 1886 on, department records mention only two Blackfoot

Camps, the North and the South, and subsequently only two Head Chiefs among the

Siksika.

There can be little doubt as to Red Crow’s status as one of the leading Chiefs of the Kainai; Red Crow arrived after the treaty proceedings had commenced and the other

Kainai leaders for the most part reserved their comments until his arrival (Laird in Morris

1971:259). However, Red Crow, several other Kainai Chiefs—Father of Many Children,

Medicine Calf, and Many Spotted Horses—enjoyed substantial standing and influence.

Red Crow and Father of Many Children were recommended to the Treaty Commissioners as the proper individuals to be recognized as Head Chiefs, but when Father of Many

Children declined the position due to his poor health, Red Crow successfully lobbied for

Rainy Chief, a close ally, to be recognized as Head Chief. While Rainy Chief was a

18 Wheatly to McLean, September 26, 1898, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7920, File 32-1, pt. 1; Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1879:80.

208 leader of some status, Father of Many Children’s son Hind Bull also appears to have had a legitimate claim to the position as well, given that he was leader of a large faction of the

Followers of the Buffalo and that John Healy, a prominent American trader, had stated prior to treaty negotiations that Red Crow and Hind Bull were the two leading Chiefs of the Kainai (Dempsey 1980:114-15). On the Treaty 7 document Red Crow is identified as the Head Chief of the South Bloods and Rainy Chief is identified as the Head Chief of the North Bloods and after settling on the reserve these factions became known as the

Upper camp and Lower camp respectively.

The Annuity Paysheet for 1877 records 14 separate Kainai bands and six leaders listed as “Chiefs with no bands” 19 . This is somewhat curious, considering that within

Kainai systems of leadership and authority, any Chief without a following would essentially cease to be a Chief. Dempsey (1980:115) relates that Red Crow arranged to have the different segments of his own band, the Fish Eaters, counted together under his leadership. The various factions of the rival band Followers of the Buffalo, meanwhile, were listed separately under their leaders, essentially conveying the impression that the

Red Crow was the leader of the largest local band within the Kainai. Once treaty annuities had been paid, Red Crow presented several other individuals, almost all from his own band the Fish Eaters, to be recognized as Minor Chiefs, and these individuals are listed on the 1877 Annuity Paylist as “Chiefs with no bands”. These individuals were

Many Spotted Horses, Stolen Person, One Spot, White Antelope, White Striped Dog, and

The Moon. In subsequent years each of these individuals was recognized as a Chief of a separate band on the Annuity Paylists 20 . The fact that the 1878 Annuity Paylist recorded

19 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9412. 20 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9412.

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20 separate Kainai bands and records Red Crow’s band as having experienced a serious reduction in numbers, tends to confirm Dempsey’s account.

In the pre-reserve era, Kainai local bands, often called clans by Blackfoot speakers, were autonomous social and political units that maintained an on-going association with the larger regional band though kin ties, participation in the annual Sun

Dance, the summer bison hunt, and all-comrades societies (as discussed in Chapter IV).

During the reserve era and into the present, band affiliation has remained important to the

Kainai. Owing to the fluid and flexible nature of Kainai bands, the number and names of

Kainai bands have changed over time. Several historians and ethnographers have provided descriptions of the names and numbers of Kainai bands at different periods.

According to Dempsey, the Kainai were composed of five major bands and 13 minor bands, each of which were derived from and therefore aligned to one of the major bands.

Dempsey identified the major bands as the Followers of the Buffalo, Fish Eaters, Lone

Fighters, Many Tumors, and Black Elks. The Followers of the Buffalo and the Fish

Eaters represented the largest factions among the Kainai, with seven and five associated bands respectively. Dempsey (1980:99) reports that the Followers of the Buffalo had for many years been the most influential band among the Kainai, but their pre-eminence began to wane by the mid-18 th century as the Fish Eaters gained ascendancy. Dempsey relates that Many Fat Horses, Many Children, Marrows, All Tall People, Knife Owners,

All Short People, and All Black Faces were all connected to the Followers of the Buffalo, while Six Mouths, Shooting Up, Many Brown Weasels, Bear People, and Hairy Shirts were associated with the Fish Eaters. The Scabbies were said to be the lone off-shoot of the Many Tumors. Two of the major pre-reserve Kainai bands, the Lone Fighters and the

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Black Elks, had no derivative bands. Finally, Dempsey suggests that two additional bands, the Orphans and the Crooked Backs, were formed in the early reserve period

(Dempsey 1982:98).

From information gathered around 1910, Wissler (1911:21) listed seven different

Kainai bands: Fish-eaters, Black-elks, Lone-fighters, Hair-shirts, Many-children, Many- lodge-poles, and Short-bows, although he acknowledges that this list may well be incomplete. Maclean identified nine bands among the Kainai: the Black Elks, Sweating

People, Short People, Sore Feet, Fish Eaters, Goose People, Bad People, Vexed People, and Skinned Legs (1895:256). Goldfrank (1945:38), meanwhile, identified eight different bands in existence among the Kainai when she conducted her fieldwork in the late 1930s: The Fisheaters, the Pacer-Fisheaters (a splinter group), Black Elks, Lone fighters, Followers of the Buffalo, Many Children, Many Tumors, and the Hairy Shits.

According to Goldfrank each band had its own leader, except for the Followers of the

Buffalo and Many Children who had recently chosen a single leader between themselves.

Goldfrank stated that the largest band was the Fisheaters and their Chief was also recognized as the Head Chief.

Pete Standing Alone, a respected Kainai band member and active ceremonialist, working collaboratively with anthropologist Fraser Taylor in the late 1980s, reviewed the

Kainai bands listed by the above sources and acknowledged that most of these bands were familiar to him, but that several bands had come to be known by different names.

Standing Alone explains that a stronger sense of band membership seemed to persist at the Old Agency, but that the newer communities on the reserve, such as Standoff, were made up of people from many different bands and that people there tended to identify

211 with the community more strongly than with band affiliation (Taylor 1989:315-16). In

Kitomahkitapiiminnooniksi: Stories from our Elders , Zaharia and Fox (1995:vii) relate that since settling on the reserve many bands have come to be known by more than one name. The composition of bands was also changing during the early reserve era and many of the Elders interviewed by Zaharia and Fox stated that they belonged to several different bands in their lifetimes.

While the importance of band affiliation has endured into the present, after the turn of the 20 th century, the local band system underwent some fundamental transformations as people began relocating more broadly over the reserve and intermingling with people from other local bands.

At first people settled near their clan relatives and built houses facing east. They tried to camp as they had always done. As our people began to rely on rations, they moved closer to the Indian Agent’s office and the ration house. Some people began to lose touch with their clan relations (Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:70).

During the early reserve period, bands still tended to settle together when they could and a number of bands established separate camps along the Belly River, near the Old

Agency site, which served as the administrative centre of the reserve (Brown and Peers

2006:20; Dempsey 1982:103). However, economic opportunities offered by farming and ranching served to mitigate against the traditional band structure. As people took up farms or moved to be closer to cattle herds or agency buildings, the integrity and coherence of bands began to dissipate. Hanks and Hanks (1950:18) also relate that among the Siksika, the local bands began to break up after settling on the reserve. Not only was there little need to remain in larger groups for security and defence, but few

Chiefs retained the means to support large numbers of followers as had been done

212 formerly. Some of the bands, after being settled on the reserve for a period of time, received new names, and some communities composed of individuals from different bands received band-like nicknames that reflected their geographical location (Dempsey

1982:104; Zaharia and Fox, Vol. 1 1995:vi-vii). Band members who took part in the farming program initiated in 1907 formed new communities as they were relocated from river bottoms onto newly broken plots on the open prairies (First Charger 1998:4-5).

Fluctuations in population also served to diminish the band system. By 1911, the population on the Blood reserve had dropped to 1122, before starting to increasing again in the 1920s 21 . By that point however, the band system was beginning to diminish in importance, as several bands had disbanded due to a reduction in numbers, people were re-settling in permanent locations away from the Agency office, increasing identification with community names rather than band names, with less emphasis on communal economic and social pursuits (Taylor 1989:315). Bands came to be referred to by more than one name and as band members spread out across the reserve, bands became less readily identified (Zaharia and Fox, Vol. 1 1995:vii). In the late 1930s, one of

Goldfrank’s (1945:39) informants commented that “(t)he bands now are all mixed up” and indicated that while most Kainai knew of their own band affiliation, many had only a vague idea regarding the band affiliation of others. According to Pete Standing Alone, it was mostly the older people who most strongly retain allegiance to historical local bands

(Taylor 1989:312-314).

Despite these influences, the band system has endured among the Kainai. At the

Sun Dance, the camp circle followed an established order with each band taking its designated place (Blackfoot Gallery Committee 2001:20; Crowshoe and Manneschmidt

21 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs. Annual Report, Part 2 1914:6.

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2002:15-16). After settling on the reserve, bands continued to exhibit somewhat fluid membership as people transferred between bands. Some bands that dissolved after their leaders died saw surviving members dispersed to other bands 22 . During the early reserve era, the less well off still sought to attach themselves to Chiefs who could best provide for their followers and on occasion new leaders who had obtained wealth through new economic activities rose to prominence and garnered a following. With respect to the

Siksika, Hanks and Hanks (1950:128) asserted that pre-reserve leadership traits endured and band members expected their leaders to display generosity, exhibit concern for their welfare, and to protect their interests; these same qualities remained important for Kainai leadership as well (Narcisse Blood, personal communication, October 21, 2004). Pete

Standing Alone confirms that even into the modern era, band allegiances, which may not have been readily apparent, strongly manifested themselves during band council elections and elected officials were expected to promote the interests of their own local bands or clans (Taylor 1898:312). The changing circumstances of settled reserve life and the influence of missionaries, education, new economic pursuits, and dispersal of people into different locations all tended to mitigate against the band system on the Blood reserve as

Kainai increasingly participated in other kinds of social relations; nevertheless, band identity has continued as a feature of Kainai social organization.

The Blood Annuity Paylists reveal something of the changing composition of

Kainai local bands and leadership transitions in the early reserve era. The Blood Annuity

Paylists 23 represent a great source of information on leadership and the composition of

Kainai local bands during the early reserve period. Treaty 7, like all the numbered

22 NAC RG 10 Vols. 9412 to 9433. 23 NAC RG 10, Vols. 9412 to 9433.

214 treaties, stipulated that an annual payment of $5 per person be made to all band members, with Minor Chiefs and Head Chiefs receiving $15 and $25 respectively. On most reserves, this payment was made annually by the Indian Agent, who made a record of individuals paid. In the case of the Blood reserve, the Annuity Paysheets recorded individuals in separate bands under the leadership of Head Chiefs or Minor Chiefs. The bands that appear on the Treaty Annuity Paylists reflect, at least nominally, the various pre-reserve local bands that collectively comprised the larger Kainai regional band or tribe. Each band was identified with the name of its leader, in addition to receiving a letter designation by Indian Affairs. Thus, those that chose to follow Red Crow were identified as “Band ‘A’, Red Crow’s Band” on the Annuity Paylists, where they were counted, and paid, together. Father of Many Children’s band was designated as Band ‘B’ on the Annuity Paysheets, White Antelope’s band was Band ‘C’, and so forth (See

Appendix A) 24 .

Between 1880 and 1882, when all the Kainai bands had finally settled on the reserve, there were 22 different bands, ‘A’ through ‘U’, listed on the Annuity Paylists

(See Appendix A). In 1883, an additional band, Band ‘V’, which was comprised of individuals newly transferred from other bands, was listed under the newly recognized

Head Chief Calf Tail 25 . While the treaty stipulated that a maximum of two Head Chiefs and 15 Minor Chiefs were to be recognized by the department, and thus a maximum of

17 separate bands, initially no attempt was made to enforce this limit. Annuity Paylists

24 On the Annuity Paylist compiled at Treaty 7, Red Crow’s band was designated Band ‘S’, Rainy Chief’s band was designated as II, and other bands received non-sequential alphabetical identifiers. In the years immediately following, 1878 and 1879, letter designations for Kainai bands were inconsistently applied on the Annuity Paysheets. Starting in 1880, Kainai bands were consistently identified with sequential alphabetical labels. Thus Red Crow’s band was Band ‘A’, Father of Many Children’s band was Band ‘B’, White Anteloope’s band was Band ‘C’, and so on. See Appendix A 25 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9416.

215 reveal that from the time the Kainai settled on their reserve in 1880 until 1889, over 20

Chiefs were recognized and paid as such. Twenty-two were on the Annuity Paylist between 1880 and 1882, and 23 from 1883 to 1889 26 .

Through the 1890s and the early 1900s, a number of bands were dissolved or absorbed by other bands and the number of bands recorded on the Blood Annuity Pay

Lists decreased. Between 1890 and 1892 there were 20 distinct Kainai bands on the

Annuity Pay Lists. The death of Minor Chiefs in 1893 and 1897 and the subsequent dispersal of their followers to other bands further reduced the number of Kainai bands to

18 27 . In 1899, the year that Red Crow died, the Annuity Pay Lists revealed the loss of an additional band, thus by the turn of the 19 th century there were 17 distinct bands on the

Blood reserve, with two Head Chiefs—Crop Eared Wolf and Day Chief—and 15 Minor

Chiefs, precisely the number stipulated by treaty. Over the next several years, between

1900 and 1907, eight more Minor Chiefs died. Some of these were ultimately replaced, but a number of bands were allowed to dissipate after the death of a Chief and members transferred to other bands. In other cases, the bands endured for a time without a recognized Chief before a successor was named 28 . By the end of the first decade of the

20 th century, there were 14 bands on the Blood reserve recorded in Indian Affairs records, two represented by Head Chiefs, and 12 acknowledged as being under the leadership of

Minor Chiefs 29 . The number of bands remained constant during the 1910s, although a number of Chiefs died and were not replaced. Indian Affairs records indicate that in

1920, there were still 14 Kainai bands in existence, but that four of these lacked leaders

26 NAC RG 10, Vols. 9414 to 9422. 27 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9423 to Vol. 9426. 28 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9423 to Vol. 9426. 29 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9442.

216 recognized as Chiefs by Indian Affairs (GA M1826/4). These changes in the numbers of bands and band affiliation on the Blood reserve indicates that pre-reserve social and political dynamics continued to have salience during the early reserve era. Despite the restrictions imposed by a sedentary existence on the reserve and the administration of

Indian Affairs officials, Kainai bands continued to fluctuate in size and number as people transferred allegiances in order to take advantage of economic opportunities, renew or defer social relations, or to align themselves with more influential leaders. Despite the changes experienced by the Kainai in a settled reserve context, traditional systems of leadership and authority continued to have relevance.

Elections and Band Leadership

Durring the early reserve period, irregular elections periodically occurred among the

Kainai to replace Head Chiefs and Minor Chiefs who had died. In 1878, a year after

Treaty 7 was negotiated, N.W.M.P. Commissioner Col. MacLeod reported that at a council of the Kainai at Fort Kipp, one new Head Chief and two Minor Chiefs were elected in place of Rainy Chief, Weasel Bull, and Heavily Whipped, all of whom had died in the year since Treaty 7 was concluded, which was considered an ill omen by many Kainai 30 . Rainy Chief died shortly after the 1878 Annuity payments and, on the recommendation of Red Crow, Running Rabbit was installed as the successor of Rainy

Chief as Head Chief. However, Running Rabbit did not have a substantial following among the Kainai and was not regarded as a strong leader by many of the Kainai

(Dempsey 1980:123). It was reported that he maintained closer ties to the people on the

Blackfeet Reservation in Montana and in fact had also been listed as a Chief there.

30 Scollen to Dewdney, April 13, 1879, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3695, File 14942; Dempsey 1980:119.

217

Within a few years, Running Rabbit left permanently for the Blackfeet Reservation,

“taking with him four lodges of his immediate friends and relations” 31 and leaving behind his treaty medal, coat and flag. By taking this action, Running Rabbit had, in the opinion of the department, voluntarily surrendered his position of Head Chief. A note on the Annuity Paysheet for 1882 indicates that Running Wolf was elected as Minor Chief for Band ‘I’ the band previously headed by Running Rabbit 32 . However, a new Head

Chief was not immediately appointed, although several Minor Chiefs connected to the

Followers of the Buffalo requested that one be nominated (Dempsey 1980:146). After

Running Rabbit left the reserve, Red Crow increasingly came to be seen in the eyes of department officials as the unparalleled leader of the Kainai.

Among the Kainai, one Head Chief position, the one for the Upper Blood camp, was continually occupied by Red Crow and his successors, Crop Eared Wolf and then

Shot Both Sides. The Head Chief for the Lower Blood camp, however, sometimes remained vacant for a period of years. Following the removal of Running Rabbit as

Kainai Head Chief, the position remained unfilled for at least a year before Calf Tail was chosen as the second Head Chief. On the 1883 Annuity Paysheet, Calf Tail was cited as the newly elected Head Chief. Calf Tail was designated as the leader of Band ‘V’ and had transferred from Wolf Collar’s band (Band ‘N’). Band ‘V’ was a newly created band consisting of individuals transferring from various other bands 33 . It was necessary to create a new band for Calf Tail because, although he was related to several band Chiefs, he had no following to speak of and few of the traditional qualifications for leadership

31 McLeod to Dewdney, March 17, 1882, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3583, File 1057. 32 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9415A. 33 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9416.

218

(Dempsey 1980:151). Indeed, it appears that the nomination of Calf Tail was largely arranged by Cecil Denny, the Indian Agent.

I think that a vote of the whole will elect an Indian called Calf Tail who has shown himself to be a very good man, and one who has been of great aid to me in taking stolen horses 34 .

Despite Denny’s assertions that White Calf was a respected and influential leader, it was necessary to bolster his support through the distribution of presents.

I should be glad if the department would give the new Blood Chief a present of a wagon as he is poor, but has a great influence among them for bad or good 35 .

White Calf, a respected military leader, leading Kainai Chief, and a Minor Chief under the Indian Act had long had designs on the Head Chief position, but Denny, wary of

White Calf’s reputation as a military leader and truculent nature, thwarted his bid

(Dempsey 1980:152-53). White Calf, infuriated over his failed attempt to be named head

Chief, denounced Calf Tail and cursed him by predicting his imminent death. By 1885, the newly appointed Head Chief Calf Tail had died in an outbreak of disease that swept through the Kainai. He was succeeded as Chief for Band ‘V’ by Bull Horn, but Bull

Horn was designated as a Minor Chief, not a Head Chief 36 . There was only one Head

Chief, Red Crow, between 1884 and 1889, when Day Chief became Head Chief of the

Lower Band. Day Chief remained in this position until his death in 1907.

In 1885, Agent Pocklington reported on the election of four new Minor Chiefs in place of four who had died. While Pocklington commented that “(t)hese Indians were elected by a majority the male adults under Sec. 73 of the Indian Act”, these elections were not authorized by the department and were of an informal nature, that is, although

34 Denny to Dewdney, July 28, 1883, NAC RG 10, Vol.1550 35 Denny to Dewdney, September 28, 1883, NAC RG 10, Vol. 1550. 36 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9416.

219 they appear to conform to the terms of the Indian Act, these elections were not confirmed by Order-in-Council as was the practice with officially sanctioned elections 37 . Further, since Pocklington indicated that each new Chief succeeded a specific leader, it would seem that each was selected by a particular local band. For instance, Calf Shirt was identified as replacing Button Chief as Minor Chief for Band ‘P’, Eagle Rib replaced

Wolf Collar as Minor Chief in Band ‘N’, Heavy Shield replaced Many Spotted Horses as

Minor Chief in Band ‘R’, and Bull Horn replaced Calf Tail as Minor Chief in Band ‘V’.

When Head Chief Calf Tail died in 1883, no new Head Chief was appointed. He was succeeded by Bull Horn as Minor Chief representing Band ‘V’ 38 . Calf Shirt and Eagle

Rib were younger men who Pocklington felt would generally support the objectives of the department (Dempsey 1980:182). However, all of these individuals would have attained status, demonstrated leadership qualities, and attracted a following prior to settling on the reserve and have ensconced within the pre-reserve systems of leadership and authority.

At this time, White Calf once again made a bid to be named Head Chief of the

Lower Bloods, approaching Pocklington and suggesting that Hind Bulls’s band and

Father of Many Children’s band—Bands ‘B’ and ‘J’ respectively on the Annuity Paylists and both aligned with the Followers of the Buffalo—be amalgamated under his leadership 39 . Essentially, White Calf was attempting to establish himself at the head of what would be largest Kainai local band, strengthen his position as the most powerful leader at the Lower camp, and consolidate his claim to be recognized as a Head Chief.

Pocklington expressed misgivings about White Calf, fearing that he would ultimately

37 Pocklington to Dewdney, June 21, 1885, NAC RG 10, Vol. 1552. 38 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9416. 39 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9418.

220 factionalise the Kainai and refused to endorse the proposal 40 . In his quest to attain the position of Head Chief of the Lower Bloods, White Calf made claims based upon traditional leadership traits while at the same time engaging the imposed Indian Act forms of Chiefs and band government. White Calf not only gathered a following and mobilized support within his own local band the Followers of the Buffalo through traditional leadership structures but subsequently pressed Agent Pocklington to install him in the position of Head Chief in order that he may attain a similar status to Red

Crow. This kind of political manoeuvring served to re-inscribe both Kainai systems of leadership and authority as well as Indian Act band government as competing expressions of political authority were given substance in practice.

Five years later, in 1889, Agent Pocklington again informed the department about the election of three new Chiefs on the Blood reserve. According to Pocklington, Day

Chief was elected as a Head Chief of the Blood band, replacing Calf Tail, who had died in 1885. Day Chief was placed at the head of Band ‘O’, which had not had a leader since

Minor Chief Bull Turning Round had died in 1886, while Wolf Bull was elected Minor

Chief from Band ‘B’ and Many Dust was elected Minor Chief from Band ‘M’. Since

Calf Tail had died, Red Crow had been the only Head Chief recorded on the Annuity

Paysheets between 1884 and 1888 41 . The leadership transitions that occurred within

Kainai bands during the 1880s were the first to take place since the Kainai settled on the reserve and reflect emerging Kainai political arrangements in the context of the reserve setting. Kainai local bands retained considerable coherence from the pre-reserve era and the new leaders selected would have risen to prominence largely within traditional

40 Pocklington the Dewdney, November 9 1885, NAC RG 10, Vol. 1553. 41 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9417 to Vol. 9422.

221 systems of leadership and authority. On the reserve, however, the recognition of Chiefs and Headmen by the treaties and the terms of band government stipulated under the

Indian Act were increasingly coming to place constraints upon the selection of Kainai leaders. Kainai systems of leadership and authority, shaped by the actions of both band members and Indian department officials, were being adapted to the developing political relations on the reserve.

Pocklington implied that Day Chief was chosen by the Blood band in general, while Wolf Bull and Many Dust were elected solely by members of their respective local bands.

I have the honour to inform you that the Indians have elected ‘Day Chief’ A88 to be their second Head Chief since ‘Calf Tail’ deceased.

. . .

The members of band B have elected ‘Wolf Bull’, 2B, to succeed his father as the Minor Chief of the Band.

I would also inform you that the Indians of Band C have elected ‘Many Dust’, 2M, to succeed ‘White Antelope’ as Minor Chief of the Band 42 .

Wolf Bull succeeded his father as Minor Chief of Band ‘B’. Many Dust, who replaced

White Antelope as Minor Chief of Band ‘C’, was a member of Striped Dog’s band, Band

‘M’, which dissipated around that time with most its members transferring to Band ‘C’.

Notably, Day Chief was identified as a member of Red Crow’s band, indicating that perhaps he had benefited from a close connection with Red Crow. According to

Dempsey (1980:222), Red Crow had sought to block Blackfoot Old Woman, one of the leading Chiefs at the Lower camp, from attaining the position of Head Chief and had suggested Day Chief to the Agent. The endorsement of Red Crow and the tacit support

42 Pocklington to Dewdeny, February 7, 1889, NAC RG 10, Vol. 1556.

222 of the Agent was doubtless a factor in the selection of Day Chief as Head Chief by the

Kainai. Following his appointment as Head Chief, Day Chief relocated to the Lower camp, taking a portion of his following with him; the rest chose to remain in the Upper camp and joined another band. Pocklington offered a brief assessment of the new Head

Chief:

Day Chief is a quiet sort of man & Red Crow informs me has been his best aid in rescuing stolen horses. He will remove to the Lower Agency and take up a field formerly the property of ‘Bull Turning Round’ deceased 43 .

Day Chief received a new red suit to indicate his status as Head Chief 44 . Both Red Crow and Agent Pocklington took an active interest in the selection of the Head Chief for the

Lower Camp. Red Crow wanted to block a powerful rival from attaining the position, while Pocklington wanted to ensure that the new Head Chief, if not cooperative, was at least not hostile to the department’s objectives. In this manner, the position of Chiefs on the Blood reserve was becoming a site of struggle, subject to the aims, objectives, and experiences of those seeking to invest the institution with their own understandings of the proper exercise of political authority. The selection of Chiefs in effect represents a site of engagement in which Kainai leaders and Indian Affairs officials debated and determined the exercise of political authority on the reserve.

A schedule prepared by Blood Indian Agent James Wilson in 1899, in response to a department circular requesting information about the leaders on the various reserves in the Northwest Territories, identified Red Crow as Head Chief of the Upper Agency and indicated that he was elected previous to Treaty in 1877. Agent Wilson remarked that

“The chiefs and minor chiefs are not elected or appointed for any specified time”,

43 Pocklington to Dewdney, February 7, 1889, NAC RG 10, Vol. 1556. 44 Pocklington to Dewdney, May 6, 1889, NAC RG 10, Vol. 1556.

223 meaning that they were serving indefinitely and were not officially elected under the terms of the Indian Act. The schedule listed two Head Chiefs and 17 Headmen for the

Blood band. All others were recorded as having been appointed subsequent to 1878.

Red Crow is recognized as Head Chief of the Upper Band, while Day Chief, who is identified as having been appointed in 1889, was recognized as the Head Chief of the

Lower Band 45 (See Appendix B). Red Crow and six other Chiefs—Going to the Bear,

One Spot, Old Moon, White Calf, Stolen Persons, and Eagle Shoe—were identified as having been elected previous to 1877, that is, had gained a following and become Chiefs in the traditional manner prior to treaty, while those Chiefs who became so after settling on the reserve were said to be appointed even though a number of them were reported as having been elected under Section 73 of the Indian Act.

Through the 1890s, the Kainai continued to adjust to reserve life, with changes occurring to the size and composition of local bands and the selection of new Chiefs. A number of Minor Chiefs passed away and were replaced by new leaders. Little Ears replaced Bull Back Fat as Minor Chief in Band ‘K’ in 1893 46 . As well, during this time a number of bands dissolved. This mostly occurred when Minor Chiefs died and the surviving members transferred to other bands. In 1893, the Annuity Paylist reveals that

Band ‘D’ under the leadership of Eagle Head was dissolved and members transferred to several other bands 47 . In 1897, Band ‘S’ under White Calf was dissolved and band members transferred to other bands, Primarily to Red Crow’s Band (Band ‘A’) and to

Bull Horn’s band (Band ‘V’). In 1899, Band ‘T’ under Stolen Person, who made Treaty

7 was dissolved. Only a handful of people remained in Band ‘T’ and these individuals

45 NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 46 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9426. 47 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9426.

224 transferred to several other bands 48 . In at least two instances, however, bands were dissolved while their leaders were still alive and individual band members were placed on the rolls of various other bands. In 1890 Band ‘L’ under Hind Bull and Band ‘M’ under

Striped Dog, both of who had made Treaty 7 in 1877, were dissolved. Hind Bull transferred to Wolf Bull’s band (Band ‘B’) and Striped Dog transferred to Many Dust’s band (Band ‘C’). Neither was henceforth recognized as a Minor Chief by the department and from that point forward, each of these former Chiefs received only the $5 annuity entitled to any band member. The number of Minor Chiefs appearing on the Annuity

Paylists was correspondingly reduced by two 49 . Through the dissolution of bands in this way, by 1900, the number of bands among the Kainai were reduced to 17, with two Head

Chiefs and 15 Minor Chiefs, which exactly corresponded to the number stipulated under

Treaty 7. More significantly, however, the dissolution of Hind Bull’s and Striped Dog’s bands indicate that local band membership continued to be fluid as individuals sought to align themselves with more powerful leaders and that the number of local bands continued to fluctuate as had been the case in the pre-reserve era.

The early reserve era represents an important period for Kainai leadership as they were confronted with the new realities of reserve life. After experiencing a series of crises in the immediate pre-reserve era that unsettled enduring social and political routines, Kainai leaders, subject to the limitations imposed by a sedentary existence on the reserve and the coercive administration of Indian Affairs officials, encountered restrictions to the exercise of political authority. The leadership transitions that occurred between 1878 and 1900 reflect the broader implications for Kainai political organization

48 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9432. 49 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9423.

225 as leaders sought to consolidate authority while Indian Affairs officials began their attempts to influence the selection of leaders. Kainai band Chiefs remained individuals of status and influence within the community and were looked to by band members to provide support, guidance, and to ensure the continued welfare of their bands (Frank

Weasel Head, personal communication, November 18, 2004). As in the pre-reserve period, various individuals aspired to leadership positions, collecting a following around themselves and endeavouring to win the acclaim of their local band. However, this process was confounded by the constraints of reserve life and the increasing interference of the Indian Agent, who was interested in installing as Chiefs individuals that they regarded as ‘progressive’. Leaders such as Red Crow realized the constraints and possibilities of Kainai political organization within the reserve setting and worked to consolidate his own authority and undermine rivals. Traditional leadership qualities such as generosity, a war record, and integrity continued to be important and individuals who did not enjoy the esteem of band members would not remain effective Chiefs for long

(Dempsey 1980:220-221; Frank Weasel Head, personal communication, November 18,

2004). As well, growing tensions within the community that could not be resolved by

Chiefs and their followers simply parting ways as might have been done in the pre- reserve era were leading to the development of significant divisions within the community. The emergent political arrangements elaborated during the early reserve era were constituted as Kainai leaders engaged and debated the exercise of political authority on the Blood reserve. The leadership transitions and realignment of local bands during the early reserve era reveal both the continuing importance of Kainai band Chiefs and

Kainai leadership becoming a site of struggle.

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Transition to a New Generation of Leaders

In 1899, J. Wilson, Blood Indian Agent, explained that during the previous several years five Blood Minor Chiefs—Eagle Head, Hind Chief, Striped Dog, White Calf, and Stolen

Person—had died without successors having been appointed and suggested to the department that the opportunity be now taken to elect what he called a “good working man to act as working Chief on the reserve, and one who could be consulted with regard to all work” 50 . He intimated that Red Crow was becoming too old to be reliable in that regard and was apt to change his mind thereby hindering the Agent’s work.

Of late he has given me a good deal of trouble in this way, and if a strong minded man was appointed as Minor Chief, with the understanding that he was to take charge of working parties, it would not only be a great convenience to the Farmers and myself, but it would be appreciated by the working Indians. For a year or two back the Indians have been pressing for this appointment and have cited the election of “Iron Shield” at the Blackfoot Crossing 51 .

In the context of increasing tensions over the development of the reserve economy, divisions over leadership began to manifest themselves and the Agent as well as different factions of the Kainai attempted to direct the process for appointing Chiefs to their own ends, apparently referring to the appointment of Iron Shield as Head Chief among the

Siksika as a precedent. This was a fairly unusual circumstance, even by the incongruous standards of Indian Affairs. Following the death of Crowfoot, Head Chief of the

Blackfoot South Camp, in 1890, two individuals emerged each with a strong claim to be recognized as Head Chief. Iron Shield had been endorsed by Crowfoot before his death,

50 Wilson to Laird, May 5, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 51 Wilson to Laird, May 5, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

227 while Running Rabbit 52 had received the vote of a majority of band members in an election held by Indian Affairs officials 53 . The department conceded that each had a viable claim to be recognized as Head Chief and more importantly, each had the backing of a considerable portion of the South Camp (Calf Robe 1979:26). In the pre-reserve era, the situation would have been settled with each leader simply removing to a new location with their following. However, on the reserve, such remedies were not available. The situation remained unresolved until 1897, when a senior Indian Affairs official decreed both men should be paid as Head Chiefs, each man serving as Head Chief in alternate years. Perhaps the “working Indians” that Wilson refers to were citing the example of a leader being appointed in order to appease a disgruntled faction within a Band.

The Agent suggested that Eagle Child of One Spot’s band be appointed as a

Minor Chief. This individual was characterized as a conscientious worker and a great influence among a certain segment of the Kainai.

He is a great power among the young men, and one who has always taken an active part in all work. He has a waggon (sic), rake, mower and a good bunch of cattle, and in almost every way sets a good example to the other Indians, I am certain that his election would please all the younger Indians. If possible I would like this appointment made before the working season goes further 54 .

While Agent Wilson refers to the election of Eagle Child, he seems to imply that Eagle

Child would be simply installed as Minor Chief without recourse to the opinions of the

Kainai. Such a move would allow the Agent to install an individual sympathetic to the aims and objectives of the department and effectively circumvent any opposition that may have been offered by Red Crow or the other Chiefs. This also reveals something of

52 This person was not the same Running Rabbit that had been dismissed as a Head Chief on the Blood reserve in 1882. 53 Paget to Reed, October 2, 1896, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-4. 54 Wilson to Laird, May 5, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

228 the developing divisions between those who had status and privilege in the established horse and cattle economy and those who wished to expand farming operations. David

Laird, Indian Commissioner approved of the appointment of Eagle Child as Minor Chief for an indefinite period on the understanding that should authority for the elective system be obtained for the Blood reserve, that the term of office should expire 55 . However, before this action could be taken, Red Crow died and was succeeded by Crop Eared

Wolf.

Before his death, Red Crow made known his wishes that his adopted son Crop

Eared Wolf succeed him (Goodstriker 1996:18, Francis First Charger, personal communication, December 20, 2005). Crop Eared Wolf was confirmed as the unanimous choice to succeed Red Crow as Head Chief at a meeting held by Indian Commissioner

David Laird 56 . There were other candidates who had a claim for the position, including

Chief Moon, another son of Red Crow. However, these challengers either were not able to attract sufficient support among the band members, or declined to press their claim.

According to Dempsey (1998), Red Crow’s eldest son Willie Red Crow actively campaigned to be recognized as Head Chief, but lacking Red Crow’s approval, was unsuccessful in his bid. Inspector Markel asserted that another of Red Crow’s sons,

Chief Moon, should have been the proper successor to the position, but he was usurped by Crop Eared Wolf 57 . However, Chief Moon’s daughter has stated that her father had declined to stand for the position (Maggie Curly Rider in Zaharia and Fox 1995:12;

Francis First Charger, personal communication, December 20, 2005). The Agent was instructed, upon securing a Declaration of Office from Crop Eared Wolf, to present him

55 Marginalia, Wilson to Laird, May 5, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 56 McLean to Laird, September 11, 1900, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 57 Markel to McLean, February 12, 1909, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121,698-3.

229 with the Treaty medal that Red Crow received at the making of Treaty 7, signifying his status as Head Chief 58 .

Crop Eared Wolf, the younger brother of Red Crow’s second wife, was adopted by Red Crow after he was left orphaned as a young boy when his parents died in an epidemic (Dempsey 1980:59). The boy soon became a favoured child of Red Crow and as a young man accompanied his adoptive father on raids, compiling a respectable war record. Through raiding and breeding, Crop Eared Wolf was able to establish a large horse herd and by the time the Kainai settled on the reserve, he possessed considerable wealth. He remained close to Red Crow, living in his camp, farming vegetables and grain, and continuing to increase his horse herd. When the opportunity arose to exchange horses for cattle in the 1890s, Crop Eared Wolf was quick to take advantage and established himself as a leader in the industry (Dempsey 1998). During the first decades on the reserve, Crop Eared Wolf was a confidant of Red Crow and an astute observer of

Kainai politics, becoming a man of status and prominence among the Kainai. He came to embody many of the same leadership qualities for which Red Crow was renowned and after becoming Head Chief was a staunch defender of Kainai interests and unwaveringly opposed any surrender of reserve lands. While Crop Eared Wolf was able to earn a reputation as a warrior in the pre-reserve era, he developed many of his leadership traits during the early reserve era, as an active ceremonialist, distributing surplus agricultural produce to band members, and generally earning a reputation for generosity, strength of character, and wisdom. The selection of Crop Eared Wolf as Head Chief in 1900 demonstrates that traditional influences were still important to Kainai politics in the reserve era.

58 Laird to McLean, October 24, 1900, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, file 121698-3.

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In April 1905, the deaths of two Blood Minor Chiefs were reported to the department. These were Old Moon, who had made Treaty 7 in 1877, and Many Dust, who had served since 1889 and were reported to have been leaders of Bands ‘H’ and ‘C’ respectively 59 . Agent R. N. Wilson originally recommended that only one of these positions be filled by appointment because he explained that only one of the bands remained of a significant size. Writing to the department on the matter, Indian

Commissioner Laird stated:

I beg to state that Mr. Agent Wilson recommends that the vacancy caused by the death of “Many Dust” be filled, as the Band is a somewhat numerous subdivision of the tribe and contains some worthy men. I would support Mr. Wilson’s recommendation and request that authority be given to appoint a progressive man for the position for an indefinite term, the appointee to sign the usual declaration. With regard to the vacancy in Band H. I., Mr. Wilson states that it should not be filled at present 60 .

However, in the end, both positions were filled. The department gave authority for appointments in the usual manner for an indefinite term and requested that a declaration be signed 61 . Running Crane, who was characterized as “one of the best workers on the reserve and is a man of good judgement as well as being progressive” was selected to fill the Minor Chief position and signed a Declaration of Office. This Declaration identifies

Running Crane as the Minor Chief of Blood Band ‘C’ 62 . In the second instance, after it was determined at the annuity payments that Band ‘H’ numbered 56 individuals, it was recommended that the position be filled. Eagle Bear (aka Left Hand) was selected to fill the vacancy in Band ‘H’. According to Agent Wilson, this individual was sympathetic to the aims of departmental policy.

59 Laird to McLean, April 6, 1905, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 60 Laird to McLean, May 6, 1905, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 61 Pedley to Laird, May 11, 1905, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 62 Laird to McLean, Sept 12, 1905, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

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Left Hand has been a leader of the progressive party on the reserve and one of the staunchest supporters of the department for 12 or 15 years 63 .

It was noted that he was previously a member of Band ‘A’, but would be subsequently transferred to Band ‘H’ 64 . There was no indication of how these men were selected, however, policy and precedent on the Blood reserve was to hold a meeting of the male band members over the age of 21 and select candidates in an open vote.

In 1906, the deaths of two more Minor Chiefs, Wolf Bull of Band ‘B’, and Eagle

Ribs of Band ‘N’, were reported to the department. While the department directed that successors be nominated for both these men, only one Minor Chief was appointed, Many

White Horses, who replaced Eagle Ribs as the Minor Chief for Band ‘N’. This appointment was confirmed by the department for an indefinite term and a Declaration was signed 65 .

In November 1911, in response to complaints made by a delegation of Chiefs from Treaty 4 who asserted that vacancies to the ranks of Chiefs were routinely being left unfilled by Indian Affairs officials, the department issued a circular letter to all Indian

Agents requesting that the death or resignation of Chiefs and Councillors be reported immediately (See Chapter III). Consequently, Blood Indian Agent Hyde submitted the name of Weasel Fat for appointment as Minor Chief in place of Bull Shield (Band ‘Q’,

1878) and Strangling Wolf (Band ‘L’, 1879), who had died in 1910 and 1908 respectively. In the opinion of Agent Hyde, “Weasel Fat is a progressive Indian well liked and a most suitable man” 66 . The department confirmed the appointment for an indefinite term. It is not clear whether Weasel Fat’s appointment was to fill one or two

63 Laird to McLean, March 28, 1906, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 64 Laird to McLean, March 28, 1906, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 65 Laird to McLean, December 10, 1906, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 66 Hyde to McLean, November 13, 1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

232 vacancies, but he was designated as the Minor Chief of Band ‘L’ on the Declaration of

Office that he signed.

In April 1913, Agent Hyde informed the department of the Death of Crop Eared

Wolf. The Agent praised the leadership qualities of Crop Eared Wolf and informed the department on his expressed desire that he be succeeded by his son.

Crop Eared Wolf was the Right man in the right place, he had all the necessary attributes to make a successful Chief, and always had the confidence and obedience of the Tribe, I also lost a good friend in him. Before dying, he wished his son Shot Both Sides to be appointed Head Chief in his place. If it meets with the departments approval, seeing that it is Head Chief that is to be elected, I think it would be preferable to have an election, and allow the tribe to vote on it and so express their wishes on the subject 67 .

This course of action was authorized by the department and Agent Hyde subsequently reported that Shot Both Sides was unanimously elected by the Blood tribe. He mentioned that the public endorsement Shot Both Sides received from the late Head Chief carried considerable weight among the Kainai and that Shot Both Sides was more effective in mobilizing support.

Judging from the speeches, the Indians were largely influenced by the wishes of the late Crop Eared Wolf and besides Shot Both Sides was a better canvasser than the other aspirants, also jealousy among the Minor Chiefs was a large factor in his election 68 .

The election of Shot Both Sides was confirmed by the department for an indefinite period. Shot Both Sides had a long and distinguished career as Head Chief, serving until his death in 1956. He was well respected among the Kainai for his character and integrity and was described in departmental correspondence as unassuming and industrious 69 (Maggie Eagle Plume in Zaharia and Fox 1995:26; Sam Red Crow in

67 Hyde to McLean, April 16, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1. 68 Hyde to McLean, May 16, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1. 69 Wilson to Scott, February 20, 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1.

233

Zaharia and Fox 1995, Vol. 1:50). Retaining a strong belief in Blackfoot spirituality throughout his life, Shot Both Sides embodied traditional leadership traits of compassion, generosity, and concern for the well-being of all band members in attempting to improve conditions of the reserve (Jim Shot Both Sides in Zaharia and Fox 1995:54). He was also willing to use his position to challenge the Indian Agent and oppose department policy, consistently resisting all attempts to obtain a surrender of land on the Blood reserve.

After his death in 1956, Shot Both Sides was succeeded by his son Jim Shot Both Sides as Head Chief.

By 1914, a new Agent, W. J. Dilworth, had been appointed to the Blood reserve.

When it came to filling vacancies among the Kainai leadership, Dilworth was more eager to directly interfere in the process than were his predecessors. In December 1914,

Blackfoot Old Woman, the Head Chief of the Lower Agency, died. In reporting the death to the department Dilworth stated that he would prefer to appoint a new Head Chief rather than hold an election because he was certain the Kainai would likely nominate someone of which he did not approve. “Election by Indians would result in the choice of a loud talker. I would prefer to have a progressive doer as chief. A man of sense and substance” 70 . If allowed to appoint a new Head Chief, Dilworth wanted to wait until after the matter of expenditures of lease monies came up for discussion in order to see how each individual conducted themselves. Presumably, Dilworth would be disinclined to appoint someone who opposed him on the matter. Essentially, Dilworth was seeking to use the expenditure of lease monies to gauge the disposition of candidates for the position of Head Chief and exert some influence over the political routines of the Kainai Chiefs with respect to the disbursement of band income and reserve resources.

70 Dilworth to Scott, December 21, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

234

Dilworth was instructed as to proper procedure to follow, that is, the choice of the majority of band members was to be ascertained at a meeting of the band, the choice being confirmed by the department only on the recommendation of the Agent. Not to be dissuaded, Dilworth continued to press the department to permit him to appoint

‘progressive’ men of his own choosing as leaders. In January 1915, Agent Dilworth reported that a recent meeting of the Blood band members Weasel Fat was the overwhelming favourite to replace Blackfoot Old Woman as Head Chief of the Lower

Agency. Dilworth adamantly opposed this choice, because, as he explained, Weasel Fat was strongly associated with traditional Kainai systems of leadership and authority. The largest cattle owner on the reserve, Weasel Fat derived his status and influence from participation in Kainai ceremonial activities, by demonstrating traditional qualities of leadership, and by cultivating a following through oratory and beneficial acts, enjoying considerable support among the band members invested in the prevailing social and economic circumstances on the reserve.

As I have previously written on the 21 st ult. these Indians would elect the talker the agitator; and that is exactly what they have done. While nothing can be said greatly wrong about Weasel Fat, his greatest weakness is his oerweaning desire for popularity among the Indians, his desire to talk talk, give feasts, chase off visiting to other reserves, give dances, all of these things of course tending to keep him in the limelight. Would do nothing against he wishes of the majority of the Indians even if he knew it to be right. A great gift giver. In short a good Indian in many ways but representing the old order, the medicine men, the Sun Dance men, has considerable following which he has got thru his extravagant gift giving and his talking those things in council that the majority of the Indians like to hear. Then as representing the old order of things I would not recommend Weasel Fat (sic—spelling and grammatical errors as in the original). 71

Clearly, Dilworth considered Weasel Fat to be antagonistic to department objectives and expressed concern that if made Head Chief he would certainly pursue treaty grievances,

71 Dilworth to MacLean, January 12, 1915, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

235 resist reductions in rations, and otherwise create difficulty for department officers. In contrast, Dilworth suggested that Minor Chief Running Antelope be elevated to the vacant Head Chief position. Among the earliest participants in the farming program initiated on the Blood reserve in 1907, Running Antelope was characterized as hard- working and law-abiding. According to Dilworth, Running Antelope represented an influential force among most of the farmers on the Resesrve.

My choice for head chief is minor chief Running Antelope. This Indian was appointed by Mr. R. N. Wilson some 10 years ago. He is the opposite of Weasel Fat is a doer rather than a talker; Is about as well off in personal property as Weasel Fat with the difference that he has gathered all of his property by energy and perseverance, Running Antelopes home is the model on the Blood reserve. He was the first Indian that approached Mr. R. N. Wilson to try and get the farming started. Has always been on the side of progress is not a loud talker or one given to talking at every opportunity. Whenever he does talk he says something in few words, always sensible and reasonable.

Many of the Indians think him mean because he will not give them feasts, etc, consequently not so popular as Weasel Fat. Yet he has all of the progressive and thinking Indians on his side, and is strongly for progress by this quiet yet effective influence. 72

While each man had a significant following, Dilworth asserted that Weasel Fat had the support of a considerable majority and that any further discussion on the matter would only serve to exacerbate the issue. Both Weasel Fat and Running Antelope had come to prominence by demonstrating a capacity for leadership and gathering a following in a manner that reflects the continuing influences of traditional forms and practices of leadership. Through selfless acts, achieving success in subsistence activities, an ability to materially assist other band members, and generally exhibiting a concern for the welfare of other band members, both Weasel Fat and Running Antelope perpetuated traditional systems of leadership and authority within the reserve context. In the case of Weasel Fat,

72 Dilworth to MacLean, January 12, 1915, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

236 this would seem to be obvious. Participation in the sun dance and other important Kainai rituals, his conspicuous generosity, and a concern for representing the consensus of his followers all have clear continuity with pre-reserve political action. Meanwhile, the actions of Running Antelope may also be regarded as motivated by traditional conceptions of leadership. Although he declined to participate in give-aways or sponsor dances, he participated in traditional forms of leadership in other ways. In standing as a representative for the farming faction and others who were participating in new economic activities, Running Antelope undertook a responsibility to act on behalf of others consistent with traditional leadership roles. As a successful farmer, Running Antelope was expected to provide guidance and material support which he did by working to expand farming operations on the reserve. The evident division between those supporting Weasel Fat and those supporting Running Antelope gives some indication of the emerging differences between the band members who retained wealth and standing in the horse economy and ceremonial activities on the one hand and the emergent element that had begun to acquire a degree of wealth in the cash economy and desired to expand farming operations on the other. Deepening division among the Kainai meant that political representation was becoming a site of struggle as Kainai leadership and the selection of Chiefs was becoming more contentious. Nevertheless, there were definite continuities with traditional systems of leadership and authority as the expectation of leaders remained largely the same and leaders continued to employ many of the same strategies to win and retain followers.

Dilworth pressed the department for authority to summarily appoint Running

Antelope as Head Chief of the Lower Agency and William Wadsworth as a Minor Chief

237 arguing that such a move would be of benefit to the band. Dilworth suggested that the appointment of these individuals would result in a more useful and productive band council and promote the advancement of the band.

The above suggestions I beg to submit for your consideration as being along progressive lines and along lines that will lend more usefulness to the Indian Council which at present time is of little or any importance, towards an progressive idea. 73

The department remained indisposed to consider the action suggested by Dilworth.

While the department would not approve the appointment of a Chief against the wishes of a majority of the band, there was no reluctance in simply declining to confirm as Chiefs individuals that the Agent did not recommend. Dilworth was advised that there was no necessity to fill vacancies unless band members absolutely demanded it and that it would perhaps be for the best to leave the matter in abeyance for the present. This was in fact a common department strategy when confronted with selection of Chiefs considered

‘unprogressive’, confrontational, or otherwise unsuitable. In this way, Aboriginal leadership was further constrained as individuals who encouraged traditional practices, would not conform to department mandates, or challenged Indian Affairs administration and management of reserves were prevented from assuming the position of Chief. In this manner, Weasel Fat was essentially blacklisted by the department and denied the opportunity to exert further political influence as a Head Chief.

Accordingly, Dilworth deferred any action on the matter until 1917 when he informed the department of the deaths of two Minor Chiefs, Running Crane and Little

Ears. He remarked that both of these individuals had done good work on the reserve and expressed his desire that good men true to the department be selected to succeed them.

73 Dilworth to MacLean, January 12, 1915, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

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Dilworth also reminded the department that no successor was ever appointed for Lower

Band Head Chief Blackfoot Old Woman because “the person selected at that time for chief by the Indians would be hopeless, an agitator and generally opposed to progress” and suggested that he be allowed to suggest progressive candidates to fill these three vacancies 74 . Although Dilworth was again informed that the department would only confirm the appointment of Chiefs assented to by the majority of the band he once more attempted to convince his superiors to allow him to fill the vacancies by appointment.

With regard to the appointment of chiefs, would it not be better to have chiefs made by appointment, and chosen from the most influential members of the band who support the department’s policy, the most popular men are those who try to keep up the traditions of the past 75 .

The department remained un-persuaded and despite Dilworth’s entreaties, no action was taken on the matter. More broadly, Dilworth’s attempts to control the selection of Chiefs may be understood as an endeavour to recompose the Kainai band council as a forum through which the Kainai could be subjected to more effective colonial regulation. The strong community support given to Weasel Fat would indicate that traditional systems of leadership continued to have considerable salience among the Kainai for selecting Chiefs.

Refusing to confirm the appointments of such individuals and attempting to install Chiefs considered more amenable to department policy was a means to assert greater control over the institution and impose the department’s conception of political authority.

Conflicts over the appointment of Chiefs arose as the band council emerged as a site of struggle.

74 Dilworth to McLean, October 1, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1. 75 Scott to Dilworth, October 2, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

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Vacancies on Band Council

By 1920, the number of Chiefs recognized on the Blood reserve had become quite reduced. In response to an inquiry from the department on the matter, Agent J. F. Faunt reported that in addition to Shot Both Sides, the Head Chief, there were seven Minor

Chiefs or Councillors. These were identified as One Spot, Running Wolf, Left Hand,

Many White Horses, Running Antelope, and Weasel Fat 76 . When the Blood Memorial was presented to the Minister of the Interior in 1920, among the grievances the band raised was the fact that vacancies in the band council had been left unfulfilled.

Section 43—Your Memorialists represent that whereas under the Treaty of the 22 nd day of September, 1877, they are entitled to two Head Chiefs, and fifteen Councillors, vacancies therein caused by death have not been filled for many years, and at present there is only one Chief and the Councillors number eight only, much to the detriment of the affairs of your Memorialists, who are thus deprived of the necessary official leadership provided for them by Treaty.

While Treaty 7 stipulated that two Head Chiefs would be recognized for the Kainai, one for the North Blood and one for the South Blood, one of these Head Chief positions sometimes remained unfilled for a period of years. Rainy Chief, who was designated as

Head Chief of the South Blood, in Treaty 7, died in 1878 and Running Rabbit was selected in his place. However, Running Rabbit was declared to have vacated the position of Head Chief when he relocated to the Blackfeet Reservation in Montana and the position remained vacant for at least a year until Calf Tail was named Head Chief of the Lower Camp in contentious circumstances. Calf Tail died in 1885 and no replacement was chosen until Day Chief was selected in 1889. Day Chief died in 1907 and was succeeded as Head Chief by Blackfoot Old Woman at the suggestion of Agent

76 Faunt to McLean, July 12, 1920, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

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Wilson 77 . Blackfoot Old Woman had been a Minor Chief since 1878, having been identified by Col. Macleod as a replacement for one of the three Chiefs that died in the year following Treaty 7. He was certainly a Chief of some standing and had attained his position prior to the Kainai settling on the reserve. Following the death of Blackfoot Old

Woman in 1914, only one Head Chief was recognized on the Blood reserve, despite the repeated efforts of the Kainai to have the position filled 78 . Commissioner Graham, in his reply to the charges in the Blood Memorial, simply asserted that the appointment of

Chiefs and Councillors was the responsibility of the department 79 . This response did not satisfy Head Chief Shot Both Sides and Minor Chiefs Many White Horses, Running

Antelope, and Left Hand, who signed a rejoinder prepared by R. N. Wilson, the retired

Indian Agent whose assistance was enlisted by the Cheifs.

Section 8. Refers to No. 43 of the Memorial and our repeated request that the vacancies among our chiefs be filled up to the number provided for by Treaty. The reply that “The Commissioner has nothing to do with this matter”, is no reply at all as we did not address this complaint to the Commissioner or connect him with it. We are glad, however, to learn through the agent more recently that the department has decided to fill the vacancies as requested, which is a move in the right direction, but we desire to impress upon the Government our wish to have these vacancies filled by means of an open election under a proportional system that will provide all of our people with representation proportionate to their numerical strength. We also ask that each new chief be elected for a term of three years only and that the surviving six life chiefs appointed under the old system be not molested 80 .

It is worth noting that the incumbent Chiefs wished to retain their status as life Chiefs, that is serving for an indefinite period, but wanted incoming Chiefs to be elected in accordance with the band government provisions of the Indian Act for three year terms.

77 Laird to McLean, October 21, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 78 Dilworth to Mclean, January 12, 1915, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1. 79 Graham to Scott, March 17, 1922, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt 2. 80 Head Chief Shot Both Sides and Minor Chiefs of the Blood reserve to Hon C. A. Stewart, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs. December 20, 1922, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt 2.

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Such a move would allow the serving Chiefs to retain a marked precedence over any new

Chiefs, consolidate their authority within the band council, and assert a degree of control over the institution. It also reveals an extensive knowledge of the substance of the Indian

Act and a determination to turn it to their own ends. The Kainai continued to press the department on the matter, indicating that the selection of Chiefs remained an important concern for them. In asserting their right to have a full complement of Chiefs as stipulated under treaty, Kainai leaders were expressing themselves not only on the conditions of management that should prevail on the reserve, but also attempting to negotiate the terms of political representation within the context of Indian affairs administration.

In 1922 the band again requested that the full complement of Chiefs be recognized as stipulated by treaty. The Agent advised that as a result of the deaths of a number of Kainai Chiefs there were now eight vacancies and band members were asking that these be filled. He also mentioned that some bands have become quite small and suggested that they could be amalgamated, which reflects on-going changes in the composition and structure of Kainai bands.

During the past few years quite a number of the minor chiefs or headmen of this band have died with the result that at present there are eight vacancies to be filled.

The Indians have asked that something be done towards filling of these vacancies. I cannot find anything on file as to what procedure was followed on previous occasions.

The vacancies were caused by the deaths of the following: Running Crane, Young Pine, Weasel Fat, Running Wolf, Little Ears, Strangling Wolf, Bull Shield and Bull Horn.

Some of these bands have become so small that I thought that two or three of them could be merged into one. Strangling Wolf’s band has only eighteen as also

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has Bull Horn’s and I had thought that these two could be transferred to Heavy Shield’s band which only numbers seventeen 81 .

This initiative originated entirely with the Kainai, who clearly felt that Chiefs filled vital leadership roles within the community and were sufficiently important to insist on having these positions filled. Kainai Chiefs and band members would hardly push Indian Affairs on this matter if they saw these positions primarily as government collaborators or officers of the Crown, nor would the department be reluctant to make the appointments if the Kainai leaders were unable to successfully challenge the administration and management of the reserve. By insisting upon their right to have all the Chiefs to which they were entitled under treaty, Kainai leaders continued to exert influence over the composition and orientation of band council, asserting their own conception of how it should operate in practice.

An internal headquarter memo recommended that the Blood Agent be authorized to hold a meeting of the band to select candidates to fill the vacancies, but D. C. Scott,

Deputy Superintendent General, delayed action, stating that he would personally discuss the issue with band members when visiting the reserve in the near future. Whether these discussions ever took place is not indicated in the records. However, no action was taken to fill the vacancies and a petition signed by over 100 Blood band members requesting that elections be held to fill the vacancies in the positions of Chiefs and Headmen before the next treaty payments was forwarded to the department through the office of the

Agent 82 . Commenting on this petition, Agent Faunt indicated his disinclination to appoint additional Chiefs.

81 Faunt to McLean, May 28, 1922, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1. 82 Petition to Scott, December 1922, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

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I might say that some of these vacancies have existed for years and I have just been allowing them to exist as I think the band as a whole gets along just as well without the kind of headmen we have had up to the present.

I suppose however they are entitled to have a certain number of chiefs or headmen as provided for in the Act and now that they have put there desires in writing, we will have to give the matter some attention 83 .

Faunt implied that Kainai Chiefs were a nuisance, but given that they were capable of concerted political action in opposition to department objectives, Faunt’s reluctance to recommend that additional Chiefs be recognized reflects a more substantial concern that

Chiefs were able to effectively engage Indian Affairs officials regarding the administration of the reserve. Scott, while ostensibly supportive of proper representation for the Kainai, refrained from authorizing an election, instructing instead that a meeting of the band be held to determine the number of Chiefs to be added. This served as a delaying tactic that permitted the department to avoid relinquishing increased control to the Kainai.

In the meantime, Head Chief Shot Both Sides retained legal council to press the department on the matter 84 . The lawyer wrote to Scott on the matter twice, however, the department records contain no record of a response and in any event, no action was taken on the matter. The continued pressure brought to bear by the Kainai Chiefs demonstrates the significance of the matter and their determination to force the department to acknowledge their right to a full complement of Chiefs. The department, for its part, in resisting the efforts of the Kainai leadership to address this matter, signalled its reluctance to concede a political advantage which could permit the Kainai to consolidate and expand the authority of Kainai leadership within the reserve. In these actions, department

83 Faunt to McLean, January 18, 1923, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1. 84 February 23, 1923, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

244 officials and Kainai Chiefs were essentially engaged in a struggle over the composition and competence of the band council.

Conclusion

Over the first 50 years on the reserve, the Kainai leadership experienced increasing interference from Indian Affairs as leadership became a site of contestation. The flexible and decentralized nature of Kainai leadership and authority was misconstrued in Treaty 7 of 1877, which stipulated that the Kainai were entitled to two Head Chiefs and 15 Minor

Chiefs. While there were certainly Kainai leaders like Red Crow, Rainy Chief, and

Father of Many Children who were acknowledged to have considerable influence, no leaders wielded supreme authority over the entire regional band. The position of Head

Chief, therefore, was largely of the Canadian Government’s creation. Over the early reserve period, as the Kainai accommodated themselves to life on the reserve, changes began to manifest in their social and political organization. Initially, the various local bands maintained a sense of coherence, but by the turn of the century this had begun to be mitigated as people were starting to engage in various economic activities and relocated across the reserve. The duties and obligations of Chiefs as well began to undergo some fundamental changes. With the hardships of early reserve life and rations available to all band members through department officials, the provision of food was diminished as a

Chiefly requirement. Warfare and raiding were effectively curtailed as a means to demonstrate leadership qualities. It also became more difficult to support a large following. Some of the functions of Chiefs became more formalized. For instance,

Indian Affairs officials and the N.W.M.P. considered the Chiefs to possess judicial

245 authority and be able to enforce laws and demand obedience from their followers. As well, sedentary existence upon the reserve and the increasing control wielded over the

Kainai by Indian Affairs officials placed constraints upon the authority exercised by the

Chiefs. Nevertheless, local band Chiefs remained significant positions within the community and Chiefs were expected to continue to be generous, self-effacing, and dependable while providing for the welfare of their followers.

The Annuity Paylists show that the leadership and the number of bands remained fairly stable over the first part of the reserve period. As Chiefs died, new leaders were routinely selected and confirmed through informal ‘elections’ held by the Indian department. This process reveals the challenges and constraints placed upon Kainai political systems in the reserve setting. Kainai leaders attempted to consolidate their authority while Indian Affairs officials began to directly interfere in the selection of leaders by blocking those they considered intractable. Approaching the turn of the 19 th century, a number of Chiefs died and several bands dissolved as their members transferred to new bands in a pattern that reflects pre-reserve social dynamics. This trend continued in the first decades of the 20 th century and while the reserve population declined to about 1100 people by 1911 before rebounding, the reduction in the number of

Chiefs owed more to the Agent’s desire to avoid the election of what he termed

‘agitators’ than population reductions. Both Agents Dilworth and Faunt had declined to hold meetings to nominate candidates for vacant Chief positions because they did not approve of the likely candidates. It is also clear that during this time some of the divisions between the different factions within the Kainai began to express themselves in the selection of Chiefs and that manipulation of the system by Indian Affairs officials

246 exploited this division. By 1920 the ranks of the Chiefs had become seriously depleted and Head Chief Shot Both Sides repeatedly pressed Indian Affairs to sanction an election for the Kainai. Department officials, fearing that the Kainai would select leaders that they regarded as intractable, allowed the matter to stand in abeyance for a number of years. In this back and forth process, both the Kainai and department officials were engaged in a debate over the terms and substance of the band council, contributing to its formation as a contested institution. While there was some consideration of applying the elective provisions of the Indian Act to the Blood reserve, it was in fact not until the

1930s that elections were sanctioned and the Kainai were able to select new Chiefs. By this point, leadership had become a contentious issue and the band council a site of struggle between Kainai leaders and Indian Affairs.

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CHAPTER SIX

Kainai Band Council Confrontations with Indian Affairs

In the early years of the 20 th century, the Kainai were faced with a series of complex political issues that directly confronted the management of land and resources on the

Blood reserve and ultimately served to engage Kainai Chiefs in contests over the nature of leadership and authority in the colonial context. During this time, the surrender of reserve lands, attempts to depose the Head Chief, and the lease of reserve land for wartime production served as flashpoints around which Kainai Chiefs, employing various responses, sought to resist pressure exerted by Indian Affairs officials and exert their own political autonomy. These confrontations essentially became struggles over meaning and power in which Kainai leaders attempted to challenge the regulatory intrusions of the

Indian Affairs administration and ultimately came to debate the terms of colonial domination.

Meeting Between the Kainai Chiefs and Agent Hyde

When J. W. Hyde became the new Agent in 1911, replacing R. N. Wilson, Head Chiefs

Crop Eared Wolf and Blackfoot Old Woman, and several of the other Minor Chiefs sought him out and met with him in order to make known their concerns and present their views on how the reserve should be run. This meeting represented more than merely an opportunity for the Chiefs to air grievances. It revealed that the Chiefs were actively seeking to engage the Indian Agent in Kainai systems of meaning and to recast their interaction within the parameters of Kainai political systems. This meeting provides an important context for understanding the dynamic between the Chiefs and the Indian

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Agent, in which participants attempted to reinterpret and re-inscribe events according to their own conception of political authority. In seeking to exert influence over the disposition of land, resources and the social organization of the reserve, Crop Eared Wolf and the other Kainai Chiefs sought to contest the colonial impositions of the Indian

Affairs administration and assert a degree of political autonomy. Agent Hyde reported on the substance of the meeting, which began with a symbolic act of conferring a name upon the Agent.

CROP EARED WOLF the Head Chief after greeting Mr. Hyde began to speak. He said they had come to give Mr Hyde a new name and have a talk with him about certain matters on the reserve. All the Chiefs had been talking outside and the name they had decided to give him was “Pa-na-koan” meaning “Seeing a long way off”. This was the name of the first big Chief who made treaty with the Americans in 1855 and they had heard such good reports of Mr Hyde they thought that this was a good name to give him. They hoped he would be a good friend to the Bloods and they would be good friends with him 1.

Beginning with Crop Eared Wolf, each Chief proceeded to reiterate their wishes for mutual friendship to be established. Also significant was the way in which the meeting was conducted with Chiefs each addressing the Agent in turn, adopting the form of a formal Kainai regional band council. This meeting was attended by Head Chief Crop

Eared Wolf, as well as Minor Chiefs Blackfoot Old Woman, Running Wolf, Running

Antelope, Left Hand, Little Ears, and White Calf Chief. Speaking each in turn, the

Chiefs identified issues of concern and articulated their conception of how affairs on the reserve should be arranged. The most immediate concerns of the Chiefs were the issue of rations, the management of the cattle on the reserve, livestock on the reserve, grazing leases, payments due individual band members for grain shipped, and the selection of two new Chiefs for the Lower Agency. They also wanted to see the young men who had been

1 Hyde to McLean, June 30, 1911, INAC 773/3-1.

249 educated in the boarding and industrial schools given the opportunity to work on the reserve and expressed reservations about some of the Agency employees. Finally, they uniformly expressed themselves against selling any reserve land 2.

For his part, Hyde appears to have listened to each Chief carefully, acknowledging the formality of the occasion and responding in kind. He used the opportunity to explain department objectives and attempted to impress upon the Chiefs their responsibilities as officers of the Crown to uphold the law and to promote Indian

Affairs policy. The need for the Kainai to establish funds to pay for their welfare through the sale of their lands, as the Siksika and Piikani had already done, was especially emphasized by the Agent.

Mr Hyde thanked them for giving him such a good name and hoped he would live up to it. He would be a good friend to the Bloods but they had to help him as much as they could. . . . He told them that the Chiefs were elected because they were supposed to be the most influential men in the Band and he wanted them to show they were so and put down the whiskey trading and all dishonesty and then they would get on and soon be self supporting like the whites. If they were entitled to have two new chiefs then they would be allowed to have them.

. . .

He spoke to them of the benefits derived by the Blackfeet [sic] and the Peigans through selling part of their reserves but Crop Eared Wolf said that they would not sell any of the land and when Mr Hyde asked him what the Bloods would do when the lease ran out in two years and they did not get the $5000.00 a year Crop Eared Wolf said he hoped the Government would stock the reserve again for them and when Mr Hyde told him the Government would not do this he said they would all be quite willing to lease the reserve again but to another firm 3.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf reminded Agent Hyde of the proper protocols the occasion demanded.

2 Hyde to McLean, June 30, 1911, INAC 773/3-1. 3 Hyde to McLean, June 30, 1911, INAC 773/3-1.

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Crop Eared Wolf now said that as they had given Mr Hyde a new name it would be all right if he would give each of them a little present. Mr Hyde said he would and each Chief was given some tea and bacon as a present 4.

This exchange reveals the competing visions implicated in the tensions of colonial rule and the terms of engagement between the Kainai leaders and the Indian Affairs administrators. Giving a Kainai name to the Agent and the exchange of gifts at the conclusion of the meeting marks this as an auspicious occasion. In Kainai culture, the giving of names honoured both the recipient as well as the individual who bestowed the name and effected a series of mutual obligations between the parties (Narcisse Blood personal communication, February 18, 2005). Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf and the other

Chiefs were seeking to establish a formal and beneficial relationship with the Agent, attempting to draw him into enduring Kainai political routines and conventions by inscribing the relationship with their own expectations and experiences. The gifts of tea and bacon would have, in the eyes of the assembled Chiefs, acknowledged Hyde’s acceptance of the name bestowed upon him and implicated him in a relationship of reciprocal duties and responsibilities. Further, the on-going efforts of the Indian department to regulate and manage the social organization and economic practices, in particular, the attempts to make the administration of the Blood reserve self-financing through concluding a surrender of a portion of the Blood reserve, inevitably altered the conditions and context of Kainai politics. Kainai leaders, in challenging the control over their lives wielded by Indian Affairs officials and asserting their right to determine how the reserve was run, effectively entered a debate into the terms of colonial domination.

Here the Kainai band council becomes a site of struggle as both Kainai Chiefs and the

Indian Agent sought to invest the institution with their own conceptions of the proper

4 Hyde to McLean, June 30, 1911, INAC 773/3-1.

251 exercise of political authority. Inevitably, both the Kainai and department officials sought to reconfigure each other according to their own construction of political and administrative possibilities, revealing something of what Comaroff and Comaroff

(1992:259) refer to as the “challenge and riposte” of the colonial encounter, that is, the dynamic processes by which in the expression of political authority in the reserve context were given meaning and substance. In doing so, Kainai leaders utilized traditional political systems to address present exigencies in innovative ways. Therefore, this exchange provides not only a prism through which to view subsequent interactions between Kainai Chiefs and Indian Affairs administrators, but more broadly a means of conceptualizing the struggles over power and meaning in the Canadian colonial context.

Attempts to Secure a Surrender of a Portion of the Blood Reserve

The surrender of reserve land came to dominate Kainai politics in the early 20th century as Indian Affairs sought to reduce the costs associated with the management of the reserve. As part of a broader initiative to secure what were perceived to be excess reserve lands from First Nations across the prairie provinces, the Kainai were repeatedly pressed to surrender a portion of their reserve. The department’s desire to secure a surrender in order to fund policy initiatives and carry out programs on the Blood reserve was succinctly stated by Frank Pedley, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1911.

It is not the policy of this department to force Indians to surrender their lands for sale but at the same time you should keep before the Bloods the fact that a certain portion of their large estate could be turned into cash, very greatly to their benefit, without unduly restricting the area of their reserve. If townships to the south of the reserve next to Cardston were surrendered, and probably some land on the eastern margin of the reserve, a sufficient amount would be obtained to place them in a very enviable financial circumstance. You should keep before them the fact that the Government of the country cannot continue to lavish gifts upon them

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when they have already [received?] under the Treaty such a magnificent landed estate, which was of course intended for their support 5.

As such, the colonizing impetus to deprive the Kainai of land and resources and finance their own domination was in the first instance driven by an economic imperative. But it also had social and political implications as Kainai leaders, in resisting and confronting attempts to erode their land base and reduce treaty obligations, were drawn into struggles over power and meaning, engaging in a debate about the exercise of authority and attempting to gain purchase on the new forms of political engagement engendered in the colonial encounter.

The issue of obtaining a surrender of a portion of the Blood reserve land was originally broached when Frank Pedley, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs instructed Inspector Markle in March, 1907 to inquire whether the Kainai would be willing to surrender 2400 acres along the southern boundary of their reserve. As the

Indian Agent in the Birtle Agency, Manitoba, Markle won the commendation of his superiors for his diligence in advancing department policy while reducing expenditures

(Martin-Maguire 1998:237). In 1900, he became the Indian Agent at the Blackfoot

Agency, where, appalled at what he considered to be the indolence of the Siksika, he strove relentlessly to encourage industry, thrift, and self-reliance among his charges. “He saw himself transforming a shiftless, beggarly people that had been a troublesome problem to the department into an industrious and above all a self-supporting group”

(Hanks and Hanks 1950:43). To this end, Markle sought to expand farming operations, increase band cattle herds, and urge individual families to cultivate vegetable gardens.

He also viewed rations as a serious disincentive to industriousness and established a

5 Pedley to Hyde, August 9, 1911, INAC 773/3-1.

253 policy of cutting off all those he considered able to work (Jobson 1985:22-23). Markle was promoted to Inspector of Indian Agencies in Alberta in 1904 and immediately embarked on a determined campaign to secure the surrender of reserve lands.

Inspector Markle warned that there might be considerable opposition among the

Kainai to any proposal to surrender a portion of their reserve.

[I]t might take a year to prepare the minds of these Indians for such a proposition and then to be very cautious about it, if attempted any other way there would likely be a stampede of those most favourable inclined with those who are opposed to giving up an acre of land 6.

Indeed, when the matter was first brought before a meeting of prominent band members the overwhelming sentiment was against surrendering reserve lands.

The result of this meeting was, led by Chief Crop Eared Wolf, that they would not agree to the sale of land in question for any consideration. Crop Eared Wolf stated the price to be received for this land, irrespective of greatness, would not change his attitude on this question 7.

Day Chief, the Head Chief of the Lower Camp, and a number of Minor Chiefs similarly refused to consider any proposition of surrender. However, one Minor Chief, Left Hand, allowed that he might be open to a surrender, providing that a minimum price for the land was guaranteed by the department. Crop Eared Wolf moved swiftly to silence this dissenting opinion by subverting the meeting and effectively ending debate on the matter.

“At this juncture Crop Eared Wolf arose and ordered all present to withdraw from the meeting and the great majority of those present obeyed the Chiefs instructions” 8. That such a large number of band members followed Crop Eared Wolf would indicate that he had pervasive influence among the Kainai and was able to effectively rally a significant portion of the band behind his leadership.

6 Markle to McLean, March 7, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 7 Markle to McLean, May 16, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1. 8 Markle to McLean, May 16, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

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There were, however, evident divisions among the Kainai over the issue of surrender. Tensions appear to have played out between the majority of Crop Eared

Wolf’s supporters, who tended to be older, established band members with a strong commitment to the existing social hierarchy and a minority faction of men from the younger generation seeking to improve their prospects in the newly established farming industry and the developing cash economy on the reserve. The older band members were by and large strongly opposed to the sale of any portion of the reserve, while many of the younger men, mainly school graduates who had little invested in the existing social and economic organization on the reserve, were interested in acquiring land and equipment to begin farming and therefore supported the surrender. Two of the Minor Chiefs, Running

Crane and Left Hand, were newly emergent leaders who had been lately appointed by

Agent R. N. Wilson and had not risen to prominence in the traditional manner of the earlier generation of leaders. These individuals were characterized as ‘progressive’ farmers by the Agent and were willing to consider a surrender in order to further farming operations on the reserve. Claiming that many band members were frustrated with the result of the meeting, Minor Chiefs Running Crane and Left Hand took the initiative to pursue the matter further with Inspector Markle.

Again with the question of the Blood Indians surrendering a portion of their reserve I now desire to say that I have been asked by a couple of the Minor Chiefs to remain here a few days longer to give the Indians an opportunity to consider the question more minutely than they have so far done. The Minor Chiefs referred to say that the question is too important to dismiss off hand, as Chief Crop Eared Wolf did, with little or no consideration, and that already a number of the Indians are dissatisfied with the verdict rendered last Wednesday 9.

Running Crane and Left Hand, as leaders of the minority faction on the reserve were acting independently in meeting with Markle, pursuing the interests of their followers as

9 Markle to McLean, May 17, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

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Kainai Chiefs had long done in the pre-reserve era. However, within the context of the reserve, their actions had important political ramifications for the nature of the band council and systems of leadership and authority. The band council increasingly became a site of struggle as these leaders sought to establish new forms of political engagement.

Inspector Markle, apparently acting on his own initiative, drafted terms for a surrender of a much larger portion of the reserve, about 40,000 acres, than originally contemplated. As an incentive to accept the surrender, Markle proposed that 20% of the proceeds be made available for distribution and the balance be used to build houses, stables, and other improvements.

I have suggested to the two Minor Chiefs that the erection of a house and stable, costing $1000.00, for the heads of families was worthy of very serious consideration and they apparently were pleased with the scheme for they have agreed to call a meeting and discuss the question among themselves and advise me within a few days as to whether they think a majority of the band will agree to the surrender with the prospects of a new house and stable within their reach 10 .

Although Inspector Markle had been only authorized by the department to present a surrender of 2400 acres, this more ambitious initiative was entirely in keeping with

Markle’s campaign to secure the surrender of large tracts of reserve lands to finance the administration and management of treaty obligations and Indian policy.

In the period leading up to the surrender, there was a great deal of divisive discussion, with leaders of both factions attempting to exert influence to carry the vote.

Minor Chiefs Running Crane and Left Hand endeavoured to hold a meeting to discuss the surrender, but Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf persuaded most band members not to attend.

Preceding the vote Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf worked ceaselessly to ensure it was defeated, using his influence to convince voters to reject the surrender. Agent Wilson,

10 Markle to McLean, May 17, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

256 commenting on events leading up to the vote, identified Crop Eared Wolf as largely responsible for its defeat.

After this the real excitement began. Crop Eared Wolf gathered up a bunch of people and proceeded to the Barracks at Macleod where he made a bunch of protests to the Police. Then he had a meeting at the town where he engaged one of the lesser legal lights, for which Macleod has always been famous to help him defeat the proposed sale of land. During the intervening fortnight the chief was tireless. He used his influence to the utmost, coaxing, pleading and threatening. Some whom he could not convert were turned over to the lawyer who filled them up with nonsensical ideas. Others were bought, it is reported, and many were frightened in various ways the most effective scare being the warning that if any of the Blood reserve was surrendered the Indians would be removed beyond Edmonton 11 .

Stripped of its polemics, this account reveals Crop Eared Wolf successfully cultivated opposition to the surrender. Exploiting his influence within traditional systems of leadership and authority as well as employing new strategies, he was able to establish a preponderance of opinion against the surrender. What the agent characterizes as coaxing and threatening can be understood as reflecting the traditional process of decision-making in which parties talked out an issue in order to arrive at a consensus. Further, although department officials would have found the practice irksome, Crop Eared Wolf was certainly entitled to enlist the services of a lawyer to interpret and explain the proposal to the Kainai. In addition to using his influence among Kainai, Crop Eared Wolf attempted to pressure Inspector Markle into calling off the surrender vote. Together with Head

Chief Day Chief, he approached Markle, insisting that they represented the ultimate authority on the reserve and intimated that they enjoyed the support of senior Indian

Affairs officials and Markle might find himself out of a job if he continued to press the surrender question 12 . Crop Eared Wolf then retained the services of Colin Macleod, a

11 Wilson to Laird, June 6, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 12 Markle to Pedley, May 22, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

257 barrister from the nearby town of Macleod, and drafted a letter to David Laird, Indian

Commissioner expressing concern over the proposed surrender.

I would be sorry to think that you had forgotten your promise made long ago to me and my people, that the department would never permit any surrender of the reserve. Your letter to me of the 18 th of January, 1902, comforted me further in the matter and I am sorry that I must write you again to confirm the assurances that then given me that the reserve would never be disturbed. A short time ago a meeting of the Chiefs of the reserve was called to consider the proposition Mr. Muckle [sic] made for the purchase of the reserve, and with the exception of three minor Chiefs, who by the way have only been lately appointed, all refused to consider the matter of the sale. The Indians do not want to sell the reserve or any part of it 13 .

Crop Eared Wolf was assured by Laird that no surrender was possible without the consent of the Blood band obtained by a vote of the majority of male band members over the age of 21 14 . With the letter received from Commissioner Laird in 1902 in hand, the

Kainai Head Chiefs, Crop Eared Wolf and Day Chief, together approached Inspector

Markle insisting that no portion of the reserve would be taken or sold without the consent of the band.

This seems a striking tactic, in which Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf, engaging in deft political manoeuvring, adapted traditional practices to a contemporary situation. Not unlike pre-reserve practices, Crop Eared Wolf sought to exploit a relationship with another powerful leader in order to bolster his own standing and authority, mobilize different resources to his cause, and broaden the political context beyond the boundaries of the reserve. This strategy also reveals an understanding of the department hierarchy and the Canadian legal system. During the early years of the 20 th century Aboriginal leaders demonstrated an increasing propensity to seek legal council and resort to legal action to resist the arbitrary and paternalistic impositions of the Indian Affairs

13 Crop Eared Wolf to Laird, May 28, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, 29103-1. 14 Laird to Crop Eared Wolf, May 30, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, 29103-1.

258 administration (Goodwill and Sluman 1984:119-20). Additionally, Crop Eared Wolf, by retaining possession of a letter from a senior departmental official for five years and using it to make his case to the department, demonstrated a particular knowledge of the department bureaucratic structure and the legal contingencies of Indian policy. By undertaking this action, Crop Eared Wolf was actively reformulating and re-inscribing colonial regulatory authority by engaging the department bureaucratic structure and advancing the Kainai leader’s conception of how the reserve should be managed.

Running Crane and Left Hand found support among some of the younger band members who wished to begin farming and were open to the prospect of a surrender, while the two Head Chiefs and most of the older band members remained staunchly opposed. Markle sought to exploit this division by exhibiting some of the material benefits that might be obtained with the proceeds of a surrender.

We then had a meeting and I placed the greater proposition before those present. I had pencil drawings of cottages, stables and farms before them and although the two Head Chiefs opposed the offer I made, together with about all of the old time Indians present, I was satisfied that a number of the younger and more progressive men were inclined to entertain the proposal to surrender 15 .

Afterwards, a group of Minor Chiefs and others who favoured a surrender met separately with Markle and expressed a desire to have the matter brought up before the entire Blood band.

Chiefs (Minor) Running Crane, Left Hand, Blackfoot Old Woman, Young Pine, Many White Horses, and Strangling Wolf came to the office with about 50 Indians and another meeting was held. Soon after the meeting opened Strangling Wolf loudly protested against the gathering and its object. The other Minor Chiefs stated that they desired to meet the wishes of the Government if it was at all reasonable 16 .

15 Markle to Pedley, May 22, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 16 Markle to Pedley, May 22, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

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Essentially, different factions on the Blood reserve were engaged in political manoeuvring, as leaders explored the various means by which to exert some control over the management of reserve land and resources.

In discussing the terms of surrender, these Minor Chiefs and band members stated that they would not agree to releasing the land suggested by Markle along the southern boundary of the reserve because this represented the best hay and pasture lands on the reserve, but would consider a tract of 2400 acres to the east of the St. Mary’s Railway.

There was a general consensus that a surrender for this smaller parcel of land could be obtained for a minimum price of $100,000 and a $10 cash payment. A date was set for a surrender vote to be taken and the Minor Chiefs present vowed to do all they could to carry a vote against the desire of the Head Chiefs Crop Eared Wolf and Day Chief17 .

In spite of the assurances of the Minor Chiefs and the confident expectations of

Markle, the surrender was overwhelmingly rejected, with 109 voting against the proposal and only 33 in favour. The surrender was defeated largely due to the efforts of Crop

Eared Wolf and the other Chiefs opposing the surrender, who were effectively able to mobilize support and persuade band members to reject it. Indeed, Markle attributed the defeat almost solely to the influence of Crop Eared Wolf.

The proposition, however, was opposed from the outset by Chiefs Crop Eared Wolf and Day Chief, also by a number of the minor chiefs. Minor Chief Blackfoot Old Woman was one of the number who promised to give it his support on the 22 nd of May, in fact he was the most prominent supporter Minor Chief Running Crane then had in its [sic] favour. On the evening before the poll he turned around and agreed to support the opposition. The explanation of his conduct was given to Running Crane about as follows:- “he was afraid of going farther with the young chiefs and had decided to go back on his trail and join the old chiefs”. This means that he was intimidated like many of the young men by Crop Eared Wolf and feared the consequences if he opposed the Head Chiefs 18 .

17 Markle to Pedley, May 22, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 18 Markle to McLean, June 7, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1

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Markle implied that there was considerable support for the surrender, but that Crop Eared

Wolf was able to subvert this. The opposition to the surrender, however, appears to have been more substantial than Markle acknowledged. Markle’s record of the vote revealed that Minor Chiefs Running Crane, Left Hand, Young Pine, and Many White Horses supported the surrender, with Head Chiefs Crop Eared Wolf, and Day Chief, as well as

Minor Chiefs, Blackfoot Old Woman, One Spot, Running Wolf, Little Ears, Strangling

Wolf, Bull Shield, Heavy Shield, and Bull Horn, opposing the surrender. This reflects a split of the Kainai Chiefs between younger members who wished to expand farming operations and the older established leaders who desired to maintain the status quo. The latter group represents a cohesive group with a following on the Annuity Paylists of well over two-thirds of the band 19 . Five of the opposition Chiefs vigorously canvassed each arrival at the poll and Markle also believed that a considerable number of supporters of the surrender stayed away from the poll “fearing the ill-will of Head Chief Crop Eared

Wolf and his prominent followers” 20 . If such were the case, it would have been entirely in keeping with traditional political customs, where criers or advocates of a particular course of action would circulate the camps in an attempt to drum up support and band members, if unable to reconcile themselves to a majority decision, would absent themselves. It is also significant that Blackfoot Old Woman mentioned he was compelled to align himself with the old Chiefs as a group rather than Crop Eared Wolf in particular. Irrespective of the antagonisms that Markle impugns here, the reversal of

Blackfoot Old Woman can be understood within the framework of traditional Kainai consensus decision-making. It was not unusual, in working towards consensus, for

19 NAC RG 10, Vol. 9440. 20 Markle to McLean, June 7, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

261 parties to be strongly divided, even hostile. Once the weight of opinion became clear however, dissenting parties were expected to either reconcile themselves with the prevailing opinion or leave the group (First Charger personal communication, December

15, 2004). Chiefs who chose to disregard the wishes of their band members risked loosing followers to other leaders. These same mechanisms were doubtlessly working in the reserve era and Blackfoot Old Woman and others who recanted their support for the surrender, rather than fearing Crop Eared Wolf, simply acknowledged that the old Chiefs carried the prevailing opinion and reconciled themselves to the developing consensus.

Although the surrender was defeated, Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf and his compatriots continued to rally against any surrender of reserve lands. An article appearing in the Macleod Gazette reported on an interview held with leading Kainai

Chiefs. Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf was described as “a statesman among his advisors” who displayed poise and acumen in defending the interests of his people. Crop Eared

Wolf was accompanied by Day Chief and a number of the other Minor Chiefs21 .

Speaking in turns, the Chiefs each rose to protest the recent attempts to have them surrender a portion of their reserve. It was claimed that Agent Wilson used unfair measures in attempting to secure a surrender, that those in the employ of the Agency who voted against the surrender were dismissed, while those that voted in favour were retained and given extra rations. They also took issue with the purchase of a steam plow against the wishes of the Chiefs, and mentioned a petition being forwarded to the department asking that Agent Wilson be removed. In this interview, Crop Eared Wolf and the allied Chiefs were advancing their case outside the channels of Indian Affairs and

21 Macleod Gazette, August 1, 1907, on file RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

262 seeking to bring pressure regarding the administration of the reserve through new forms of political engagement.

This initial attempt to secure a surrender of a portion of the Blood reserve reveals something of the political dynamics among the Kainai at the time and the developing tensions that was beginning to manifest itself in Kainai politics. Head Chief Crop Eared

Wolf emerged as the catalyst behind the opposition to the surrender and rallied most of the Minor Chiefs as well as a greater portion of band members to the cause. Certainly

Crop Eared Wolf considered the reserve inviolate, influenced by Red Crow on the matter, who consistently opposed any erosion of the reserve land base, and on his deathbed Crop

Eared Wolf implored the Kainai to never consent to sell any part of their reserve 22

(Dempsey 1980:256). Running Crane, meanwhile, represented a minority faction who were largely exempt from the established horse economy and sought other avenues to improve their standing. This episode also reveals the shifting political processes on the reserve in which Crop Eared Wolf and other leaders mobilized resources in traditional and non-traditional ways in order to confront and challenge Indian Affairs officials and other supporters of the surrender. Crop Eared Wolf enjoyed considerable influence among the Kainai as a leader who had attained status and influence in the traditional manner, as well as being recognized as Head Chief of the reserve by Indian Affairs. He was able to both mobilize his supporters against the surrender and challenge Indian

Affairs officials within the administrative structure, effectively mediating between two spheres and redeploying political meanings in a new context.

22 April 16, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1.

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Attempts to Depose Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf

Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf’s refusal to cooperate with the efforts by Markle and

Wilson to secure a surrender of a portion of the Blood reserve inevitably raised the ire of those officials and, perhaps not unexpectedly, they sought to have the Chief deposed under the terms of the Indian Act. Indian Affairs officials commonly sought to remove

Chiefs that opposed surrenders or other department initiatives from office. As discussed in Chapter III, the Indian Act empowered the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to remove Chiefs and Headmen for dishonesty, intemperance, immorality, or incompetence and this power was readily used to chastise leaders that Indian Affairs officials perceived to be uncooperative or ‘unprogressive’. Even prior to the surrender vote, Markle suggested that the Kainai would be more disposed to consider surrender if they had more reasonable Head Chiefs and advised that a stern warning from the department to the effect that their continued opposition could lead to censure might have a salutary effect.

My impression is that if Chiefs Crop Eared Wolf and Thunder Chief [a.k.a. Day Chief] were informed by you that you learn with regret that they have presumptiously [sic] opposed the department in many ways and that if they continue in this line of action that you will be compelled to seriously consider whether it would not be in the interests of the Indians to remove them from office and appoint others in their stead – Chiefs who would more quickly take up advanced ideas and be a help to the department instead of a hindrance 23 .

While the department declined to act on Markle’s suggestion, it nevertheless reveals that

Markle embraced the expectation that Kainai Chiefs were primarily department functionaries and required to assist with the implementation of Indian Affairs policy.

Markle had little patience for Chiefs that ‘presumptuously opposed the department’ by asserting a measure of political autonomy in their attempts to influence what happens on the reserve and challenging department officials in their refusal to acquiesce to

23 Markle to McLean, May 16, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

264 administrative imperatives. The desire to censure Crop Eared Wolf and Day Chief was a political act that contested the exercise of political authority on the Blood reserve by directly intervening in the affairs of the Kainai band council and curtailing the actions of the Kainai Chiefs.

With the failure of the surrender vote, Markle and Wilson began in earnest a campaign to depose Head Chiefs Crop Eared Wolf and Day Chief, asserting that they had lost the confidence of the band members, although the results of the surrender vote indicate that this was not in fact the case. The charges proffered against Crop Eared Wolf and Day Chief were, respectively, intemperance and incompetence. It was reported that the former had been seen drunk on the reserve and the latter was too old to continue as

Chief 24 . Markle insisted that the band would be much better served with a more progressive Head Chief.

The department declined to act on Markle’s recommendation to depose both the

Kainai Head Chiefs, which having been made so soon after an unsuccessful surrender vote raised suspicions with senior department officials. Commissioner Laird certainly viewed the call for deposing Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf as consequent on the defeat of the surrender 25 . The department routinely accepted advice from officers in the field on such matters, nevertheless, H. C. Ross, the department’s in house authority on the election provisions of the Indian Act, reviewed the case and was unable to support the request that the Kainai Head Chiefs be deposed.

I submit that to try and find ground for the deposal of a chief simply because he was unfavourable to a surrender is an objectionable practice, as the Indians might

24 Markle to Laird, June 7, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 25 McKenna to McLean, June 11, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3; McLean to Laird, June 28, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

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fairly complain that they were practically coerced in the matter of a surrender, the chiefs being afraid to offer any opposition for fear of being deposed 26 .

Ross maintained that a single incident of Chief Crop Eared Wolf appearing intoxicated six months previous could not be construed as drunkenness under the Indian Act and asserted that Day Chief “ought not to be deposed without further proof of ‘incompetency’ than the fact of his opposition to the surrender” 27 . Moreover, Ross, referencing the correspondence between Laird and Crop Eared Wolf, related that opposition to the surrender might have been justified. It seems that Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf, in communicating his concerns over the proposed surrender and seeking confirmation that the promise made to him by a senior department official would not be broken, effectively communicated a political message in a language the department could comprehend. This correspondence substantiated Crop Eared Wolf’s opposition to the surrender, confronted

Indian Affairs officials regarding the exercise of political authority on the reserve and, more broadly, the terms of colonial domination.

The rebuke from the department for a time seemed to quell the efforts to have

Chief Crop Eared Wolf deposed, but almost a year later, in June 1908, Agent Wilson again requested that Crop Eared Wolf be deposed, this time citing incompetency as the charge. While Wilson claimed that Chief Crop Eared Wolf had been presenting difficulties ever since he was identified as self-supporting and taken off the ration list, his confrontations with Crop Eared Wolf essentially revolved around extent of authority of the Head Chief and conflicts with the Agent over reserve management. The main contention that Wilson had against Chief Crop Eared Wolf was his obstruction of farming operations. As a part of department policy, Wilson was trying to expand agricultural

26 Ross to Pedley, June 19, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 27 Ross to Pedley, June 19, 1907, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

266 cultivation on the Blood reserve. In 1907, having received permission from the department to purchase a steam plow out of Blood band funds, Wilson planned to break land for individual band members, who would be encouraged to take up farming 28 . Upon being informed of plans to undertake more extensive cultivation of reserve lands, Chief

Crop Eared Wolf made clear that he was adamantly opposed to any such endeavour.

[W]hen extensive farming at this point was decided upon by the department I naturally took an early opportunity of explaining the plans to Crop-eared-wolf but as soon as he had heard enough to see that a serious attempt to cultivate a portion of the reserve was intended he abruptly terminated the discussion by refusing to hear any more about it and peremptorily ordering me to drop it. He said he would have no farming done on this reserve other than what the Indians cared to do in their own way, which as I pointed out to him, after 25 years of reserve life then amounted to ‘nil’. He at once enlisted the support of the late Thunder Chief [a.k.a. Head Chief Day Chief] and two or three others of the older chiefs who with a dozen or so of the worthless element among the Indians and set themselves up as an opposition and endeavoured to persuade the other Indians to refuse to farm 29 .

Within the framework of reserve politics, this ‘worthless element’, as the Agent characterized them was mobilized by Crop Eared Wolf as he rallied support in opposition to the farming initiatives. Crop Eared Wolf reportedly disrupted the laying out of farms and plowing land by pulling up the marking posts Agent Wilson had placed. Crop Eared

Wolf then confronted Agent Wilson, insisting that no farming was to be done and, according to Wilson, exclaiming “The whole reserve belongs to me. The Government made me chief over it all and no Indian or white man has a right to do anything that I tell him not to do” 30 .

Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf’s opposition to farming was more than just intransigence, however. It was related to the management of resources, social

28 Wilson to Laird, June 28, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 29 Wilson to Laird, June 28, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 30 Wilson to Laird, June 28, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

267 organization, and the exercise of political authority on the reserve. As a successful cattle owner, Chief Crop Eared Wolf was hostile to farming initiatives, wanting to keep the reserve primarily as a cattle range, while Agent Wilson earnestly sought to expand agricultural operations 31 . Notably, when he first became Head Chief, Crop Eared Wolf, as one of the largest cattle owners on the reserve, was regarded by Indian Affairs officials as a progressive individual, with the expectation that the cattle industry would expand under his leadership 32 . This had in fact occurred, as the number of cattle on the reserve increased and more band members became cattle owners. The antagonism that pertained between the Head Chief and the Agent appears to have rested primarily upon Crop Eared

Wolf’s commitment to the cattle industry and his insistence that as Head Chief decisions about the economic development of the reserve should not be made without his approval.

Growing tensions between cattle owners, who were largely composed of the band members that wished to maintain the existing social and economic situation on the reserve, and the ‘progressive’ band members, mainly younger residential school graduates who wished to improve their prospects through farming, were also a factor

(Dempsey 1997:55). In his submission for the Indian Affairs Annual Report, Agent

Wilson remarked on this division.

Though a clamorous minority of the older Indians, headed by some of the principal chiefs, were opposed to the farming scheme, the working element, which is in the Majority, is so favourable to the project that the applications for land now aggregate as much acreage as the steam plough will be able to break in two years 33 .

Wilson made several more requests that Chief Crop Eared Wolf be deposed and lobbied for Minor Chief Running Crane to be appointed Head Chief and Chief Moon to be

31 McDougall to McLean, March 29, 1909, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 32 Laird to McLean, July 7, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 33 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report 1907:169.

268 appointed Minor Chief. While senior members of the department concurred that the actions of Chief Crop Eared Wolf were detrimental to the best interests of the band, they were reluctant to depose him, acknowledging that while he was often difficult, he was a capable leader and possessed many admirable qualities 34 . Ultimately, it was felt that there were insufficient grounds for deposition 35 .

When Chief Crop Eared Wolf was subsequently convicted of being drunk on the reserve, Agent Wilson was certain that he could now provide the department with irrefutable grounds to depose Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf 36 . The department evidently still had reservations about taking this action. Senior department officers agreed that there was perhaps now enough evidence to secure the deposal of Chief Crop Eared Wolf, but remained suspicious of Wilson’s motives.

The real reason the agent desires the chief be deposed is on account of his unprogressiveness and interference with farming operations, but this charge, which is defined as ‘incompetency’ is not defined by any evidence other than that of the agent himself 37 .

In similar cases, the department rarely deposed a Chief for a single conviction of drunkenness, usually instructing the Agent to issue a stern warning that such behaviour would result in removal of that individual from office. Inspector Markle endorsed

Running Crane and Moon Chief and explained that while some of the Minor Chiefs would sympathize with Chief Crop Eared Wolf, the majority would not complain if he were to be deposed.

The Indians thought it was for their interest to follow their Chief, and Crop Eared Wolf has not been slow to profit by these opinions. If he is deposed he doubtless will feel hurt and for a short period there may be a number who will sympathize

34 Laird to McLean, July 7, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 35 McLean to Laird, September 4, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 36 Laird to McLean, November 23, 1908, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 37 Ross to McLean, February 25, 1909, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

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with him but few will cling to him for any great length of time, they will be looking to the new Chief for benedictions and favours 38 .

The opinion of the Deputy Superintendent General was that the grounds for deposal of

Chief Crop Eared Wolf were not exceptionally strong and consequently requested that a third party, Rev. John McDougall, quietly investigate the situation39 .

McDougall, a long-standing Methodist missionary, had worked among Cree and

Ojibwa peoples before establishing a mission at Morley in 1873 among the Stoneys with his father the Rev. George McDougall. In addition to his missionary work, McDougall was active in ecclesiastical and public affairs. He served as the Chairman for the

Saskatchewan district of the Methodist Church and as Superintendent of Missions for

Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, and was elected president of the 1906 Methodist

Church Conference. He was commissioned by the government to encourage plains

Aboriginal peoples to make treaties and he served as an interpreter during the negotiations of Treaties 6 and 7 (Nix 2000). During the North-West Rebellion of 1885,

McDougall was a scout and Chaplin for the Alberta Field Force. After his retirement form the Morley Mission in 1906, McDougall was engaged as Special Commissioner to the Doukhobors and a Commissioner for Indian Affairs (Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal

Council 1996:52). It was in this latter capacity that McDougall was charged with investigating the charges against Crop Eared Wolf. He reported that considerable antagonism existed between Agent Wilson and Crop Eared Wolf and believed that the

Head Chief was becoming increasingly unpopular among band members as well. He was favourably impressed by both Running Crane and Chief Moon, but was of the opinion the choice of Head Chief should be left to the Kainai themselves and suggested that an

38 Markle to McLean, February 12, 1909, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 39 McLean to McDougall, March 9, 1909, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

270 election be held. For the department to depose the Head Chief and appoint a successor without consulting band members would, in McDougall’s estimation, only increase the difficulties on the reserve 40 .

This counsel caused a dilemma for the department. Constrained by the terms of the Indian Act, with Chief Crop Eared Wolf appointed for an indefinite term, it would not, Ross advised, be possible to hold an election unless the position were to be declared vacant by the resignation, deposal, or death of the incumbent.

With reference to the suggestion of Rev. John McDougall that the best way to get over the difficulty about the removal of Chief Crop Eared Wolf would be to have an election on the Blood reserve for the office of Head Chief of the Upper Bloods, I beg to remark that, while it might be the best course to follow, if it were possible, it is a question of whether, when a chief has been appointed for an indefinite period, the office that he holds can be declared vacant unless he has first been removed: it has invariably been the custom not to declare the office vacant until the removal of the incumbent by death, resignation, or deposal. According to Section 96 of the Indian Act the department does not appear to have the power to depose Chief Crop Eared Wolf; consequently I do not see how it can hold an election or make an appointment to fill his place 41 .

The introduction of the elective system was briefly considered as a way around this impediment, but this course of action was quickly dismissed by Agent Wilson. The

Kainai, he felt, would select traditional leaders who came to prominence within traditional Kainai systems of leadership and authority and were largely opposed to the department’s objectives. Clearly, Running Crane and the leaders of the so-called

‘working class’ that is, those individuals who were establishing themselves in the developing cash economy, did not enjoy the broad support of Kainai band members.

I must say that in my opinion it would not be advisable to introduce the elective system on this reservation yet. The reason is that the standpoint of the Indians is not identical with that of the department and they would probably elect an agitator. . . . So long as there is a strong reactionary element in the tribe I think it

40 McDougall to McLean, March 29 1909, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 41 Ross to Pedley, April 5, 1909, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

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would be better for us to appoint the chiefs and confine the appointments to recognized leaders of the working, progressive class or at least to those who, if not workers themselves, have for many years identified themselves with the workers by using their influence to advance whatever industry has been attempted. After a while, when the Bloods are free of the predominating influence of the old chiefs, which will be when the latter have passed away, I would advocate the elective system 42 .

Wilson’s reluctance to adopt the elective system on the Blood reserve was primarily related to his concern that the old Chiefs continued to exert considerable authority and influence among the Kainai. The fact that Wilson thought it would be many years before the Kainai would likely elect leaders of which the department would approve indicates that dissatisfaction with Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf and the other established leaders was not nearly as pervasive as reported by Markle and McDougall. The continued relevance of Kainai systems of leadership and authority allowed Crop Eared Wolf and his compatriots to retain support within the reserve context. With the Agent unable to recommend the application of the elective system and the grounds submitted for deposing

Chief Crop Eared Wolf not considered strong, the department reached an apparent deadlock in the issue. Unable to force Chief Crop Eared Wolf, no further attempts to depose him were made during Wilson’s tenure as Agent 43 . Moreover, the attempts to depose Crop Eared Wolf had important implications for Kainai systems of leadership.

Crop Eared Wolf survived the attempts to remove him from the position of Head Chief, consolidated his support, and emerged as a more powerful leader. Crop Eared Wolf refused to be intimidated by the repeated attempts to depose him and effectively confronted Wilson over the exercise of political authority and the administration and management of the reserve. In this confrontation, Crop Eared Wolf demonstrated an

42 Wilson to McLean, June 4, 1909, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3. 43 Ross to Pedley, June 9, 1909, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3.

272 understanding of the department administrative structure and the Indian Act, exploiting the bureaucratic regulations on the matter to hinder and delay attempts to remove him.

Through this process the position of Head Chief was conferred additional substance and authority within the framework of Indian Act band government that made it possible for

Kainai leaders to challenge Indian Affairs officials, but at the same time subjected to a greater degree of administrative regulation. That is, the assertion of political power under the administrative system perpetuated by the Indian Act also served to delimit the nature of that power. Through this process of confrontation, of ‘challenge and riposte’, the position of Head Chief was imbued with meaning in the colonial context.

Further Attempts to Secure a Surrender of a Portion of the Blood Reserve

In 1913, Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, instructed Inspector Markle to revisit the issue of obtaining a surrender of a portion of the

Blood reserve 44 . Attempts to secure a surrender from the Kainai were preceded by surrenders successfully obtained from the Siksika and Piikani, both of which had been secured by Markle. The Piikani were induced to surrender over 28,000 acres in 1909 and the following year, in 1910, the Siksika also agreed to surrender a large portion of their reserve, some 115,000 acres in all 45 (Martin-Maguire 1998:323, 406). Emboldened by these recent successes, Markle expressed every confidence that with careful planning, the

Kainai would readily agree to a surrender 46 . In pursuing a surrender, Markel employed a precise strategy. Typically, he would meet informally with the Chiefs or leading men

44 Scott to Markle, November 21, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 45 Canada. Department of IndianAffairs Annual Report 1910:181; Canada. Department of IndianAffairs Annual Report 1911:187 46 Markle to Scott, December 17, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1.

273 who he felt might be amenable to considering a surrender, advising them to discuss it with their fellow band members. Next, Markle would call a formal meeting of all band members eligible to vote, impressing upon them the government’s expectation that the reserve would be self-financing and emphasizing the benefits that would accrue to band members from a surrender. If necessary, Markle would convene several such meetings to consolidate support and overcome opposition. Nor was he above threats, cajoling, and intimidation, cutting rations and withholding credit and other forms of assistance.

Although the Indian Act permitted a cash distribution to be made to band members from the proceeds of the land sales, Markle felt that such a practice led to profligacy and preferred to offer practical items such as houses, buildings, farm implements, work horses, and cattle that he believed would materially benefit the band and promote industriousness. Markle was loathe to authorize a cash payment or to make the promise of free rations in the surrender terms, believing it to promote indolence, but he was more than willing to do so if it otherwise proved impossible to secure a surrender. Markle developed a successful strategy in executing surrenders, ultimately securing more surrenders than any other department official, apart from W. M. Graham (who would later become Indian Commissioner ) (Martin-Maguire 1998:237).

All of these strategies were in evidence in Markle’s dealings with the Kainai. In preparation for discussing a surrender with Kainai band members, he directed that rations be curtailed, as he had prior to the Blackfoot surrender in 1910.

I have told Mr. Dilworth that the department desires to be freed as much as possible from expense in the operation of this reserve and I entertain the view that all able bodied Indians should soon provide their own livelihood. There may not during the winter be opportunities for such to gain a livelihood but starting with the next fiscal year it is my present opinion that all but the aged and infirm should be struck from the free ration privilege. . . . Some are likely to find fault with

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suggested policy and in event they do it will be an opportune time to tell them that they have abundant resources within their command to provide for themselves as the Indians of the Blackfoot band did 47 .

The department approved of the proposal to remove able bodied band members from the ration list, but insisted that it was not the intention to use rations as a means to pressure the Kainai to surrender a portion of their reserve 48 . Many Kainai remained convinced, however, that the cut in rations was aimed at forcing them to capitulate. Agent Dilworth reported having been told that “Mr. Markle is trying to starve us to sell part of our land like he has done to the Peigans and the Blackfoot" 49 . This suspicion on the part of the

Kainai was justified, given that the department had blatantly sought to force the issue of surrender to a head. The department issued instructions for farm operations on the Blood reserve, stipulating no more funds would be provided for breaking new farm land until the Kainai had consented to a surrender 50

While one or two Minor Chiefs and a few younger men who wished to take up farming were favourably disposed to a surrender, most of the Chiefs and a large majority of the band were strongly opposed to any notion of surrendering reserve lands. Many

Kainai remained unimpressed with the results of the Siksika and Piikani surrenders and expressed misgivings about the way the surrender terms had been implemented 51 . Kainai band members were aware of what was taking place on other reserves and had an intimate knowledge not only of the terms of surrender but how the agreements were being carried out. Consequently, there was a reluctance among the Kainai to consider a surrender, which was only re-inforced by the enduring influence of the late Head Chief

47 Markle to Scott, December 17, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 48 McLean to Dilworth, February 7, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 49 Dilworth to McLean, January 25, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 50 McLean to Campbell, June 20, 1912, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7595, File 10103, pt. 1. 51 Markle to Scott, December 17, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1.

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Crop Eared Wolf, who had reportedly gathered the Minor Chiefs about him shortly before his death and implored them not to sell a foot of their reserve 52 . Chiefs opposed to the surrender were accordingly able to consolidate their support and foster a political consensus against a surrender.

The division among the Kainai over the issue of surrender endured along the same lines as in 1907, between the recent school graduates and other band members with little horse wealth and limited access to the cattle industry, who sought to expand farming operations and obtain other improvements to the reserve and the band members who were invested in the established horse economy, owned cattle, and wished to preserve the status quo. Markle sought to exploit this division in order to win support for the surrender, as he had with the Blackfoot and Peigan surrenders.

I talked to some members of the band in a round about manner and one Minor Chief stated that while he was favourably inclined a majority of the band were opposed and therefore it was useless to press the question. One of the young men came to me and asked that I urge this matter before members of the band and further stated that there were a good number who desired it but the older members were opposed in too great numbers. I advised him to get the young men to select a delegation from their numbers and go direct to the new Head Chief [Shot Both Sides], providing this was their desire, and try and convince him that it would be in the interests of both the old and the young to have a surrender brought about. I also informed him that if the proposed interview with the Head Chief was encouraging and they wished me to assist them that I would be glad to render them any reasonable assistance to prepare a surrender to safeguard their interests as far as my ability allowed. If I am able to get them to come to me for assistance it will be better than for me to attempt to crowd this question on them 53 .

Markle’s efforts did not succeed in generating any real support for a surrender among the majority of the Kainai, who remained largely opposed, especially among the older generation of band members. Nevertheless, Markle recommended that approximately

190,000 acres on the north and south ends of the reserve be targeted for surrender, which

52 Unattributed document, April 16, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1. 53 Markle to Scott, December 30, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1.

276 he estimated would yield $2.6 million, and proposed terms of surrender that were similar to those taken at the Blackfoot and Peigan reserves. A sum of $950,000 was earmarked to be immediately spent on improvements to establish band members as farmers, with the balance of $1.65 million to fund a trust, the income from which was to be used to pay for farming operations, livestock, assistance for the aged and infirm, and perhaps a food issue, if the department so approved 54 . Despite expectations voiced by Markle that the

Kainai would soon be favourably disposed to a surrender, no change in attitude was forthcoming, which attests to the continued political strength of the Chiefs opposed to a surrender, and the matter lay dormant for a number of years 55 .

No further efforts were made to secure a surrender for several years as other issues occupied Indian Affairs officials and Kainai Chiefs. The department was concerned with developing the reserve economy by expanding farming operations and increasing the cattle herd in order to achieve reductions in rations. The attention of the

Kainai Chiefs, meanwhile, was largely focussed on distribution of lease monies, rationing, and the selection of a Head Chief to replace Blackfoot Old Woman. By 1917, however, Markle felt that a greater number of band members were now in favour of a surrender, although he cautioned that it would still be difficult to secure a majority vote and that the issue should be dealt with carefully 56 . Agent Dilworth similarly believed that prospects were favourable for a surrender on the Blood reserve, remarking that what he described as the progressive element was in the ascendancy and that in general the Kainai were displaying a greater inclination for new initiatives.

54 Markle to Scott, February, 17, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 55 Markle to Scott, May 8, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 56 Markle to Scott, January 27, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1.

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At present the Blood Indians are showing the greatest evidence of progress, everyone nearly is working at top speed to get a large acreage seeded, many who would like to be farming have no chance to get started. The progressive element is largely in the majority, 75% belong to this class we still have tho [sic] a class of kickers who cannot see progress 57 .

Dilworth apparently overstated the support for a surrender. Despite the optimistic assessments offered by the Agent and Inspector Markle, the Kainai remained largely indisposed to the matter and a determined opposition developed around Head Chief Shot

Both Sides and several of the Minor Chiefs, who marshalled a variety of resources in an attempt to block the proposed surrender. Upon hearing that the department was again going to approach the Kainai for a surrender of a portion of the reserve, Head Chief Shot

Both Sides forwarded a statement to the department through the offices of his lawyer, expressing their firm resolve not to consent to a surrender and complaining that Agent

Dilworth was resorting to threats and intimidation in order to win a surrender.

The Agent is going a little too fare on selling the land, and I myself I am keeping the land and I refuse to sell the land to anybody or either to the department. Mr. J. W. Dilworth takes the Indians one by one and tells them to sell the land that they will be rich in a short time. If the Indians don’t sell the land they will have no more ration untill we sell the land of 90,000 acres of the Blood reserve [sic— all spelling and grammatical errors as appear in the original] 58 .

A surrender vote was held on June 7, 1917 and Dilworth reported that 124 band members voted in favour of the surrender and 116 against 59 . However, following the surrender vote, complaints about fraud and gross irregularities soon surfaced. Head Chief Shot

Both Sides petitioned the department through R. N. Wilson, the former Agent, alleging that Agent Dilworth, determined to force a surrender through, had “launched a policy of

57 Dilworth to Scott, April 23, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 58 Fawcett to Scott, June 1, 1913, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 59 Dilworth to Scott, June 13, 1911, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

278 wholesale intimidation and bribery to secure the necessary votes” 60 . Band members who did not support the surrender were refused all forms of assistance usually made available by the Agency.

Those who would not promise to surrender were promptly blacklisted and given to understand that they could expect no work or assistance of any kind from the department while those who promised to support the surrender were favored in the distribution of work, rations, agency stores and cheques 61 .

Further, it was asserted that the vote had taken place under suspicious circumstances.

The Agency staff were all away on the day of the vote (participating in the Provincial election), and no outside authority was available to scrutinize the vote, meaning that the recoding of the vote was entirely in the hands of the Agent 62 . In addition, there were charges that the votes in favour of a surrender were procured through promises of beneficial treatment or the threat of having funds due individuals withheld.

R. N. Wilson, the former Agent whose assistance was enlisted by Head Chief

Shot Both Sides, explained to the department that Shot Both Sides strongly objected to the manner in which the surrender was obtained.

This one he calls a ‘crooked surrender’ and protests that the manner in which it was secured constitutes a breach of faith by the Government which since ’77 has always assured the Indians that the reserve would not be taken from them without their consent. He sees not difference between forcible seizure of the land and getting it away from the Indians by threats and bribery followed by a vote taken under such suspicious circumstances 63 .

Complaining that the surrender vote was not conducted according to department regulations, Shot Both Sides called on Scott, as Deputy Superintendent General, to reject

60 Wilson to Scott, June 11, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 61 Wilson to Scott, June 11, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 62 Standard procedure for surrender votes was for the vote to be tallied by the Agency Clerk, overseen by the Agent and the Inspector for Indian Agencies, as well as missionaries, and perhaps a solicitor acting on behalf of the Chiefs (Instructions to Agents on file NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1).. 63 Wilson to Scott, June 11, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1.

279 the surrender and send a higher ranking official to re-conduct the surrender vote. Wilson asserted that the distrust of Dilworth was so profound that it would be impossible for the

Agent to secure a surrender.

Many of these same charges were also presented to the department in a petition signed by Head Chief Shot Both Sides and Minor Chiefs Weasel Fat, Heavy Shield,

Running Wolf, One Spot, Bull Horn, and Many White Horses. This petition, forwarded by J. Hicks, a Macleod lawyer working on behalf of the Kainai, protested the surrender vote, complaining of irregularities. Among the complaints were that the notice for the vote was insufficient, that the vote was timed when a large number of band members would be away from the reserve, that the votes of some entitled to vote were discounted, while votes from underage band members in favour of surrender were counted, that no representative of the opposing faction was allowed to observe the procedure, that the

Agent used persuasion and influence while the vote was being conducted, that a deceased band member was recorded as voting. It was further alleged that Agent Dilworth received a commission from the Mormons in Cardston to secure the surrender 64 . For

Head Chief Shot Both Sides and the other Kainai Chiefs, the complaints made to the department through Wilson and the petition were a means to circumvent the Agent and re-iterate their opposition to the surrender and to oppress the department on matters of procedure. These tactics represent the Kainai Chiefs taking up new forms of political engagement within the parameters of the Indian Affairs administrative structure.

The scrutiny of the vote occasioned by Head Chief Shot Both Sides’ allegations had the desired effect. The surrender vote conducted by Dilworth was considered sufficiently questionable that Scott instructed Inspector Markle to visit the Blood reserve

64 Hicks to Roche, June 12, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1.

280 and conduct an investigation into the charges made by Head Chief Shot Both Sides 65 .

Irrespective of the fact that Dilworth was largely exonerated of any impropriety in the conduct of the surrender vote, the department still declined to accept the surrender. Scott simply explained that the surrender vote had not been accepted by the department because a majority of eligible band members did not vote in favour of it 66 .

In the spring of 1918, yet another surrender was placed before the Kainai.

Dilworth maintained that two thirds of the band were now in favour of a surrender and that a successful result could be achieved. “All the progressive elements of the band are in favor of surrender, only the old timers, and agitators are opposed” 67 . Deputy

Superintendent General Scott, in authorizing a surrender vote, forwarded terms of surrender for 93,000 acres for a minimum price of $1.395 million, with $350,000 dedicated to building homes for old and destitute, stables for farmers, cows, bulls and breeding mares and the remainder placed in a trust fund with the interest used to fund farming and livestock operations and provide weekly rations to all band members 68 .

As the date set for the surrender vote approached, the intensity on the reserve ratcheted up and several outside parties interested themselves in the proceedings. The department received representations that the surrendered lands immediately be made available to returned soldiers, the Mormon communities south of the Blood reserve expressed interest in purchasing reserve lands, and settlers in Macleod and Lethbridge wanted the land thrown open to homesteading 69 . At the same time, allegations were

65 Scott to Markle, June 25, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 66 Scott to Fawcett, June 20, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 67 Dilworth to Scott, October 1, 1917, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 1. 68 Scott to Dilworth, January 22, 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 2 69 Matheson to Shaw, February 16 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1; Dilworth to Scott, March 1, 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1.

281 made that Dilworth was misrepresenting terms of surrender and was actively campaigning on behalf of the surrender. Department regulations expressly forbade

Agents from exerting undue influence, limiting their responsibilities to presenting the terms of surrender and recording the vote. As a result, Head Chief Shot Both Sides asserted that the Kainai placed little trust in Agent Dilworth and requested that the department send a more senior official to preside over the surrender vote. It was reported in a letter prepared on behalf of Shot Both Sides by J. D. Matheson, a lawyer from

Macleod, that the large majority of Kainai were against the surrender.

The head chief of the band, Shot on Both Sides, and I understand, a majority of the minor chiefs and quite a large number of the Indians who claim not to be subject to outside influence are very determined in their opposition to surrendering land 70 .

Dilworth asserted that the opposition could be traced to three individuals, the Head Chief and two other band members. The rest of the Kainai, he claimed, were well satisfied with the surrender 71 .

In any event, Dilworth reported that the surrender had passed by a vote of 156 to

68 and assured that all proper procedures were followed and that the surrender would stand the fullest scrutiny 72 . It is worth noting that the surrender document was not signed by Head Chief Shot Both Sides, but only by Minor Chiefs Young Pine, Running

Antelope, and Left Hand. As well, the signatures of Percy Creighton and Fred Mountain

Horse, who were not Chiefs, also appeared on the document. This did not, of course, conform to proper procedure. Departmental policy required the document be signed by

70 Matheson to Shaw, February 16, 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 71 Dilworth to Scott, March 21, 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 72 Dilworth to Scott, March 1, 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 2.

282 the Head Chief 73 . While the department made tentative preparations to approve the surrender by Order-in-Council and began to arrange for the sale of the land identified in the surrender, the surrender was never officially approved. The department ultimately declined to accept the surrender without explanation and the land in question was leased out under the Greater Production Scheme 74 .

The attempts to secure a surrender of a portion of the Blood reserve was a galvanizing issue for Kainai Chiefs and had important political ramifications for Kainai systems of leadership and authority. The division within the Kainai over the surrender issue tended to exacerbate growing tensions over the economic development of the Blood reserve. One faction, mainly younger school graduates who were making headway in the developing cash economy were favourable to a surrender because they wished to expand farming operations through the proceeds derived from a surrender. The majority of band members remained indisposed to a surrender, either because they retained a commitment to the existing social and economic arrangements on the reserve or because of the lasting respect for Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf, who before his death implored the Kainai not to surrender any reserve land (Frank Weasel Head, personal communication, December 15,

2004). Many people were either cattle owners themselves or connected to cattle owners through kin ties and the cattle industry on the reserve was fundamentally related to the established horse economy. Further, those who retained a commitment to the horse economy were also often active ceremonialists and participants in medicine societies.

Each of these factions was represented on the Kainai band council by leaders recognized by Indian Affairs and these leaders, in responding to the question of surrender undertook

73 Instructions, May 15, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 74 McLean to Dilworth, May 27,1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7541, File 29103-1, pt. 2.

283 new forms of political engagement in their dealings with Indian Affairs officials and other parties, which required that traditional systems of leadership and authority address new issues and be deployed in new situations. These struggles helped define the nature and extent of Kainai politics in a reserve context.

Greater Production Campaign and Blood Memorial

In an effort to increase food production to assist in the war effort during the First World

War, the department hatched the scheme of the Greater Production Campaign. This notion, the brainchild of W. M. Graham, sought to bring so-called idle reserve lands into agricultural production. Under the program, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs was empowered to lease reserve lands without a surrender and to even spend band funds without the consent of band members (Carter 1991:250). Graham developed his scheme under the patronage of Arthur Meighan, Minister of the Interior and Superintendent

General of Indian Affairs in the Borden Government, and later serving as Prime Minister from 1920 to 1921. Graham had a distant family connection to Meighan through marriage (Titley 1983:33). The Greater Production Campaign, was enacted through an amendment to the Indian Act in 1918 and enabled through an advance of $300,000 from the War Appropriation to the Department of Indian Affairs for the purpose (Carter

1991:250; Titley 1983:30). Graham was elevated to the newly created post of the

Commissioner for Greater Production for the prairie provinces and given sweeping powers to lease reserve lands, direct the use of band funds in relation to the program, and to manage lands under the aegis of the Greater Production Campaign (J. Dempsey

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1999:75). Under his meticulous guidance an estimated 255,000 acres of reserve land was leased to Euro-Canadian farmers and ranchers.

The Greater Production Campaign undertook to lease as much land as possible to settlers, to establish large scale government run agricultural operations on reserve lands, and to incite Aboriginal peoples to increase agricultural production 75 (Dawson 2002:12).

As noted by R. N. Wilson in the scathing account of the effects of the scheme on the

Blood reserve in his pamphlet ‘Our Betrayed Wards’:

The last mentioned feature of the ‘Greater Production’ activity, while it was really the only commendable undertaking of the four, was also the most neglected, and the farming efforts of the Indians were interfered with, retarded, and discouraged in a number of ways in favour of the Government farm which was given the right of way over everything 76 .

The powers bestowed upon the Commissioner stood in contravention of the Indian Act, which at that time prohibited the taking of reserve lands without the consent of the band expressly obtained through a surrender vote. To get around this obstacle, an amendment to the Indian Act was hurriedly passed, permitting reserve lands to be leased without the consent of the band (J. Dempsey 1999:75; Dawson 2002:12). In all, Greater Production farms were established on five reserves in Alberta and Saskatchewan, including a farm comprising 4800 acres on the Blood reserve. These large scale commercial farms were run by department employees on reserve lands and the somewhat vainglorious boast from

Meighan that, with holdings of over 20,000 acres, “the Superintendent General of Indian

Affairs was now the largest farmer in the Dominion” (cited in Titley 1986:42 and

Dawson 2002:14).

75 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report 1919:10. 76 ‘Our Betrayed Wards’ by R. N. Wilson, p. 22, on file INAC File 773/3-1

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From the start, the Greater Production Campaign was beset with a number of difficulties. Aboriginal peoples were resentful of their lands being confiscated and the

Greater Production farms were plagued by mismanagement and incompetence. The

Euro-Canadian farmers and ranchers leasing reserve lands too often abused the land by over stocking or employing poor cultivation practices. Moreover, the financial success of the program was qualified at best. Despite Meighan’s bold contentions that the Greater

Production Campaign represented a spectacular success, after three years of operations, the expenditures greatly outstripped revenues and only the large advance from the War

Appropriation, which represented more than a third of the total income generated, allowed the project to stay out of the red (Titley 1986:43). By the time the Greater

Production Campaign was terminated in 1921, revenues from the leases allowed the advance to be paid back in full and a modest profit to be recorded. As Bruce Dawson

(2002:12) noted, the efforts of the Greater Production Campaign resulted in few tangible benefits for Aboriginal farming, which continued much as it had before the project was initiated. The Greater Production Campaign endured several years past the end of the

Great War, simply because it enjoyed Meighan’s enthusiastic patronage. With the fall of the Meighan government in 1921, Deputy Superintendent General Scott, who had never supported the project, moved quickly to terminate the Greater Production Campaign, closing the Greater Production farms, cancelling the agricultural leases on reserve lands, and selling off the farm machinery purchased for the program (Dawson 2002:15; Titley

1986:31).

During the time the Greater Production Campaign was in operation, approximately 90,000 acres of land on the Blood reserve were leased to non-Aboriginal

286 farmers and ranchers and a 4800 acre Greater Production farm, staffed exclusively by

Indian Affairs employees, was located on the Blood reserve. Many of these leases were located on the land identified in the 1918 surrender, which the department had ultimately declined to accept. The lease of a smaller portion of reserve land, some 6000 acres, was agreed to by the band members, but the terms were in dispute. These actions prompted a concerted response from the Kainai. Already rankled about the status of the surrender and the terms of the disputed lease, Head Chief Shot Both Sides was further disconcerted when large flocks of sheep were driven onto the reserve by leaseholders without the consent or knowledge of the Kainai. Questions regarding these issues were met with obfuscation by the Agent and attempts to receive clarification from higher ranking department officials were taken as evidence of a simmering insurrection 77 . Indian

Commissioner Graham arrived on the Blood reserve with an N.W.M.P. escort and proceeded to threaten the Head Chief. The incident was described by R. N. Wilson, who related Shot Both Sides’ complaint to the department.

[T]he Indians were contentedly awaiting the pleasure of the department when like a bolt out from the blue came the sensational arrival of Mr Graham and his detachment of police (3) with a lot of wild west talk about cattle killing, sheep killing, and other depredations up to then unheard of and certainly not contemplated by any Indian in this vicinity 78 .

The department did finally relent to pressure from the Kainai Chiefs and had

Commissioner Graham investigate the Blood Agency. This investigation found gross irregularities in the conduct of Agency business, questionable financial practices, and shoddy recordkeeping. Graham revealed that the cattle industry in particular was subject to considerable abuses. Under the management of Agent Dilworth, no round up or count

77 Wilson to Scott, June 2, 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1. 78 Wilson to Scott, June 2, 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 1.

287 of the cattle had been made, cattle owners had difficulty getting information regarding transactions involving their cattle or even the number of cattle they owned and proceeds from cattle sales were routinely withheld or misappropriated. There were few restrictions on the Agent’s actions and Dilworth apparently took a free hand with both band finances and personal property. Graham, after meeting with band members, interviewing reserve staff, and examining Agency records, castigated Dilworth.

In listening to different complaints and going over the manner in which the business of this agency has been conducted, I haven’t the slightest doubt in my mind that the Indians have just cause for feeling as they do towards their agent. I did not think it possible that a man could go as far as this agent has in handling their funds, cattle and business generally, without getting into more serious trouble with them than he has 79 .

In the face of serious allegations of mismanagement, Dilworth tendered his resignation.

However, no attempt to prosecute him was ever undertaken, nor is there evidence that individual band members received compensation for their losses.

Although pleased that Dilworth was forced out as Agent, Shot Both Sides and other Kainai Chiefs remained frustrated by the lack of action on their protests to the department. As a result, a Memorial was prepared outlining the substance of their grievances and presented to the Minister of the Interior on May 31, 1920. This lengthy document was prepared by R. N. Wilson in conjunction with R. V. Sinclair, a lawyer working on behalf of the Kainai, at the direction of Head Chief Shot Both Sides and with the support of all the Minor Chiefs 80 . The Memorial details charges of fraud, neglect and mismanagement, asserting that the viable and productive cattle and farming industries on the Blood reserve were systematically destroyed by ill-conceived department policies. In particular, it was asserted that a 1918 surrender for lease of reserve lands was taken

79 Graham to Scott, December 26, 1918, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2. 80 Sinclair to Scott, May 30, 1920, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2.

288 improperly, that the operations of the Greater Production farm on the Blood reserve was detrimental to Kainai farming operations, and that the grazing leases tendered under the

Greater Production Campaign resulted in losses of an estimated 2000 head of cattle and some 500 work horses. The Memorial concludes with an appeal for action on 12 separate points, which requested that the grazing leases on the Blood reserve be terminated, the disputed lease surrender be cancelled, that the Greater Production farm cease operations, that compensation for losses be paid to band members, that the cattle herd be restored, that vacancies to the ranks of the Chiefs be filled, and that a judicial investigation into the management of the Blood reserve be undertaken 81 .

Commenting on the Memorial, D. C. Scott, Deputy Superintendent General, did not dispute the essential veracity of the claims made, explaining that the circumstances of the Kainai have declined precipitously since the inauguration of the Greater Production

Scheme on the Blood reserve and the explanations of department officials on the matter were not satisfactory.

I take a serious view of the statements made in them memorial, for the following reasons:

In the fiscal year 1916-17 the Blood Indians were in a fairly prosperous condition. Their business was being conducted after a settled policy, which had obtained for several years. They were practically self-supporting. Beyond the cost of administration, they were of no expense to the Government. Farming had been carried on for some years. A considerable quantity of grain had been raised, cattle had been sold in the market and good prices realized from time to time. The Indians of the reserve and the Government activities were in a solvent condition. Now all this has changed. The cattle herd was been decimated, and the farming operations are disturbed. It is alleged that the Indians have lost nearly five hundred work horses, and our own officers say that conditions could not be worse. Naturally the question arises how this change came about. The department is immediately thrown upon its defence, as the memorial directly blames the new policy inaugurated when Commissioner Graham took charge of all the farming and stock-raising operations on the Blood reserve, and began the

81 Memorial of the Blood Indians, no date, circa May 1920, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2.

289

development of the greater production campaign, for which he was specially appointed 82 .

Nevertheless, the department remained reluctant to address the issues brought forward by the Kainai. Commissioner Graham, in an item by item rebuttal of the Memorial, blamed incompetent Agents for all the hardship suffered by the Kainai and flatly refuted that any harm was occasioned by the operation of the Greater Production program on the Blood reserve 83 .

Scott, despite accepting that there was merit to the assertions made in the

Memorial, remained wary of holding an inquiry into the management of the Blood reserve. He advised Minister Meighen that it would be more politic not to pursue such an undertaking.

While no doubt holding of a judicial investigation would clear the air, I am not sure that the department would come out of it very well. While I have no objection personally to this ordeal, I think it a better policy to avoid it 84 .

The department’s stalling led Wilson to enlist a number of opposition MPs to direct questions to the Minister on the matter in the House of Commons. This did succeed in causing Scott and other senior department officials some measure of discomfort, but did not result in any specific action being taken.

A formal response to the Memorial was finally supplied to Head Chief Shot Both

Sides in October 1922, almost a year and a half after the Memorial was originally presented to the department. The Kainai were less than satisfied with the response. In the first place, the department attempted to prevent the Chiefs from consulting a lawyer or other outside advisor by insisting that it be kept confidential. The Chiefs interpreted

82 Scott to Meighen, June 8, 1920, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2. 83 Graham to Meighan, January 20, 1921, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2. 84 Scott to Meighen, June 8, 1920, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2.

290 this as an attempt to forestall the matter because they would be unable to produce an adequate reply to the document.

We declined to accept the papers under any pledge of secrecy and informed the department’s representative that as the matter was one of tribal and public business we would deal with it as we saw fit 85 .

In refusing to be constrained by the department’s edict, the Kainai Chiefs insisted on the right to deal with the matter as they saw fit, effectively debating the terms over how they would proceed. The Chiefs further expressed their dissatisfaction with the responses, maintaining that the department had failed to deal with the substance of the charges made in the Memorial.

We regret, however that we must tell you that the Blood Indians are profoundly disappointed to find that you should consider that our very serious charges of maladministration can be disposed of by merely forwarding to us the bald denials and evasions of the Commissioner. As one of our elder chiefs put it “We were hopeful of tangible results from the long expected visit of Mr Stewart [Minister of the Interior] but all he has done for us is to send us a big bundle of the Commissioner’s lies.” Our experience is like that of a person who asked for bread and was given a stone 86 .

The reply formulated by the Kainai Chiefs went on the reiterate their concerns about the disputed 1918 lease surrender, and their claims that the Greater Production Campaign on the Blood reserve was responsible for heavy loses of livestock and agricultural production, expressly denying the explanations offered by Commissioner Graham, and again requested a full independent investigation into the conditions on the Blood reserve.

85 Shot Both Sides and Blood Minor Chiefs to Stewart, December 20, 1922, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2. 86 Shot Both Sides and Blood Minor Chiefs to Stewart, December 20, 1922, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2.

291

This document was signed by Head Chief Shot Both Sides, and Minor Chiefs Many

White Horses, Running Antelope and Left Hand 87 .

No further response from the department was forthcoming and as it became evident that the Memorial would not compel Indian Affairs to address the grievances of the Kainai, Wilson in 1921 produced a pamphlet entitled “Our Betrayed Wards” that was circulated to the press, interested politicians, and the general public. This document, based largely upon the 1920 Memorial, restated the earlier charges, adding background context for readers unfamiliar with the intricacies of the Indian Affairs administrative hierarchy and the historical circumstances of the Kainai (Fisher 1974). At the time of publication, “Our Betrayed Wards” caused a minor sensation which ultimately resulted in

Charles Stewart, Minister of the Interior, visiting the Blood reserve 88 . However, the visit achieved little of substance and the department continued to insist that the misfortune experienced by the Kainai was the result of an unprincipled Agent and adverse weather conditions, for which the department could not be held responsible. After some years farming on the Blood reserve eventually recovered and by the end of the 1920s, production returned to previous levels. The cattle industry, however, remained moribund and the Kainai cattle herds did not return to the numbers seen at its height until after

World War II (Goldfrank 1945:35).

Despite the fact that the Memorial was of only limited effectiveness in forcing the department to address the grievances of the Kainai, it is nevertheless evidence of political engagement by the band. The Memorial represents a concerted effort by the Kainai

Chiefs to confront and challenge the regulatory authority of Indian Affairs and an

87 Shot Both Sides and Blood Minor Chiefs to Stewart, December 20, 1922, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2. 88 Rauox to McNally, July 24, 1922, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7102, File 773/3-1-1, pt. 2.

292 assertion regarding how the reserve and its resources were to be managed. Ultimately, the Memorial expressed their conception of the proper role of the Chiefs in conducting the affairs of the Kainai and the appropriate exercise of political authority on the reserve.

In bringing the Memorial forward, the Kainai Chiefs sought to provoke a departmental response by utilizing the Indian Act and department regulations against the actions of

Indian Affairs officials. They achieved partial success in that Agent Dilworth was dismissed and an investigation into the administration was undertaken.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the Kainai were in the end unsuccessful in forcing the Department of

Indian Affairs to satisfactorily address their grievances, the Memorial and subsequent pamphlet reveal the Chiefs as willing to engage the department and challenge the established order on the reserve. The Kainai clearly considered themselves as owners of the reserve land and resources and fully competent to direct how these were to be utilized through Head Chief Shot Both Sides and the Minor Chiefs. Department officials tended to dismiss the actions of the Kainai Chiefs as being primarily instigated by Wilson, who they characterized as a disgruntled former employee. However, this is an injustice to the

Kainai leaders who were fully capable of discerning their interests and determining a course of action. In this, they certainly sought advice from Wilson and while they depended upon him to prepare correspondence to the department on their behalf, it does not appear that they were beholden to him. The Kainai Chiefs did not hesitate to consult other outsiders with respect to their claims against the department. Indeed, Aboriginal peoples across western Canada were at this time commonly making representations to the

293 department through lawyers, missionaries, and other interested parties. In confronting

Indian Affairs officials, protesting iniquitous or arbitrary treatment, and asserting a degree of authority in the way in which the reserve was managed Kainai leaders were engaging in a debate over the terms of their own domination and ultimately serving to reconstruct colonial institutions in locally meaningful ways. Employing Kainai conceptions of leadership and authority, Kainai Chiefs re-inscribed the limited capacities permitted Chiefs under the Indian Act to contest the surrender of reserve lands, attempts to depose the Head Chief, and the operation of the Greater Productions Campaign on the

Blood reserve. For the Kainai, these issues became the site of struggles over meaning and power within the wider context of colonial relations.

294

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

In the years following the submission of the Blood Memorial, leadership and the composition of the Kainai band council continued to be the seat of contention and confrontation. The appointment of new Chiefs was a recurrent issue as the Kainai repeatedly requested elections be held to replace Chiefs that had died. Half a dozen formal requests were made between 1922 and 1943, with Shot Both Sides appealing directly to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs on the matter in 1930 and 1943 1.

During this time there was some discussion within the department regarding the official application of the election provisions of the Indian Act to the Kainai and informal elections to fill vacancies were held in 1930, 1944, and 1955 2. While these elections followed the procedures of the Indian Act, the Kainai continued to select Chiefs as they had since the early reserve era under what Indian Affairs officials called the indefinite or life-time system. The status of the band council on the reserve remained an issue of debate, as acknowledged by T. R. L. MacInnes, Department Secretary. When the question of officially applying the elective system to bands in western Canada was before the department in the late 1940s, MacInnes noted the substantial opposition to the elective system among bands in southern Alberta and advised that in these cases that it

1 Petition from Blood band members, December 1922, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1; Pugh to MacKenzie, March 11, 1927, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1; Shot Both Sides to Scott, January 27, 1930, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1, Christianson to MacKenzie, May 29, 1933, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1; Devine to McGill, March 31, 1937, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3- 5, pt. 1; Shot Both Sides to McGill, March 24, 1943, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1. 2 Pugh to Scott, April 24, 1930, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1; McMillan to Schmidt, July 3, 1944, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1; Hunter to Battle, November 21, 1955, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 2.

295 would be necessary to proceed with caution 3. Following the 1951 revision of the Indian

Act, several plebiscites were held among the Kainai regarding the introduction of the elective system on the Blood reserve, but there was considerable resistance to the move, as support for the existing council remained high, and each of these were defeated 4. The elective provisions of the Indian Act did not come into force until 1962 when the first elections under the two-year system were finally held (Boldt and Long 1987:105).

Over this period, Kainai Chiefs continued to express concern over the administration of the reserve, addressing issues such as oil and gas rights, the timber limit, cattle industry, farming operations, payment for livestock sold on and off reserve, rations for destitute band members, grazing leases, and education 5. The Kainai Chiefs pursued these matters in various ways, presenting disputes, grievances, and petitions to

Indian Affairs personnel, elected officials, and local newspapers. In general, Head Chief

Shot Both Sides and the other Kainai Chiefs, in attempting to mitigate the oppressive oversight of Indian Affairs officials and to receive redress for what they thought were questionable actions, were seeking more autonomy in running their own affairs on the reserve. As well, by the early 1940s the Kainai Chiefs were attending regular band council meetings, chaired by the Indian Agent. At these meetings, the band council attended to many of the same items as specified under the limited by-law powers of the

Indian Act band government—control of livestock, suppression of noxious weeds, maintenance of roads, and the like. But they also addressed disputes between band members, the regulation of the farming and cattle industries, the distribution of rations,

3 MacInnes to Jones, February 28, 1946, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7115, File 3/1-5, pt. 1; MacInnes to Jones, January 4, 1949, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7115, File 3/1-5, pt. 1. 4 Ragan to Jones, March 22, 1954, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 2; Battle to Acland, July 18, 1958, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 2. 5 Interview with Chiefs, circa February, 1931, INAC 773/3-1.

296 health care for band members, and other important areas of reserve administration 6. At about the same time, the Kainai Chiefs also began to routinely submit official Band

Council Resolutions to the department. These forms were common administrative documents and were used by Indian Bands to make official requests of Indian Affairs with respect to reserve lands, band funds, or membership. For the most part, Band

Council Resolutions dealt with mundane matters of reserve administration, but occasionally, the Kainai band council used Band Council Resolutions in an attempt to modify or redirect the application of department policy. Participating in band council meetings and framing and submitting resolutions inevitably delimited a more prescribed structure within which Kainai Chiefs were required to work. Certainly, such practices served to subordinate Kainai leadership to Indian Affairs administrative procedures and, more broadly, a colonial governmental order. However, even in these restrictive circumstances, Kainai leaders worked to subvert the authority of the Indian Agent and assert a degree of control over the regulation of the reserve. For instance, in band council meetings they refused to restrict the size of individual horse herds, to consent to leases if they did not agree with the terms, or to curtail the disbursement of funds to band members 7. Frank Weasel Head, who worked as an administrative assistant for the band council in the 1950s, related that the council would engage in obfuscation, delay, and misdirection to avoid coming to a decision in cases where the Agent was trying to force an issue to a head (Frank Weasel Head personal communication, March 17, 2005). In other instances, the Chiefs would agree to a course of action prior to a band council meeting and vote in unanimity, or speak Blackfoot in order to debate an issue in front of

6 NAC RG 10, Vol. 7136, File 773/3-6. 7 NAC RG 10, Vol. 7136, File 773/3-6.

297 the Agent without revealing their positions on the matter. The Kainai Chiefs employed these strategies to challenge department officials regarding the management of the reserve. In so doing they were asserting a degree of political authority and actively redefining relations between themselves and Indian Affairs. In essence, the actions of the

Kainai Chiefs served to imprint the positions of Chiefs and Councillors with their own conceptions of leadership and authority, reconfiguring the band council to a degree as an

Aboriginal institution. These actions continued the efforts of the Kainai Chiefs, in ways similar to earlier leaders, to employ traditional systems of leadership and authority in the reserve context and ultimately debate and recast terms of colonial domination.

The flexibility of Blackfoot systems of leadership and authority has always allowed the Kainai to adapt to changing political, social, and economic circumstances while still retaining their fundamental cultural traits and preserving their political autonomy. As nomadic bison hunters, the Blackfoot developed sophisticated social and political institutions that offered flexible yet resilient means to manage and distribute resources, organize people, and regulate both internal and external relations. The acquisition of the horse and firearms during the historic period led to increased wealth, greater social differentiation, and an intensification of social and ceremonial institutions.

As well, participation in the fur trade, the effects of epidemic diseases, missionary activities and the demise of the great bison herds all had dramatic consequences for

Blackfoot political systems. However, essential traits of leadership and authority such as generosity, respect for individual autonomy, and consensual decision-making endured into the reserve period. During the early reserve era and the first decades of the 19 th century the Kainai made the transition to settled reserve life and this inevitably required

298 that their social and political systems be adapted to their new circumstances. Although

Treaty 7 was silent on the issue of leadership and the regulation of Blackfoot political systems, Indian Affairs officials soon began to interfere in the selection of Kainai leaders and sought to impose the terms of the Indian Act, including the elective provisions. The leaders that made Treaty 7 had come to prominence during the pre-reserve era and earned their positions in the traditional manner by distinguishing themselves in warfare and raiding, demonstrating generosity, and gaining a reputation for wisdom. During the initial years on the Blood reserve, the pre-reserve systems of leadership and authority continued to have considerable salience. Generosity, sound judgement, and consensual decision-making all remained conditions of leadership and leaders were still expected to provide for the welfare of their followers. However, on the reserve, the Kainai came under the regulatory authority of Indian Affairs officials, who exerted increasing control over all aspects of reserve life.

During the early reserve era, the appointment of leaders to band council increasingly became a site of contestation and by the turn of the 19 th century department officials were attempting to directly intervene in the selection of Chiefs. Agent Wilson, in 1899, expressed his desire to “install a good working man” as Chief on the Blood reserve and Agent Dilworth, in the 1910s, consistently refused to hold elections because he did not approve of the individuals who the Kainai would be most likely to choose 8.

Despite the interference of Indian Agents, it is apparent that pre-reserve leadership traits remained important and that traditional means of winning support and obtaining positions of leadership had continued relevance. The selection of new Chiefs between 1878 and

8 Wilson to Laird, May 5, 1899, NAC RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3; Dilworth to Scott, December 21, 1914, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1; Dilworth to MacLean, January 12, 1915, NAC RG 10, Vol. 7124, File 773/3-5, pt. 1.

299

1900 reveals that although the number and composition of Kainai bands on the Blood reserve were changing, many aspects of the pre-reserve social and political dynamics continued to endure. Chiefs remained esteemed individuals whose influence, support, and guidance was important to their followers. Following the turn of the 19 th century, the

Kainai witnessed the transition to a new generation of leaders as those that had risen to prominence in the pre-reserve era passed away and were replaced by new leaders who had come of age on the reserve. While a growing tension over the economic development of the reserve was apparent between band members who had established themselves in the developing cash economy and those who remained invested in the horse economy and the existing social hierarchy, pre-reserve systems of leadership and authority remained important and leaders continued to employ many of the same strategies to mobilize support and consolidate their followings. The succession of Head

Chiefs on the Blood reserve during the early 20 th century, in which Red Crow was replaced by his son Crop Eared Wolf in 1900 and who was in turn succeeded by his son

Shot Both Sides in 1913, demonstrate aspects of this. Both men were said to embody traditional leadership qualities, were respected for success in the ranching industry, and had demonstrated a commitment to improving conditions on the reserve. They were in each case reported by the Indian Agent to be the consensus choice of the Kainai.

This contestation and challenge over the exercise of political authority is clearly evidenced in the political struggles over the disposition of land and resources on the

Blood reserve that occurred between the Kainai Chiefs and Indian Affairs officials in the early years of the 20 th century. The surrender of reserve lands, attempts to depose the

Head Chief, and the lease of reserve land for wartime production all served to engage the

300

Kainai in debates over meaning and power in the colonial context. Essentially, these confrontations represent what John and Jean Comaroff have described as the “challenge and riposte” of the colonial encounter, in which both the colonizer and the colonized seek to reconstruct each other in terms of the available political and cultural possibilities. The exchange between Agent Hyde and the Kainai Chiefs in 1911 provides a concise example of the dynamic processes by which in the expression of political authority in the reserve context were given meaning and substance. The exchange, which included bestowing a

Kainai name upon the Agent and the distribution of gifts for the Chiefs, both parties presented visions for the administration of the reserve and sought to inscribe reserve politics with their own expectations and experiences. During the early years of the 20 th century, the Kainai Chiefs became embroiled in a series of conflicts with Indian Affairs over the management of lands and resources on the Blood reserve that fundamentally represented struggles over meaning and power in the colonial context. Within these situations, Kainai leaders and Indian Affairs officials were enmeshed in dynamic processes that substantiated and defined the exercise of political authority on the Blood reserve. The attempts to secure a surrender of a portion of the Blood reserve were adamantly opposed by Head Chief Crop Eared Wolf, who exploited his pervasive influence among Kainai band members, as well as employing traditional political practices and innovative tactics within the reserve setting to ensure the proposal was defeated. Subsequently, Agent Wilson and other department officials attempted to have

Crop Eared Wolf deposed under the terms of the Indian Act, but these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, reinforcing the status of the Head Chief and delimiting the extent of his political authority in regards to the Agent. Shot Both Sides, when he became Head

301

Chief, continued to fight against the alienation of reserve land, launched a vigorous protest against the Greater Production Campaign and the mismanagement of reserve resources, and pushed for vacancies on the band council to be filled. These events served to vitalize Kainai leadership, perpetuate a sense of their political capacities, and demarcate the context for the exercise of political authority on the reserve.

Confrontations with Indian Affairs officials over the management of reserve lands and resources conveyed the substance and significance for assertions of political and cultural autonomy.

This thesis has undertaken a historical anthropology of band government which contemplates the formation of band government not only as a political institution, but also as a cultural project of governance. By offering detailed ethnographic descriptions of particular events in relation to broader historical processes, this thesis has endeavoured to situate Kainai systems of leadership and authority within a colonial context in order to examine how the institution of band government was given meaning and substance through the actions of both Indian Affairs officials and Kainai leaders. In this regard, elected band government may be usefully conceived of as a colonial project of governance. Colonial projects of governance are those diverse strategies, routines, and practices which, drawing upon enduring historical ideological formations, seek to effect social transformations within specific historical, political, and cultural contexts (Thomas

1994:105-06). Culturally and tactically complex, colonial projects of governance mediate between pervasive hegemonic discourses that serve to delimit how social objects are construed and the ways these ideals are expressed and implemented in practical local circumstances. Essentially, colonial projects represent specific events and initiatives,

302 shaped by abiding historical ideological formations, manifest in particular activities of state agencies and other social actors. From this perspective, band government represents more that just a repressive measure directed at Aboriginal peoples; rather it is a location within which the categories of the colonial order were defined and deployed. Band government served as a site of struggle in that it provided a field for the interplay between structural constraint and situational contingency, expressed in the various political and cultural assertions made by both the colonizer and colonized. By participating in the operation of band government, in its articulation and execution, both

Indian Affairs officials and Kainai leaders through their actions worked to define its form and content and delineate the possibilities of political action within the reserve context, ultimately serving to constitute and shape colonial relations. Both sides brought their own set of understandings and expectations to the band government and each sought to inscribe the institution with their own conceptions of leadership and the exercise of political power on the reserve. Kainai leaders, in contesting the selection of Chiefs, opposing the surrender of reserve lands, resisting efforts to depose Chiefs, and protesting the actions of Indian Agents, challenged department policies and expressed their conception about the role of the Chiefs in the management of the reserve. These actions represent the structures and processes by which the terms of colonial domination were perpetuated and negotiated within the reserve setting.

In order to delineate a context of enduring historical formations and constitutive ideologies within which the particular routines, practices, and procedures of band government were elaborated, this thesis combines archival research and ethnographic interviews to determine how the band government provisions of the Indian Act were

303 developed and implemented by Indian Affairs on the one hand and how they were received and experienced by the Kainai on the other. Within the discipline of anthropology, historical and archival materials are increasingly being used to offer comprehensive historic appraisals of cultural processes that are the central concern of anthropological investigation. In what has been termed the historic turn in anthropology, studies of historical processes and historical consciousness have gained prominence within the discipline (Ortner 1984:158). Archival research may be regarded as ethnographic to the extent that it is concerned with the study of meaning created by groups of people in particular historical circumstances and cultural settings and attempts to construct politically and socially situated accounts, descriptions, and representations of human experience. Indeed, archival research has assumed a more prominent role within the discipline as anthropologists look to situate local cultural systems within broader social and political processes and seek to understand the dynamic processes by which cultural relations are created, propagated, and transformed. This project has made extensive use of archival material, primarily the RG 10 record group containing the records for the Department of Indian Affairs, to examine the development and implementation of the band government provisions of the Indian Act.

While discussions of band government in the academic literature often imply that the primary intention of band government was to undermine or remove Aboriginal leaders and that band government subjected Aboriginal communities more directly to departmental control, the research presented in this thesis shows that band government was applied in a haphazard and indiscriminate manner. Senior department officials certainly regarded band government as a tool for directed civilization, but developed no

304 coherent strategy for its implementation. Consequently, until the turn of the 19 th century band government remained administratively ambiguous, being officially applied by

Order-in-Council in some communities, followed informally in others, and in many communities simply not attempted. By the early 20 th century, however, band government had coalesced into a more or less standard set of procedures. In eastern Canada, band government was officially applied to all Indian bands by a comprehensive Order-in-

Council in 1899 and in western Canada the department settled into a routine of confirming Chiefs for an indefinite term elected in conformity with the elective provisions of the Indian Act. Tobias (1975), among others, have stated that band government was intended primarily for the more ‘advanced’ bands in eastern Canada, but it has been argued here that it was an important initiative in western Canada as well.

Even though the band government was not officially applied to most bands in western

Canada until after World War II, elections were held on many reserves from an early date and department officials routinely acted as though the provisions of the Indian Act were in force. Leaders were required to conform to the band government regulations and the terms of the Indian Act were commonly referred to in determining the number of Chiefs and Headmen for each band as well as for deposing leaders of which they disapproved.

At the same time, the institution of band government also developed as a means for

Aboriginal leaders to exercise political authority and to engage Indian Affairs officials over governmental regulation. A number of bands in western Canada insisted on their rights under treaty to Chiefs and Headmen in response to overtures from the Department to abolish these positions. Similarly, bands across western Canada, including the Kainai, repeatedly requested that elections be held to fill vacancies to the ranks of Chiefs; in

305 particular, a delegation to Ottawa of leaders from Treaty 4 cited the terms of the treaty in asking that additional Chiefs be confirmed. The procedures and practices of band government were established in bands in western Canada well before its official application and, as an important adjunct of Canadian Indian policy, developed as a site of struggle through which colonial relations were constituted and contested.

The development and implementation of the elected band government provisions of the Indian Act is an important and largely overlooked element of the civilization and assimilation projects the Canadian government directed towards Aboriginal peoples. The institution has become ubiquitous in First Nations administered under the Indian Act and has been operating within some reserve communities for more than a century. Reflecting prevailing ideals of human progress, Canadian Indian policy in the 19 th century sought to achieve the moral and social advancement of Aboriginal peoples by inculcating Euro-

Canadian values and behaviours. To this end, liberal democratic institutions were regarded as a salient feature of civilized society and elected band councils were perceived to be indispensable for the social development of Aboriginal peoples. It has been commonly asserted that band government was an institution that worked to displace

Aboriginal leaders and erode Aboriginal political systems in an effort to consolidate governmental control over Aboriginal communities and certainly this was the explicit intention of the architects of the policy. But in considering how band government was understood and received by Aboriginal peoples, with specific reference to the experience of the Kainai in the late 19 th and early 20 th century, it is clear that band government was partially an Aboriginal institution as well. The participation of Aboriginal peoples in the routines and procedures of band government afforded the opportunity to confront and

306 challenge Indian Affairs officials in an effort to assert a measure of political autonomy and in effect contest the terms of colonial domination. Overall, elected band government represents a specific set of administrative initiatives, motivated by enduring notions of

Aboriginal incapacity and the primordial nature of Aboriginal culture, expressed in local practices and circumstances that sought to undermine Aboriginal culture and incorporate

Aboriginal peoples into the Canadian body politic, while at the same time band government in practice developed as a site of struggle in which Aboriginal leaders and

Indian Affairs officials strove to re-inscribe the institution with their own conceptions and meanings about authority, power and rule in the colonial context.

307

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APPENDIX A

Blood Band Annuity Paylists, 1877-1883

1877 Men Men Women Children

Amount Bands Paid

S 46 Red Crow 43 96 164 3661 EE 11 Bull Turn Round 10 23 36 831 T 24 Bull Backfat 24 54 132 2523 U 15 Wolf Collar 15 39 62 1395 V 21 Eagle Head 19 39 74 1587 FF 14 White Calf 14 26 67 1287 W 21 Bad Head 10 29 79 1449 X 18 Hind Bull 18 25 53 1155 Z 24 Medicine Calf 24 44 97 1983 AA 16 Weazel Bull 15 21 50 1035 GG 13 Go to the Bear 13 28 52 1119 DD 16 Eagle Shoe 11 22 41 891 II 10 Rainy Chief 10 15 26 625 JJ 11 Heavily Whipped 9 20 48 927 6 Chiefs with no band 6 27 56 1086 Special Payments 23 276 Total 241 531 1038 21800 We Certify to having paid the Blood Indians as per the forgoing schedules the amount opposite their respective names (Signed) W. D. [Illegible]

Sub-Inspector Frank Norman Staff Constable NWMP

2 Chiefs @ $25 50 18 Hd. Men - 15 270 1790 Indians – 12 21480 $ 21800 (Reproduced from NAC RG 10, Vol. 9412)

327

1878

Chiefs of Bands Amount Chiefs of Bands Amount Paid Paid Red Crow 1560.00 Brought Forward 8060.00 Bull Back Fat 1415.00 White Calf 645.00 Wolf Collar 585.00 Going to the Bear 250.00 Eagle Head 1600.00 White Antelope 450.00 Hind Bull 300.00 White Striped Dog 245.00 Many Spotted Horses 435.00 The Moon 330.00 Medicine Calf 1150.00 Father of All Children 750.00 Stolen Person 150.00 Strangling Wolf 520.00 One Spot 310.00 Running Rabbit 1987.00 Eagle Shoe 290.00 Various unpaid last year 1965.00 Carried Forward 8060.00 Total 1521.00 1 Head Chief 16 Minor Chiefs Total Number 2488 (Reproduced from NAC RG 10, Vol. 9412)

1880

Recapitulation Red Crow (HC) 112 580.00 Father of Many Children 110 560.00 White Antelope 34 180.00 Eagle Head 189 455.00 Blackfoot Old Woman 129 655.00 Going to the Bear 58 300.00 One Spot 24 120.00 Old Moon 13 65.00 Running Rabbit 42 210.00 Hind Bull 19 95.00 Bull Back Fat 96 480.00 Strangling Wolf 26 130.00 Striped Dog 23 115.00 Wolf Collar 2 10.00 Bull Turning Round 14 70.00 Miscellaneous 53 265.00 Arrears 12 60.00 956 4850.00 (Reproduced from NAC RG 10, Vol. 9413)

328

1881

Treaty No. 7

Paid At Blood Reserve on the 25 th Sept. 1881 ARREARS ANNUITY Numbers in Family Names Amt.

Amt. $

Band Number No. of people paid For What Year Paid Number Paid

Men Women Boys Girls Others $ Red Crow’s Band 497 2505.00 Father of Many Children M.C. 168 850.00 White Antelope “ 36 190.00 Eagle Head “ 244 1230.00 Blackfoot Old Woman “ 248 1250.00 Going to the Bear “ 116 590.00 One Spot “ 181 915.00 Old Moon “ 115 585.00 Running Rabbit HC 256 1305.00 Bull Back Fat MC 291 1465.00 Hind Bull “ 178 900.00 Strangling Wolf “ 183 925.00 Striped Dog “ 116 590.00 Wolf Collar “ 143 725.00 Bull Turning Round “ 141 715.00 Button Chief “ 165 835.00 Bull Shield “ 126 640.00 Many Spotted Horses “ 118 600.00 White Calf “ 98 500.00 Stolen Person “ 70 360.00 Eagle Shoe “ 70 360.00 3560 Total 18030.00 Arrears 1877, 78, 79, 80 13716.00 Full amount paid 1881 $31746.00 (Reproduced from NAC RG 10, Vol. 9414)

329

1882

Treaty No. 7

ARREARS ANNUITY Numbers in Family Names Amt.

Amt. $

Band Number No. of people paid For What Year Paid Number Paid

Men Women Boys Girls Others $ Red Crow H.C. 461 2325.00 Father of Many Children M.C. 3 15 81 169 855.00 White Antelope M.C. 36 190.00 Eagle Head “ 1 5 81 242 1220.00 Blackfoot Old Woman “ 269 1355.00 Going to the Bear “ 120 610.00 One Spot “ 7 35 81 183 925.00 Old Moon “ 1 5 “ 104 530.00 Running Wolf “ 8 40 “ 131 1060.00 Hind Bull “ 117 865.00 Bull Back Fat “ 18 90 “ 345 1735.00 Strangling Wolf “ 2 10 “ 186 940.00 Striped Dog “ 115 585.00 Wolf Collar “ 152 770.00 Bull Turning Round “ 5 25 “ 155 785.00 Button Chief “ 140 710.00 Bull Shield “ 3 15 “ 136 690.00 Many Spotted Horses “ 112 570.00 White Calf “ 9 45 “ 77 395.00 Stolen Person “ 63 325.00 Eagle Shoe “ 75 385.00 57 285 “ 3521 17835.00 3521 Indians @ $5 17,605 1 Head Chief 20 20 Minor Chiefs @ 10 200 57 Indians 1 year Arrears 285 Amount Paid 1882 $18110 (Reproduced from NAC RG 10, Vol. 9415A)

330

1883

Treaty No. 7

Paid At Blood Reserve on the 25 th Sept. 1883 ARREARS ANNUITY Numbers in Family Names Amt.

Amt. $

Band Number

No. ofpeople paid For What Year Paid Number Paid $ Men Women Boys Girls Others Recapitulation

A Red Crow H.C. 3161600.00 B F. of Many Children M.C. 92 470.00 C White Antelope “ 42 220.00 D Eagle Head “ 138 700.0 E B.foot Old Woman “ 157 765.00 F Going to the Bear “ 61 315.00 G One Spot “ 141 715.00 H Old Moon “ 71 365.00 I Running Wolf “ 131 665.00 J Hind Bull “ 111 565.00 M Bull Back Fat “ 2311165.00 L Strangle Wolf “ 1 5 82 127 645.00 M Striped Dog “ 81 415.00 N Wolf Collar “ 67 345.00 O Bull Turning Round “ 96 490.00 P Button Chief “ 113 575.00 Q Bull Shield “ 105 535.00 R Many Spotted Horses “ 71 365.00 S White Calf “ 81 415.00 T Stolen Person “ 40 210.00 U Eagle Shoe “ 51 265.00 V Calf Tail H.C. 2721380.00 15 258913185.00 2467 Indians @ $5 each $12835 2 Head Chiefs @ $25 50 20 Minor Chiefs @ 15 200 1 Indian 1 year arrears 285 Total Amount paid $13190 (Reproduced from NAC RG 10, Vol. 9416)

331

APPENDIX B

Schedule of Blood Chiefs, 1899

List of Chiefs on the Blood Reserve and dates of appointment

Elected Date of Election Name of Chief Band or or Remarks Appointed Appointment Red Crow Head Chief Elected Previous to1877 The chiefs and Minor Chiefs (Upper) are not elected or appointed Day Chief Head Chief Appointed 1889 for any specified time (Lower) Wolf Bull Minor Chief “ 1889 Many Dust “ “ 1889 Blackfoot Old Woman “ Elected 1878 Going to the Bear “ “ “ “ 1877 One Spot “ “ “ “ 1877 Old Moon “ “ “ “ 1877 Running Wolf “ Appointed 1883 Little Ears “ “ 1893 Strangling Wolf “ “ 1879 Eagle Ribs “ “ 1885 Calf Shirt “ “ 1879 Heavy Shield “ “ 1885 White Calf “ Elected “ “ 1877 Stolen Persons “ “ “ “ 1877 Eagle Shoe “ “ “ “ 1877 Bull Horn “ Appointed 1885 (Reproduced from RG 10, Vol. 3939, File 121698-3)