Multimodal Salafi Engagement with Digi- Tal Media in Azerbaijan

Multimodal Salafi Engagement with Digi- tal Media in Azerbaijan

CAP PAPERS 195 AUGUST 2017

Kamal Gasimov is a researcher in the field of Islamic Studies from Azerbai- jan. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in Oriental Studies (Persian language and literature) from Baku State University (Azerbaijan). He has also studied Arabic language and literature at Kuwait University. Currently, he is a doctoral student at the Department of Near Eastern Studies at the Universi- ty of Michigan. His research has mainly concentrated on Islamic social movements, particularly quietist Salafi trends and their interaction with Is- lamists or jihadis; the transnationalization of Salafism and its connection with local (post-Soviet) actors; and Islamic legal theories.

“Social networks bring good and evil, but you should use them for good purposes. With the help of social networks, you have to spread the correct understanding of monotheism and the teach- ings of Islam with which the prophet came. You must distribute this through the media. This is a rare opportunity for you - use it and do not leave it to the evildoers and preachers of delusion.”1

Sheikh Salih Fawzan al-Fawzan

“Religious movements are brought together—realized as movements—through the circulation of discursive forms that address religious subjects, calling them into being, uniting them in com-

mon actions of reading, listening, seeing. In the contemporary world, electronic media are central to this process. They are the dominant technologies (though by no means the only ones) through which this circulation takes place and the forms of political and religious identities are forged.”2

Brian Larkin

his paper examines Azerbaijani out post-Soviet space, making it possible for Salafis’ engagement with the new them to bypass legal limitations and state T media technologies. Our main re- borders. However, the Internet is not only a search questions are: how do Salafis use dig- field of possibilities, but also a space that ital or Internet media, what are the outcomes alters Salafis' epistemology and their meth- of this interaction, and what styles of com- ods of argumentation. In other words, munication do Salafis employ in their cyber Salafis’ relationship with digital media engagements? Salafis3 in Azerbaijan are de- should not be understood in purely instru- prived of state support and do not possess mental terms—as “sequential processes of institutional power. Salafi leaders have lost movement of an essentially unchanged con- their access to mosques, and therefore their tent from source to destination” 5—but rather channels of communication with society and as a process of interaction. The new tech- the scope of their preaching became severely nology shapes new forms of transmission limited. Under such conditions of structural and acquisition of knowledge, as well as the restrictions and exclusion from public space, construction of a community’s identity and the Internet offers many invaluable opportu- the authority of its leadership. In turn, nities for Salafism. Since 2008 (with the clo- Salafis give the computer-mediated envi- sure of the Abu Bakr mosque, the main cen- ronments new and unexpected meanings. ter of Salafi preaching), the Internet has become an important sphere for the transmis- One of the main Salafi leaders in Azerbai- sion of Salafi knowledge, multi-level com- jan—Qamet Suleymanov (b. 1970)—deploys munication with society and authorities, dis- a set of discursive and performative media putes with rival religious groups, and the strategies on the Internet in order to achieve construction of religious authority. his preaching goals and, following the loss of their mosque, preserve Salafis’ sense of Access to digital media has enhanced “the belonging to a single community. At the channels through which ideas and infor- same time, Suleymanov’s media politics aim mation can be circulated and has enlarged to promote his main cause (reopening the the scope of what can be said and to Abu Bakr mosque) by representing Salafism whom.”4 This plurality of channels allows as an indigenous phenomenon absolutely Salafis to overcome governmental control. loyal to the political regime and compatible In addition, Internet media facilitate cross- with the nation-state. In order to propagate border interaction between Salafis through- and defend their causes, Salafis extend their

2 epistemology and interpretative approach Salafism in Azerbaijan: beyond Islamic texts to various secular me- The ahl al-sunna wa al- dia sources (news, political speeches, official decrees etc.), employing the language jama’a Community of and rhetoric of these sources for their own Abu Bakr Mosque ideological purposes. ack in the late 1980s, the small epi- In the following, we will conduct a detailed centers of Salafi preaching in Azer- analysis of the abovementioned forms of B baijan were student dormitories, Salafi engagement with digital media. It where Arab students who came to the Soviet should be noted that the cyber activity of Union to study medicine and the oil industry Muslim groups in post-Soviet countries re- taught the Qur’an, Sunna and Islamic law to mains poorly studied. Those studies that ex- ordinary Azerbaijanis. These foreign stu- ist tend to focus on the Internet resources of dents and their most diligent local disciples radical jihadi groups, especially from the made the first Azerbaijani and Russian 6 7 Northern Caucasus and Central Asia, translations of Salafi literature. However, while the engagement of other Muslim sects the wide diffusion of Salafism in the capital, has been largely ignored. In particular, there Baku, and other cities in Azerbaijan oc- is a lack of research on the Internet engage- curred through the activities of public and ment of "quietist" or "purist" Salafi groups, private Islamic organizations. After inde- despite the fact that these are the largest pendence, the Azerbaijani political elite was Salafi communities in Russia, Central Asia, highly interested in developing relationships and Azerbaijan. This research seeks to aid in with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries filling that gap, and analyzes previously un- in order to gain their political and financial studied Internet sources in Russian and support. During the period of 1994-1999, Azerbaijani. However, the Internet does not Azerbaijan received millions of dollars of replace physical reality and Salafis interact humanitarian aid under the umbrella of the in predominantly urban environments where King Fahd program.8 In addition to Saudi physical and virtual spaces are closely inter- Islamic foundations, NGOs based in Kuwait, connected. As such, before examining their Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were cyber activity, the appearance and diffusion also carrying out charitable activities in the of Salafi da’wa in Azerbaijan will be dis- capital and countryside.9 It goes without cussed. saying that almost all Islamic charitable organizations were involved in proselytizing activities: building mosques, distributing religious literature, and helping young Azer- baijanis gain admission to well-known Is- lamic universities. By the end of the 1990s, when Heydar Aliyev centralized power in the country, the

authorities had begun to develop policies for Shi'a and Sunni mullah-storytellers, who the prevention or control of transnational were mostly religiously uneducated, did not religious (notably Islamic) flows. Conse- know the Arabic language, and intermingled quently, the government of Azerbaijan their speeches about Islam with folk tales, closed down many of these organizations; anecdotes, and literary themes. Often, em- others were closed by the governments of powered by Salafi da'wa, young new lay their own countries, particularly in the af- advocates of Salafism entered into disputes termath of 9/11.10 However, the curbs on with these mullahs and corrected their reli- foreign sponsors failed to prevent the diffu- gious “mistakes,” demanding proof of every sion of Salafism. In fact, if Salafism story they delivered.11 Within the walls of emerged in Azerbaijan as result of external the mosque, a new community was formed, influence, Salafi networks in the country many members of which described them- have been structured around young Azerbai- selves either as Salafis or as ahl al-sunna wa janis who received religious education in al-jama’a. These self-identifications implied Islamic countries, notably Saudi Arabia, and a claim to “orthodoxy” and a differentiation returned home to preach. The largest Salafi of the religion from all other forms of Islam community in Azerbaijan was formed inside in Azerbaijan, particularly the dominant the Abu Bakr mosque, which was built in Shi’ism. Baku in 1997 with the financial assistance of the Kuwaiti charitable organization “Revival The Abu Bakr mosque and its surroundings of the Islamic heritage.” The mosque’s were places of social interaction, identity preachers were young Azerbaijanis who had building, and meaning production, where graduated from the Islamic University of attendees rediscovered Islamic theology and law, studied Arabic, brought friends and Medina (IUM). Qamet Suleymanov—the most charismatic and experienced IUM family members, discussed problems, and traded and read books. The exact number of graduate—became he leader of the Salafi community and the imam of the mosque. Salafis in Azerbaijan is unknown, though it His eloquent sermons drew 7,000-8,000 is generally agreed not to exceed 50,000 (not people; no other mosque could attract such a a large number for a country of almost 10 number of believers. million people). However, having penetrated a new environment, Salafism was able to The Abu Bakr mosque’s Salafi network in- influence it, becoming one of the most com- cluded a considerable number of urban edu- petitive religious currents in Azerbaijan.12 cated youth, as well as civil servants, busi- nessmen, and professionals from local and Nevertheless, despite its successful diffu- foreign companies. The mosque had a trans- sion, the spread of Salafism in Azerbaijan formative impact on the religious sphere in had—and still has—limitations, due to the Azerbaijan. Salafis were able to win new nature of the socio-political context in which followers by introducing a new discourse of it operated. The appearance and practices of “bookish” Islam, which cut against the tradi- Salafis inspired negative reactions to them tional Azerbaijani religious discourse of the among a large number of Azerbaijanis, who

perceived this “fundamentalist” and Nevertheless, Salafi leaders, especially “scripturalist” religious movement as a Suleymanov, recognize the existing gov- threat to the secular environment of the ernment and the president as legitimate from country. Meanwhile, the Shi’ites, the largest the shari’a point of view, and call on lay Islamic group in Azerbaijan, considered Muslims to ignore the political struggle in Salafism a deviant, hostile phenomenon. the country. As a matter of fact, the sources Local media narratives, which associated the of inspiration and discursive references for Abu Bakr mosque and its community with Azerbaijani Salafis are such authoritative international terrorism, religious fanaticism, creators of contemporary Salafism as ‘Abd and “the lair of Wahhabism”13 (especially al-Aziz ibn Baz (d. 1999), Muhammad ibn after 9/11), also nurtured these attitudes.14 Salih al-Uthaymin (d. 2001), Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999) and Salih Political elites likewise viewed Salafism as a ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan (b. 1933), all of potential danger and an alien phenomenon. whom taught political obedience to those Unable to fully control or adapt it, they im- who hold political power in the country.18 In posed structural limitations in order to pre- addition to these prominent scholars, two vent its diffusion. During the presidency of Salafi sheikhs—Muhammad Aman al-Jami Ilham Aliyev, the state’s intervention into (d. 1996) and Rabi’ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali the religious sphere has increased. The state (b. 1931)—had a particular influence on not only tried to manage and control reli- Suleymanov, who proudly mentions that “he gious movements, as it had done before, but was always with sheikh Rabi’”19 and “had a also started creating an Azerbaijani version personal relations with al-Jami.”20 The intel- of “traditional Islam” (ənənəvi islam), which lectual influence of these two figures was ignores differences between Shi’ism and particularly strong at the IUM in the 1990s, Sunnism, does not have connections with when Azerbaijani students were studying external Islamic institutions, and never inter- there. The major characteristics of this trend feres in politics. Clearly, Salafism does not in modern Salafism are a strict focus on fit into this “ecumenical paradigm.” Thus, preaching and struggle against religious in- Suleymanov has not been appointed as an novations, the refutation of political partici- imam by the Caucasus Muslim Board 15 pation, fierce criticism of jihadism and polit- (CMB), and his community has never been ical Islam, loyalty to the Saudi royal family, registered by the State Committee for Work 16 and all-out support for the official religious with Religious Associations (SCWRA). institutions and organizations of Saudi Ara- On top of that, police and local authorities, bia, such as the Council of Senior Ulama in the capital and Sumgait as well as in the and the Permanent Committee for Islamic regions (especially in Qusar and Zaqatala), Research and the Issuing of Fatwas. After have often responded to Salafi activities 17 returning home, IUM graduates have repro- with persecution and physical violence. In duced these same quietist Salafi ideas and general, the Azerbaijani authorities’ stance practices, especially in terms of focusing on on Salafism could be defined as alternating piety and preaching, ostracizing Islamists between symbolic and physical violence.

and jihadis, and legitimizing the existing interaction on the grassroots level, Salafis political regime21. Therefore, the rivals of have been able to transform the bodily hab- this quietist Salafi trend, notably jihadis, its, language, dress, moral codes, and every- frequently stigmatize its followers as day practices of thousands of citizens of madkhali or jamii (the follower of al- post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hence, even if the Madkhali and al-Jami) or even, as in the majority of Azerbaijani Salafis follow a qui- case of the post-Soviet space, as qametchi etist trend, being concerned predominantly (in Azerbaijani) or qametovec, (in Rus- with theology rather than politics, they exert sian)—“the follower of Qamet a transformative societal impact and create a Suleymanov.” new vision of a pious Muslim society and state, which indirectly challenges the current Thus, in contrast to Shi’ite Islamists (of the political system and, more directly, its cul- Islamic Party of Azerbaijan or Muslim Un- tural hegemony. ion Movement), Salafis do not belong to the formal organizations that directly confront Despite the limitations imposed by the state, the current political regime. However, social the Salafi da’wa continued to diffuse steadi- movements can pose a threat to the authori- ly as long as Salafis had access to the Abu ties even without participating in the con- Bakr Mosque. But the loss of the mosque ventional political process. Although quietist considerably weakened the diffusion of and purist, Salafis actually challenge domi- Salafism. The reason for this was not only nant cultural codes and create new societal the aforementioned perplexing context in identities, producing networks of activists which Salafism operated, but also intra- that spread particular interpretations of Is- Salafi conflict between its purist trend, led lam.22 The transformative power of “anti- by Suleymanov and other IUM graduates, political” Salafism is seen as potentially and the jihadis. Salafis in Azerbaijan pur- contentious by the Azerbaijani political re- sued their da’wa when the insurgency in the gime. Despite strong quietism, Salafis have North Caucasus against Russia was still on- a very political longing: they want Azerbai- going and NATO was fighting the Taliban jan to be ruled by the Qur'an and Sunna, but in Afghanistan. In this context, Suleymanov unlike the political opposition, both secular and other IUM graduates have been in- (e.g. the Musavat Party, the Azerbaijani volved in harsh debates with jihadis, both in Popular Front Party, etc.) and religious (Is- mosques and in cyberspace, about whether lamic Party of Azerbaijan and other Shi‘ite there is a global jihad, whether Azerbaijan is Islamists), they pose a challenge to the polit- a Muslim country, and whether the Azerbai- ical regime without direct collision. As soci- jani authorities are legitimate rulers. This is ologist Cihan Tugal has pointed out, reli- yet another manifestation of the long- gious social movements are able to chal- standing debate between two religious lenge both society and the state by project- transnational actors, quietist and jihadi ing alternative hegemony, which denatural- Salafis, which reached the South Caucasus izes everyday life and constitutes an alterna- in the 1990s. The Abu Bakr mosque was a tive everyday routine.23 Through their daily place of permanent contestation between the

6 followers of these two transnational Salafi mosque) or the CMB succeeded in exclud- groups. The confrontation came to a head in ing Salafis from them and appointing “offi- 2008, when a member of the jihadi group cial” imams.25 Salafi preachers have since that operated along the northern border be- been unable to gain the position of imam, tween Dagestan and Azerbaijan threw a gre- whether in the capital, other cities, or the nade into the Abu Bakr Mosque while peo- countryside. The loss of a physical place of ple were praying.24 Two people died and worship considerably limited the public eighteen were injured, including sphere in which Salafism could operate, Suleymanov. After this episode, authorities eventually leading to its fragmentation. decided to close the mosque. Nevertheless, the limitations on the scale Salafism Online: Creating and scope of their activities, the fear of re- an Alternative Infra- pression, and the desire to escape state control have simply encouraged Salafis to find structure other spaces for interaction. Deprived of their mosque, and barred from building a fter the closure of the Abu Bakr mosque in a physical space, Salafis began to Mosque in 2008, Salafism lost its actively explore virtual space. Today, Islam- former societal influence and its dif- A ic presence in cyberspace is rapidly expand- fusion slowed. The Friday sermons and dai- ing, and the Internet supplements and some- ly lessons were interrupted, and various times even supplants “traditional approaches shops surrounding the mosque—where reli- to Islamic knowledge management and dis- gious clothing, Salafi literature, and audio 26 semination.” The fact that Azerbaijan is an and video tapes of prominent Salafi preach- 27 “internet leader in the South Caucasus” ers were available for sale—were closed. also makes the relocation of Salafis from the Obviously, Salafis did not disappear over- physical space to cyberspace a strategic night. But without access to the Abu Bakr move. According to recent statistics, nearly mosque, their resources and capacity to 80 percent of the population used the inter- spread their message diminished considera- 28 net in 2016, and that number is growing. bly. In addition, the mobile penetration rate is Salafis started gathering and praying at the 100 percent, which contributes to the rapid Ashur Bey (Lezgi) mosque, the “Ilahiyyat” dissemination of audio and video materi- 29 mosque (in the department of theology at als. Since the closure of the mosque, Baku State University), the mosque in Salafis have been actively exploring the pos- Garachuhur district and the mosque in sibilities of the cybersphere and winning a Mehdiabad township—all located either in new following through social media. Baku or its suburbs. In some of these In fact, the media has been an integral part mosques, Salafis even managed to become of the Salafi da’wa since its arrival in Azer- imams and organize small Salafi communi- baijan. In places where Azerbaijani Salafi ties. However, the authorities either closed leaders have studied, notably around the those mosques (as in the case of Ashur Bey

mosques of Medina, one can always find fierce debates occur with jihadis or those many small shops selling (and playing loud- who support their ideas. The Salafi leaders ly) CDs by prominent Salafi sheikhs. Re- view jihadis as their main competitors with- turning home in the 1990s, Medina gradu- in the religious field, as they refer to the ates recreated the same familiar spatial envi- same corpus of textual tradition and preach ronment: CDs with Friday sermons and lec- nearly the same theology. In addition, Medi- tures by Suleymanov and other Salafi na graduates see jihadists’ radical actions as preachers were sold around the Abu Bakr a direct threat to their local preaching be- mosque and widely circulated among its at- cause they give authorities ever-present jus- tendees. Obviously, the official websites of tification for the complete prohibition of the such harbingers of global Salafism as Ibn Salafi da’wa in Azerbaijan. This is why a Baz, Ibn-Uthaymin, al-Fawzan, al- rubric on the site, named “Sects” (firqələr), Madkhali, and others have also influenced lists mumay’is (mumeyyilər)31 and kharijites how Azerbaijani Salafis understand elec- (xəvariclər)32 before other Islamic commu- tronic media. nities, which Salafis consider deviant (such as Sufis, Shi’ites, and Quranists33). Besides In 2003, Azerbaijani Salafis launched the this rubric, the site abubakr-mescidi.com site of the Abu Bakr mosque—abubakr- features such sections as “Topics” (a mescidi.com—which originally functioned 30 thematiс guide to the numerous textual, au- primarily as a forum. The pages of this dio and video materials on theology, law, forum constitute a living historical docu- ethics, and marriage), “Writings” (which ment on the development of Salafism in contains articles and Salafi books translated Azerbaijan, a source that makes it possible from Arabic into Azerbaijani language), to trace the spread of Salafi theology and “Fatwas” (offering a translation of fatwas by jurisprudence, discover what questions it the most authoritative scholars of contempo- evoked among Muslims, and understand rary Salafism), “Sermons” (the majority of how the Salafi da’wa was interspersed into Friday sermons given by Suleymanov from the life of post-Soviet Azerbaijan. The fo- the mid-1990s to the present day are availa- rum consists of numerous questions about ble here), and “Inquiries” (where users can religion, life, and politics posed by visitors, pose questions to Suleymanov or listen to along with Suleymanov’s responses to them. his YouTube-fatwas). For now, the content The forum is not only a sphere for commu- of these sections is available only in Azer- nication between a mufti (one issuing a reli- baijani; the Russian version of the site is gious opinion) and a mustafti (one seeking currently under construction, however. this opinion), but also a place of heated reli- The site of the Abu Bakr mosque is gradual- gious polemics. On its pages, Suleymanov ly being transformed into a multifunctional refutes other theologies and constructs his digital mosque equipped with religious texts, own authority, engaging in debates with video sermons, and online lessons, which is anonymous users who speak on behalf of managed by certain cyber-preachers, “the Shi’ism and Sufism. However, his most seekers of knowledge” (elm tələbələri),

8 whose written and oral materials make up its following, thereby compensating, to a cer- content. Their names are listed in the right tain degree, for the loss of physical contact corner of the site and include Suleymanov, in the context of the mosque, as well as other Medina graduates who accept his au- providing Salafis with some publicity. En- thority, and several preachers who did not gagement in performative politics on study abroad but acquired religious YouTube allows Suleymanov himself to knowledge inside the Abu Bakr mosque. demonstrate his rhetorical skills, charisma, The list implies that these preachers are the and other forms of accumulated spiritual bearers of the most authentic Islamic capital, with the goal of building up his reli- knowledge in Azerbaijan, and that all visi- gious authority and winning new followers. tors to the site should therefore study Islam from them. YouTube has a special influence on the political economy of Salafi knowledge. Salafis It is immediately evident that, on the site, increasingly prefer to translate, comment, audio and video resources are more promi- and read books by famous Salafi figures to nent than texts. In fact, Suleymanov and their audience in audio format, rather than other Azerbaijani Salafi preachers prefer print editions.35 In addition to “audio oral performances to written communication books,” Salafis translate the video-fatwas of as a means of knowledge transmission for major Salafi sheikhs from Arabic into Azer- strategic reasons. Firstly, digital media ex- baijani and disseminate them via the pand their audience, especially in urban en- YouTube channel of fatvalar.com, thus fa- vironments where people spend more time miliarizing local Muslims with historical using their computers and smart phones than and recent developments in the field of reading theological treatises. Secondly, the global Salafism. Publishing religious books number of questions is growing; since the requires obtaining permission from the closure of the Abu Bakr mosque, the internet SCWRA, which is not an easy task, espe- is almost the only “place” where one can ask cially for Salafis (the Committee itself has a Suleymanov for a fatwa. Written responses number of anti-Salafi publications). Under to forum questions are time-consuming, and such circumstances, the medium of so have not been given since 2016. Quick YouTube allows Salafi preachers to transmit audio responses are preferred. In addition, religious knowledge while avoiding state- the new “Questions and answers” (Sual- imposed restrictions. Cavab)34 section provides a forum for Along similar lines, Salafis have also begun Suleymanov to give video responses to the 36 most important and frequent questions of his exploring Mixlr. Through this streaming audience on a weekly or monthly basis, us- platform, Azerbaijani students studying in ing various YouTube channels owned by Medina teach the writings of well-known Salafis. In the absence of a mosque, digital Salafi scholars to their Azerbaijani audience media have become an indispensable tool on a weekly basis. Mixlr, which can also be for Salafis, allowing them to sustain oral considered an electronic form of radio, communication and visual contact with their makes it possible to transmit Salafi

knowledge—outside state-controlled chan- grants live),42 and responds to their numer- nels—from the prestigious Islamic Universi- ous questions. Such meetings are usually ty of Medina to various parts of Azerbaijan. held in an informal atmosphere—in a mosque, café, or private apartment—and Nor does Salafi strategic and creative en- widely circulated on the various Salafi In- gagement with the media end here. Since the ternet channels. Communication mainly oc- loss of the mosque, Salafi leaders have in- curs in Russian: although Suleymanov most- creasingly traveled around the country to ly speaks and writes in Azerbaijani, he never meet with Salafi communities from outside disregards Russian-speaking Muslims, espe- the capital. The loss of a fixed home for cially the Russian-speaking segment of Salafism appears to have encouraged them Azerbaijani society, addressing their ques- to travel in order to keep da’wa from fading tions both in YouTube videos43 and in the away. Suleymanov has begun to meet with Abu Bakr forum. It is apparent that his Salafis more often, traveling to Qobustan,37 38 39 40 knowledge of Russian is mediocre, but this Shirvan, Ganja, Quba, and other cities is not a significant obstacle, since his fatwas and regions of Azerbaijan to answer peo- are regularly translated into Russian by his ple’s questions. If in the past people from followers, as well as certain Kazakh Salafi the countryside and suburbs came to Baku to networks. The Kazakh Salafi portal “Sunna listen to the sermons of IUM graduates, now Press” has a separate section where Muslims those graduates have themselves begun to can ask Suleymanov questions.44 It also di- travel to meet their audience. Significantly, rects users to “The official website of all these “regional meetings” are recorded Sheikh Qamet Suleymanov in the Russian and distributed on the Internet, creating a language,” where he addresses the questions sense of cohesion in the fragmented reli- of Russian-speaking Muslims from nearly gious community. By providing video and all post-Soviet countries.45 Launching a per- audio recordings of these meetings, sonal website in Russian—the language of Suleymanov demonstrates to his followers “international communication” among coun- that they are a part of a large community tries in post-Soviet space—is a strategic de- present nearly in all the cities of Azerbaijan. cision that enables Suleymanov to reach a These recordings simultaneously reinforce broader audience of Muslims and non- his authority by demonstrating—both to Muslims alike. laymen and to his rivals—that he has followers in various parts of the country. These local and transnational engagements within computer-mediated environments can Furthermore, digital media allows be viewed as an extension of the Abu Bakr Suleymanov to exert his authority even be- mosque's infrastructure in a virtual space. yond the borders of Azerbaijan. As a well- This conception meshes with the theory of known Salafi preacher, he pays short visits 41 Brian Larkin, who sees media as a part of to Muslims in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and wider infrastructure, including physical in- Russia (even the far northern city of Tyu- frastructure, which connects people and fa- men, where a lot of Azerbaijani labor mi- cilitates the transnational circulation of ideas

and goods within and between vast urban ty and creating an “imagined community” of environments.46 When Salafis had the Abu Salafis across borders. Bakr mosque, digital media served as a virtual extension of the physical infrastructure that connected people and attracted them to the mosque and its surroundings. Then, Salafi Media Politics: when Salafis lost their access to the mosque, Persuasion and Muted the Internet became more of an alternative Criticism infrastructure that largely substitutes for physical infrastructure. To a certain extent, s was already mentioned, journalists the Internet compensates Salafis for limited regularly represent Salafism as a for- access to mosques, television, and radio, and A eign export that is alien to Azerbai- preserves their sense of being a single com- jani traditions. The Azerbaijani,48 Russian,49 munity that once gathered in the Abu Bakr and Iranian50 media outlets package mosque. Salafism into their “rhetorical foil,”51 which does not distinguish between various trends We can see that Salafis in some ways imitate within global Salafism and depicts local and recreate their physical infrastructure in Salafis as “Wahhabis,” “terrorists,” “funda- the virtual space. The reason for this is, mentalists,” and “long-bearded radicals” above all, to preserve the authority of the striving to establish an Islamic state in secu- Abu Bakr mosque and the collective lar Azerbaijan. Furthermore, journalists’ memory of its community. Salafi digital perspectives on Salafism and its relation to media cultivate a sense among the Salafis religious radicalism are often colored by that the mosque is still “alive,” that it func- their choice of interview subjects, typically tions and has an imam who continues to read Shi’ite theologians associated with the CMB Friday sermons and responds to the ques- or SCWRA experts, both of whom take a tions of the faithful. The fact that some of hostile stance on Salafism. Criticisms of Suleymanov's video sermons are still being Salafism are also amplified in the media fol- recorded inside the Abu Bakr mosque,47 and lowing local or global events related to that pictures of the mosque are presented on jihadism or international terrorism. the cover of many Salafi audio tapes, could also be considered part of this symbolic Despite the apparent hostility of journalists, politics aimed at maintaining adherents’ Suleymanov and other Salafi preachers have sense of belonging to a single community. never stopped trying to approach them. The most successful in building relationships In addition, Internet infrastructure allows with the local media was Salafi preacher Salafis to reach an uninitiated audience even Yashar Qurbanov, a Medina graduate and beyond Azerbaijan. It facilitates transnation- close associate of Suleymanov. Owing to his al interaction between Suleymanov and exceptional eloquence, education, and per- post-Soviet Muslims, expanding his authori- sonal connections, Qurbanov managed to become a host of several local radio chan-

nels, and even on a regional television chan- He was also able to give an interview on the nel. He focused primarily on Islamic wor- same topic to the popular Azerbaijani Inter- ship and morality, avoiding controversial net news agency APA TV55 and to the Voice theological issues and Salafi polemical criti- of America56. cism, an approach which allowed him to temporarily evade unwanted attention.52 Suleymanov therefore sees media as a plat- However, his main references were still the form through which he can reach a broader body of Islamic texts that constitutes the audience as well as protect his community basic sources of Salafism, a fact that eventu- from criticism. Lacking access to television ally led to accusations that Qurbanov’s radio or radio, he began approaching numerous appearances were tantamount to a covert websites, which have mushroomed in Azer- 53 baijan at a frenetic pace since the mid- diffusion of Wahhabism in Azerbaijan. 57 These criticisms, particularly in the context 2000s. These sites provide Suleymanov, of the structural limitations imposed on who is excluded from the state’s discussions Salafism in Azerbaijan, led Qurbanov to fol- with religious figures, with at least some op- low his classmate Suleymanov in relocating portunity to enter into a public discussion of his main preaching activities to cyberspace. jihad, religious radicalism, terrorism, and There, he became famous for creating one of Wahabbism. Through his online interviews, the biggest Islamic electronic libraries in Suleymanov responds to critics, explains his Azerbaijan, islamevi.az (House of Islam), theological beliefs, and seeks to familiarize whose appealing slogan reads, “The house society with Salafism in order to achieve its that unites us.” recognition as one of the indigenous religious communities of Azerbaijan. Almost all However, in spite of Salafi efforts, the gen- his interviews contain three main messages eral attitude of the media toward Salafism to people and authorities: Salafism is not an has not changed. Since 2014, the local me- alien phenomenon in Azerbaijan, Salafis dia has often mentioned Suleymanov and have no connection to terrorists, and only like-minded Salafi preachers in connection the reopening of the Abu Bakr mosque can with a group of Azerbaijanis who joined ji- prevent the growth of radicalism in the hadi formations in Syria (such as ISIS or country. Intriguingly, in his attempts to sup- Jabhat al-Nursa). Although ostensibly nega- port and publicize his causes, Suleymanov tive, this occasional attention has some posi- constructs his messages by combining the tive aspects for Suleymanov: it allows him Islamic concept of persuasive criticism to remind the public of his existence and ob- (nasiha), the language and rhetoric of the tain some publicity for himself and his secular Azerbaijani media, and locally rec- community. In 2014, for example, he even ognizable idioms. For example, in one of his managed to give an interview to Al interviews he states: Jazeera,54 where he explained the meaning Mosques are the main places where spirituality is of Salafism, as well as stating that there is preserved. It is mosques that have preserved the mo- no jihad in Syria and that his community rality and spirituality of our community and our na- was by no means connected with jihadists. tion. It is not expedient for us to disassemble them,

especially if we don’t open new ones. It seems to me harsh actions or calls for resistance against that certain individuals want to evoke negative opin- them. ions among people about the president and the state. I call the closure and demolition of mosques a provo- Another pertinent example: when asked cation. This is a provocation against the state and the what he thinks about the ban on wearing hi- president. The religious community of Narimanov District has always been respectful of Azerbaijani jab in schools, Suleymanov answered: laws and has supported Mr. President Ilham Aliyev. It is unnecessary to play with the feelings of the faith- We have never opposed our state and have distin- ful. This prohibition, in the first place, diminishes the guished ourselves from other mosques with our ideo- influence of Azerbaijan in the Islamic world. On the logical struggle against radicalism. That is the exact other hand, it negatively affects the attitude of Azer- reason why we have been attacked. That is why they baijani believers toward the state. In such a context, [radicals] threw a grenade at us. Those who want to some [third party] forces use the situation in accord- close [mosques] should visit them at least once on ance with their own [selfish] interests. In Azerbaijan, Friday. There is no free space in mosques anymore. the ban on hijab is a crucial issue that provokes un- Therefore, we need to build new mosques, as is being pleasant popular attitudes toward the president. Arti- done in other countries. For example, when looking ficial exaggeration of the problem [wearing hijab in at the news about Russia, they regularly show that a schools] is not in favor of the state.59 church has been opened, has been repaired, and so on. But here, on the contrary, mosques are being Unlike Shi’ite Islamists from the Islamic closed, which is not a good sign. It contradicts our morality.58 Party of Azerbaijan, Suleymanov prohibited his followers from joining demonstrations in In this passage, Suleymanov represents Abu front of the Ministry of Education,60 writing Bakr mosque not as a Salafi mosque per se, in the Abu Bakr forum that, “the rally in but as one of the Azerbaijani “traditional” front of the ministry was a misstep, maybe mosques that cultivated morality and strug- in time the solution to the problem would gled against radicalism. Hence, his message have been found, but this rally complicated implies that the closure of the mosque con- the issue even more.”61 If the Shi’ite Islam- tradicts public morality. In order to defend ists perceived the ban as an attack on Islam, his cause, he connects the closure of the Abu Suleymanov presented it as an erroneous Bakr mosque to the issues that are part of decision that played into hands of “some public discourse in Azerbaijani society: the [third party] forces” that seek to spoil the preservation of moral values and the fight relationship between the president and the against radicalism. His rhetorical strategy people. Interestingly, his responses mimic implies that both issues could be approached the language and rhetoric of the official positively if authorities would reopen the Azerbaijani media, which often associate mosque. In addition, the passage also con- problems in the country with the “intrigues tains a soft criticism of the authorities’ gen- of foreign enemies.” By deploying such rhe- eral policy towards mosques in the country. torical strategies, Suleymanov reveals to his This indirect appeal to the power-holders, followers that he disagrees with the state’s combined with muted criticism of them, is policies. But by blaming “third forces” and part of the Islamic concept of nasiha, which offering gently-worded advice, he also im- is a softly persuasive criticism of (and cour- plies that he, as a preacher, is on the side of teous advice to) the authorities, without any

the authorities and that his primary concern fied party can blame “outside forces” (such is the interests of the state. as “malicious individuals” inside the Minis- try of Internal Affairs), thus avoiding mak- In recent years, the Salafis began using In- ing any harsh political statements while en- ternet media to publicize cases of repression suring that the appeal will go straight to the and violence against them. As has already president. This approach allows Salafis both been mentioned, Salafis are at times physi- to attract attention to their problem and to cally abused, have their beards forcibly show their loyalty to the state. shaved off, and are locked in police stations. Usually, these raids are “carried out by local This form of protest not only bears the hall- police and local “authorities” that do what mark of Saudi Arabian religious discourse, they think is demanded of them by the top, which opposes direct criticism of state struc- even though this is not necessarily the tures, but it could also be seen as a way of case.”62 For example, in November 2014, adapting to highly illiberal local political the police arrested a group of Salafis who conditions. In Azerbaijan, people generally had gathered and to perform religious rituals show a very low trust in government struc- in a private apartment. In an interview, tures, associating them with “the most nega- Suleymanov told a popular online news site tive phenomena, such as injustices and unre- that “radicals are being ignored, while nor- solved problems.”66 For example, only 32 mal people are under attack,” adding that percent of people “somewhat trust” police, “we do not want to blame the Ministry of and around 11 to 22 percent trust courts, Internal Affairs. But there are some individ- whereas nearly 84 percent of the population uals in this structure who misuse their posi- trust the president.67 In other words, people tion. Possibly, they incline to a certain belief do not trust institutions, which they consider and take revenge on our brothers. We are corrupt, and believe that their problems can against that.”63 After this event, the affected only be solved by the intervention of the Salafis wrote letters and made a video ap- president. They often sign petitions in the peal to the President and the minister of In- name of the president or protest holding his ternal Affairs, complaining about the brutali- portraits, indicating that they do not repre- ty of Sumgait’s police department.64 sent the opposition nor seek to revolt against

65 the political regime but simply demand a According to a popular Salafi formulation, solution to a certain problem (which helps it is forbidden to criticize officials publicly; them to avoid possible repression on the part if they commit a serious breach of conduct, of the government). Similarly, in order to they can be criticized, but only in front of defend their causes in the media, Salafis in- the ruler. As Salafis do not have direct ac- terweave their method of approaching au- cess either to government structures or to the thorities with locally recognizable idioms president, they send their message through and locally embedded practices of protest. the medium of the Internet, using a very common “safe” form of public criticism of officials in Azerbaijan whereby the dissatis-

“Salaf News” Media their religion. In this way, Salafis try to re- Project: Intervention into fute the two most common media attacks against them: “Salafism is an external hos- the Field of Journalism tile phenomenon incompatible with all Azerbaijani traditions” and “Salafism is in- nteraction with various private internet herently anti-science.” The final message news agencies led the Salafis to the idea emphasizes that Salafis are the movement of creating their own media project, I that is most loyal to the existing political through which they could better introduce regime: “It is not important for us how a rul- themselves to society and reach a wider au- er came to power, whether he is fair or not, dience. In 2014, Salafis launched a new me- whether he is president or king—none of it dia platform, Salaf News (Sələf Xəbər), is important at all. In all circumstances, obe- which was theologically legitimized by dience [to the ruler] is the sine qua nоn. Any Suleymanov.68 He pointed out that journal- manifestation of opposition to the Muslim ists often inaccurately convey or completely ruler (in our case, Supreme Commander-in- misrepresent his words, so from now his in- Chief Ilham Aliyev) is forbidden (haram) terviews would be published on Salaf News. according to the religion of Islam.” One of the main reasons for the creation of this Internet news agency is circumventing Developing their loyalty narrative, Salafis the information blockade under which the point out that the major goal of their project Salafi community found itself following the is aiding the state in its fight against all “an- closure of the Abu Bakr mosque. The pro- ti-patriotic and radical religious groups,” as ject is conceived as a Salafi voice that com- well as contributing to “the enlightenment of municates with the public directly rather citizens,” “protection of state security” and than through any third party, in an effort to “the multi-ethnicity of the society.”70 Salafis represent Salafism as a local phenomenon harness these locally recognized discourses, that is fully compatible with the nation state. especially the “struggle against radicalism” and “enlightenment of the masses,” which Salaf News introduces itself through a spe- 69 are widely used by state structures in rela- cial section, “Who are we, Salafis?,” that 71 tion to opposing religious radicalism , im- sends three main messages to readers. The plying that the Salafi approach of going first message: Salafism does not contradict back to the Qur’an and Sunna is very much the values of Azerbaijani society; on the in line with the policies and goals of the contrary, it cultivates a good attitude toward 72 government. The Salafis try to legitimize parents and preserves family ties. The se- their da’wa by injecting it into the discours- cond message is that the Salafis are not es supported by the state and by speaking in against science—they actually support the a language that is daily reproduced and re- development of scientific knowledge and peated in the media, widely recognized in technology, but insist that Muslims have society, and does not seem dangerously pro- made the most scientific progress when they vocative to the authorities. were most committed to the principles of

The article “The notion of patriotism in Is- armed conflicts in the Muslim world. Ac- lam”73 exemplifies the Salafi media pro- cording to him, Muslims there confront infi- ject’s other attempt to represent Salafism as dels (kafirlər), while in other places Mus- a local phenomenon by using locally recog- lims are mostly fighting Muslims.74 Howev- nizable idioms. First, Salaf News explains er, he stipulates that jihad is invalid unless the meaning of motherland (vətən), referring ordered by the legitimate ruler (the president to both the Explanatory Dictionary of Azer- of Azerbaijan), so he prohibits Salafis from baijani Language, which defines it as “the taking any arbitrary action regarding this country where a person is born and grew up issue, though he regularly affirms— and where he is a citizen,” and to the various particularly following skirmishes on the classical Arabic dictionaries (for example, front lines—that Salafis will join the war the famous Lisan al-Arab of Ibn Mansur). against Armenian occupation as soon as Deploying Azerbaijani and Arabic lan- mobilization is announced.75 guages along with the Qur’anic verses and hadiths, Salafis respond to the popular criti- These statements about the motherland, pat- cism directed against them that Salafi theo- riotism, and Nagorno-Karabakh once more logical beliefs are contrary to the modern demonstrate Salafis’ attempts to situate understanding of patriotism. Simultaneous- themselves within the political context of ly, they are trying to convince lay Salafis Azerbaijani society, as well as point out the that attachment to the national state is not national dimensions of their movement. alien to Islam and that their ideological op- Thus, the deterritorialization of the transnational phenomenon of Salafism has certain ponents – Salafi-jihadis, who reject national 76 borders, concepts, and symbols – have com- limits in Azerbaijan. Local environment pletely erred. and ethno-nationalist discourses clearly hamper the development of some Salafi Then, the text defines the notion of patriot- movements,77 but they also help them adapt ism as the unity of citizens, protection of the to the local context and encourage them to homeland, and obedience to the ruler. After demonstrate the “comprehensiveness” (al- a thorough explanation of all three forms of shumuliyya) of Islam that is supposed to ac- patriotism by Qur’an and Sunna, it ends with commodate any cultural and political chal- a wish to “restore territorial integrity, get lenges. In this respect, Azerbaijani Salafis’ back to Shusha, and perform a prayer inside strategic engagements with Internet media in its mosques.” That is a direct reference to show their ability to creatively adapt and the main issue of Azerbaijan’s foreign poli- reformulate both local narratives and Salafi cy—the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, to concepts. which Azerbaijani Salafis pay particular attention. News about events from the front All previously mentioned approaches to the lines is frequently posted on Salaf News. media are more obviously manifested in Suleymanov also emphasizes that the war in Salaf News’ method of combining argu- Karabakh is a jihad and distinguishes the ments derived from religious texts with in- Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from other formation produced by mass media. In fact,

the project’s strategy of intermingling reli- nalists and political analysts, with the goal gious texts with news about politics, society, of dispossessing them and replacing their culture, technology, etc. distinguishes it interpretative authority. from other Salafi media initiatives. The project imitates the discourse and rhetoric of Salaf News emphasizes that its main object professional journalism while supplement- is not simply to transmit news, but to “ex- ing news with religious commentary, thus plain many contemporary problems and melding local and global events and Salafi events related to the Islamic world and Mus- theology into a single narrative. Salafis ap- lims.” Therefore, “in order not to get lost in ply the interpretive methods they use on Is- an overabundance of information,” it tries to lamic texts to political and social phenome- handpick the most “valuable and useful” na, thus giving potential readers a vision of news for readers. The site explains that news the world through a Salafi lens. is provided selectively according to its media politics, which has the following distinc- Salafis’ intervention in the journalistic field tive features: (1) it always shows the source required cultural capital (“educational cre- of the information; (2) it does not present dentials, technical expertise, general news about crimes and other negative hap- knowledge, verbal abilities, and artistic sen- penings without a serious need; (3) it avoids sibilities”)78 typically possessed by journal- information containing speculation and lies; ists. Various aspects of Salafi media en- (4) it approaches all issues in the context of gagements--from the official name of the common sense; and (5) it brings good news project (Azerbaijan Islamic Studies and to readers in Azerbaijan and the Islamic News Portal) to Suleymanov’s attempts to world.80 (At the same time, however, the site position himself as a public expert com- claims that their project follows the same menting on Islam and society—show that rules of information transfer as any other Salafis are trying both accumulate and uti- news agency, presumably in the hope that lize this capital. However, they do not in any people will use it as a source of information way see themselves as part of the field. on a regular basis.) Salafis see journalists as a group of special- ists who often distort the truth79 and associ- Salaf News applies the same criteria for dis- ate the Salafi community with terrorists. tinguishing truth from falsehood to the vari- They see political analysts or scholars of ous social and political events as Salafi Islamic studies as professionals who de- scholarly tradition does while defining pro- sacralize texts and pretend to be legitimate phetic narrations. In this way, Salafis not and competent interpreters of religion for only extend their epistemology and method- local media and government structures. The ology beyond the texts of the Salafi canon, Salafi media project, therefore, encapsulates but they also create a hybrid discourse that asymbolic struggle against these two groups mimics the rhetoric of the Azerbaijani media over the legitimate right to interpret both (especially television and broadcasting) by religion and the world. It strategically imi- presenting predominantly positive news in tates and reformulates the rhetoric of jour- which Azerbaijan appears as an island of

prosperity and stability in the region. The tries. Thus, despite the existence of the principle of news is selectively drawn from local and “freedom of speech,” the laws of these countries protect a religious community of no more than 15 mil- global news agencies, with a focus on gen- lion all over the world, punishing those who insult eral wellbeing in Azerbaijan and the success them and affect their feelings. So why, then, when it of the president's domestic and foreign poli- comes to insulting the Muslim community of more cies. Meanwhile, the “positive” news sto- than half a billion, does the principle of "freedom of ries—from the creation of new infrastructure speech" immediately disappear? Is that justice? to the growth of economic indicators to the As for our religion, Islam prohibits anti-Semitism. adoption of various laws aimed at facilitat- The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon ing people's lives—are explained and legiti- him) said: “Arab has no superiority over non-Arabs. mized through religious texts. For example, Non-Arab is not superior to Arab. As a white has no superiority over a black nor a black has any superiori- Salaf News accompanies the story “Azerbai- ty over white except by piety.” jani President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree approving the ‘Regulations on the Preferen- We ask the Almighty to give Muslims patience and 82 tial Housing System” with a hadith: punish those who condemn Islam.

“The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon The commentary both reproduces and sup- him) said: Whoever relieves one of the hardships of a ports the anti-Western rhetoric of the Azer- believer in this world, Allah will alleviate his hard- baijani government, supplying it with the ship on the Day of Resurrection. Whoever relieves anti-Jewish Salafi discourse. Deploying such the needs of someone in difficulty, Allah will allevi- media strategies, the Salafis legitimize the ate his needs in this world and in the Hereafter. Allah helps the servant as long as he helps his brother.”81 president's policies (in hopes of protecting the da’wa from possible suppression at the Similarly, a news story headlined “Ilham hand of state structures), but most im- Aliyev: The Politics of Islamophobia, Rac- portantly, they hope that such an approach ism and Xenophobia is Pursued in Europe” would finally convince authorities to reopen is readily available on many sites. It de- the Abu Bakr mosque. At the same time, scribes how the president condemned the they turn the president’s news, speeches, and EU for Islamophobia and migrantophobia activities into part of the Salafi da’wa, following a resolution in the EU Parliament demonstrating that all events and phenome- that fiercely criticized the Azerbaijani gov- na find confirmation in Islamic texts. ernment for violating human rights. Howev- er, the Salafi media platform accompanies Another recent and relevant example here the story with the following commentary: would be the Salafi interpretation of the devaluation of Azerbaijani currency (manat) Unfortunately, support for the principle of “freedom that occurred in February and December of speech” does not prevent many Western govern- 2015. Suleymanov received numerous ques- ments from spreading hatred and insults against Islam and Muslims. But just one question arises: why does tions about how to cope with rising prices the West not apply the principle of "freedom of and whether believers were allowed to join speech" to manifestations of anti-Semitism? It is rallies against government policies. In his known that the denial of anti-Semitism and the Holo- video and audio performances, Suleymanov caust is a criminal offense in many Western coun- explains the devaluation as a divine punish-

ment for the sins of the people, who global events related to the worldwide Mus- shortchange or bribe each other and take lim community (umma). Particular attention loans from banks.83 In other words, he has is paid to Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the used the crisis to critique the morals of soci- “Sunni countries”: Saudi Arabia, the United ety. Concomitantly, he forbids his followers Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Pakistan. These to join rallies organized by the secular oppo- Muslim states, especially Saudi Arabia, are sition, and calls on Muslims to endure the represented as friendly countries through hardships and ask forgiveness from Allah, reports of economic cooperation, bilateral implying that it is not the president who is to relations, meetings of the heads of states, blame for economic problems but people provision of humanitarian assistance to committing sins. In line with Suleymanov’s Azerbaijan, and so on. Conversely, the nar- fatwas, Salaf News supplies the president’s rative on Iran is negative, portraying it as an words that the exchange rate of manat will aggressor, as a country that causes discord soon stabilize and that Azerbaijan will over- between Muslims, and especially as an ally come all crises alongside the following of Armenia—with which Azerbaijan is at Qur’anic verse: “No creature is there crawl- war.86 This type of narrative depicts Azer- ing on the earth, but its provision rests on baijan through a Salafi political imaginary in God; He knows its lodging-place and its re- which it appears as an integral part of the pository. All is in a Manifest Book.”84 Sunni world and as an ally of Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, it also supports “official” media With links to its YouTube videos, Salaf narrative that represents Azerbaijan as a News invokes the imposing corpus of fatwas country which has excellent relations with of the authoritative, predominantly Saudi, the Muslim world and is a model of sustain- Salafi sheikhs (Ibn Baz, Ibn al-Uthaymin, able development and religious pluralism. and al-Fawzan al-Madkhali), claiming that obedience to the ruler is not just politics, but As well as social and political news, the pro- a part of worship. Moreover, the loyalty of ject provides various useful materials about the Salafis stands in opposition to the rebel- health and technology in the style of “life lious stance of Shi’ites, whom the Salafi hack” Internet resources, which is also part media represent as agents of external (spe- of general Salafi media strategies. Deploy- cifically Iranian) influence.85 This media ing religious texts, news, and various forms strategy creates a persuasive discourse that of useful information in digital media, frames Shi’ism as a potential danger to the Salafis try to create an all-encompassing In- Azerbaijani political regime, setting up a ternet platform aimed at replacing “conven- contrast with the supposed safety of the ul- tional” news sites for lay Salafis, as well as tra-submissive Salafism, which would under to attract a wider, uninitiated audience. no circumstances interfere in the political field. It should be noted that, in addition to local Conclusion news, Salaf News always has an eye on

his article has discussed how Salafis for themselves in order to persuade authori- in Azerbaijan engage with digital ties to reopen the Abu Bakr mosque. In their T media after having been deprived of strategic media engagements, which aim to the Abu Bakr mosque. It argues that digital propagate and defend their main cause, media became a virtual extension of their Salafis represent themselves as an indige- mosque that, to a certain extent, compen- nous religious community by using locally sates for the absence of physical infrastruc- recognizable idioms and imitating the rheto- ture. Having recreated their mosque in cy- ric, forms, and parlance of secular journal- berspace, Salafis sustain their preaching and ism. By incorporating news into their system sense of belonging to a single community of argumentation and intermingling it with through discursive and performative media religious texts, Salafis have extended the politics. The new media also makes it possi- application of their methods beyond the Is- ble for Azerbaijani Salafis to transmit lamic textual corpus. Consequently, they knowledge, to be involved in transnational have created a discourse united by a single interaction with post-Soviet Salafis, and to narrative that explains the happenings of the attract the new followers, while evading world for lay Salafis as well as the uninitiat- state control. ed through the Salafi weltanschauung.

Regularly attacked by local and foreign mul- timedia, Salafis eventually decided to speak

1 "The prominent scholar Al-Fawzan recommends the use of social media in spreading the call to Allah and respond- ing to the advocates of misguidance” (in Arabic), YouTube video, posted by “AshashaS,” May 2, 2016 https://goo.gl/r6iN3p 2 Brian Larkin, “Ahmed Deedat and the Form of Islamic Evangelism,” Social Text 26:3 (2008): 101. 3 Salafism is an Islamic current, which calls for Islam to be understood as it was by “pious ancestors” (al-salaf al- salih), the first three generation of Muslims. In fact, almost all Islamic sects appeal for an understanding of Islam along these lines, but Salafis produce a strong discourse of juxtaposition by contrasting their imitation of social and religious practices of the first Muslims with the theology of all other Islamic trends. A major component of Salafi theology is the rigorous propagation of the unity of God (tawhid), combat against polytheism (shirk), criticism of Sunni speculative Islamic theology (kalam), as well as all kinds of Greek influences on Islamic theological discourse, the struggle against reprehensible religious innovations (bid’a) and an extremely hostile attitude towards Sufism and Shi’ism, both of which are accused of innovation and polytheism. As this paper does not focus on Salafi theology, a more detailed explanation can be found in: Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Ac- tion,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009): 33-57. 4 Dale F. Eickelman, “Communication and Control in the Middle East,” in New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, ed. Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003): 33. 5 Jeremy Stolow, “Religion and Media,” Theory, Culture, and Society 22:4 (August): 124-125. 6 See Alexander Knysh, “Islam and Arabic as the Rhetoric of Insurgency: the case of the Caucasus Emirate,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35 (2012): 315-337; Matteo Vergani and Dennis Zuev, “Neojihadist Visual Politics: Comparing YouTube Videos of North Caucasus and Uyghur Militants,” Asian Studies Review 39 (2014): 1-22. 7 See Noah Tucker, “Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging in Central Asia,” CERIA Briefs 11-15 (2016), accessed July 20, 2017, https://goo.gl/d6Yke6 8 Musa Qasimli, Azarbayjan Respublikasynyn khariji siyasaty (1991-2003) (Baku: Mutarjim, 2015), 296-301.

9 Rufat Sattarov, Islam, State, and Society in Independent Azerbaijan. Between Historical Legacy and Post-Soviet Reality (Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2009):146-147. 10 Sattarov, Islam, State, and Society, 132. 11 Kamal Gasimov, “Examining Salafism in Azerbaijan: Transnational Connections and Local Context,” in Religion and Soft Power in the South Caucasus, ed. Ansgar Jodicke (London: Routledge, 2017): 112 (forthcoming) 12 Gasimov, “Examining Salafism,” 113. 13 Although media and even some scholars refer to “Salafism” as “Wahhabism”, here I do not use this term because “Wahhabism” is just a part of a broader Salafi tradition. In addition, Wahhabism/Wahhabite has a pejorative meaning to the people designated as such. 14 Sattarov, Islam, State, and Society, 253-254. 15A semi-official religious organization that supervises the religious arena in Azerbaijan by registering Muslim communities and appointing imams to mosques. 16 A state institution that registers all religious communities and assists the government in shaping public policy on religion. 17 See, for example, “Sumqayytly salafi: “Qollarymyza qandal vurdular, ustumuza chyxdylar, bashymyzda oturdular,” BBC, November 18, 2014, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/PMM5gE 18 Gasimov, “Examining Salafism,” 100. 19 “Elman Qasymovun “Biz bir idik. Ozbaklar... Hanzala qardash ...” shubhasi”, YouTube video, posted by “Azer Islamoglu,” January 8, 2017, https://goo.gl/3VTq2M 20 “Official website of the sheikh Qamet Suleymanov in Russian language,” Qamet.com, accessed July 20, 2017, https://goo.gl/U76HJN 21 Gasimov, “Examining Salafism,” 111. 22 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The Salafi Movement: Violence and the Fragmentation of Community,” in Muslim networks: From Hajj to Hip hop, ed. M. Cooke & B.B. Lawrence (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 211. 23 Cihan Tugal, “Transforming everyday life: Islamism and social movement theory,” Theory and Society 38:5 (2009), 429. 24 Sattarov, Islam, State, and Society, 256. 25 In general, many mosques in Azerbaijan are places of permanent contestation between charismatic imams educat- ed abroad and “official” imams appointed by the CMB. 26 Garry Bunt, IMuslims: Rewiring the house of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 15. 27 Alexey Sidorenko and Arzu Geybullayeva, “The Internet in Azerbaijan,” Caucasus Analytical Digest 15 (2010): 2-7. 28 International Telecommunication Union, accessed July 3, 2017. https://goo.gl/6Eqc9P 29 International Telecommunication Union. 30 Forum of Abu Bakr mosque: https://goo.gl/aXogDi 31 From the Arabic verb tamayya’ – “to become liquid”. Salafis use this stigma to designate other Salafis whom they think hide their jihadi or Islamist views. Suleymanov often stigmatizes rival Salafi preachers who challenge his authority using this term. 32 Kharijites are adherents to a sect that developed after the assassination of the third caliph Uthman in 656. The title is derived from the Arabic word khuruj, meaning “insurrection”. This sect was extremely violent and declared eve- ryone who disagreed with its ideology and policies an infidel. From the very beginning, Suleymanov stigmatized all his rivals within the Salafi movement, mostly (though not exclusively) jihadis, as Kharijites (which is a usual prac- tice of quietist Salafi preachers) and popularized this term through his sermons and interviews. Interestingly, in time, local media, along with some officials, policy experts and even scholars, adopted this ideologically loaded term, using it to differentiate between Suleymanov’s followers and his rivals (designating the formers as moderates and the latter as radicals). See, for example, Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State” International Crisis Group Europe Report (Brussels, 2008); Dobroslawa Wiktor March, “Measuring Muslims: The Problem of Religiosity and Intra-Religious Diversity,” in Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion: New Methods in the Soci- ology of Religion, ed. Luigi Berzano and Ole Preben Riis, vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 220. 33 By Quranists (Quranilər) Salafis mean all groups who reject prophetic narrations and accept only the authority of Quran. 34 See abubakr-mescidi.com, accessed June 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/efQziL. 35 See, for example, site of the Abu Bakr mosque; Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, “Qamet Suleymanov: "The Book of Monotheism," accessed July 2, 2017, https://goo.gl/1qxwmV.

36 “Abubakrmescidi,” Mixlr, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/VhxLCm 37 “Qamat Suleymanov-Qobustan, qysa sual javab”, YouTube video, posted by “abuisaselefi selefi,” June 15, 2017, https://goo.gl/SysQit 38 “Sheikh Qamet: ‘Bu hizbi harakat takfirchiliyin yeni va gizli formasydyr.’ Shirvan shahari,” YouTube video, posted by “Azar Islamoglu,” October 12, 2016, https://goo.gl/ru34Qh 39 “Qamet Suleymanov-Gancada qysa sual javab”, YouTube video, posted by “abuisaselefi selefi,” April 16, 2016, https://goo.gl/r9Wj5F 40 “Qamet Suleymanov-Qubada Sual Javab”, YouTube video, posted by “abuisaselefi selefi”, June 23, 2016, https://goo.gl/yoky31 41 “Sheikh Qamet otvechaet na voprosy – 1, Ukraina,” YouTube video, posted by “Tovhide Devet,” February 6, 2015, https://goo.gl/HvPFZt 42 “Vstrecha Sheikha Qameta s bratyami v gorode Tyumeni”, YouTube video, posted by “Salafin Fahmi ila,” May 14, 2016, https://goo.gl/GGPYkm 43 See, for example, “Qamet Suleymanov. Otvety na voprosy,” YouTube video, posted by “abuisaselefi selefi,” May 31, 2016, https://goo.gl/AdnXVV 44 Sunna Press, accessed 23 July, 2017, https://goo.gl/9bshoc 45 Qamet.com, “Official website of the sheikh Qamet Suleymanov in Russian language,” accessed July 20, 2017, https://goo.gl/Xq7S2V 46 Brian Larkin, Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria (Durham, NC: Duke Uni- versity Press, 2008), 5. 47 Suleymanov is allowed to perform prayers inside the mosque with a very limited number of his closest compan- ions, but it is still closed to the public. 48 See, for example, X. Ismailova and S. Abbasov, “Logovo vahhabittov v Baku,” Echo, May 2, 2001, https://goo.gl/xuhhss; Modern, “Vahhabilar na istayir?,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/N8zH8P; Musavat, “Vahhabi tahlukasi unuduldumu...,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/Q2Fhyx 49 For some generic examples, see Sohbet Mamedov, “Khidzhaby dlya azerbaydzhanok shyut araby,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 1, 2013, https://goo.gl/FdBFjk; Anton Evstratov, “Zakavkazskiy inkubator Salafitov,” March 3, 2016, https://goo.gl/m191zx; 50 “Who supports Wahhabi Movements in the Republic of Azerbaijan,” AhlulBayt News Agency, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/gchNfv; Qafqaz, “Barrasi-ye khatar-e vahhaiyyat dar jomhuri-ye Azerbayjan,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/nY6P5Y 51 Alexander Knysh, “A clear and present danger: ‘Wahhabism’ as a rhetorical foil,” Die Welt des Islams 44:1 (2004): 3-26. 52 For some of his radio broadcasts, see his personal channel on YouTube: https://goo.gl/kKLryA 53 See, for example, “Vahhabilarin arxasynda bir general var,” Musavat, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/Y5Vpxf 54 “Azeri selefi lideri Al Jazeera'ye konushtu,” YouTube video, posted by Al Jazeera Turk, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/4xQvJE 55 “Suriyada doyushan azerbayjanlylar,” YouTube video, posted by APA TV, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/UGzGyd 56 Tapdiq Farhadoglu and Parvana Bayramova, “Qamet Suleymanov: Suriyada 100 yox, 50 azarbayjanlynyn oldurulduyunu demak olar,” Amerikanyn Sesi, January 14, 2014. 57 These online news agencies gradually became more numerous, especially after 2005. According to a political ana- lyst whom I interviewed in July 2017 (he preferred to remain anonymous), many of these sites are financed by min- isters and high-ranking officials, who use them to achieve their political goals and in the information struggle against political rivals in the country. 58 Parvin Abbasov, “Qamet Suleymanov: ‘İlahiyyat’ masjidinda gadanlaryn choxu bizim qardashlardy,” Lent.az, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/pfUWti 59 “Qamet Suleymanov hijab qadagasyny pisladi,” Musavat, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/znZStN 60 After the former Minister of Education Misir Mardanov prohibited female students from wearing hijab in primary schools, a series of “anti-hijab ban” demonstrations erupted in 2010-2012, resulting in violent clashes between pro- testers and police in Baku. 61 Suleymanov’s answer on Seymur, April 28, 2011 (07:53 a.m.), Forum of the Abu Bakr mosque, April 11, 2011, https://goo.gl/kwNXUz 62 Sofie Bedford, Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2009): 147.

63 Murad Ahmad, “DİN-da bazi shakhslar vazifalarindan sui-istifada edir”: Qamet Suleymanov,” Qafqazinfo, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/gcFRey 64 “Sumqayytly salafi: "Qollarymyza qandal vurdular, ustumuza chyxdylar, bashymyzda oturdular,” BBC, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/PMM5gE; “Sumqayytly salafilari shahar polisinda ishganjaya maruz qaldyqlaryny bildiriblar,” YouTube video, posted by “Turan agentliyi,” November 17, 2014, https://goo.gl/ExMTuD 65 “Kutla qarshysynda nazirlari tanqid etmak khavarijlarin yoludur – Sheyx Saleh al-Fovzan (video),” YouTube video, posted by “Salafkhabar kanaly”, December 20, 2016, https://goo.gl/JcCfSr 66 Anar Valiyev, “Social Capital in Azerbaijan: Does it help to build democracy?,” Caucasus Analytical Digest 30 (2011): 11 67 See Caucasusbarometer.org, accessed July 23, 2017. 68 “Hajy Qamet salafilarin yeni sayty haqda danyshdy: ‘Qardashlar maslahatlashdilar ki…’”, Lent.az., accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/K4YAid 69 Salaf Khabar, “Biz salafilar kimik?,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/GT5RTu 70 Salaf Khabar, “Dovlat bashchisi uçun dua “Salaf-Khabar”-yn bidatidir?,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/PgFFNU 71 Even a brief survey of the local media will reveal numerous references by various officials to “the religious enlightenment (maarifləndirmə)” in the context of the struggle against religious radicalism. For example, only in 2016, the SCWRA held hundreds of “enlightenment/educational” events (maarifləndirmə tədbirləri) in the capital and in the regions of Azerbaijan. See the “Events” or “Enlightenment” sections of the SCWRA’s “Society and Religion” newspaper: https://goo.gl/9VgBxA 72 In his various interviews with Internet news portals, Suleymanov also often inscribes his main cause (the reopening of the mosque) into the state-constructed discourse of combating religious radicalism through enlightenment. See Fariz Mirzayev, “Haji Qamet: “Qanunlar dina uygun olmaluydyr,” Kulis.az, accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/GfRbAa 73 Salaf Khabar, “Islamda vatanparvarlik anlayyshy,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/fwdbVZ 74 Salaf Khabar, “Qamet Suleymanov: Biz Qarabagy azad etmeye getmaliyik,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/yDXFJN 75 Salaf Khabar, “Jabhada son bash veran hadisalarla bagly Qamet Suleymanovla ekskluziv musahiba,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/kJxpjC 76 Gasimov, “Examining Salafism,” 122. 77 Roel Meijer, “Introduction,” in Global Salafism: 29. 78 Rodney Benson and Eric Neveu, “Introduction: Field theory as a work in progress,” in Bourdieu and the journalistic field, ed. Rodney Benson and Eric Neveu (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 4. 79 “Qamet Suleymanov - Mediada yazylanlara inanmayyn!,” YouTube video, posted by “Tovhid Tube,” April 23, 2014, https://goo.gl/CRBDrz 80 Salaf Khabar, “Dovlat bashchysy uchun dua” 81 Salaf Khabar, “Prezident Ilham Aliyevin (Allah onu qorusun) farmany ila Azarbayjanda “Guzashtli manzil” sistemi yaradylyr,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/iEBZkM 82 Salaf Khabar, “Ilham Aliyev (Allah onu quvvatlandirsin): “Avropada islamofobiya, irqchilik, ksenofobiya siyasati aparylyr,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/q7pvXw 83 “Qiymatlarin artmasynyn sabablari,” YouTube video, posted by “Abu Bakr Mascidi”, January 29, 2016, https://goo.gl/XWdvAX 84 Salaf Khabar, “Ilham Aliyev (Allah onun ali ila musalmanlaryn ishlarini duzaltsin): “Manatın mazannasi ədalatlidir,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/rTbkxX; Salaf Khabar, “Ilham Aliyev (Allah onu quvvatlandirsin): ‘2016-cı il Azarbayjan uchun synaq ilidir,’” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/9gjsry 85For example, the site disseminated news about the operation of law enforcement agencies against Islamists led by the Shi’ite theologian Taleh Bagirov in Nardaran in November 2015, accompanying it with comments from prominent Salafi sheikhs about the impermissibility of uprisings. Commenting on this issue to one of the local online news agencies, Suleymnov said, “Events in Nardaran indicate that “pro-Iranian forces” are involved, because yesterday's event was committed by supporters of the Shi’ite sect. I cannot claim it for sure, but the evidence gives grounds for saying this.” See: Salaf Khabar, “Sheykh Qamet Suleyman: Nardaran hadisasini pisladi, ‘Kanar quvvalarin tasiri gorunur’,” accessed July 23, 2017, https://goo.gl/KwJFN5 86 Gasimov, “Examining Salafism,” 122.