Department of Agriculture

SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3

Improving the Firefighter Entrapment Wildland Fire Fatalities Survivability System and more ... Fire Management Today is published by the Forest Service, an agency in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC. The purpose of Fire Management Today is to share information related to wildland fire management for the benefit of the wildland fire community. No longer appearing in print, Fire Management Today is available onine at www.fs.fed.us/managing-land/fire/fire-management-today.

Victoria Christiansen, Chief Shawna A. Legarza, Psy.D., Director Forest Service Fire and Aviation Management

Kaari Carpenter, General Manager • Hutch Brown, Editor

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SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3

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www.fs.fed.us #forestservice On the Cover:

First detected in August 2017, the Tappan Fire was managed by the Forest Service to return the natural ecological role of fire to landscapes in a wilderness area on the Salmon–Challis Natonal Forest in Idaho. Responders traveled to the remote area on horseback to monitor the fire. Photo: USDA.

SEPTEMBER 2019 IN THIS VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Firefighter ISSUE and public Anchor Point: Back to the Basics Using Unplanned Ignitions: Shawna A. Legarza, Psy.D...... 4 Evolution of Forest Service Policy safety is our Hutch Brown ...... 37 Opportunities To Improve the Wildland Fire first priority. System The 1994 Guide Fire: A Tragedy Revisited Victoria Christiansen...... 5 Hutch Brown ...... 43 The USDA Forest Service’s Fire Fuels Management Bibliography: Another Fuel Breaks Work in Colorado and Aviation Management Staff Erratum Holly Krake ...... 46 has adopted a logo reflecting three M.E. Alexander...... 10 central principles of wildland fire Run Halted by Proactive management: Wildland Firefighter Fatalities: Pivotal Fuels Treatments Meeting of Wildland Fire Leaders Holly Krake ...... 48 z Innovation: We will respect and Tom Harbour...... 11 value thinking minds, voices, Technology Use on Wildfire: Case Study and thoughts of those that Assessing Wildland Firefighter Entrapment on the challenge the status quo while Survivability Donavan Albert ...... 50 focusing on the greater good. Wesley G. Page and Bret W. Butler . .16 z Execution: We will do what Texas A&M Forest Service: Building we say we will do. Achieving Capacity at Local Fire Departments Improving Safety Outcomes at the USDA program objectives, improving Jason Keiningham ...... 52 Forest Service: 1994–2018 diversity, and accomplishing Hutch Brown ...... 20 The Huey on the Hill targets are essential to our credibility. Emotional and Social Intelligence Randall C. Thomas ...... 55 Competencies in Incident Command z Discipline: What we do, we A.E. Black, R.E. Boyatzis, K. Thiel, This Day in History: Cramer Fire, 22 July will do well. Fiscal, managerial, and K. Rochford...... 28 2003 and operational discipline are at 6 Minutes for Safety ...... 57 the core of our ability to fulfill Managing Unplanned Ignitions: our mission. Staff Ride for Leadership Training My Great Encounter With the Aviator Lincoln Bramwell, Anne Buckelew, Mike Randall C. Thomas ...... 59 Elson, Cavan Fitzsimmons, Jada Jackson, Kevin Khung, Erica Nevins, and Ellen Shaw. . . . . 32

GUIDELINES for Contributors Fire Management Today 3 ANCHOR POINT

1994, the South took more lives. Once again, I asked myself: How could this happen?

Back to As my career advanced, I started to more fully understand what safety meant. I the Basics learned that understanding safety means understanding the , the uring my 1989 rookie school for basics of wildland —fuels, wildland , we were weather, and topography. It meant that, required to memorize the 10 when scouting line, you always looked DStandard Fire Orders and the 18 Watch back where you came from, having one Out Situations. We chanted them loudly foot in the black and eyes forward on during our physical training sessions indirect attack. It meant feeling the pine and we quizzed each other constantly. If needles or caribou moss to understand we missed a word, we did pushups. We By Shawna A. Legarza, Psy.D. the fuel moistures. It meant learning Director, Fire about the weather and the power of struggled to understand them; instead, and Aviation Management Mother Nature. It meant “lick and go,” we memorized the words. We put Forest Service stickers on our helmets and on the backs runny noses and watery eyes, and loud of our radios. cracks from snags falling. It meant always Understanding safety knowing our escape route. It meant We also really tried to understand the finding a safety zone when there were no somewhat mysterious intent behind each was as complex then safety zones. It meant listening to those statement. For instance, take “Fight fire as it is today. little voices in your head proclaiming the aggressively, having provided for safety right thing to do. If it was safe, we did it; first.” For me as a young 18-year-old if it wasn’t, we didn’t. firefighter, that was a difficult statement days, I thought safety meant survival— Now, when I think about safety as to understand. Was I to be aggressive not getting caught in a bad situation. So the Forest Service’s National Fire and in order to be safe … or be safe in order to mitigate my lack of understanding, I Aviation Director, I think about the to be aggressive? And despite my inner did what my boss told me and didn’t ask challenges of working in the wildland– turmoil, fire order 6 told me this: “Be many questions. Understanding safety urban interface, excessive fuel loading, alert. Keep calm. Think clearly. Act was as complex then as it is today. decisively.” What a confused kid I was! extreme weather events, fatigue, stress management, emotional intelligence, In 1990, my second year in fire, the improving the wildfire system, enhanced Upon reflecting on my experiences, I Dude Fire occurred. It was a fatality training and decision making, and remember different levels of leadership fire in which six inmate crew members taking care of our people. and learning as I tried to understand the perished. It was puzzling for me and, meaning behind the word “safety”—to I imagine, for others. I wondered how The wildland fire system is complex. do no harm. To be frankly honest, when something so awful could happen. Please help me ensure that all wildland I was 18 years old working on a fire After this fire, Paul Gleason developed firefighters understand the basics of engine, I really didn’t understand the “LCES” (Lookouts, Communication, how the 10 and 18 and LCES tie to the concept behind fireline safety. In those Escape Routes, Safety Zones). Then, in challenges faced today. ■

Fire Management Today 4 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Our Nation has over a billion “burnable” acres of vegetated landscapes, most of them naturally adapted to periodic wildland fire.

social, political, financial, and cultural factors all drive outcomes in the wildland fire environment (fig. 1). With pieces connected to civil Opportunities society, responders, communities, and landscapes, our wildland fire system is extremely complex. To Improve the So is our operating environment. For one thing, forces are at play over which we have little or no control. For another, a broad set of stakeholders is involved, Wildland Fire which presents both challenges and opportunities. * CHALLENGES System One challenge is fire seasons that now span the whole year, along with Victoria Christiansen that have grown in frequency, size, and severity. Forty years ago, a wildfire larger than 10,000 acres (4,000 WILDLAND FIRE SYSTEM ha) was relatively rare. Twenty years Historically, wildland fire fundamentally ago, a wildfire larger than 100,000 acres shaped the American landscape, (40,000 ha) was relatively rare. Today, and it continues to do so today in we talk of megafires, and we see them a highly modified environment. every year. In 2017, we had 12 fires that Forest, brush, and range fires were burned more than 100,000 acres (40,000 common in “presettlement” times, ha) and an additional 39 fires that and the American Indians realized the burned more than 40,000 acres (16,000 important role fire played in revitalizing ha) (NICC 2018). and reinvigorating landscapes. They used fire for purposes ranging from Those megafires cost. The fires that shaping habitats for desired species to escape initial attack are only 2 to 3 Vicki Christiansen, Chief of the Forest Service. reducing fuels to protect communities. percent of all the fires we fight at the Forest Service, but they take up 30 Sound familiar? percent of our suppression budget. In

y personal passion is connecting 2017, the near Ventura was Today, our Nation has over a billion people with their natural “burnable” acres of vegetated resources, including the natural landscapes, most of them naturally Mecological role of wildland fire and the adapted to periodic wildland fire. And challenges of wildland fire management. Vicki Christiansen is the Chief of the Forest as our Nation has changed, so has our The solutions come in the context of a Service, Washington Office, Washington, DC. ability to live with wildland fire. wildland fire system that is increasingly complex and difficult. To get to the * The article is adapted from a speech by the In the wildland fire system we have solutions, we have to understand the author at the Fire Continuum Conference in today, a full suite of environmental, wildland fire system we have today. Missoula, MT, on May 21, 2018.

Fire Management Today 5 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 ENVIRONMENTAL Year after year, fires Climate have been taking up Fuel Conditions growing shares of our Topography budget and growing numbers of our personnel. POLITICAL OUTCOMES IN SOCIAL Development in Wildlands Laws & Regulations THE WILDLAND Expectations & Pressure FIRE Public Health the largest in history up to that Consequences ENVIRONMENT Responsibility Acceptance point. It burned for more than a month, covered more than 280,000 acres (112,00 ha), and destroyed more than a thousand structures. Each year, U.S. taxpayers lose FINANCIAL CULTURAL Incentives Policies & Procedures $20 billion to $100 billion in wildfire- related damages to infrastructure, public Disincentives Fire Service Relationships health, and natural resources. Capacity Self-view of Role

The year 2017 was one of the largest fire years in recent history. More than 10 Figure 1—The wildland fire system we have today includes environmental, social, political, million acres (4 million ha) burned, the financial, and cultural factors that drive outcomes in the wildland fire environment. second most since 1960, and more than 12,000 structures were destroyed. At peak fire activity, our Nation had 28,000 But the most tragic cost by far is in So these are the challenges we face firefighters in the field, and it was the terms of lives lost to wildfire, and that … deaths from wildfire entrapments, costliest fire year to that date. The Forest is another growing challenge in our growing fire years, soaring suppression Service alone spent more than $2.4 billion. wildland fire environment. In 2017, costs, rising fire size and severity, 14 wildland firefighters lost their lives. and growing damage to homes, That was more than half of our entire Since 1910, there have been more than communities, watersheds, habitat, and agency budget. Year after year, fires have 1,000 wildland firefighter fatalities, with timber. been taking up growing shares of our rising rates of firefighter fatalities from budget and growing numbers of our the 1920s to the 2000s (fig. 2). In recent The primary drivers are hazardous personnel. That has come at the expense years, scores of other people tragically fuel buildups, the effects of a changing of everything else we do—forest health, perished in wildfires as well, including climate, and increasing development outdoor recreation, forest products, more than 80 fatalities on the 2018 in the wildland–urban interface, all watershed restoration, and all the rest. in California alone. of which are expected to continue. Climate models project warmer and drier conditions across large parts of the West and large increases in the area burned.

And that’s just it. Warmer and drier are becoming the new normal, something we can’t control. We also face the challenge of increased development in the wildland–urban interface. An estimated 120 million people in over 44 million homes are at varying levels of risk from wildfire, especially in the West (Martinuzzi and others 2015). Less than 2 percent of the communities at risk are prepared as Firewise communities. Figure 2—Wildland firefighter fatalities by decade, 1920s to 2000s. The pink trendline shows a rising number of fatalities, particularly after 1980. Source: National Interagency Fire Center (2016).

Fire Management Today 6 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Damage from the 2017 Thomas Fire near the Los Padres National Forest in California. Structures survived the fire due to defensible space. Photo: USDA Forest Service, Stuart Palley (December 22, 2017).

WHAT WE CAN DO: continual learning and adaptation are and national policymakers based on FIRE RESPONSE key to keeping pace with the rising three national goals: So these are the challenges—drought, complexity of the wildland fire system. fuel buildups, growth in the wildland– We need to focus on the factors in 1. Restoring and maintaining healthy urban interface—a legacy of fire the system that we can control, such fire-adapted landscapes. This might exclusion compounded by a changing as the quality of our relationships, look different based on different land climate and homes spreading into fire- understanding that State, local, and management objectives in different prone landscapes. This is the wildland Tribal governments have different parts of the landscape. objectives and missions in response to 2. Creating fire-adapted communities— fire. This is a part of the complexity not fireproof but adapted to living of the wildland fire system, and in with fire. In our complex this system, the Cohesive Strategy has wildland fire system, become our foundational doctrine. 3. An effective, safe, and risk-based wildfire response. (By response, I the Cohesive Strategy do not necessarily mean wildfire has become our Since 2009, the broader fire community has stepped forward to strengthen suppression). Again, this might look foundational doctrine. relationships and coordination through different based on different land the National Cohesive Strategy for management objectives in different Wildland Fire Management. Fire should landscapes—conceivably even on the same fire. But it always means safe fire environment we are in, and it unite us across the landscape through our common goals for the watersheds and effective wildfire response based contributes to the growing complexity of on risk analysis for all ownerships. the wildland fire system we have: those we share. social, political, and cultural factors we All three goals need to work together must work within, including the ones we The wildland fire system required a across broad landscapes, inclusive of can’t control. new approach. All stakeholders came together to develop a national strategy communities. The goals need to create synergies, where we work with partners But there are things we can do. At the that was truly shared. We created an ranging from national to local. Guiding Forest Service, we are convinced that all-lands national blueprint for further dialogue between local communities principles and shared core values

Fire Management Today 7 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 include improved risk management and active management, using every at our disposal to make the landscape more resilient.

At the Forest Service, we are committed to doing our part: z We are accelerating the treatment of the landscapes we manage to improve forest and grassland conditions and create greater resilience, z We are helping communities become fire adapted, and z We are working with our partners to develop a shared risk-based response to wildfire.

All of this needs to be done before a fire comes! Figure 3—Firefighter using a driptorch during a firing operation on the 2017 Thomas Fire, the largest in California history. Photo: USDA Forest Service, Los Padres National Forest (December 21, 2017). RISK-BASED RESPONSE TO WILDFIRE Let’s focus for a moment on risk- risks for longer term reductions in high probability of success. We are a can- based response to wildfire. For some, a risk. Such fires each year are few. do organization, and that hasn’t changed. narrative has formed that Forest Service firefighting is not aggressive enough. 2. When a fire seems likely to threaten But we also expect our responders to To frame this up, I will talk about three lives, homes, or neighboring property, accept the situation when all we can different decision points and outcomes we suppress it as fast as we can and do is point protection until the fuels or for wildland fire management: prioritize our resources accordingly. We make that decision while the weather changes, using burnouts and other tactics to steer fire around homes, 1. Fire is an important land treatment fire is still small, and our rate of infrastructure, and other values at risk tool to reduce fuel loads and achieve suppression success is nearly 98 (fig. 3). We neither expect nor allow beneficial natural resource outcomes. percent. These are the overwhelming firefighters to risk their lives attempting In many landscapes in the South and majority of the fires on national forest land, about 7,000 fires annually. the improbable. Any other policy would be unconscionable and unacceptable to 3. Two to 3 percent of the fires we fight the wildland fire community and to the We neither expect nor escape our control. These few fires people we serve. allow firefighters to risk typically become very large, often due to extreme conditions of fuels, their lives attempting the We are assisting line officers and weather, and topography. incident commanders with decision- improbable. making , enhanced analytics, and Our Leader Intent for fire response has alignment needed for making risk- been consistently clear: even on wildfires informed choices when responding to close to homes and communities, safety wildfires. Our goal is to allow managers West, fire is the major land treatment is our highest priority. No home is to better examine alternative strategies tool. Planned ignitions are one way worth a human life. We will commit and to take into account the inherent to get fire on the landscape under firefighters only under conditions tradeoffs between exposure, risk, and conditions we choose. Additionally, where they can actually have a chance highly valued assets and opportunities unplanned ignitions, especially on of succeeding in protecting important for fire benefits. Federal lands where we are the land values at risk. manager and the fire manager, are an We are working with our partners to important land treatment tool when The Forest Service has always expected increase our focus on prefire work to executed under the right conditions firefighters to be aggressive in taking develop strategies to ensure that we are and when we comanage the risk with necessary action using tactics that have a all on the same page before fires occur. our neighbors, accepting short-term

Fire Management Today 8 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 FIRE FUNDING FIX for wildfire resilience projects Another thing in our fire environment If we want a on Federal lands. With this new that we can control is the way we tool, projects for hazardous fuels work together to create more resilient permanent fire funding reduction can be started and landscapes. In 2018, Congress gave fix, then we need to be completed more quickly. us a big push to treat more lands and accountable for our improve forest conditions. fire spending. By giving us new tools and more funds, along with a fire funding fix, The omnibus spending bill for 2018 will the omnibus will help the Forest help the Forest Service stabilize our Service to stabilize our programs. It budgets for firefighting after decades will also extend our ability to work z One tool was amending the Good of spiraling out of control. In 2017, with neighbors and partners under the Neighbor Authority to help us firefighting claimed 56 percent of our Cohesive Strategy to meet our shared work more efficiently with States budget—up from just 16 percent in goals—to help us learn to live with to maintain the health of forests 1995. At the rate we were going, fire wildland fire (fig. 4). would have taken up two-thirds of our by allowing road maintenance and reconstruction in the good neighbor budget by 2021. And as firefighting WITH TRUST COMES funds have run out, the Forest Service agreements. has had to cover the shortfall by taking z Another tool was our expanded ACCOUNTABILITY In the years to come, it will be up to the funds from nonfire programs. ability to use stewardship contracts by extending their maximum duration Forest Service to make good on that promise. The fire funding fix will go Through the omnibus bill, Congress from 10 years to 20 years. This will for 8 years, from 2020 to 2028, but it resolved the dilemma beginning in allow industry to create additional comes with a caveat: no blank check. If 2020. First, our regular firefighting markets for wood products in areas we want a permanent fix, then we need appropriation will be frozen at the 2015 where mills are scarce. to be accountable for our fire spending. requested level so it will no longer grow z The omnibus also authorized the Congress will be watching. at the expense of everything else we do. use of new categorical exclusions Second, Congress created a separate fund to cover firefighting costs during severe fire years so that we no longer have to raid our nonfire programs. Of course, none of this kicks in until 2020.

The omnibus also represented new investments by Congress in the health of Federal lands. It gave the Forest Service an additional $40 million for hazardous fuels reduction, for a total of $430 million in 2018, and it fully funded the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program (CFLRP) at $40 million.

Together, the Forest Service’s Hazardous Fuels program and the CFLRP are already reducing the risk of severe wildfires, especially in the West. In fiscal year 2017, we treated 3.2 million acres (1.3 million ha) across the National Forest System to reduce fuels and improve ecological conditions.

Through the omnibus bill, Congress also gave the Forest Service several new Figure 4—Prescribed fire to restore a healthy, resilient ponderosa pine woodland on the Deschutes tools to help us reduce wildfire risk by National Forest in Oregon, part of the Greater La Pine Basin Cohesive Strategy Project. The partnership improving forest conditions. project is designed to reduce fuels to protect homes in the wildland–urban interface and to improve forest conditions across shared landscapes in multiple ownerships. Photo: USDA Forest Service.

Fire Management Today 9 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 So the Forest Service has taken a close things will vindicate the trust that Service, Northern Research Station. look at our fire spending systems, Congress has placed in us, on behalf of http://www.fs.fed.us/nrs/pubs/rmap/ and we are introducing reforms to the people we serve. rmap_nrs8.pdf. (29 May 2018). improve our accountability. Central NICC (National Interagency Coordination to our success will be a system of key I will close with a couple of quotes. To Center). 2018. Wildland fire summary and statistics annual report, 2017. performance indicators to help us paraphrase Senator Gaylord Nelson (D– https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/ evaluate the cost-effectiveness of our WI), the founder of Earth Day, it is up intelligence/2017_statssumm/intro_ asset use. to all of us, working together, to create summary17.pdf. (29 May 2018). an environment of decency, quality, and NIFC (National Interagency Fire Center). In all of this, we ask for the help and mutual respect. 2016. Wildland fire accidents and support of our partners. The omnibus fatalities by year. https://www.nifc.gov/ spending bill has created opportunities And the Father of Conservation and safety/safety_documents/year.pdf. (29 that have been years in the making by founder of the Forest Service, Gifford May 2018). giving us a fire funding fix and new Pinchot, had this to say about the Pinchot, G. The fight for conservation. New authorities. But with new opportunities future of conservation: “The vast York: Doubleday, Page and Company. comes the challenge of living up to the possibilities of our great future will 152 p. ■ expectations of the people we serve. become realities only if we make ourselves, in a sense, responsible for Now we have more opportunities to that future” (Pinchot 1910). pursue our goals under the Cohesive Strategy: healthy, resilient fire-adapted LITERATURE CITED landscapes; communities that are Martinuzzi, S.; Stewart, S.I.; Helmers, D.P. adapted to living with fire; and safe, [and others]. 2015. The 2010 wildland– effective, risk-based wildfire response. urban interface of the conterminous Our success in delivering all these United States. Res. Map NRS–8. Newtown Square, PA: USDA Forest

Fuels Management Bibliography: Another Erratum

M.E. Alexander

he winter 2007 issue of Fire Management Today included LITERATURE CITED Alexander, M.E. 2007. A fuels management a subject-indexed fuels bibliography with subject index. Fire Tmanagement bibliography of previously Management Today. 67(1): 44–48. published articles in Notes Alexander, M.E. 2008. Fuels management and its predecessors dating back nearly bibliography: an erratum. Fire 70 years (Alexander 2007). Management Today. 68(1): 32. Andersen, E.V., Jr. 1971. Shaded fuel-breaks: A year later, I issued an erratum to fire control and timber both benefit. Fire the bibliography in the form of an Control Notes. 32(2): 11–12. omission under the and ■ fuelbreaks heading (Alexander 2008). I’ve since discover another important reference (Andersen 1971) that should have been included under this same Dr. Marty Alexander, a semiretiree, is the subject area. This second erratum to Proprietor of Wild Rose Fire Behaviour and the bibliography is issued in the interest resides on an acreage in Leduc County in central of completeness. Alberta, Canada.

Fire Management Today 10 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Marker for a fallen firefighter on the Mann Gulch Fire. On August 5,1949, 15 Forest Service and a Helena National Forest fire guard were entrapped by a wildfire in Mann Gulch along the Missouri River in Montana. Twelve jumpers and the forest guard paid the ultimate price. Photo: USDA Forest Service.

firefighters die at a higher rate than their counterparts in structural fire response, and the emotional, social, and fiscal costs of wildland firefighter deaths, accidents, and injuries weigh heavily on each of us. These costs have generations-long impacts that are too devastating to absorb as simply “the price of doing business.”

Unless we choose to change the ways in which we operate, too many wildland firefighters will continue to die in preventable incidents. We need Wildland Firefighter change—positive change. We need to improve our strategies, tactics, and human-factors training in wildland fire so more of us live long and healthy lives Fatalities: Pivotal after engaging.

NATIONAL FALLEN Meeting of Wildland FIREFIGHTERS FOUNDATION INITIATIVE * The National Fallen Firefighters Fire Leaders Foundation (NFFF) has taken on the task of working to coalesce the Tom Harbour many voices of wildland fire in support of reducing line-of-duty deaths, accidents, and injuries among ires that occur outside buildings, wildland firefighters. As a first step, improvements, and structures, Too many in the fire the NFFF conducted a wide-ranging whether fueled by grass, brush, service are dying in needs assessment of all populations Fforest, timber, or other materials, are involved in wildland fire response, the line of duty while the wildland fires we deal with in the including natural resource management fire service. A wildland fire can take fighting fire in the organizations. After a year of focused many forms: thousands of acres of trees wildland environment. inquiry, the NFFF presented its on fire; the purposeful burning we do findings and engaged a representative to improve ecosystems; even a small vacant-lot grass fire. We refer to all these every day of the year some part of the as wildland fires. American fire service is dealing with a wildland fire. Tom Harbour, now retired, was the director of These were the fires confronted by our Fire and Aviation Management for the Forest ancestors, and we continue to struggle Too many of our brothers and sisters in Service, Washington Office, Washington, DC. with them to this day. With more than the fire service are dying in the line of 1 billion burnable acres (400 million duty while fighting fire in the wildland * The article is adapted from a submission ha) of wildlands in the United States, environment. Data suggest that wildland by the author on May 20, 2018, to the International Journal of Wildland Fire.

Fire Management Today 11 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 sample of American wildland fire z A proven track record of working with leaders in a discussion at a meeting One resounding diverse agencies around the common held outside Washington, DC, on April goal of reducing firefighter fatalities. 17, 2018, ahead of the Congressional theme was the need Fire Service Institute’s annual National to end the perceived The NFFF is known for its efforts Fire and Emergency Services Dinner “worlds apart” in recognizing each agency’s unique and Symposium. between wildland and organization and culture, then tapping structural firefighters into those characteristics to build a This group of leaders was asked to cohort that strengthens partnerships and respond to the NFFF’s needs assessment and organizations. collaboration—keys to successful change. with inputs, reviews, comments, and commitment to a series of actions and recommendations emanating This diverse group of leaders met in THEMES FOR DISCUSSION At the April meeting, leaders heard the from the assessment. The event began both the large group and smaller, more results of the NFFF’s comprehensive with thoughtful opening comments focused discussion sessions. The NFFF survey of stakeholders, as well as by leaders from the NFFF, U.S. Fire clearly intended to form and sustain a detailed report on six “listening Administration, Wildland Firefighter collaborative relationships and build sessions.” The sessions were a series of Foundation, Congressional Fire coalitions among organizations to focus groups held across the country to Service Institute, U.S. Department support national efforts to reduce solicit direct feedback from firefighters of Agriculture (home to the Forest wildland fire line-of-duty deaths. Widely representing the range of departments Service), and U.S. Department of the acknowledged for reducing line-of-duty and organizations that deal with Interior (home to four other Federal deaths among structural firefighters wildland fire. wildland fire organizations). Attendees through programs under the Everyone represented a broad range of additional Goes Home® umbrella, the NFFF was One resounding theme was the need stakeholder organizations, including: now proposing to use its strengths and to end the perceived “worlds apart” resources to do the same for wildland between wildland and structural z The National Volunteer Fire Council, firefighters. The NFFF’s assets and firefighters and organizations. expertise include: z The International Association of Fire Firefighters acknowledged the need to Chiefs, work and train collaboratively across z More than a decade of experience organizations; they want to build bridges z The International Association of Fire focusing on firefighter health and safety; Fighters, and bring both worlds together. From z A broad array of tools, programs, the leadership level on down, there is z The International Association of and resources that can be easily Wildland Fire, consensus that we need to bridge the adapted for use by the wildland fire thinking that separates natural resource z The International Fire Service community; and organization firefighters from those in Training Association, z The National Fire Protection Association, z The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health/ Center for Disease Control, z The National Institute of Standards and Technology, z The National Association, and z State organizations.

Water Tower Fire burning near Alpine, UT, in 2017. Reducing risk from wildfires to communities is critical to the wildland fire community. Photo: USDA.

Fire Management Today 12 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 A member of the Boise Interagency during a burnout on the Trinity Fire in Idaho in 2013. Wildland firefighting always means managing risk. Photo: USDA Forest Service, Tim Mason (February 2, 2013).

the structural fire service. The more they come together to mitigate incidents, the stronger their collaboration can be in reducing line-of-duty deaths and injuries.

Community risk reduction was also a common topic at the listening sessions. Participants acknowledged the need to engineer a future when wildlands are less flammable and communities better equipped to deal with wildfire. However, participants recognized that the “Design it Out” option for wildland fire is a strategic vision on a grand scale that will take an z A growing awareness of the gaps in We routinely accept risk, but we never extensive investment of time, people, and available resources supporting the accept loss. But doesn’t accepting risk funding. Those investments suggest far- emotional wellness of personnel and mean that we are accepting the chance reaching resolutions in the wildland fire their families. of suffering loss? There is a clear environment that will not likely transpire and evident need to have the difficult in the immediate future. Although the conversations surrounding risk. This will participating firefighters want leaders to RISK MANAGEMENT include frank discussions about what Another dominant topic at the listening continue to advance advocacy for these the fire community is willing to risk and sessions was risk management. While efforts at the State, local, and Federal what the community is willing to lose risk management is a well-known levels, they recognize that they can’t wait when fighting a wildfire. That discussion, concept in the structural fire service, for that future to become reality. Other, not yet had, and multiple other factors natural resource management agencies more immediate actions are needed to continue to cloud the application of with wildland fire responsibility are just improve their safety. risk management within wildland fire now using the term more frequently. It response. The corresponding ambiguity is evident, however, that the specifics leads to uncertainties: of applying risk management are Another dominant topic neither understood nor used across z There is no commonly accepted organizations. at the listening sessions definition of risk management and was risk management. no common way of applying risk All of us involved in wildland fire know management principles within the that risk is inherent to our profession. wildland fire community, including Firefighters, fire managers, fire leaders, among the final decision makers fire chiefs, and others all purposefully Participants stressed the need for (agency administrators). accountability at all levels and the engage in a hazardous activity, whether z Expectations regarding the acceptance willingness to “do more” at the it is the planned fire we light (prescribed of risk differ between those protecting individual, crew, and company level to fire) or the unplanned fire we fight or public lands and those protecting increase personnel safety. Firefighters otherwise manage (wildfire). Currently, private lands. recognize that reducing fatalities is our willingness to accept risk in response intertwined with other issues, including: to wildfire is out of alignment with z Managing fuels through the use of the biophysical reality we face. We still prescribed fire reduces risk but is z The lack of access to good data, respond to fire in the same manner we often not an option. Laws, rules, always have, without adjusting to the regulations, common practice, and z The need for firefighter physicals and reality of today’s fires. other influences often limit wildland fitness testing to develop a baseline for fire management. health and wellness, and

Fire Management Today 13 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 z Managing community-building 4. Reconcile data problems. practices reduces risk but is often Although the National Fire Protection difficult to achieve. Association has done much work in z Individual tolerances for risk vary this area, there is no authoritative widely and are influenced by many national consensus on data for wildland factors. firefighters across the spectrum of z Perceptions of risk levels and risk agencies and organizations. tolerances can vary between levels of leadership on the fireground and 5. Continue to focus research and between leaders and firefighters. prevention on the major categories of line-of-duty deaths and/or z The public seems conflicted about injuries in wildland fire accidents, risk, and therefore firefighters are including: conflicted about risk. z Medical incidents such as z Having a partner or group of partners cardiac events, rhabdomyolysis, perceived as risk averse can lead to hyperthermia, and occupational additional risk burdens for firefighters, cancers; landscapes, and communities. Historical marker—gravesite of firefighters who died in the Big Blowup of 1910, Coeur d’Alene z Motor vehicle accidents, including National Forest, Idaho. Photo: USDA Forest unsafe driving, lack of seat belt use, The discussion around risk management Service, C.K. McHarg (1921). and so forth; will be critical, affecting wildland fire policies and tactics for decades to come. z Burnovers/entrapments; The sooner the dialogue can start, the z Aviation accidents; and sooner the wildland community can z Snags/rocks/rolling debris. begin to establish a common vision. The discussion All stakeholders (firefighting personnel, around risk agency and political leaders, the public, management will 6. Adapt effective Everyone Goes Home® tools for wildland fire and researchers) need to be at the table be critical, affecting to discuss values at risk (monetary management use, and target values, biological values, egos, wildland fire policies marketing of these tools to wildland landownerships, and so forth). and tactics for fire agencies/organizations. decades to come. Existing and future tools can be made One of the core questions to ask more inclusive of wildland firefighters is, “What are we protecting or not and organizations. Targeted marketing protecting, and what are the positive service organizations need to become efforts, beginning at the State wildland and negative effects of these decisions in worlds that learn to support one fire academy level, will broaden the long and short term?” We should be another in wildland fire management exposure of wildland firefighters to clearly asking up front whether the gains work. these tools. are worth the exposures; the discussion about values and tradeoffs is critical. 2. Increase marketing efforts for the 7. Utilize State advocates of Everyone ® Cohesive Strategy. Goes Home for outreach to wildland fire organizations. RECOMMENDATIONS There is little overall awareness of The wildland fire service leadership at the National Cohesive Strategy for The NFFF’s well-developed network the April 2018 meeting was able to reach Wildland Fire Management. Where of State-based volunteers can be used consensus on initial steps to improve the it has been implemented, the strategy to advocate for the Everyone Goes ® health and safety of wildland firefighters. has demonstrated its effectiveness. Home program and provide training Below is a series of recommendations These “points of light” (including to wildland fire organizations. Special for steps that the agencies represented central Oregon and Flagstaff, AZ), effort also needs to be made to recruit can take, guided by the experience and where the “worlds apart” are now additional advocates from within the oversight of the NFFF, to begin to reduce working together, can be used to model wildland fire community. injuries, deaths, and accidents among implementation. wildland firefighters. 8. Increase awareness of the 16 3. Increase the application and Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives 1. Bring the “two worlds apart” closer understanding of risk management among wildland firefighters. together. concepts. The 16 initiatives are strategies for Natural resource management and fire implementing the Everyone Goes

Fire Management Today 14 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Home® program but are not well known Association of State Wildland among wildland firefighters. How can we respond Fire Committee. He stated that there is significant work to do to effect change; To broaden awareness and utilization, in a manner that yet change we must. we can: protects citizens, sustains landscapes, Every year, wildland fires engage z Explore whether the 16 initiatives can and manages thousands of firefighters from Federal, be tweaked to become more broadly State, local, and private entities. inclusive of wildland fire culture, reasonable risk for Firefighters understand the need to z Better explain the interaction between responders? “take action at the lowest level” to the 16 initiatives and the wildland improve their own health and safety, fire community’s well-known 10/18/ but the NFFF’s listening sessions LCES, and inform and improve practices, training, revealed that firefighters also have and education. high expectations for leaders. They are z Develop materials to explain counting on us! implementation of the 16 initiatives 12. Increase the use of medical within a wildland fire context. screenings and fitness/wellness This revelation demands that the programs to improve the health and wildland fire community embark on a 9. Change the wildland fire paradigm safety of all firefighting personnel. more vigorous campaign to reduce line- from, “Can we accomplish the Identification of preexisting risk of-duty deaths, which is a worthy goal mission?” to “Can we survive the factors through medical screenings and for all and a common starting point for mission?” increased adoption of holistic health better collaboration. We need to enlist As a profession, we need to ask, “How programming, such the Fire Service everyone’s help and have every agency can we respond in a manner that Joint Labor Management Wellness with an interest in the wildland fire protects citizens, sustains landscapes, Fitness Initiative, should be prioritized. problem engaged. and manages reasonable risk for responders?” 13. Enhance the ability of the wildland Fortunately, we can rely on the NFFF to fire service to take care of its lead the way. ■ 10. Change the expectation that we people prior to and in the aftermath can succeed on every wildland fire of a firefighter injury or fatality. mission all the time. Firefighters want access to tools to support emotional wellness for 11. Introduce results of research themselves and their families, such as products and findings at all levels those developed by the NFFF. of the organization, down to the lowest applicable level. CALL TO ACTION A tremendous amount of good science The session closed with an inspirational information is not being effectively used. call to action from the State This information should be used to of Florida, chair of the National

Fire Management Today 15 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Assessing Wildland Firefighter Entrapment Figure 1—Firefighters deploying fire shelters on the in Orange County, CA, on Survivability October 22, 2007. Photo: Karen Tapia-Anderson. Copyright © 2014 . Used with Wesley G. Page and Bret W. Butler permission.

ildland firefighters work 1991). Two key elements of the safety slope and wind on convective heating in complex and dynamic protocols are the identification of escape (Butler 2014). While identifying or environments, with many routes and safety zones because past constructing safety zones of suitable Wdangers that pose serious threats to their firefighter entrapments have repeatedly size is and will remain an essential part safety. Falling snags and rocks, steep demonstrated the value of having a of firefighter safety, it is also important and rugged terrain, and rapid increases designated place of refuge to retreat to to recognize that not all goes according in fire behavior are just some of the when fire behavior abruptly changes. plan. For various reasons, firefighters’ dangers that affect wildland firefighters. escape routes to their safety zones can Because of the many possible ways Since the late 1990s, safety zone size be unexpectedly cut off (fig. 1). that firefighters have been or could (that is, the minimum separation be injured, various safety protocols distance between firefighters and flames When faced with such a situation, have been developed in the United needed to minimize the threat of burn firefighters might have a small but States to help mitigate the hazards, injury) has been estimated as four times important window of opportunity to including the standard firefighting the height of the flames (Butler and select one of several deployment sites. orders (McArdle 1957) and LCES Cohen 1998). However, recent research In addition to the recommendations (lookouts, communications, escape has updated how we determine safety listed in the “Last Resort Survival” routes, and safety zones) (Gleason zone size by incorporating the effects of

Wesley Page is a research forester for the Forest Our analysis found that use, slope Service, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky steepness, flame height, and the separation distance Mountain Research Station, Missoula, MT; from flames were key variables influencing entrapment and Bret Butler is a research mechanical engineer for the Forest Service, Fire Sciences survivability. Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Missoula, MT.

Fire Management Today 16 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 section of the Incident Response Pocket survivability during an entrapment Guide (NWCG 2014), recent research We confirmed that (Page and Butler 2017). Specifically, we may further aid in selecting a suitable compiled and statistically analyzed data deployment site. Specifically, we utilized fire shelter use related to the fire environment (fuels, data contained within entrapment significantly increased weather, and topography) in and around investigation reports to understand the likelihood the entrapment area as well as data on the factors that influence firefighter of surviving an how the entrapped firefighters were survivability (Page and Butler 2017). affected physically (whether there was Our analysis found that fire shelter use, entrapment. an injury or fatality). slope steepness, flame height, and the separation distance from flames were An important part of such an analysis the key variables influencing entrapment to acquire and transfer new information is relying on the entrapment reports survivability. This analysis provides to others within the organization is to provide accurate and complete an opportunity to discuss and reiterate essential (Zimmerman and Sexton information. Our study revealed important concepts related to firefighter 2010). The creation of the Wildland Fire that the quality and completeness of entrapments and to demonstrate the Lessons Learned Center (https://www. investigations related to firefighter potential use of data gleaned from wildfirelessons.net) in 2002 represented entrapments varies widely and entrapment investigations to enhance a major step in helping to ensure that that many of the reports failed to future firefighter safety. organizational learning would become a provide detailed information about reality by providing useful and relevant the entrapment area (such as size products and services to the wildland LEARNING FROM PAST and shape) (Page and Butler 2017). fire community. Additionally, basic information about ENTRAPMENTS the fire environment at the time of the Through a shift in culture and One particularly useful product of the entrapment (fuel moisture, wind speed, enactment of recommendations center has been the Incident Review and so on) was sometimes entirely compiled following firefighter fatalities Database, which houses collections omitted or buried in the documents, (see, for example, TriData 1998), the of reports, reviews, and investigations with no standardized format. U.S. wildland firefighting community related to incidents that involve wildland has made organizational learning a firefighters. We used the documents in However, we found the Green Sheets major priority. Organizational learning this database to analyze and evaluate produced by the California wildland encompasses several tasks, but the ability the factors that influence firefighter firefighting agency, Cal Fire, to be notable exceptions. The Green Sheets generally follow a standardized format, with clear, concise summaries of the Valley SART - Green Sheet GREEN SHEET Page 2 of 9 key environmental variables near the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection SUMMARY beginning of the document (fig. 2). (CAL FIRE) This Informational Summary Report references, on Saturday, September 12, 2015, at approximately 1402 hours, one and three helitack firefighters In contrast, Federal agency Learning suffered serious burn injuries after becoming entrapped and then deployed their fire Informational Summary Report of Serious CAL FIRE shelters on the Valley Incident, in Lake County, California. Reviews or Facilitated Learning Injuries, Illnesses, Accidents and Near Serious Accidents CONDITIONS Analyses don’t share a common

Weather organization, are mostly written in Konocti Remote Automated Weather Station, approximately 5.5 miles north east of the burnover location at 1400 hours; � Temperature: 88° a long narrative format, and lack � Relative Humidity: 12% � Wind: West 18 mph, gusts of 30 mph comprehensive summaries. While � Fuel Moisture: Chamise 51%, fine dead fuels 3% (unshaded) � Probability of Ignition: 89% narratives may be essential in providing Fuel Type Conifers intermixed with hardwoods, pockets of Manzanita and Chamise. Size of adequate context for an incident, they brush: 6 foot plus, south of the deployment site. Road Conditions also make it difficult to extract basic Clear, dry Topography information about important aspects Multiple intersecting drainages with short, moderate to steep, slopes. Shelter Deployment and Serious Burn Injuries Fire Behavior of the entrapment, such as the fire Approximately 110-130 acres with multiple spot fires resulting in understory burning September 12, 2015 with group tree torching and short crown runs driven by wind and/or slope alignment. behavior and the particulars of the Valley SART SEQUENCE OF EVENTS fire environment at the time of the 15-CA-LNU-008670 15-CA-CDF-000580 On Saturday, September 12, 2015, at approximately 1323 hours, a helitack crew was entrapment. dispatched to a vegetation fire as part of an initial attack wildland response. The vegetation fire was reported at 8015 High Valley Road, in Kelseyville, California. At California Northern Region approximately 1330 hours, the helicopter (C1) with two fire captains, six firefighter I’s, and one pilot lifted off from the Sonoma-Lake-Napa-Unit (LNU) helitack base. The front A Board of Review has not approved this Informational Summary Report. It is intended seat fire captain’s (FC1) report on conditions was: two acres in grass and oak In addition to being difficult to extract as a safety and training tool, an aid to preventing future occurrences, and to inform woodland, a moderate rate of spread, with one structure immediately threatened and interested parties. Because it is published on a short time frame, the information the potential to burn 20 acres. C1 crew observed short range spotting with some contained herein is subject to revision as further investigation is conducted and isolated tree torching. FC1 and FC2 determined the left flank of the fire would be their from the entrapment reports, the data additional information is developed. priority. C1 landed in a field near an access road which led to the fire’s left flank. When the helitack crew started a direct attack on the left flank towards a structure (RES1), usually represent only a portion of the Lookout Communications Escape Routes Safety Zones Lookout Communications Escape Routes Safety Zones range of values needed to produce high- Figure 2—The first two pages of the Green Sheet produced for the Valley Fire Shelter Deployment on quality statistical models. Owing to the September 12, 2015, by Cal Fire. Note the organization and summary information. nature of the circumstances in which

Fire Management Today 17 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 the data were gathered—that is, either a fatality or a near-miss situation—the 100 data tend to represent the extreme end 90 of survivability in terms of the various environmental variables. When safety 80 70 zones perform as designed and no significant injuries occur, the details 70 50 regarding the size of the safety zone 60 and the environmental conditions are 60 less likely to be reported. Capturing the details associated with these “nonevent” 50 entrapments is important, however, because they contain vital information 40

needed to help define various fire and Flame height (ft) 40 30 30 environmental thresholds that affect entrapment survivability. 20 20 LESSONS LEARNED 10 Despite the challenges of analyzing 0 entrapment investigation reports, we 5 10 15 20 25 30 made several important findings that both confirm long-held beliefs and provide Slope steepness (%) additional insights related to surviving an entrapment. Although firefighter Figure 3—Separation distances (in feet) needed to ensure a 95-percent probability of surviving an training emphasizes the importance entrapment with a fire shelter deployed. Note that these are distances for surviving an entrapment with a of fire shelters, there haven’t been any fire shelter and do not represent safety zone separation distances. quantitatively based assessments of their ability to enhance survivability during actual entrapments. We confirmed that fire behavior, and analyses related to the of a quantitatively based assessment fire shelter use significantly increased the “trench” or “Coandă” effect suggest that of entrapment survivability is that likelihood of surviving an entrapment slopes greater than 45 percent are the it becomes possible to estimate the most prone to flame attachment and thus separation distances needed to ensure rapid increases in fire behavior (Gallacher a certain likelihood of survival under a It is important to and others 2018). given set of environmental conditions. recognize the dangers Our analysis confirmed the danger posed Figure 3 shows one such relationship that steep slopes pose by steep slopes and suggested that for in graphic form. The figure displays the and to avoid placing each unit increase in slope percent, the separation distances required to have firefighters there odds of a fatality during an entrapment a 95-percent chance of surviving an whenever possible. increase by 3 percent (Page and Butler entrapment with a fire shelter. These 2017). Additionally, we found that steep separation distances are generally much slopes limit fire shelter effectiveness, less than would be required for a safety probably due to the effects of increased zone and would thus probably result in a (Page and Butler 2017). This information convective heating on the fire shelter nonfatal injury for those entrapped. Such a is already well ingrained into wildland material (Butler and Putnam 2001). It figure is useful for relaying the importance firefighter training and only confirms is therefore important to continue to of selecting deployment zones as far away what was previously suspected: that fire recognize the dangers that steep slopes from the flames as possible and on terrain shelters save lives. pose and to avoid placing firefighters on that is as flat as possible. steep slopes whenever possible. Slope steepness has been thought to LOOKING AHEAD influence firefighter safety because of Flame height and separation distance Using the data contained within its effects on fire spread rate and fire were also two key variables that entrapment investigation reports to intensity and its common association influenced entrapment survivability. ask and answer specific questions with previous firefighter fatalities (Wilson As expected, increasing flame height not only helps fulfill the promise 1977). The Incident Response Pocket and decreasing distance between of organizational learning but also Guide identifies slope steepness in excess firefighters and flames result in a lower can provide firefighters with useful of 50 percent as an indicator of extreme likelihood of survival. One benefit information. Our analysis shows one

Fire Management Today 18 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 potential avenue for using such data Gallacher, J.R.; Ripa B.; Butler, B.W.; Journal of Wildland Fire. 26(8): (Page and Butler 2017), but no doubt Fletcher, T.H. 2018. Lab-scale 655–667. several others exist. For example, observations of flame attachment on Page, W.G.; Butler, B.W. 2018. Fuel and compiling information on the spatial slopes with implications for firefighter topographic influences on wildland location of firefighter entrapments safety zones. Journal. 96: firefighter burnover fatalities in Southern 93–104. California. International Journal of may help identify areas that may be Gleason, P. 1991. LCES—a key to safety Wildland Fire. DOI: 10.1071/WF17147. particularly susceptible to fatal burnovers, in the wildland fire environment. Fire TriData. 1998. Wildland firefighter safety such as canyons or drainages, which Management Notes. 52(4): 9. awareness study: phase 3—implementing could then be mapped (see, for example, McArdle, R.E. 1957. Standard firefighting cultural changes for safety. Arlington, Page and Butler 2018). Additionally, orders. Fire Control Notes. 18(4): VA: TriData Corporation. 48 p. https:// compiling and analyzing data related to 151–152. www.nifc.gov/safety/safety_documents/ other accident types, such as tree-felling NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating phase3/1Acknow-Sum-WFSAS.pdf. (4 accidents, may also yield useful insights. Group). 2014. Incident response pocket April 2018). guide. PMS 461. [Place of publication Wilson, C.C. 1977. Fatal and near-fatal In order to facilitate the type of data unknown]: [Publisher unknown]. forest fires: the common denominators. analysis needed to make quantitatively https://www.nwcg.gov/sites/default/ The International . 43(9): 9-10, files/publications/pms461.pdf. (7 March 12–15. based assessments, it is important 2018). Zimmerman, T.; Sexton, T. 2010. to realize the benefits of adopting a Page, W.G.; Butler, B.W. 2017. An Organizational learning contributes to more systematic and comprehensive empirically based approach to defining guidance for managing wildland fires for way to describe, analyze, and store wildland firefighter safety and survival multiple objectives. Fire Management specific information contained within zone separation distances. International Today. 70(1): 8–14. investigation reports. Long narrative ■ documents tend to make gathering data more cumbersome, and the lack of summary information sometimes forces the reader to make generalizations or interpretations that would be better made by the investigation team. While narratives have several benefits, the addition of short summaries with detailed environmental information will no doubt facilitate future analyses. SUCCESS STORIES WANTED ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was supported by the Joint Fire Science Program, the National Fire Plan through the Washington We’d like to know how your work Office of Forest Service Research, the has been going! National Wildfire Coordinating Group Let us share your success stories from your State fire program or your Fire Behavior Subcommittee, and the individual . Let us know how your State Fire Assistance, Wildland Fire Management Research Volunteer Fire Assistance, Federal Excess Personal Property, or Firefighter Development and Application Program. Property program has benefited your community. Make your piece as short as 100 words or longer than 2,000 words, whatever it takes to tell your story! LITERATURE CITED Butler, B.W. 2014. A study of the impact of slope and wind on firefighter safety zone effectiveness. Missoula, MT: Submit your stories and photographs If you have questions about your USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain by email or traditional mail to: submission, you can contact our Research Station, Fire Sciences FMT staff at the email address Laboratory; final report; Joint Fire USDA Forest Service below. Science Program, project 07–2–1–20. Fire Management Today Butler, B.W.; Cohen, J.D. 1998. Firefighter 201 14th Street, SW safety zones: How big is big enough? Fire Washington, DC 20250 Management Notes. 58(1): 13–16. Butler, B.W.; Putnam, T. 2001. Fire shelter performance in simulated wildfires: an Email: exploratory study. International Journal [email protected] of Wildland Fire. 10(1): 29–44.

Fire Management Today 19 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 1910. It was a year of great fires across the United States, with an estimated Improving Safety 50 million acres burned (Pyne 2001). In August, great firestorms swept over more than a million acres in the Outcomes at the Northern Rockies in a matter of days. The fires burned into towns, and people fled the flames on crowded trains. Eighty-four firefighters, trapped in the USDA Forest mountains while battling the blazes, paid the ultimate price (NICC 2018). Service: 1994–2018 One lesson was that no single entity could control fires alone, setting the stage for the Weeks Act of 1911, which Hutch Brown authorized the cooperative wildland fire management organization the Nation has today. The Forest Service also adopted a policy of suppressing every he culture of the USDA Forest (2001), Cramer (2003), and by 10 a.m. on the morning after it Service has been shaped by (2006). The Forest Service’s fatality rate was first reported. For decades, Forest the maxim “Certainly it can be overall was several times higher than for Service crews tried to put out every fire, Tdone” (Pinchot 1947), borrowed from the National Park Service or the Bureau no matter how remote. Fire exclusion the Coast Guard by the agency’s first of Land Management (USDA Forest Chief, Gifford Pinchot (1905–10). From Service 2016). the moment employees joined the Forest Service beginning in 1905, they regarded Alarmed, Forest Service leaders tried In 2006, Chief Dale conservation as a noble cause and holding employees more accountable Bosworth launched an their work as critical to national well- for violating safety rules. Investigations agencywide effort to being. They took pride in overcoming following South Canyon, Thirtymile, difficulty and danger to accomplish and Cramer led to repercussions for create a “Safety Culture their work, which often took place in some Forest Service fire personnel. for the 21st Century.” high-risk environments, particularly As a result, large parts of the wildland on wildland fires. The agency’s “can- fire community lost confidence in the do” culture emboldened employees, serious accident investigation process, allowed fuels to build up, creating including firefighters, to take risks to and some Forest Service employees explosive situations under severe fire get the job done. launched grassroots reforms with the weather conditions and heightening goal of learning from accidents rather risks for wildland firefighters, especially than placing blame and taking punitive CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE in the backcountry but also near homes actions. So it’s no surprise that injuries and and communities. fatalities have long bedeviled the In the mid-2000s, Forest Service leaders Forest Service. Overall fatality rates Fuel buildups contributed to dozens launched a parallel effort to change the for the Forest Service held steady in of tragedy fires. Table 1 shows tragedy Forest Service’s safety culture. Changing the 1970s–2000s at about eight per fires with 10 or more firefighter a culture as old and powerful as the year (USDA Forest Service 2018a), fatalities, some of which led to program Forest Service’s is difficult, yet it seems but fatality rates for firefighters across reviews and reforms. For example, to be working. all agencies were rising. The number the 16 tragedy fires from 1937 to 1956 of firefighter fatalities more than (including the 5 shown in table 1) What has improved? How did it come doubled from the 1970s to the 2000s, motivated Forest Service leaders to climbing from 90 to 193 per decade about? What are the indications of (NIFC 2018a). For Federal firefighters organizational change? alone, the number of burnover fatalities averaged 15 per decade in HISTORY OF FIRE-RELATED Hutch Brown is the editor of Fire the 1990s–2000s (NIFC 2018b), with SAFETY CONCERNS Management Today and a program high-profile tragedy fires (burnover fires The Forest Service has a long history specialist for the Forest Service, Office of costing lives) that included Dude (1990), of concern about firefighter safety, Communication, Washington Office, South Canyon (1994), Thirtymile beginning with the Big Blowup of Washington, DC.

Fire Management Today 20 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 adopt the 10 Standard Fire Orders in 1957, later supplemented by the 18 Table 1—Wildfires with 10 or more firefighter fatalities, 1905–2018. Situations That Shout “Watch Out!,” guidelines to help firefighters recognize Number of and manage risk. Year Name of fire Location of fire fatalities Technology development made a huge 1910 84 Big Blowup Northern Rockies difference, saving lives and preventing 1933 29 Griffith Park Fire Los Angeles, CA injuries on the fireline. Over the years, 1937 15 Blackwater Fire Near Cody, WY the Forest Service’s technology and 1943 11 Hauser Near San Diego, CA development centers invented various kinds of safety gear. Federal firefighters 1949 13 Mann Gulch Fire Helena National Forest, MT today wear gloves, goggles, hardhats, 1953 15 Rattlesnake Fire Mendocino National Forest, CA special boots, and fire-resistant clothing 1956 11 Inaja Fire Near San Diego, CA when fighting fires, and they carry fire 1966 12 Near Los Angeles, CA shelters to use in an emergency. Before deploying on the fireline, they also 1994 14 South Canyon Fire Near Glenwood Springs, CO undergo rigorous training and a test for 2013 19 Yarnell Hill Fire Yarnell, AZ strength and fitness. Source: Gabbert (2013). However, the accident investigation reports in the 20th century were largely limited in scope. They focused entirely on physical factors— CHANGING THE SAFETY them down to something like LCES fire behavior, resources used, CULTURE (Putnam 1995). firefighter tactics, and the like. The By the 1990s, visionary wildland fire corresponding safety reforms focused professionals were already questioning Putnam and others focused on creating on the same physical circumstances, the rules-driven approach to safety long-term solutions leading to cultural leading to a steady growth in rules, on the fireline (Holdsambeck 2018). change (Holdsambeck 2018), such as: technologies, and training materials In 1991, based on his experience for wildland firefighting. A familiar on the Dude Fire (1990), hotshot z a performance-based training system pattern emerged, with one or more superintendent Paul Gleason boiled the (task books); tragedy fires and accident investigation “10 and 18” down into a shorter formula z an interagency Wildland Fire reports leading to reforms and new easier to remember: LCES (lookouts, Leadership Development Program, rules and technologies—until the next communications, escape routes, and inaugurated in 2002 (WFLDP 2018); tragedy fire. safety zones). Gleason was committed and to learning from entrapments like Dude, z a world-class interagency Wildland By the 1990s, the prevailing approach which cost six firefighters their lives, and Fire Lessons Learned Center, also to safety in wildland fire management doing what he could to help firefighters established in 2002 (WFLLC 2018). had hardened into following a set of make sense of the changing situations rules. The mantra became “the rules they faced on the fireline. are firm—we don’t bend them and The early leaders in formulating alternatives to the traditional rules- we don’t break them” (Holdsambeck Following the South Canyon Fire in based approach strove to create a 2018). The rules-based approach 1994, other fire professionals in the learning culture within the wildland fire presumed that firefighters following field launched similar learning-based community. Drawing on the experience safety rules and using the appropriate initiatives (Holdsambeck 2018). They of high-reliability organizations working safety gear would be safe from harm went beyond the traditional focus in high-risk environments (Putnam on the fireline. Accordingly, accident on rules and physical factors on the 1995; Weick and Sutcliffe 2008), they investigation reports following the fireline to raise social and psychological advocated for making every accident South Canyon (1994), Thirtymile questions about human performance and incident an opportunity for learning (2001), and Cramer (2003) Fires placed in stressful situations under rapidly rather than an occasion for finding fault, blame on some of the fire personnel changing conditions. Ted Putnam of the placing blame, and holding individuals involved, shaming them for violating Missoula Technology and Development accountable for breaking rules. rules like the “10 and 18.” Punitive Center, for example, organized a measures followed in some cases. “wildland firefighters human factors” Despite the winds of change blowing workshop, with findings that included from the field, national leaders “too many rules” and the need to boil

Fire Management Today 21 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 continued to embrace the traditional Administration, the overall fatality rate (2007) concluded that “deeper rules-based approach (Holdsambeck for Forest Service employees from 1998 underlying cultural and organizational 2018). A tipping point came in 2004 to 2006 was 63, or about 6.4 fatalities patterns … have kept the agency from when the Forest Service, in concert with per year (Dialogos International 2007). dealing effectively with safety and the Office of Inspector General, brought In 2006, Forest Service Chief Bosworth other significant challenges.” Studies of criminal charges against an employee (2001–07) launched an agencywide Forest Service culture in relation to both involved in managing the Cramer effort to create a “Safety Culture for the workplace safety and workforce diversity Fire. The move eroded employee trust 21st Century.” “At the end of the day,” have found a cycle of organizational in senior leadership and discouraged he told the National Leadership Team dysfunction (Dialogos International fire personnel from cooperating with (now known as the National Leadership 2007; Metropolitan Group 2014), accident investigators, undermining the Council, or NLC), “I want everyone to with conformity to traditional values agency’s incipient learning culture. go home to their families” (Dialogos and resistance to change embedded at International 2007). several points. In 2005, members of the Forest Service’s Risk Management Council, For example, the Forest Service has acting without official authority but a tradition of decentralized decision supported by representatives of the In 2010, Chief Tom making, with most decisions made union (the Forest Service affiliate of Tidwell made safety by local line officers (Kaufman 1960). the National Federation of Federal the first of five The original ranger compounds were Employees), set out to repair the national priorities for farflung, with travel largely limited damage (Holdsambeck 2018). They to horseback, so local decision proposed replacing the rules-based the Forest Service making only made sense. Moreover, serious accident investigation process and launched an decentralized decision making accords with a learning-based “Just Culture,” agencywide “Safety with the principle of subsidiarity a system of protecting employees from Learning Journey.” in American democracy (whereby blame, shame, and punitive actions. governance is as close as possible to Just Culture offered employees social the point of service delivery), and rewards for fully participating in it maximizes the flexibility of land reporting on incidents and accidents In accordance with one of the management and its responsiveness to and for joining in the agency’s safety recommendations by the 1995 Wildland public input. learning culture. Firefighters Human Factors Workshop (Putnam 1995), the Forest Service Although decentralization has served The Just Culture process gave birth to hired the consulting firm Dialogos the agency well (Blum and others 2008), the facilitated learning analysis (FLA) International to study the agency’s it has also produced cultural resistance (Holdsambeck 2018), a learning-based safety culture. Researchers held to change and obstacles to safety. One approach to accident investigations group sessions and interviews with obstacle was what Dialogos International founded on “doctrine” rather than rules about 400 Forest Service employees called “addiction to autonomy,” giving (Hollenshead 2006). Tested and validated from across the agency to “identify local line officers considerable latitude to on burnovers in 2005 and 2006, the FLA underlying core dynamics that may keep things the way they are. Employees gradually gained support from regional be causing challenges around safety” traditionally believed that decisions fire directors, some Regional Foresters, (Dialogos International 2007). Dialogos should be left up to local line officers the director of Fire and Aviation International (2007) found widespread based on local circumstances. The local Management in the Washington Office, disagreement among employees about line officer knows best and will make and the Deputy Chief for State and what the Forest Service’s safety goals the right decision, so the thinking went, Private Forestry. In 2009, despite ongoing should be, with some embracing zero even if it means exposing employees to resistance from some Washington Office fatalities as “an obvious and absolute needless risk. directors, the Deputy Chief for State and ambition” and others rejecting zero Private Forestry formally endorsed the fatalities as “noble sounding but The Forest Service also has powerful FLA process. unattainable.” Many employees traditions of conforming to authority still regard Forest Service activities, and rallying around the cause (Kaufman CULTURAL DYSFUNCTIONS especially on the fireline, as inherently 1960, 1997; Pinchot 1947), leading to By then, the Forest Service’s national dangerous and fatalities as an inevitable a “taboo against dialogue.” As Gifford leaders had embraced the need for part of the job, whereas others sharply Pinchot explained, the agency was change, in part because of an annual disagree (DeGrosky 2016; Smith 2016). “engaged in a great and necessary fatality rate that remained stubbornly undertaking in which the whole future high. Based on figures from the With opinions divided about such of the country was at stake” (Pinchot Occupational Safety and Health crucial matters, Dialogos International 1947). Imbued with “the zest of the

Fire Management Today 22 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 pioneer,” Forest Service employees safety initiatives. The team met to to all fire-related accidents, with the held “a strong belief that whatever discuss a disconnect between fire assurance of no punitive actions, blame, the Service set out to do, that it could managers and line officers, and National or shame (Holdsambeck 2018). A and would accomplish” (Pinchot Incident Management Organization learning culture was finally taking 1947). The “can-do” culture made teams led simulations on units of the root. Through the Wildland Fire employees uncomfortable with voicing National Forest System to engage Lessons Learned Center, firefighters disagreement or raising controversial fire managers, line officers, dispatch could openly—and without fear of topics, believing that it would only upset personnel, and other partners in reprisal—report on accidents and close people and undermine the teamwork practicing and learning together. calls as learning opportunities for the needed for success. Local line officers organization as a whole. Chief Tidwell will make the decisions anyway, or In 2009, Dialogos International officially endorsed the FLA, and soon so the thinking went; raising safety completed a followup report on thereafter, the Forest Service took the concerns won’t change anything, and the Forest Service’s safety culture. next step by working with partners in the it might even get you in trouble for not The report presented elements of wildland fire community to develop the being supportive enough. organizational dysfunction and resistance coordinated response protocol (CRP) to to change, including habituation replace the serious accident investigation Both elements of Forest Service to autonomy and the taboo against system. The CRP demonstrated national culture—habituation to autonomy and dialogue. It noted ongoing distrust leadership’s commitment to learning the taboo against dialogue—can lead between managers and employees and from tragedy while also supporting to poor risk management. Local line the importance of establishing a safety employees and their families, a major officers or other decision makers might culture based on learning. step forward embraced by employees not understand the risks they are asking (Holdsambeck 2018). employees to take, and employees might not feel comfortable with raising In 2011, Forest Service employees concerns that their supervisors might not After the Safety across the Nation participated in the be willing to hear. As a result, employees Learning Journey first “Safety Engagement” sessions, might believe that they are on their own began in 2010, the which “effectively launched the agency’s to make the best of a situation. When collective effort across all levels of the getting the job done takes precedence 5-year running agency to create a safety culture in the over taking a moment to stop, think, average number of Forest Service” (USDA Forest Service and talk before acting, then safety can be work-related fatalities 2016). Many employees took training in compromised. A former director of Fire began to drop. becoming attuned to safety issues and and Aviation Management in the Forest in personally managing risk, including Service’s Washington Office put it this refusing to engage in unsafe behaviors, way: when “can do” becomes “make even when asked to by leaders. By do,” people on the fireline can get hurt using a Safety Empowerment Authority (Williams 2002). In 2010, Chief Tom Tidwell (2009–17) card, every employee was now entitled set a national goal of zero work-related to stop any work that he or she believed fatalities, and he made safety the first to be unsafe. SAFETY LEARNING of five national priorities for the Forest JOURNEY Service. Under his leadership, the Forest In 2012, the NLC launched a second In response to the findings by Dialogos Service embarked on an agencywide International (2007), Forest Service round of Safety Engagement sessions, “Safety Learning Journey” to become this time holding “leader-to-leader” leaders began emphasizing safety as a a safer organization. Picking up on a core value and learning as the basis for meetings throughout the Forest Service, recommendation by the 1995 Wildland followed by “leader-to-employee” safety, in part by adding safety briefings Firefighters Human Factors Workshop to meeting agendas and by hiring more meetings to help overcome challenges (Putnam 1995), NLC members visited and improve safety in local units (USDA safety personnel. Chief Gail Kimbell seven organizations that also work in (2007–09) asked the NLC to continue Forest Service 2016, 2018a). In addition, high-risk environments and that were the Forest Service began to develop a the safety initiative launched by Chief known for their outstanding safety Bosworth and to encourage cultural process of checking employees in and records (USDA Forest Service 2016). out during field assignments to ensure change at the regional level (USDA The agency compared itself to these Forest Service 2016). that everyone goes home safely. The high-reliability organizations and moved agency also distributed emergency to change its safety culture accordingly. In 2008, the Forest Service established locator devices for employees in remote a Safety Working Core Team to give locations and gave employees the By 2010–11, the Forest Service was ability to use offline maps on handheld strategic direction to Forest Service taking an FLA approach in responding

Fire Management Today 23 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 devices. Units formulated projects for the loss of seven lives in a single year Learning Journey goal of creating a safe, improving safety and began holding were stark reminders of the urgent need rewarding, and resilient work environment sessions for new employees that focused for changing the agency’s safety culture. for everyone—an environment for on safety as a core value (USDA Forest learning to anticipate and avoid unwanted Service 2016). National new employee In 2016, driven by the need for outcomes of all kinds. orientation sessions incorporated an change, the Forest Service adopted a hour-long safety component (USDA set of wildland fire risk management POSITIVE SAFETY Forest Service 2018a). protocols. The protocols included a OUTCOMES “vision for risk management in fire” Launched in the 1990s through In 2014–15, the NLC initiated a third based on three principles: (1) “Life individual and group initiatives in round of Safety Engagement sessions First—everyone goes home;” (2) a the field, the Forest Service’s journey (USDA Forest Service 2016). Using focus on the safety of initial responders toward adopting a learning-based a standard meeting facilitation guide, to emergencies; and (3) reaffirmation safety culture has benefited from a session leaders focused on “personal of the goals of the National Cohesive signature characteristic of decentralized and organizational resilience and the Wildland Fire Management Strategy, organizations (Blum and others 2008): workload-safety balance” (USDA Forest including “safe, effective, efficient risk- the power of grassroots action to effect Service 2016). As in the first two rounds, based wildfire management decisions.” organizational change. The unsung leaders reported employee feedback to heroes who responded to a punitive the NLC, along with summaries of local In 2016, the first biannual gatherings rules-based safety culture in the 1990s actions taken. for seasonal and temporary employees through pushback from below helped were held, and they became known as to change the game, putting the Forest In 2015, the Forest Service formed Life First engagements. Focusing on Service on the road to becoming a research units at the Rocky Mountain wildland firefighters, Life First aimed learning organization (Holdsambeck Research Station to study safety-related to increase the odds that everyone 2018; Hollenshead 2006; Putnam 1995; ways of improving organizational goes home safely by avoiding needless Weick and Sutcliffe 2008). performance and work outcomes. exposure to risk (USDA Forest Service The agency also established a Safety 2016). Over 900 employees and One early indication of change in the Boot Reimbursement Program and stakeholders participated, including Forest Service’s safety culture was an electronic program called eSafety agency administrators, wildland fire rapid expansion of the agency’s safety to integrate the reporting of injuries responders, wildland fire leaders, and personnel after 2000 (USDA Forest and illnesses with the process for filing wildland fire partners and community Service 2018a). The number of Forest workers’ compensation claims. leaders. Participants were invited to Service safety professionals grew from “Stop, Think, and Talk before Acting” less than 20 in 2000 to more than 160 In 2015, the NLC formed working in situations involving exposure to risk. in 2018. groups to complete a programmatic safety analysis for Emergency Medical In 2017, the Forest Service formed a team In 2015, in another sign of progress, the Services and to recommend actions of experts from the Safety Engagement Office of Personnel Management ranked to increase the chances of survival and Life First sessions to design “Life- the Forest Service’s Health and Wellness and rapid recovery for Forest Service Work Dialogues,” with the goal of Program in the top 10 of 291 programs employees who become seriously ill or continual improvement in creating safe, representing 36 Federal agencies (USDA get injured on the job. The NLC also rewarding, and resilient workplaces. The Forest Service 2016). The Forest Service decided to make elements of the Safety dialogues were envisioned as part of a program ranked number five, with a Learning Journey part of the agency’s future all-employee engagement. They score of 97.5 percent, compared to an normal business operations, with were to focus on building trust, managing average score of 62 percent. biannual sessions planned to coincide exposure to hazards of any kind, and with the arrival and departure of better learning from each other. Perhaps the strongest sign of success seasonal and temporary employees. was a decline in fatality rates for the In 2018, the Forest Service launched Forest Service (fig. 1). From 1969 to Tragically, after several years of safety its Stand Up for Each Other initiative, 2009, the Forest Service averaged seven improvements, the Forest Service with multiple sessions for all employees. to eight work-related fatalities per fiscal suffered seven fatalities in fiscal year Although focused on workforce year (USDA Forest Service 2018b). 2015. Seven firefighters paid the ultimate diversity, the initiative has a strong safety After 2010, the 5-year running average price, including three fatalities in an component: it introduced safety as one number of work-related fatalities, which entrapment on the Twisp of five core values for the Forest Service had held steady in the 2000s, began to in Washington. For Chief Tidwell and (in addition to conservation, service, drop. It never again topped 4 per year other Forest Service leaders, the Twisp interdependence, and diversity). Stand after 2012, and the Forest Service achieved tragedy fire came as a shock. Twisp and Up for Each Other also shared the Safety

Fire Management Today 24 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 ■ Fatalities ■ 5-Year Avg. ■ Trend line (Fatalities) Figure 1—Forest Service work-related fatalities began to decline after the Safety Learning Journey began in 2010, suggesting program success. Source: Occupational Health and Safety Administration, cited in USDA Forest Service (2018a). its goal of zero fatalities nationwide in 2009, fatalities associated with aviation, 3, right). The equivalent numbers for fiscal year 2011 and again in 2018, when vehicles, and personal health and fitness aviation fatalities were 3.8 per year and the 5-year average dipped to 2.4. together accounted for 82 percent of 1 per year, a steep decline. all wildland firefighter fatalities (NIFC Another indication of success was 2018b), with aviation alone accounting In accordance with falling numbers the declining number of fire shelter for almost a third (32 percent). of work-related fatalities (fig. 1), deployments across the wildland fire circumstantial evidence suggests a drop in community (fig. 2, left) as well as for In the 5-year period from 2006 to 2010, workplace injuries for the Forest Service the Forest Service alone (fig. 2, right). the Forest Service had 28 aviation in the 2010s. New workers’ compensation Since the late 1980s, the number accidents, compared to 19 from 2011 claims filed since 2010 have declined of deployments has fallen overall to 2015 and only 4 since then (USDA by 36.5 percent (USDA Forest Service (Holdsambeck 2018; RMC 2018), Forest Service 2018b) (fig. 3, left). The 2018b), a sign that fewer employees have indicating a declining number of number of associated fatalities fell suffered injuries on the job. Accordingly, entrapments and burnovers. from 23 in the 5-year period from 2006 the associated costs have also declined. to 2010 to 4 from 2011 to 2015 and Despite rapidly rising medical treatment Part of the reason for the declining none thereafter. In the 57-year period costs, the Forest Service paid $3.1 million fatalities was a drop in the rate of from 1961 to 2018, the average annual less in compensation costs in 2015 (the aviation accidents (fig. 3), a major source number of aviation accidents was 7.35, most recent reporting period) than it paid of Forest Service fatalities. From 2000 to compared to 1.3 in the last 10 years (fig. in 2010.

DEPLOYMENTS FOR ALL DEPLOYMENTS FOR THE FIRE ORGANIZATIONS FOREST SERVICE

Figure 2—Fire shelter deployments for all fire organizations (left) and for the Forest Service (right) have fallen sharply since 2003, indicating declining numbers of firefighter entrapments and burnovers. Source: RMC (2018).

Fire Management Today 25 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 FOREST SERVICE AVERAGE ANNUAL AVIATION-RELATED NUMBER OF AVIATION- ACCIDENTS AND RELATED ACCIDENTS FATALITIES AND FATALITIES

■ 1961–2018 ■ 2009–2018 ■ Fatalities ■ Accidents Figure 3—Forest Service aviation-related accidents and fatalities have fallen sharply in the 2010s (left). So has the average annual number of aviation-related accidents and fatalities (right). Source: USDA Forest Service (2018b).

CULTURAL CHANGE? it, especially Steve Schlientz, Director Hollenshead, E. 2006. Why we need doctrine Employee surveys suggest that a change of the Office of Safety and Health, now. Fire Management Today. 66(2): 7–8. in the Forest Service’s safety culture USDA Forest Service, Washington Kaufman, H. 1960. The forest ranger: a study in administrative behavior. Washington, might be contributing to declining Office, Washington, DC; and Steve Holdsambeck, Branch Chief, Risk DC: Resources for the Future. 259 p. numbers of work-related fatalities Kaufman, H. 1996. The paradox of Management, USDA Forest Service, Fire (USDA Forest Service 2018b). Since excellence: remarks upon receiving the 2010, the Forest Service has conducted and Aviation Management, Washington Dwight Waldo Award of ASPA, June 30. three all-employee safety surveys. In Office, Tucson, AZ. Public Administration Review. 56(6): ii. the latest survey (conducted in 2015), Metropolitan Group. 2014. Decoding the employees strongly agreed that: LITERATURE CITED diversity challenge. USDA Forest Service, Blum, G.; Brown, H.; Cutts, J. [and others]. Leadership Forum, 21 April, Washington, z “I have support from my supervisor 2008. Decentralization in the Forest DC. or manager to improve safety where I Service: origins, implications, and NIFC (National Interagency Fire Center). work,” prospects. 60 p. Unpublished report, 2018a. Wildland fire accidents and Senior Leader Program, class 5, action fatalities by year. https://www.nifc.gov/ z “I have the responsibility to pause and learning team project. On file with: safety/safety_documents/year.pdf. (23 discuss any work activity that looks or USDA Forest Service, Washington Office, October 2018). feels unsafe,” and Washington, DC. NIFC (National Interagency Fire Center). z “I take personal responsibility for DeGrosky, M. 2016. The biggest lie never 2018b. Wildland fire fatalities by type of accident. https://www.nifc.gov/safety/ my own and my coworkers’ safety at told. Wildfire. 25(4): 10–11. http:// wildfiremagazine.org/article/the-biggest- safety_documents/Fatalities-Type-of- work.” lie-never-told/. (27 September 2018). Accident.pdf. (6 November 2018). Dialogos International. 2007. Integrating Pinchot, G. 1947 [reprinted in 1998]. Breaking The surveys suggest, despite the Forest mission accomplishment with safety at new ground. Washington, DC: Island Service’s traditional cultures of “can the U.S. Forest Service: diagnostic memo. Press. 522 p. do” and habituation to autonomy, that Discussion , April 25. USDA Forest Putnam, T. 1995 [updated in 1996]. Findings local decision makers are placing safety Service, Washington Office, Washington, from the Wildland Firefighters Human first. Moreover, employees seem to DC. Factors Workshop. Tech. Rep. 9551– 2855–MTDC. Missoula, MT: USDA feel authorized to raise concerns about Gabbert, B. 2013. How today’s Yarnell tragedy fits into the history of multiple fatality Forest Service, Missoula Technology and unsafe behaviors and situations, despite wildland fires. 30 June. Wildfire Today. Development Center. 74 p. the cultural taboo against dialogue in https://wildfiretoday.com/2013/06/30/ Pyne, S.J. 2001. Year of the fires: The story Forest Service culture. history-of-multiple-fatality-wildland-fires/. of the great fires of 1910. New York, NY: (25 October 2018). Viking. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Holdsambeck, S. 2018. Personal RMC (Risk Management Committee). 2018. The author thanks Forest Service communication. Branch Chief, Risk RMC safety gram archive. National safety professionals for furnishing the Management, Fire and Aviation Wildfire Coordinating Group. https:// www.nwcg.gov/committees/risk- information and materials for this Management, USDA Forest Service, Washington Office, Tucson, AZ. management-committee/resources/rmc- article and for reviewing and improving safety-gram-archive. (7 November 2018).

Fire Management Today 26 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Smith, M. 2016. The big lie. Wildland Fire Leadership, 16 June. http:// wildlandfireleadership.blogspot. com/2016/06/the-big-lie.html. (27 September 2018). USDA Forest Service. 2016. Background. In: USDA Forest Service. Safety engagement: appendix F. 5 p. Unpublished report. On file with: USDA Forest Service, Washington Office, Washington, DC. USDA Forest Service. 2018a. Forest Service safety journey. National New Employee Orientation, October. Stock presentation. On file with: Steve Schlientz, USDA Forest Service, Washington Office, Washington, DC. USDA Forest Service. 2018b. 2007-2016: a decade of investment leading to improved workplaces. Workplace Dialogues 2018, briefing paper. 3. 4 p. Unpublished report. On file with: USDA Forest Service, Washington Office, Washington, DC. Weick, K.; Sutcliffe, K.M. 2008. Organizing for higher reliability: lessons learned from wildland firefighters. Fire Management Today. 68(2): 13–19. WFLDP (Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program). 2018. WFLDP background. https://www.nwcg.gov/ wfldp#collapse2. (6 November 2018). WFLLC (Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center). 2018. Latest discussions/ Recent lessons learned. https://www. wildfirelessons.net/home. (6 November 2018). Williams, J. 2002. Lessons from Thirtymile: transition fires and fire orders. Fire Management Today. 62(3): 6–8. ■

Fire Management Today 27 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 2017; Jahn and Black 2017; Useem and others 2005; Waldron and Ebbeck 2015) Emotional and and learning organizational theory (see, for example, Black 2009; Black and Dether 2006)—confirms that high- performing teams and their leaders need Social Intelligence to display openness, nondefensiveness, and a willingness and ability to consider and integrate diverse perspectives. These Competencies in are core ESI behaviors (Druskat and Wolff 2001). Since ESI competencies can be acquired through training as well as nurtured through experience, the Incident Command first author was curious about which ESI competencies are most valuable in incident command, how well the A.E. Black, R.E. Boyatzis, K. Thiel, and K. Rochford current wildland fire training and development system is nurturing these important skills, and where we might ffective leadership of wildland and explores the possible applications for look for future improvements. To find fire operations requires paying training and development. out, the first author contracted with the careful attention to the fire second, a leading scholar in the study of Eitself and to relationships both internal As a leader of a diverse set of formal ESI and leadership competencies and and external to the incident. At the and informal teams, the successful IC performance at Case Western Reserve center of the action is the incident needs to be able to play a number of University, to conduct a study of the commander (IC), who must integrate roles at different points in time—as ESI necessary in incident command her or his skill in managing the technical executive, as innovator, as teacher, (Boyatzis 1982, 2018). aspects of wildland fire operations with and as pastor. The IC supervises and relationship management as well as directs a variety of specialists drawn motivational and negotiating skills. from a variety of organizations— BRIEF REVIEW OF THE Federal, State, local, and/or county. STUDY The set of competencies required to Additionally, she or he interacts with a Boyatzis and others (2017) interviewed manage and lead others effectively is multitude of partners, community-based ICs1 using a critical incident technique referred to as emotional and social groups, interested citizens, residents, in which each IC was asked to tell intelligence (ESI) (Boyatzis 1982, 2018; and business owners. The ability to Goleman, 1998). These competencies switch among various roles and appeal have been found to predict outstanding to people from various backgrounds 1 Although the target population was leadership across a variety of professions, and stakeholder groups would seem ICs (type 1 and 2 and Area Command), due to restrictions on use of the Resource Ordering Supply System (which tracks qualifications for wildland fire personnel The successful incident commander plays a number in the United States), only current Federal of roles at different points in time—as executive, as employees with an agency email address innovator, as teacher, and as pastor. were eligible to participate.

A.E. Black is a social science analyst for the from large Federal agencies (including to require a high and sustained level Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research the military) (Boyatzis 1982; Koman of ESI, in addition to a high degree of Station, Missoula, MT; R.E Boyatzis and Wolff 2008), to product innovators technical competence in wildland fire is a distinguished university professor of (Dreyfus 2008; Kendall 2016), to behavior and wildland fire management Organizational Behavior, Psychology, and family business leaders (Miller 2016), strategies and tactics. Cognitive Science and K. Thiel is a doctoral to higher education administrators candidate in Organizational Behavior (Babu 2016), to knowledge worker Previous applied research into at Case Western Reserve University, teams (Mahon and others 2014) and successful team dynamics in wildland Weatherhead School of Management, pastors (Boyatzis and others 2011). fire management—mostly through the Cleveland, OH; and K. Rochford is an This article provides a brief overview lenses of high-reliability organizing (see, assistant professor in the Department of of the first study of ESI in wildland fire for example, Black and McBride 2013; Management, Eccles School of Business at management (Boyatzis and others 2017) Black and others 2012; Fox and others the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT .

Fire Management Today 28 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 a story about a time when “he/she felt effective (then ineffective) as an IC.” Interviews were recorded and Emotional and Social Intelligence transcribed, then coded for presence and frequency of each of the 12 ESI Competencies Important for Incident competencies most consistently related Commanders to effectiveness of leaders in various fields (Boyatzis 2018; see the sidebar): Competencies associated Competencies associated with with average and outstanding outstanding performance 1. Adaptability, performance 2. Emotional self-control, Achievement Orientation: Striving Emotional Self-Control: Keeping 3. Emotional self-awareness, to improve or meeting a standard of disruptive emotions and impulses in excellence. check. 4. Positive outlook, Organizational Awareness: Adaptability: Flexibility in handling 5. Achievement orientation, Reading a group’s emotional change. 6. Empathy, currents and power relationships. 7. Organizational awareness, Influence: Wielding effective tactics Empathy: Sensing others’ feelings 8. Inspirational leadership, for persuasion. and perspectives and taking an active 9. Influence, interest in their concerns. 10. Coaching and mentoring, Conflict Management: Negotiating Coaching and Mentoring: Sensing and resolving disagreements. others’ development needs and 11. Conflict management, and bolstering their abilities. 12. Teamwork. Teamwork: Working with others Inspirational Leadership: Inspiring toward shared goals. Creating group and guiding individuals and groups. Interviews were also coded for possible synergy in pursuing collective goals. emergent themes that were important Note: The emotional self-awareness and positive outlook competencies were not found to be for IC performance but not among the either distinguishing or threshold competencies for incident commanders. 12 ESI competencies. Sources: Definitions are from the scales of the Emotional and Social Competency Inventory (Boyatzis To determine whether some skills are 2009; Boyatzis and Goleman 1996); the associations with performance are adapted from Boyatzis and particularly important, Boyatzis (1982) others (2017). recommended comparing “outstanding” performers to others. “Outstanding” performers were identified by collecting Emotional self-control, adaptability, 1. “[A]ppreciation of interpersonal nominations from peers, bosses, and empathy, coach and mentor, and dynamics, demonstrated by the use of subordinates (Lewin and Zwany 1976). inspirational leadership distinguish pre-season time to focus on building The sample representing “outstanding” outstanding [performance]. … trust among possible team members performers was drawn from those Meanwhile, achievement orientation, … [and] to build relationships nominated by multiple sources. The organizational awareness, influence, and educate agency staff and comparison sample was drawn from conflict management, and teamwork administrators;” and the remaining group. This resulted in [were] necessary competencies for a list of 34 ICs (17 from each group); achieving average performance, 2. The tendency among outstanding however, due to travel, prior obligations, but not sufficient alone to enable performers to describe “others and other difficulties, results were based outstanding performance. … in more humanizing terms” by on interviews of 15 ICs (split between Two competencies—emotional emphasizing the relationship between the two samples). Interviewers and self-awareness and positive the speaker and subject, such as coders were blind to which performance outlook—were not found to be referring to fireline personnel as group participants were assigned. Only either distinguishing or threshold “kids out there” or to the public as nonagency researchers interacted with competencies. “families.” Dehumanizing language the ICs and the resulting data after the is less personal and turns people into initial project invitation. Boyatzis and others (2017) identified categories, such as referring to fireline two emergent themes that provide personnel simply as “resources.” In terms of the 12 ESI competencies, additional insight into behaviors that according to Boyatzis and others (2017), distinguish outstanding from average Given the multiple diverse groups analysis showed the following: performance among ICs: involved in any incident, effectiveness

Fire Management Today 29 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 requires the IC to “see” people—her or the same time (Jack and others 2013a, competencies, in addition to ensuring his team, line officers, cooperators, and 2013b). Learning by paying attention to that the current training and development others—sensitively to be able to build emotions and to the subtle dynamics of intentionally target task-related technical relationships. The use of the empathy social relationships only occurs when our skills, the wildland fire community could competency helps, but the use of time, a brains are operating in DMN. consider ways to deliberately train and coaching attitude, and even simple word support the development of emotional choice suggest that the outstanding ICs In comparing the lists of ESIs for and social skills such as coaching and see others more personally. average and outstanding performers mentoring. Lessons learned in executive (sidebar on previous page), it could education highlight the significant Results suggest, as evidenced by the be postulated that the ESIs for role of peers as coaches and mentors, presence of five important competencies average performance are more task particularly when the focus is on positive (sidebar on previous page), that the quality focused than the ESIs for outstanding reinforcement and joint development, of training and development of fire performers, which add ESIs associated as opposed to focusing on gaps and personnel as they come up through the with relationships. The two emergent weaknesses (Boyatzis and others 2013). ranks is good. At the same time, results themes support this, suggesting that Although coaching and mentoring also suggest an opportunity for more outstanding performers deliberately pay comprise only one of the competencies targeted training to consistently cultivate more attention to relationship building observed in participating ICs, this one specific ESI skills. This is evidenced by the and coaching and mentoring, in other competency enables the others to be greater number of ESI competencies and words, use more of the DMN (Boyatzis developed and therefore needs special frequency of their use found among the and others 2017). Obviously, both attention. ICs regarded as outstanding by their peers, modes are needed for successful incident subordinates, and supervisors. management; the suggestion here Many of the National Wildfire seems to be that effectiveness depends Coordinating Group’s (NWCG’s) POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS on whether the appropriate mode is training efforts are focused on The wildland fire community could use selected and how rapidly one is able building requisite technical skills. these insights in complementary ways, move between the TPN and DMN. However, the interagency wildland including: fire community, with the NWCG at Let’s consider current training and the center, has also explicitly sought z Conducting a followup study to development in light of this. Current to identify and build leadership confirm these results and test the wildland fire training and development competencies (NWCG 2003). Even a emergent hypotheses; and in the United States rely on both brief survey of the NWCG’s training traditional learning (classroom and/or and development curricula reveals z Reviewing existing training and online) and practice (monitored on-the- a system that is constantly being development programs to identify job training) (NWCG 2018). One could updated, with many updates having the ways in which the current process consider these phases as “educational” potential to incorporate the kinds of might be enhanced to further and “practical,” with the combination insights discussed here. For example, develop the full complement of ESI intended to ensure both cognitive expansion of the peer networks and competencies. knowledge and demonstrated ability. ongoing benchmarking and learning Ample evidence over the past 32 years established under the “Leadership is One way to consider these results is in leadership and education studies Action” framework (NWCG 2008) through the lens of new neuroscience indicates that a combination of these and expanding the availability of research, which indicates that the can effectively develop ESI in adults the curricula to nonoperational fire human brain makes a tradeoff between (Boyatzis and others 2002) and that personnel (such as Command and efforts to carry out a task and efforts these improvements can be sustained General staff (NWCG 2010, 2014)) to relate to others (Boyatzis and others (Boyatzis 2008). Research suggests that have the potential to provide the 2014; Jack and others 2013a; Rochford functional performance (that is, the training and practice grounds for and others, in press). This emerging ability to quickly toggle between the developing critical DMN/ESI skills work suggests that our brains cannot DMN and TPN) can be intentionally and the functional capacity to toggle simultaneously complete both technical built as well through deliberate, quickly between task- and relationship- and emotional tasks (Boyatzis and specific practices (Boyatzis and others focused leadership. others 2014). That is, we can apply 2014). Thus, the current system seems information already in our heads structurally capable of developing ESI Thus, it is apparent that training and to complete a task (called the Task competencies. The question is: Do the development structures useful for Positive Network, or TPN) or we can content and evaluation also support this? developing ESI competencies exist. be open to new stimuli (such as new Could they, and how might they, be information, called the Default Mode Given the gap between average and further optimized to ensure development Network, or DMN) but not both at outstanding performance in ESI of all critical ESIs?

Fire Management Today 30 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 LITERATURE CITED Boyatzis, R.E.; Rochford, K.; Jack, Frontiers in Psychology. 5(1322). DOI: Babu, M. 2016. Characteristic of effective A.I. 2014. Antagonistic neural 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01322. eCollection leadership of community college networks underlying differentiated 2014. presidents. leadership roles. Frontiers in Human Miller, S.P. 2014. Next-generation leadership 200 p. Cleveland, OH: Case Western Neuroscience. 8(114). DOI: 10.3389/ development in family businesses: the Reserve University. fnhum.2014.00114. critical roles of shared vision and family Black, A.E. 2009. The key decision Boyatzis, R.E.; Thiel, K.; Rochford, K.; climate. Frontiers in Psychology. 5(1335). log: facilitating high reliability Black, A.E. 2017. Emotional and DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01335. and organizational learning. Fire social competencies of incident team NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating Management Today. 69(2): 5–10. commanders fighting wildfires. Journal Group). 2003. Leadership curriculum Black, A.; Dether, D. 2006. Learning from of Applied Behavioral Sciences. 53(4): design and delivery strategy. NWCG escaped prescribed fires—lessons for 498–516. Curric. Mgt. Issue Pap. 40. 3 p. high reliability. Fire Management Today. Dreyfus, C. 2008. Identifying competencies Unpublished paper. On file with: 66(4): 50–56. that predict effectiveness of R and D NWCG. Black, A.E.; McBride, B.B. 2013. Safety managers. Journal of Management NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating climate in the U.S. Federal wildland fire Development. 27(1): 76–91. Group). 2008. Establishing the management community: influences Druskat, V.U.; Wolff, S.B. 2001. Building framework for “Leadership is Action.” of organizational, environmental, the emotional intelligence of groups. NWCG Curric. Mgt. Issue Pap. 93. group, and individual characteristics. Harvard Business Review. 79(3): 81–90. 2 p. Unpublished paper. On file with: International Journal Wildland Fire. Fox, R.; Gabor, E.; Thomas, D.; Ziegler, J.; NWCG. 22(6): 850–861. Black, A. 2017. Cultivating a reluctance NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating Black, A.E.; Saveland, J; Thomas, D; to simplify: exploring the radio Group). 2010. Assignment of course Ziegler, J. 2012. Using escaped prescribed communication context in wildland name and number for S–580 replacement fire reviews to improve organizational firefighting. International Journal of course. NWCG Curric. Mgt. Issue Pap. learning. Final report. JFSP project Wildland Fire. 26(8): 719–731. 107. 1 p. Unpublished paper. On file with: 10–2–05–1. Boise, ID: Joint Fire Science Goleman, D. 1998. Working with emotional NWCG. https://www.nwcg.gov/sites/ Program. 31 p. intelligence. New York: Bantam. 383 p. default/files/issue_papers/IssuePaper107.pdf. Boyatzis, R.E. 1982. The competent Jack, A.I.; Dawson, A.; Begany, K. [and [Date accessed unknown]. manager: a model for effective others]. 2013a. fMRI reveals reciprocal NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating performance. New York, NY: John inhibition between social and physical Group). 2014. Assignment of course Wiley and Sons. 342 p. cognitive domains. Neuroimage. 66: name and number for the new leadership Boyatzis, R.E. 2008. Leadership 385–401. course. NWCG Curric. Mgt. Issue Development from a Complexity Jack, A.I.; Dawson, A.J.; Norr, M. 2013b. Pap. 124. 2 p. Unpublished paper. On Perspective. Consulting Psychology Seeing human: distinct and overlapping file with: NWCG. https://www.nwcg. Journal. 60(4):298-313. neural signatures associated with two gov/sites/default/files/issue_papers/ Boyatzis, R.E. 2009. A behavioral approach forms of dehumanization. NeuroImage. IssuePaper124.pdf. [Date accessed to emotional intelligence. Journal of 79(1): 313–328. unknown]. Management Development. 28: 749–770. Jahn, J.; Black, A.E. 2017. A model of NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating Boyatzis, R.E. 2018. The behavioral communicative and hierarchical Group). 2018. National Incident level of emotional intelligence and its foundations of high reliability organizing Management System: Wildland Fire measurement. Frontiers in Psychology. in wildland firefighting teams. Qualification System Guide. PMS 310–1. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01438 Management Communication Quarterly. https://www.nwcg.gov/sites/default/files/ Boyatzis, R.E.; Goleman, D. 1996. DOI: 10.1177/0893318917691358. publications/pms310-1.pdf. (24 October). Emotional and Social Competency Kendall, L. 2016. A theory of micro-level Rochford, K.; Boyatzis, R.E.; French, S.; Inventory. Boston: Hay Group/Korn dynamic capabilities: how technology Jack, A. [In press]. Neural roots of Ferr y. leaders innovate with Human ethical leadership and the development Boyatzis, R.E.; Stubbs, E.C.; Taylor, S.N. Connection. 292 p. Cleveland, OH: of better leaders: the default mode 2002. Learning cognitive and emotional Case Western Reserve University. Ph.D. network versus the task positive network. intelligence competencies through dissertation. Journal of Business Ethics. graduate management education. Koman, L.; Wolff, S. 2008. Emotional Useem M.; Cook J.; Sutton L. 2005. Journal on Learning and Education. intelligence competencies in the team Developing leaders for decision making 1(2): 150–162. and team leader, Journal of Management under stress: wildland firefighters in the Boyatzis, R.E.; Brizz, T.; Godwin, L. 2011. Development. 12(1): 56–75. South Canyon Fire and its aftermath. The effect of religious leaders’ emotional Lewin, A.Y.; Zwany, A. 1976. Peer Academy of Management Learning and and social competencies on improving nominations: a model, literature critique Education. 4(4): 461–485. parish vibrancy. Journal of Leadership and and a paradigm for research. Personnel Waldron, A.L.; Ebbeck, V. 2015. The Organizational Studies. 18(2): 192–206. Psychology. 29(3): 423–447. relationship of mindfulness and self- Boyatzis, R.E.; Smith, M.; Van Oosten, E.; Mahon, E.; Taylor, S.; Boyatzis, R. compassion to desired wildland fire Woolford, L. 2013. Developing resonant 2014. Antecedents of organizational leadership. International Journal of leaders through emotional intelligence, engagement: exploring vision, mood, and Wildland Fire. 24(2): 201–211. vision and coaching. Organizational perceived organizational support with ■ Dynamics. 42: 17–24. emotional intelligence as a moderator.

Fire Management Today 31 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Restoring more natural conditions and reducing hazardous fuels is now a major focus of Federal land managers in the Southwest.

of soil, and impairment of watershed functions.

Ponderosa pine forests recover slowly after severe fire and may not return to prefire conditions for hundreds of years, if ever. Several large fires in the Managing Unplanned Flagstaff, AZ, area and throughout the Southwest have illustrated the risk posed by these conditions and the urgency of addressing the situation. Ignitions: Restoring more natural conditions and reducing hazardous fuels are now a major focus of Federal land managers Staff Ride for in the area. Mechanical removal prior to burning is used when possible, but the limited value of the material has made Leadership Training landscape-level mechanical treatment challenging. Prescribed fire and managing natural ignitions are currently Lincoln Bramwell, Anne Buckelew, Mike Elson, Cavan Fitzsimmons, Jada the only ways to improve conditions Jackson, Kevin Khung, Erica Nevins, and Ellen Shaw across significant acreages in this region.

UNPLANNED FIRE FOR he history of wildland fire ground fuels and fuels leads to RESOURCE BENEFITS management in the Southwest— catastrophic crown fires under dry and The Forest Service changed its full- and northern Arizona in windy conditions. These changes have suppression policy in 1978 to give Tparticular—has been well researched also resulted in drastically different line officers more options to manage and well documented (Cooper 1960; habitat conditions for plants and unplanned wildfires (Nelson 1979). The Covington and Moore 1994; Finney animals, and the resulting high-intensity policy was founded on the knowledge and others 2005; Pyne 2016; Swetnam fires can lead to severe flooding, loss and understanding that, under the right and Baisan 1996). Prior to Euro- American settlement, frequent surface fires in the ponderosa pine zone kept forest conditions open and ground fuel The authors were members of an action learning team as part of the Forest Service’s Senior Leader accumulations low. Ponderosa pine is Program in 2017. The group project focused on leadership training issues associated with managing well adapted to frequent surface fires; natural ignitions for resource benefits on wildland fires. Lincoln Bramwell is the chief historian, with thick bark and self-pruning lower Washington Office (detached), Fort Collins, CO; Anne Buckelew is an assistant budget coordinator, branches, mature trees rarely succumb State and Private Forestry, Office of the Deputy Chief, Washington, DC; Mike Elson is the district to surface fires. ranger, Flagstaff Ranger District, Coconino National Forest, Flagstaff, AZ; Cavan Fitzsimmons is the staff officer for Recreation, Lands, Minerals, and Heritage, Tongass National Forest, Ketchikan, Over the last 150 years, the normal fire AK; Jada Jackson is the coordinator of the Forest Legacy Program, Northeastern State and Private interval has been disrupted by grazing Forestry, Princeton, NJ; Kevin Khung is the district ranger, Pagosa Ranger District, San Juan and other impacts of settlement. As National Forest, Pagosa Springs, CO; Erica Nevins is the director of Program Development, Budget, a result, tree densities are now much and Accountability, Pacific Southwest Region, Vallejo, CA; and Ellen Shaw is the deputy director of higher and the accumulation of the Partnership Office, Washington Office, Washington, DC.

Fire Management Today 32 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 conditions, fire can result in a positive effect on wildland resources. However, the goal of returning fire to the landscape to serve the ecological health of forest lands proved so elusive to professionals in the field that Congress, in the Federal Land Assistance, Management and Enhancement Act of 2009, directed the wildland fire community, in association with State and local partners, to develop a National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy (WFLC 2010, 2012, 2015). That strategy focuses on: z Safely and effectively extinguishing fire; z When needed, using fire where allowable; z Managing natural resources; and z As a Nation, living with wildfire.

The Flagstaff Ranger District (on the Figure 1—The Mormon Fire, a managed unplanned ignition, cleaning up pine needles, old logs, and Coconino National Forest in Arizona) dead grasses that would otherwise contribute to wildfire danger. Photo: True Brown, Coconino National managed a natural ignition for resource Forest (June 2, 2017). benefit for the first time in 2009. The 1987 Coconino National Forest Plan and fire management plan permit this management approach outside of National Forest. This led to decreased Our Senior Leader Program action designated wildland–urban interface fire intensity, which opened a window learning team interviewed regional fire areas and congressionally designated of opportunity to successfully allow leaders in the Southwestern Region and the Mormon Fire to achieve objectives found a need to increase line officers’ outlined in the forest’s 1987 land and skills and confidence in managing resource management plan (fig. 1). unplanned ignitions in order to safely Line officers tend to be return more fire to the landscape. Our keenly aware of the risk DILEMMA: SUPPORTING team wanted to develop a product to they are assuming for an LINE OFFICERS’ TOUGH meet the following objectives: action that is essentially DECISIONS z Build practical familiarity with the use voluntary. Although the Southwestern Region of of naturally ignited wildfire; the Forest Service had seen successes and had policies in place to support z Demonstrate what success looks like; using unplanned ignitions to treat z Illustrate the region’s interest in wilderness areas, where more restrictive fuels that had accumulated over many developing line officers; and standards apply. Over the succeeding years, regional leadership felt that z Encourage peer-to-peer learning. years, the district became more and opportunities to responsibly use natural more experienced and active in using ignitions were being missed. A number this tool, with increasing numbers of factors were likely responsible, but SOLUTION: POSITIVE- and sizes of managed natural fires, as lack of line officer confidence and OUTCOME STAFF RIDE conditions and locations allowed. perceived lack of support for a line We understood that setting goal-driven officer’s decision may have been the policy, on its own, did not achieve goals. For example, the 2016 Mormon Fire was most important reasons for not choosing To achieve goals, we needed to teach a lightning-ignited wildfire located on the to manage unplanned wildland fires for and encourage goal-aligned behavior. southwest side of Mormon Mountain resource benefits. Line officers tended— With the intent of shaping goal-aligned on the Flagstaff district. Consistent and still tend—to be keenly aware of the behaviors, our team borrowed the spring rain and snowfall moderated risk they are assuming for an action that wildland fire organization’s staff ride seasonal conditions on the Coconino is essentially voluntary. concept and took line officers and fire

Fire Management Today 33 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 managers step-by-step through the utilized to produce goal-aligned behaviors The challenges were great but the process of successfully managing an across our organization. potential rewards were even greater. The unplanned wildland fire on their unit. Coconino National Forest effectively THE MORMON FIRE STAFF managed the Mormon Fire and treated The military originally developed the RIDE over 7,800 acres (3,200 ha) over the staff ride concept for studying leadership Our group worked with the course of the 2-week incident. decisions made during a battle when Southwestern Region to identify a alternative decisions could have been successfully managed unplanned As our team began to interview the staff, made. A staff ride requires active wildfire. The regional office supplied line, and fire managers who participated participation and immersion in the event us with information on a number in managing the fire, four themes arose being studied. The staff ride develops of such wildfires managed by its again and again: leaders by exposing them to hard truths employees, with varying levels of size in an experiential learning environment. and complexity. We settled on the 2016 z Communication, It conveys lessons from the past to Mormon Fire on the Coconino National z Relationships, present-day leaders by emphasizing Forest primarily for its complexity—we z Trust, and “learning” rather than “training.” did not want to showcase a fire where z Team ownership. the decisions were easy. Borrowing the concept, the Forest Service generated staff rides on disaster fires (such The Mormon Fire offered every These themes were critical to creating as the 1953 Rattlesnake Fire in California, conceivable roadblock to managing an a successful atmosphere and enabled the 1990 Dude Fire in Arizona, and the unplanned ignition, including: everyone involved to give each other 2012 Cramer Fire in Idaho (Wildland space when things inevitably did not Fire LLC 2013)), with the intent of z Overgrown forest surrounding a large go as planned on the incident. These learning from past mistakes. Our action exurban community; themes truly form the building blocks learning team adapted the approach for managing any unplanned ignition. and designed a staff ride around a z Protected activity centers for threatened Mexican spotted owl; and successfully managed unplanned wildfire We divided the fire into four key events to demonstrate what a favorable outcome z Occurrence during the summer tourist and built the stops (or “stands,” as they looks like. The result is a learning tool season in Flagstaff and Sedona, AZ, are called on staff rides) around critical that can be adapted to any region and which would suffer from smoke impacts. moments that participants identified as key to their success in managing the fire:

z Initial decision; z Collaboration with external partners; z Discussions about exposure to risk; and z Adaptability in decision making.

The stands take participants through the many decisions and the extensive foundational work that should happen well before the first smoke appears. In traveling from stand to stand, the participants see the need to work across resource areas both internally and with external partners. They witness the process of weighing safety and resource risk management decisions, and they learn the need for dealing with constantly changing conditions on the ground.

Our team conducted a pilot staff ride on the Coconino National Forest on the site of the Mormon Fire near Flagstaff Participants on the staff ride in August 2017 discuss management dilemmas on the Mormon Fire. Photo: in August 2017. We had 6 experts USDA Forest Service, Brady Smith.

Fire Management Today 34 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 and staff hosting the staff ride for the Third, our work reinforced the 26 participants who took part in the The staff ride concept importance of partnerships: we 2-day ride. The staff ride concept was accomplish work more successfully already familiar to the participants, who is a familiar method when we involve all our stakeholders accepted and embraced it as a way of for simulating the and partners. The Mormon Fire simulating the tension, anxieties, and tension, anxieties, illustrated the practice of working across decisions that occur before, during, and and decisions that boundaries and across landscapes to after managing incidents. Our pilot achieve common goals. We cannot do ride provided a proof of concept from occur before, during, this work without our partners. the field. Participants in the August and after managing staff ride, along with our partners incidents. Finally, leadership intent was and advisors, provided feedback and the inspiration for this project. comments that encouraged further use Southwestern Regional Forester Cal and development of the Mormon Fire with the decision to be made. The Joyner and his regional fire team Staff Ride. guide presents questions for the group provided clear and direct information to discuss, and it includes maps and about their needs and what we could EXPERIENCE THE STAFF directions. You can find the guide at: produce to help their efforts. RIDE VIRTUALLY https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_ Through the course of staff ride DOCUMENTS/fseprd580563.pdf. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS development, our team produced several This work would not have been possible products that are available to view, THE MORMON FIRE without professional support, input, download, and use. It is our hope and time, and skills from the Coconino STORY MAP National Forest, the Forest Service’s intent that the Mormon Fire Staff Ride For those unable to travel to the site Southwestern Regional Office, the will be a template, providing an example of the Mormon Fire, our team worked School of Forestry at Northern Arizona of how to use the staff ride concept to with the Southwest Fire Science University, the Southwest Fire Science highlight and teach experiences from Consortium to craft a story map. The Consortium, and the Wildland Fire other events that had positive outcomes. map is an online tool that shares the Lessons Learned Center. We are content of the Mormon Fire Staff grateful for their inspiration, assistance, THE MORMON FIRE STAFF Ride Participant’s Guide, combined and encouragement for this project. with background reading, videos, RIDE FACILITATOR GUIDE Their dedication to protecting lives maps, and photos. It allows anyone to The staff ride is designed to be led and managing natural resources in the experience the positive-outcome staff by a facilitator who sets the stage for Southwest is the story we sought to ride from their home units. You can discussions at each stand and leads the share through this staff ride. group through questions designed to get find the story map at: https://arcg. them to think for themselves about the is/1PLaqf. leadership decisions they would make. LITERATURE CITED Cooper, C.F. 1960. Changes in vegetation, A facilitator’s guide gives direction and LESSONS LEARNED structure, and growth of southwestern background on how to successfully In preparing the Mormon Fire Staff pine forests since White settlement. facilitate the Mormon Fire Staff Ride. Ride, we identified a number of Ecological Monographs. 30: 129–164. You can find the guide at: https://www. issues that are relevant in today’s fire Covington, W.W.; Moore, M.M. 1994. fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/ management world. First, managing Southwestern ponderosa pine forest fseprd580562.pdf. wildfire incidents for ecological effect is structure: changes since Euro-American a complex issue that is national in scope. settlement. Journal of Forestry. 92(1): Every region deals with this challenge 39–47. THE MORMON FIRE STAFF Finney, M.A.; McHugh, C.W.; Grenfell, I.C. RIDE PARTICIPANT’S GUIDE and opportunity, and through this project we underscored and validated 2005. Stand- and landscape-level effects The target audience for the Mormon of prescribed burning on two Arizona known risks and hurdles and offered a Fire Staff Ride is the line officer. wildfires. Canadian Journal of Forest The event focuses on helping line fresh look at addressing them. Research. 35(7): 1714–1722. officers gather information about an Nelson, T.C. 1979. Fire management policy unplanned ignition and experience the Second, feedback from the pilot staff in the national forests—a new era. dilemmas associated with the major ride provided a framework for using Journal of Forestry. 77(11): 723–725. decisions made during the Mormon this tool—a safe learning environment Pyne, S.J. 2016. The Southwest: a fire survey. Fire. They use a participant’s guide for line officers to confidently practice Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press. 206 p. for a description of each stand, of the making and implementing leadership decisions, with consideration and Swetnam, T.W.; Baisan, C.H. 1996. situation at a particular time on the Historical fire regime patterns in the fire, and of the dilemma associated respect for lives and risk.

Fire Management Today 35 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Southwestern United States since AD www.forestsandrangelands.gov/ 1700. In: Allen, C.D., ed. Fire effects in strategy/documents/reports/phase2/ southwestern forests: Proceedings of the CSPhaseIIReport_FINAL20120524.pdf. Second La Mesa Fire Symposium. Gen. (2 April 2018). Tech. Rep. RM–GTR–286. Missoula, WFLC (Wildland Fire Leadership MT: USDA Forest Service, Rocky Council). 2015. The national strategy: Mountain Research Station: 11–32. the final phase in the development WFLC (Wildland Fire Leadership of the National Cohesive Strategy Council). 2010. A National Cohesive for Wildland Fire Management. Wildland Fire Management Strategy. https://www.forestsandrangelands. http://www.forestsandrangelands. gov/strategy/documents/strategy/ gov/strategy/documents/reports/1_ CSPhaseIIINationalStrategyApr2014. CohesiveStrategy03172011.pdf. (2 April pdf. (2 April 2018). 2018). Wildland Fire LLC (Lessons Learned WFLC (Wildland Fire Leadership Center). 2013. Cramer Fire staff ride Council). 2012. A National Cohesive [Video]. YouTube. https://www. Wildland Fire Management youtube.com/watch?v=xrIhJVHJ07Y. Strategy: phase II report. http:// [Date accessed unknown]. ■

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Fire Management Today is accepting fire-related contributions! Send in your articles and photographs to be featured in future issues.

Subjects of published material include:

z Aviation z Fire History z Planning (including z Communication z Fire Use (including Budgeting) z Cooperation/Partnerships Prescribed Fire) z Preparedness z Ecological Restoration z Fuels Management z Prevention z Education z Firefighting Experiences z Safety z Equipment and Technology z Incident Management z Suppression z Fire Behavior z Information Management z Training z Fire Ecology (including Systems) z Weather z z Fire Effects Personnel z Wildland–Urban Interface

Contact the editor via email at [email protected].

Fire Management Today 36 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Firefighters in 1911 suppressing a wildfire on an unknown national forest in the Forest Service’s Northern Region. Suppressing all fires was the Forest Service’s standard policy until the 1970s. Photo: USDA Forest Service.

WILDLAND FIRE TERMINOLOGY As fire management policy has shifted, wildland fire terminology has changed. In current usage, Using Unplanned Ignitions: based on Fire Executive Council (2009) and National Wildfire Evolution of Forest Coordinating Group (2018): z Wildland fire is any nonstructure fire that occurs in vegetation or natural fuels. Wildland fire Service Policy includes prescribed fire and wildfire. z Wildfire is an unplanned ignition Hutch Brown of a wildland fire (such as fires caused by lightning or volcanoes or unauthorized and accidental n the last 50 years, Federal fire policy United States was “the Brazil of its day” human-caused fires). Wildfires has undergone tremendous change. (Pyne, n.d.). More than a quarter of the includes escaped prescribed fires. Some people (including the author) original U.S. forest estate, mostly in the z Unplanned ignition is the initiation Ican still remember when the goal of East, was cleared away, partly through of a wildland fire that was wildland firefighting was simple: put out the use of fire. Farmers, settlers, and unplanned, regardless of cause. every fire by 10 a.m. on the morning after others spread fire across vast landscapes, it was first detected. Since then, Federal and huge areas went up in flames. z Prescribed fire is any fire policy for wildland fire management intentionally ignited by has grown more complex. The changes The early conservation movement management actions in triggered shifts in terminology, such as espoused fire control to protect accordance with applicable laws, “wildfire” versus “wildland fire.” (For America’s remaining forests. The first policies, and regulations to meet some of the definitions currently in use, national parks were founded in the late specific objectives. see the sidebar.) 1800s, including Yellowstone National z Use of wildland fire is Park in 1872, and the U.S. Army management of either wildfire or When and why did changes in Federal assigned units to protect the parks by prescribed fire to meet resource fire policy occur? This article focuses suppressing fires wherever they could objectives specified in land and on the evolution of the Forest Service’s (van Wagtendonk 2007). resource management plans. policy of using unplanned ignitions to reduce fuels and allow fire to play its Note: Under policies before FEC (2009), natural ecological role. the use of unplanned natural ignitions Hutch Brown is the editor of Fire Management was called “prescribed natural fire” THE FIRE REVOLUTION Today and a program specialist for the Forest (NWCG 1995) and later “wildland fire In the 19th century, according to the Service, Office of Communication, Washington use” (NWCG 2003). fire historian Stephen J. Pyne, the Office, Washington, DC.

Fire Management Today 37 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Established in 1905, the Forest Service of Agriculture and the Interior. The followed suit, vigorously suppressing The 1995 policy urged team reaffirmed the Federal policy of wildland fires (Graves 1919; Pinchot using natural ignitions for resource 1905). After the Big Blowup in the Federal fire managers benefits (FMPRT 1989). The public Northern Rockies in 1910 resulted in to consider “all wildland controversy might have discouraged 84 firefighter fatalities (NICC 2018), fires, regardless some land managers from risking the agency virtually went to war against of ignition source, the use of prescribed natural fire, but wildfire, creating a Forest Service Federal policy continued to allow for it. identity around fire exclusion (Egan as opportunities to 2009; Pyne 2001). meet management 1995 POLICY REVIEW objectives.” The next Federal fire policy review Then came what Pyne (2015) called came in 1995, prompted by more severe a fire revolution—a rejection of fire wildfires. In 1994, the number of fires exclusion in favor of restoring fire to cost-effective because it led to needless that burned 1,000 acres (400 ha) or fire-adapted ecosystems. Decades in the spending on firefighting. more reached 162, an unusually high making (Arno 2014; Carle 2002), with number for the time (Truesdale and origins dating to fire use by American The Forest Service replaced fire exclusion others 1995). Federal firefighting costs Indians and the “light burning” with a policy of “appropriate suppression soared to a record $918 million (NIFC practiced by private and Tribal forest action.” Line officers and fire managers 2017a), and a wildfire blowup on the landowners in the early 20th century could use wildland fire within limits South Canyon Fire in Colorado resulted (Komarek 1962; Stoddard 1962), the fire set by land and resource management in 14 firefighter fatalities. Altogether, revolution began with several landmark plans (forest plans, for short) and of fire 35 wildland firefighters perished in events (Pyne, n.d.): management plans tiered to the forest 1994, the highest number of firefighter plans. For example, the Salmon National fatalities since 1910 (NICC 2018). z In 1962, the Tall Timbers Research Forest in Idaho, in its forest plan from Station in Florida held the first in a 1988, dictated a “suppression strategy” In response, the National Wildfire series of fire ecology conferences, and at lower elevations outside wilderness Coordinating Group released a report The Nature Conservancy initiated its areas while allowing “containment outlining a joint policy for the Federal signature prescribed fire program. or confinement strategies” on natural agencies with wildland fire management z In 1963, an advisory board ignitions at higher elevations under responsibilities (NWCG 1995). The commissioned by the U.S. limited conditions (SNF 1988). report stressed public and firefighter Department of the Interior released safety. However, it also called wildland a report on the ecological role of JOINT FEDERAL FIRE POLICY fire “an inevitable natural force” that wildland fire (Leopold and others Then came the Yellowstone Fires of has “shaped ecosystems through time” 1963), prompting the National Park 1988. The resulted in (NWCG 1995). The policy proposed: Service to begin using lightning- part from lightning ignitions designated ignited fires in 1968 (fig. 1). by the National Park Service as z Incorporating the “role of wildland z In 1964, Congress passed the “prescribed natural fires”—that is, the fire as an essential ecological process Wilderness Act, followed in 1972 use of unplanned ignitions as a form and natural change agent … into the by programs launched by the Forest of “biotic management” for a “realistic planning process” by integrating fire Service to use lightning-ignited fires in presentation of primitive America” “as a critical natural process” into wilderness areas. (Leopold and others 1963). Recognizing forest plans; and the role of wildland fire in shaping and z Using fire “to protect, maintain, and sustaining natural systems, the National In 1978, the Forest Service officially enhance resources” and allowing fire Park Service used—and still uses— joined the fire revolution by formally “as nearly as possible … to function lightning ignitions for resource benefits. abandoning its policy of fire control in its natural ecological role.” (the 10 a.m. Policy and its variant, the However, national headlines about 10 Acre Policy). The change came in The 1995 report went so far as to urge Yellowstone National Park going response to an inquiry by the Office of Federal fire managers to consider “all up in flames, along with an escaped Management and Budget. An agency wildland fires, regardless of ignition prescribed natural fire on the Bob study team concluded that the policy source, as opportunities to meet Marshall Wilderness in Montana, fed of fire control “fails to recognize any management objectives” (NWCG 1995). a public backlash (van Wagtendonk benefits from fire, or the existence of Nevertheless, any response to wildland 2007). The controversy led to a report those resources which do not need total fire had to align with “approved fire in 1989 by an interagency review team (or any) fire protection” (Pyne 2015). management plans” tiered to forest commissioned by the U.S. Secretaries Fire control was deemed not to be plans. That left the “appropriate

Fire Management Today 38 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Figure 1—Lodgepole pine in Yellowstone National Park regrowing following stand replacement fires in 1988. Lodgepole pine has serotinous cones with seeds released by severe fire, allowing the forest to naturally regenerate. Many landscapes are naturally adapted to severe fire. Source: Federal Joint Fire Science Program (NRFSN 2015).

suppression response” up to individual line officers and fire managers.

2001 POLICY REVISION The next policy review came in 2001, following yet another exceptional fire year. In 2000, for the first time since 1963, more than 7 million acres (2.8 million ha) burned in a single fire season (NIFC 2017b). Moreover, an escaped prescribed fire on the Bandelier National report called the WUI “a major fire fire,” “wildfire,” and “fire use” to avoid Monument in New Mexico became problem that will escalate as the nation “confusion and misunderstanding within the Cerro Grande Fire, which caused moves into the 21st Century” (NWCG the agencies and among cooperators, enormous damage to the city of Los 2001). Accordingly, the 2001 report partners, and the public” (NWCG Alamos. The 47,650-acre (19,060-ha) emphasized hazardous fuels treatments, 2001). In its glossary, the report defined fire destroyed 235 homes. declaring that “fuels management wildland fire as “any nonstructural fire is an important aspect of vegetation that occurs on wildland,” and it defined In response, the National Wildfire management and is integral to restoring prescribed fire as “any fire ignited by Coordinating Group released a report and maintaining ecosystems.” The management actions to meet specific outlining a review and update of the report urged land managers to focus on objectives.” However, the report gave no 1995 Federal fire policy (NWCG 2001). protecting the WUI. definitions for wildfire or fire use, and the The report found that the 1995 policy “is term “prescribed natural fire” appeared still generally sound and appropriate,” In stressing “hazardous fuels reduction,” nowhere in the report. and it recognized “the role of fire in the 2001 report conflated “treatment of sustaining healthy ecosystems.” It called fuels” with “ecosystem sustainability” 2003 POLICY for fire management plans incorporating (NWCG 2001). Fuels treatments to IMPLEMENTATION “the role of wildland fire as an essential protect the WUI are not always the same In 2003, an interagency team sought to ecological process and natural change thing as vegetation treatments to sustain clarify the terminology. Chartered by the agent,” declaring that “wildland fire or restore healthy, resilient fire-adapted National Wildfire Coordinating Group, will be used to protect, maintain, and ecosystems (DellaSala and others 2003; the team published a report outlining enhance resources and, as nearly as Keegan and Fiedler 2000; Reinhardt and a strategy for implementing the 2001 possible, be allowed to function in its others 2008). Moreover, fuels treatments Federal fire policy (NWCG 2003). natural ecological role” (NWCG 2001). have nothing to do with the use of Based on the definitions of wildland fire wildland fire to restore naturally dense and prescribed fire in the 2001 report, However, the 2001 policy placed special forest types in fire regimes with relatively the 2003 strategy described three types emphasis on protecting the wildland– long fire-return intervals, such as mixed of wildland fire: urban interface (WUI). In view of the conifer, lodgepole pine, and spruce–fir. Cerro Grande Fire and the rising number In such vegetation types, “ecosystem z Wildfire—“an unplanned and of homes destroyed by wildfire across the sustainability” and “the use of wildland unwanted wildland fire … where the Nation, the 2001 report concluded that fire” mean allowing fire “to function in objective is to put the fire out;” the “fire hazard situation in the Wildland its natural ecological role” rather than z Wildland fire use—the use of a Urban Interface is more complex and suppressing fire or reducing fuels (fig. 1). naturally ignited wildland fire extensive than understood in 1995” “to accomplish specific resource (NWCG 2001). Echoing the National The 2001 report also called for management objectives;” and Fire Plan (USDA/USDI 2001), the 2001 clarification of such terms as “wildland

Fire Management Today 39 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 fire or a natural ignition designated z Allowed line officers to use both With the 2009 strategy, for wildland fire use was no longer “planned and unplanned ignitions achieving its objectives and could not to achieve land and resource what was formerly be brought back into prescription, it management goals;” and known as “wildland fire became a wildfire. Once declared a z Permitted fire managers to manage use” became the use wildfire, a fire could not be redesignated a single wildland fire for multiple of wildfire to achieve as anything else. Moreover, every objectives, such that part of a fire wildland fire could be only one type objectives stated in might be managed as a wildfire (that of fire; if any part of a prescribed fire is, suppressed at minimum cost) and forest plans. or wildland fire use fire could not be another part of the same fire might be brought back into prescription, then managed for resource benefits (that it became—and remained—entirely a is, allowed to function in its natural z Prescribed fire—“any fire ignited by wildfire, to be suppressed at minimum ecological role). management actions to meet specific cost. objectives.” The 2009 guidance—the policy currently 2009 REVISED STRATEGY in place—is to use wildland fire as a The 2003 strategy thereby officially In 2009, the interagency Fire “tool in the restoration process” through did away with the term “prescribed Executive Council (part the Wildland the “management of either wildfire natural fire,” replacing it with the Fire Leadership Council) released or prescribed fire to meet resource term “wildland fire use,” which led to “guidance” with modifications to the objectives” specified in forest plans (FEC awkward formulations like “wildland 2003 strategy for implementing the 2009). In managing wildland fire for the fire use fires” (NIFC 2009). 2001 Federal fire policy (FEC 2009). “role of fire as an essential ecological Designed to give fire managers more process and natural change agent,” According to the 2003 strategy, flexibility, the 2009 guidance: preference is to be given to “natural fire.” “appropriate management response” The “initial action” on “human-caused applied to every wildland fire based on z Eliminated the term “wildland wildfire” is “to suppress the fire at the the forest plan and the corresponding fire use” and reduced the types of lowest cost”—in effect, fire control. fire management plan. Every wildland fire from three to two: human-caused fire not “ignited by » Wildfires—“unplanned ignitions or However, line officers and fire managers management actions” automatically prescribed fires that are declared can use the decision-support process to became a wildfire, with an appropriate wildfires,” and manage any wildfire, no matter what management response of suppression » Prescribed fires—“planned ignitions the cause, for the purpose of restoring at minimum cost. When a prescribed to meet specific objectives;” or maintaining “the natural fire regime where safe and possible.” Thus, the 2009 policy circled back to the 1995 Federal fire policy, which urged line officers and fire managers to consider “all wildland fires, regardless of ignition source, as opportunities to meet management objectives” (NWCG 1995).

So what was formerly known as wildland fire use has now become the use of wildland fire to achieve management goals, with wildfire

The Ibex Fire in the Frank Church–River of No Return Wilderness on the Salmon–Challis National Forest in Idaho. Ignited by lightning and detected in July 2017, the unplanned ignition was monitored and managed by the Forest Service to return the natural ecological role of fire to a landscape of conifers (subalpine fir and lodgepole pine). Photo: USDA.

Fire Management Today 40 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Figure 2—Annual acres treated through the use of unplanned ignitions, 2005–17. The trend shows steady growth, especially after 2014. Source: USDA Forest Service (2017).

no longer defined as an “unwanted ecosystems and watersheds in the plan wildland fire play its natural ecological wildland fire” but rather as “an area” by taking into account “wildland role? Figure 2 shows a rising trend in the unplanned ignition.” The switch from fire and opportunities to restore fire- use of unplanned ignitions, particularly a pejorative to a neutral definition of adapted ecosystems” (paragraph since 2014. One benefit might be fewer wildfire gave line officers the flexibility 219.8(a)(1)(v)). In effect, the planning risky deployments of firefighters to to use both planned and unplanned rule encourages individual units to fold remote locations where no values are at ignitions, even accidental human the 2009 strategy into their forest plan risk. The results remain to be seen. ignitions, to achieve objectives stated in revisions, giving local line officers and forest plans. fire managers more flexibility to use ACKNOWLEDGMENTS both planned and unplanned ignitions The author thanks Russ Briggs FOREST PLAN REVISIONS for management purposes. and Emily Platt for reviewing and Forest plans are key. No matter how commenting on an early version of this much latitude managers have under Under the 2012 planning rule, the article. Russell D. Briggs is the director Federal fire policy (FEC 2009), forest Salmon–Challis National Forest of the Division of Environmental plans limit the extent of allowable fire and other units have revised or are Science at the College of Environmental use. So when the Cramer Fire broke out revising their forest plans accordingly, Science and Forestry, State University on the Salmon–Challis National Forest partly by including the language of of New York, Syracuse, NY; and Emily in 2003, fire managers had no choice planned and unplanned ignitions. K. Platt is a district ranger for the Forest but to suppress it. The fire was burning For example, the draft revised forest Service on the Mount Adams Ranger at an elevation well below the 8,000- plan for the Okanogan–Wenatchee District, Gifford Pinchot National foot (2,438-m) threshold allowed for National Forest in Washington, site Forest, Trout Lake, WA. The author is the use of wildland fire, so firefighters of a fatal entrapment on the 2001 solely responsible for any errors. were dispatched to the scene, even Thirtymile Fire, stated that “vegetation though no values were at risk in the management activities may include LITERATURE CITED steep and roadless terrain other than use of planned and unplanned fire Arno, S.F. 2014. Slow awakening: the lives of the firefighters themselves. ignitions” and that “more unplanned ecology’s role in shaping forest fire Two helirappelers were assigned to clear fires will be managed instead of being policy. Peeling Back the Bark. Blog. 16 a helispot near the top of a ridge, and suppressed due to limited firefighting October. Durham, NC: Forest History when the fire burned into the drainage resources” (OWNF 2011). And the Society. https://fhsarchives.wordpress. below them, a fatal entrapment ensued. draft revised forest plan for the Cibola com/2014/10/16/6295_arno_role_of_ National Forest in New Mexico stated ecology_in_shaping_forest_fire_policy/. (4 April 2018). The Forest Service’s 2012 planning that the “goal is to improve ecosystem Carle, D. 2002. Burning questions: America’s rule requires land managers to revise health by restoring fire to the landscape in the form of planned and unplanned fight with nature’s fire. Westport, CT: forest plans to give fire managers more Praeger Publishers. 322 p. ignitions” (CNF 2016). flexibility (USDA Forest Service 2012). CNF (Cibola National Forest). 2016. Cibola The rule calls for plan components National Forest Mountain Ranger that “maintain or restore the ecological Will forest plan revisions lead to more Districts plan revision—preliminary draft integrity of terrestrial and aquatic instances of the Forest Service letting land and resource management plan.

Fire Management Today 41 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Albuquerque, NM: USDA Forest Service. 2009. Wildland fire use fires (1998–2008). Pyne, S.J. [N.d.]. After the fire: the still small 192 p. https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/ https://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_ voice and the still burning landscape. FSE_DOCUMENTS/fseprd510428.pdf. stats_fireUse.html. (4 April 2018). Presentation, Public Education, National (4 April 2018). NIFC (National Interagency Fire Center). Fire Protection Association, Washington, DellaSala, D.A.; Martin, A.; Spivak, R. [and 2017a. Federal firefighting costs DC. others]. 2003. A citizen’s call for ecological (suppression only). https://www.nifc.gov/ Pyne, S.J. 2001. Year of the fires: the story of forest restoration: forest restoration fireInfo/fireInfo_documents/SuppCosts. the great fires of 1910. New York, NY: principles and criteria. Ecological pdf. (4 April 2018). Viking. 322 p. Restoration. 21(1): 14–23. NIFC (National Interagency Fire Center). Pyne, S.J. 2015. Between two fires: a fire Egan, T. 2009. Teddy Roosevelt and the fire 2017b. Total wildland fires and acres history of contemporary America. Tucson, that saved America. New York, NY: (1960–2016). https://www.nifc.gov/ AZ: The University of Arizona Press. 552 Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 324 p. fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_totalFires.html. (4 p. FEC (Fire Executive Council). 2009. Guidance April 2018). Reinhardt, E.D.; Keane, R.E.; Calkin, for implementation of the Federal NRFSN (Northern Rockies Fire Science D.E.; Cohen, J.D. 2008. Objectives and Wildland Fire Management Policy. Network). 2015. Fire history and fire considerations for wildland fuel treatment Washington, DC: U.S. Department of ecology in Yellowstone—a field tour. in forested ecosystems of the interior Agriculture/U.S. Department of the http://www.nrfirescience.org/event/fire- western United States. Forest Ecology and Interior. 20 p. https://www.nifc.gov/ history-and-fire-ecology-yellowstone-field- Management. 256: 1997–2006. policies/policies_documents/GIFWFMP. tour. (4 April 2018). SNF (Salmon National Forest). 1988. Final pdf. (4 April 2018). NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating forest land and resource management plan: FMPRT (Fire Management Policy Review Group). 1995. Federal wildland fire fire planning and suppression. Salmon, Team). 1989. Final report. NPS D–392. management policy and program review. ID: USDA Forest Service: IV-68–IV-71. Denver, CO: National Park Service. 21 p. Boise, ID: National Interagency Fire https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_ https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/ Center. https://www.forestsandrangelands. DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5310596.pdf. (4 uploads/final_report_fire_management_ gov/strategy/documents/ April 2018). policy_1989.pdf. (4 April 2018). foundational/1995_fed_wildland_fire_ Stoddard, Sr., H.L. 1962. Use of fire in pine Graves, H.S. 1919. A policy of forestry for the policy_program_report.pdf. (4 April 2018). forests and game lands of the Deep nation: the statement of a policy presented NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating Southeast. In: Tall Timbers Fire Ecology before forestry conferences of 1919. Group). 2001. Review and update of the Conference Proceedings. Tallahassee, Washington, DC: USDA Forest Service. 1995 federal wildland fire management FL: Tall Timbers Research Station and 11 p. policy. [Place of publication unknown]: Land Conservancy: 31–42. Vol. 1. http:// Keegan, C.E.; Fiedler, C.E. 2000. Synergy [Publisher unknown]. 76 p. https:// talltimbers.org/publications/tall-timbers- between ecological needs and economic www.nifc.gov/PIO_bb/Policy/ fire-ecology-conference-proceedings- impacts of ecosystem restoration. In: FederalWildlandFireManagementPolicy volume-1/. (4 April 2018). Smith, H.Y., ed. The Bitterroot Ecosystem _2001.pdf. (4 April 2018). Truesdale, D.; Bradshaw, B.; Burgess, T. [and Management Research Project: What we NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating others]. 1995. Fire suppression costs on have learned. Symposium proceedings. Group). 2003. Interagency strategy large fires: a review of the 1994 fire season. RMRS–P–17. Ogden, UT: USDA Forest for implementation of the Federal Washington, DC: USDA Forest Service, Service, Rocky Mountain Research Wildland Fire Management Policy. Fire and Aviation Management. 18 p. Station: 74–76. [Place of publication unknown]: USDA Forest Service. 2012. National Forest Komarek, E.V. 1962. The use of fire: an [Publisher unknown]. 57 p. System land management planning. The historical background. In: Tall Timbers https://www.sierraforestlegacy. Federal Register. 77(68): 21162–21276. Fire Ecology Conference Proceedings. org/Resources/Community/ https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_ Tallahassee, FL: Tall Timbers Research SmokeManagement/AirQualityPolicy/ DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5362536.pdf. (4 Station and Land Conservancy: 7–10. Vol. FedWldFireMgmtPolicy.pdf. (4 April April 2018). 1. http://talltimbers.org/publications/ 2018). USDA Forest Service. 2017. Forest Service tall-timbers-fire-ecology-conference- NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating hazardous fuels treatment acres proceedings-volume-1/. (4 April 2018). Group). 2018. Glossary of wildland fire accomplished by FY, region, and method. Leopold, A.S.; Cain, S.A.; Cottam, C.M. management terminology. PMS–205. http://fsweb.wo.fs.fed.us/fire/fam/fuels/ [and others]. 1963. Policies of park https://www.nwcg.gov/glossary/a-z. (4 hazardous.html. (22 October 2018). management. In: Wildlife management April 2018). USDA/USDI (U.S. Department of in the national parks. Advisory Board on OWNF (Okanogan–Wenatchee National Agriculture/U.S. Department of the Wildlife Management. U.S. Department Forest). 2011. Proposed action for forest Interior). 2001. Managing the impacts of the Interior, Washington, DC. https:// plan revision. Portland, OR: USDA Forest of wildfires on communities and the www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/ Service, Pacific Northwest Region. 89 p. environment. Washington, DC: USDA/ leopold/leopold5.htm. (5 November 2018). https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_ USDI. 35 p. https://clinton4.nara.gov/ NICC (National Interagency Coordination DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5312322.pdf. (4 CEQ/firereport.pdf. (4 April 2018). Center). 2018. Wildland fire accidents April 2018). van Wagtendonk, J.W. 2007. The history and fatalities by year. https://www.nifc. Pinchot, G. 1905 [reprinted 2005]. The use and evolution of wildland fire use. Fire gov/safety/safety_documents/year.pdf. (5 of the national forest reserves: regulations Ecology. 3(2): 3–17. November 2018). and instructions. Loveland, CO: Western ■ NIFC (National Interagency Fire Center). Heritage Company. 142 p.

Fire Management Today 42 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Figure 1—Aldo Leopold Wilderness, McKnight Mountain, New Mexico. The wilderness area has an active program for using unplanned ignitions, helping to sustain a resilient and biodiverse landscape. Note the various vegetation types and stages, indicating staggered disturbance effects over time. Source: Forest Service, Wildernet; photo: R. Wilkerson.

Depending on the circumstances, local land managers could now monitor a lightning-ignited wildland fire, using it for ecological benefits. Evolving policy iterations directed that wildland fire will “as nearly as possible, be allowed to function in its natural ecological role” (FEC 2009; NWCG 2001; WFLC The 1994 Guide Fire: 2003). Many national parks and wilderness areas have benefited as a A Tragedy Revisited result (Wells 2009). AVIATION FATALITIES Beginning in the 1970s, the Forest Hutch Brown Service developed a robust prescribed natural fire program in New Mexico’s wilderness areas. To this day, the Gila ince the 1990s, USDA Forest National Forest has a powerful culture Service employees and leaders have Evolving policy of using unplanned ignitions in its taken steps to improve the agency’s wilderness areas (Pyne 2015). Ssafety record (USDA Forest Service iterations directed that 2018), resulting in a declining number wildland fire will “as In June 1995, the Forest Service of fatalities since 2010. Yet wildland nearly as possible, be managed a lightning ignition in one of firefighter entrapments have persisted allowed to function in them, the Aldo Leopold Wilderness (NIFC 2018), despite the safety measures, its natural ecological (fig. 1). The agency spent $100,000 safety training, and personal protective to monitor the Bonner Fire, which equipment adopted by the wildland fire role.” burned 28,500 acres (11,500 ha) before community. rains finally extinguished the flames in July (Ganey and others 1996). The The single greatest common fire returned natural processes to high- denominator for entrapments is elevation ecosystems that needed them in the presence of firefighters on a In 1968, the National Park Service a successful instance of using unplanned particular fireground. That raises a adopted a policy of using lightning- ignitions for resource benefits. policy question: Why and under what ignited fires in fire-adapted ecosystems circumstances do fire managers try to for ecological benefits, a practice A year earlier, however, the Forest control wildland fires? known at the time as prescribed natural Service decided to suppress another fire. In the early 1970s, the Forest lightning fire in almost the same A CHANGING POLICY Service pioneered similar programs location (Ganey and others 1996). The Under Forest Service policy until the in wilderness areas. In 1978, the 1970s, the answer was simple: fire agency replaced fire control altogether exclusion (Pyne 1982, 2015). With limited with a flexible policy of “appropriate exceptions for prescribed fire, the Forest suppression action,” which could Hutch Brown is the editor of Fire Management Service pursued a policy of suppressing range from fully suppressing a fire to Today and a program specialist for the Forest every wildland fire by 10 a.m. on the confining a fire in a certain place under Service, Office of Communication, Washington morning after it was first reported. certain conditions. Office, Washington, DC.

Fire Management Today 43 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 agency spent $7.5 million in trying to accidents from 1979 to 2000 attributed control the Pigeon Fire in 1994, an effort The landing failed and the accident to pilot error (Rock that ultimately failed. The fire burned FitzPatrick, n.d.). The account was in 8,000 acres (3,200 ha) in the Aldo the helicopter crashed, the Forest Service tradition, in accident Leopold Wilderness before finally going killing the pilot and two investigation reports, of focusing entirely out in July rains. of the four firefighters on the particulars of an incident. It aboard. did not ask why a national forest with During the Pigeon Fire, lightning an active fire use program in the Aldo ignited another fire not far away in Leopold Wilderness decided to suppress the same wilderness area. For unclear the Guide Fire in the first place. habitations or other development reasons perhaps related to the decision anywhere nearby. to suppress the Pigeon Fire, the Forest EXCEPTIONAL FIRE YEAR Service decided to attack what became The Forest Service dispatched a However, the year of the Guide Fire was known as the Guide Fire. four-person helitack crew to begin exceptional in the annals of wildland suppressing the Guide Fire (Rock fire management. The number of Ignited in the Black Range (a mountain FitzPatrick, n.d.). A Bell 206 LIII initial- wildland firefighter fatalities in 1994 range straddled by the Aldo Leopold attack helicopter arrived over the fire at reached 35, more than in any year Wilderness), the Guide Fire started on about 3 p.m. After assessing the fire, the since 1910 (NIFC 2016). The U.S. Fire July 12, 1994, at an elevation of about helicopter pilot approached a helispot at Administration attributed the unusually 8,500 feet (2,600 m). The weather on an elevation of about 9,520 feet (2,900 high number of fatalities to “elevated that summer afternoon was hot and m) in steep terrain about a quarter mile fire severity and frequency” (TriData dry, with temperatures at about 90 °F (0.4 km) away from the fire. The landing Corporation 1995): (32 °C) (Rock FitzPatrick, n.d.). The failed and the helicopter crashed, killing fire was burning in tinder-dry fuels the pilot and two of the four firefighters In 1994, the weather conditions loosely described as “fir” and “pine” aboard. Tragically, pilot Robert Boomer were unusually dry in the western (Rock FitzPatrick, n.d.), probably and firefighters Anthony Sean Gutierrez United States and the fire season mixed conifer, which has historically and Sam “Vinagron” Smith paid the was described as the worst on burned in fires of low to high severity at ultimate price. record in terms of the number of intervals ranging from 15 to 400 years fires and, particularly, the number (Hunter and others 2014). Located in a A summary of the incident in an of large fires that occurred. These wilderness area, the site had no human agencywide compendium of aviation fires caused tens of thousands of firefighters to be deployed to an estimated 74,000 fires over a five-month period, including more than 100 that were described as major fires. The number of fires and the commitment of resources to attempt to control them were estimated as four to five times greater than most years.

A week before the Guide Fire, a wildfire blowup on Storm King Mountain in Colorado had caused 14 firefighter fatalities. With resources overextended on other fires, the small South Canyon Fire had slowly backed downhill for days before initial attack could begin, contributing to conditions that caused the blowup (Butler and others 2001).

Alarmed by the number of firefighter fatalities—and by the exceptionally high number of large fires that year (Truesdale and others 1995)— In 1994, following the burnover of 14 firefighters on the South Canyon Fire, a helicopter drops officials might have discouraged fire off an investigation team. Photo: Steve Kautz, USDA Forest Service. use anywhere, including in New

Fire Management Today 44 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 any circumstance that may represent www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr325.pdf. The Guide Fire was in unnecessary exposure” (Christiansen (12 April 2018). 2018). Under some circumstances, NIFC (National Interagency Fire Center). a remote wilderness suppressing a wildland fire rather than 2018. Wildland fire fatalities by year. Boise, area with fire-adapted managing it for resource benefits—if ID: National Interagency Fire Center. 23 p. https://www.nifc.gov/safety/safety_ line officers have the decision space ecosystems and nothing documents/Fatalities-by-Year.pdf. (25 obvious to protect, other necessary, which they often do October 2018). not under their land and resource than the lives of the NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating management plans—“may represent Group). 2001. Review and update of the firefighters themselves. unnecessary exposure.” Indeed, 1995 federal wildland fire management it might be the riskiest and most policy. Boise, ID: National Interagency expensive decision that fire managers Fire Center. 76 p. Mexico’s wilderness areas. In a can make. Pyne, S.J. 1982. Fire in America: a cultural similar situation in 2012, the Forest history of wildland and rural fire. Seattle, Service’s Deputy Chief for State and WA: University of Washington Press. 654 LITERATURE CITED p. Private Forestry, anticipating a severe Butler, B.W.; Bartlette, R.A.; Bradshaw, L.S. Pyne, S.J. 2015. Between two fires: a fire fire season and seeking to focus the [and others]. 2001. The South Canyon history of contemporary America. Tucson, Fire revisited: lessons in fire behavior. Fire Forest Service’s limited resources AZ: The University of Arizona Press. 512 Management Today 61(1): 14–20. on wildland firefighting, sent out an p. Christiansen, V. 2018 (2 April). Letter to agencywide “2012 Wildfire Guidance” Rock FitzPatrick, C.S., comp. [N.d.]. Bell Regional Foresters, Station Directors, letter forbidding the use of unplanned 206LIII, July 12, 1994, Southwest Region. IITF Director, Deputy Chiefs, and WO ignitions except as approved by a In: USDA Forest Service fatal aviation Directors. Chief’s letter of intent for Regional Forester (Hubbard 2012). accident history (1979–2000). Washington, wildland fire – 2018. On file with Office DC: USDA Forest Service, Fire and of Communication, Washington Office, Aviation Management: 69–71. http:// Washington, DC. A FATEFUL TRAGEDY www.fs.fed.us/fire/av_safety/assurance/ Conditions in 1994, especially following FEC (Fire Executive Council). 2009. Guidance mishaps/fatal_aviation_accident_history. for implementation of the Federal the South Canyon tragedy, might have pdf. (5 October 2017). Wildland Fire Policy. Washington, DC: contributed to the decision to suppress TriData Corporation. 1995. Analysis report on Fire Executive Council. 20 p. the Guide Fire. By contrast, conditions firefighter fatalities in the United States in Ganey, J.L.; Block, W.M.; Boucher, P.F. in 1995 again allowed for the use 1994. Arlington, VA: TriData Corporation; 1996. Effects of fire on birds in Madrean of unplanned ignitions in the Aldo final report; contract no. EMW– forests and woodlands. In: Ffolliott, Leopold Wilderness. Alternative fire 95–C–4713. Submitted to: United States P.F.; DeBano, L.F.; Baker, Jr., M.B. Fire Administration, Federal Emergency management approaches in the same [and others], tech. coords. Effects of fire Management Agency, Washington, area in consecutive years had strikingly on Madrean Province ecosystems: a DC. 64 p. https://www.usfa.fema.gov/ different outcomes. symposium proceedings. Gen. Tech. Rep. downloads/pdf/publications/ff_fat94.pdf. RM–GTR–289. Fort Collins, CO: USDA (5 October 2017). In the same area as the 1994 Pigeon Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Forest Truesdale, D.; Bradshaw, B.; Burgess, T. [and and Range Experiment Station: 146–154. Fire, the use of a natural ignition on the others]. 1995. Fire suppression costs on Hubbard, J. 2012 (25 May). Letter to Regional Bonner Fire a year later was cheaper large fires: a review of the 1994 fire season. Foresters, Station Directors, Area Director, and more effective than wildland fire Washington, DC: USDA Forest Service, IITF Director, Deputy Chiefs and WO suppression. Using a wildland fire rather Fire and Aviation Management. 18 p. Directors. 2012 wildfire guidance to than suppressing it restored the benefits USDA Forest Service. 2018. The USDA Regional Foresters, Station Directors, Area of fire to more than three times the land Forest Service’s safety journey: 1994–2008. Director, IITF Director, Deputy Chiefs Communication aid. 12 p. Unpublished area at a tiny fraction (1.3 percent) of and WO Directors. On file with: Policy paper on file with the USDA Forest the total cost. Moreover, the decision to Analysis Staff, Forest Service, Washington Service, Washington Office, Office of suppress the Guide Fire inadvertently Office, Washington, DC. https://www. Communication, Washington, DC. contributed to a tragedy that cost three documentcloud.org/documents/407523- Wells, G. 2009. Wildland fire use: managing firefighters their lives. 2012-wildfire-guidance-memo-may-25. for a fire-smart landscape. Fire Science html. (5 October 2017). Digest. Boise, ID: Joint Fire Science Hunter, M.E.; Iniguez, J.M.; Farris, C.A. Accordingly, the Guide Fire might Program. 4 (January): 1–11. 2014. Historical and current fire hold a safety lesson for the Forest WFLC (Wildland Fire Leadership management practices in two wilderness Service along the lines of the agency’s Council). 2003. Interagency strategy for areas in the southwestern United States: Life First engagements (USDA Forest implementation of the Federal Wildland the Saguaro Wilderness Area and the Service 2018). In 2018, in the spirit of Fire Management Policy. Washington, Gila-Aldo Leopold Wilderness Complex. DC: Wildland Fire Leadership Council. Life First, Forest Service Chief Vicki Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS–GTR–325. Fort 57 p. Christiansen directed fire personnel “to Collins, CO: USDA Forest Service, Rocky ■ ‘stop, think and talk’ before ‘acting’ in Mountain Research Station. 38 p. https://

Fire Management Today 45 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Fuel Breaks Work in Colorado

Holly Krake Fuel breaks on the White River National Forest in Colorado protected homes in the community of Silverthorne, CO, during the Buffalo Fire in June 2018. Photo: USDA. hen the Buffalo Fire in Colorado sparked on the “Without the proactive White River National Forest forest treatments, we Won June 12, 2018, the flames stopped lodgepole pines killed by mountain short of nearly 1,400 residences near likely would have lost pine beetle had stood, ripe for ignition. Silverthorne, CO. homes.” Separating the subdivisions from the –Bill Jackson, district ranger surrounding forest, the fuel breaks were Two mountain subdivisions were built as part of larger proactive forest threatened by catastrophe. It wasn’t management programs in Colorado’s Summit County and throughout the just the air support from firefighting National Forest, listed the benefits from watershed around the Dillon Reservoir. helicopters and airtankers and more than the work: “The fuel breaks reduced the 150 firefighters on scene that helped save number of trees available to burn next “Wildfires don’t know boundaries,” the communities. Part of the success to homes; gave firefighters safe spots to said Christina Burri, watershed scientist was due to proactive work over the last aggressively fight the fire; and provided decade to build fuel breaks and reduce for effective drop zones. hazardous fuels where homes meet Without the proactive forest treatments, wildlands—the wildland–urban interface. we likely would have lost homes.” At the time this article was written, Holly Krake was the acting regional press officer for Bill Jackson, a district ranger for the The fuel breaks are open spaces 300 the Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region, Forest Service on the White River to 500 feet (90–150 m) wide, where Lakewood, CO.

Fire Management Today 46 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Airtanker pilots were able to effectively drop fire retardant (pink foreground) while ground crews used the fuel breaks as a safe place to engage the Buffalo Fire near Silverthorne, CO, on June 13, 2018. Photo: USDA.

The fuel breaks are open spaces 300 to 500 feet wide, where lodgepole pines killed by mountain pine beetle had stood, ripe for ignition. for Denver Water, “so when it comes to forest management in Denver Water’s priority watersheds, we take an all- hands, all-lands approach. By partnering with all the landowners, from Federal, State, local, and private, we’re able to better protect all of our interests from catastrophic wildfires and extend our partnership created in 2010 between According to Jackson, “From Forests to investment and reach throughout the Denver Water and the Rocky Mountain Faucets helps us identify areas where we entire area.” Region of the Forest Service. Since 2010, have common interests in limiting high- Denver Water and the Forest Service intensity wildfires and improving forest One such partnership is the From Forests have invested about $33 million in and watershed health. The partnership to Faucets program, a forest management treatments across 70,000 acres. helped us stretch our funds to treat more acres in Summit County.”

In this case, the Forest Service was able to invest in 900 acres (364 ha) of hazardous fuels-reduction projects next to the Wildernest and Mesa Cortina neighborhoods above Silverthorne, projects that saved an estimated $913 million worth of homes and infrastructure from the Buffalo Fire.

The Colorado State Forest Service and the Natural Resources Conservation Service joined From Forests to Faucets in 2017 to allow forest managers to take even more of an “all-hands, all-lands” approach. Funds will go to forest treatments on nonfederal and private lands as well as on national forests. ■

A helicopter drops water to cool off hot spots at the edge of a fuel break on the Buffalo Fire, June 12, 2018. Photo: USDA.

Fire Management Today 47 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 A large smoke column builds over the Methow Valley from a type 1 incident, which compounded problems with the availability of resources following a lightning bust on August 11, 2018. Photo: USDA Forest Service.

fire laid down to just a few feet—we caught and held it there.”

But the story started with all the elements of a looming disaster: Wildfire z Heavy dead and down timber, z Rugged terrain, z Very limited crew availability, and Run Halted z A big “lightning bust” (multiple “dry lightning” strikes from a storm with little or no rain reaching the ground).

by Proactive In fact, during Red Flag conditions on August 11, 2018, a lightning bust resulted in 21 new fire starts in the Fuels Treatments Methow Valley on the Okanogan– Wenatchee National Forest. Firefighters suppressed 17 of the starts within 48 Holly Krake hours, but 4 fires quickly grew together in rugged fuel-heavy terrain to become the McLeod Fire. By August 16, the o firefighters and communities Yet in a small community nestled in fire had grown to nearly 4,000 acres across the West, the words “Red the dry forests of the eastside Cascade (1,600 ha) and was threatening to run Flag Warning” mean trouble, Mountains, two Red Flag Warnings down a drainage into the community of Twith extreme fire behavior from a within a week didn’t result in a single Winthrop. A second Red Flag Warning combination of warm temperatures, home lost or in unacceptable risk to came in the next 24 hours, and the fire very low humidities, and strong winds. firefighters, despite a 4,000-acre (1,600- more than doubled in size as it pushed Existing wildfires might make large runs ha) wildfire burning just north of down the drainage, driven by winds into unburned areas and increase the Winthrop, WA. blowing at 30 miles per hour (48 km/h). risk to firefighters, and any new ignitions can quickly turn into the next large What made the difference? Proactive Driving along the edge of the fire wildfire to threaten a community. In hazardous fuels reduction on nearby area in his pickup, Ellis pointed out other words, a Red Flag Warning spells national forest lands. the green canopy and large trees still trouble with a capital T. intact. “Ground crews were successful “Since 2004, we’ve been proactively in making a stand along containment thinning and burning strategic areas lines anchored into more than 2,700 north of Winthrop to reduce risk and acres [1,100 ha] of hazardous fuel What made the help restore the forest,” said Matt Ellis, a treatments,” he noted. “We knew the difference? Proactive district fire management officer with the chance of success was high while Okanogan–Wenatchee National Forest. hazardous fuels “These efforts were tested and tried in reduction on nearby a critical 24-hour period as the McLeod national forest lands. Fire threatened to race down a critical Holly Krake is the public affairs officer for the drainage and into folks’ backyards. Forest Service, Okanogan–Wenatchee National Instead of 100-foot [30-m] flames, the Forest, Wenatchee, WA.

Fire Management Today 48 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Previous thinning and prescribed fire work (green on left, photo on right) on the Okanogan–Wenatchee National Forest allowed firefighters to hold the McLeod Fire (red lines on left) and keep it from threatening the community of Winthrop, WA (gray on left), in August 2018. Source: left—Tom Delph, USDA Forest Service; right—Kari Greer, USDA Forest Service. the risk to firefighters was less. These treatments gave us the margin to have the right plan at the right place for the right reasons.”

As of late October 2018, the fire remained held along containment lines 11 miles (18 km) from the community of Winthrop.

The fuels treatments were an integral part of the Okanogan County Wildfire Protection Plan to create cross-boundary defensible space and reduce wildfire risk. Since 2004, 2,700 acres (1,100 ha) of National Forest System lands in the area have been thinned and/or burned for as little as $100 per acre. This represents a good return on investment in mitigating wildfire risk and increasing safety. As of October 2018, the McLeod Fire had cost more than $14 million to suppress—a cost that likely would have been much higher without the investment in hazardous fuels treatments. A crew of firefighters on the McLeod Fire on August 22, 2018. Firefighters were exposed to less risk due to ■ decreased fire behavior and lower rate of spread as a result of years of proactive thinning and prescribed fire (the open area to the right of the group). Photo: Kari Greer, USDA Forest Service

Fire Management Today 49 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Tom Vail from Cisco Systems setting up a wireless access point on the Rattlesnake Fire in Arizona. Photo: Donavan Albert, USDA Forest Service.

skills to rapidly know how to exploit and leverage technology to its fullest extent is a huge bonus. The ITSS’s responsibilities range from defining a management team’s IT strategy for an incident to providing timely, tactical technology solutions throughout the entire fire assignment, often working 16-hour days for 14 days straight. So the demands can be intense.

THE RATTLESNAKE FIRE Technology Use The Rattlesnake Fire began on April 11, 2018, about 25 miles (40 km) southwest of Alpine, AZ. The fire burned through on Wildfire: Case forest litter and dead and downed fuels, mostly ponderosa pine. As of May 7, the fire was 90 percent contained after burning more than 26,000 acres Study on the (10,400 ha) on the Apache–Sitgreaves National Forest, San Carlos Apache Reservation, and White Mountain Rattlesnake Fire Apache Reservation. The fire challenged the incident Donavan Albert management team in many ways, especially in the arena of IT. Factors that made the incident especially complex included: he need for modern technology in wildland fire management No one IT specialist z The remoteness of the incident grows every day with each has the answers command post location at Josh Ranch Tnew incident. Keeping up with new on the Apache–Sitgreaves National technology advances as well as to every solution, Forest; providing a portable, solid, yet adaptive contrary to the z The lack of team-networking and responsive information technology expectations of many. equipment; (IT) network at the incident command post can be challenging, especially z The involvement of three host agencies; in remote environments. Although about being technically savvy. It is IT support is critical to the success more about being a collaborative, of incident management teams in resourceful, and technically fluent supporting firefighters on the ground, member of a highly responsive, goal- the role of an IT support specialist oriented team. It’s about knowing Donavan Albert, the national web manager for (ITSS) can go unnoticed unless where, how, and whom to reach out to the Forest Service, Office of Communication, technology issues or problems arise. for timely assistance, if needed. Washington Office, Washington, DC, has served as an incident technology support IT SUPPORT TEAM Contrary to expectations, IT specialists specialist for incident management teams Serving as an ITSS on a fire do not have technical solutions to throughout the Nation, but most recently in the management team is not just every business need. But having the Southwest for more than 10 years.

Fire Management Today 50 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 (left) Team 5’s e-Isuite server, CradlePoint router, and Network Attached Storage. (right) The laptop was used every morning to livestream the morning briefing to key stakeholders. Photos: Donavan Albert, USDA Forest Service. z A couple of remote spike camps; use. The team returned the equipment z Drive times of 4 to 5 hours to get in Phoenix, AZ, following its 14-day The Rattlesnake Fire assignment on the fire. from one side of the fire to the other; provided plenty of z Weather conditions that ranged from opportunities for The team also leveraged WebEx (web high wind to snow; and improving the quality conferencing software) as a way to make z Wildlife such as elk and deer all over the fire briefings available through a live the road system, especially at dawn of IT services on video stream. Every day at 7 a.m. and and dusk. incidents. 6 p.m., agency administrators, Tribal representatives and members at the San ACHIEVING IT GOALS ON Carlos Apache Reservation, the incident reducing the risk associated with business advisor, and others participated THE FIRE driving in remote, wildlife-inhabited in these meetings without having to be Due to the remoteness of the fire and areas. There were also efficiency gains physically at the incident command post. the size of its perimeter, the team’s when the team enabled remote access, incident commander and plans section eliminating the need for a paperwork BUILDING ON SUCCESS chief expressed a couple of visionary courier or for requiring firefighters to IT goals: One of the most important takeaways make a 5-hour drive to the incident from this incident is the goal of building command post. 1. Remote database connectivity so that incrementally on each technology team members who were not at the success. The Rattlesnake Fire provided To establish a solid network numerous opportunities for improving incident command post could process infrastructure at the incident command and view incident data remotely; and the quality of IT services on incidents, post, Cisco Tactical Operations was especially for incidents where firefighters 2. A live video stream of the morning invited to come out to Josh Ranch and team members are geographically and afternoon fire briefings. to demonstrate its latest network dispersed. By identifying areas in technology. Within 36 hours, a systems need of further improvement through Achieving both of these goals greatly engineer from Cisco arrived, tent in additional planning or testing, the team helped reduce drive times for agency hand. He stayed two nights at Josh will be prepared for the next “roll,” administrators, incident management Ranch, helping to deploy the latest wherever that may be. team members, and firefighters, thereby wireless technology for the team to ■

Fire Management Today 51 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Rescue equipment acquired in 2016 by the Sundown Volunteer Fire Department through a grant for $15,000 from the Rural Volunteer Fire Department Assistance Program. Photo: Texas A&M Forest Service.

House Bill under which it passed during the 2001 Texas legislative session), the Rural Volunteer Fire Department Assistance Program awards cost-share grants to help volunteer and eligible combination fire departments purchase firefighting vehicles, fire and rescue equipment, protective clothing, and dry-hydrants. The grants also help cover the purchase of library materials and training aides and tuition related to recognized training programs, such as the wildland fire academies hosted by Texas A&M Forest Service and the annual fire training schools put on by Texas A&M Texas A&M Forest Engineering Extension Service. Texas A&M Forest Service: Building Service offers an aggressive suite of programs aimed at Capacity at Local building the capacity of local volunteer fire Fire Departments departments.

Jason Keiningham The program is funded primarily through an assessment on certain property and casualty insurance here’s a little bit of everything emergency response. As such, Texas providers licensed by the Texas inside the 268,597 square A&M Forest Service offers an aggressive Department of Insurance. Funding miles (695,663 km2) of Texas suite of programs aimed at building is supplemented by Volunteer Fire Tlandscape. With sizable metropolises, the capacity of local fire departments Assistance grants from the USDA Forest large trade corridors, competitive through training, equipment, grants, and Service. From its inception in September ports, 130 million acres (52.6 million insurance. 2002 through March 2018, the ha) of farmland and ranchland, and assistance program funded over 30,000 over 28 million people scurrying about requests totaling almost $258 million. some of the most varied geography RURAL VOLUNTEER FIRE Of the funded requests: in the country, it’s easy to say that the DEPARTMENT ASSISTANCE emergency response needs of the State PROGRAM are diverse. The most widely used assistance program administered by Texas A&M Fortunately, Texas recognizes that Forest Service is the Rural Volunteer Jason Keiningham is head of the Capacity the volunteer fire department is the Fire Department Assistance Program. Building Department, Texas A&M Forest front line of defense for all-hazard Commonly known as “2604” (after the Service, College Station, TX.

Fire Management Today 52 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Texas A&M Forest Service presenting the Galena Park Volunteer Fire Department with funds from the Rural Volunteer Fire Department Assistance Program to help acquire a new pumper/tender. Photo: Texas A&M Forest Service. z 1,816 were for ; The Helping Hands Program allows z 4,662 were for fire and rescue The most widely used donations of gently used fire and rescue equipment, fire trucks, and other items. equipment such as slip-on units, self- assistance program contained breathing apparatus, and The State makes the items available to extraction equipment; administered by Texas fire departments while providing liability relief to the donor. Since 1997, the z 4,351 were for structural and wildland A&M Forest Service is the Rural Volunteer Helping Hands Program has received personal protective equipment; over $42.8 million in donated equipment z 1,323 were for library materials and Fire Department from 802 generous donors. Through training aides; and Assistance Program. their donations, 27,474 requests were z 20,568 went toward training tuition filled as of March 2018. for 76,287 firefighters. Property Program make up the bulk Texas A&M Forest Service also has the In 2016, Texas A&M Forest Service of assistance awarded to volunteer fire Fire Safe Program and the Fire Quench added an all new element to the Rural departments in Texas, both in number Program. Through these programs, Volunteer Fire Department Assistance of requests and in value. However, Texas fire departments are able to purchase Program by offering a $20,000 grant A&M Forest Service has six additional personal protective clothing, water toward slip-on units for departments programs to assist in building capacity handling equipment, and class A foam that received a 2.5-ton-cargo, a 5-ton- for Texas fire departments. at discounted rates. cargo, or a tractor-style U.S. Department of Defense Firefighter Property The Texas Intrastate Fire Mutual Aid The agency also provides assistance to Program truck. This element launched System (TIFMAS) Grant Assistance fire departments in the form of vehicle in 2016, during which 95 such grants Program awards reimbursement grants insurance. Nonprofit volunteer fire have been awarded (included in the tally to career fire departments and to departments operated by members of awarded fire and rescue equipment combination departments not eligible are eligible for insurance on their shown above). for assistance under 2604. The program vehicles through Texas A&M Forest delivers $1 million in grant assistance Service’s Motor Vehicle Self Insurance ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS annually, with $800,000 dedicated to Program. Coverage is at levels of The Rural Volunteer Fire Department TIFMAS vehicles and $200,000 to $100,000 per person for bodily injury, Assistance Program and the Firefighter training tuition grants. with a maximum of $300,000 per

Fire Management Today 53 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 (left) Military truck acquired by the Cameron Volunteer Fire Department through the Firefighter Property Program and converted with assistance from the Rural Volunteer Fire Department Assistance Program. (right) Five-ton military truck acquired by the Panhandle Volunteer Fire Department through the Firefighter Property Program and converted with assistance from the Rural Volunteer Fire Department Assistance Program. The department chose the color scheme to match the local school colors. Photo: Texas A&M Forest Service.

member. Each year, more than 600 fire For over 60 years, Texas A&M Forest Service has departments and 14,000 firefighters take advantage of the program. partnered with the USDA Forest Service to transfer excess U.S. Department of Defense property to LONG-TERM PRIORITY emergency service providers. Population growth, changes in land use, and unmitigated fuel loads from recent drought conditions have led to increased occurrence; and $100,000 for property funded by a 2-percent sales tax on wildfires, 80 percent of which burn damage, with a maximum of $100,000 the sale of fireworks. This program within 2 miles (3.2 km) of a community. per occurrence. This program has provides reimbursement grants for Texas fire departments are the primary saved volunteer fire departments Texas firefighters to obtain workers’ emergency response providers for more in Texas an estimated $3 million in compensation and death and disability than 85 percent of the state. For that premiums since 1995. insurance from private insurance reason, Texas A&M Forest Service’s companies. The program reimburses 100 work to protect lives and property The Rural Volunteer Fire Department percent of the cost of eligible insurance through building the capacity of the Insurance Program, created in 2001 coverage up to a yearly maximum local fire departments is and will remain by the 77th Texas Legislature, is of $125 per covered fire department a priority for years to come. ■

Fire Management Today 54 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Randall Thomas in a Bell 206 Jet Ranger helicopter while he was on the National Park Service helitack crew at the Ash Mountain helibase outside of Three Rivers, CA, in the summer of 1985. Photo: Randall Thomas, USDA Forest Service.

Upon later reflection, I concluded that I could have refused to take the risk of walking uphill in front of the Huey.

of the flight manager. The helicopter we were in was a Bell UH–1, nicknamed “Huey.”

As we approached the fire, we were facing a steep and challenging slope. The helicopter pilot did what’s called a toe-in, putting the front of the skids against the angled slope and trying to hold the ship in that position, in a hover, while maintaining clearance for the main rotor blades from the steeply angled slope. My coworker exited the helicopter on the left side and slipped The Huey on down the slope parallel to but not in the path of the tail rotor.

I was sitting in the back on the right the Hill side of the helicopter, and I was ordered to exit and walk around the front of the helicopter on the uphill side, under Randall C. Thomas the spinning rotor blades. As I did so, I could see the flight manager give me some type of hand signal, looking me uring the summer of 1986, I was college in the fall, with money left over straight in the eye with a glare. In my a young and energetic firefighter to help repair my 1969 Mustang (always training, I had been taught to make eye working for the National Park heavily on my mind). contact with the pilot whenever near DService in central California in the the front of the helicopter, and the flight Sierra Nevada. I was on a prescribed ACCEPTING RISK manager was seated next to the pilot, so burn crew. The previous year, for the On July 4, 1986, I had a very National Park Service, I had been on interesting experience. Three of us a helitack crew (also described as a plus the pilot lifted off in a helicopter Randall Thomas is the lead fire dispatcher helicopter initial attack crew, used to from the heliport to respond to a fire for the Forest Service at the Coeur d’Alene transport people and crews to a fire). On reported to be only a few minutes Interagency Dispatch Center in Hayden, ID, my days off in 1986, I would help out away. A fellow helicopter crew currently on detail in the supervisor’s office of the helicopter crew, and my overtime member and I were assigned to initial the Idaho Panhandle National Forests, Coeur and hazard pay would help pay for attack on the fire under the direction d’Alene, ID.

Fire Management Today 55 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 I paused to try and understand what he Before liftoff from the helipad, we could of resources to quickly suppress any was communicating to me. have done a quick briefing checklist. fires on a high-profile holiday, with the The area we were going to was just a fire danger it entailed. I watched my Then I continued walking around to few miles from the heliport, the flight coworker slip and fall downslope after the left side of the helicopter, where manager had good knowledge of the he exited the helicopter. I wanted to I unloaded some firefighting gear, local area, and he knew the terrain offload equipment so we could make , and equipment, and we very well. The IRPG section called a good landing zone and start initial started to make a helispot. Other folks “Situation Terrain Influences” would attack, and I assumed that my coworker hiked in from a road, probably about a have played a major role in the safety of was not seriously hurt, but in retrospect 45-minute hike. our operation. I am not sure how I could be so certain.

Soon, a Bell Jet Ranger, the park Once over the fire, we should have The IRPG requires an after-action helicopter, came over the fire. There was taken risk management more seriously. review, and we never really had one. A still not enough open area to land, so a A steep slope on a hillside with heavy few days later, I asked the flight manager park employee jumped off the helicopter vegetation hampered our access. what he had been trying to convey to when the skids were a few feet off the The IRPG outlines Aviation Watch me while I was walking uphill around ground. After a while, the landing zone Out situations, many of which were the front of the helicopter. He had been was cleared, and other firefighters were overlooked. trying to tell me to keep my head down. shuttled in by the Huey. Within one I was crouched down, but he thought I operational period, the fire was under might stand up and get hit in the head control and the initial attack operation The Incident by the spinning rotor blades. He said had succeeded. Response Pocket it was good helicopter crew member training that kept me safely crouched Upon later reflection, I concluded that Guide requires an down. I could have refused to take the risk of after-action review, walking uphill in front of the Huey. I and we never really AVOIDING NEEDLESS RISK accepted the risk to my personal safety had one. In conclusion, some people tell stories because I felt the need to complete the of facing unsafe situations, walking mission. Also, the flight manager had away unscathed, and seeming proud of asked me to do it, and I wanted to meet it (even when they say they will never the challenge and prove myself to be a For example, the Watch Outs include do it again). Not me. I made a foolish can-do kind of guy. “Was this flight necessary?,” “Are any decision. I was part of an event in which guidelines being ignored or policies people took unnecessary risk and did BETTER MANAGING RISK being broken?,” and “Is there a better not take the time to carefully analyze Many of the safety problems that we way to do it?” It took a ground crew the risk and the ramifications of their encountered during this aerial initial only about 45 minutes to hike into the actions. attack could have been prevented if location. Once on the scene, the ground we had used the Incident Response troops alone could have safely built a If you are going to be involved in fire Pocket Guide (IRPG) we have today for good landing zone in plenty of time for and aviation management, pay attention wildland fire suppression and aviation helicopter shuttling operations and then to your IRPG and other safety manuals. operations. Published by the National started initial attack. It only makes sense. As it states in Wildfire Coordinating Group, the IRPG the IRPG under “Integrity”: “Set the contains phrases and examples that can The IRPG asks, “Are you driven by an example. Choose the difficult right over help in understanding the incident I overwhelming sense of urgency?” Yes, the easy wrong.” described. we were. It was the Fourth of July, and ■ our fire managers wanted to use plenty

Fire Management Today 56 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 This Day in History: Cramer Fire, 22 July 2003

Editor’s note: The piece is adapted from 6 Minutes for Safety, a program and website perimeter is now over the ridge and in the managed by the 6 Minutes for Safety Subcommittee under the guidance of the NWCG Cache Bar drainage. The fire is now on Risk Management Committee. “This Day in History” is a brief summary of a powerful both sides of the ridge that the helispots learning opportunity and is not intended to second-guess or judge decisions and actions. are on, with fire active below H–1.

At H–2, the two helitacks are falling ut yourself in the following At 8 p.m., the fire intensity is reported to large trees to clear room for medium situation as if you did not know be low; due to a thermal belt, however, helicopters ordered for a crew shuttle. what the outcome would be. the fire burns actively until 3 a.m. on PWhat are the conditions? What are you July 22. At 11:27 a.m., H193 transitions to thinking? What are you doing? bucket work on H–1. Minutes later, the At around 9:30 a.m. on July 22, H193 firefighters on H–1 pull back and retreat INCIDENT SUMMARY rappels two helitack firefighters into a down a trail toward the Salmon River. In 2003, central Idaho, including the new helispot (H–2) up the ridge from Within 20 minutes, H–1 is burned over. Salmon–Challis National Forest, has H–1. Air attack reports that the fire Fire activity is reported as intense. been in a 4-year drought. Spring and summer rainfall has lagged.

A fire is reported on July 20 at 4:30 p.m. in the area of Cramer Creek, a steep and arid drainage into the nearby Salmon River.

Jumpers size up the Cramer Fire at 3 acres (1.2 ha), with high spread potential. High winds keep them from engaging the fire.

Firefighters are flown into a helispot (H–1) on a ridge sloping down toward the Salmon River between the Cramer drainage and the Cache Bar drainage to the west. Due to fire behavior, the firefighters don’t engage the fire. The fire burns actively until 2:30 a.m. on July 21.

By morning, the fire has spread over 35 acres (14 ha).

In addition to other air and ground Topography of the Cramer Fire tragedy on the slopes of Long Tom Mountain overlooking the resources, the Indianola helicopter H193 Salmon River in central Idaho. The fatal burnover occurred on July 22, 2003, near H–2. The fire and helitack crew report to the fire on began on July 20 in the Cramer Creek drainage, then spilled over West Ridge into the Cache Bar July 21 at 3:15 p.m. By 5:52 p.m., the drainage to the west, where flames later sped uphill and overran H–2. Source: Cramer Fire Accident fire is at 200 acres (80 ha). Investigation Report.

Fire Management Today 57 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 By 2:30 p.m., the fire in the Cache Bar °C) and set record highs. Relative drainage was observed by the leadplane drainage, having spilled over from the humidities are 10 to 15 percent. and air attack 50 minutes before the Cramer Creek drainage, has become fire reached H–2, yet it was never an active fire front. At 2:47 p.m., plans Fuels in the Cache Bar drainage are communicated to them. are made to remove the helitack crew short grass on the south aspects and from H–2. nearly continuous fields of ceanothus What will you and your crew do during any on the north. Live fuel moistures are fire assignment to get accurate information At 3 p.m., the fire on both sides of the critically low and the Burn Index and about current fire behavior? ridge begins to spread rapidly. Both Energy Release Component indicate helicopters assigned to the fire are at the dangerous conditions. E and S—There were no effective safety helibase 15 minutes away for refueling zones for the rappellers at H–2. After and maintenance when the helitacks call Based on the predicted weather and the fire H–1 below them burned over, the only for an immediate pick up. information above, what are your concerns? way out was a helicopter.

At 3:05 p.m., they call again for How could you and your crew safely engage a Helicopters have become a common immediate pickup. At 3:09 p.m., they fire in a similar situation? resource on fires, transporting call for immediate pickup and report that firefighters to and from remote locations they are fine but taking a lot as well as delivering food, of smoke. At 3:13 p.m., the water, supplies, and medevac. helitacks report fire and smoke below them and request What would you do if the immediate pickup. helicopter couldn’t come? Discuss why depending on helicopters as At 3:19 a.m., the helitacks an escape route is a bad idea. contact the helibase, asking about the status of the INCIDENT helicopter. Arriving at the fire, COMPLEXITIES the helicopter is unable to land On any incident, firefighters due to smoke. may or may not be aware of problems with incident Both rappellers leave H–2 management effectiveness, at 3:20 p.m. At 3:24 p.m., the adequacy of resources, and Cache Bar drainage is fully other big-picture details. engulfed in fire. The rappellers make a final call for immediate Discuss how you and your crew will pickup … both die soon thereafter. LOOKOUTS, maintain safety without knowing these COMMUNICATIONS, things. HISTORY ESCAPE ROUTES, SAFETY The Salmon River Breaks in central REFERENCES Idaho, including the Salmon–Challis ZONES L—The investigation report states that USDA Forest Service. 2003. Accident National Forest, have a long history of there were no effective lookouts for the investigation factual report: Cramer Fire entrapping firefighters: 161 to date. Steep fatalities, North Fork Ranger District, rappellers at H2. It is not uncommon slopes predispose the area to rollout Salmon-Challis National Forest, Region to assign small squads to isolated tasks and rapid uphill fire growth, commonly 4. 0351–2M48–MTDC. Missoula, MT: such as cutting helispots. The rappellers leading to extreme fire behavior and Missoula Technology and Development on H2 were clearing large trees to make difficult conditions for suppression. Center. 70 p. a larger helispot. National Interagency Fire Center. 2013. Cramer Fire case study (2013 refresher) How can information about an area’s fire How would you and your crew maintain [Video recording]. YouTube. https:// history help your situational awareness? situational awareness of the fire and the www.wildfirelessons.net/orphans/ felling operation at the same time? viewincident?DocumentKey=becb12c6- SIZEUP c45f-46ff-8e5a-9be16da1db9e. (29 May On July 22, crews are informed at the C—The rappellers were made aware 2018). ■ morning briefing that conditions of the low-intensity fire in the Cache will be getting progressively warmer Bar drainage as soon as they were and drier than on previous days. dropped off. However, the development Temperatures surpass 100 °F (38 of an active fire front in the Cache Bar

Fire Management Today 58 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 The author in 1985 with a Bell 206 Jet Ranger, the park’s exclusive-use helicopter, Ash Mountain Helibase, Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Park, California. Photo: Randall C. Thomas.

couple of gentlemen walking up to us. One looked like he was in his sixties and the other might have been 30 to 40 years old.

During helicopter operations, onlookers sometimes want to see what’s going on and maybe take a few pictures. I wondered whether these two gentlemen would somehow interfere with our helicopter operations because we were so close to our helicopter landing zone. But my fears quickly faded as we engaged in friendly conversation.

I explained what our mission was and what role I specifically played. The older gentleman took notice of my green flight suit, commenting My Great Encounter that he used to wear “one of those suits.” I introduced myself, and as he shook my hand, he said, “My name is With the Aviator Chuck Yeager.” I almost fell over. I said, “Chuck Randall C. Thomas Yeager—you’re the one who broke the sound barrier?”

arly in the summer of 1985, General Chuck Yeager was a famous World War II ace fighter pilot and later I had just started my summer I had a big grin on job on the helitack crew for a test pilot. By coincidence, I had read ESequoia and Kings Canyon National my face, barely able an article about Chuck Yeager only a Park in the southern Sierra Nevada. to believe that I was couple of weeks earlier. I had duties such as fighting fires, but talking with one of I was very excited. I had a big grin on my main job was much like that of a the greatest pilots the flight crewmember on a helicopter: my face, barely able to believe that I was I was to ensure safe and efficient world has ever known. talking with one of the greatest pilots transportation for personnel and cargo the world has ever known. And earlier I on the parks’ exclusive-use helicopter, had been apprehensive about these folks a Bell 206 Jet Ranger. supplies and direct people in getting off walking up to us! What an idiot I was! I the helicopter. I would need to ensure really felt stupid. One of the first missions I was assigned that folks exited the helicopter in a safe to was transporting a California manner, unload the cargo, and ensure that the doors were properly latched conservation trail crew and its supplies Randall Thomas is on detail in timber and everything was secured before the to a location in the park called Crabtree contracting and land use permits for the Forest ship lifted off again to get the next load. Meadows. The first flight transported Service, Idaho Panhandle National Forests, just the camp crew cook and me so Coeur d’Alene, ID. that I could be in position to unload As the cook and I were waiting at the helicopter landing zone, I noticed a

Fire Management Today 59 SEPTEMBER 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3 Chuck talked about breaking the sound barrier and about his military career. At the time, he still flew jets, but as a GUIDELINES civilian. for Contributors I asked Chuck about the movie The Right Stuff. I was very interested in how Fire Management Today (FMT) is an STYLE they portrayed him in the movie. Chuck international magazine for the wildland fire Authors are responsible for using wildland told me that he himself was in one scene community. The purpose of FMT is to share fire terminology that conforms to the latest of the movie, as a bartender in Pancho information and raise issues related to wildland standards set by the National Wildfire Barnes’s bar. I made sure to look for him fire management for the benefit of the wildland Coordinating Group under the National next time I watched the movie. fire community. FMT welcomes unsolicited Interagency Incident Management System. manuscripts from readers on any subject related FMT uses the spelling, capitalization, to wildland fire management. hyphenation, and other styles recommended Chuck and his party were camping in the U.S. Government Printing Office Style nearby, and they just happened to be However, FMT is not a forum for airing Manual, as required by the U.S. Department on a hike when I met him. After I personal grievances or for marketing of Agriculture. Authors should use the told my coworkers about my meeting commercial products. The Forest Service’s Fire U.S. system of weight and measure, with with General Chuck Yeager, they told and Aviation Management staff reserves the equivalent values in the metric system. Keep me that Chuck visited the park quite right to reject submissions that do not meet the titles concise and descriptive; subheadings frequently and that other National Park purpose of FMT. and bulleted material are useful and help Service personnel had met and visited readability. As a general rule of clear writing, use the active voice (for example, with him as well. SUBMISSIONS write, “Fire managers know…” and not, Send electronic files by email or traditional “It is known…”). Give spellouts for all It was really great for a young guy like mail to: abbreviations. me to have the chance to meet and visit USDA Forest Service with someone so famous, someone who Fire Management Today TABLES made aviation history. As a country boy 201 14th Street, SW Tables should be logical and understandable from the mountains of northwestern Washington, D.C. 20250 without reading the text. Include tables at the Montana, I never imagined that I would Email: [email protected] end of the manuscript with appropriate titles. meet someone like Chuck Yeager, Submit electronic files in PC format. Submit much less in a remote part of the Sierra manuscripts in Word (.doc or .docx). Submit PHOTOGRAPHS Nevada in California. I will cherish the illustrations and photographs as separate AND ILLUSTRATIONS memory for the rest of my life. files; do not include visual materials (such Figures, illustrations, and clear photographs ■ as photographs, maps, charts, or graphs) are often essential to the understanding of as embedded illustrations in the electronic articles. Clearly label all photographs and manuscript file. You may submit digital illustrations (figure 1, 2, 3; photograph A, photographs in JPEG, TIFF, or EPS format; B, C). At the end of the manuscript, include they must be at high resolution: at least 300 clear, thorough figure and photo captions dpi at a minimum size of 4 by 7 inches. labeled in the same way as the corresponding Include information for photo captions and material (figure 1, 2, 3; photograph A, B, photographer’s name and affiliation at the C). Captions should make photographs and end of the manuscript. Submit charts and illustrations understandable without reading graphs along with the electronic source files the text. For photographs, indicate the name or data needed to reconstruct them and any and affiliation of the photographer and the special instructions for layout. Include a year the photo was taken. description of each illustration at the end of the manuscript for use in the caption. RELEASE AUTHORIZATION Non-Federal Government authors must sign For all submissions, include the complete a release to allow their work to be placed name(s), title(s), affiliation(s), and address(es) in the public domain and on the World of the author(s), illustrator(s), and Wide Web. In addition, all photographs photographer(s), as well as their telephone and illustrations created by a non-Federal number(s) and email address(es). If the same employee require a written release by the or a similar manuscript is being submitted for photographer or illustrator. The author, publication elsewhere, include that information photograph, and illustration release forms also. Authors should submit a photograph are available upon request at of themselves or a logo for their agency, [email protected]. institution, or organization.

Fire Management Today 60 AUGUST 2019 • VOL. 77 • NO. 3