THEORIES OF GENIUS AND THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN
LAURA C. BALL
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GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PSYCHOLOGY
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ABSTRACT
Otto Weininger (1906) once noted that "genius is linked with manhood, that it represents an ideal masculinity in the highest form" (p. 113). This sentiment is hardly surprising, as men have dominated the ranks of eminent figures throughout history
(Simonton, 1999). This thesis has two aims: first, to examine the theories of genius; and second, to determine what exclusion strategies are used by these theorists to deny women genius status. The theories of genius will be limited to those with a psychological basis, and are presented in four categories: creativity, madness, intelligence and eminence. The exclusion strategies presented in this thesis are exclusion by type and. psycho-biological exclusion. Historical and contemporary texts will be examined using a critical presentist perspective. The conclusions drawn from this analysis will be presented from a feminist social constructionist position, and will be put forward as an example of epistemological violence. (v)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor, Thomas Teo, for all the support and guidance he has provided me with on this project, and throughout my Master's degree program. He is an advisor and teacher in the truest senses of the words. I would also like to thank Alex
Rutherford for all her kind comments and thoughtful feedback. She has been an invaluable source of knowledge and an excellent role model. In addition, I would like to thank my committee members, Jennifer Steele and Didi Khayatt for their time and effort.
Besides my committee, I would also like to thank the members of the History &
Theory of Psychology community at York University for their support in every way. In particular, I would like to recognize the following people for their friendship, suggestions, and endless hours of emotional support: Marissa Barnes, Jenn Bazar, Ritu
Bedi, Jeremy Burman, Anne-Marie DePape, Jason Goertzen, Alicia Grimes, Adele
Lamphier, Mary Mantello, Jesse Orriss, Laura Reynolds and Mike Walsh. Finally, I would like to thank my family for encouraging me to follow my dreams, and see them through. I would especially like to thank my sister, Diana Ball, for everything she has done for me and more. (vi)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract iv
Acknowledgements v
1. Introduction 1
2. Feminist Critique of Psychology 15
3. Creativity and Madness Theories of Genius 36
4. Intelligence and Eminence Theories of Genius 55
5. Exclusion by Type 78
6. Psycho-Biological Exclusion 91
7. Conclusion 110
References 119 1
What is genius? It is the power to be a boy again at will.
Sir James Matthew Barrie1
Theories of Genius and the Exclusion of Women
Chapter One
Introduction
Overview
The word genius holds many connotations: high IQ, excellence in a particular area of study, superior artistic or creative skills, or having made a significant contribution to the course of human history. The word has been applied to many eminent figures, such as Albert Einstein (1879-1955), William Shakespeare (1564-1616), or Ludwig van
Beethoven (1770-1827). Yet, where did the term come from and how has it evolved?
Who has typically defined genius throughout history? How has it enabled the exclusion of women from this elite distinction? These questions will provide a focus for this analysis of the genius literature.
This thesis will be presented over the course of six chapters. Chapter one will provide an introduction to the concept of genius, its etymology, and the major themes in the genius literature. In addition, the first chapter will discuss, in detail, how the texts will be analyzed and the theoretical position I will take with the genius literature. Chapter two will offer a background on the feminist critique relevant to the arguments I will present.
Chapter three will outline two of the main themes used for conceptualizing genius:
1 p. 249 - Barrie, J.M. (1900). Tommy andGrizel. London: Cassell and Company. 2 creativity and madness. Chapter four will explore the remaining two themes in the genius literature: intelligence and eminence. Chapters five and six will explore, through the process of text analysis, the strategies used for excluding women from the designation of genius. These tactics are exclusion by type, and psycho-biological exclusion, respectively. The final chapter will present the remaining criticisms and conclusions, which will question not only the subject matter under discussion, but also the ethical- political nature of the literature. The limitations of this thesis will also be discussed.
Etymology
The word genius comes from the Latin gens, which means family (Murray, 1989a;
Weiner, 2000). It can be traced back to the Roman Empire, where it referred to a male attendant spirit (Murray, 1989a). The female version was called ajuno or iuno (Weiner,
2000). From the earliest records, it appears that the genius was connected to the family and household (Murray, 1989a; Weiner, 2000). It was conceived of as a guardian spirit of an individual person, as Well as a group of people, or a place (Murray, 1989a).
Genius in this sense of guardian spirit was attributed not only to
individuals but also, by extension, to groups of people (the genius populi
Rotnani, for example) and to places, the celebrated genius loci: cities,
towns, houses, marketplaces and street corners al have their own
presiding deity. (Murray, 1989a, p. 3)
The spirit was thought to be external to the person or place, yet always connected to them
(Weiner, 2000). A similar concept, daimon, can be found in Greek culture prior to and 3 during the Roman Empire (Albert, 1969). By the turn of the third century BC, the relationship between the individual and their genius began to change, so that the genius, while still viewed as an external entity, was born alongside the individual and came to bear directly upon their personality (Murray, 1989a; Weiner, 2000). Roman custom was for each man to celebrate his genius on his birthday and provide his genius with offerings. Penelope Murray (1989a) states that the modern practice of having cakes at birthday parties are the remnants of this tradition. The spiritual meaning of genius remained popular throughout the Middle Ages in Italy, England and France (Murray,
1989a).
It is unclear when the word genius was first used in reference to a person, but it is thought to be sometime during the 16th century (Albert, 1969).
The word "genio" appears to have been used during the middle of the
sixteenth century when it referred primarily to a great artist, denoting
specifically such a person's great but not unique abilities. Specifically,
the term "genio" was used first in the sixteenth century primarily to
denote the "newly created" (Albert, 1969, p. 743).
However, it is during the Enlightenment (18th century) when the use of the word in the
English language changed so that genius came to refer to the unique abilities of a person
(Albert, 1969; Murray 1989a).
But during the course of that century a striking and fundamental change
occurs in the meaning of the word: up till this time, genius as personal, 4
protective spirit had been something every man possessed, now genius
as an extraordinary creative power becomes the prerogative of a highly
selected and privileged few. (Murray, 1989a, p. 3)
The change in the meaning of the word genius is easily seen in Samuel Johnson's
A Dictionary of the English Language (1755). Here Johnson provided the following definitions: (1) the protecting or ruling power of men, places, or things; (2) a man endowed with superior faculties; (3) mental power or faculties; (4) disposition of nature by which any one is qualified for some peculiar employment; and (5) nature, disposition.
Clearly, only the first definition is consistent with the original meaning of the word genius. This is owing to the use of another similar Latin word - ingenium. Ingenium refers to both a natural disposition and an innate ability (Murray, 1989a). "For ingenium in the sense of 'natural ability' is a quality which cannot be acquired by learning, nor is it a quality which everyone possesses" (Murray, 1989a, p. 3). When translated into English, ingenium became genius as well, therefore adding to the complexity of the original definition (Murray, 1989a). Thus, after the collapse of the Roman Empire, it was the male version of the spiritual term that survived, which became entangled with the notion of natural ability.
It is interesting to note that although genius now refers almost exclusively to a particular native superior or unique ability, some authors continue to add a mystical connotation to the word (Albert, 1969). "Toward the middle of the nineteenth century the term genius assumed additional meanings that were less clear for the being more mystical 5 or overly speculative" (Albert, 1969, p. 743). Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum (1931) stated that there is always a religious sub-flavour to the term, even in scholarly work (see also
Terman, 1925). Due to this fact, at the beginning of the 20th century it was argued that the word genius should not be used within psychological or scientific discussions (W. Hirsch,
1897; Hollingworth, 1926); however it remains in the literature to this day.
Creativity, Divinity, and Madness
Creativity has long been thought to have divine origin and inspiration (Murray,
1989b). The Greeks were fascinated by creativity, although they had no word for it
(Murray, 1989b). Instead, they invoked the idea of the Muses: the nine daughters of Zeus, who were thought to bestow divine talent, in a variety of disciplines, upon deserving adults (Murray, 1989b). Thus, humans were not born with superior talents, but were given them in later years. However, as the concepts of genius and ingenium developed and became entangled, the divine gift of creativity was thought to be given at birth
(Murray, 1989b). For some time, these inborn gifts were still considered to have been a blessing from a divine entity.
The inspiration of artists appears to others to come in bursts, adding to the perception of divine origin (Weisberg, 1986). The period of inspiration, particularly for poets, was thought to be characterized by a type of frenzy or irrationality (Murray,
1989a).
Plato's doctrine of poetic inspiration as a kind of frenzy or enthusiasm
formulated, for the first time in Western culture, a belief in the 6
irrationality of the poetic process, which remained standard for centuries
to come and which, in certain important ways, anticipated some of the
notions which were later associated with the idea of genius. (Murray,
1989a, p. 4)
Therefore, even within the Classical period, madness and mysticism were tied to the concept of creativity. It is not surprising that these ideas became so entwined with the notion of genius. As genius began to refer to an individual's unique abilities, it was exclusively equated with the divinely inspired creativity of artists, poets, musicians and authors (Murray, 1989b; see Kant, 1790/2000). While, in later years, the notion of creativity has been expanded to include extraordinary work in the maths and sciences, the themes of madness and mysticism have remained (Albert, 1969; Howe, 1990; Weisberg,
1986; see Eysenck, 1995; and Simonton, 1994).
In the 19th century, the association of creativity with madness was transformed from divine inspiration to biologically-based pathology. This turn in thinking was marked by a new relationship between genius and madness: genius became linked with the criminal profile (see Lombroso, 1889/1905). This shift in thinking was clearly visible in the literature of the time as well; the evil genius character became a staple of popular fiction.
One such notable figure is Professor Moriarty, first appearing in The Final Solution
(1893) in Arthur Conan Doyle's (1859-1930) Sherlock Holmes series. Moriarty represented the genius who willingly turned his talents to criminal ends. On the other side of the coin is the classic character Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde, created by Robert Louis Stevenson (1850-1894). The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886) featured a highly intelligent scientist whose alter-ego was a psychopath with no regard for society.
These characters, among others, have captured the imagination of scholars and the public alike to this day.
Another popular example of genius and madness is the case of the American chess master, Paul Morphy (1837-1884). He excelled in chess at a young age, earning him the reputation of a child prodigy, and by the age of 22 was hailed as the first unofficial world chess champion2 (Lawson, 1976). However, his later years were marked with tragedy. He was known to wander the streets of the French Quarter in New Orleans naked, speaking to people that no one could see. Morphy was also severely depressed, and suffered from feelings of persecution (Lawson, 1976). He died in his bathtub at the age of forty-seven.
Today, Morphy is still considered by many to be the greatest chess player to ever live
(Lawson, 1976).
Intelligence and Eminence
The association between genius and intelligence has a much shorter history than the relationship between genius and creativity. While the late eighteenth century featured some early theorizing on the topic, it was the Darwinian revolution in science that seemed to cement the relationship. Charles Darwin's (1809-1882) cousin, Francis Galton
(1822-1911), published his classic work, Hereditary Genius (1869/2006), which marked the beginning of a new trend in the psychological sciences: the application of statistics to
2 The firstofficia l world chess championship wasn't held until 1886. 8 the measurement of intelligence and its heritability (Fancher, 1985). However, since intelligence tests had not yet been designed, Galton and his successors (see Castle, 1913;
Cattell, 1903,1906,1910) relied on lists of eminent figures in history to make their case for the hereditary, and ultimately, predictive nature of intelligence.
With the advent of the intelligence test, it became possible for researchers to detect extraordinary intellectual potential at a young age. Lewis M. Terman's Genetic
Studies of Genius (1925) was the first to attempt to systematically study genius from an early age. However, reaction to this study was swift and severe. Leaders in the field, such as Leta S. Hollingworth (1926) condemned Terman for confounding the terms genius and gifted. She argued that there was no psychological or scientific basis to genius
(Hollingworth, 1926; see also W. Hirsch, 1897), and that it was irresponsible to confuse it with giftedness, which is scientifically and empirically defined (Hollingworth, 1926).
Despite her warnings, and the warnings of others (see Albert, 1969; Eysenck, 1995; A.
Jensen, 1996), genius and gifted continue to be used synonymously.
The intellectual genius is typified in the Indian mathematician, Srinivasa
Ramanujan (1887-1920). Ramanujan was discovered by G.H. Hardy (1877-1947), and is considered to be one of the most talented natural mathematicians in centuries (Gardner,
1983). Having had no formal education in mathematics, Ramanujan was able to independently discover Bernoulli numbers at age 17 while living in extreme poverty in
India (Kanigel, 1991; A. Jensen, 1996). He provided some of the most remarkable insights into mathematics, yet had never heard of the questions being asked by other great 9 mathematicians of this century (Gardner, 1983). Hardy recalled that Ramanujan, upon arriving at the University of Cambridge, had to be taught even the simplest formulas, yet was able to solve problems in such advanced ways that contemporaries rarely had the skills to understand what he had done (A. Jensen, 1996). He died at the age of 33, having compiled more than 3000 theorems during his four years at Cambridge (1914-1918)
(Kanigel, 1991). In 1997, the Ramanujan Journal was launched to honour his achievements by publishing high-quality articles in his areas of interest.
The Gender of Genius
When one thinks of a prototypical genius, the first personalities that come to mind are almost invariably male. "Genius is linked with manhood, that it represents and ideal masculinity in the highest form" (Weininger, 1906, p. 113). This sentiment is hardly surprising, as men have dominated the ranks of eminent figures throughout history
(Howe, 1999; Simonton, 1999). Society has, in general, denied women the opportunity to step outside the home and onto the world stage (Howe, 1999; Simonton, 1999). In addition, the arenas where women have been encouraged to succeed are rarely those that are overtly valued by society. "In a man's world, men have usually held the power to decide which kinds of achievement are to be valued" (Howe, 1999, p. 33). There are those, such as Charlotte Bronte and Marie Curie, who have managed to attain eminence in a man's world. However, for the most part, the achievements of women in male- dominated fields have largely been ignored. When speaking of the impact of Albert 10
Einstein's work, David Henry Feldman (1986) stated, "if little Albert had been a girl, I think we would never have heard of her" (p. 172).
In a more current example, Ben A. Barres (1954-), a professor of Neurobiology at Stanford University, recently described his experiences as a trans-gendered male in academia (2006). He presented an interesting view-point to the readers of Nature: there are very few academics that have had experiences in the profession as both a female and as a male. Barres provided the following anecdote:
As an undergrad at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), I
was the only person in a large class of nearly all men to solve a hard maths
problem, only to be told be the professor that my boyfriend must have
solved it for me. I was not given any credit. I am still disappointed about
the prestigious fellowship competition I later lost to a male contemporary
when I was a PhD student, even though the Harvard dean who had read
both applications assured me that my application was much stronger (I had
published six high-impact papers whereas my male competitor had
published only one). Shortly after I changed sex, a faculty member was
heard to say "Ben Barres gave a great seminar today, but then his work is
much better than his sister's." (Barres, 2006, p. 134)
This trend is evident even in psychology. As Raymond E. Fancher (1996) noted,
Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) was listed in the 1903 edition of American Men of
Science as one of the top fifty psychologists. Although she and two other women were 11 present on the list, the title was not changed to American Men and Women of Science until the 1960s (Fancher, 1996). This begs the question: in what ways have women's achievements been denied equal status with men's, and the title of genius?
Theoretical Approach and Methodology
The current thesis will take a theoretical approach to exploring the genius literature. Using a critical presentist perspective, historical and contemporary texts will be used to explore current theoretical concerns (Teo, 2005). I will adopt a feminist social constructionist position, which presumes that gender differences are culturally and historically embedded (Gergen, 1985; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990). From an epistemological standpoint, power structures are considered central to understanding what is considered knowledge (Riger, 1992). Therefore, historically, knowledge claims have reflected the interests of men (Riger, 1992), who have presented them as objective truth.
Text analysis is the primary method I will use for the critical reconstruction of the genius literature (Fitch & Sanders, 2005; Halliday, 1978, 2002; Morawski & Steele,
1991; Threadgold, 1998). The process of text analysis, put forward by Halliday (1978), differs from discourse analysis because of its explicit focus on the social context in which the text was created, and the social system that is generated from the creation of the text.
Texts, Halliday (2002) stated, are identified from non-text in three ways: "generic structure, textual structure (thematic and informational), and cohesion" (p. 44). He argued that the text itself may be seen as a semantic unit from which a reader may infer certain 12 ideas and meanings. "But its unity as a text is likely to be displayed in patterns of ideational and interpersonal meaning as well. A text is the product of its environment, and it functions in that environment" (Halliday, 2002, p. 47). Therefore, a text can be seen as a "sociological event, a semiotic encounter through which the meanings that constitute a social system are exchanged" (Halliday, 2002, p. 50). Halliday (2002) stated that the most important function of a text is the meaning exchange. It is within this interaction, or conversation, that reality is constructed between the author and the reader.
Beyond this, Halliday (2002) states that the meanings constructed in this reality are the social system itself. "Text is the primary channel of the transmission of culture"
(Halliday, 2002, p. 53). A text, Halliday stated (2002), may be seen as acting within and on the culture in which it is situated, however, more importantly, it also creates the environment and transmits these meanings to the next generation. Thus, a text may be interpreted at both the personal and social level.
Halliday's (1978,2002) process of text analysis involves understanding language to be part of a larger social structure and context (Halliday, 1978; Threadgold, 1997).
Thus, texts must be seen, not only as an exchange between the author and the language, but also the culture and society. As Halliday (1978) stated, the reader is able to make
"informed guesses" about the meaning of the text based on their knowledge of the
"linguistic system and from his sensibility to the particular cultural, situational and verbal context" (p. 61). Therefore, analysis of texts may stem from analysis of the language, the author and the author's cultural-historical influences. 13
All theories have been presented in the thematic categories I have identified after a thorough examination of the literature. The four central themes to be explored in this thesis are: creativity, intelligence, madness and eminence. However, due to the vast amount of literature, only selected exemplar theories have been chosen for review.
Theories were chosen for their scholarly impact: each was written by notable figures, and cited heavily by their peers. Citations were found through Psyclnfo, Web of Science,
JStor, and Google Scholar. However, this method proved ineffective as citations for the genius literature is difficult to find, or is nonexistent in Web of Science, JStor and Google
Scholar. In Psyclnfo, citations are only shown when they appear in current articles. In addition, the citations for books are not well documented. Thus, the best method of finding highly cited works was through a systematic review of the literature. These works are presented here.
Within each thematic category, the exemplar theories have been further organized into disciplinary-based categories: philosophical, philosophical-psychological and psychological. Philosophical refers to those theories created by philosophers.
Philosophical-psychological refers to those theories presented from the mid-1800s to early-1900s that have an interdisciplinary approach, such as the work by the criminologist, Cesare Lombroso. Finally, the psychological literature category includes those theorists that fall within psychiatry or psychology proper. Through the process of text analysis, the strategies employed by authors to exclude women from being labelled 14 as geniuses have been identified and examined. 'Strategies' here refers to Foucault's concept, presented in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969/2005).
Such discourses as economics, medicine, grammar, the science of living
beings give rise to certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings
of objects, certain types of enunciation, which form, according to their
degree of coherence, rigour, and stability, themes or theories...
Whatever their formal level may be, I call these themes and theories
'strategies'. (Foucault, 1969/2005, p. 71)
Thus, within the context of this thesis, 'exclusion strategies' refers to the ways in which women have been cast in the theories of genius that allow the author to deny them genius status. These have also been presented in the thematic categories I have identified following a critical review of the literature. The two strategies explored in the current thesis are: exclusion by type and psycho-biological exclusion. The exclusion by type strategy relies on the notion of 'separate spheres' for men and women, which, as this chapter has shown, has been a popular theme in psychology. The psycho-biological exclusion strategy, on the other hand, rests on the premises of Darwinian evolution and biological determinism, also popular themes in psychology. It is expected that despite some discontinuity in theoretical discourses, there will nevertheless be some continuity in the goals behind the exclusion. In particular, it is believed that many authors used these strategies, implicitly or explicitly, to further the goals of an androcentric science. The exclusion strategies presented in this thesis, and the format of analysis, will closely 15 follow that of Jill Morawski and Robert Steele's (1991) paper (see chapter two). In particular, the exclusion strategies presented in this thesis are intended to build upon those suggested by Morawski and Steele (1991). The exclusion by type strategy may even be unique to the genius literature.
The following chapter will explore the feminist critiques relevant to this thesis, and will discuss Morawski and Steele's (1991) article in detail. 16
Chapter Two
Feminist Critique of
Psychology
The critique of science and psychology as patriarchal disciplines has had a long tradition (Teo, 2005). This chapter will highlight those topics and authors whose work is of the greatest relevance to the study and construction of genius, to help understand how and why women may have been excluded from this construction. In addition, it will also elaborate on the position I will be taking in this thesis, and the methodology being used.
Therefore, the focus of the review will be on issues surrounding methodology, objectivity, language and power.
Types of Feminist Critique
In her classic study, Evelyn Fox Keller (1982) noted that there have generally been three types of feminist critique in science: liberal, radical liberal, and radical.
Liberal feminists generally do not take issue with the discipline itself, but rather its practices, such as unequal access to education and unequal hiring policies (Keller, 1982).
Radical liberal feminists, on the other hand, would argue that the unequal practices have lead to a greater predominance of men in the field, which leads to a discipline that is androcentric by nature. Therefore, the subjects of inquiry, and the methodologies are all necessarily gender biased (Keller, 1982). Radical feminists go one step further: they argue that the conclusions drawn from the data are subject to male bias. Thus, radical 17 feminists question the very notion of objectivity, upon which the sciences are founded
(Keller, 1982).
Within psychology, several authors have taken the radical feminist position (see
Lowie & Hollingworth, 1916; Sherif, 1998; Shields, 1975; Tavris, 1993; Weisstein,
1993). Naomi Weisstein's (1993) paper represented one of the most strongly stated oppositions to the dominant order in psychology (Sherif, 1998). "Psychology has nothing to say about what women are really like, what they need and what they want, especially because psychology does not know" (Weisstein, 1993, p. 197). Weisstein (1993) stated that this was because psychology, as a discipline had historically rested on the belief that human personality and behaviour is based on individual factors, which may be innate, and possibly determined in infancy, perhaps by the sex of the child. She concludes that
"the uselessness of present psychology (and biology) with regard to women is simply a special case with a general conclusion: one must understand the social conditions under which women live if one is going to explain the behaviour of women" (Weisstein, 1993, p. 207).
The specific approaches taken by feminist authors within the gender differences literature is most commonly broken down into three basic categories: empiricist, standpoint and post-modern (Harding, 1986). However, the feminist standpoint position will not be discussed here, as the feminist critique of the genius literature tends to fall within the feminist empiricist tradition (see Castle, 1913; Hollingworth, 1926, 1942; 18
Woolley, 1915), and the position of this thesis will draw on the post-modern, or more precisely, the social constructionist position.
Feminist empiricism is rooted in liberal feminism, which strives for equal rights between the sexes (Keller, 1982). Therefore, most feminist empiricists are equality feminists: determined to prove that the genders are more similar than they are different.
This position, now formally known as the Gender Similarities Hypothesis (Hyde, 2005), is favoured by such authors as Helen Thompson Woolley (1910), Leta S. Hollingworth
(1914; see also Montague & Hollingworth, 1914), and Janet Shibley Hyde (1990, 1994,
2005). They argue that research which finds gender differences is poorly constructed, and if scientific methodology were properly applied, they would find that no relevant gender differences emerge (Marecek, 2001). However, it is not the case that all feminist empiricists are committed to finding gender similarities. Authors such as Eleanor
Maccoby (1974, 2000), Carol Jacklin (see Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974) and Alice Eagly
(1995, 1999; see also Wood & Eagly, 2002) have strived to show that there are consistent differences between the males and females on some dimensions. It is important to these researchers to determine which differences are genuine and which are the result of poorly constructed research. Gender differences may be socially constructed, a product of biological evolution, or both, but they do exist (Eagly, 1995,1999; Wood & Eagly,
2002). However, they would emphasize that these differences do not imply any value judgment. It is interesting to note that Maccoby and Jacklin's The Psychology of Sex
Differences (1974) has been used as evidence by both types of feminist empiricists as 19 well as traditional patriarchal researchers (Abad, Colom, et al, 2004; Arden & Plomin,
2006). Proponents of the Gender Differences Model (GDM) point out that they did find reliable gender differences which indicate that the genders are different on several variables (Abad, Colom, et al, 2004; Arden & Plomin, 2006). On the other hand, proponents of the Gender Similarities Hypothesis (GSH) argue that since Maccoby and
Jacklin began with a list of nineteen observed gender differences and concluded that only four of these were reliable, the genders really are more similar than they are different
(Hyde, 2005; Riger, 2000).
Typically, the genius literature in psychology, philosophy and other disciplines takes a position consistent with the GDM: men and women are fundamentally different on certain key variables, which is the reason why women cannot achieve genius status
(see Darwin, 1877/1998; Ellis, 1926; Eysenck 1995,1998; Kretschmer, 1929/1970;
Lombroso, 1889/1905; Lombroso & Ferrero, 1893/2004; Schopenhauer 1883/1964;
Weininger, 1903/1906). I will analyze this type of reasoning most directly in chapter six, where I discuss the psycho-biological exclusion strategy. The GSH, however, is clearly evident in the critical works of Leta S. Hollingworth (1926,1942), and Helen Thompson
Woolley(1915).
Postmodern feminists question the very idea of difference. They state that there is no advantage to studying gender differences or similarities (Hare-Mustin & Marecek,
1988,1990,1994). Instead, they advocate asking what social and power structures allow
gender differences to appear (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988,1990, 1994; Marecek, 20
2001). Rhoda Unger (1979) was the first to recognize the need for a distinction between sex and gender. In her landmark paper, Toward a Redefinition of Sex and Gender (1979), she argued that there needs to be a clearer distinction between the two terms. Unger
(1979) stated that sex should be used in reference to those variables which are limited to one's physiology, whereas gender may encompass those variables that are psychological, biosocial, environmental, or any combination of these. Therefore, when speaking of gender differences, researchers would be less inclined to use biologically deterministic explanations (Unger, 1979). In addition, postmodern feminists question the idea of sex and gender as dichotomous variables. They suggest that both sex and gender may exist on a continuum (Butler, 1989; Riger, 2000; Unger 1979, 1990). A dichotomous vision of sex and gender, they argue, is the result of androcentric biases and serves to reinforce the status quo in society (Riger, 2000; Unger 1979, 1990). With respect to critiques of the discipline as a whole, postmodern feminists often urge for: 1) a move away from biological reductionism; 2) greater analysis of historical and cultural shifts in society; 3) dissolving the hierarchy in academia between research and practice, as well as basic and applied research; and 4) a realization that there is no distinction between the scientific and the political (Marecek, 2001).
Within this thesis, I will be taking a social constructionist feminist position. I will use this position to argue that, in some ways, the literature on genius is influenced by both social and historical factors. However, I will also argue that women's position in society has affected their ability to attain genius, and therefore any attempt at excluding 21 women from genius has failed to take into account their socially constructed realities. In fact, it was these texts, among others, that helped reinforce the roles that women filled in society, thereby producing a self-fulfilling prophecy. In addition, I will also argue that despite the ability of some women to succeed in male-dominated fields, their work has been under-evaluated, and the power to determine who receives the label of genius has remained in the hands of men.
Gender Differences Research in Psychology
The belief in innate differences between the sexes is not new. It has been reinforced throughout time by social custom and religion (Bohan, 2002; Shields, 1975).
However, in the 19 century, the new religion, science, began to address the question
(Bohan, 2002; Shields, 1975). Janis Bohan (2002) stated that the belief that science would provide objective truths about the world lent credence to their findings of male superiority. As Shields (1975) observed, "that science played handmaiden to social values cannot be denied" (p. 753).
Before outlining gender differences research in psychology, as it pertains to the genius literature, it is first necessary to delineate the biases underlying the literature. The discussion will begin with drawing distinctions between biological determinism and social constructionism. In addition, the concept put forward by Rachel Hare-Mustin and
Jeanne Marecek (1988, 1990) known as 'alpha bias' will also be outlined. Finally, the specific theories commonly used to justify gender differences research will be discussed.
These biases and theories will appear again in the theories of genius and exclusion strategies chapters. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss them openly here, before coming across them embedded within specific theories of genius.
Biological Determinism
Biological determinists appeal to biological explanations for psychological and behavioural phenomena (Marecek, 2001; Riger, 2000; Unger 1992). They often invoke
Darwinian evolution to support their theories. As such, this position is often referred to as biological determinism or alternatively, as social Darwinism. '"Social Darwinism' has often been used as a general term for any evolutionary argument about the biological basis of human differences" (Gould, 1996, p. 368). These claims are often far-fetched, but biology has assumed the position of being the one irreducible factor: it is inevitable and unchangeable (Marecek, 2001; Riger, 2000; Unger 1992). From this point of view, gender differences are essential to our natures. Male and female are often presented as yin and yang: complimentary, with each piece being necessary to ensure the survival of the species. Biological determinists claim "that biology inevitably and inescapably determines relations between the sexes" (Riger, 2000, p. 29).
The biological determinist position will be quite evident within many of the authors' theories presented in this thesis. Most notably, it will form the basis of all the explanations for gender differences in genius found within the psycho-biological exclusion strategy chapter. 23
Social Constructionism
Social constructionists claim that culture not only determines our interactions, but also the way we construct reality within scientific theories (Berger & Luckmann, 1966;
Bohan, 2002; Danziger, 1990, 1997; Gergen, 1985; Hacking, 1992; Lyotard, 1979/1984;
Marecek, 2001; Riger, 2000). Thus, social structures, social conventions, power hierarchies and language are the root of the apparent differences between the genders.
However, most social constructionists would admit to some influence of biology (Riger,
2000; Unger, 1979,1990). Those that only recognize the influence of social forces are often referred to as social determinists, or strong constructionists (Bohan, 2002).
Some of the authors presented in this thesis draw upon social constructionism for their theories of genius (Lange-Eichbaum, 1931). In addition, some of these authors also question socially-constructed realities as an explanation for the lack of female genius
(Castle, 1913; Hollingworth, 1926). Finally, the social constructionist position will also form the basis of my own observations, critiques, and conclusions.
Alpha Bias
Rachel Hare-Mustin and Jeanne Marecek (1988, 1990) have proposed a classification system for types of biases found in gender research: the alpha bias and the beta bias. The system is based on hypothesis testing in psychology. However, bias does not refer to the probability of making a particular type of error, but rather to the content of the theory itself (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990). Alpha bias refers to a tendency to exaggerate gender differences, whereas beta bias refers to the tendency to 24 minimize gender differences (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990). However, since the beta bias is not commonly found within the genius literature, it will not be discussed further.
Alpha biased theories are most commonly found within traditional patriarchal research, and are exemplified by the Gender Differences Model (Hare-Mustin &
Marecek, 1988,1990; Hyde, 2005). However, in the late 1970s and 1980s, feminists also began to adopt this approach (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990). Difference feminists claimed that the genders are different and, in many cases, diametrically opposed to one another. They maintained that these differences were part of the very nature of femininity and masculinity, earning these theorists the alternate title of essentialists (Bohan, 1993;
Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988,1990). The prototypical difference feminist is Carol
Gilligan (1982), who has argued against Lawrence Kohlberg's (1981, 1983, 1984) notions of a universal, stage-theory of moral development. She stated that women appear morally deficient in his studies because his theory was derived from work with males only. In A Different Voice (1982) presented Gilligan's argument for a 'female' system of morality, the ethic of care.
Patriarchal researchers have used theories supporting gender differences to justify the exclusion and oppression of women. However, difference feminists attempted to subvert this practice by acknowledging the differences between men and women, but emphasizing that those differences do not imply any value judgment (Bohan, 1993; Hare-
Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990); the genders are different but equal. This type of 25 research often takes a qualitative or narrative approach, rather than using traditional quantitative methods.
Alpha-biased theories have had both positive and negative consequences for theorizing about women. The positive outcome of this type of research is that it has allowed feminist researchers to extol the virtues and worth of so-called feminine traits
(Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990). In addition, it gave women a distinct voice within the psychological literature. Finally, by emphasizing the commonalities among women and giving those commonalities value, it helped to generate empowering feelings of sisterhood and solidarity (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990). However, the exaggeration of femininity in opposition to masculinity easily allowed for a continued support of the status quo (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990). While difference feminists attempted to give these feminine traits the value that they had traditionally been denied, their claims did not fundamentally differ from those made by patriarchal researchers. The differences between men and women could be, and were, used to support continued unequal treatment (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990; Marecek,
2001). By emphasizing that these differences are essential to our natures, difference feminists continue to mask the inequality between the genders (Bohan, 1993; Hare-
Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990). Finally, by viewing men and women as opposites, essentialist theories tend to overlook the large amount of diversity within the genders
(Bohan, 1993; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990). The alpha bias is commonly found in the genius literature. Quite often, men and women are presented as diametrically opposed on at least one important aspect (see
Eysenck, 1995,1998; Galton, 1865,1869/2006; Kretschmer 1929/1970; Lombroso
1889/1905; Lombroso & Ferrero, 1893/2004; Weininger, 1903/1906). Proponents of both types of exclusion strategies within this thesis display the alpha bias. The concept of exclusion strategies will be outlined in the Theoretical Approach and Methodology section.
Specific Approaches
Two approaches have typically been used to explain the existence of gender differences: functionalism, and psychoanalysis (Shields, 1975). However, as it is the functionalist school which has mainly concerned itself with the 'problem of genius,' the psychoanalytic approach will not be discussed. The functionalist position will be outlined, while also making reference to the variability hypothesis, Social Darwinism, and biological reductionism.
It was the researchers belonging to the functionalist movement in the United
States that first addressed the issue of gender differences in psychology (Shields, 1975).
They relied primarily on evolutionary theory to justify the superiority of the "Caucasian" male above all others (Gould, 1981; Richards, 1997; Shields, 1975). The application of
Darwin's theory of evolution to human social issues is often referred to as social
Darwinism (Gould, 1996). Therefore they are, almost without exception, biological determinists (Gould, 1996; Shields, 1975). Social Darwinists, have typically invoked the variability hypothesis to account for male superiority (Shields, 1975). The variability hypothesis states that it is variation in the species which leads to the possibility of its survival (Darwin, 1877/1998). Within psychology, it has usually been posited that males are the more variable of the species, with females tending to regress towards the median on most variables considered important to human advancement (Darwin, 1877/1998; see also Shields, 1975).
Because variation from the norm was already accepted as a mechanism
of evolutionary progress... and because it seemed that the male was
more variable sex, it soon was universally concluded that the male was
the progressive element in the species... the hypothesis of greater male
variability became a convenient explanation for a number of observed
sex differences, among them the greater frequency with which men
achieved "eminence". (Shields, 1975, p. 743).
These theories, to which Shields (1975) refers, will be presented in detail in chapter four.
As evidence for this position, social Darwinists have often used phrenology, brain size and weight measurements, anthropometric data, lists of eminent persons, intelligence tests, neurological data, anthropological data, and comparative biology (Gould, 1996;
Shields, 1975,1982). This position has been championed by authors such as Herbert
Spencer (1820-1903), Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), Havelock Ellis (1859-1939), and
G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924), among others (Gould, 1996; Shields, 1975, 1982). 28
After the publication of Darwin's Origin of the Species (1859/1991), Francis
Galton put forth his work to the study of intelligence, eminence and genius (Fancher,
1985; Galton 1869/2006; Shields, 1982). In Hereditary Genius (1869/1892) he used
Darwin's evolutionary theory as the foundation to argue for the intellectual superiority of males over females, and of white males over all other races (Fancher, 1985; Galton
1869/2006; Gould 1996). Galton's conclusions were later echoed by Darwin himself in
The Descent of Man (1874/1998). Darwin (1874/1998) speculated that it is advantageous for males to be more variable, but there is no evolutionary advantage for females to vary.
Therefore, variation, upon which human survival and advancement depends, is transmitted solely through males (Darwin 1874/1998; see also Shields, 1975,1982).
Social Darwinist accounts of individual differences went out of favour with American
th academics for a period during the 20 century; however it has started to regain its popularity in academia (Cassidy, 2007; Shields, 1975).
Feminist Interpretations
The argument will now turn to specific topics within the feminist critique of psychology that are relevant to the study of genius. These are the notions of objectivity, power and language.
Objectivity
The scientific ideal of objectivity is important to the study of genius. Specifically,
the idea of 'separate spheres' which comes out of this literature, forms the basis of the
exclusion strategy discussed in chapter five: exclusion by type. The capacity for 29 rationality, intellect, and objectivity is also often referred to as a strictly male trait that is necessary for the expression of genius, which will be presented in both chapter four and chapter six (see Darwin, 1878/1999; Ellis, 1926; Galton, 1865,1869/2006; Lombroso &
Ferrero, 1893/2004; Schopenhauer, 1883/1964).
Keller (1982) argued that the notions of autonomy and objectivity are tied to the masculine identity from childhood. Using Nancy Chodorow's feminist object relations theory of gender development, Keller (1982) showed how these concepts develop in young children.
According to Keller, one of the major steps in child development is forming an understanding of the self. This comes only after the child learns to assimilate their experiences of pleasure and pain, gratification and disappointment (Keller, 1985).
Through this, the child learns to differentiate between the self and the other, the subject and the object. Keller (1985) stated that the understanding of self enables a child to relate to the world through objective perception and thought.
The transition from unity to autonomy is fraught with anxiety for the young child
(Keller, 1985). One of the first 'others' that the infant recognizes is the mother. The anxiety produced from this realization brings the child to depend on the mother - an early form of love (Keller, 1985). The child yearns to reestablish their unity with their mother; yet at the same time they gain pleasure from their growing sense of autonomy which is threatened by the desire for unity with the mother (Keller, 1982,1985). This "double- edged sword" is central to object relations theory (Keller, 1982, p. 596). As the child begins to recognize their separateness from other objects, they gradually move from an egocentric vision of the world to viewing themselves as part of a world that exists independently (Keller, 1985). Keller (1985) argued that the focal point of this understanding comes directly from the child's relationship with the mother - the child learns to identify themselves in opposition to the mother. The child recognizes themselves as the subject, and the mother as the independent object. Anxiety, for the child, is founded in the fear of destruction of the object, in this case, the mother (Keller,
1982). The survival of the subject, in this case, the child, depends on destroying
(externalizing) the object (Keller, 1982).
A male child will turn to his father in order to help cope with the anxiety of this new sense of self. The father, who is now also seen as separate from both the child and the mother, is an ideal candidate to help relieve the fear of becoming reunited with the mother and losing their newfound autonomy (Keller, 1985). It is this period that Freud referred to as the oedipal conflict - the father represents the harsh new reality that separates the child from their early unity with their mother. Males separate from their mother to develop a sense of self, and further divorce themselves from her to learn their gender identity from their father (Keller, 1985). However, female children never need to fully separate themselves from the mother. While they do learn to separate themselves from their mother to form a sense of self, they continue to look to the mother to form their gender identity (Keller, 1985). Keller (1985) stated that due to this process, a male's gender identity tends to be more fragile than a female's, and a female's sense of 31 autonomy is less strong than a male's. Thus, from an early stage, children understand masculinity to represent the ideas of autonomy and objectivity, and femininity to represent unity and subjectivity (Keller, 1985). These archetypes are very evident within the genius literature. As Weininger (1906) stated, "genius is linked with manhood, that it represents and ideal masculinity in the highest form" (p. 113).
The male child learns to associate their new identification with the father as a denial of the mother, and transforms this guilt into aggression (Keller, 1982). By aggression, Keller refers to a desire to dominate. It is through the domination, or mastery, of the object that the child may relieve their guilt (Keller, 1982). They have not destroyed the object, the mother, but gained mastery over it.
Keller (1982,1985) has argued that it is this desire for autonomy, objectivity, and domination that characterizes science. Therefore, the goals and language of science have been genderized from its very inception. "Not only does our characterization of science thereby become colored by the biases of the patriarchy and sexism, but simultaneously our evaluation of masculine and feminine becomes affected by the prestige of science"
(Keller, 1985, p. 92). As the foundation of science has been laid using a male version of reality, it is this world view which is preferred over the diametrically opposed feminine version of reality. Therefore, women have tended to "retreat from science", as it has not supported their standpoint (1985, p. 89). It comes as no surprise then, that in the male- dominated sciences, it is objectivity and individuality that are prized (Keller, 1982). The more subjective a science is, the less value it is perceived to have. 32
Carolyn Wood Sherif (1998) demonstrated how these ideas have permeated the very structure of psychology. She stated that psychology became committed to methodologism and reductionism in order to appear more like the 'hard' sciences, such as physics (Sherif, 1998). This created a hierarchy in the discipline, which still exists today.
In the upper echelons were the 'harder', or 'masculine', objective psychological pursuits, such as pure experimental psychology, and mental testing. In the lower echelons were the more 'feminine', or 'softer', subjective areas, such as social and applied psychology
(Sherif, 1998). Sherif (1998) stated that it is no surprise that the more prestigious,
'masculine' areas are dominated by men, whereas women tend to enter into the less prestigious, 'feminine' areas. Sherif (1998), among others (see Keller, 1982), have argued that the decision as to what is labeled masculine or feminine, hard or soft, in the sciences has rested with men. They maintain that these are not objective, real classifications, but are socially constructed.
Keller's (1982, 1985) ideas have been criticized by others. Specifically, her use of object relations as a means of feminist analysis has been critiqued (Hockmeyer, 1988).
Other theories could be used, such as a Marxism (Hartsock, 1983; Hekman, 1997) or social constructionism (Gergen, 1985; Hare-Mustin, 1988; Riger, 1992). However,
Keller's work was chosen to be outlined here because of its impact and feminist perspective. It was, and still remains a very influential feminist theory of the development of objectivity in science. 33
The notion of separate spheres for men and women will be revisited in chapter five. In addition, the concept of objectivity as representing masculinity in the sciences will be featured in both chapter four and chapter six.
Power and Language
Post-modern feminists argue that it is social structures which should be the object of study, not gender differences (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, 1990,1994; Marecek,
2001). This includes language, power, and other aspects of society. This same argument has been made by some critics of the genius literature (see Hollingworth, 1926), and will also be the position that I will be taking within this thesis.
In feminist research on language, three questions typically dominate the field: 1) do the genders use language differently?; 2) in what ways does language create, reflect, and maintain gender inequality?; and 3) if language does create, reflect and maintain gender inequality, how can language be changed (Crawford, 2001)? However, as it is the second question that is the most pertinent to this thesis and the analysis of the genius literature, it will be discussed in detail, to the exclusion of the other two.
Jeanne Marecek (2001) has illustrated some of the ways in which feminists have uncovered hidden sexism in language within psychology. One of the ways to uncover this sexism is by deploying qualitative and discourse analysis. An excellent example of this is the text analysis of traditional psychological writings by Morawski and Steele (1991).
Morawski and Steele (1991) stated that texts are the best place to identify hidden sexism in psychology. "Being a science which relies on journals, books and papers for 34 most of its public transactions of knowledge, one of psychology's arenas of power is the text" (Morawski & Steele, 1991, p. 109). They go on to state that:
We show, following Foucault, how the power of an author over his
subject(s) is systematically constructed; how in the dialectics of power...
the possession of power produces fears that it will be lost; and how
rationality, objectivity and facts are used as textual strategies that deny
the relativity of the authors perspective. (Morawski & Steele, 1991, p.
109)
They identified three trends in the literature that lend themselves to maintaining traditional gendered power relations: 1) the male gaze; 2) the logomachinist; and 3) power and knowledge. The male gaze refers to the purportedly objective stance of scientists that actually observes the world from a male standpoint. They liken this to a film: "it is also because men are usually the heroes of a film's narrative and we see events and other characters, especially women, through male eyes" (Morawski & Steele, 1991).
As an exemplar of this, Morawski and Steele (1991) point to Sigmund Freud's Medusa's
Head (1955,1940).
It is not women who are frightened of female genitalia, but men who are
scared off. Apotropaic acts then seem to be sex specific; it is women's
genitals that men find horrifying. Freud does not here speak of women's
fears of the penis, in fact, for him, the penis is a symbol of reassurance
... Following Freud's perspective, we become caught in the male gaze. 35
He requires us to view the female genitals with horror, but to join him in
becoming heroic subjects defiantly displaying the penis" (Morawski &
Steele, 1991,p. Ill)
As Morawski and Steele (1991) explain, the woman becomes an object of observation for the male. "He is the voyeur, she the victim" (Morawski & Steele, 1991, p. 111).
The second theme, the logomachinist, refers to traditional scientific work that masquerades as objective research, but simply echoes the stereotypes of the dominant culture (Morawski & Steele, 1991). This position reflects the interplay between the authority of the expert author, and the denigration of their subjects. As an exemplar of this, Morawski and Steele (1991) point to Walter Mischel's (1969) article, Continuity and
Change in Personality.
Mischel's work undercuts itself because latent within the background of
the manifest work lies an elaborate subtext which reproduces one of the
oldest stereotypes held by man: women are dangerously irrational
creatures and men... are cognitively consistent rational and as predictable
as machines. (Morawski & Steele, 1991, p. 112).
After a detailed analysis, Morawski and Steele make the following conclusion about
Mischel's text:
It is genderless in the same way the generic 'he' or 'man' is used to
stand for both males and females: it assumes that masculine experience
and signifiers adequately characterize the experiences of both men and women... But, in actuality the text is structured with typically masculine
values and interests: the certainty of thought; the fecklessness of
emotions; the importance of reason and science; the valorization of
machines; and finally the objectification of women. (Morawski & Steele,
1991, p. 114)
The objectification of women, which comes in the form of "girl watching" (Morawski &
Steele, 1991, p. 114) is similar to the position taken by Freud. However, the placement of men as the norm and representing the universal ideals of humanity make it a distinctly different argument.
Finally, in the section on power and knowledge, Morawski and Steele (1991) explicitly point to the tendency of researchers to characterize themselves as experts and that their subjects are incapable of accurate thought, knowledge, or self-reflection. As their last exemplar work, Morawski and Steele (1991) point to Nisbett and Wilson's
(1977) article, Telling More Than we Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.
Morawski and Steele (1991) state that:
However, it is in Nisbett and Wilson's text that women are most
completely marginalized. There is no attempt as we saw in Freud or
Mischel to combat a threatening adversary. Women are not a threat.
While men have power as the generic he, as difficult subjects, as
authorities, as men of genius and as the authors, there are very few
appearances by women in the article and these are in very traditional or dependant roles... The most effective application of textual power is not
by vying with and testing the other, but by marginalizing or omitting her
from the text. (Morawski & Steele, 1991, p. 120).
In the theories of genius presented within this thesis, many of the authors will engage in the strategies listed by Morawski and Steele (1991). However, I will present two additional strategies for consideration: exclusion by type and psycho-biological exclusion. The exclusion by type strategy may well be unique to the genius literature.
These concepts will be explained in detail below.
It is with these theories of language and power in mind that the remaining chapters will address the discursive strategies with which women have been excluded from the genius literature. Specifically, the methodology will closely follow that of
Morawski and Steele's (1991) feminist textual analysis of traditional psychology's treatment of women. 38
Chapter Three
Creativity and Madness Theories of Genius
Before discussing how women have been excluded from the designation of genius, we must first examine the theories themselves. These theories will be presented in four categories: 1) the creative genius; 2) the intelligent genius; 3) the eminent genius; and 4) the mad genius. Each type of theory will be offered with philosophical, philosophical-psychological and psychological examples where appropriate.
Philosophical refers to those theories which are entirely philosophical in nature, and existed with philosophy proper. Philosophical-psychological theories encompass those that exist in the inter-disciplinary studies that have informed psychology. These include social sciences like anthropology, sociology and criminology; the sciences, such as biology and physics; medicine and psychiatry. However, the most emphasis will be placed on the review of the psychological theories, which are those that have been developed within psychology proper. Chapters three and four will present these theories in the same format as the themes presented in chapter one. Therefore, chapter three will review the literature on the creative and the mad genius, whereas chapter four will review the intelligent and the eminent genius.
The Creative Genius
Perhaps one of the most well-known themes in the genius literature is creativity
(Albert, 1969; Murray, 1989b). Many authors have called upon this concept as the defining feature which sets genius apart from all others (Eysenck, 1995,1998; N. Hirsch, 39
1931; Kant, 1790/2000). Its theoretical tradition dates back to the Enlightenment, with the rational aesthetics of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
Philosophical
Kant, in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (1790/2000), discussed the issue of genius in relation to aesthetic concepts. "Genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which Nature gives rule to art" (Kant, p. 188). Kant further elaborated on the innateness of genius: "We thus see... that genius is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given; it is not a mere aptitude for what can be learnt by rule.
Hence originality must be its first property" (Kant, 1790/2000, p. 189). In addition, Kant stressed that this originality cannot stem from imitation of past works, but must be novel and "serve as a standard or rule of judgement for others" (Kant, 1790/2000, p. 189).
These original works, Kant believed, were beyond the ability of the genius to explain or create at will:
It cannot describe or indicate scientifically how it brings about its
products, but it gives the rule just as nature does. Hence, the author
of a product for which he is indebted to his genius does not know
himself how he has come by his Ideas; and he has not the power to
devise the like at pleasure or in accordance with a plan, and to
communicate it to others in precepts that will enable them to produce
similar products. (Kant, 1790/2000, p. 189-190). 40
Therefore, it is evident that Kant viewed genius, at least in part, as an entity external to the individual, which is not quite under their own influence. Thus, genius must create whenever their instincts dictate; their creativity cannot be harnessed and unleashed at will. This view is not uncommon during Kant's time, as the concept of genius was only beginning to become attached to an individual's abilities, rather than as a spiritual being
(Albert, 1969; Murray, 1989a). His theory reflects that transition, as he incorporates both the individual and the mystical. Finally, Kant stated that "Nature by the medium of genius does not prescribe rules to Science, but to Art; and to it only in so far as it is to be beautiful Art" (Kant, 1790/2000, p. 190). For Kant, genius belongs strictly within the realm of the arts, rather than the sciences. "If after this analysis we look back to the explanation given above of what is called genius, we find... that it is a talent for Art; not for Science, in which clearly known rules must go beforehand and determine the procedure" (Kant, 1790/2000, p. 202). This is an interesting stance for him since he was known for his belief in the primacy of reason. However, Kant did reconcile this by stating that "the mental powers, therefore, whose union (in a certain relation) constitutes genius are Imagination and Understanding" (Kant, 1790/200, p. 201). For the genius, the faculty of reason lies in relation to the faculty of imagination: "the Imagination is here creative, and it brings the faculty of intellectual Ideas (the Reason) into movement" (Kant,
1790/2000, p. 199). Therefore, Kant's understanding of genius and artistic works of genius follows from his theory of rational aesthetics. 41
Kant's work is interesting, because it represents one of the first attempts at an actual theory of genius. His concept of genius is perhaps the most embedded in theory and observation, and therefore one of the strongest arguments to be presented in this thesis. The only rival to Kant's work may be the theory of genius put forward by Arthur
Schopenhauer (1883/1964), to be presented in chapter four. It should also be noted here that Kant did not discuss the issue of gender differences in genius. In the English translations of The Critique of Judgment, Kant refers to genius using masculine pronouns.
However, when read in the original German, Kant used non-gendered pronouns. There may be many reasons why Kant did not discuss the issue of gender and genius. One possibility for this is that Kant did not find the discussion of gender differences relevant to the purpose of his Critique of Judgement, namely the evolution of his rational aesthetics. A second possibility is that Kant may have believed it so improbable that a woman could achieve genius status that the discussion of gender was simply not worthy of addressing. This last point is difficult to discern because in English translations of his work, masculine gendered pronouns are consistently used for genius. However, in the original German, Kant uses non-gendered terminology. This would possibly make an interesting archival project in future research. However, for the present purposes, because he did not discuss the issue of gender, his theory of genius will not be included in the analyses presented in chapters five and six. His theory was included here though, because of it is one of the first complete theories of genius which had a lasting impact on other researchers pursing this topic. 42
It is important here to touch briefly upon the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche
(1844-1900). Nietzsche was a noted disciple of Arthur Schopenhauer's (see chapter four), at least early in his career (Tanner, 1989). His initial writings did occasionally address the topic of genius, although loosely (Nietzsche, 1878/1996; Tanner, 1989).
'Genius' is not a crucial term in Nietzsche's vocabulary, which is
initially surprising, for two reasons: first, his preoccupation with art and
artists at every stage of his career might well lead one to expect he
would use the term, and the concept... Secondly, his obsession with
greatness in all its forms means that he has recourse to a fairly extensive
set of terms to characterize manifestations, and again one might expect
that 'genius would therefore occur frequently. (Tanner, 1989, p. 128)
Tanner (1989) attributed this largely to his falling out with the only genius he had ever known, Richard Wagner. Tanner (1989) noted that, while Nietzsche does discuss geniuses in Human, All Too Human: A Book For Free Spirits (1878/1996), he remains unconvinced of the greatness of a genius, and falls short of an actual theory of genius.
Nietzsche (1878/1996) suggested that:
Perhaps the engendering of genius is reserved to only a limited
period of humanity. For one cannot expect the future of humanity
to hold at the same time everything that only very particular
conditions in some past time could produce. (Nietzsche,
1878/1996, p. 144) 43
Perhaps this is why he did not feel the need to theorize on the topic: the age of geniuses had passed. He did, however, produce a 'hypothetical' caricature of a genius artist, and it is here that Nietzsche made his one suggestion on the nature of genius: that they are flawed, but that their exceptional works would not be possible without these exceptional flaws of character. Tanner (1989) suggested that this vision of the flawed genius was a direct reference to Nietzsche's one-time friend, Wagner. The concept of genius was subsequently replaced with the iibermensch, often translated as superman or overman in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1883-1885/1954). However, once again, this concept remains ill-defined for Nietzsche.
More vague and obscure when instead of instancing particular cases of
greatness he evokes for us the idea of the iibermensch... He seriously
underdescribes his ideals, so that we are left wondering what an
iibermensch would be like if we met one, and whether Nietzsche himself
had any but the vaguest notions on the subject. (Tanner, 1989, p. 138)
As Tanner (1989) noted, it is unlikely that Nietzsche (1883-1885/1954) had worked out all of the political implications with regards to his iibermensch concept. This apparent lack of foresight and conceptual clarity allowed for, perhaps, one of the greatest tragedies of the genius literature: the interpretations of iibermensch by Adolf Hitler (1889-1945). It is in Hitler's Mein Kampf{ 1925/1971), where he presents himself as Nietzsche's iibermensch. 44
Philosophical-Psychological
Nathaniel Hirsch (1931), in contrast to Kant, felt that the creativity of the genius may encompass both the arts and the sciences. However different these two occupations may appear on the surface, he cautioned that they have the same underlying motivations.
"There is a general creative activity that underlies all 'invention,' a common psychical process which is the common denominator..." (N. Hirsch, 1931, p. 305). N. Hirsch
(1931) asserted that it is creative intelligence which is the sole necessary component of genius. "All men of genius have not only common traits (that are, however, traits common to all men), but one uncommon exclusive and singular process - creative intelligence" (N. Hirsch, 1931, p. 304). While those recognized as genius in their diverse fields may have additional similarities, psychological or otherwise, it is their creative intelligence that remains the only universal factor, which distinguishes them from the rest of humanity (N. Hirsch, 1931). Like Kant, N. Hirsch also emphasized that creativity is innate, and is outside the control of the genius: it is ".. .an irresistible impulsion which sets genius aside and makes it create, not because it wishes but because it must" (N.
Hirsch, p. 305). N. Hirsch did recognize that his definition of creative intelligence did not fully distinguish it from general intelligence or instinct. Therefore, he explicitly pointed this out and stated:
For a host of good reasons it is better not to label Creative
Intelligence in terms of "general instinct" although it resembles
instinct in its impetuosity, its innateness, and several other major 45
characteristics. But Creative Intelligence also resembles Objective
intelligence; yet it is neither instinct nor intelligence... Creative
Intelligence, with its phases of intuition, the impulse to create, and
the affective state of ecstasy is the sole necessary source of genius.
(N.Hirsch, 1931, p. 305)
N. Hirsch (1931) stated that there are many other traits that are sometimes associated with genius, such as self-confidence and persistence; however these are not the defining feature. These traits are found not found across all those who reach genius status, and they are also traits which ordinary persons may have in abundance as well. Therefore, the creative intelligence which forces the genius to create is the only trait required as an explanation.
It is interesting that while N. Hirsch (1931) emphasizes the psychological aspect of genius, he also maintained the mystical overtone. N. Hirsch (1931) depicts the genius as almost a slave to their creative intelligence, having no choice but to create when it dictates. This image brings to mind the earlier definitions of genius as an external entity.
In addition, this is one of the first instances where scientific endeavours are included in a creativity theory of genius. However, perhaps due to the lack of conceptual clarity in the work, N. Hirsch's theory remains less well known than some of his creativity theory counterparts (M. Jensen, 1933). Psychological
Hans Eysenck (1916-1997), set out to answer questions relating to definition and measurement of genius, creativity and intuition; the relationship between genius and madness, intelligence and personality; and to determine if it was possible to formulate an empirically testable psychological theory of genius (Eysenck, 1995). Eysenck (1995) critiqued the past psychological literature on genius3 because he felt that our failure to understand the concept stems from the over-reliance on results and theory coming only from the psychometric and individual differences domain.
Danziger (1990) argues that the history of psychology exhibits three
models of research: the experimental (Wundt), the psychometric
(Galton), and the clinical (Kraepelin). To these I would add the
psychophysiological-genetic approach (Helmholtz), which is needed to
fill in the picture. I... insist that our understanding of creativity and
genius must be based on all four, and that our present dissatisfaction
with research in this area is due to restricting empirical and theoretical
work, largely to one area - the psychometric study of individual
differences. (Eysenck, 1995, p. 7)
Eysenck (1995), true to his word, did precisely this; he drew on all four lines of research to inform his theory of genius.
3 It should be noted that Eysenck (1995) did not specify which research he was referring to. This was an unsupported statement about "our present dissatisfaction with research in this area" (Eysenck, 1995, p. 7). 47
Consistent with his work on g-factor theories of intelligence (see Eysenck, 1988),
Eysenck (1995) envisioned genius on a measurable continuum, where anyone is, to some degree, a genius. Using height as an example, he argued that the distinction of who is tall, average, or short is largely a subjective decision, dependant on social, cultural and historical factors. The same could be said of genius (Eysenck, 1995). Therefore, while
Eysenck envisioned true genius as a product of genetic factors, he also acknowledged that the recognition of genius was embedded within socio-historical contexts.
Eysenck (1995) then considered the problem of intelligence. While all geniuses may be intellectually gifted, not everyone who is intellectually gifted will be considered a genius. "Intelligence is a dispositional variable, i.e. it enables a person with that ability to solve certain problems, produce certain results, achieve certain aims, but it does not guarantee success" (Eysenck, 1995, p. 47). After examining the literature on intelligence,
Eysenck concluded that it was not a good predictor of genius. "The facts leave little doubt that high IQ is not a sufficient factor for genius status. Nor is high IQ necessarily a predictor for creativity" (Eysenck, 1995, p. 65). This last point was an especially
important one for Eysenck, as his theory of genius hinged on the concept of creativity. He
suggested instead, that creativity and intelligence were independent psychological entities
(Eysenck, 1995, 1998).
Following a review of psychological literature, Eysenck (1995) concluded that in
addition to creativity and a reasonably high IQ, the necessary psychological and personality traits of geniuses are: "originality, lack of emotionality, individuality, imagination, rebelliousness, independence, a radical approach ... persistence, perseverance, strong activation, strength of character, forcefulness" (p. 114). It is the latter set of qualities, which he terms ego-strength, that differentiate the genius from the high achiever. He also found that there is a strong correlation between genius and psychopathy, and proposed that each have a common, hereditary genetic origin (Eysenck,
1995,1998). He argued that there is a causal, biological link between creativity and neurotransmitter activity in the hippocampus (Eysenck, 1995). Specifically he proposed that dopamine raises creativity and serotonin acts as a creativity inhibitor. Therefore, a genius would have excess amounts of dopamine, and may be deficient in serotonin
(Eysenck, 1995). As a final note, he proposed that the gifts bestowed upon genius are applied synergistically, in that each one multiplies the effects of the others rather than simply adding to them (Eysenck, 1995). Therefore creativity, intelligence and psychopathy are not additive, but multiplicative, which results in a J-shaped population distribution, with genius occupying the exclusive top end of the curve (Eysenck, 1995).
Hence the most normally distributed conditions for supreme
achievement interact in such a manner as to produce a J-shaped
population distribution, with huge numbers of non- or poor achievers, a
small number of high achievers, and the isolated genius at the top.
(Eysenck, 1995, p. 280)
Eysenck (1995) concluded that the products that result in genius are hereditary, and therefore, genius has a genetic basis. 49
Eysenck's theory appears to be the first truly scientific theory of genius at first glance, and is very popular for that reason. However, upon closer inspection, it does not hold up to scrutiny. Despite having some research to defend his claims, they remain conjecture. No one has actually done these biological and psychological studies on verifiable geniuses. Simply because geniuses appear to be more creative, and that creativity may be related to dopamine levels in the brain, does not mean that his theory will hold up to testing. As such, Eysenck's use of the term "causal" is premature, at best
(Eysenck, 1995, p. 280). Even if geniuses could be examined and they displayed the prescribed patterns, this evidence would remain correlational until researchers could manipulate dopamine levels in non-pre-existing groups. Furthermore, terms such as creativity and intelligence, not to mention genius, lack conceptual clarity. Without determining what these concepts are, it is difficult to the relationships between them.
Therefore, Eysenck's (1995,1998) theory of genius remains within the theoretical realm, and falls short of the scientific theory he attempted to construct.
Summary
While the proponents of the creativity theory disagree on whether genius is expressed in the arts alone, or both the arts and sciences together, they do agree on
several points. There is a strong consensus that the creativity of a genius cannot be learned; that it is an innate characteristic (Eysenck, 1995; N. Hirsch, 1931; Kant,
1790/1952). Furthermore, they each emphasize that this creativity is, to some extent,
outside the control of the genius. Finally, among the psychological theorists, the 50 creativity of a genius is believed to be a genetic and hereditary trait (Eysenck, 1995;
Simonton, 1994, 1999).
The Mad Genius
The second prevalent theory is the mad genius syndrome (Simonton, 1999).
Proponents of this position hold that there is a strong correlation between genius and psychopathy (Eysenck, 1995; Kretschmer, 1929/1970; Lange-Eichbaum, 1931;
Lombroso, 1889/1905; Simonton, 1999). It has been suggested that this theory achieved its current credibility during the period of political unrest following Napoleon's (1769-
1821) reign in France (Becker, 1992). Prior to this period, it was thought that a touch of madness was necessary and a positive force for the genius, rather than the negative personality trait it is currently viewed to be (Claridge, 1992).
Philosophical-Psychological
Cesare Lombroso was one of the most outspoken proponents of this position. He argued for a strong correlation between genius and madness; he even went as far to suggest that genius should be considered a distinct type of psychopathy (Lombroso,
1889/1905). "Even genius, the one human power before which we may bow the knee without shame, has been classed by not a few alienists as on the confines of criminality, one of the teratologic forms of the human mind, a variety of insanity" (Lombroso,
1889/1905, p. 1). He remarked that, on occasion, the signs of degeneration are even more evident in genius than in the insane. Lombroso (1889/1905) concluded that the typical genius exhibits many of the same characteristics as the insane, including: vanity, abuse of 51 alcohol and drugs, vagabondage, sexual abnormalities, eccentricity and an exaggeration of the phases of inspiration and exhaustion, among other qualities. In an attempt to offer an explanation for their abnormal behaviour, he suggested that genius is moderated by fluctuations in barometric pressure and temperature (Lombroso, 1889/1905). "There are few among these who do not confess that their inspiration is strangely subject to the influence of weather" (Lombroso, 1889/1905, p. 101). However, Lombroso (1889/1905) did take issue with the idea that genius was hereditary. He stated that it is true that eminence does tend to run in families, yet it is unclear whether this transmission of genius is from the mother or father. In addition, "among most men of genius... there can be no heredity because of the predominance of sterility and of degeneration" (Lombroso,
1889/1905, p. 142). Lombroso (1889/1905) felt that the hereditary transmission of genius was the exception, rather than the rule. However, he did argue that insanity, and particularly alcoholism, is highly hereditary (1889/1905).
Lombroso's (1889/1905) theory of the link between genius and madness, though not without strong criticisms (Galton, 1869/1892; W. Hirsch, 1897; Mora, 1964; Terman,
1925), has remained influential in the literature to this day. His work is fraught with problems: from conceptual vagueness to dubious methodology. However, Lombroso's influence on those that succeeded him in the genius literature cannot be denied (see
Eysenck, 1995, 1998; Kretschmer, 1929/1970). 52
Psychological
Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum (1874-1949), unlike some of his contemporaries, did acknowledge that genius is purely a socially constructed phenomenon (see Kretschmer,
1929/1970; Terman, 1925). Lange-Eichbaum (1931) provided the following illustration of the difficulty in assessing what is truly genius:
Genius cannot be anything absolute, cannot be anything firmly
established once and for all. It cannot be something perennial, something
universally valid... On the contrary, genius must be a valuation, a
denomination of value or an experience of value, (p. 11-12)
In light of this, he remarked that no two lists of eminent persons in history will be the same. Therefore, genius is a sociological phenomenon, and not biological or psychological (Lange-Eichbaum, 1931). He concluded that "a genius is a bringer of spiritual values, and one who is revered by numerous persons" (Lange-Eichbaum, 1931, p. 14). The socially constructed nature of genius indicates that it is public perception that dictates what true genius is. Going beyond this, genius is something which attracts a sort of religious devotion by its followers; genius requires a congregation (Lange-Eichbaum,
1931). Therefore, fame is a key ingredient:
Only in rare instances does fame lead to the appraisement of the famous
person as a genius... It is a rare variety of fame, a climax of fame,
thanks to which an individual is felt, with a certain ardour, to have
something sacred about him, and is thus enshrined as a "genius"... No 53
one has ever been appraised and experienced from the outset as a genius,
and no one therefore can ever have been born a genius. One who is not
yet called a genius is not a genius. "Unrecognized" genius does not
exist; people are not geniuses until they have been "recognized".
(Lange-Eichbaum, 1931, p. 33-34).
Yet, Lange-Eichbaum (1931) assured the reader that, despite the public perception of the sacredness of the genius, "a genius is a human being" (p. 29) and possesses nothing inherently godly about them. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Lange-Eichbaum (1931) noted that, in all the biographies of geniuses that he had studied, so-called psychologically normal geniuses are a distinct minority. "It may be a bitter pill for humanity to swallow, this recognition that in most instances 'genius' and 'insanity' are inseparable. The fact is, that the nature of things is cruel and meaningless.. .we have to recognize unpalatable truths" (Lange-Eichbaum, 1931, p. 178). Thus, he would reject the eugenicist position that we can, or even should, attempt to breed genius. This position becomes especially poignant when we consider that Lange-Eichbaum (1931) openly
spoke out against the works of Nietzsche and their role in Nazi ideology (Loewenberg,
1950; Sax, 2003). For Lange-Eichbaum, any attempt to breed or nurture genius is unthinkable.
Those who have become geniuses are far too ego-centric, far too impressed
with a sense of self-importance; because they are far too much a law unto
themselves and far too eager to impose their own will upon others. Two such beings cannot tolerate one another, cannot live together. The mere
thought of it is too horrible. (Lange-Eichbaum, p. 165)
He concluded that genius is not something to be praised as the higher evolution of man, but rather something that will inevitably destroy itself; whether through public actions such as crucifixion, or through their own inclination to insanity (Lange-Eichbaum, 1931).
Therefore, in his own classification system for geniuses, Lange-Eichbaum (1931) includes four factors: talent, fame, veneration and insanity. However, it is the two psycho-biological factors which he builds his classification system on. Talent is broken down into two sub-categories: exceptional and average gifts. Insanity is also broken down into two different categories: healthy and bionegative (substance abuse, etc)
(Lange-Eichbaum, 1931). These four sub-categories interact together at different magnitudes, resulting in the twelve different categories of genius (Lange-Eichbaum,
1931). The addition of the psycho-biological factors into the model alongside the
sociological is not unusual, as he was a psychiatrist by training, following in the tradition of Julius Paul Mobius (1853-1907) (Loewenberg, 1950; Sax, 2003).
Lange-Eichbaum's (1931) work was heavily influenced by his predecessors,
Mobius (1901), and Lombroso (1889/1905). His book presents an interesting theory,
coupled with data from examinations of biographical material. However, the most
interesting part of this book is the time and place in which it was situated. Lange-
Eichbaum's (1931) work was written during Hitler's rise to power, and after the
publication of his Mein Kampf (1925), where he presented himself as the embodiment of 55
Nietzsche's iibermensch concept. Considering Lange-Eichbaum's dislike of Nietzsche, and his anti-Nazi stance (Loewenberg, 1950; Sax, 2003), this book can be seen as a warning to other Germans of what the future could hold with Hitler at the helm. While far from being a rigorous scientific work, Lange-Eichbaum's (1931) is probably the most interesting theory presented here, and even more so when its social context is taken into account.
Ernst Kretschmer (1888-1964) strongly supported the link between genius and madness. "Mental disease, and more especially, those ill-defined conditions on the boundary of mental disease, are decidedly more frequent among men of genius"
(Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p. 6). Accordingly, Kretschmer developed two main personality types that may be applied to the three domains of genius: literary men, scientists and leaders (Kretschmer, 1929/1970). The first personality type is the cyclothyme, which tends to cycle between positive and depressive states. "The moods of the cyclothyme lie between the extremes of hilarity, and sorrowful depression" (Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p.
54). The cyclothyme may be recognized by their interest in the 'real' world, their sociability and general good nature (Kretschmer, 1929/1970). Futhermore, they may be sub-divided into three temperaments: "the hypomanic (very cheerful and lively), the syntonic (realistic, practical and humorous) and the soft-melancholic (sad-relaxed)"
(Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p. 54). The second personality type, the schizothyme, tends to be more withdrawn. "The schizothyme temperaments have a common inclination to autism, that is, to keeping themselves to themselves, to shy withdrawal from their fellow- men, and to humourless seriousness" (Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p. 54). The schizothyme may be recognized by their introverted nature, lack of social skills and serious outlook
(Kretschmer, 1929/1970).
From this range, results the threefold division of temperaments:
hyperaesthetic, that is highly strung and with a sensitive inner life;
then the middle position occupied by cool, active men of decision,
inclined to consistency in thought and general systematisation; and
finally anaesthetic temperament expressed in the distorted
eccentric, the dull and indolent waster. (Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p.
54)
Kretschmer (1929/1970) proceeded to use these designations when speaking of exemplars of the literary men, scientists, leaders and heroes. Like Lange-Eichbaum, he found the idea of breeding genius to be problematic, in that they are so prone to insanity
(Kretschmer, 1929/1970). However, unlike many in his time, Kretschmer (1929/1970) stated that 'hybridisation', or the cross-breading of races is the key to genius.
When we examine the problem of genius biologically, we come upon
just such processes of cross-breeding. Pure races, inbred for very long
periods, are often poor in genius to a very marked degree, though they
may show a very high general level of capability, as may be seen in
the regions of the purest Nordic racial elements. (Kretschmer,
1929/1970, p. 65) 57
This idea, in particular, is interesting because Kretschmer (1929/1970) directly spoke against the common belief at the time of the superiority of the 'Nordic' race (Gould,
1996).
Kretschmer's (1929/1970) work is notable in two respects. First, he took
Lombroso's (1889/1905) ideas and attempted to update them into a psychological context, by adding his clinical expertise. Second, Kretschmer (1929/1970) expressed the controversial idea of racial mixing as being beneficial to humanity. He compounds this statement by saying that it is simply untrue that the Nordic race could possibly be the only source of genius. This would be an especially difficult position for a German author to adopt at that time. It is for these reasons that Kretschmer's work has remained important in the genius literature.
Summary
While the proponents of this position cannot achieve a consensus on whether or not there is a biological basis to genius, they share a disbelief in the eugenicist notion that breeding genius would be beneficial. Interestingly, despite many strong criticisms
(Galton, 1869/1892; W. Hirsch, 1897; Terman, 1925,1947) the mad genius theory continues to find support to this day (Eysenck, 1995; A. Jensen, 1996; Simonton, 1999).
The next chapter will address the theories of genius that focus on the concepts of intelligence and eminence. In doing so, different themes in the literature will become evident. This is, in large part, because the intelligent and eminent genius theories tend to be more psychological in nature than philosophical. 58
Chapter Four
Intelligence and Eminence Theories of Genius
The last chapter outlined the theories of genius rooted in the concepts of creativity and madness. This chapter will address those theories that look to intelligence and eminence as defining features of genius. The presentation of these approaches will follow the same format as the preceding chapter: philosophical, philosophical-psychological and psychological.
The Intelligent Genius
The relationship between intelligence and genius has had a long tradition (Galton,
1865,1869/2006; Schopenhauer, 1883/1964); however it gained considerable emphasis in the psychological literature (Gardner, 1997; Terman, 1906/1975, 1916,1925, 1930,
1947,1959). The philosophical roots of this tradition date back to the German Romantic philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), whereas the psychometric tradition began in England, with Francis Galton (1822-1911).
Philosophical
In The World as Will and Idea (1883/1964), Arthur Schopenhauer wrote that genius was an innate ability, of which intellect and perception were its defining features.
He believed that all perception is intellectual in nature, but that perception is not limited to the sensuous; it also encompasses the Platonic forms (Schopenhauer, 1883/1964).
"Accordingly, since [genius] has for its objects the Platonic Ideas, and these are not comprehended in the abstract, but only perceptibility, the essence of genius must lie in the perfection and energy of the knowledge of perception" (Schopenhauer, 1883/1964, p.
138). He also stressed that the ability to perceive, not only the particulars of external reality, but the universal forms can be used as a measure of genius.
The degree in which everyone not merely thinks, but actually perceives,
in the particular thing, only the particular, or a more or less universal up
to the most universal of the species, is the measure of his approach to
genius. And corresponding to this, only the nature of things generally,
the universal in them, the whole, is the special object of genius.
(Schopenhauer, 1883/1964, p. 143)
In addition, Schopenhauer (1883/1964) believed that genius could be expressed in any number of domains, including the creative arts, philosophy or the sciences. He believed that the inspiration for these works of genius appears to come from a spontaneous instinctive necessity.
What is called the awakening of genius, the hour of initiation, the
moment of inspiration, is nothing but the attainment of freedom by the
intellect, when delivered from its service under the will... Then it is of
its greatest purity, and becomes the clear mirror of the world; for,
completely severed from its origin, the will, it is now the world as idea
itself... (Schopenhauer, 1883/1964,p. 143-144)
Thus, as Schopenhauer went on to explain, men of genius possess an intellect free from will. He believed that it is this freedom which makes a genius more inclined to madness. "The kinship of genius and madness, so often observed, depends chiefly upon the separation of the intellect from the will which is essential to genius, but is yet contrary to nature" (Schopenhauer, 1883/1964, p. 153). This assertion formed the basis of the distinction between ordinary persons and genius.
Following in his Romantic philosophical tradition, Schopenhauer (1883/1964) characterized an ordinary person as being ruled by emotions. However, the genius, almost as if they represent a distinct species, are ruled by the intellect. "The normal man consists of two-thirds will and one-third intellect, the genius, o the contrary, has two- thirds intellect and one-third will" (Schopenhauer, 1883/1964, p. 140). Within his framework, a genius stands apart even from a talented person. He stated that:
The difference between genius and mere talent makes itself noticeable
even here. For talent is an excellence which lies rather in the greater
versatility and acuteness of discursive that of intuitive knowledge...but
the genius beholds another world from them all... (Schopenhauer,
1883/1964, p. 138)
Therefore, Schopenhauer (1883/1964) placed even men of talent in direct opposition to men of genius. Furthermore, he stated that:
Mere men of talent come always at the right time; for they are roused by the
spirit of their age, and called forth by its needs, they are capable only of
satisfying these... The genius, on the contrary, comes into his age like a
comet into the paths of planets, to whose well-regulated and comprehensible 61
order its entirely eccentric course is foreign. Accordingly he cannot go hand
in hand with the existing, regular process of the culture of the age, but flings
his work far out on to the way in front ... upon which time has first to
overtake them (Schopenhauer, 1883/1964, p. 157).
Therefore, the talented person is well-received by their peers, but their influence is temporary. Their works will be approved of, and they will be rewarded for them.
However, the next generation will sweep them aside, in favour of a new crop of similarly talented individuals. In contrast to this, a genius is in conflict with their peers, but in time will be accepted, and their works and influence are eternal.
Schopenhauer's theory of genius stands in stark contrast to the rational philosophy • of Kant. However, like Kant, his work is explicated comprehensively, and has remained influential to this day. Yet, true to his Romantic tradition, Schopenhauer's writing is much more poetic, and enjoyable to read.
Otto Weininger (1880-1903), in contrast to Schopenhauer (1883/1964), did not spend a great deal of effort defining genius (Weininger, 1903/1906). His purpose was to
"attempt to place the relations of Sex in a new and decisive light... to refer to a single principle the whole contrast between man and woman" (Weininger, 1903/1906, p. ix).
Weininger (1903/1906) borrowed extensively from Schopenhauer's (1883/1964) writings on genius. He stated that "the conception of genius concludes universality... genius, as I have already shown, would have universal comprehension, and through its perfect memory would be independent of time" (Weininger, 1903/1906, p. 168-169). However, 62 unlike Schopenhauer (1883/1964), Weininger (1903/1964) did not believe that this universal comprehension meant understanding the Platonic forms, but instead that it entailed a gestalt-like view of the world. "For the genius the ego is all, lives as the all; the genius sees nature and all existences as whole; the relations of things flash on him intuitively; he has not to build bridges of stones between them" (Weininger, 1903/1906, p. 169). This new understanding thus implied that a genius could not exist in any domain of their choosing. "And so the genius cannot be an empirical psychologist slowly collecting details and linking them by associations; he cannot be a physicist, envisaging the world as a compound of atoms and molecules" (Weininger, 1903/1906, p. 169).
Therefore, a genius could only exist within the creative arts, or philosophy.
Since Weininger's (1903/1906) theory of genius was, for the most part, a short reinterpretation of Schopenhauer (1883/1964), I will not present an analysis of his work here. Instead, a detailed analysis will be given in chapter six, where Weininger's
(1903/1906) unique ideas on genius, namely the difference in ability between men and women, will be outlined.
Philosophical-Psychological
Francis Galton is especially notable in the genius literature because he not only theorized on the topic of genius, but was the first to study the concept empirically. His work became an inspiration for the psychologists who came after him. On the subject of genius, Galton provided two significant works: Hereditary Talent and Character (1865) and Hereditary Genius (1869/2006). 63
In Hereditary Talent and Character (1865) Galton first outlined his belief that intelligence is inherited through a process similar to Mendelian genetics, which was being independently developed at the same time (East, 1923; litis, 1943). Although
Mendel's work was yet to be discovered (East, 1923; litis, 1943), it was a common belief
(Galton, 1865) at the time that intelligence was passed on from the mother to sons.
However, Galton (1865) reasoned that intelligence must come from both parents and is passed on to both sons and daughters. "I find that talent is transmitted by inheritance in a very remarkable degree; that the mother has by no means the monopoly of its transmission" (Galton, 1865, p. 157). He used this belief to claim that we should breed intelligence in humans, the same way we would breed desirable characteristics in horses
(Galton, 1865). "If a twentieth part of the cost and pains were spent in measures for the improvement of the human race that is spent on the improvement of the bred of horses and cattle, what a galaxy of genius might we not create" (Galton, 1865, p. 165)! Galton
(1865) concluded that "by selecting men and women of rare and similar talent, and mating them together, generation after generation, an extraordinarily gifted race might be developed" (p. 325). This article clearly laid the foundation for Galton's (1883) later ideas on eugenics.
In Hereditary Genius (1869/2006), Galton furthered his arguments from
Hereditary Talent and Character (1865). He begins the book by defining what he means by 'natural ability'. "By natural ability, I mean those qualities of intellect and disposition, which urge and qualify a man to perform acts that lead to reputation" (Galton, 1869/2006, 64 p. 39). Furthermore, Galton (1869/2006) believed that a man who possessed extraordinary intelligence could not help but become eminent. "If a man is gifted with vast intellectual ability, eagerness to work, and power of working, I cannot comprehend how such a man should be repressed" (p. 40-41). As he had shown in his previous work,
and endeavoured to do again, Galton (1869/2006) believed that intelligence was hereditary. However, there were other qualities he deemed necessary to achieve eminence that were also hereditary. "Ability, combined with zeal and with capacity for hard labour,
is inherited" (Galton, 1869/2006, p. 40). He clearly equated eminence and genius with
intellectual ability, but also gave credence to the role perseverance, for without effort, no wofk of genius could be created.
Within this book, Galton (1869/2006) also made a number of assertions about the
hereditary nature of intelligence based on geographical, racial, and demographic
information. Galton (1869/2006) tried to show conclusively that genius was limited to
white males of European descent.
This new book was hailed as a great scientific contribution in his time (Gould,
1981). However, it lacked the scientific rigour of the time, displayed well in Darwin's
Origin of the Species (1859/1991). Galton (1869/2006), intent on proving his hypotheses,
overlooked obvious social factors contributing to his work. Even in the introduction to
Hereditary Genius (1869/2006), Galton admitted to the probability of making multiple
errors in his data in service of his point of view. 65
I beg [the reader] will do me the justice of allowing that I have not
overlooked the whole of the evidence that does not appear in my
pages. I am deeply conscious of the imperfection of my work, but
my sins are those of omission, not of commission. Such errors as I
may have made, which give fictitious support to my arguments, are,
I am confident, out of all proportion fewer than such omission of
facts as would have helped to establish them. (Galton, 1869/2006, p.
13)
Galton (1869/2006) went on to place the onus on the reader to prove the impartiality of his work:
He may most reasonably suspect that I have been unconsciously
influenced by my theories to select men whose kindred were most
favourable to their support. If so, I beg he will test my impartiality as
follows - Let him take a dozen names of his own selection, as the
most eminent in whatever profession and in whatever country he
knows most about, and let him trace out for himself their relations.
(Galton, 1869/2006, p. 13)
My analysis of Galton's reasons for overlooking social conditions will be presented in more detail in chapter five.
It should also be noted here that Havelock Ellis' (1926) A Study of British Genius, followed in much the same tradition as Galton (1865, 1869/2006), and James McKeen Cattell (1903; see below). Like Galton (1865,1869/2006), Ellis (1926) belongs within both the intelligent and eminent genius categories (see below). Yet, his book adds little to the theoretical discussion on genius, as it is essentially a recapitulation of Galton (1865,
1869/2006) and Cattell (1903). Therefore, it will not be discussed here. However, it will receive considerably more attention in chapter six.
Psychological
Lewis M. Terman (1877-1956) was one of the first trained psychologists to become interested in genius. His doctoral dissertation, Genius and Stupidity (1906/1975) chronicled the differences between seven bright and seven stupid boys, as assessed by teacher ratings and an early version of the Binet-Simon Intelligence Scales. Terman
(1906/1975) emphasized, however, that his dissertation was qualitative in nature and that he made no attempt at psychological exactness, as he wanted to more closely examine the everyday conditions within the classroom.
In 1916, Terman unveiled his newly constructed Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale.
He felt that it was a tool of great social value to be utilized by the American education system:
The future welfare of the country hinges, in no small degree, upon the right
education of these superior children. Whether civilization moves on and up
depends most on the advances made by creative thinkers and leaders in
science, politics, art, morality, and religion. Moderate ability can follow, or
imitate, but genius must show the way. (Terman, 1916, p. 12) 67
Terman (1916) used the fear of hidden genius going to waste to sell his new test to the educational system and other academics. "Even genius languishes when kept over-long at tasks that are too easy" (Terman, 1916, p. 13). Thus, Terman was able to promote the
Stanford-Binet as an absolute necessity to help identify those that might require special education, particularly potential geniuses. The Stanford-Binet is then, no longer simply a psychometric measure of intelligence, but a tool to be harnessed for the betterment of society. Terman defined an IQ greater than 140 as "near genius or genius" (Terman,
1916, p. 79). With all of the other IQ groupings, Terman presented psychological profiles to aid teachers in early identification. However, he lamented that genius had not been systematically studied long enough at that point to provide any identification criteria beyond their IQ scores (Terman, 1916).
Following the publication of the Measurement of Intelligence (1916), Terman undertook a massive project in order to correct the lack of knowledge about genius. He organized a large-scale longitudinal study of gifted children to be run out of Stanford
University. This represented the first ever in-depth, empirical study of genius. Terman's
Genetic Studies of Genius, published in 1925, became the first of five books in a series of the same name which focused on the lives of one thousand gifted children. The famed
Terman's Termites was the main experimental group, which consisted of 367 males and
301 females who were followed for their entire lifespan. The Stanford group is still collecting data on many aspects of the lives of these individuals and their families (see
Rogers, 1999; Tomlinson-Keasey & Little, 1990). 68
In the preface to Genetic Studies of Genius (1925), Terman denounced a belief in the "Great Man, who has commonly been regarded by the masses as qualitatively set off from the rest of mankind, the product of supernatural causes, and moved by forces which are not to be explained by the natural laws of human behaviour" (Terman, 1925, p. v).
Thus, he rejected any theory which implied a supernatural origin to the abilities of a genius. He also did not believe in any theories which propose "that intellectual precocity is pathological" (Terman, 1925, p. v). Therefore, Terman (1925) stated outright his disbelief in the merits of mad genius theory.
Several themes become clear in Terman's writing. First, he equated the terms gifted and genius, and used them synonymously. A second theme, perhaps already evident from the first, is that the defining feature of genius is superior intelligence.
Intelligence was construed by Terman to be a single unitary entity, which could be accurately described through the assignment of an IQ score. Thirdly, Terman strongly believed that genius can be reduced to operationalized variables and studied empirically.
Finally, he held that genius does not have to be a classification assigned in a post hoc fashion, but that it can be empirically studied a priori and predicted through the use of his intelligence test, the Stanford-Binet. Therefore, Terman upheld the belief in the hereditary component to genius, and, at the same time, denounced the influence of socio- historical factors.
Catharine Cox (1890-1984), a student of Lewis Terman, wrote the famed second volume in the Genetic Studies of Genius series (Eysenck, 1995, 1998). As Eysenck 69
(1995,1998) stated, this is perhaps the most well known work on genius within psychology. The book, entitled The Early Mental Traits of Three Hundred Geniuses
(1926), was an attempt to posthumously assign IQ scores to various eminent men and women throughout history based on samples of their achievements, biographies and assorted archival data. In order to select her subjects, Cox (1926) felt that they must meet the following criteria:
1) they should reach a standard of unquestioned eminence; 2) they
should be... persons whose eminence was the result of unusual
achievement and not a consequence of fortuitous circumstance...; and 3)
they must be persons for whom adequate records are available... (p. 31).
Cox (1926) began with Cattell's (1903; see below) list of 1000 eminent men (N=967) and women (N=33), who undoubtedly met the first criterion. From there, those that met the second and third criteria, were born after the year 1450, and were in the top 510 places in
Cattell's (1903) list were selected to form Group A (Cox, 1926). This first group consisted of 282 individuals. The second group, Group B, was taken from those on the list who met all three criteria, were born after 1450, but were in the bottom 490 persons on the list. This second group was comprised of 19 individuals (Cox, 1926).
For both of these groups, Cox (1926) assigned IQ scores for each individual, and included a short biography and chronology of their achievements. She found the geniuses
selected ranged widely in their estimated IQ scores from childhood and adulthood. The
lowest IQ score of the 301 geniuses was 100, equal to the average population score. The 70 highest IQ score, 190, was given to John Stuart Mill only (Cox, 1926). Interestingly, this still places him 10 points lower than Terman's (1917) analysis of Francis Galton, where he found him to have an IQ of 200. This is likely because, philosophically, Terman and
Galton were very closely aligned as hereditarians and eugenicists, whereas Mill stood in direct opposition to their position (Fancher, 1985).
Cox's (1926) addition to the Genetic Studies of Genius series lends little to the theoretical framework proposed by Terman. It does, however, provide some evidence for his theory that genius is a result of high intelligence, which can be measured by the
Stanford-Binet. With data showing that performance on his intelligence test could explain the works of past geniuses, it was easy for him to suggest that children's performance on the same intelligence test could help with early identification and promotion of future genius. The Genetic Studies of Genius series is most notable in that it is the first psychological and empirically testable theory of genius.
Leta S. Hollingworth (1886-1939) is well known for her work on intelligence, particularly on gifted children. Slightly less well known are her views on genius.
However, she is included in this section for two reasons: first, she provided an excellent critique of Terman's studies, and conducted her own longitudinal study, although on a much smaller scale. Secondly, she is especially relevant because she did work on the topic of genius, and provided a strong feminist critique of it.
In 1926, Hollingworth published Gifted Children: Their Nature and Nurture. It was a fairly detailed account of gifted children, which focused on their development, 71 family history, personality, physical characteristics, education and specific specialized talents. She also outlined an experimental curriculum for the education of identified gifted students (Hollingworth, 1926). However, in this book, Hollingworth (1926) also critiqued the past work on Great Men and studies of eminence. She concluded that it is not necessary to resort to the concept of genius to explain eminence. An equally possible explanation is simply that eminent men have just had more education and more opportunity (Hollingworth, 1926). Since many social and political forces have kept women from showing their true talent, it is not surprising that they should be underrepresented in the lists of eminent persons. Hollingworth (1926) lauded Terman's
Genetic Studies of Genius (1925) as the first study to remove many of these barriers to accurate assessment for women. In the past, women have been excluded from having the same education as men in order to limit them to domestic duties associated with maternity (Hollingworth, 1926). With the introduction of the Stanford-Binet into the school system, gifted girls may be recognized and have their abilities nurtured. However, she also felt that his study was far from perfect and further research need to be conducted
(Hollingworth, 1926).
In her critique of Terman's work, Hollingworth (1926, 1942) made clear that it was not acceptable to use the term gifted as a synonym for genius. She stated:
In addition to all these conflicts of signification, there is a superstitious
conception of genius... as something semidivine, mysteriously superhuman. 72
Striving as we are, for clear understanding of the facts about gifted children,
it seems best not to describe them as geniuses. (Hollingworth, 1926, p. 31)
Hollingworth (1926) stated that the term genius has no psychological meaning and therefore has no place in serious scientific discussion. If it was to remain in the literature, more work would need to be conducted to determine the relationship between genius and giftedness. Therefore, in 1924, Hollingworth began her own longitudinal study of gifted children; however, the manuscript had not been completed by the time of her death in
1939. So, her husband, Harry Hollingworth completed the manuscript to have it published in 1942 as the book Children Above 180IQ. In this book, Hollingworth (1942) re-stated her thoughts on genius, and particularly her conviction that the terms genius and gifted should not be used synonymously. She concluded, based on the results from her longitudinal study that IQ may have some relationship to genius. She stated:
When, about twenty years ago, Terman began to attempt classifications
of high deviates, on the basis of IQ, he called 140 IQ (S-B) "genius or
near genius." The intervening years have proved that this idea must be
revised... Somewhere between 170 and 180 IQ (S-B) we begin to see
merging in early adulthood that "highly unusual power of invention or
origination," that "original creative power, frequently working through
the imagination," which is ordinarily called "genius". (Hollingworth,
1942, p. 319) 73
Therefore, Hollingworth (1942) did agree that there is some relationship between IQ, eminence and genius; however this was a very cautious conclusion. She called for a reassessment of Terman's (1916) original categorizations.
Hollingworth's (1926, 1942) works do not stand alone as important theories of genius. However, they did provide cogent, thought-provoking methodological critiques of
Terman's (1916, 1926) hallmark studies. In addition, Hollingworth is an important figure in the feminist debate in psychology, and will be drawn upon in chapter five and chapter six, especially because her work dealt primarily with issues of intelligence and biological determinism (1914a, 1914b, 1916).
While many authors in the intelligence literature have subscribed to the single- factor theory of intelligence (now known as g-factor; see Eysenck, 1995, 1998; A.
Jensen, 1996; Terman, 1916,1926), Howard Gardner (1943-) is best known for his theory of multiple intelligences (1983, 1999). The theory states that humans have evolved with at least seven different types of intelligences: linguistic, logical, spatial, musical, bodily kinesthetic, interpersonal and intrapersonal (Gardner, 1983). In contrast to Terman
(1916), Gardner (1983) felt that these abilities could not be measured with a paper and pencil test, nor are they universal; intelligences are culturally and historically determined.
In keeping with this theory, Gardner (1997) proposed that there are multiple types
of extraordinariness. The first is the Master, which "is an individual who gains complete
mastery over one or more domains of accomplishment; his or her innovation occurs
within established practice" (Gardner, 1997, p. 11). Gardner (1997) stated that one of the best exemplars of this type of person is Wolfgang Mozart (1756-1791). The second type is the Maker, exemplified by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who is a person that "may have mastered existing domains, but he or she devotes energies to the creation of a new domain" (Gardner, 1997, p. 12). The third type of extraordinary mind is the Introspector, whose "primary concern... is an exploration of his or her inner life: daily experiences, potent needs and fears, the operation of consciousness (both that of the particular individual and that of individuals more generally)" (Gardner, 1997, p. 12). This type of person is exemplified by Virginia Woolf (1882-1941) (Gardner, 1997). The final type is the Influencer, who, like Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), "has as a primary goal the influencing of other individuals" (Gardner, 1997, p. 12). Gardner (1997) stressed that extraordinariness is developmental; it is a highly complex and dynamic interaction between a person, their internal and external environment, and chance. He concluded by stating that extraordinary people may only be identified by their reflectiveness, their ability to identify and use their strengths, and their persistence in the face of setbacks and failure (Gardner, 1997).
The next step for Gardner was to define genius and show how his theory fit with this concept. For Gardner (1997), a genius is simply one who stands out from the rest in their particular field. He subdivided them into particularistic and universal geniuses. A particularistic genius is one whose personality and philosophy is evident in their work
(Gardner, 1997). The universal genius, on the other hand, is one whose personality and 75 philosophies are not readily evident through their work (Gardner, 1997). Each type of extraordinary person may fall into either category of genius.
Gardner's (1997) theory is interesting because it represents an alternative to the theory proposed by Terman (1916, 1926). As it is a new work, it is difficult to ascertain what the impact will be. However, this is one of the few theories presented here that accepts genius across a number of domains, socio-historical periods, and demographic variables. Gardner's (1997) theory of genius is, in my estimation, the best one with which to move forward if psychologists continue to study genius. It is theoretically superior because of its sociocultural emphasis, and non-reductionistic nature, which easily allows for expression of genius in a variety of venues.
Summary
Unfortunately, for proponents of the intelligent genius theories, there is little similarity between them. They are divided on the issues of socio-historical influence, how genius may be recognized, and what intelligence is at the most basic level. However, there are two distinct points of convergence beyond their primary focus on intelligence: genius is an innate gift which cannot be taught; and genius is, to some extent, a hereditary quality.
The Eminent Genius
The relationship between genius and eminence is most evident in the works of
James McKeen Cattell (1903,1906,1910), Cora Sutton Castle (1913), and Dean Keith
Simonton (1984, 1994,1999). It should be noted here though, that eminence is rarely 76 cited as being sufficient for defining genius by itself. Most often it is linked to either creativity (Eysenck, 1995; Simonton, 1984,1999) or intelligence (Galton, 1865,
1869/2006; Cattell, 1903,1906, 1910; Terman, 1926), therefore resulting in considerable overlap. However, since almost every author would agree that a genius must at some point become eminent, it is necessary to include it as a separate section.
Philosophical-Psychological
In Hereditary Talent and Character (1865) Galton examined lists of eminent men in hopes of finding evidence for the hereditary basis of intelligence. He discovered that, depending on the source used and the method he employed when examining the data, close familial relations could be found for anywhere between 1 in every 3 Vi men to 1 in every 12 men on the list (Galton, 1865). Galton (1865) used these findings to argue for the development of policies in England that would encourage breeding between the most intelligent (Caste A) and discourage breeding between the least intelligent segments of the population (Caste B). He also advocated that Caste A and B should not be allowed to interbreed, as this would result in further social degeneration (Galton, 1865).
In Hereditary Genius (1869/1892), Galton extended his analyses of eminent men.
He refined his analyses of eminent persons by defining more rigorously what he meant by
'eminence'. "When I speak of an eminent man, I mean one who has achieved a position that is attained by only 250 persons in each million of men, or by one person in each
4,000" (Galton, 1869/2006, p. 18). Through this, he furthered his theory that intelligence
is inherited and mostly determined by genetics. In light of these conclusions, Galton 77 stated that we must be prepared to follow a plan of eugenics in order to create a better society for future generations (Galton, 1869/1892). Although the term eugenics only appeared in Galton's later writing (see Galton, 1883), his suggestions and theorizing in
Hereditary Genius remains consistent with his later works (Fancher, 1985; Gould, 1981).
The greater analysis of this work may be found in chapter five, although it has already been briefly touched upon in the Intelligent Genius section.
Psychological
In contrast to Galton, Cattell (1860-1944) rejected the idea that eminence was solely related to genetics (Cattell, 1903,1906). "It is evident that there are two leading factors in producing a man and making him what he is - one the endowment given at birth, the other the environment into which he comes" (Cattell, 1903, p. 359). He stated that it was too early to tell whether genius, in particular, was the result of environmental conditions, biology, or both (Cattell, 1903). Thus, he proposed a statistical, demographic study of noteworthy persons throughout history. Cattell (1903) acknowledged that there is a difference between genius, greatness and mere eminence; however for the purposes of his study, he would not differentiate. He comprised a list of 1000 eminent men and women, that showed "a nice gradation in eminence" (Cattell, 1903, p. 362). After examining the biographies of these individuals in detail, Cattell (1903) concluded that it was unlikely that genius was hereditary. In addition, he recommended that proper education must be given to potential geniuses. "Can we not with the knowledge we have and with the knowledge we should acquire do more to produce such men, to select them, to train them and to use them" (Cattell, 1903, p. 377)? CattelPs (1903) recommendations place Terman's (1916) claims regarding the utility of the Stanford-Binet within context.
Cattell (1906, 1910), continued to produce articles on the subject of eminence.
These were taken from studies on data from American Men of Science. Within these articles, Cattell (1906,1910) continued to add data for his prior (1903) claims regarding the unlikely heritability of eminence. He found that there was a vast inequality between different regions of the United States: some areas were much more likely to produce eminent men than others (Cattell, 1906). He acknowledged that each area had different amounts of immigrants and African Americans, but Cattell (1906) reasoned that the lower rates of eminence in these regions was likely a function of poor social conditions.
Thus, he concluded that the main predictors of eminence were "density of population, wealth, opportunity, institutions, and social traditions and ideals" (Cattell, 1906, p. 735).
Cattell (1903, 1906, 1910) made little in the way of theoretical contribution to the
study of genius. However, his data was important to include here because it provided an
important critique of Galton (1865,1869/2006), and was also the inspiration for the work
of Cora Sutton Castle (1880-1966) (1913). However, Castle's work will not be outlined
here, as it follows closely with CattelPs (1903). The only difference between their two
articles is their population: Cattell (1903) studied predominately men but included some
women, whereas Castle (1913) studied only eminent women. Her work will be discussed
in detail in chapter five. Dean Keith Simonton (1948-) in his Genius, Creativity and Leadership (1984) used historiometry, or the use of statistical methods to find patterns in human behaviour over time, to provide a measurement of genius, creativity and leadership on a sociohistorical scale (Simonton, 1984). Through the use of descriptive statistics, structural-equation modelling and generational time-series analyses, Simonton (1984) identified a series of commonalities among eminent geniuses throughout history. He found that the crucial period for developing the potential of a future genius is in adolescence and early adulthood, while the rest of the lifespan is devoted to achieving eminence (Simonton, 1984). The eminent genius, on the whole, is influenced by an incredible number of personal and social factors, including birth order, education, age, originality and influences of role models (Simonton, 1984). In addition, Simonton (1984) proposed that genius can be sub-divided into two distinct groups: the creators and the leaders. For works of creativity, it is personal factors and biographical events which determine eminence, whereas for achievement in leadership, it is external factors like popularity, and political climate (Simonton, 1984). Simonton (1984) argued that these are generalizable, nomothetic findings.
Simonton (1984, 1997, 1999) has followed in the tradition of eminence theorists before him, statistically analyzing lists of eminent persons. However, Simonton (1984) has updated many of these techniques, which has produced a wealth of new results confirming the importance of environmental factors in the emergence of genius (1984,
1999). Yet, Simonton's (1984, 1999) self-understanding of the scientific nature of his 80 work is misguided. His 'nomothetic' findings are not causal, but are correlational. Also, like other eminent genius theorists, the validity of his data is reliant on reliability of the biographical sources used. Therefore, Simonton's (1984,1997, 1999) contributions should be limited to data used as evidence for more theoretically-guided works (see
Eysenck, 1995, 1998; Gardner, 1997), or as a counter-point to eminence data stressing only the hereditary nature of genius (see Galton, 1865,1869/2006).
Summary
As with the intelligent genius theorists, there are few ideas shared between the proponents of the eminence theory. No agreement can be reached on whether genius is innate, or merely a product of good timing and external forces. The only commonalities found between these theorists is the belief that genius may be found in many diverse fields, that eminence can be measured statistically, and that it is not sufficient for defining genius on its own.
Conclusion
There are several themes evident within the genius literature. The first is the age- old question of psychology - nature vs. nurture. Is genius the result of good genes, or good teaching and hard work? The second question of interest is more theoretical. Is genius better explained by appealing to a single abstract concept, such as creativity or madness, or through a multiplicative approach (see Eysenck, 1995)? A final theme that can be found throughout the literature is hero-worship and the problematization of genius. Is genius inevitably linked with madness? Or is the genius to be revered as a hero 81 with spiritual or religious significance? These questions have predictably found no clear answer in over two centuries worth of literature. However, there is one remaining theme which has achieved the most enduring and uniform agreement: the exclusion of females from theories of genius. It is this theme that will be explored in depth throughout the remaining chapters. 82
Chapter Five
Exclusion by Type
In this chapter, I will explore the exclusion by type strategy. This refers to those authors who do not deny the existence of female genius per se. They do, however, distinguish between the traits necessary for female and male genius separately, which are represented hierarchically with females occupying the lesser position. Male genius is typified by individuality, persistence, and adding to the accomplishments of the human race in a public forum. Female genius, on the other hand, is most often viewed as a matter of external factors, a virtue of their social position or physical features, or is to be displayed quietly in domestic matters. This hierarchy in the recognition of genius upholds the notion of separate spheres for males and females.
Francis Galton
Francis Galton (1865) represents a prime example of this type of exclusion strategy. In his writings, the qualities which distinguished men of genius were not the same as those which distinguished women of genius. In Hereditary Talent and Character
(1865), Galton was primarily concerned with proving the hereditary nature of eminence, and making a case for breeding practices that would encourage eminence. Galton (1865) argued that society should promote marriages between those that are most likely to produce eminent offspring. "What an extraordinary effect might be produced on our race, if its object was to unite in marriage those who possessed the finest and most suitable 83 natures, mental, moral, and physical!" (Galton, 1865, p. 165). He illustrated his meaning in the following passage:
So far as beauty is concerned, the custom of many countries, of the
nobility purchasing the handsomest girls they could find for their wives,
has laid the foundation of a higher type of features among the ruling
classes. It is not so long ago in England that it was thought quite natural
that the strongest lance at the tournament should win the fairest or
noblest lady. The lady was the prize to be tilted for. She rarely objected
to the arrangement, because her vanity was gratified by the eclat of the
proceeding. (Galton, 1865, p. 165)
In this quote, Galton made clear, not only his disdain for women, but also his view of the role they play in advancing society. Men are needed to accomplish great feats; women are needed for their beauty and social position. Together, the best of each gender will continue to produce eminent males and beautiful females, to the betterment of society.
Galton's vision of the relationship between men and women becomes clearer still in his vision of a Utopian society, Laputa4 (Galton, 1865).
Let us, then, give reins to our fancy, and imagine a Utopia - or a Laputa,
if you will - in which a system of competitive examinations for girls, as
well as for youths, had been so developed as to embrace every important
4 The name Galton (1865) gave to his Utopia is the same given to the floating island in the sky in Jonathan Swift's (1667-1745) Gulliver's Travels (1726). Ironically, the inhabitants of Swift's Laputa are very educated but fail to make good use of their skills. 84
quality of mind and body, and where a considerable sum was allotted to
the endowment of such marriages as promised to yield children who
would grow into eminent servants of the state. (Gallon, 1865, p. 165)
In the following quote, Galton (1865) presented a vision of what the public examinations would entail for both men and women. In a hypothetical conversation between a government official, and the top ranked men in the examination, Galton (1865) stated that:
"Gentlemen, I have to announce the results of a public examination,
conducted on established principles, which show that you occupy the
foremost places in your year, in respect to those qualities of talent,
character and bodily vigour which are proved, on the whole, to do most
honour and best service to our race. An examination has also been
conducted on established principles among all the young ladies of this
country who are now of the age of twenty-one, and I need hardly remind
you, that this examination takes note of grace, beauty, health,
good-temper, accomplished housewifery, and disengaged affections, in
addition to the noble qualities of heart and brain." (Galton, 1865, p. 165)
It is clear from this passage that Galton did recognize genius in women; however he certainly did not believe them capable of achieving eminence in public, creative or academic forums (Galton, 1865). It is suggested that the genius of women should remain 85 behind closed doors; that it is for the males in her family to put their genius towards the betterment of society.
What is merely suggested in Hereditary Talent and Character (1865) is confirmed in Hereditary Genius (1869/2006). When speaking of eminent men of science,
Galton (1869/2006) stated, "it therefore appears to be very important to success in science, that a man should have an able mother" (p. 180). In this case, he means that an able mother is one who provides the sort of home schooling which encourages a child to question freely. In doing so, the child learns to recognize problems in his environment and search for answers. A mother may encourage this, but will not pursue it herself, as
Galton (1869/2006) indicated that women are far too blinded by love and custom to fully engage in science. Here, he further clarified the all-important role of the mother:
Of two men with equal abilities, the one who had the truth-loving
mother would be the more likely to follow the career of science; while
the other, if bred up under extremely narrowing circumstances, would
become as the gifted children in China, nothing better than a student and
professor of some dead literature. (Galton, 1869/2006, p. 180-181)
It is clear that Galton believes that the realms in which women may express genius are marriage and motherhood. Galton did believe these to be important functions for humanity and the evolution of genius. However, women still retain a supportive function in the betterment of society; they do not actually engage in it. In making this distinction 86 between the spheres of men and women, Galton attaches a value judgement to the types of genius, with females occupying the lesser position.
Galton's attitude towards women likely has roots in his own personal experiences.
His biographer, Derek Forrest (1974), noted:
There does appear to have been a change in Galton's attitude to women
after his Syrian experiences which could owe its origin to an unfortunate
encounter in Beyrout. In his Cambridge letters home he refers to several
occasions on which he met attractive women. There is no trace of
heterosexual interest after 1846, apart from his marriage in 1853, and for
the remainder of his life his attitude to women is one of polite
indifference. (Forrest, 1974, p. 33)
He indicated that this may have been due to Galton possibly contracting a sexually transmitted disease in his travels. However, in his travels in Africa, Galton did remark rather extensively on the beauty of the Nama5 women, and one "Venus" in particular, in his Narrative of an Explorer in Tropical South Africa:
I profess to be a scientific man, and was exceedingly anxious to obtain
accurate measurements of her shape... The object of my admiration
stood under a tree...I took a series of observation upon her figure in
every direction, up and down, crossways, diagonally, and so forth, and I
5 The Nama is one of the three tribes Galton encountered in his South African travels. The other two were the Herero and Ovambo. For a full account of these travels, refer to Narrative of an Explorer in Tropical South Africa: Being An Account of a Visit to Damaraland in 1851 (Galton, 1860/1889) 87
registered them carefully upon an outline drawing for fear of any
mistake; this being done, I boldly pulled out my measuring-tape, and
measured the distance from where I was to the place she stood, and
having thus obtained both base and angles, I worked out the result by
trigonometry and logarithms. (Galton, 1860/1889, 53-54)
Fancher (1983) suggested that Galton's physical and psychological distance from the
Nama people, and the women in particular was a Freudian defence mechanism, and an attempt to maintain his Victorian purity.
Galton, physically present in Africa, was of course faced with more than
just written descriptions of such taboo-breaking, and we may assume
that his response was sometimes stronger than simple 'libidinous
fascination'. Indeed, he was sometimes aware of a direct threat for
personal corruption. (Fancher, 1983, p. 78)
Galton was fascinated by the physical attributes of women, and at the same time attempted to treat them with scientific disinterest, feigning objectivity.
While Galton was often fascinated with the physical attributes, and freely wrote about them, Fancher (1998) showed that he utterly ignored the intellectual ability of women. Galton's autobiography is littered with over 250 names of eminent men he came to know, however there is no mention of the three revolutionary women he knew quite well: George Eliot, Beatrice Potter Webb, and Florence Nightingale (Fancher, 1998). He noted that Webb, "found Galton to be the most "ideal man of science"... and that she 88 always listened to Galton "with rapt attention [but] I regret to say without the least reciprocity" (as quoted in Fancher, 1998, p. 108, his emphasis added; see also Webb,
1950, p. 116). It is reasonable to assume then, that Galton's lack of recognition of the abilities of his female contemporaries may be seen as not only a product of his times, but also of a certain disdain for women developed from his own personal experiences.
Galton's (1865,1869/2006) writings conveyed these beliefs, resulting in the creation of separate spheres of genius for men and women, and thus, the use of the exclusion by type strategy.
Cora Sutton Castle
Many studies had been done on eminent men, including those of Galton (1865,
1869/2006), James McKeen Cattell (1903, 1906, 1910), Havelock Ellis (1926), and
Catharine Cox (1926)6. However, Cora Sutton Castle (1913) was the first to identify trends in eminent women specifically. She noted that "this research had its origin in my interest in Professor Cattell's "Statistical Study of Eminent Men" to which I have referred so frequently in this book, and his suggestion that a study of eminent women ought to be made along similar lines" (Castle, 1913, p. v). Therefore, her results must also be interpreted, in this section, alongside those of Cattell's (1903, 1906, 1910; see chapter two). Using Cattell's Order of Merit Method, Castle (1913) described her methodology as such:
6 The lists of James McKeen Cattell (1903,1906, 1910), Havelock Ellis (1904/1926), and Catharine Cox (1926) did include some women, however they were a distinct minority. 89
I retained for my list the name of every woman noted in any three out of
the six encyclopedias or dictionaries. My original intention was to
eliminate from the lower end of the group until I had 1,000, a convenient
and sufficiently large number with which to work. But when I had
discarded twenty-three Biblical characters the entire number was only
868. It is a sad commentary on the sex that from the dawn of history to
the present day less than 1,000 women have accomplished anything that
history has recorded as worth while. One can not evade the question, - is
woman innately so inferior to man, or has the attitude of civilization
been to close the avenues of eminence against her?" (Castle, 1913, p. 1-
In her examination of the lives and works of the 868 eminent women on her final list, Castle (1913) showed that, contrary to popular opinion, eminent women excelled in twenty-nine different areas. Literature was by far the most populated group with 337 cases. However, in careful examination of the different areas of eminence, Castle (1913) found that most women, who become eminent by their own efforts, did so through works that appealed to the emotions. Those that found eminence for other reasons were through such means as marriage, sovereignty, religion and martyrdom, being born into eminence, being a mistress to an eminent man, tragedy, motherhood, or great beauty (Castle, 1913).
Therefore, Castle (1913) concluded that: 90
The common concept of woman as a creature of feeling rather than a
creature of reason may not be without foundation. If this conception is
just, our classification tends to show that when woman has attained
eminence, it has not been in spite of her femininity, but rather because of
it. (p. 42)
Thus, women who have attained eminence in society have not done so by breaking down the socially constructed barriers set against them, but rather by conforming to the standards set for them.
In addition to this finding, Castle (1913) noted that, of the 633 recorded marriages of the eminent women on her list, 259 of those married a total of 268 eminent men. Of these women, the great majority were married to men who were more eminent than themselves, thus reinforcing the hierarchy of male and female eminence. Interestingly, when the lists of these men and women are combined into one, the five most eminent women in Castle's (1913) analysis fall within the top 20 eminent persons. These women included: Mary Stuart (1542-1587) (9th), Jeanne d'Arc (or Joan of Arc) (1412-1431)
(12th), Queen Victoria of England (1819-1901) (13th), Queen Elizabeth of England (1533-
1603) (18th), and George Sand (1804-1876) (20th). In order to create the relative rankings of the eminent men and women, Castle (1913) used the rankings of eminent men done by
Cattell (1903). In the unmarried group, of which there were 142 confirmed cases, Castle
(1913) states: 91
This is an interesting group. 49.2 per cent, of the unmarried eminent
women belong to the nineteenth century. 72.5 per cent, were born in the
last two centuries. There is, of course, the possibility that some of our
contemporary women of distinction may yet marry, and thus reduce this
ratio. The number of cases born in earlier centuries is too few to give
definite results, but the following table tends to show an increasing
incompatibility between eminence and marriage, until, in the nineteenth
century, one distinguished woman in every five has chosen to work and
live alone. (Castle, 1913, p. 50)
Castle (1913) demonstrated that, as women have reached ever more success in public forums, their ability, or choice to engage in traditional feminine activities has steadily declined. Despite their non-traditional domestic lives, the fact remains that these women still achieved their eminence by displaying traditional gender roles. Castle (1913) completed her Statistical Study of Eminent Women by re-stating her original question, to which she did not find an answer: "has innate inferiority been the reason for the small number of eminent women, or has civilization never yet allowed them an opportunity to develop their innate powers and possibilities?" (p. 90).
Castle's (1913) article is interesting in that, while attempting to shed some light on the disparity between eminent men and women, she ended up reinforcing traditional gender roles. As Cattell demonstrated in his Statistical Study of Eminent Men (1903), men can achieve eminence in a number of domains, in a wide variety of cultures across any time period. Women, on the other hand have been limited to achieving eminence through traditionally feminine spheres. In addition, their recognition seems to have increased only since the eighteenth century, and has mostly been limited to Western cultures (Castle, 1913). The reasons behind Castle's (1913) conclusions are difficult to discern, as little is known about her. Certainly, Castle had been influenced by Cattell, as she herself stated. Whether she was a student of his, or merely worked for him is not known. However, Castle's (1913) article does lend statistical methodology to the notion of separate spheres of genius for men and women, thereby displaying the exclusion by type strategy.
Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum
Lange-Eichbaum (1931) presented several exemplars for each category of genius.
However, within the twelve types, Lange-Eichbaum (1931) included only four female exemplars of genius. The first is part of group four, which consists of those individuals who are "psychotic or markedly psychopathic persons devoid of exceptional talent but revered as saints or geniuses" (Lange-Eichbaum, 1931, p. 146). It is within this category that he spends a considerable amount of time discussing Joan of Arc as a primary exemplar. Lange-Eichbaum (1931) states that she is considered both a saint and a genius in France, yet:
...she was nothing more than an unhappy paraphrenic, the victim of a
disordered mind whose hallucinations of sight and hearing, delusions of
grandeur, and fanatical strength of will, enabled her to perform her 93
exceptional achievements. Her invincible delusions dragged her to the
scaffold erected by ancient unreason for her destruction. But the morbid
element in her nature bestowed upon her the martyr's crown. It has been
the same with other famous exemplars of this type. (Lange-Eichbaum,
1931, p. 147-148).
Earlier in the book, Lange-Eichbaum also described her as being "peculiar" because of the "contrast between her femininity and her masculine vocation (the pursuit of arms, clipped hair, male attire, leadership in the field)" (1931, p. 22). The second female in his list of geniuses is Josephine Beauharnais (1763-1814), the first wife of Napoleon
Bonaparte (1769-1821). Lange-Eichbaum (1931) classified her as belonging to group six, which "comprises persons to whom 'luck' has brought success, and therefore fame, although they have no very exceptional talent and are free from psychopathological taint"
(Lange-Eichbaum, 1931, p. 148). Lange-Eichbaum (1931) placed the final two women within group eight, which was comprised of "persons who have only become celebrated owing to their marked psychopathological abnormality" (p. 150). The female exemplars of this category were Joanna Southcott (1750-1814), the religious prophetess, and Mary
Baker-Eddy (1821-1910), the founder of Christian Science. Although, he acknowledged that Mary Baker-Eddy could also be placed in group four alongside Joan of Arc.
While Lange-Eichbaum (1931) never discussed the issue of gender differences directly, and how they work into his categorizations, the only female exemplars he presented fell within traditional gender roles, lacked any native talent, showed 94 psychological abnormalities, or were actually psychotic. Interestingly, his evaluations of the contributions of eminent women in history are not remarkably different from those made by Castle (1913). It is also strange that Lange-Eichbaum (1931) was willing to address the socially constructed nature of genius, and yet did not follow this line of reasoning through to make the conclusion that female genius may have been forced into conforming to socially-constructed norms. Therefore, Lange-Eichbaum (1931) is considered to have de-valued the contributions of women in comparison to those made by men, and reinforced the notion of separate domains of genius for males and females.
Conclusion
The literature in this category shows that there existed, for these authors, a distinct difference between what could be considered genius in men, versus what could be considered genius in females. The work on eminent males throughout history has shown that they are most often noted for their own accomplishments (Cattell, 1903, 1906,1910;
Cox, 1926; Ellis, 1926; Galton, 1865, 1869/2006; Simonton, 1999). These accomplishments can appear across a wide variety of domains; they are free to explore any creative, academic, or politically-related horizon. Women, on the other hand, have not historically enjoyed the same liberties. They are either excluded outright from lists of eminent people (Galton, 1865,1869/2006) or are severely underrepresented (Cattell,
1903, 1906, 1910; Cox, 1926; Ellis, 1926). Simonton (1999) noted that it is difficult to include women in studies of eminence as they make up only 3% of the great historical figures! Galton (1865,1869/2006) and Ellis (1926) made the judgement that if women 95 did not appear on the lists of eminent persons, with a few exceptions, then it was because they were not intelligent enough to achieve the heights of genius that men can reach.
Therefore, their genius was to be expressed in the home, or through their sons (Galton,
1865, 1869/2006). Others have noted the sociological aspect to eminence and genius, yet found that women only became recognized in typically feminine spheres or because of external factors (Castle, 1913; Lange-Eichbaum, 1931). All of these authors have, in their own way, recognized some degree of genius in women, and at the same time reinforced traditional gender roles in the constraints placed upon its expression. Male genius may be expressed in any arena, whereas female genius is limited to the home, and similarly feminine pursuits. Thus, there are separate spheres for each gender, with the feminine occupying the lesser position in the hierarchy of genius. 96
Chapter Six
Psycho-Biological Exclusion
The concept of psycho-biological exclusion refers to denying women the ability to attain genius status based on the presence or absence of certain psychological qualities.
Typically, those that employ this strategy look to genetics and Darwinian evolution to justify their arguments. From this standpoint, the lack of female genius is due to innate, biological, sex-linked differences that are expressed in psychological traits such as creativity and intelligence. In this chapter I will explore those authors who have employed the psycho-biological exclusion strategy in their theories of genius. The authors presented in this chapter will range from the arguments of the Romantic philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer, to those of the psychologist, Hans J. Eysenck.
Arthur Schopenhauer
Arthur Schopenhauer (1883/1964) expressly stated that women cannot be considered genius. Genius, he proposed, can be expressed in the body as a condition which is "an abnormal predominance of sensibility over irritability and reproductive power... this must take place in a male body" (Schopenhauer, 1883/1964, p. 159). He goes on to state that "women may have great talent, but no genius, for they always remain subjective" (Schopenhauer, 1883/1964, p. 159). Schopenhauer provided some guesses as to how the brain of a genius may differ from ordinary persons of talent. These include a cerebral system that "must be perfectly separated from the ganglion system," and that the brain must contain "the purest, most concentrated, tenderest, and most excitable nerve- 97 substance" (Schopenhauer, 1883/1964, p. 159). However, he stated that "our knowledge is not yet sufficient to determine this accurately, although we easily recognise the form of skull that indicates a noble and lofty intelligence" Schopenhauer, 1883/1964, p. 159).
Thus, he fell back on the phrenology and brain size measurements that were popular at the time, and consistently showed women to be at a disadvantage intellectually to their male counterparts (Gould, 1981/1996; Shields, 1982).
Schopenhauer's writings are highly consistent with scientific thought in his time.
He pays little attention to gender differences, beyond one simple statement, which is presented in parentheses as a side note. It is my belief that Schopenhauer did not give this topic more attention because the scientific findings he presented with respect to the brain and intelligence were well accepted in Europe (Gould, 1981/1996; Shields, 1982). As debating these findings were not the purpose of his book, The World as Will and Idea
(1883/1964), it is likely that he simply accepted the research and incorporated it into his writings where applicable.
Charles Darwin
Darwin has been included in this section, not because he had his own theory of genius, but because of his connection to Galton's work. He was a great inspiration for
Galton's work, and in turn, Galton's work helped to shape his ideas on the relative intellectual powers of men and women. Darwin (1877/1998) uncritically accepted his cousin's conclusions regarding intelligence and genius (see below). He provided an evolutionary argument in support of Galton, effectively strengthening Galton's claims. 98
However, his shift in focus on gender issues placed him within the psycho-biological exclusion category.
In The Descent of Man (1877/1998), Charles Darwin argued that men and women have diverged in many aspects of their characters. Most importantly, men, he argued, are more intelligent than women (Darwin, 1877/1998). "The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shown by man's attaining to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than can woman" (Darwin, 1877/1998, p. 584). As evidence for this position, he stated:
We may also infer, from the law of deviation of averages, so well
illustrated by Mr. Galton, in his work on 'Hereditary Genius,' that if
men are capable of a decided pre-eminence over women in many
subjects, the average of mental power in man must be above that of
woman. (Darwin, 1877/1998, p. 584)
As Alaya (1977) pointed out, this is one of the few points in the entire book that Darwin
accepts as fact from an outside source without presenting any additional data. This may
be, in part, because Galton was his cousin. However, this may also be an indicator of the
strength of this belief, both personally and culturally.
Darwin (1877/1998) explained that the difference in intelligence between man
and woman is deeply rooted in our evolution.
With social animals, the young males have to pass through many a
contest before they win a female, and the older males have to retain their 99
females by renewed battles... But to avoid enemies or to attack them
with success... requires the aid of the higher mental faculties, namely,
observation, reason, intervention, or imagination. These various faculties
will thus have been continually put to the test and selected during
manhood... (Darwin, 1877/1998, p. 584)
Therefore, the development of intelligence in males was critical to survival of their genes, in both sexual selection and natural selection. Darwin (1877/1998) went on to state:
Now, when two men are put into competition, or a man with a woman,
both possessed of every mental quality in equal perfection, save that one
has higher energy, perseverance, and courage, the latter will generally
become more eminent in every pursuit, and will gain the ascendancy. He
may be said to possess genius - for genius has been declared by a great
authority to be patience; and patience, in this sense, means unflinching,
undaunted perseverance. (Darwin, 1877/1998, p. 585)
Darwin (1877/1998) explained that since these qualities are developed in men partly through sexual selection, and partly through natural selection, they are also passed on more completely between males.
Thus man has ultimately become superior to woman. It is, indeed,
fortunate that the law of equal transmission of characters to both sexes
prevails with mammals; otherwise if is probable that man would have become as superior in mental endowment to woman, as the peacock is in
ornamental plumage to the peahen. (Darwin, 1877/1998, p. 585)
Darwin (1877/1998) stated that, because these effects have been selected for over a long period of time, and are passed on to further generations, equality of education would not change the situation.
We might conclude... that the inherited effects of the early education of
boys and girls would be transmitted equally to both sexes; so that the
present inequality in mental power between the sexes would not be
effaced by a similar course of early training; nor can it have been caused
by their dissimilar early training. (Darwin, 1877/1998, p. 585-586)
Therefore, Darwin (1877/1998) argued, that on the basis of his theory of evolution, women do not have the psychological capacity to attain genius. In order to support this, he referred to his cousin, Francis Galton's, theory of genius, which had been inspired by
Darwin's own Origin of the Species (1859/1991).
Darwin's (1877/1998) beliefs are well supported in the scientific theories of his time (see Galton 1869/2006), and are consistent within his own theory of evolution.
However, he is judged to have employed the psycho-biological exclusion strategy due to his acceptance of common wisdom and current scientific theory, which he did not do in many other aspects of his work (Alaya, 1977). Darwin's theory of evolution (1859/1991;
1877/1998) was built on many years of careful examination and notetaking, however 101 when it came to the 'woman problem' he simply took for granted the validity of his cousin's work.
Cesare Lombroso
Cesare Lombroso (1889/1905) never denied the existence of female genius. "In the history of genius women have but a small place. Women of genius are rare exceptions in the world" (Lombroso, 1889/1905, p. 137). He named a few examples from the physical sciences, literature, fine arts, politics, and religion. These included Mary
Somerville (1780-1872), George Eliot (1819-1880), George Sand, and Sarah Martin
(1791-1843), among others. However, Lombroso (1889/1905) argued that the accomplishments of women of genius pale in comparison to men of genius, such as
Michelangelo (1475-1564), Isaac Newton (1643-1727) and Honore de Balzac (1799-
1850). "Even J.S. Mill who was very partial to the cause of women, confessed that they lacked originality. They are, above all, conservators" (Lombroso, 1889/1905, p. 138).
Lombroso (1889/1905) stated that:
They have never created a new religion, nor where they ever at the head
of great political, artistic or scientific movements. On the contrary,
women have often stood in the way of progressive movements. Like
children, they are notoriously misoneistic; they preserve ancient habits
and customs and religions, (p. 138-139)
As an explanation for those women who have appeared to reach the heights of genius, such as Joan of Arc, Lombroso stated that there is "something virile about them" (Lombroso, 1889/1905, p. 138). He concluded from this observation that "there are no women of genius; the women of genius are men" (Lombroso, 1889/1905, p. 138).
Lombroso left this comment fully unqualified with any sort of data or additional observation. He seemed to simply regard this as such an obvious fact that no one would require anything more in order to believe the truth of his claims.
In Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman (1893/2004),
Lombroso did provide some further explanation for his claims regarding originality and female genius. He argued that women's lack of originality stems from their lack of native talent in any realm in which man has succeeded:
While woman is barred from creating great things by her lack of genius,
she is also less adapted than man to the minor productions at which
average men succeed. This is due to her lack of originality, which is
overdeveloped in the man of genius and found in more modest
proportions in the average man. In fact, women have no particular talent
for any art, science, or profession... only rarely do they carry the stamp
of true originality in any branch of work. This is the effect of a lesser
differentiation in their brain functioning. (Lombroso & Ferrero,
1893/2004, p. 83)
This biologically-based difference in intelligence is rooted in women's role in reproduction, Lombroso (1893/2004) argued. He stated that "there is an antagonism between the reproductive and intellectual functions. Today, the work of reproduction has 103 for the most part devolved onto the woman, and for this reason she has been left behind in intellectual development" (Lombroso & Ferrero, 1893/2004, p. 87). Therefore, by virtue of being a female, women are unable to have the psychological quality, intelligence, necessary to compete with men of genius.
Lombroso's work on the genius of women is interesting, in that he provides little, if any, evidence for his claims. His theory of female genius is, perhaps, one of the more inflammatory ones, and yet appears to be mere speculation. As such, his work on the topic is an excellent exemplar of the psycho-biological exclusion strategy.
Otto Weininger
Otto Weininger (1880-1903), the famous Austrian philosopher, wrote the book
Sex and Character in 1903. This book was an exploration of the roles of men and women, based on their biological and psychological characteristics. Men, Weininger argued, should strive for genius and rise above their sexuality. Women, on the other hand, should be devoted to their sexual function: motherhood (Weininger, 1903/1906). He noted that there are women who are actively fighting for emancipation; however, like
Lombroso, he feels that it is the masculine nature of these women that is striving to be free. No truly feminine woman would desire emancipation. Weininger stated that females with masculine characters may be identified by their homosexual or bisexual relationships. "The woman who attracts and is attracted by other women is herself half male... we find that the degree of emancipation and the proportion of maleness in the composition of a woman are practically identical" (Weininger, 1903/1906. p. 66). Weminger goes on to state that "homo-sexuality in a woman is the outcome of her masculinity and presupposes a higher degree of development... a very large number of highly gifted women and girls concerning whom I myself have been able to collect information, were partly bisexual, partly homo-sexual" (Weininger, 1903/1906. p. 66). In addition, heterosexual women who are attracted to effeminate men can be included in this category. He cites George Sand, George Eliot and Catherine the Great of Russia (1729-
1796) as primary exemplars of masculine, but gifted, women.
Yet, despite believing that women may be imbued with masculine spirit, and able to achieve great feats, he denies that women may ever attain genius. "There are women with undoubted traits of genius, but there is no female genius, and there never has been one (not even amongst those masculine women of history which were dealt with in the first part), and there never can be one" (Weininger, 1903/1906, p. 189) [his emphasis].
This is, in part, because Weininger (1903/1906) believed that women lacked a soul.
However, his explanation goes beyond that. He stated:
A female genius is a contradiction in terms, for genius is simply
intensified, perfectly developed, universally conscious maleness. The
man of genius possesses, like everything else, the complete female in
himself; but woman herself is only a part of the Universe, and the part
can never be the whole; femaleness can never include genius. This lack
of genius on the part of woman is inevitable because woman is not a 105
monad, and cannot reflect the Universe" (Weininger, 1903/1906, p.
189).
Thus, women can be seen as only half a person. They cannot be capable of fulfilling the universality requirement of genius, in Weininger's estimation. Therefore, he concludes that "from genius itself... woman is disbarred" (Weininger, 1903/1906. p. 113).
Weininger's writings are often shocking to a more current reader. However, they must be viewed within the lens of his time. In addition, he was writing at a young age, and his extremism may be a result of this. It is true that his position on the 'woman question' was extreme, even when compared to his predecessors and contemporaries, which would indicate some personal motivation. As Helen Thompson Woolley pointed out in her review of the book:
It is written with a heroic attempt to preserve an atmosphere of
dispassionate philosophical discussion, but the serenity is frequently
broken by spiteful outbursts of what all women always do, and what no
man ever does, which are worthy of any old gossip of either sex. It is
only fair to say that the poor young author displayed the full courage of
his convictions by committing suicide at the age of twenty-four.
Woolley, 1915, p. 193)
Therefore, it is my belief that Weininger's writings, while certainly somewhat the product of his times, must be taken as largely the result of personally held beliefs. In his rejection of the female soul and intellect, Weininger represents a prime example of an author who has employed the psych-biological exclusion strategy in his writings on genius.
Havelock Ellis
Havelock Ellis, in his A Study of British Genius (1926), reported that women do not achieve eminence, or genius, in their respective fields as often as men because they are not as intelligent. Within this study, he included 975 men, and 55 women in the analyses, making the ratio of eminent men to eminent women approximately 18 to 1.
Ellis (1926) attributed this to the lower standard of ability which society holds for women.
A slightly lower standard of ability, it would appear, prevails among the
women than among the men. On account of the greater rarity of
intellectual ability in women, they have often played a large part in the
world on the strength of achievements which would not have allowed a
man to play a similarly large part. (Ellis, 1926, pg. 9)
However, Ellis does provide some consolation to women, in two ways. First, he stated that "in one department... the women seem to be little, if at all, inferior to the men in ability, that is in acting" (Ellis, 1926, pg. 10). In addition, he noted, with some pride, that the proportion of women on his list, 5.3 percent, was higher than on Cattell's list, which was approximately 3.2 percent. It is interesting to note that while Ellis's (1926) list of eminent men corresponds fairly well with Cattell's (1903), his selection of eminent 107 women bares little resemblance to Castle's (1913), who counted a total of 178 eminent women hailing from England.
When speaking of the notion that ability is inherited through the female line, Ellis disagreed (1926) by simply stating that "a man inherits his genius from his father more often than from his mother for the simple reason that genius is rare in women" (p. 84).
However, he later went on to state that while female geniuses are rare, and that genius must be inherited through the fathers' line, it is also important that the mother express an above average degree of intelligence. The genius of women is not to found in public spheres, unless they are held to a lower standard than men, but is to be found in the home and in motherhood.
Ellis's (1926) conclusions bare a striking resemblance to many of the theories circulating in his time, most notably those of Galton (1865,1869/2006) and Lombroso
(1889/1905). Ellis relies on statistics, as do Galton (1865,1869/2006), Cattell (1903) and
Castle (1913), to make his views on women clear. This reliance on statistical data as proof for his claims does make it more palatable to the current reader, especially when compared to authors such as Lombroso (1889/1905) and Kretschmer (1929/1970; see below). Nevertheless, his statements do not follow from the data he provides - women cannot be considered less intelligent than men simply due to their lack of appearance on lists of eminent persons. As Hollingworth (1926) stated, it is not necessary to resort to biologically reductionist explanations when there are obvious social factors involved. It is only when social conditions are equally favourable for men and women that explanations based on biological differences can be put forward (Hollingworth, 1926). The evidence presented by Ellis (1926) is not sufficient to make his claims of intellectual inferiority.
However, both his methodology and position may be understood as typical of the time in which he was writing. In the end, his reliance on Darwinian evolution and lack of consideration of social factors make him a prime example of a theorist who actively employed the psycho-biological exclusion strategy.
Ernst Kretschmer
Ernst Kretschmer argued in The Psychology of Men of Genius (1929/1970) that, based on the work done by Julius Paul Mobius (1901)7, the phenomenon of genius is found only in men. "The complex kind of intellectual creativeness which is recognized sociologically as 'genius' is very largely confined to the male sex" (Kretschmer,
1929/1970, p. 124). Still, Kretschmer did not deny that women may possess great talent.
He named the poet Annette von Droste-Hulshoff (1797-1848) as an example
(Kretschmer, 1929/1970). As an explanation for this, Kretschmer (1929/1970) took a similar stance to Lombroso (1889/1905) for the reason behind female greatness. "The great women achieved greatness - because they were great men" (Kretschmer,
1929/1970, p. 126). He justified this statement with the following short case study of
Annette von Droste-Hulshoff:
The poems of Droste have actually a harsh, powerful, realistic tone.
Their style and language is so rugged and masculine that the verses of
7 In The Physiological Mental Weakness of Woman (1901), Mobius argued that women were mentally weak in comparison to men. He did not, however, discuss the 'problem of genius' directly. 109
many masculine poets appear tender and womanish in
comparison...Droste-Hulshoff, however, not only feels as a man, but
would also like to be one... In order to get into the mood in which her
best and most genuine effects were produced, she used to have to
imagine herself- dressed as a man. (Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p. 124-
125).
Kretschmer then took this simple case study and applied it to all women of greatness:
It is precisely this predilection for dressing up as a man that betrays the
abnormal, contrary, sexual component in psychopathic women. And this
mixture of masculine and feminine feelings is found equally in most of
the great women of history: Queen Elizabeth of England, Empress
Catharine and, especially emphasised, in Queen Christina of Sweden.
(Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p. 125-126).
Once having explained away the existence of eminent women, Kretschmer (1929/1970) returned to the question of why there is such an observable difference between the genders. "The mental differences between the sexes too, as far as they concern the problem of genius, rest essentially upon... hormone effects. It may be that these hormones produce certain mental dispositions similar in nature to the 'secondary sex characters" (Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p. 129). Therefore, the ability to develop the psychological quality of "intellectual creativeness" necessary for genius lies in the sex hormones, leaving women forever unable to reach the same heights as men due to their 110 biological makeup (Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p. 124). Kretschmer did, however, provide women with some consolation:
The genius of a woman lies in her sons, i.e. whatsoever a woman
possesses in the way of significant intellectual endowment is in the form
of hereditary qualities which can come to full sociological expression in
her sons... (Kretschmer, 1929/1970, p. 124).
In the end, Kretschmer stated that since the biologically-based differences between the genders, with respect to the psychological qualities necessary for genius, have developed and become solidified over a long period of time, they would need an equally long period of time to devolve. Therefore, the issue of gender differences in genius should not have any part in modern psychological explorations (Kretschmer, 1929/1970).
Kretschmer (1929/1970), like Lombroso (1889/1905) did not provide much in the way of evidence for his position, relying on the resonance of his discourse with the reader. Also, like Lombroso (1889/1905), Kretschmer's (1929/1970) theory is a difficult read for many current readers due to its inflammatory nature. This is largely because his theory is an extension of that provided by Lombroso (1889/1905). Kretschmer's
(1929/1970) assertions about the biologically-based deficiency in women's intelligence makes him another standout exemplar of the psycho-biological exclusion strategy.
Hans J. Eysenck
Hans Eysenck (1995,1998) very clearly placed the distinction of genius solely on men. "Creativity, particularly at the highest level, is closely related to gender; almost Ill without exception, genius is found only in males (for whatever reason!)" (Eysenck, 1995, p. 127). As proof of this statement, Eysenck (1995) provides many examples, most interestingly, the work by Catharine Cox (1926). He stated that there were no women to be found in this book. However, if Eysenck had read the book, he would have discovered that there are, in fact, eight women included in her analyses (Cox, 1926). However, it is true that in the other sources he cited there are few if any women (Eysenck, 1995).
Eysenck (1995, 1998) rejected social factors as a cause for the gender differences
in genius. The first social cause he attends to is education (Eysenck, 1998). However, he
argued that "in the Middle Ages, convents were repositories of knowledge, and nuns had
an education not necessarily inferior to that of monks" (Eysenck, 1998, p. 135). Having rejected this point, Eysenck (1998) then moved onto the most often cited reason:
women's obligations in the home and motherhood. Yet, again he discounted this as a
plausible explanation. He stated that "it has been found that women in academe published
less than men, but marriage and family obligations do not generally account for the
gender difference observed - women with children published as much as their single
female colleagues" (Eysenck, 1998, p. 135). The final notion Eysenck (1998) entertained
begins to fall into the psychological rather than the social. He stated that highly gifted
women often have more broad interests than highly gifted men.
Research on highly gifted boys and girls equal in mathematical ability
showed that boys tended to concentrate all their efforts on mathematics,
and achieved greater success than girls who spread their efforts more 112
widely. It is not known whether this is a universal tendency, but it may
account for much of the difference in creativity; absolute concentration
is essential for great achievement. Why boys and girls should differ in
this respect is not known. (Eysenck, 1998, p. 135-136)
Eysenck (1995,1998) believed that the most likely explanation for gender differences in genius, however, is rooted in the personality. As Eysenck (1995) explained, psychoticism is highly correlated with schizophrenia, manic depression, and creativity. Men have generally been found to score almost twice as high as women on this personality dimension.
Males and females differ profoundly in a personality variable essentially
concerned with psychopathology; I have called this personality
dimension "psychoticism"... Now I will only draw attention to the fact
that males are much higher on this dimension than females, and that
psychoticism is highly correlated with creativity... Psychoticism is not
only correlated with creativity, but also with the fighting spirit that is
needed to help the creative person, or the genius, to overcome the
difficulties envious mediocrity creates to prevent orthodoxy from being
overthrown. (Eysenck, 1998, p. 136)
Women, however, tend to score more highly on neuroticism, which is unrelated to creativity, the necessary component for genius, according to Eysenck's theory (1995).
Also, within Eysenck's (1995) theory of genius, high intelligence is said to be a threshold 113 trait for genius: it is necessary, but it is not a distinguishing factor. He explored this possibility in some detail. After a review of the literature on general intelligence (g) and standardized intelligence tests, Eysenck (1995) concluded that it is likely that there are gender differences in g, however this must still be considered carefully as there is plenty of contradictory evidence. In addition, he felt that the possibility that there is a genetic basis to these differences could not be ruled out.
There clearly are... powerful differences between males and females
which point the males in the direction of greater achievement... The
possibility of a genetic differentiation along these lines should not be
ruled out; there is a good deal of evidence in that direction. (Eysenck,
1995, p. 130).
Therefore, Eysenck (1995, 1998) clearly believed that the lack of women of genius was
due to deficiencies in their psychological traits, which possibly have a genetic basis.
Eysenck (1995, 1998) stands as the most current author to be included in this thesis who
blatantly rejected the possibility of female genius. However, unlike many of his
predecessors, Eysenck (1995,1998) did present a wealth of data to prove his claims. Of
those that did present some data (see Ellis, 1926), his is much harder to refute. However,
it is not impossible. The differences in personality dimensions could still have a social
basis. In addition, his argument that women in academia publish as often as their single
counterparts is flawed. It does not matter how often they publish, but where, and how
often it is cited. No analysis of journals is presented. However, Eysenck (1995) did report 114 that some studies have found a "very marked and in fact increasing disparity between the sexes" (p. 127) for number of citations. There is little chance for genius to be recognized in academia if no one is reading or referring to the article. It is my belief that, due to his premature leap to biological causes for gender differences in genius, Eysenck (1995,
1998) is perhaps one of the best examples in Psychology proper of a theorist using the psych-biological exclusion strategy.
Conclusion
The authors presented in this section stand out from many of the others presented in this thesis, due to the nature of their arguments. However, most of these authors must be looked at from within their historical context. Schopenhauer, Darwin, Lombroso,
Kretschmer and Ellis were all writing in a time where the intellectual abilities of women were hotly debated. Many believed in their intellectual inferiority, however some, like
John Stuart Mill, had put forward the notion that if women were truly emancipated they may be able to compete intellectually with men (Alaya, 1977). In addition, Weininger was writing shortly before the ascendancy of the Nazi Party in Germany. In each of these cases, their beliefs, however they may appear, are a product of the time in which they were writing. In some cases, most notably that of Weininger, the ideas presented are clearly much stronger than those typically expressed at the time. Therefore, in those cases there may have been some personal motivation behind their writings. However, the works of Hans Eysenck have been published only recently, and can thus be viewed mostly as the product of personally held beliefs. Nonetheless, in all cases, the author presented their 115 case against women of genius by appealing to Darwinian evolution and genetics to explain apparent deficiencies in women's psychological traits. It is for these reasons that each author is presented here as having willingly employed the psycho-biological exclusion strategy. 116
Chapter Seven
Conclusion
In this final section of my thesis, I will draw together my final comments and conclusions on the genius literature. In addition, I will comment on the ethical-political nature of the work, placing it within the context of the material on epistemological violence in psychology.
The genius literature is incredibly diverse. One must be careful in studying genius due to the varied meaning of the term. It is not uncommon to see genius referring to eminence (for example Cattell, 1903,1906,1910; Galton, 1865,1869/2006), giftedness
(for example Terman, 1916, 1925; Atkinson, 1993), or the character or Zeitgeist of a time period or geographical region (for example Alaya, 1977). Therefore, a researcher who is intending to study genius must be quite clear about what it is they are intending to study.
Within the context of this thesis, I was interested in examining theories of genius that equate genius with the socially-constructed phenomenon of eminence. By this I mean that the theories included in this thesis were attempting to explain why people who became eminent were considered geniuses. The theories presented all posited reasons behind this: creativity, madness, intelligence. Eminence itself was also considered as a potential reason for genius: that fame was the key ingredient for a talented person to be considered genius.
All of the authors that were included in this thesis are the most heavily cited in the genius literature, based on a systematic literature review. More emphasis was placed on 117 theories which drew on psychological concepts, such as intelligence or creativity, or were developed by psychologists themselves. Thus, considering the amount of literature and the time period covered by this thesis, many works were not discussed. However, every attempt was made to choose authors that have produced novel theories, that discussed the notion of female genius, and that have made an impact on the psychological literature on genius.
A final limitation to this thesis was that it included only theories from Western
European and North American researchers. This choice was made for several reasons.
The first was a practical concern: the works by Western European and North American authors are more readily available in Canadian libraries, and through North American literature search databases. Secondly, these are also the articles and books that have been translated into English. Thirdly, authors within the Western European and North
American academic communities tend to cite each other more readily than Eastern authors. Finally, the term genius came from the Latin language, and thus the concept of genius as used today is found more readily in Western literature.
Even within these limitations, the literature on genius is quite varied, as chapters three and four of this thesis has shown. In the over two hundred years of theorizing the topic, no conclusion has been reached regarding the nature of genius. This is to be expected, due to the socially and historically constructed nature of the phenomenon. As society changes what and who it values, so shall the lists of eminent persons. 118
The types of genius theories presented in this thesis do not map neatly onto the exclusion strategies. It seems to be the case that the psychobiological exclusion strategy is the preferred strategy for psychologists as it pervades all four types of genius theories: creativity, madness, intelligence and eminence. It represents one example of Hare-Mustin and Marecek's (1988, 1990) alpha bias, which is the tendency to exaggerate gender differences. The reliance on biologically reductionistic explanations of behaviour, particularly as it relates to gender and race, is a common stance in psychology (Cassidy,
2007; Gould, 1981; Shields, 1975, 1982, 2007). However, as many feminists have argued, there is no reason to adopt a biological explanation when there is a readily available social explanation (Hollingworth, 1926; Marecek, 2001).
The exclusion by type strategy, however, is particularly interesting as it may be unique to the genius literature. This strategy is commonly found within the eminence theories of genius, as the data seems to lend itself particularly well to this kind of explanation. The eminence theorists of genius tend to rely on statistical data garnered from lists of eminent persons throughout history. The data shows that women do not succeed in recognized professions in the same numbers as men (Castle, 1913; Cattell,
1903; Cox, 1926; Ellis, 1926; Galton, 1865, 1869/2006; Simonton, 1999). Where they do
succeed seems to be limited to 'feminine' spheres (Castle, 1913). The authors that employ this exclusion strategy claim that the separate spheres of achievement do exist for males and females, with the male sphere being those domains that are typically more valued by society. The exclusion by type strategy represents another example of Hare- 119
Mustin and Marecek's (1988,1990) alpha bias. Interestingly, very few of these authors have questioned the social conditions that may have promoted such gender differences in achievement. They have typically ignored the fact that women were often denied the same educational opportunities as men. In addition, the traditional division of labour has made it difficult for women to step outside the home and succeed in public forums.
Where they have succeeded is often in professions that did not require them to leave the home, such as literature. Finally, since men have dominated in most domains, the power to decide what areas are valued lies with them. This leads to the most valued professions being labelled masculine, and the least valued professions being labelled as feminine.
Thus, the achievement of women has been hampered by many socially constructed barriers, thereby producing the illusion of separate spheres of genius.
It is my view that theories which focus on the domain-specificity of genius, such as Gardner's (1997; see chapter 4), are the only conceivable way to capture the phenomenon of genius. Instead of attempting to reduce genius down to a singular root cause, Gardner (1997) invoked his multiple intelligences theory: that each 'intelligence'
is distinct, and can only be truly judged by those who share that intelligence (Gardner,
1993, 1999). For example, the merits of an artist can only truly be judged by other gifted
artists. This implies that it is not possible to test for an 'intelligence' through the use of pen-and-paper tests, such as the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales (Gardner, 1993,
1999). In addition, Gardner's theory of genius (1997) and his theory of multiple
intelligences (1993,1999), stressed the cultural-historical nature of gifted performance. It 120 is the values of a culture or historical time period which determines what is valued and considered 'intelligent'; these concepts are not fixed (Gardner, 1993, 1997, 1999).
Therefore, genius is what any given society decides it is; there is nothing inherent about these eminent people to be explained (Gardner, 1997). This sentiment has also been put forward by Michael J. A. Howe (1990).
It is by no means correct to assume that by designating a person as being
a genius we are rating that individual's accomplishments in any truly
objective sense. What we are actually doing is rather different: we are
assessing how those achievements have been judged by other people.
(Howe, 1990, p. 39)
Thus, genius is a historically embedded, socially constructed phenomenon, and is not
suitable for study via traditional psychological methodology. In other words, genius cannot be reduced to biological causes, studied in a laboratory, predicted, or have universal theories created to explain its existence.
In keeping with this notion, it should be noted that even Gardner's (1997) theory
is subject to a feminist social constructionist critique. Gardner (1993, 1997, 1999) himself
acknowledges that his theory is not complete, as he continues to study cross cultural data.
He also acknowledges that the 'intelligences' are not fixed, but are malleable and can vary across cultures and historical time periods. The problem, from a feminist social
constructionist position, is that Gardner (1993, 1997, 1999) stated that an intelligence
could only be evaluated from within, by others that share that type of intelligence. 121
Unfortunately, taking this position may continue to make it difficult for women (and non- white males) to achieve genius. This is because the power to determine who is considered genius, historically and across cultures, has laid in the hands of white, middle-to-upper class men. Future theorists in the genius literature must find a way around this problem: accepting that there are no objective standards for genius, as genius is a socially and historically constructed phenomenon, yet also removing the potential for bias against women and non-white males through power structures.
By accepting that genius is of a human kind and not a natural kind (Hacking,
1992), more avenues of explanation are opened for researchers studying genius. Case studies (see Albert, 1998; Cox, 1926; Gardner, 1997; Terman, 1917), statistical analyses of eminent persons (see Cattell, 1903, 1906, 1910; Castle, 1913; Ellis, 1926; Galton,
1865,1869/2006; Simonton, 1984), and psychobiography (Lange-Eichbaum, 1931;
Terman 1947b) are all possibilities. Future researchers of genius should look to philosophy, history, sociology, and anthropology, rather than psychology and biology for their methodology and guiding theoretical principles.
Furthermore, the understanding of genius as a historically embedded and socially constructed phenomenon may lead a researcher to critically examine their own conclusions. Past researchers of genius, as has been demonstrated in chapters five and six, have failed to consider their own context when constructing their theories.
Specifically, most researchers in the genius literature have neglected the social constraints placed upon women when considering their general lack of achievement and eminence. This same observation could be applied to other categories, such as race or socio-economic status. In order to show why the consideration of context is important in the genius literature, it is necessary to discuss the concept of epistemological violence
(Teo, in press).
Epistemological violence was developed from Spivak's (1988) concept of epistemic violence. Spivak (1988) critiqued colonial practices of depriving the Other, or the subaltern person of a voice or history. Epistemological violence, on the other hand, critiques empirical works in psychology that cast the Other as being problematic, in some way (Teo, in press). Teo (in press) argues that the conclusions that are drawn from the data in psychology are interpretations, and mere speculation, not fact.
The term epistemological suggests that these speculations are framed as
knowledge when in reality they are interpretative speculations regarding
data. The term violence denotes that this "knowledge" has a negative
impact on the "Other" and that the interpretative speculations are
produced to the detriment of the "Other." (Teo, in press, p. 18)
The negative impact can come in a multitude of forms. However, researchers must begin to recognize that not only do their social and political beliefs influence their work, but that their work may also have social and political consequences (Teo, in press). An example of this is how the results of the army intelligence tests in the United States influenced their immigration policies after WWI (Gould, 1981). I believe that the conclusions drawn by the authors presented in this thesis constitute an example of epistemological violence. Women, and, in many cases, anyone else who is not a white middle-to-upper class male, are portrayed as being deficient in some way because of their general lack of achievement. As Galton (1865, 1869/2006) and others have reasoned, if women have not achieved eminence it is because they are not able to do so. Yet, their conclusions are merely interpretive speculation, and not fact.
Their results could have been interpreted in other ways which do not have a negative impact for women.
The data clearly and consistently show that women have not achieved eminence in the same numbers as men (Simonton, 1999). Most researchers have interpreted this as being the result of women's deficiencies. The consequences resulting from these conclusions could include reduced educational opportunities, and return to traditional division of labour. However, as Hollingworth (1926) noted, there is no reason to adopt a biologically reductionist stance when obvious social causes are available. An equally viable explanation of the lack of eminent women is that women have been denied opportunities to succeed outside the home. In addition, it is possible that their works are not looked upon as highly simply because they are women, thereby reducing the chance that they will receive the genius label (see Barres, 2006). This notion can be supported through the research finding that the work completed by women is often undervalued in comparison to the work completed by men (Adams, et al, 2006; Davies, Spencer &
Steele, 2005; Steele & Davies, 2003). Finally, men have typically been the ones to define 124 genius, such that the definition of the term is inescapably androcentric. The power to name and define then influences who is allowed to be included. These conclusions do not necessarily result in negative political consequences, but, in fact, quite the opposite. If this power structure is recognized, it could lead to an increase in educational and job opportunities, as well as a re-evaluation of social prejudices against the work produced by women.
Teo (in press) has called for hermeneutic guidelines for the interpretation of psychological data in order to reduce or avoid epistemological violence. The development of guidelines for interpretation would be valuable for the genius literature. It may help future researchers to critically examine their own standpoint, as well as the conclusions they draw from their data. This thesis has shown that such guidelines may be necessary, considering the recent works produced by Eysenck (1995, 1998), among others. Researchers who study genius must begin to recognize the socially-constructed nature of their topic, and reflect that understanding in their work. Then research on genius may become, not a tool to enforce the status quo, but act as a foil to call negative social practices into question. 125
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