EU referendum: Foreword 1. Brexit: one year on Anand Menon p4

Well, it’s not boring is it? Politics continues to surprise us, and all the while the Article 50 clock Part One: Public Opinion keeps ticking. One year on from the EU referendum, this report is intended for all those who 2. Brexit and the election John Curtice p6 are interested in what has happened since the referendum, and how the Brexit process might 3. Public attitudes Sara Hobolt, Thomas Leeper and James Tilley p8 unfold in the months and years to come. 4. Public debate Alan Renwick p10

As ever, my thanks to all those who contributed to this report. The authors have, in some cases, Part Two: Parties and Politics had to turn their sections around extremely quickly after the general election. All have had to 5. MPs Philip Cowley p12 cope with irritating questions and queries from me. I’m grateful to Hannah Bridges for doing 6. The political parties Tim Bale p14 the copy editing so quickly and thoroughly. As ever, Ben Miller played a crucial role in getting 7. British politics Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwin and Maria Sobolewska p16 the report designed and produced, greatly assisted by Navjyot Lehl, while Phoebe Couzens 8. The role of Parliament Adam Cygan p18 has worked tirelessly to keep The UK in a Changing Europe show on the road. Finally, I’d like to express particular thanks to Camilla Macdonald, who has shepherded this process from the Part Three: Brexit and the Politics of the UK start and gone over all the text assiduously. I’m sure it’s pure coincidence that she’s leaving us 9. Northern Ireland John Garry and Colin Harvey p20 on 23 June. 10. Scotland and Brexit Nicola McEwen p22 11. Wales and Brexit Rachel Minto p24 Professor Anand Menon 12. Brexit and devolution Michael Keating p26 The UK in a Changing Europe 13. Regional implications Philip McCann and Raquel Ortega-Argilés p28

Part Four: Brexit and the Economy 14. The UK economy Jonathan Portes p30 Theresa May’s decision to call a snap election threw up yet more questions regarding Britain’s 15. Trade and the Single Market Thomas Sampson p32 withdrawal from the European Union. Such a time of uncertainty calls for timely academic 16. Public finances Iain Begg p34 analysis, and so the Political Studies Association (PSA) is delighted to have teamed up with The 17. UK economic policy Swati Dhingra p36 UK in a Changing Europe once again to shed some light on the Brexit process. Part Five: Brexit and Public Policies Following two successful collaborations in 2016 (Brexit and Beyond and Brexit: Six Months On), 18. The politics of agriculture Carmen Hubbard, David Harvey and Anne Liddon p38 examines the progress that has been made thus far. EU referendum: one year on 19. UK environmental policy Charlotte Burns, Viviane Gravey and Andrew Jordan p40 20. The Great Repeal Bill Catherine Barnard p42 The PSA is committed not only to studying but also informing political decision-making. In what 21. Immigration Jonathan Portes p44 follows Professor Anand Menon and his colleagues will guide you through the complex political 22. Britons in the EU Michaela Benson p46 journey that is Brexit and consider how the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is likely to play out 23. Nationality politics Nando Sigona and Laurence Lessard-Phillips p48 across a range of policy areas. 24. The repatriation of competences Jo Hunt p50 25. Foreign policy Richard G Whitman p52 26. Higher education Simon Marginson p54 Professor Angelia Wilson Chair, Political Studies Association Part Six: Brexit and the EU 27. The member states Hussein Kassim p56 28. The EU position Simon Usherwood p58

Image credits for photographs on the front cover and running header can be found on page 60 We should have known better. While it is relatively straightforward issues, such as dealing impact of Brexit may well be further complicated Richard G Whitman points out, Brexit even seems doubtless a useful exercise to track what has with the rights of EU nationals in the UK, are in by its unequal impact on different parts of the to have provided a fillip to plans for some kind of become of Brexit a year after the referendum fact fiendishly complicated. country. enhanced EU defence capability. on EU membership, we were naïve in expecting history to stand still while we completed the task. As for the politics, well, what do I need to say? Meanwhile, there is much we will need to know Much has changed over the course of the last As the drafts for this publication were coming in, Public opinion seems to be in flux, with John rather rapidly. How parliament will deal with the year. But there is evidence that not enough has the General Election took place. And whilst the Curtice, Maria Sobolewska and her collaborators Great Repeal Bill is one thing. A related minefield, been done to think through both the immediate outcome may change nothing at all to do with and Sara Hobolt and her team suggesting not explored by Jo Hunt, concerns where the powers process of leaving the EU and the structures and Brexit, one cannot discount the possibility that it only that old class allegiances to particular parties that are repatriated end up – Belfast, Cardiff and policies we would like to have in place once we will change everything. might be loosening, but that Brexit itself might Edinburgh will all have their piece to say on the have exited. Brexit, in other words, will pose a be becoming a new political divide, alongside matter. challenge to our government, our parties, our So, with that caveat firmly in mind, this collection the traditional left-right spectrum. At the same civil service and all those involved in the various looks at what the decision to leave the EU has time, a minority government will have to deal Turning to more substantive issues, the kind of sectors where it will hit home. come to mean one year on. We cover everything with a parliament whose approach to Brexit is agricultural policy that will replace the Common from public opinion, politics, economics and as yet unclear, and where backbench rebellion, Agricultural Policy is something we should start By Anand Menon the implications for the nations of the United as Phil Cowley underlines, is all too likely in worrying about sooner rather than later. So too is Kingdom, to a raft of public policies ranging from dealing with one of, it not the, most complicated the need to deal with the rights of EU nationals in agriculture to higher education. issue of public policy of our lifetime. As for the this country. parliamentary parties themselves, well, read Tim Inevitably, there is no clear conclusion that can Bale’s entertaining piece. In contrast to the uncertainty that has be drawn from such a broad overview. However, characterised our approach, the EU, for its part, several things do stand out. First, there is much All this politics will take place against the has sorted out its negotiating position and is about Brexit that is no clearer than it was a backdrop of the British economy. As Swati waiting for the British government to arrive. For year ago, and much that is less clear. Talk of a Dhingra intimates, the economy may not be in all the early hopes that clever diplomacy might referendum on Irish unity has come as something the rudest of health, and a hard Brexit would divide the EU27, they have remained resolutely of a shock. Jonathan Portes points out that hardly represent a cure. Equally, as Philip McCann united in their determination to see the process what might originally have been thought of as and Raquel Ortega-Argilés point out, the ultimate through without weakening the EU. Indeed, as

ONE 4 5 Support for Labour increased across the course Consequently, it was amongst working class voters of the campaign amongst both Remain and Leave and in predominantly working class constituencies voters. But, at 13 points, the increase was more that the Conservatives advanced most. According marked amongst the former than it was the latter to Lord Ashcroft’s polling data, Conservative (six points). As a result, what before the election support was up twelve points amongst working was a 15-point difference between Remain and class “DE” voters than it was in 2015, but by only Leave voters in the level of support for Labour had four points higher amongst professional and grown to 22 points by polling day. managerial “AB” voters. Equally, Conservative support increased by nine points on average in Evidence that Remain and Leave Britain diverged the 30% most working class seats in England and in their willingness to vote Conservative or Wales, but by only one point in the 25% most Labour is also to be found in the pattern of the middle class. In short, the divergence between election results. With the exception of Scotland, Remain and Leave voters served to cut across the the Conservative vote increased most in those traditional class base of Britain’s two-party system. Introduction The general election areas that voted Leave, while Labour made most progress in areas that backed Remain. What lies ahead? The EU referendum was deeply disruptive for At first glance, the outcome of the 2017 election Britain’s two main political parties. Conservative suggests Brexit has had the opposite effect. Within England and Wales, Conservative The general election was, then, more of a Brexit MPs were deeply divided in their preference for Support for UKIP imploded to just 2%, lower than support increased on average by 10 points in election than immediately meets the eye. Many a Leave or Remain, while Labour MPs blamed their in 2005 and 2010, let alone 2015. The level of constituencies where, according to estimates Leave voter switched to the Conservatives, while leader, Jeremy Corbyn, for the Remain side’s defeat Liberal Democrat support failed to recover from made by Chris Hanretty of the University of East Remain voters were more inclined to back Labour and mounted a challenge against him. Meanwhile, the 8% to which the party had sunk two years ago. Anglia, Leave won over 60% of the vote in the EU than their Leave counterparts. As a result, the a majority of Conservative supporters ignored the The Conservatives and Labour between them won referendum. Conversely, support fell on average Conservative party in particular won over voters advice of their Prime Minister and voted for Leave, 82% of the votes cast across the UK as a whole, it would not normally be expected to reach. The by two points in seats where the Leave vote was while around a third of Labour voters went against more than at any election since 1970. It seems as question that now faces the party is whether it can less than 45%. Labour, in contrast, saw its vote their party’s advice and backed Leave too. though Brexit has paved the way for a return to keep them as it tries to negotiate Brexit against the increase by twelve points in seats where the the two-party politics that characterised British backdrop of a hung parliament, in which there will Leave vote was lowest, but by only nine points in In contrast, few such difficulties faced the Liberal party politics in the immediate post-war period. be pressure on the Prime Minister to soften her those places where it had been highest. Democrats or UKIP. Holding a referendum to vision of what Brexit should mean. get out of Europe was UKIP’s raison d’être, However, this conclusion is too simple. Brexit was Not the least of the reasons why the Conservatives and thus an issue on which both the party’s associated with, and was probably at least a partial By John Curtice elected representatives and its supporters were cause of, a reshaping of the choice voters made gained ground most amongst Leave voters and in united. And while around a quarter of Liberal between Conservative and Labour. places where the Leave vote was highest last year Democrat voters also failed to follow their party’s is that the party benefitted most from the collapse recommendation to vote Remain, once the Consider, first of all, the trends in party support in the UKIP vote. According to a poll conducted referendum was over the traditionally pro-EU amongst Remain and Leave voters during the on polling day by Lord Ashcroft, 57% of those who party was soon arguing there should be a second course of the election campaign. In the last four voted UKIP in 2015 voted for the Conservatives referendum after the Brexit negotiations were polls conducted by ICM immediately prior to the this time, while only 18% switched to Labour. completed. election being called, 53% of Leave voters said Equally, where in England and Wales UKIP secured that they intended to vote for the Conservatives, under 7.5% of the vote in 2015, Conservative Between them, these developments raised an compared with 38% of Remain supporters. support fell back on average by three points, while interesting question. Would the Conservatives However, this gap widened during the course in those seats where UKIP won more than 17.5%, and Labour lose support during the course of the of the election campaign. In the last four polls the Conservatives advanced by ten points. Brexit process, as unhappy Remain voters switched ICM undertook before polling day, support for to the Liberal Democrats and Leave voters were the Conservatives amongst Leave voters was five The Conservative party is, of course, traditionally attracted by the unambiguous position of UKIP. If points higher at 58%, while that amongst Remain the party of middle class voters. But Leave so, might British politics be fractured yet further? voters had dropped five points to 33%. voters were disproportionately working class. TWO PART ONE: PUBLIC OPINION 6 7 The referendum has given rise to a new form of conducted in late April this year, each of these political attachment based on the Leave-Remain scenarios was described in detail – crucially divide. A year on, nearly three quarters of people without the “soft”, “hard” and “no deal” labels think of themselves as “Leavers” (38 per cent) or – and people were asked to make a choice “Remainers” (35 per cent). These groups are similar between a series of pair-wise options of different in size to the proportion of people who identify negotiation outcomes. Our survey shows that with political parties. It is primarily the people who Leavers are relatively united in preferring the voted Remain who have come to identify strongly hardest version of Brexit when given a choice. with this perspective after the election. The This is driven primarily by a desire to control prospect of Brexit has made some people more immigration, to limit the powers of the European committed to EU membership. A crucial question Court and to avoid paying any sort of settlement for the future of British politics is whether these bill to the EU. In contrast, Remainers are much new political identities dissipate over time as more divided: while a small majority favours a soft Brexit becomes a reality, or persist. This is likely Brexit over a hard Brexit, 40 per cent prefer the to depend on whether, and how, political parties latter. On the whole, Remainers and Leavers are mobilise this new fault line in British politics. looking for many of the same things from Brexit: Introduction greater sovereignty, good trade arrangements and 50% Right What do people want from Brexit? no settlement bill. They differ over the questions The EU referendum was a historic democratic of controlling immigration and giving rights to EU 40% Wrong exercise that has given the British Government The negotiations between the British Government citizens resident in the UK. a popular mandate for leaving the EU. Yet, the and the EU involve an array of complex policy 30% choice between leaving or remaining in the questions. The most prominent so far has been One year on, the electorate remains divided on EU provided little in the way of guidance as to the trade-off between the Government prioritising whether a vote on Brexit was a good or a bad what type of Brexit the public wanted. As the 20% preferential trade agreements with the EU or thing. However, those divisions are much less Government starts to negotiate the UK’s exit from prioritising control over EU immigration rates. stark when we focus on what citizens want from 10% the EU, we asked whether the public remains Don’t know But there are many other policy choices that Brexit and what they will accept. Theresa May’s divided and what people actually want from Brexit. relate to the “divorce bill”, continuing EU budget hard Brexit is popular not only among Leavers, Our survey evidence shows that, while the public 0% August November February May contributions and access to EU funds, jurisdiction but also among a sizable proportion of Remainers. remains almost equally divided on whether leaving 2016 2016 2017 2017 of the European Court of Justice, border controls Moreover, when asked how the Government is or staying is a good idea, there is an emerging Was Britain right or wrong to vote to leave the EU? with the Republic of Ireland and so on. These handling the Brexit negotiations, the percentage consensus about what Brexit should look like, and Source: YouGov polls questions did not feature on the referendum of people who say “well” has increased from there are high levels of support for a “hard Brexit” ballot paper, nor are they issues that many just 20 to 35 per cent over the last six months. along the lines proposed by Theresa May. leave the EU, while people who voted Leave think people necessarily gave much thought to before As negotiations with the EU start in earnest, the it was right (see figure above). the referendum. However, it is crucial for the Government may also benefit from a rally “round No regrets as the public remains divided Government that the outcome of the negotiations the flag” effect from both Leavers and Remainers. Interestingly, the continuing divide between those is perceived to be legitimate by the people. At the same time, however, the possible costs While many commentators speculated that voters who favour and oppose Brexit appears to have of Brexit will also become more apparent as would change their opinion on Brexit after the given rise to a set of new political identities in Our research shows that, when asked to choose the negotiations proceed: these could harden implications of leaving the EU became clearer, Britain. It is well established that many people feel between outcomes resembling what have opposition among those who continue to identify public opinion surveys so far tell a very different attached to a political party and this attachment become known as “soft Brexit” and “hard Brexit”, themselves as Remainers. story. In fact, very few people have changed their shapes their attitudes to all sorts of things. The EU a large majority of the public favour the latter. minds about the way they voted. When asked “In referendum, however, was a highly unusual event. Perhaps more surprisingly, when asked to choose By Sara Hobolt, Thomas Leeper and James Tilley hindsight, do you think Britain was right or wrong The two main parties were openly split over the between the Government’s preferred outcome to vote to leave the EU?”, polls show almost no issue. The electorate was also divided: around 40 of hard Brexit and a “no deal” alternative, there change since the referendum: people who voted per cent of Conservative supporters voted Remain, is a majority in favour of walking away from the Remain continue to think it was wrong to vote to while a third of Labour supporters voted Leave. table without any kind of deal. In the survey we

THREE PART ONE: PUBLIC OPINION 8 9 Brexit as such. The Conservatives, capitalising on the short- and the long-term economic impacts of May’s huge early poll lead over Corbyn, wanted Brexit should be a matter of major concern. a debate about who could best negotiate Brexit, not the details of the deal that should be sought. Strengthening the public debate Indeed, they wanted to avoid tying themselves to specific negotiating objectives. Labour, meanwhile, The question of how public debate over complex sought to shift the agenda away from Brexit – on policy issues such as Brexit could be improved is which their compromise position risked pleasing important. In the wake of the referendum, 50 MPs no one – towards domestic policies that were signed a motion calling for the creation of a body popular with voters. that would check the truthfulness of claims made during campaigns and fine those who flouted its Brexit’s unknowns rulings. That, however, is unlikely to achieve much: it is easy to mislead without directly lying. It also The result of all this was that an election called raises questions about free speech, while failing to to clarify the Brexit position in fact did very little address the problem that important matters are to advance public understanding or discussion often simply given little careful attention. of the Brexit options. As the Director of The UK This was supposed to be the Brexit election. In her There were at least three reasons for this. One, as in a Changing Europe, Anand Menon, put it, Another approach seeks to create fora in which Downing Street statement on 18 April announcing suggested, was the unforeseen and tragic eruption the main party manifestos “dance[d] daintily members of the public can learn about and her intention to seek the dissolution of parliament, of terror into the campaign caused by the attacks round the tricky issues” of Brexit. Subsequent discuss the issues in depth. One version of this Theresa May spoke of little else. She suggested in Manchester and London. This inevitably shifted campaign debates did little to expose, let alone is a citizens’ assembly: a gathering of randomly that, without an early election, her opponents the agenda towards the terrorist threat. It raised fill, the gaps. There was little explicit thinking selected citizens who reflect the diversity of the would have both the will and the ability to disrupt deep questions about both Theresa May’s record about how to trade off a general public desire population at large. They meet to learn about, her efforts to negotiate the best possible Brexit on police funding and Jeremy Corbyn’s record for lower immigration against the preference for deliberate upon, and deliver recommendations deal. The vote, she hoped, would deliver a secure of opposition to counter-terrorism legislation maintaining trade with the EU (see the section on relating to the issues on their agenda. As part of majority for her favoured Brexit plan. and seeming friendship with certain terrorist public attitudes). There was little debate about The UK in the Changing Europe, I am leading a organisations. whether the advantages of being able to negotiate team that will run a Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit Brexit’s low profile trade deals with non-EU countries outweigh the in the autumn. Its recommendations will be A second reason was the spectacular misfiring disadvantages of leaving the Customs Union. The published in a report and put to parliament. In the end, however, Brexit did not dominate. It of the Conservative campaign. Conservative Conservatives brandished the idea that “no deal was mentioned on average 580 times a day in the strategists intended to focus on one core is better than a bad deal” as a totem, but little A better quality public discussion now would main UK-wide newspapers in the week following message: that Theresa May, not Jeremy Corbyn, attention was given to what “no deal” implies. strengthen the Brexit process. It would encourage May’s statement. But that fell below 500 for the was the person to provide the “strong and stable Labour said free movement would end, but also politicians to focus on real, hard choices rather following two weeks, then below 400 for the four leadership” needed for successful Brexit. But the said they wanted the option of membership of than sloganeering. It could ready public opinion and a half weeks between then and polling day, Conservative manifesto introduced controversial the Single Market to remain open, implying free for the kind of deal we are likely to get, rather dipping to just 155 mentions a day in the sixth policies – most notably on social care – that movement might continue. than the deal we might dream of. It would help week of the campaign, immediately following the distracted attention away from that core message. negotiators understand the kind of trade-offs Manchester bombing. When the BBC’s Andrew The prime minister’s forced U-turn on social The weakness of debate around Brexit is that are most likely to engender public support. Neil interviewed the prime minister on 22 April, care undermined the credibility of the message. longstanding. During last year’s referendum Without this, a debate driven by rhetoric risks his questions turned to Brexit only in the last few Veteran election watcher Sir David Butler tweeted campaign, both sides peddled misinformation. cornering our leaders into accepting an outcome minutes. Interviewing Jeremy Corbyn four days that “In the 20 general election campaigns I’ve Most criticism has, understandably, focused on the that harms us all. later, Neil asked nothing directly about Brexit itself, followed, I can’t remember a U-turn on this scale”. inaccuracies of the victors, such as the infamous although he did enquire towards the end about £350 million claim and the statements about By Alan Renwick immigration. The other main television debates A third reason – and perhaps the most Turkey’s future EU membership. But the losers and interviews gave Brexit more attention, but still fundamental – was that neither Conservative nor were at it too: that the Treasury machine was used it did not dominate. Labour strategists ever wanted a debate about to promote highly misleading claims about both

FOUR PART ONE: PUBLIC OPINION 10 11 • Threat of an election/resignation. A nuclear with the outcome. A survey of MPs conducted option, to be deployed only sparingly, prime by Ipsos MORI between October and December ministers have threatened to make votes on 2016 asked Conservative MPs about the trade- legislation a vote of confidence – meaning offs that may be required in any negotiations (see that a defeat on a vote would trigger a general figure). The plurality response of Conservative election. This was a tactic John Major, for MPs is in the top right-hand corner of the graph – example, used on occasion in the 1990s. prioritising both controlling immigration and not paying money into the EU budget over access to What lies ahead? On a 0-10 scale, where 0 means being in the EU single market at all costs and 10 means the single market – but with significant minorities who took a different stance. Of these eight factors, none apply now. Therebeing able to control immigration at all costs / not paying any money at all into the EU is no majority. There are only a handful of newbudget, where do you think the balance should lie (combined)? (%) On a 0-10 scale, where 0 means being in the EU single market Introduction • A large majority. Although large majorities Conservative MPs. No MPs – old or new – are at all costs and 10 means being able to control immigration are not unambiguously positive (they bring thanking the prime minister for her magnificent at all costs / not paying any money at all into the EU budget, where do you think the balance should lie (combined)? (%) One of the most striking developments in the House with them their own problems of party election campaign. The Conservatives have been in of Commons over the last 50 years has been the rise management), they do at least provide a buffer government for seven years now, either alone or in of backbench dissent. MPs are increasingly willing against rebellious MPs within a government’s coalition, and the habit of rebellion has built up on to vote against their party line. This was, at least own party. the backbenches. Whatever else it is, Brexit is not in part, the justification for the calling of the 2017 • Delivery of a manifesto pledge. Knowing that a low salience issue, and whilst the fundamentals 3 34 Pay no money no money Pay general election. Whilst the claim that extra support they are elected mostly because of their party of Brexit were sketched out in the manifesto, much EU budget into for the Conservatives would strengthen Theresa label, and not because of their own wonderful of the detail that Parliament will have to vote on May’s bargaining power with other European leaders personality, MPs are more restrained in rebelling over the coming years was absent. This last factor 21 9 may have been dubious, there was more credibility if an item of policy has been clearly set out in would have caused a problem in the House of behind the idea that it would be easier to get all the their party’s manifesto. Lords in particular, even if the Conservatives had Brexit legislation through Parliament with a larger • A first-term government. Discontent builds won the election. 10 11 11 Commons majority. May had inherited a slender up over time within a governing party, so By requiring specifically worded motions for governments born out of a period in opposition single market

Commons majority from David Cameron, which, to access Retain the triggering of early election, the Fixed Term when she called the election, stood at just 17. In usually see lower levels of rebellion than those Parliaments Act removes the ability of a prime Retain access to Control the House of Lords – which has been a permanently that have been returned for multiple terms. single market immigration minister to link the triggering of an election to the hung chamber since 1999 and has been increasingly • Prime ministerial coattails. MPs who feel they passage of specific pieces of legislation. Theresa May The same survey found that a full quarter of willing to defy the government – she had no majority owe their victory to the prime minister can can still threaten to resign as prime minister if she Conservative MPs believed that it would not be at all. A larger Commons majority would have given often be persuaded to show loyalty in return does not get her way, of course, but this is unlikely to honouring the referendum result if the UK ended her more room for manoeuvre with her own MPs, (“she got you here”). have quite the leverage it once might have done. up staying in the single market after the Brexit and some more power with the Lords. To repeat a • A large cohort of new MPs. The “coattails negotiations; just over a third said it would be remark made by David Cameron at 7am on 23 June effect” applies especially to new MPs swept in In terms of attitudes, we know relatively little about impossible to say it was honouring the vote if the 2016: “Well, that didn’t go according to plan”. on a wave of support for the party at the polls; incoming MPs, and it is, anyway, always best to UK still paid into the EU budget. Almost 60% said and anyway, new MPs tend to be less willing be sceptical about attempts to read across from that they would not see it as honouring the terms What makes for a rebellion? to stand up to their whips, from a mixture of stances taken before parliament to behaviour once of the referendum if immigration from within the inexperience and (in some cases) careerism. at Westminster. But on the Conservative side of EU could not be controlled. Indeed, it is probably worse than it looks on paper. • Low salience issues. Parliament deals with a lot the House of Commons, at least, because there Here are eight factors that help party managers get of legislation. On much of it, MPs do not have are so few new MPs, we can draw on surveys from Passing the detailed Brexit legislation through legislation through the House of Commons: much knowledge or interest, and even if they before the election, which show plenty of scope for parliament was already a hard enough task before do have a view on some issues, if it is low profile disagreement. the election; by the morning of 9 June, it had got a • Attitudinal cohesion. MPs do not rebel for the they can often be persuaded to stick to the lot harder. sake of it. There has to be a disagreement on party line provided it is not something they feel We know that around half of Conservative MPs the issue for rebellion to be considered. very strongly about. voted Remain, even if most soon came to terms By Philip Cowley FIVE PART TWO: PARTIES AND POLITICS 12 13 him than they already were. Interestingly, however, The election he seemed to escape any censure whatsoever from his youthful fan-base outside Westminster, All this confusion, the Lib Dems hoped, would even though many of them were furious that the see their fortunes revive as the standard-bearer UK had voted to leave the EU and therefore might for “the 48%”. But their prayers proved to be in reasonably have wondered if their hero could have vain as the bulk of Remain voters, even those done more to avoid that outcome. who continued to hope Brexit could be avoided, seemed destined, at elections anyway, to stick with Had Labour MPs not lost their heads and triggered the devils they knew rather than throw their lot in a premature leadership contest, perhaps things with Tim Farron. would have been different. But they did, thereby ensuring that any of Corbyn’s extra-parliamentary Brexit’s biggest loser, however, was obviously UKIP. army who shared their suspicions that he (and his Farage, who stepped down to spend less time with Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell) had secretly his family and more time with his new best friend, wanted Brexit all along promptly forgot all about Donald Trump, proved predictably irreplaceable. their reservations in the rush to defend “Jeremy” Meanwhile, Mrs May was offering his voters not against “the chicken coup”. only more Brexit and less immigration, but also grammar schools, a war on wind turbines, and Introduction end. No-one could doubt, for instance, whose side With Corbyn re-elected, Labour MPs found whole lot more besides. UKIP (which, as usual, forearm smashed above its themselves being asked to go against everything As far as the UK’s political parties were concerned, weight media-wise) was on. The same could be almost all of them had ever stood for by voting Little wonder, then, that she belatedly bought her last summer’s EU referendum was a bit like one of said for the Lib Dems, the SNP and the Greens. in favour of the government triggering Article advisors’ arguments that she should capitalise on those tag-team wrestling matches you see on TV. And, although no-one was paying anywhere near 50, thereby setting the clock ticking on the UK’s the collapse of the Conservatives’ right-wing rival Although the bout began with everyone thinking as much attention as they should have been, both departure from the EU. Most of them managed by calling an early general election – a contest they knew who was on which side, by the end of the DUP (pro-Brexit) and Sinn Fein (anti) behaved to swallow their objections and their pride, which, by delivering her a bigger majority, would, it no-one in the ring – nor, for that matter, in the entirely as predicted. reasoning that it was the only way of reconciling paradoxically, make her less dependent on her audience – was sure anymore. the difference between their views and the own Eurosceptic ultras at Westminster. From referendum to election significant support for Leave in many Labour-held Everyone knew, of course, that the Conservative constituencies that looked vulnerable either to It didn’t, of course, turn out that way. Six Party was divided on the issue. But it wasn’t until After the referendum, things seemed to become UKIP or to the Conservatives as a result. That said, disastrous weeks later, the Conservatives were the bell went and the seconds stepped out of a little clearer – at least on the Tory side. The nearly 50 MPs voted with their consciences and returned to Westminster with fewer MPs and the ring that we (or indeed he) knew that David Remainers either retired hurt (David Cameron in many cases (and surely not coincidentally) with no parliamentary majority, stuck, when it comes Cameron was going to be fighting not only Nigel and George Osborne) or else acted as if they’d their largely Remain-supporting constituents. to Brexit, between Scylla (Tory “headbangers” Farage but also Boris Johnson and Michael Gove. always been Leavers (Theresa May and virtually insisting on full-speed ahead to a Hard Brexit) and everyone else) – not only to the extent of insisting In the wake of Article 50, Labour’s position on Charybdis (the DUP which wants out of the EU And while no-one expected Jeremy Corbyn to get on a so-called hard Brexit but even talking about what it wanted out of the Brexit it had just voted but without a return to a hard border with the into the ring at the same time as David Cameron, “no deal being better than a bad deal.” A handful for remained, to put it mildly, a little unclear. South). Whether, in such rough seas, Mrs May most people had assumed he’d do his bit. of Europhiles (kudos, Anna Soubry and Nicky Had it fully reconciled itself to rejecting freedom or her successor can keep the ship afloat for two Instead, he spent most of the bout in the dressing Morgan) refused to drink the Kool-Aid but they of movement and therefore leaving the Single full years of tough negotiations with the EU27 is room – a decision which allowed grapple-fan were cast into outer-darkness (and booted off the Market? What exactly was the have-our-cake- anyone’s guess. favourites like Kate Hoey and Gisela Stuart to frontbench) as “Remoaners”, replaced by veteran and-eat-it solution that it was proposing if it give the distinct, but misleading, impression that Europhobes like Liam Fox and David Davis. wasn’t “the Norway option”? Would Labour MPs By Tim Bale Labour’s MPs were as divided on whether to really dare to vote down whatever deal (or no leave or remain as their Tory counterparts. Labour, however, found it much harder to pull off deal) Theresa May eventually agreed with the EU the collective amnesia trick. Jeremy Corbyn’s AWOL in two years’ time? No-one, not even Labour’s True, the country’s smaller parties managed to act during the referendum campaign made his critics spokesman on the issue, Keir Starmer, seemed to hold things together all the way through to the in the Parliamentary Labour Party even angrier with know for sure. SIX PART TWO: PARTIES AND POLITICS 14 15 for Leave in the 2016 EU referendum, based on language on Brexit alarmed Remain-leaning voters figures provided by Chris Hanretty. The Conservatives in traditionally Conservative areas and put her stagnated or fell back in Remain areas, gaining the reputation as a competent steward of negotiations at most ground in the strongest Brexit seats, which risk. She looked like a leader determined to appease also saw the biggest collapse of UKIP support. This the most vocal and ideological Brexiteers at any cost. fits with much of the pre-election polling showing Jeremy Corbyn’s strategy, by contrast, moved the large-scale switching from UKIP to the Conservatives. party towards the mildly Eurosceptic centre. Faced The surprise comes on the Labour side. The party’s with a complex issue where his party’s traditional surge was greatest in the strongest Remain areas, but position was a long way from the median voter’s, Labour surged everywhere else, too. Corbyn’s party Mr Corbyn embraced the pro-Brexit position of the was up by nearly 13 points on 2015 in seats where median voter, even at the risk of antagonising the less than 35% voted Leave; and rose a still-hefty 7.4 strongly pro-EU segments of the Labour coalition, in points in seats where more than 65% did so. a move reminiscent of an earlier Labour leader’s. In This had two important effects. Firstly, the fall in 1997, Tony Blair gambled that he could pitch to the Introduction Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour, meanwhile, had a better Conservative support combined with the surge centre ground on economic issues while retaining night than expected, polling 40% of the national in Labour support was sufficient to topple huge the loyalties of working-class left wingers. On Brexit, The 2017 general election was billed as the “Brexit vote – their highest share since 2001 and a 9.5-point majorities in Conservative-held Remain seats, Jeremy Corbyn pitched to the Eurosceptic centre election”. Set against the backdrop of the 2016 increase since 2015 – and winning 262 seats, 30 particularly in London, where Labour overturned ground by invoking Article 50 and accepting the end referendum on EU membership, Prime Minister more than in 2015. large majorities in Battersea, Kensington and Enfield of freedom of movement, gambling that Remain Theresa May framed the election as a way of Southgate, and slashed Conservative majorities in voters alarmed by Theresa May’s shrill rhetoric and Can the election result be attributed to a “Brexit “strengthening her hand” ahead of the negotiations previously safe seats such as Putney and the Cities of effect”? Initial reactions to the result certainly hard Brexit policy would recognise that Labour was with the EU and ensuring stability. But, in the end, London and Westminster. Big swings in Remain seats focused on the Brexit realignment. The shock Labour the only viable alternative. This Brexit Blairism helped she achieved neither. have created a new swathe of marginal seats for win in Canterbury came to epitomise this – Labour’s blunt the Conservatives’ appeal in Leave areas, while Labour to target in the next election. While the Conservative Party attracted a 42.4% share vote increased over 20 percentage points in this allowing Labour to capitalise on alarm with Theresa of the national vote – their highest share since 1979 traditionally blue seat with two university campuses, Secondly, Labour’s resilience in Leave areas thwarted May’s Nigel Farage tribute act in Remain areas. and an increase of more than 5% on their result in where 55% of voters were estimated to have voted Conservative attempts to turn traditional working- Conclusion 2015 – the party failed to increase its number of seats. class Labour heartlands blue by consolidating UKIP Remain. Jeremy Corbyn became the first party leader Of course, Brexit was not the only factor driving the At 318, the Conservatives won 13 fewer seats than in support. The Conservatives increased their vote in to take the seat from the Conservatives since William results. Leave and Remain voting patterns capture 2015 and were left eight short of a majority. A working such areas, often dramatically, and usually at UKIP’s Gladstone. a range of other fundamental differences between majority of 17 made way for a hung parliament and expense. Yet, Labour also bounced back in these areas, people and places: in identity attachments, social negotiations with the Democratic Unionist Party The effect of the Brexit referendum on the 2017 vote so the net Labour to Conservative swing was weak class, education levels, ethnic diversity and views of (DUP), which if successful will leave May, now a greatly Figure 1 illustrates the changes in English and even in the strongest Leave seats. The Conservatives immigration, among others. diminished figure, with a working majority of just 13. Welsh constituencies by their estimated support made just six gains from Labour in Leave areas of England and Wales. Most MPs representing heavily Yet this may be another reason Brexit Blairism proved FIGURE 1: 15 Leave seats such as Derby North, Bolsover and Stoke a smart strategy. Labour’s decision to embrace Vote changes in North held on with reduced majorities. departure from the EU in some form may have the 2017 versus 10 helped them reframe the election around other Party strategies 2015 general issues such as austerity and public services, and elections 5 Theresa May expected her embrace of Brexit to remind voters in Leave areas of their traditional in English fundamentally change the electoral map in her suspicions about the Conservatives. Meanwhile in and Welsh 0 favour, by holding Remain voting heartlands while Remain areas, the party could advance by promising constituencies Under 35% 35-40% 40-45% 45-50% 50-55% 55-60% 60-65% Over 65% by share of expanding into Leave-voting, Labour strongholds. a “softer” alternative approach to “hard” Brexit. -5 Instead the opposite occurred: Labour held firm support for The Conservatives went into this election eager to “Leave” in in their Leave-leaning seats, and achieved often paint Labour as out of touch and extreme, but failed the 2016 EU -10 Change in Labour vote 2015-17 stunning advances in previously true-blue, Remain to realise that, in their own heartlands, they were referendum Change in Conservative vote 2015-17 seats. One possible reason is that in the “Brexit -15 vuln Swing from Conservative to Labour 2015-17 election”, Jeremy Corbyn’s position on the EU was erable to the same charge. Change in UKIP vote 2015-17 better aligned with the electorate than Theresa By Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwin -20 May’s. May’s ever more strident and inflexible and Maria Sobolewska

SEVEN PART TWO: PARTIES AND POLITICS 16 17 final outcome – whether a deal or no deal. opportunity of a hung Parliament to provide a Furthermore, before the election the prime strong counter balance to the requirement of minister consistently stated her unwillingness to meeting the Article 50 deadline of 29 March 2019 provide a “running commentary” to Parliament on by insisting that democratic accountability and the progress of the negotiations. scrutiny, whether in the chamber or via select committees, is not compromised. Following the election of a minority government, it may be argued that Parliament is in a better Given the legislative and political challenges of position to exert influence over the Government delivering Brexit, it is essential that Parliament and during the Brexit negotiations both in terms of the Government avoid conflict as far possible and scrutiny and with respect to the substance of the cooperate in order that the objectives of Brexit negotiations. The absence of a parliamentary and parliamentary democracy are fully reconciled. Introduction Parliament to exercise control and scrutiny over majority is likely to make it difficult for the In terms of parliamentary activity, this will, first the Government. Government to conduct negotiations without and foremost, require improved cooperation In the year since the EU referendum, the key reference to MPs, especially by not offering between Government and the opposition to question that has preoccupied Parliament is Parliament since the referendum a “meaningful vote” on the outcome of the ensure that parliamentary scrutiny is focussed on how to legislate to give effect to the decision of negotiations which, with a minority government, it key legislative proposals. the British people to leave the EU. The practical The process by which Article 50 was formally remains possible that Parliament could reject. question of how Brexit would be delivered, and in triggered on 29 March 2017 provides a good Post-election, the Government should present, what time scale, was not fully discussed during the illustration of the parliamentary challenges the The parliamentary challenge of delivering Brexit without delay, its legislative proposals, especially referendum campaign. Since the referendum, both Government faces in delivering Brexit, even if it – democracy versus efficiency where new and potentially complex UK legislation the Government and Parliament have focussed had retained an overall parliamentary majority. will be required before Brexit – for example with on how to leave the EU within the two-year The judgment of the Supreme Court in January Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the respect to immigration or customs rules – which timetable prescribed by the Article 50 process, 2017 confirmed that Parliament, not the newly elected Parliament will be a legislative cannot be adopted via the Great Repeal Bill. To while simultaneously formulating a strategy to Government, had the sole power to trigger Article one. To deliver Brexit, Parliament will need to ensure that this legislation is enacted within address the immediate legal consequences for 50, thereby laying down an important marker that pass a number of important bills (upwards of the necessary timeframe, and to avoid the the UK of leaving the EU. To address this latter Parliament cannot be bypassed during the course 10), including the Great Repeal Bill (see the uncertainty of the so-called “cliff-edge”, sufficient point, the Government has proposed laying of the Brexit negotiations. One consequence of the Great Repeal Bill section on this) before the parliamentary time for scrutiny of all new before Parliament the Great Repeal Bill, which will Supreme Court judgment is that it has created an completion of the Article 50 negotiations. This legislation must be built into the Government’s convert, on the day of withdrawal, all existing EU expectation that Parliament will be engaged in the will prove challenging given limited parliamentary legislative programme. law into UK law. Brexit process, which, in practice, means exercising time. The time available consists of only two effective scrutiny over the Government during the full parliamentary sessions, during which Ultimately, the success of Brexit will be judged To further complicate matters (not least by Brexit process. This engagement will only increase parliamentarians will need to continue with not by the outcome of the referendum, but on shortening the parliamentary time available to with a hung parliament, with the opposition likely the wider legislative programme. However, it the basis of how Parliament gives effect to the debate Brexit) the prime minister called a snap to identify opportunities to amend or even defeat is the absence of a working majority that will referendum decision. In particular, this means general election for 8 June 2017. The aim of the Government on Brexit issues where there may undoubtedly make it more difficult to secure whether UK citizens believe, in the years to come, the Government in calling this election was to be cross-party support. parliamentary approval for key Brexit legislation, that their expectations for Brexit have been strengthen its majority and, arguably, provide such as the Great Repeal Bill. delivered by the Parliament they elected to fulfil it with a stronger mandate during the Article Despite the Government making a commitment this task. 50 negotiations. However, the outcome of the before the election that both Houses of Parliament Delivering Brexit within the timescale prescribed election, a hung Parliament with a minority will vote on any final Brexit deal, it is not totally by Article 50 will place immense pressure By Adam Cygan Conservative government, creates uncertainty clear what this will mean in practice, though upon Parliament. Effective management of and would appear to leave the UK in much weaker the hung Parliament should place limits on parliamentary time will be an important tactic position at the commencement of the Brexit the Government’s scope to bypass Parliament. that is likely to be employed by the Government, negotiations. By contrast, the outcome of a hung Specifically, there remains uncertainty as to not least as a way of limiting debate and scrutiny. Parliament creates improved opportunities for whether Parliament will be able to reject the It is therefore crucial that Parliament uses the

EIGHT PART TWO: PARTIES AND POLITICS 18 19 As is now clear, the DUP is likely to enjoy significant as well as the symbolic and identity-related post-election political leverage in Westminster to aspects. As the DUP is finding in its discussions pursue an agenda of the UK exiting the EU, and over cooperation with the Conservative Party, will be in pole position to shape the associated both communities in Northern Ireland may border regime. discover they are not universally welcomed in their respective sovereign states. United Ireland? Conclusion A danger for the DUP, and for unionism in general, is alienating the nationalist community While in Britain Brexit maps onto a set of even further, to such an extent that they begin issues relating to sovereignty, immigration and agitating in a sustained way for a referendum globalisation, Northern Ireland is grappling with on a united Ireland to facilitate the “return” of an arguably bigger basket of thornier questions Northern Ireland to the EU on an all-island basis. relating to the place and nature of the border, the The fact that nationalists in Northern Ireland related significant threat of civil disquiet, and the have now effectively voted to turn their backs on prospect of a referendum on a united Ireland. All Westminster politics is a clear warning of where of which would add further complexity to the UK Introduction overwhelmingly Remain, while Protestant voters politics may go in the not-too-distant future. constitutional mix. and the main unionist party, the Democratic Northern Ireland voted to Remain and, one Unionist Party (DUP), are strongly “Leave”. The debate needs to be normalised. Demands These challenges have to be faced in the fragile year on, is a society struggling with the forces Thus, the easiest way to make sense of the for a “border poll” should not be seen as strange, context of no functioning government in Northern unleashed by the Brexit vote. It has exacerbated consequences of Brexit for Northern Ireland is unusual or contrary to the constitutional status Ireland and an unstable Westminster regime tensions and reopened its ever-present to view these through the prism of the unionist- quo. The possibility of a referendum on a united depending on a party representing one half of sovereignty fracture. nationalist distinction. Ireland is a core element of the 1998 Good Friday/ Northern Ireland. Belfast Agreement, which established the current Politics in Northern Ireland typically focuses on The border political structures in Northern Ireland. If it is By John Garry and Colin Harvey issues relating to the divide between Catholic obvious (to the Secretary of State for Northern nationalists (who are favourably disposed to a What to do about the border is one major Ireland) that there is significant desire for such a united Ireland) and Protestant unionists (who challenge. Nationalist parties in Northern Ireland referendum, then such a poll may be held. prioritise the maintenance of Northern Ireland’s (and Catholic voters) firmly oppose any form of union with the rest of the UK). The recent “hard border” between Northern Ireland and the With both nationalist parties now putting this Westminster election (June 2017) confirms that Republic of Ireland. And the unionist parties (and more firmly on the agenda, and with the major this remains the dominant dynamic in Northern Protestant voters) are highly sceptical of any east- gains for Sinn Féin in the Westminster election Irish politics. Northern Ireland is still a society west alternative, namely border controls between (and the elections to the Northern Ireland scarred by ethno-national division and the Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Assembly in March 2017), the likelihood it will consequences of conflict. occur has increased. If opinion poll evidence These are highly sensitive issues. If not handled over the coming months points to a significant Is Brexit an issue that cross-cuts this divide, with well, there is potential for significant disquiet, proportion of Northern Ireland citizens favouring significant numbers of Catholics and Protestants either from staunch nationalists upset by any unity with the Republic of Ireland (or clearly on both sides of the debate? The simple answer is: physical manifestation of a north-south border or supporting the call for a unity referendum), it No. from hard-line unionists whose identity would be would be difficult to withstand the pressure to wounded if barriers to their smooth movement advance this option. In contrast to Britain, where both Conservative- across the UK were introduced. inclined voters and Labour supporters are Unity would also require a referendum in the seriously split on the Brexit issue, in Northern How this border question plays out has been Republic of Ireland, and any such debate would Ireland, Catholic nationalist voters and parties are significantly affected by the Westminster election. grapple with the financial pros and cons of unity

NINE PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK 20 21 Brexit also catapulted the independence issue back Looking ahead to the top of the political agenda. The Scottish National Party (SNP) manifesto for the 2016 Both the UK Conservatives and the SNP have been Scottish Parliament elections sought a mandate humbled by the general election results, and it is to hold a new independence referendum if there not yet clear how this will affect the relationship was clear demand, or if there was a “significant between their two governments. The coming and material change in the circumstances that year will be dominated by the Brexit negotiations. prevailed in 2014, such as Scotland being taken Despite the first minister’s call for a seat at the out of the EU against our will”. A majority in table, the Scottish Government’s capacity to the Scottish Parliament (consisting of SNP and influence negotiations is likely to remain limited. Green MSPs) backed the Government’s call for a On the other hand, the Scottish Conservative referendum once the terms of Brexit were known. leader, Ruth Davidson, buoyant from her electoral Yet, the Scottish Parliament lacks the legal authority success, seems intent on trying to influence the Introduction Europe. The first priority was to try to keep the to hold a referendum similar to the 2014 vote and UK’s Brexit stance. UK within the European Economic Area (EEA) the UK Government rejected the call, declaring that Last June, Remain secured a 62% vote share in and the EU Customs Union. In the event of the “now is not the time”. The Scottish Conservatives’ In parallel, the introduction of the Great Repeal Bill Scotland, with only 38% of voters backing Leave. UK Government negotiating withdrawal from electoral gains and the SNP’s losses in the 2017 will intensify debate about the repatriation of EU Support for remaining in the EU was the highest these, the paper argued that Scotland should general election have been widely interpreted as competences and their impact on the devolution of any nation or region in the UK, with a majority either become a full or associated member of the public rejection of an early referendum. settlements (see the section on repatriation). The in all 32 local authority counting areas and almost European Free Trade Association, or have direct prime minister has insisted that EU frameworks every demographic. association with the EEA. The process toward triggering Article 50 had need to be replaced by UK frameworks to preserve already generated a step-change in formal the UK internal market. This has been perceived But the choice was not only Scotland’s to make. In Clearly, the prospect of Scotland remaining within intergovernmental relations between the UK by the SNP as an attempt to weaken the powers her speech to the Conservative Party Conference the Single Market while England and Wales do not Government and the devolved governments. of the Scottish Parliament by expanding the areas last autumn, Theresa May insisted, “Because we raises considerable practical and legal difficulties, But the Joint Ministerial Committee (European where the Westminster Parliament has exclusive voted in the referendum as one United Kingdom, not least around the free movement of money, Negotiations) – set up specifically to discuss Brexit competence. The Scottish Government doesn’t we will negotiate as one United Kingdom, and goods, services and people across two separate – has been a frustrating process for all involved reject the need for common UK frameworks to we will leave the European Union as one United markets. The Scottish Government argued that (see also the section on Wales). Having raised avoid barriers to trade and mobility. But there will Kingdom. There is no opt-out from Brexit.” By these need not be insurmountable, and that expectations that it would provide an avenue for be tensions over who gets to decide what such contrast, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon insisted, innovative solutions could be found. The extent of joint agreement on a UK approach prior to the frameworks would entail, who owns the process of “we didn’t vote to leave – we voted to remain. the challenge would only become apparent once triggering of Article 50, it singularly failed to do so. overseeing their implementation, and who wields To be told that we have to leave, regardless, is the UK’s status vis-à-vis the EU was made clearer. If There was no intergovernmental discussion of the the power should disputes emerge. tantamount to being told that our voice as a the UK-EU agreement minimises tariffs and non- UK Government’s Brexit position prior to either nation doesn’t matter”. tariff barriers, the practical obstacles in the way the prime minister’s Lancaster House speech, the By Nicola McEwen of a differentiated Brexit for Scotland would be publication of the White Paper or the triggering Developments since the EU referendum reduced. of Article 50. The JMC (EN) was also supposed to provide the devolved governments with oversight The morning after the referendum, the first Overcoming the political objections, however, was of negotiations with the EU. minister announced her intention to find a way always going to be difficult. In contrast to Northern to respect the wishes of the Scottish people. She Ireland, where the land border with the Republic The JMC process may be difficult to resurrect secured the backing of the Scottish Parliament of Ireland has generated political commitment in without a functioning Executive in Northern to negotiate with the UK Government, EU Dublin, London and Brussels to find a compromise, Ireland. Besides, prior to the general election at institutions and member states to explore options there is little sympathy in the UK Government least, the UK Government’s appetite for the JMC for keeping Scotland in the Single Market. A for a differentiated Brexit deal for Scotland. The (EN) had diminished, as had the expectations of compromise proposition was set out in the proposition was formally rejected by the Secretary the Scottish Government regarding its capacity to Scottish Government’s paper, Scotland’s Place in of State for Exiting the EU in April. uphold its remit.

TEN PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK 22 23 in partnership with Plaid Cymru, as an evidence- would be better organised than most JMC based contribution to the UK debate. The White meetings have been.” Indeed, there is little to Paper – ‘Securing Wales’ Future: Transition from the indicate that the UK Government has engaged European Union to a new relationship with Europe’ seriously with the devolved administrations. This – addressed both the UK’s future relationship does not bode well for the latter’s role in the Brexit with the EU, and the internal functioning of the negotiations themselves, something both the UK post-Brexit, as a union of four nations (see the Welsh and Scottish Governments have called for. contributions by Jo Hunt and Michael Keating). What next for Wales? The Welsh Government presents a contrasting vision of Brexit to that proposed by the UK Today, Wales is working to protect its future Government. Not least, it prefers continued both within the UK and within Europe. Of central participation in both the single market and the importance to Wales is the Great Repeal Bill, and Customs Union. The Welsh Government also its consequences for devolution and the future of stresses the importance of freedom of movement, the UK’s own union (see Jo Hunt’s contribution). although asserts that there ought to be a Attached to this are fundamental questions about stronger link between freedom of movement and how powers will be repatriated to the UK, how employment than is currently exercised in the UK. It (or indeed whether) lost EU funds (specifically Introduction The Leave vote left the Welsh Government without calls for continued Welsh involvement in a number for agriculture and regional development policy) a mandate to advocate its pro-EU position. Added will be compensated for via UK domestic sources, of EU programmes, including Horizon 2020 (for On 24 June 2016, Wales awoke on the “winning to this is the Welsh Government’s weak bargaining and how Welsh interests will be protected in science and research), ERASMUS+ (education and side” of the EU referendum. 17 of 22 local hand in its dealings with the UK Government. In international trade deals. Beyond this, during the training), Creative Europe (supporting cultural and authority areas had voted “Leave”, totalling this, Wales differs from Scotland (through calls for negotiations themselves, Wales will continue work creative sectors) and the Ireland-Wales Programme 52.5% of those who went to the polls. And a second independence referendum) and Northern to defend its key industries, seeking to ensure (a European Territorial Cooperation programme this against a backdrop of high levels of EU Ireland (with acutely sensitive political issues that sufficient levels of migration and pushing for a that connects organisations, businesses and funding, a devolution settlement premised on demand attention), both of which voted Remain. close relationship between the UK and the EU. communities). It also seeks for the UK to remain a EU membership, and overwhelming support for partner in the European Investment Bank. “Remain” from Welsh politicians and sectoral During the summer of 2016, the political institutions However, whatever the final relationship between of Wales set to work preparing themselves for the the UK and the EU, Wales is investing in its own organisations. So began Wales’ Brexit journey: a Despite these contrasting positions, the Welsh UK’s prospective withdrawal from the EU. The Welsh future in Europe, as a “European nation” in its divided nation with a weak bargaining hand, yet Government has consistently emphasised areas Government established inter alia an EU Transition own right. As it stands, from the Welsh outpost in with distinct interests to protect both within the of complementarity with the UK Government, Team to coordinate all Brexit activity, and a European Brussels (Wales House), a number of organisations UK and within Europe. Advisory Group of external stakeholders. The insisting that their positions are “not work to advance Welsh interests and support Welsh response of the National Assembly for Wales was irreconcilable”. It is in this cooperative spirit that participation in collaborative ventures with a range of Wales’ journey since the EU referendum swift and decisive. Days after the EU referendum, it the Welsh Government has participated in the national and regional actors. Much of this European issued a report outlining some of the implications of cross-nations forum on Brexit: the Joint Ministerial activity already reaches beyond the EU, providing The Leave vote in Wales placed the Welsh the referendum for Wales. It then embarked upon a Committee on European Negotiations or JMC foundations upon which to build post-Brexit. Indeed, Government in an unenviable position. Prior to programme of research and analysis, spearheaded (EN), established on 24 October 2016. This forum Welsh engagement with Europe is set to continue the EU referendum, it had vehemently expressed by the newly created Committee on External Affairs “seek[s] to agree a UK approach to, and objectives following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, albeit its preference for Remain, asserting that the risks and Additional Legislation. The Committee launched for, Article 50 negotiations”. However, even the tailored to a renewed set of circumstances. of Brexit were manifold in financial, economic its report, ‘Implications for Wales of leaving the most measured participants have been moved and political terms. Indeed, as a beneficiary from European Union’ in early January 2017, in which it to express some exasperation. Both the Welsh By Rachel Minto EU funds (totalling £658 million in 2014) and a clearly outlined the priority areas for Wales and a and Scottish representatives (Cabinet Secretary small nation for whom the Single Market holds scrutiny role for the Assembly. Mark Drakeford and Minister Michael Russell, particular significance, this pro-EU position had respectively) have been outspoken in their critique been rather taken for granted in Welsh politics. The Welsh Government’s white paper on Brexit of the forum, with Drakeford stating that, “St The voting public, however, did not agree. was released later that month, on 23 January 2017, Fagans Community Council, in my constituency, ELEVEN PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK 24 25 view of the constitution in which sovereignty must The third issue concerns those powers currently be in one place. The majority in Scotland and held by the EU which are also devolved within the Northern Ireland, however, voted Remain, wanting United Kingdom. The main ones are agriculture, to remain in both the UK and European unions. fisheries, the environment and some aspects of Now they are forced to choose. justice and home affairs. The UK Government’s position is that all powers will come back to From then till now Westminster, which can then decide which ones to pass down to the devolved level. The Scottish Brexit therefore presents a severe challenge to the and Welsh Governments have argued that these UK’s evolving constitution. We can illustrate this powers constitutionally belong to them. There by three developments in the year since the Brexit might need to be UK frameworks to replace vote. European frameworks but these would have to be negotiated voluntarily among the four nations. Introduction the people of Northern Ireland can vote to join the The first is the judgment of the Supreme Court Republic of Ireland. in the Miller case, which primarily concerned What lies ahead? There are two very different views of the whether Parliament needed to approve the UK’s largely unwritten constitution. One, the The constitution and the EU Government’s triggering of Article 50, giving Brexit exposes very different views of the UK “Westminster” view, is based on the principle of notice of withdrawal from the EU. The Scottish constitution, something that has not had to be parliamentary sovereignty and supremacy. This This “devolved” view of the constitution is Government joined the case to argue that it would addressed since devolution in the late 1990s. holds that the UK Parliament is the supreme entirely consistent with the European project. also need the consent of the devolved legislatures. The UK Government’s positions have implied a source of law and can do anything except bind The United Kingdom and the EU are both unions This is because it would require changes in the reaffirmation of Westminster supremacy at odds itself. Parliament, in turn, is answerable to in which different nations share power. Both are devolution acts in various ways. At the minimum with developments since 1999 and tending to a unitary British nation. It is this view of the open-ended, without a clear end point. Rather the provisions binding them to act within EU law centralisation. constitution that clashes with the European they adjust according to the times. The issue will have to be removed. The Supreme Court project, which is based on a philosophy of sharing of sovereignty is fudged and never absolutely could have ruled that the convention was not The issue could be resolved by the UK breaking up, sovereignty and power. resolved. applicable because the situation was not “normal”, with Scotland and Northern Ireland remaining in or because the EU comes under foreign affairs and the EU. Alternatively, it could be resolved by the The other view, widely held in Scotland and the Opinion surveys have repeatedly shown that the is not devolved. Instead, at the urging of the UK UK Government imposing its will and leaving the other UK nations, is that the United Kingdom is people of Scotland and Northern Ireland have no Government’s Advocate General, it ruled that the EU on terms set by itself. The result of the General a union of nations, each of which has its own problem with multiple layers of authority. Our convention was a mere political device and not Election suggests that neither the UK Government, relationship with the centre. Devolution since work on the Scottish independence referendum binding in any circumstances. with its unitary view of the constitution, nor the 1999 has reinforced this view by providing showed that, despite being forced to choose Scottish or Irish nationalists, are strong enough to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales with their between independence and the union, most The second issue concerns the idea that allow either of these to happen. Instead, Brexit will own elected legislatures and governments. It is voters continued to prefer something in between. Scotland and Northern Ireland might have a remain entwined in the changing constitutional further strengthened by the “Sewel Convention” In Northern Ireland, the power-sharing settlement differentiated from of Brexit, allowing them to politics of the UK. under which Westminster will not “normally” has gained cross-community support. The remain in parts of the EU, including the Single pass laws in devolved areas without the consent numbers of people in Scotland and Northern Market, even as the rest of the UK withdraws. A By Michael Keating of the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly Ireland who want to put all the sovereignty in one plan was presented by the Scottish Government for Wales or Northern Ireland Assembly. The place is small. in December 2016. Nationalists in Northern convention was put into law in the Scotland Act Ireland have made their own suggestions for a (2016) and the Wales Act (2017). The Northern The argument for Brexit was to “take back control”, differentiated settlement, although unionists Ireland settlement rejects the idea that there is a and restore the supremacy of the UK Parliament have opposed the idea. The UK Government unitary British people. Instead, it allows people to and people by eliminating the provisions that response is that there must be a “UK approach” define themselves as British, Irish, Northern Irish made UK law subordinate to EU law in fields where in which the whole of the UK must in the future of any combination of those. It also provides that the EU is competent. This reflects the Westminster have the same relationship with the EU.

TWELVE PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK 26 27 only a sophisticated analysis based on detailed Current political debates focus on the role that the data linking trade patterns to domestic economic devolved administrations may play in the Brexit structures and patterns can uncover these negotiations, but these give little or no attention relationships. to the issues affecting the rest of the country. Taken together, the populations of the recently This shows us that, firstly, the “metropolitan constituted city-region combined authorities elite” argument is completely wrong. London is are much larger than the total populations of less dependent on the EU for its prosperity than the three devolved administrations, although anywhere else in the UK. Indeed, the regions these areas barely figure in current discussions. which voted Leave tend to be the regions which Furthermore, many of the smaller towns and rural are most dependent on EU markets for their areas which voted strongly for Brexit, and which prosperity. This strongly suggests that it is the are likely to be the most adversely affected by it, UK’s weaker regions which are most exposed to effectively have no representation whatsoever. Brexit. Although various local government leaders have raised these issues, this has achieved little or Secondly, in economic terms, the UK and its no broader resonance. However, as the Brexit Introduction Brexit negotiations because of its balance of regions are far more exposed to Brexit trade- negotiations proceed and the potential impacts payments deficit with the rest of the EU. As such, related risks than regions in any other EU member on different areas start to become clearer, it may Two claims were made during the referendum other EU member states will be eager to agree state except the Republic of Ireland. Even be that the UK’s cities and regions become more campaign concerning the implications of Brexit for a comprehensive free trade deal with the UK in countries such as Germany or the Netherlands will involved in the process. the UK’s regions, cities and nations. The first was order to protect their trade surplus. This argument be less affected by Brexit than the UK, while many that the major beneficiaries of EU membership finds little support in modern economics. In other member states will feel almost no effect. By Philip McCann and Raquel Ortega-Argilés were the “metropolitan elites” in London, while contrast, most economists agree that the strength This suggests that the economic strength of the the rest of the country was largely deprived of of the UK’s position can only be understood in UK’s negotiating position is far weaker than most the benefits of EU membership. This theme terms of the impact of trade and foreign direct of the UK public understands. reappeared on many occasions, and was referred investment on all economic activity taking place to by many high profile Leave advocates. It also in the domestic economy, irrespective of whether The regional rather than just the sectoral frequently re-surfaced when the members of the those activities are themselves involved in trade or dimension public were interviewed by the media, suggesting not. Crucially, trade surplus or deficit levels simply that, as a campaign slogan, it had gained real have no relevance for these issues. Again, the Until now, much of the discussion on Brexit traction. Indeed, the geography of the referendum truth of this claim can only be tested by examining has been dominated by the potential impact result provided further evidence for the how the international and interregional trade on particular industries such as automobiles or “metropolitan elite” argument within England and structures of the UK’s regions affect their internal finance and whether this would require specific Wales, revealing, as it did, a stark division between economic performance. deals for certain industries. Importantly, however, pro-Remain London and its hinterland and the rest this discussion has overlooked the fact that the of the country. Testing the claims specific details of the final UK-EU agreement are likely to have very different impacts on different The “metropolitan elite” argument was always Testing both claims requires moving beyond parts of the UK, and have the potential to about London, not cities in general. There was simple numbers regarding the levels or changes in undermine much of the economic “rebalancing” never any suggestion that pro-Leave advocates gross exports and imports, because these numbers agenda that is currently being widely discussed had places like Liverpool in mind when they actually tell us very little about the economic domestically. The impacts of Brexit on the UK’s referred to “elites”. And it was never based on any dependence of a country, a city or a region, on its devolved administrations and city-regions are likely empirical evidence. trade relationships. Modern global value chains to differ markedly depending on the terms of the involve moving goods and services across many final UK-EU agreement, and there are now growing The second, interrelated claim, was that the UK different borders multiple times before a final voices that advocate a greater involvement of has a very strong economic hand to play in the product or service is produced. This means that different parts of the UK in the negotiations.

THIRTEEN PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK 28 29 be the main loser in any resulting restructurings sides towards the longer-term relationship, and, because of the relative size of the two markets. crucially, an extended “implementation” phase And labour migration – particularly of highly skilled after Brexit in which little or nothing changes with workers – appears to have slowed. None of these respect to the UK’s economic relationship with spell imminent disaster, but all will damage the the EU27. This would maintain confidence and UK’s long-term growth prospects, very much as give firms time to adjust; any negative impacts predicted before the referendum. would be spread over a longer period and, at the same time, the UK could begin to pursue deeper Meanwhile, Brexit has precipitated significant economic relationships with non-EU countries. changes in the orientation of domestic economic This scenario would also help give the UK policy, with less emphasis on fiscal restraint or Government political space to make the necessary deregulation than in the Osborne-Cameron era; compromises needed to secure a successful indeed, the May government is arguably the least outcome. “liberal” in economic orientation for four decades. However, if negotiations stall, or worse, break Finally, the notion that Brexit will lead to an overall down entirely while the Article 50 clock keeps reduction in “red tape” now seems increasingly ticking, the risk is that there is a rapid erosion in absurd. Rather, increased bureaucracy and business and consumer confidence as fears of a Introduction months. The Bank of England cut interest rates government intervention appear likely. Even on “cliff-edge” or, still worse, a “chaotic” Brexit grow. in August and announced further quantitative an optimistic reading, business faces the prospect At its worst, this could spiral, with a succession The Remain campaign made the economic easing; this appears to have supported markets of being forced to implement new immigration of announcements of business relocations in consequences of Brexit the central element of and business confidence. Financial markets, in controls on EU workers, new workers’ rights, and a variety of sectors. This would also spill over their case. In this, they were supported by the the UK as globally, have been buoyant to the cope with customs checks at borders. into financial markets, with a further fall in the apparatus of government, the key international point where many fear they are overvalued. Most pound. Politically, there would again be feedback economic institutions, and the vast majority of importantly, growth and employment held up What happens next? loops, this time negative, given the Government’s academic economists. Most forecasters predicted well. Indeed, the main strengths (a remarkably domestic political weakness. From an economic that a Brexit vote would lead, in the short term, resilient labour market, strong consumer spending In the short term, the economy appears to be perspective, the last year may well prove to have to a sharp fall in the exchange rate; turbulence in and steady growth in the services sector) and gradually slowing. Growth fell to 0.2% in the been the calm before the storm. financial markets; and, over the subsequent few weaknesses (weak private and public investment, first quarter of 2017 (down from 0.7% in the months, to a significant slowdown in growth (with poor productivity growth and a very large current fourth quarter of 2015) and recent indicators By Jonathan Portes the Treasury predicting a mild recession). Credible account deficit) of the UK economy remained of consumer and business confidence have analyses of the long-term economic impact of largely as they were before the referendum. been weak. However, employment remains at Brexit foresaw a significant hit to Gross Domestic historically high levels and there is little evidence Product (GDP), although with considerable However, the poor record of short-term forecasts yet of a dramatic reversal. Unemployment may uncertainty over the precise magnitude of this concerning the impact of the Brexit vote tell us rise, although not rapidly. Once again, this is the impact. While some elements of this campaign almost nothing about longer-term predictions. central view; there are as always risks to both the may well have backfired – in particular, George Here, the indications – albeit tentative at this point upside and downside – with the latter perhaps Osborne’s “punishment budget”, widely regarded – are both gloomier and more consistent with the rather larger. The inconclusive result of the as political posturing rather than credible economic consensus. As expected, some financial election adds a further element of uncertainty in economics – most polls suggested that voters sector jobs and investment are being relocated the short term. expected Brexit to damage the UK economy. elsewhere in the EU. So far this is a trickle, but it seems likely to accelerate as the negotiations But what will be crucial over the next year is the What’s happened since the referendum? progress with little or no prospect of any early interaction between the economics of Brexit deal on continued market access. Companies and the politics of the negotiations. Under one In the short run, however, any damage was that rely on pan-European supply chains are scenario, the negotiations progress well, with a minimal. The pound did fall sharply, but stabilised making contingency plans to deal with border relatively early agreement on the broad terms and has recovered somewhat in the last few controls and/or trade barriers; the UK stands to of withdrawal, a constructive approach on both FOURTEEN PART FOUR: BREXIT AND THE ECONOMY 30 31 Faced with these trade-offs, Theresa May’s movement of labour. No trade agreement will offer government wants to prioritise sovereignty. The the same market access that membership of the Government hopes to end free movement of Single Market provides, particularly for financial labour and to remove the UK from the jurisdiction services, but the UK should seek to keep barriers to of the ECJ. Consequently, Prime Minister May services trade as low as possible. announced in January 2017 that the UK would leave both the Single Market and the Customs To secure a good deal with the EU, the UK must Union, and would seek a new free trade be patient and willing to compromise. Trade agreement with the EU. The Government also negotiations are lengthy, complex and often signalled it was willing to leave without a deal if contentious. There is little chance an ambitious a sufficiently attractive agreement could not be agreement can be reached before Brexit occurs in reached. This approach was driven primarily by March 2019, so the UK’s first objective should be the prime minister’s need to secure support from to negotiate a transition arrangement to govern voters who backed Brexit to take back control from UK-EU relations until a longer-term agreement is the EU. However, the Conservatives’ failure to win possible. To give adequate time for negotiations, a majority of seats in the general election means the transition arrangement should last until at the Government is now under pressure to appeal least 2022. And to avoid economic disruption, it to a broader coalition of voters by developing a should mimic the status quo as closely as possible. One year ago, the UK voted to leave the EU. European integration brings economic benefits Brexit plan that is less harmful to the economy. However, voters did not choose what would come by reducing barriers to trade and investment. Once longer-term negotiations begin, progress after Brexit. But, to reap these benefits, countries must Negotiating a free trade agreement will require the UK to make concessions. Possible give up unilateral control over some areas of concessions include making payments to the EU Options for “life after Brexit” economic policy. For example, harmonising If the UK does leave the Single Market and the budget, agreeing EU regulations will continue Customs Union, what type of free trade agreement to apply in some industries, and guaranteeing One option is to remain in the Single Market and product standards across the EU creates export opportunities for UK businesses because they should it aim for? The most basic agreement immigration rights for EU citizens offered a job in preserve the free movement of goods, services, would simply ban tariffs on UK-EU trade. But the UK. The UK has a weaker negotiating position capital and labour with the EU. Another is to do not have to satisfy different regulations in different markets. But, harmonisation is only economic analysis finds the largest potential than the EU, so even with these concessions it is negotiate a bespoke trade agreement with the costs of Brexit come not from the threat of tariffs, unlikely to achieve all its objectives. But refusing EU that keeps trade barriers as low as possible possible if all countries agree to adopt the same standards, which means giving up national but from higher non-tariff trade barriers due to to compromise will guarantee failure. Research while ending labour mobility and giving the UK the imposition of customs procedures and the estimates that leaving the EU without a deal could control of regulation. Similarly, the EU’s greater control over economic regulation. Finally, emergence of regulatory differences between the reduce UK income per capita by up to 10% in the Customs Union keeps trade costs low by allowing if no deal is reached, the UK and EU would trade UK and the EU. An ambitious free trade agreement worst-case scenario. goods to cross borders without facing customs under World Trade Organization (WTO) terms. needs to go beyond tariffs and take steps to This means the UK would have much the same controls. However, countries that belong to the keep these non-tariff barriers low. This means Where next? economic relations with the EU as with non-EU Customs Union cannot have independent trade finding creative ways to minimise border checks As Brexit approaches, the UK is facing more countries such as the US or Japan. It would lead to policies. and ensure that changes to UK regulation do challenges than opportunities. From an economic tariffs on goods trade and reduced market access not create new trade costs – a goal that conflicts perspective, the question is not whether Brexit for service exporters. The integration–sovereignty trade-off with the desire to reassert national control over will harm living standards, but how large the regulatory policy. As will become increasingly As it leaves the EU, the UK must choose whether cost will be. Following the general election, the Each of these alternatives was endorsed by apparent during the Brexit negotiations, giving up to prioritise maintaining economic integration Government needs to ask how much voters are different factions of the Leave campaign prior to control is the price countries pay to keep trade or asserting its sovereignty. This choice will have willing to pay to assert their sense of national the referendum. Asking voters what they prefer costs low. does not resolve the conundrum: opinion polls important economic consequences. Research identity. If leaving the Single Market is viewed as show support for maintaining the benefits of Single conducted with colleagues at the Centre for It is also important for the UK that any agreement too costly, the UK is headed in the wrong direction. Market membership. Yet polls also find support Economic Performance at the London School covers services industries. Close to half the UK’s for taking back control by restricting immigration of Economics found that the fall in UK living trade is in services, but most agreements do little to By Thomas Sampson and removing the UK from the jurisdiction of the standards caused by Brexit would be twice as reduce barriers to services trade. Even Switzerland European Court of Justice (ECJ) (though see the large if trade reverts to WTO terms than if the UK does not have a comprehensive services trade section on public opinion). stays in the Single Market. agreement with the EU, despite allowing free

FIFTEEN PART FOUR: BREXIT AND THE ECONOMY 32 33 close to the gross amount (after deducting the UK end of 2020, while continuing to receive its share rebate) the UK was expected to pay into the EU of EU funding for agricultural support, regional budget over the entire span of the 2014-20 MFF. development and research. This solution has the Unsurprisingly, messages from the UK side dismiss pragmatic advantage of enabling the Government these claims which, it has to be emphasised, to fulfil the promise to maintain funding until the no-one on, EU Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier’s end of 2020 to UK beneficiaries from these EU team has formally made. programmes. For the EU side, higher payments to Brussels or cuts in EU programmes would be An arguably rather vindictive proposal in an EU avoided for the 2014-20 MFF, although the issue briefing document published at the end of May will return with a vengeance when the next MFF 2017 suggests the UK may also be asked to pay for has to be negotiated, most probably while Brexit relocating EU agencies from the UK, such as the negotiations are heading towards a conclusion in European Banking Authority, as well as the salaries late 2018. Using Treasury projections, the net cost of teachers at the European Schools in Brussels. to UK taxpayers would be of the order of £18 billion Introduction because many EU programmes, principally for The Bank of England can, however, look forward (€22 billion) from April 2019 to the end of 2020. research and for EU regional policy, are multi- to recovering its paid-in capital from the European During the referendum campaign, the main annual in character. In both cases, the aim is to Central Bank. RAL would still be a problem because, under EU debate around public finances was about avoid piecemeal projects and to look instead for rules, claims for EU regional programmes are whether leaving the EU would release £350 coherent programmes delivering results greater If €100 billion is fanciful, as researchers from allowed up to three years beyond 2020; as would million a week to be spent on the NHS. Even on than the sum of the parts. It does, however, mean Bruegel imply, what is realistic? Despite a House the balance of assets and liabilities. The amount the most favourable assumptions, the claim – that contracts signed in one financial year will of Lords Committee’s verdict that there is no of RAL changes from year to year as projects are which influenced many voters – was repeatedly often not fall due for final payment until several legal obligation to pay, British ministers have completed and new multi-year commitments are shown to be exaggerated. There were also years later – known in EU circles as RAL, from the been careful not to rule out some payment, using contracted, but is typically in the range of €200- concerns that any downturn in the economy as French expression reste à liquider. language such as “obey our legal obligations” 300 billion. Whether the UK should be liable for a result of Brexit would reduce tax revenues in a [David Davis]. Even so, the UK is reluctant to a proportion of RAL is negotiable: the UK could way that could worsen the UK fiscal position. Against this backdrop, the departure of the UK countenance an early agreement, for fear of a argue there was already a stock of RAL from the (assuming April 2019), will be seven quarters negative public reaction. previous MFF and it should only be liable for a The EU’s finances are set in a seven-year before the end of the MFF. An immediate end share of the change in RAL, whereas the EU side Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), to British payments would leave a hole in the What sort of compromise could be envisaged? could insist the UK pay its share of the full stock. currently covering 2014-20 and formally enacted budget that would have to be filled by other Similar bargaining could be envisaged for EU in a 2013 Council Regulation. The MFF is a hard member states. For the likes of Germany or the As explained in an earlier paper, the main elements pension liabilities and assets. fought bargain, invariably agreed after much Netherlands, the additional payments would be of a financial settlement are not unduly complex. acrimony and brinkmanship. As with many EU manageable, but the political fallout would be They turn on: the extent to which the UK accepts Best guess? Around €30 billion. accords, the ministers concerned usually claim open to exploitation by anti-EU populists. Others, that it is bound by the commitments made for victory at home, while bemoaning in Brussels such as Greece, Italy, Spain or even France, already the full duration of the MFF, and not just up to the By Iain Begg how much they have conceded. The advantage struggling to consolidate their public finances, date of Brexit; the share of total commitments the of the seven-year deal is in allowing the would need to make cuts in other spending UK should bear; and on apportioning the assets annual budget to proceed relatively smoothly, programmes at a time when austerity is already and liabilities (notably pensions) of the EU. The EU precisely because the MFF is where all the big having damaging political effects. position is to use the total transferred by the UK from compromises are settled. 2014-18 as a proportion of the total transferred by What happens next? all member states. Extrapolating from the data for What has changed since the referendum? 2014-16, this would mean a ratio of around 12%. A financial settlement has been put forward as one The subsequent emergence of the “divorce bill” of three key areas on which the EU side wants to A neat answer might be to allow the 2014-20 rapidly became a new and potentially divisive see significant early progress. Reports suggest the MFF to play out as part of a broader transitional issue in the Brexit negotiations. It arises mainly demand from the EU could exceed €100 billion, deal, implying the UK continues to pay in until the

SIXTEEN PART FOUR: BREXIT AND THE ECONOMY 34 35 The economics of Brexit challenge remains – how to reverse the decades of economic stagnation that has changed the The White Paper on Brexit prioritises immigration political landscape of the UK? There are several controls and commits to leaving the Single policy proposals to address these challenges and Market and the Customs Union, while the prime many have broad political support. Hopefully, minister continues to reaffirm that “no deal is they will become a central issue in the next better than a bad deal.” There is near consensus election. among economists that the hard – or chaotic – form of Brexit that this implies would hurt the UK By Swati Dhingra economy. Although there was little immediate economic fallout from the Brexit vote, in the first quarter of this year UK economic growth was the slowest of any EU economy. The modest recovery in real wage that started in 2014 has been eroded by the higher price inflation from the depreciation of the pound since the Brexit vote. Young workers between the ages of 18 and 21 have seen the biggest declines in real weekly earnings, which for them have fallen by 16% since Introduction Brexit looks far less certain. The press, for its part, the global financial crisis in 2008. has never been more sceptical of this path. What form of relationship to have with the EU All this will put pressure on the government to after Brexit is the key economic policy issue facing One reason for this is that the seat share of MPs soften its approach, perhaps seeking an extension the UK. This election was meant to give the prime from pro-Remain Scotland in the Conservative of the 2-year trigger period or a quick transition minister a strong mandate for a “hard Brexit”. party has increased, which could soften the deal that maintains single market membership The Conservative Party and the DUP, whose government’s previous stance of “no deal is for an extended period. This would avoid the “cliff support will be necessary to allow Theresa May better than a bad deal”. Another reason is the edge” scenario of a no deal, which would mean to continue as prime minister, agree on the main way this general election result will change that the UK reverts to World Trade Organization elements of UK’s future economic relationship the public discourse on economic policy. Early (WTO) membership without a special deal with with the EU. They want to leave the Single Market estimates are that the turnout of young people the EU on the free movement of goods, services, and the Customs Union, and they don’t want to between 18 to 24 years increased from about people and investments. Were this to happen, be subject to the jurisdiction by the European 40% in 2015 to 70%. Young people tend to it is estimated it would reduce GDP in the UK by Court of Justice. Both, in this sense, support a be much more pro-Remain than older voters, about 3% per year due to higher trade barriers “hard” Brexit. Now that the DUP is supporting the so a hard Brexit would ignore the wishes of a with the EU. government, however, there are a couple of new newly mobilised electorate. In addition, the priorities for the Conservative Party, not least Remain-Leave divide seems to have been a We also have more to learn about how the deciding on replacements for the income support factor underlying which constituencies swung to Remain-Leave divide shifted party affiliations and that the EU provides to the farming sector, which and from the Conservative party in this general the role played by the very different approaches is important for Northern Ireland. election, with the Government performing to economic policy set out by each party. particularly badly in pro-Remain urban and Certainly, the rhetoric of a low-tax, Singapore- Softly, softly? southern constituencies (see the contribution style economy that many hard Brexiteers dream by John Curtice). The election results have of looks increasingly distant from the UK centre Broadly though, while both parties in the ruling undermined the plans of the Conservative party, of political gravity. In turbulent political times, coalition agree on the plan for Brexit, the which stood on the platform of a strong and future economic policy is hard to predict. inconclusive election result means that a hard stable leadership in the Brexit negotiations. The only certainty is that the real economic

SEVENTEEN PART FOUR: BREXIT AND THE ECONOMY 36 37 In contrast, many environmental groups are rural communities very anxious. They fear that the concerned that the loss of European support end of subsidies could have a devastating impact for environmental conservation endangers our on their livelihoods and on the industry as a countryside (see environment section). They are whole. In the short term, farmers may experience calling for political commitments to preserve and a reduction in farm incomes, but there are enhance incentives that provide public goods, those who maintain that the effects of Brexit on such as the maintenance of traditional landscapes, agricultural output and farmers’ incomes may not wildlife habitats for both plants and animals, and be as severe as expected, at least in the medium high-quality water, air and soil. UK consumer and long run. What will happen after 2022, groups have not, so far, articulated any concerns however, is not at all clear. about rising food prices or the potential threats to food quality and standards from freer trade There are major questions to be answered: with the rest of the world. The political bargaining between these interest groups has yet to begin, • Should farm subsidies continue? Introduction Since the referendum since no one is at all clear about what the future might bring. • Should farmers be supported on the basis of the The referendum campaigns made much of the While there have been reports that the majority public goods they provide beyond food – their UK’s payments to the EU and of how much the of farmers favoured Brexit, we have found no The future input to landscape management, biodiversity, UK Government could save if we left. There was, compelling evidence of this. On the one hand, it soil and water quality, and carbon storage? however, very little debate on the EU spending on is clear that CAP payments are currently a major There will clearly be major political debates agriculture, other than claims that we could, after part of the incomes earned from farming, leading about the need for continued taxpayer support • If so, should that be via public subsidy, private a Brexit vote, achieve the same ends much more to government commitments to maintain these for farmers and the role of the Government in investment or both? efficiently, and with substantially less regulation. payments. The Conservative manifesto pledges protecting our environment and ensuring the • Finally, what kind of agricultural governance is to continue these payments to the end of the safety and quality of our food supplies (including needed? EU spending on the Common Agricultural next parliament (2022). On the other hand, many the regulation of inputs such as hormone Policy (CAP) peaked in the mid-1980s at 73% in the industry believe that these payments are treatment of beef and genetically modified crops). While there is little doubt that UK agriculture of the total EU spend, declining to about 40% distorting land values and rents (and possibly will survive and could even prosper without CAP today. This followed major reforms of the other capital and input costs as well), thus making There are also concerns about: support, the transition may be painful and will policy to substantially reduce tariff protection it more difficult for farmers to enter the industry affect all farmers and related businesses in rural and distortion of international markets. and expand their businesses. Meanwhile, the i) Immigration: Parts of the agricultural and Britain. These reforms were fully supported by UK increasing tendency to make the farm payments food sectors (especially horticulture, livestock governments, which have been highly critical of conditional on “greening” measures (e.g. the processing and retailing) are heavily dependent by Carmen Hubbard, David Harvey the CAP since we joined the European Economic three-crop rule which requires farmers with on migrant labour from the EU. and Anne Liddon Community in 1973. The current annual more than 30 hectares of arable land to grow at payments to farmers (totalling £2.5bn per year least three crops) and the increase in red tape in ii) Trading relations: The sector is already nervous to the UK) are the remnants of the protectionist general irritates some farmers, who feel that a about the extent to which agricultural trade CAP. A further £0.8bn per year is spent in the UK British agricultural policy would be preferable. will be sacrificed to obtain preferential trade under the CAP for environmental conservation agreements with non-EU countries. Many of and rural development schemes. These The depreciation of sterling since the referendum these countries may regard access to the UK payments (£3.3bn per year) form the major part has helped our agricultural exporters and may food market as a valuable benefit to offset (90%) of the financial benefit to the UK of EU have boosted farm prices, encouraging some increased UK access to their industrial and membership, offset by the UK’s contribution to farmers to believe that they can survive Brexit. services markets. the rest of EU spending (which has also been Equally, however, a weaker pound has made subject to the controversial UK rebate from the imports more expensive and increased costs The uncertainty that surrounds the terms of EU). across the supply chain. negotiations with the EU have made farmers and

EIGHTEEN PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES 38 39 that information continues to be fully available in product standards that are likely to remain in the public domain. However, there seems to be place to enable UK firms to continue to trade little appetite in government for such legislation with the EU. However, whilst the Government or for a wide-ranging debate about the future has paid lip service to maintaining the EU’s of environmental governance. The 25-year plan environmental rules, its general state of readiness on the UK’s Natural Environment, first promised to cope with Brexit has been described as in 2015, is still to appear, although it remained a “worryingly complacent” by the House of Lords. manifesto commitment for the Conservative Party Their Lordships were particularly exercised by the in 2017. Government’s apparent unwillingness to engage with deeper questions, such as how rules will be What will happen? properly implemented and enforced outside the EU’s environmental governance structures. The There is a significant possibility that UK reduced capacity of DEFRA, coupled with the environmental policy will be weaker post Brexit. closure of the Department for Energy and Climate Take air quality. There is an ongoing legal action Change further suggests that environmental against the Government for its failure properly to policy innovation is likely to be rather limited. Introduction statute book via the Great Repeal Bill (see the implement EU laws on air quality. The activist legal For example, opinion polls show that the public section on the Great Repeal Bill) to prevent any group Client Earth has taken the Government to support the adoption of a Clean Air Act, but only The EU has had a profound impact on UK regulatory holes emerging when the UK leaves the Labour and the Green Party were committed to environmental policy. In the 1980s, the UK was EU. The Government claims that once outside the court over the issue. Outside the EU, such groups introduce one in their election manifestos. One derided as the “dirty man of Europe”. Today, it is a EU, individual policies will be reviewed and it will will have less leverage over the Government. possible outcome of Brexit, then, is increased global climate leader and has successfully exported be up to Parliament to decide which to remove, The Conservative 2017 manifesto has some party competition over environmental issues. its own pragmatic, evidence-informed style of amend or leave as they are. vague mentions of air quality but few concrete policy making to the EU level. Yet despite this, the commitments to implement the current plan or to Another outcome is increased mobilisation on environment barely featured as an issue during the However, it was acknowledged by Andrea maintain EU standards post Brexit. environmental issues by public campaigning EU referendum campaign. After sustained pressure Leadsom, former Secretary of State for the groups. For example, the Greener UK campaign from the large non-governmental organisations Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, that a third Brexit raises other, equally profound, questions has brought together environmental NGOs (NGOs), Prime Minister Cameron belatedly made of EU environmental policy cannot simply be about the governance of the UK environment. to campaign for new, post-Brexit national an environmental case for voting Remain, but Vote copied into UK law. In many cases, EU law makes For example, there is scope for much greater legislation that is more ambitious than current Leave steered clear of the issue. Consequently, reference to EU institutions (such as provisions fragmentation of UK environmental policy as the EU environmental protections. There is certainly even though the Department for Environment, for reporting to the European Commission environment is a fully devolved matter. Currently, scope in a post-Brexit world to develop policies Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) stood to be among on water quality). It remains unclear whether EU directives set a minimum level of protection that are more sensitive to local conditions, and the Ministries most heavily affected by a vote to the UK will develop alternative governance but member states – or devolved bodies – can set to build upon Britain’s reputation for leadership leave, the environment was one of the campaign’s arrangements and whether, in devolved areas such higher standards if they so choose. Thus, Scotland in key fields like climate change. Delivering these “Cinderella” issues, gaining limited public or media as the environment, these will be centralised or and Wales have more ambitious climate policies goals will, however, require ambition and vision. attention. devolved. than England. Post Brexit, different policies are more likely to emerge across the four nations of By Charlotte Burns, Viviane Gravey What has happened since the referendum? The House of Commons Environmental Audit the UK – unless, that is, an agreement is struck to and Andrew Jordan Committee (EAC) has also underlined the risk of establish minimum standards. Determining who Since the referendum, there has been a growing “zombie legislation”, alive on the statute book but decides those standards, and their level, will be realisation in the environment and business effectively dead for want of mechanisms to secure politically challenging. sectors that Brexit will have profound implications its updating and implementation, with possibly for environmental policies, including those on negative consequences for environmental quality. Brexit, therefore, has profound implications for agriculture, fisheries, climate and energy. The The EAC has called for a new Environmental environmental policy. The immediate outlook Government has committed to “cutting and Protection Act to ensure that the environment is suggests some policy continuity, not least because pasting” EU environmental rules into the UK adequately monitored, that policy is enforced and much environmental policy is underpinned by

NINETEEN PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES 40 41 arises between two pre-exit laws, one of which it comes to post-Brexit case law, the GRB will is EU-derived and the other not, then the EU- “not require domestic courts to consider CJEU’s derived law will continue to take precedence jurisprudence”. But it is likely to have “persuasive” over the other UK law. In other words, a degree effect (i.e. the judges will take it into account). of supremacy is preserved, albeit one that can be corrected by an Act of the UK Parliament. Correct

Convert The third and most controversial aspect of the GRB will be the powers to “correct” the UK statute The second aim of the GRB is to convert the whole book. These will take the form of “Henry VIII corpus of EU law into national law. In essence, the powers”. These are powers given to the executive GRB will take a snapshot of all EU law and ensure to amend UK primary and secondary law using it all becomes part of UK law on Brexit day. This is Statutory Instruments. The use of these powers why some refer to it at the “Great Cut and Paste is necessary to deliver Brexit in the two-year Bill”. timeframe (and so will have to be brought into force prior to Brexit day), but are controversial In fact, the reality is somewhat more complex. because Parliament does not have much chance Take Directives, for example. The UK has had to to scrutinise the legislation. These powers will be Introduction legal system for Brexit. It is not a vehicle for major implement Directives, usually within two years used to make technical changes to the law (e.g. policy changes (which will be delivered by other of their adoption. Some Directives have been removing references to EU law and institutions), The Brexit vote was about taking back control. pieces of legislation). The white paper makes implemented by an Act of Parliament, like the but they will also be used to deal with issues that It had been given up at UK level by the elegant clear that the intention of the GRB is to ensure a Equality Directives, which were implemented by arise during the negotiations. In other words, the but terse European Communities Act (ECA) “smooth and orderly Brexit that commands the the Equality Act 2010. They will be unaffected by Henry VIII powers in the GRB will be used to fix the 1972. This Act gave supremacy to EU law where confidence of all”. In other words, to reassure the GRB. Others, like the Working Time Directive, plane while it is still flying. Hold on to your hats. it conflicted with UK law (i.e. EU law took employers, workers and consumers that, as far as have been implemented through “Statutory precedence over UK law) and mandated British possible, the same laws and rules will apply the Instruments” (SIs) – secondary law in the UK – By Catherine Barnard judges to follow judgments of the Court of day after Brexit day as the day before. Specifically, using powers conferred on the executive (the Justice. Brexit requires this Act to be repealed. the GRB has three aims: government and the civil service) by provisions in This will be done by the Great Repeal Bill (GRB), the ECA. Once the ECA is repealed, all these SIs which will also make provision for the many • Repeal the ECA would disappear. However, the GRB will ensure thousands of technical changes that delivering they continue to have legal effect. Brexit will require. The GRB, in other words, aims • Convert EU law into national law to deliver at the domestic level the results of the Another type of EU law, Regulations, of which Article 50 negotiations in Brussels, as well as the • Correct UK law to deliver a functioning statute there are around 12,000, will also have to be changes to UK constitutional law needed to give book incorporated into UK law. This will largely be done effect to Brexit. Most lawyers accept that a Bill simply by referring to them in the GRB, rather than along the lines of the GRB is necessary, although Repeal copying and pasting them into it. Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the Labour party, has indicated that the Prime Minister’s plans to The first and most important aim of the GRB is The case law of the Court of Justice is also a key complete Brexit through a “Great Repeal Bill” were to repeal the ECA, thus making UK law, not EU part of EU law. The GRB will ensure that pre-Brexit “history” and would have to be dropped, without law, supreme. This part of the GRB will come case law will continue to be binding on the UK providing clarity as to what he would do instead. into force on the day the UK leaves the EU. The courts. It will have the same precedent status GRB will end the general supremacy of EU law: as decisions of the UK’s own Supreme Court. In The GRB has not yet been published. However, a “newer legislation [passed by Parliament post exceptional circumstances, the Supreme Court can white paper is available and what follows is taken Brexit] will take precedence over the EU-derived reverse those decisions. After Brexit, Parliament from that. It is primarily about preparing the UK law we have preserved”. But if, after exit, a conflict too will be able to reverse those decisions. When

TWENTY PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES 42 43 a “hard Brexit”. And this is despite the fact that resolution is an essential element of an Article it was, and is, far from clear that this position 50 deal. Alongside the “divorce bill”, the extent commanded a majority either in Parliament or in to which the UK Government is prepared to the country. While public opinion is broadly hostile compromise on this issue – which, for the EU, to free movement, it remains split on whether must involve some continued elements of or not free movement is an acceptable price to “European” law holding sway in the UK for an pay for preserving other aspects of Single Market extended period – will be a key signal of whether membership. an ultimate deal is possible.

Paradoxically, the clarity of this specific decision Assuming this is resolved, the focus of political has thrown almost every other element of the debate is likely to move back to the trade-off UK immigration system into doubt. Among between freedom of movement and the Single the fundamental questions on which the UK Market, which Theresa May thought she had Government (and the official opposition) currently resolved last October. Paradoxically, despite the does not have anything resembling a clear policy fact that both main parties committed in principle are: to ending freedom of movement, the inconclusive result of the election means that the government’s Introduction advantage of the Leave side on the immigration • When will free movement end? approach to Brexit is called into question. issue, the Remain campaign largely avoided the Labour’s stance – supporting both the end of • Should EU citizens continue to enjoy preferential If the UK’s vote to leave the EU was a vote for, or topic. free movement and the continued “benefits of status in the new system? more specifically against, anything, it was a vote the Single Market” – was both confused and against free movement of workers within the EU. Meanwhile, one issue that received little high- • Will the new system have preferential or special contradictory, but does not entirely preclude the Polling evidence showed that approximately 80% level political attention during the campaign was treatment for specific sectors (or indeed nations possibility of continued membership of the Single of those who thought that immigration was mostly the future of EU citizens resident in the UK, and or regions)? Market, perhaps with some modest amendments a force for good voted to Remain, while a similar of Britons elsewhere in the EU (see the section to the current free movement rules. More broadly, proportion of those who thought it was a force for on the latter); broadly, Vote Leave’s claims that • Will policy be set primarily with respect to the the election result also calls into question the ill voted to Leave. “nothing will change” for people in the situation economic needs of the UK or by reference to Conservative Party’s (uncosted) pledge to reduce was not challenged, except by legal experts. an arbitrary and largely discredited numerical immigration to the “tens of thousands”, which is The slogan, “Vote Leave, Take Control”, summed target? highly unpopular with business. up the entire Leave campaign. However, it was What has happened since the referendum? particularly effective with respect to immigration Meanwhile, one issue that has risen sharply up the Much will depend on economic developments. policy and border control, because it contained a A few lines in one speech – Theresa May’s speech agenda since the vote is the status of EU nationals Up until now, the debate about Brexit, free large element of truth. Free movement of workers to Conservative Party conference in October 2016 resident in the UK (and Brits living elsewhere movement and immigration has been against the is one of the foundational “four freedoms” of – set the parameters of the political debate not in the EU). It quickly became apparent that the background of a relatively robust economy and the EU. Consequently, the Remain campaign just on immigration but on Brexit more broadly. promises from Vote Leave that these groups had labour market, and high immigration. If, as seems found it extremely difficult to counter the simple By saying “we are not leaving the European Union nothing to worry about were either ignorant, plausible, the economy slows significantly, and net argument that the only way for the UK to “control” only to give up control over immigration again”, deceptive or both. Equally, the prime minister migration – particularly from the EU – falls sharply, immigration was to leave. she essentially decided, unilaterally, that Brexit claimed that this issue would be easily resolved then the trade-offs noted above will appear meant not only leaving the political structure once the EU27 set out their position. They have very different, and the political dynamics may Other claims made by the Leave campaign with of the EU, but also the Single Market, given the now done so but, before the election, were met change significantly, opening up space for a more respect to free movement – in particular, that EU EU’s insistence that there is no scope for “cherry- with a deafening silence from the UK side. economically liberal approach to immigration both migrants drove down wages, reduced employment picking” different elements of the Single Market. from within and outside the EU. prospects for British workers or were responsible What next? for reduced access to public services – were at So, the prime minister’s position on immigration By Jonathan Portes best exaggerated and often simply unsupported by has, up until now, been by far the most important In the short term, the most salient political issue the evidence. However, because of the perceived factor behind the UK’s current course towards is likely to be citizens’ rights, since an acceptable

TWENTY-ONE PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES 44 45 this foundational right of EU membership will also made more vulnerable as a consequence. If this have consequences for EU nationals making Britain transpires, proper planning will be necessary not their home. October 2016 saw the establishment merely in terms of the potential costs in relation of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Freedom to health and social care, but also with regard to of Movement, a forum emphasising the value of how the reintegration of these people into British freedom of movement to the British economy and society will be facilitated. Absent repatriation, British society, as well as the rights of EU citizens it is important that clarity is provided as soon living in Britain and Britons resident in other EU as possible as to what Britons living in other EU member states. member states will need to do to continue their residence. The general election has caused further disquiet among British overseas residents about the right These are just some of the questions we might to vote. The Government issued a white paper consider. Looking forward, it is important to in October 2016 outlining its plans to legislate to carefully attend to how Britain’s withdrawal from grant lifetime voting rights to individual British the EU variously impacts on Britons living and citizens who had previously been registered to working elsewhere in the EU. Introduction of large-scale repatriation. The inability to vote vote. However, this had not become policy before in a referendum that could have such profound By Michaela Benson Freedom of movement – the right to live, work and consequences for their daily lives reinvigorated the general election. access welfare arrangements in another European the question of overseas voting rights for British pensioners living abroad have also Union member state – is one of the founding British citizens, sparking political mobilisation principles of the EU. Freedom of movement and campaigning among Britons living abroad continued to make the headlines. While claims became a central theme for the Leave campaign. around a “vote for life”. On the other hand, about what their return might cost the NHS Playing to public concerns about high levels of Britain’s expatriates were depicted as a social continue to be made, concerns about what migration, they argued that stopping freedom of problem waiting to happen. The prospect that might happen to pensions paid abroad have also movement was critical to curbing these flows. elderly British pensioners currently living in other surfaced. Simply put, while current arrangements European countries might be forced to return allow for Britons living in the EU to receive pension An estimated 3 million European citizens are promoted concerns that Brexit might place further increases in line with inflation, withdrawal from resident in Great Britain, while the latest figures pressure on an already strained National Health the EU might entail the end of this reciprocal suggest that there are 1.2 million Britons living Service. arrangement. This could result in the freezing of elsewhere in the EU. The latter represent a pensions and hence a real-term reduction in the diverse population that includes those working, These headlines paint only a partial picture. The incomes these pensioners receive. studying and retiring abroad. Just as for their EU British populations living elsewhere in the EU are counterparts living in Britain, Brexit might bring a more diverse group than a focus on pensioners The lack of clarity about what Brexit might mean about a significant transformation in the lives of suggests. Similarly varied are the motivations for Britain also affects British populations abroad. these British migrants as their political rights and for their emigration. These include work, study This uncertainty is profound and is causing social and financial entitlements are renegotiated. and family reunion. Freedom of movement may significant unease. facilitate such migrations, but is not the only thing Britons abroad and the EU referendum that enables the migration and settlement of The future for Britons abroad individual migrants. In the run-up to the referendum, Britain’s The end of free movement will undoubtedly expatriates featured in two prominent ways. First, One year on… impact on who can migrate to, and who can in that those who had lived overseas for 15 years continue to live and work in EU member states. or more found themselves ineligible to vote. Freedom of movement does not unilaterally affect It is possible that one response to Brexit might Second, because of the potential consequences British populations living in Europe; the removal of be repatriation, particularly of those populations

TWENTY-TWO PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES 46 47 drop is partly due to 25,000 fewer Poles and other of whom were born in the UK and hold a British Eastern and Central Europeans coming to work in passport. Data from recent birth statistics show Britain, and an increase of 16,000 in those leaving. that almost 12% of children born in England and Uncertainty over their future legal status has also Wales in 2015 had at least one EU-born parent triggered a rise in the number of EU nationals and (the figure rose from 8.1% in 2009), pointing their family members applying to the Home Office to their potentially increasing demographic for permanent residence – five times higher than importance. last year – and British citizenship, which is up 35% in the past year. Detailed Home Office data on This is a growing but as yet understudied and naturalisation show that the surge in citizenship underreported segment of British society. In the applications is particularly noticeable among post-EU referendum context, in which the rhetoric the citizens of older EU member states, with an about curbing EU immigration has permeated increase in citizenships applications among Italian, political, media, and popular discourses, producing French, and German nationals in the most recent a stark “us and them” narrative, the question left period. In that same period, some of the largest unasked and unanswered is what the human and number of applications, however, came from emotional costs of this will be if, for a large section Polish nationals who, since 2010, have submitted of the British population, “us and them” are the Introduction evidence pointing to an increase in mental health applications for citizenship in large numbers. same. and anxiety disorders among EU residents. A Immigration was central to the EU referendum. In number of online and offline discussion fora have Forty years of EU membership By Nando Sigona and Laurence Lessard-Phillips particular, the principle of freedom of movement, emerged, offering legal advice and mutual support one of the pillars of the EU, became a key target of in the face of the everyday and bureaucratic The focus during the referendum on recent the Leave campaign. The promise to curb the flow challenges the referendum has created for EU arrivals, particularly from Eastern Europe, has of EU nationals into Britain proved particularly nationals, especially with regard to securing legal overshadowed recent and past immigration from effective in mobilising Leave voters. Far less status in the UK. To many of them, the referendum older EU member states and, more generally, attention was given to the impact of Brexit on over result, and the realisation that their position the fact that the UK has been a member of the three million EU citizens leaving in the UK and one in Britain was now both legally precarious and EU for 40 years. For example, while the inflow million Britons residing in the EU. The issue of their subject to the fluctuation of party politics, came as of Central and Eastern Europeans, whose levels legal status was put aside, and after a year it is still a profound shock. of immigration have been relatively high since unresolved. those countries entered the EU in 2004 and The options open to EU nationals vary primarily 2007 respectively, has received extensive media Attempts to get both sides to pledge support for according to the length of their stay in Britain. coverage, far less coverage was accorded to the a rapid resolution concerning the legal status of Many long term residents are applying for mobility of EU nationals from Germany, France, EU nationals living in Britain received cross party permanent residence and British citizenship. Spain and the other older member states. These support before the referendum but evaporated Others are contemplating leaving the UK, have made up an increasing share of EU migration soon after. To date, calls for a unilateral gesture especially those who, because of their age, to the UK in recent years; most recent estimates of good will from the prime minister towards EU working status, family arrangements, or length for 2016 show that 53% of the most recent nationals have fallen on deaf ears. However, there of stay, feel excluded from existing pathways to immigrants estimates from the EU come from are signs that the political landscape emerging secure their status. Others may be doing both, EU14 countries (member states joined in 2000s). from the 2017 general election may force the securing their legal position in Britain, while Government to soften its position. considering options elsewhere in Europe. Besides, this attention on latest arrival has also obscured an inconvenient truth. Throughout A year of uncertainty According to the Office for National Statistics’ four decades of EU membership, there has been latest quarterly release of provisional long-term intermingling of people which can be most clearly A year of uncertainty over their right to remain in international migration estimates, net migration seen in the growing number of mixed-nationality Britain is taking its toll on EU nationals, with some is at its lowest level for nearly three years. The EU families in the UK and their offspring, many

TWENTY-THREE PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES 48 49 means to finance them. Northern Ireland, Wales What happens next? and Scotland should then be recognised as being able to determine their own policies over devolved What that means in constitutional terms, and areas, including fisheries, agriculture, and the its significance for the long-term future of the environment. The Supreme Court in the Article UK, remains to be seen. Pre-election, the Great 50 Miller case agreed, saying that “removal of EU Repeal Bill was set to start its legislative journey constraints on withdrawal from the EU Treaties through the Houses of Parliament before the will alter the competence of devolved institutions summer recess. Whilst this is still expected, the unless new legislative constraints are introduced. Government’s plans for the devolved nations In the absence of such new restraints, withdrawal may come up against opposition there. Yet the from the EU will enhance devolved competence”. opportunities for the devolved parliaments and Introduction Whilst the UK has been part of the EU, the governments to feed into this law-making process powers held by the devolved nations have But for the UK Government, such new legislative are very limited, despite the critical significance it During the EU referendum campaign, much was been exercised within the limits of EU law. They constraints are required. Powers in devolved will have for them and their powers. This reflects made of the UK “taking back control” of law- have implemented certain EU laws themselves policy areas will not flow directly to the devolved the lack of experience of “shared” rule making making powers from Brussels, and the issue (resulting in some difference across the UK in legislatures, but will come back to Westminster. amongst the different levels of government in the certainly resonated with many voters. Being part the rules on eligibility for agricultural payments, As a first step, as foreseen in the Great Repeal Bill UK. Opposition from the devolved parliaments of the EU has meant that a lot of the UK’s laws for example), as well as ensuring that their own White Paper, the legal frameworks set at an EU can be signalled through their refusal to grant Legislative Consent Motions. By convention, originate in Brussels. EU law making involves policies comply with the demands of EU law. level, within which the UK and its devolved nations these are required when Westminster legislates EU-wide standard-setting in areas as diverse as So, for example, Scotland’s plans for minimum currently operate, will be retained. This is in the banking regulation, agriculture, the environment, on devolved matters or to change the scope of alcohol pricing ran into trouble with the EU’s interests of legal certainty, and to ensure there is consumer protection and employment rights. With devolved powers. According to the Supreme internal market laws, constraining the Scottish legal continuity after Brexit, with no black holes the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, these powers Court in the Miller case, however, this convention Government’s actions. As the head of the Scottish emerging. Subsequently, and following “intensive will be repatriated to the UK. How much flexibility Vote Leave campaign announced ahead of the is not legally enforceable, operating only as a discussions” with the devolved nations, further the UK will, in fact, have to set its own laws after referendum, Brexit would lift these restrictions political constraint. Any resulting constitutional decisions may be taken on determining where this remains to be seen, and much will depend on and lead to Scotland gaining “major new powers”. clash over powers may provoke further moves UK-wide approaches are needed, and where the terms of our existing and future international Devolution, according to this argument, would be towards independence in Scotland. In Wales, powers may lie at a devolved level, including the agreements. enhanced as EU-derived constraints in policy areas the Government has called for a constitutional local government level. It is expected that some devolved under the Scotland Act, Government of convention and a redefinition of the UK machinery common frameworks will emerge on agriculture, But there is another aspect of this repatriation Wales Act and the Northern Ireland Act fall away. along more federal lines, creating a new system of powers that is causing constitutional environment, fisheries and regional policy – for making common policies. In any case, the areas that are devolved, but which have been headaches. Brexit may mean taking back What has happened since the referendum? UK Government will be going into the Brexit control over law making – but where is this subject to EU law. The UK Government argues negotiations with disunity at home, which may control being taken back to? The UK has now How much salience this devolution argument that this approach is necessary to ensure there ultimately prove more than an unwelcome experienced nearly 20 years of devolution. had with voters in the referendum is unknown. is no disruption to the UK’s own internal market distraction. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their However, we do now know that the suggestion – on the basis that divergences in law create own governments and parliaments, and have made by some campaigners that Brexit would lead unnecessary and costly obstacles to cross-UK By Jo Hunt primary policy responsibility for areas including to an expansion in the powers of the devolved trade. Additionally, it is said to be needed in order health, education, environmental protection nations is proving constitutionally controversial. for the Government to undertake international and agricultural policy. Block grants from the For the governments of the devolved nations, trade negotiations, with these powers falling to Treasury to the devolved administrations have the matter though is straightforward. The current London to exercise for the UK as a whole. For been supplemented by important EU funding devolution settlements must be respected, and the devolved nations, however, this approach is streams, especially significant for the devolved powers over those areas which are devolved tantamount to a power grab that undermines the nations’ agricultural sectors, as well as for their that come back from Brussels must go to Belfast, existing devolution settlement and for which their universities. Cardiff and Edinburgh, along with appropriate support is certainly not guaranteed.

TWENTY-FOUR PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES 50 51 used by Prime Minister May in her Conservative relationship (subsequently agreed at the July 2016 Party conference speech in October 2016, is Warsaw Summit). intended to signify a “reboot” of UK foreign policy – actively promoting free trade and cooperating As indicative of the diminished influence of the closely with allies to build a safe and just world. UK prior to completing the formalities of Brexit, How these priorities will differ from existing some member states have already made proposals commitments is still unclear. for deepening EU defence collaboration in a direction that the UK has resisted. The French Overseas visits and major international summits and German governments have jointly proposed since the referendum offer little indication a series of measures that include a permanent of major shifts in priorities beyond stressing military headquarters for EU missions, and the the importance of new export opportunities. creation of a common budget for military research Further, the election of President Trump, and and joint procurement to be run through the the UK government’s desire to seek a close European Defence Agency (an institution that relationship with his administration, have attracted the UK has resisted giving a substantive budget unfavourable comparisons with the more critical or a major role in defence procurement). Finally, stance of other European governments (notably they have advocated reinforcing existing military Chancellor Merkel and President Macron). The formations, such as the EU’s Battlegroups, using Introduction The Brussels bombings of March 2016 gave UK has given the impression of downplaying EU treaty provisions that allow for smaller groups different security issues greater prominence. President Trump’s ambiguous stance on matters of of member states to undertake deeper defence Discussion of foreign and defence policy was It focused attention on the issue of border and key importance to the UK, such as the stability of collaboration. largely conducted in terms of generalities during “homeland” security, and whether the UK’s NATO and global free trade. the EU referendum campaign. Key themes were security is enhanced, or compromised, through its These ideas have given energy to the ambitions of the EU’s historic role in bringing peace to the membership of the EU. This issue gained renewed What might happen? the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and European continent, and claims that it was on the attention more recently following the terrorist Security Policy for boosting the EU’s capabilities. road to creating a “European army”. attacks at Westminster, Manchester and London The relatively underdeveloped nature of the EU’s They have also given impetus to the European Bridge. foreign and security policy means that Brexit will Commission to earmark part of the EU budget for Remain campaigners argued that the prosperity have less obvious impacts for the UK than in other spending on defence research supported by all created as a consequence of EU membership was What has happened since the referendum? policy areas. The UK has not integrated its military member states. integral to national security. Brexit, they argued, capabilities or its diplomatic infrastructure with would undermine both UK and EU security The future of the EU-UK foreign and security the EU and, consequently, detachment post-Brexit Proposals for greater EU defence integration and stability. These claims were echoed by key relationship has been the subject of relatively does not require major institutional reform. have largely failed in the last two decades, partly international figures, including President Obama little public debate since the referendum. This is because these have been resisted by the UK. and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. partly because none of the alternative models However, the UK will lose its participation and the Brexit, in combination with a US administration for a future trading relationship come with a capacity to directly influence EU foreign policy that appears less committed to European security, Brexit campaigners, in contrast, made the predefined model for foreign and security policy making processes. Further, it will have diminished has given impetus to EU security developments argument that Brexit would provide the UK with cooperation. In addition, foreign policy, and influence on the direction of development of the that the UK is now in less of a position to greater freedom to fully utilise its diplomatic, especially security policy, are areas in which Mrs EU’s nascent defence policy as a non-member. influence. As a non-member, the UK faces the military and “soft power” capabilities, and hence May’s government has indicated that it wants to The referendum has already had a direct effect on prospect of being a bystander to decisions on the achieve enhanced international influence. They maintain close cooperation with the EU. The Brexit the behaviour of the EU’s other member states. future of European defence that directly impact also sought to downplay the EU’s contribution to White Paper and speeches by the prime minister It coincided with the publication of the new EU on the UK’s national security but over which it has security, insisting that NATO and the United States, have repeatedly stressed a desire for a close EU- Global Strategy (EUGS) that sets out how the EU minimal influence. not the EU, have kept the peace in Europe since UK security partnership. intends to broaden and deepen its role in global World War II. These campaigners also emphasised politics. One aspect of the EUGS was to further By Richard G Whitman the dangers inherent in supposed EU moves to The Government has also promoted the idea that develop the EU’s role in the security and defence create a “Euro army” in place of national armed Brexit gives the UK an opportunity to reshape its fields. UK support for the EUGS was predicated, forces. place in the world. “Global Britain”, a slogan first in part, on its ambition to deepen the EU-NATO TWENTY-FIVE PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES 52 53 What has happened since the referendum What might happen in the years to come?

Only one of the issues triggered by the referendum A hard Brexit, and particularly a no deal outcome, has been resolved, on a temporary basis. The UK constitute serious threats to the national viability government has ruled that in 2017-18 EU citizen and global competitiveness of UK universities. students can enter British universities on the same Under these scenarios, access to the bulk of basis as UK students, as before the referendum. European research funding will be lost, and it is EU students will continue to pay a £9,000 per highly unlikely that UK universities and science annum fee for full-time courses, supported by could be adequately compensated in the long income contingent loans payable after graduation. run. It is not just a matter of money, there is also However, the position for students entering in the lost access to networks of shared expertise. 2018-2019 is unclear, and it seems almost certain Any reduction in the national science base also that after Brexit EU students will pay fees on the narrows the scope for industry innovation. same basis as non-EU international students—that is, they will pay up-front fees in the year of study The end of direct EU access rights will trigger a without the benefit of the income contingent loans. new skilled migration scheme in UK, with incomers Those fees, determined by the universities, will from all countries handled on an equivalent basis. range from £12,000 per year to £20,000 and more. The outcome here is ambiguous. A scheme that favoured high skill researchers and educators Introduction This immersion in Europe is equally striking in The future UK residency and contribution of could maintain much of the present entry from relation to people mobility. In 2015-16, 127,440 all non-UK Europeans has been fundamentally Europe while enlarging the scope for entry from Britain’s relationship with the EU has been a EU students enrolled in UK higher education, placed in doubt by the referendum. The February other parts of the world. However, if large scale fruitful one when it comes to higher education. By 5.6% of all students. Non-UK EU countries made a 2017 White Paper on Brexit indicated that the cuts in international student numbers go ahead operating within a larger European network, UK larger contribution to staffing. In 2015-16, 31,635 Government wants to “secure the status of as planned, this would narrow the flow of talent universities have become increasingly competitive EU staff worked at higher education institutions EU citizens already living in the UK” but there from one source (international student graduates) in world terms. The UK attracts the second in the UK, 16% of the workforce. The figures are has been no resolution of this. A Times Higher while discouraging talent from another (academic largest number of international students and, by higher in the research-intensive sector, including Education poll of academics in March 2017 found staff from Europe and elsewhere). Much in higher most counts, has the second strongest research 37% of academic staff at LSE and more than one in that 53% of non-UK nationals were “actively education depends on whether in the fraught system in the world after the United States. The four in Oxford, Cambridge and University College looking to leave the UK” and 88% said that climate of Brexit the government and the country UK accounts for 3.2% of global research and London. In the last half decade, more than 40% of Brexit has made them more likely to do so in the can maintain the UK, especially its universities, as development expenditure but 9.5% of scientific new academic staff appointed on merit to Russell medium-term to long-term. This is a crucial issue, meritocratic, internationally engaged, and above papers downloaded, 11.6% of citations, and 15.9% Group universities were from the EU. and the longer it is unresolved the worse will be all, open. of the most highly-cited articles. Shared European the long-term effects. ideas, resources and talent play a key role in this In the referendum campaign, the argument in By Simon Marginson remarkable global performance. relation to higher education was straightforward. The Treasury has undertaken to compensate Universities UK and other sector bodies, and universities for any early loss of research funding The UK’s research strength rests partly on its individual Vice-Chancellors, argued vigorously under Horizon 2020 and other European leading role in EU projects, which provide access for Remain, though the issue never achieved schemes. The government includes continued to collaborators across the continent. From 2007 much public prominence and entered the official UK membership of European research schemes to 2013, the UK contributed €5.4 billion to the Remain campaign only marginally, in relation as an objective in Brexit negotiations. While the EU for research, development and innovation, to research. The Leave case accepted the need importance of European research links for UK while receiving €8.8 billion in research grants. Of for the UK Government to compensate science science is clearly understood, perhaps more so this, €6.9 billion was from the UK’s Framework research funding, but ignored the extent to which than the importance of retaining EU staff, it is not 7 Programme, in which UK universities were the free movement within the EU benefitted higher generally realised that the two areas are partly most successful recipients with a 71% share of education and research. University towns voted interdependent. Further, research is a second projects. strongly for Remain, as did staff and students. order public issue at this stage.

TWENTY-SIX PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES 54 55 The EU27 were quick to adopt a common position. a bad deal”), and the unwillingness of the prime As well as calling on the UK Government to notify minister to outline the UK’s objectives, has led to the European Council of its intention to withdraw voluble criticism that is unusual among allies. Most from the EU as quickly as possible, the leaders of notably, in the wake of European Commission the EU27 underlined their commitment to the EU President Juncker’s infamous dinner at Number 10, and agreed three principles for the conduct of the Chancellor Merkel warned the UK about harbouring Brexit negotiations: “illusions” about the outcome it would achieve from the negotiations. In addition, Ireland, which will be • that negotiations should not begin with the UK more affected than any member state by Brexit, until after London had triggered Article 50; fears its concerns have not been taken seriously • that the UK would need to accept obligations, in London, and has sought to ensure that its notably concerning EU citizens resident in the circumstances are understood in other EU capitals. UK, as well as rights vis-à-vis the EU; One year on • that the UK could not expect access to Europe’s Single Market unless it accepted the four Since June 2016, the sentiment in the capitals of the freedoms of movement of goods, capital, EU27 has moved from disappointment and disbelief Introduction Germany; for Germany, it has played the same role services and workers. to impatience. While there is still regret about the in relation to France. The UK’s relationship with outcome of the referendum, as well as a hope that Despite the UK’s well-earned reputation as an Ireland is especially intimate. As well as a common Subsequently, the EU27 have maintained their the UK will one day return, member governments “awkward partner”, none of the member states border, the two countries share close historical, collective position. Although prepared to commit are irritated about the length of time it took London wanted to see it leave the EU. They have been cultural and economic ties. themselves to a constructive bilateral relationship first to trigger Article 50 and then to commence perennially puzzled by the UK’s domestic debate in the post-Brexit era, they have refused to enter negotiations. The UK’s partners have also been about “Europe”, especially given London’s For these reasons, member governments any discussions that might pre-empt the Article 50 unimpressed by UK diplomacy since 23 June 2016. success in getting its way in successive treaty responded positively, if warily, to Prime Minister negotiations, particularly regarding future trade negotiations, as well as in day-to-day policy David Cameron’s demand in 2015 for a new relations. At the same time, they have emphasised On the eve of negotiations, the UK’s objectives making. More recently, they have been frustrated bargain for Britain, even if the UK took time to that, while the aim is not to punish the UK, the remain largely unknown. There is concern that by the UK’s lack of solidarity over the eurozone specify what it wanted. Yet, although they were negotiations will be hard, and the UK cannot London entertains unrealistic expectations, and and migration crises. Still, the member states willing to do a deal to keep the UK inside the EU, expect to retain the advantages conferred by EU anxiety that the UK will stage a walk out. To make recognised the value of the UK’s membership they were not prepared to compromise the EU’s membership. matters worse, a snap election that was called and the assets it brought as a major European fundamental principles, especially the freedom of to deliver a stronger personal mandate for the economy, with strong security and defence Any hope in other EU capitals that the UK would movement of workers. prime minister has delivered a hung parliament, capabilities, a seat on the UN Security Council, change its mind about Brexit quickly receded. introducing still further uncertainty and diminishing and global trading links. They also admired the Indeed, the tone of UK rhetoric – notably in the prospects of a conclusion of business within Post-referendum professionalism with which the UK argued its case the speeches made by Theresa May and Home the two years foreseen by Article 50. in Brussels, as well as the pragmatic approach it Secretary Amber Rudd at the 2016 Conservative The results of the EU referendum were greeted brought to the table. Party conference, which appeared to threaten the Having committed themselves to a future within with disappointment across the national capitals rights of EU citizens in the UK, Michael Howard’s the EU, the UK’s EU partners have held firm, of the EU. “We regret this decision but respect it”, Moreover, for some member states, the UK was comments about going to war to defend Gibraltar, resisting all attempts by London to “divide and said President Tusk, President Juncker, President an important ally. It is firmly rooted in the liberal as well as Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson’s conquer”. From the Netherlands Prime Minister economic camp alongside Denmark, Finland, Schulz and the Netherlands Prime Minister repeated references to World War II and the Nazi Mark Rutte to French President Emmanuel Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the Rutte in their joint statement the day after the regime, to cite but a few – provoked dismay and Macron, Europe’s leaders have underlined that, Baltic states. It was respected by the countries referendum. At the same time, agitated by the bewilderment among the UK’s partners. while they are disappointed at the UK’s decision, of Central and Eastern Europe for championing UK’s repeated claim that “they depend more on they respect it. However, they also warn that the enlargement, as well as for deciding not to restrict us than we do on them”, national leaders have Moreover, alarm about London’s expectations forthcoming negotiations will be tough. migration upon their accession to the EU in 2004. cautioned that, although Brexit will hurt the EU, (“having our cake and eating it”), its threat to walk For France, the UK has been a counterweight to the UK will suffer even greater harm. away from negotiations (“no deal is better than By Hussein Kassim TWENTY-SEVEN PART SIX: BREXIT AND THE EU 56 57 Second, and linked to this, the UK will not get Meanwhile, the European Parliament was able special treatment. The renegotiation text itself to influence the formulation of the negotiating applied to all member states, with the sole mandates. Its role under its “lead negotiator” Guy exception for the UK being a confirmation that Verhofstadt might be best thought of as that of it already met the threshold to limit benefits. a (not very) bad cop alongside the Commission, Likewise, the EU has a process for departure, and promising to veto any agreement that does not a process for establishing third-country relations, secure citizens’ rights. Close coordination between both of which will be used to establish a new the EU institutions will also limit the UK’s ability to relationship with the UK. play them off against each other, something that might potentially have complicated ratification of Thirdly, the insistence on Article 50 places the EU the deal. in a strong negotiating position. The dynamic of the negotiations will be one of the EU making an The unity of the institutions will be severely offer to the UK, rather than vice versa. We have tested in the rest of 2017, as one of the main already seen this with the publication of detailed principles of the mandate is challenged by the EU negotiating guidelines. While the EU is free to UK, namely sequencing. While the mandate does make whatever offer it wishes to the UK, the UK have some flexibility, it essentially assumes that will be limited to working around that agenda, liabilities of membership – including finances – Introduction fire. Either the vote would be won – in which case responding rather than defining. must be resolved before any discussion of the the new settlement would come into effect and new relationship. Given the politically toxic nature The EU depends on its member states for its normal service would resume, or lost – in which This imbalance of power partly explains the of the money question for the UK Government, legal, financial and political existence and so is case contingency plans would kick in. long delay between the referendum and the it is understandable that it would prefer to usually willing to try to accommodate their “local notification that the UK wanted to trigger Article bundle everything up together, if only to distract difficulties”. In the UK’s case, this meant Jean- Post referendum 50. As long as the British Government did not attention. As ever, the EU is sympathetic to this – Claude Juncker (President of the Commission) and trigger the procedure, there was no time pressure, hence its clear focus on principles for calculating especially Donald Tusk (President of the European The outline of these plans was always clear before and an opportunity to try and influence the liabilities, rather than using actual figures – but Council) trying to find an accommodation in the referendum itself, but was expanded upon content and direction of negotiations. However, its need to cover the gaps in financing for other the renegotiation that would allow Cameron very quickly afterwards, notably in the statements in the absence of any coherent British policy on member states suggest that it will stand its ground to take back something valuable in the coming on 24 and 28 June from EU leaders. how to approach the negotiations, and in the face on this issue. referendum campaign, but also respecting the of evident determination on the part of the EU interests of other members. In essence, the EU’s position was, and continues to institutions to avoid any pre-notification talks, this Whether the EU institutions will be willing or able be, that if the UK wants to leave the organisation, opportunity ultimately came to nothing. to maintain their positions through to the end of From the EU perspective, the resultant “new then it should do so, following the procedure Article 50 remains to be seen; given developments settlement” was a sincere effort to give Cameron established for just such an eventuality: the One year on to date, it looks much more likely that it will be a leg-up, albeit one pointedly draped in language infamous Article 50. the UK that has to cleave to the EU, rather than that reminded everyone that the treaties already As the UK begins substantive negotiations, it faces the other way around. Indeed, the unity of the allowed for much more flexibility than public While it is simple to state the Union’s view, it an EU with a very well-developed organisational EU has an intrinsic value as a symbol of European debate seemed to suppose. However, the carries with it a number of key consequences. structure and a negotiating position that enjoys a cooperation that will make it that much harder to overblown rhetoric that Cameron had taken into high level of buy-in from all sides. compromise or shift its position. the renegotiation meant that any advantage he First, it fits with the EU’s tradition of trying to might have gained was lost in the howls of the balance local needs with common interests. If the Importantly, any potential for conflict between By Simon Usherwood British press about being short-changed. renegotiation was not enough to convince the the European Council, Commission and European British public, then their views must be respected. Parliament was addressed early on. European Unsurprising as this was, it confirmed the dominant However, this implies respecting the views of Council President Donald Tusk quickly took the view in Brussels that the best subsequent course other member states that were not willing to offer lead as the main contact point at the level of heads of action was to maintain a very low profile, as any further concessions to the UK: hence, no post- of government, while the Commission built a intervention in the referendum was likely to back- referendum renegotiations. dedicated negotiating team around Michel Barnier. TWENTY-EIGHT PART SIX: BREXIT AND THE EU 58 59 Credits for front cover photographs and for images used in the running header on odd numbered pages: (in alphabetical order)

Bank of England Centre for American Progress Chatham House Creative Commons Diamond Geezer European Union 2016 Fernando Butcher Foreign and Commonwealth Office Georgina Coupe Jay Allen Kenny Halley Liberal Democrats Parliament / Jessica Taylor Policy Exchange Scottish National Party / Creative Commons Speed Property Buyers Steve Punter Steven Woolfe Three Fish Sleeping Tom Evans

Photograph of Theresa May on page 16:

Tom Evans, Source: Creative Commons

Photograph on page 34:

Bank of England

All other images: istockMAX.co.uk

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