CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

Immigration and the Discourse Surrounding Sanctuary Cities: A Case Study of California

and Texas Through the Lens of the Advocacy Coalition Framework

A graduate project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

By

Steve Uribe Hernandez

August 2019

Copyright by Steve Uribe Hernandez 2019

ii The graduate project of Steve Uribe Hernandez is approved:

______

Dr. Tom Hogen-Esch Date

______

Dr. Boris Ricks Date

______

Dr. Jason Morin, Chair Date

California State University, Northridge

iii Acknowledgement

I would like to thank everyone that has assisted me along my academic career.

iv Table of Contents

Copyright Page ii

Signature Page iii

Acknowledgement iv

List of Tables vii

Abstract viii

Introduction 1

Literature Review 3

The legality of Sanctuary Cities 6

Sanctuary Cities are unrelated to crime 7

The effects of Sanctuary policy in improving the undocumented populations

relationship with law enforcement 9

Sanctuary Policies within the broader community and its benefits 10

The benefits of Sanctuary implementation 11

Advocacy Coalition Framework 13

Research Methods & Case Selection 16

The Exogenous shock that divided two states 21

The Case of California 24

The Case of Texas 31

v Conclusion 36

References 40

vi List of Tables

Table 1: Demographics of California and Texas 17

vii Abstract

Immigration and the Discourse Surrounding Sanctuary Cities: A case study of California

and Texas through the lens of the Advocacy Coalition Framework

By

Steve Uribe Hernandez

Master of Arts in Political Science

While the federal government has decidedly eschewed from reforming its antiquated immigration system, sub-federal governments have chosen to institute their own measures of ameliorating immigration. There are some cities and or states who have chosen to do this by either implementing or restricting sanctuary city policies. This thesis utilizes a qualitative case study of California and Texas through Sabatier’s Advocacy

Coalition Framework theory in an effort to understand why such mirroring states went in opposing directions with sanctuary cities. This thesis is deductive in nature but will assist in providing a better understanding of why sanctuary cities have not only increased in nature, but why they are implemented in certain areas.

viii Introduction

The Pew Research Center estimated that there were 10.7 million undocumented individuals residing in the United States as of 2016 (Krogstad, Passel, & Cohn 2018).

This approximately represents 3.3% of the total United States population for that year.

The workforce of the United States is believed to be comprised of 7.8 million undocumented individuals (Krogstad, Passel, & Cohn 2018). The Pew Research Center finds that the six states of California, Texas, Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois account for 58% of the United States undocumented individuals (Krogstad, Passel, &

Cohn 2018). Most of the 10.7 million undocumented individuals are spread across 20 major metropolitan areas’ more specifically, eight of these major metropolitan areas with the largest undocumented populations are in California and Texas (Cohn & Passel 2019).

The states of California and Texas are both border states and states that have relatively larger Latino populations, but yet despite this both have elected to go in opposite directions with their views on sanctuary city policies. These two states have taken diametrically opposed viewpoints on the methods they have chosen to utilize to deal with the undocumented individuals residing within their states. One state has chosen to embrace the undocumented population while the other has taken a strict pathway to ostracizing these individuals.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the states of California and Texas through the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) in order to explain why such mirroring states went in completely opposite ends of the political spectrum when dealing with sanctuary policies i.e., one chose to become a sanctuary state while the other chose to outlaw them entirely. Utilizing Sabatier’s ACF theory I hypothesize that the exogenous shock of the

1 current administration’s policy towards the undocumented population, specifically its attempt to implement Executive Order 13768 (EO 13768) and each states direct response to the current administration’s xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants sent cascading ramifications which not only gave rise to more restrictive policies dealing with immigration, but in turn had the political implications of whether the state implemented sanctuary policy or not. I find that their pathways differed because of the coalitions reactions to the current administration’s stance on immigration policy and their acceptance or rejection of Executive Order 13768 (EO 13768).

2 Literature Review

Although there is a lack of consensus,1 the term “sanctuary” is in reference to an informal term that is utilized by cities, states, and legislation to describe variations of noncooperation, discretionary tactics, and or policies which are inclusionary and specifically directed towards undocumented individuals residing within certain jurisdictions. While the topic of sanctuary cities has become more pronounced in recent time with the current administration's disdain for them; sanctuary cities have their roots in the 1980’s Central American Sanctuary Movement (O’Brian, Collingwood, & El-Khatib

2017). During this timeframe religious establishments and municipalities began to offer shelter to individuals who were fleeing from the violent El Salvadorian war between the conservative government and the leftist’s guerrilla factions who opposed them (Sanctuary

Cities 2018). The refugees of this war originally sought and applied for asylum within the

United States but were faced with broad rejections on the stipulation that these individuals were not being personally persecuted by their government (Sanctuary Cities

2018). Forced to deport back to El Salvador, amidst a gruesome and heinous war, where they were the unwilling casualties, John Fife, a minister of the Southside Presbyterian

Church of Tuscan, Arizona, proclaimed that his church would now be a sanctuary for all

Central American individuals who sought asylum (Sanctuary Cities 2018). Following this monumental decision, which occurred on March 24, 1982, more than one hundred and

1 However, there is no consensus definition of sanctuary cities. While the Department of Homeland Security has attempted to codify what they mean by sanctuary cities there is legal definition for it. In essence, sanctuary cities are merely a policy that is designed to protect undocumented individuals from deportation.

3 fifty churches began providing shelter in the mid 1980’s to Salvadoran and Guatemalan citizens who escaped the clutches of their warring home lands (Sanctuary Cities 2018).

This movement heralded the change which would soon occur at the local level.

The city council of Madison, Wisconsin, implemented resolution 41,075 which officially declared Madison a sanctuary city (Delgado 2018). By the end of the 1980’s similar proclamations were made by more than twenty cities and four state legislatures

(Sanctuary Cities 2018). However, many of the church leaders, including John Fife, were officially charged and arrested for intentionally violating section 274 of the United States

1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (Sanctuary Cities 2018). This act formally makes it a crime to knowingly harbor any undocumented immigrants within the United

States (Sanctuary Cities 2018). Nevertheless, the actions which were implemented at the government level, which essentially ensured that any state or local employees could not inquire about an individual's immigration status, remained in effect (Sanctuary Cities

2018). The sanctuary movement was born from the good intentions of the few who refused to avert their attention, towards a conflict within Central America that the United

States directly supported by granting aid to the Guatemalan and Salvadorian governments, which created the ruthless conditions of the region, transformed into a push to protect all undocumented individuals regardless of their original backgrounds

(Sanctuary Cities 2018).

The detractors of sanctuary cities put forth the notion that sanctuary policies drive up crime rates and lead to criminalization being the default response for the undocumented population by the current administration. They denote that sanctuary policies purely serve as a means for harboring criminals which creates a dangerous

4 environment (Vaughan 2015). They cite statistics which state that sanctuary policies have directly resulted in the release of over 8,000 undocumented individuals whom harbor criminal histories and or were deemed as public safety concerns (Vaughan 2015). The legality of sanctuary cities coexisting with federal policies is another issue that is highly debated by the opposition. They prescribe to the notion that sanctuary policies are unconstitutional since they directly violate Title 8 of the United States Code along with section 1373 (The Unconstitutionality of 8 U.S.C § 1373 and its Implications for

Sanctuary Policies 2018). This argument stems from the fact that law 8 U.S.C § 1373 directly prohibits state and local governments from establishing laws or policies that impede communications with federal immigration officers (Office of Justice Programs

Guidance Regarding Compliance With 8 U.S.C. § 1373 2018). Lastly, these detractors perpetuate the mentality that sanctuary policies hinder local law enforcement agencies from working in conjunction with federal law enforcement agencies and impede local agencies from carrying out their goals of protecting all of the residents (O’Brien 2018).

However, multiple studies have not discovered a positive relationship between sanctuary policies and increases in crime. In fact, several studies have discovered an inverse relationship between undocumented individuals and the increase in crime rates.

The American Immigration Council discovered in their 2015 study that the rise in immigrants to the United States from 1990 to 2013 corresponded with decreases in crime rates around the country (Ewing, Martinez, & Rumbaut 2015). Regarding the legality of sanctuary cities, 8 U.S.C. § 1373 was found unconstitutional in regard to sanctuary cities on the basis that the tenth amendment prevents the federal government from prohibiting a state or local jurisdiction from enacting laws and policies (The Unconstitutionality of 8

5 U.S.C § 1373 and its Implications for Sanctuary Policies 2018). To the dismay of the detractors, sanctuary policies assist in encouraging good relationships amongst law enforcement and the undocumented populous by encouraging them to report crimes without the fear of deportation (Lyons, Velez, & Santoro 2013).

The legality of Sanctuary Cities

The question of whether local jurisdictions are even allowed to supposedly “opt- out” of participating in federal programs by implementing sanctuary city status is one that has been adamantly contested by both sides of the debate. Opponents of Sanctuary cities bring up the fact that Title 8, Section 1373, of the United States legal code precisely states

“...government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.” (§1373. Communication between government agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service 1996, 1).

This section makes it a felony for any entity to conceal, shield, and or knowingly harbor any undocumented individuals from immigration forces or agencies. While proponents of sanctuary cities highlight several landmark decisions by the courts e.g., Printz v. United

States which ruled that the United States could not compel local law enforcement to assist federal agents with carrying out and implementing federal laws (Sanctuary Cities 2018).

The 2012 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, in which the Supreme

Court struck down a specific provision within the Affordable Care Act that sought to pull

Medicaid funding from any state that refused to expand their health-care programs

(Sanctuary Cities 2018). These legal precedents have been used to suggest that the state

6 and local governments do not have to abide by federal programs which include immigration (Sanctuary Cities 2018). Along with the noncompliance of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainers, sanctuary cities seem to have legal basis for their grounding.

Lasch, Chan, Eagly, Haynes, Lai, McCormick, & Stumpf (2018) inspecting

Trump’s desire for mass deportation and his desire to crack down on sanctuary cities, the ways in which cities and counties are directly opposing the wishes of the administration, the ways in which they are choosing to protect their residents, and the political and legal justifications for sanctuary policies, came to the deduction that

“the six most significant policy rationales that emerged from our research are: (1) the conviction that localities (and not the federal government) should control their own criminal justice priorities and resources; (2) a desire to avoid unlawful arrests and detentions; (3) the concern that entangling police with immigration enforcement erodes trust among minority community members; (4) a commitment to preventing improper discrimination in policing based on race, ethnicity or national origin; (5) a desire to further diversity and inclusion; and (6) a wish to express disagreement with federal immigration policy” (Lasch, Chan, Eagly, Haynes, Lai, MacCormick, & Stumpf 2018, 23)

While the comprehensive study determined six specific aspects regarding sanctuary policies over the decades, it also noted that the analysis has revealed that “sanctuary cities are engaging in activity that falls within their long-established domain of local criminal justice policymaking.”

Sanctuary Cities are unrelated to crime

The myriad of research pertaining to sanctuary cities has been majorly centralized on the aspect of crime rates, the benefits of sanctuary cities in terms of helping undocumented immigrants, and the negative consequences of sanctuary cities (Lyons,

7 Velez, and Santoro, 2013; Wadsworth 2010; Kirk, Papachristos, Fagan, and Tyler 2012).

While the general debate has been centered on the proposed notion that sanctuary cities lead to crime, there has been a parse amount of research that examines other aspects of sanctuary cities. Specifically, there has been no literature which examines why sanctuary cities or states emerged. There is perhaps some anecdotal evidence at best, but nobody has systematically investigated why some cities decide to sponsor sanctuary cities while others do not.

Research analyzing the nexus of crime that is supposed to surround sanctuary cities have returned null results to indicate that such a disproportionate amount of crime actually does not exist. Collingwood, El-Khatib, and Gonzalez set out to analyze the purported claim that sanctuary cities are associated with an increase in crime (2017). The researchers hypothesized that sanctuary cities would not have an increase amount of crime (i.e. violent, property, and rape) juxtaposed to cities that are not designated as a sanctuary city as the media and opponents of sanctuary cities like to portray (2017). They also posit that there would be no effect on crime rates merely on the basis of a city based on its sanctuary status and that they doubt “that undocumented immigrants move to cities because of that city’s sanctuary status thereby reducing the crime rate” (2017 P.12). To test out their hypotheses the researchers employed two different analysis; one in which they examined all fifty-five sanctuary cities individually against crime rates one year prior to the implementation of sanctuary city status and one year after (2017). The second analysis involved analyzing the sanctuary cities against 4,000 non-sanctuary cities across twenty states and the district of Columbia (2017). Their results indicated that while some cities witnessed a mild increase or drop within crime, there was no discernable pattern

8 and that “the sanctuary policy as a rule does not lead to more crime” (2017 P.18) and the policy has no statistically significant relationship on crime rates (2017).

Lyons, Ve´lez, & Santoro (2013) examining census data extrapolated the fact that immigrant concentration across United State cities correlates with a decrease among the overall neighborhood violence of said cities. When the authors introduced the sanctuary variable they discovered that the effect of crime reduction was stronger within sanctuary cities juxtaposed to non-sanctuary cities. Those findings line up with the results ascertained by Wong’s 2017 study. Wong’s cross-sectional inspection across demographically matched large metropolitan counties, rural counties, and micropolitan counties highlighted the fact that these counties which have enacted sanctuary ordinances are in fact safer than their non-sanctuary counterparts. Similar findings alluding to sanctuary cities exhibiting less crime have been located by Wadsworth, 2010, Kirk,

Papachristos, Fagan, & Tyler 2013, Ousay & Kubrian 2009, and Martinez-Schuldt &

Martinez 2017.

The effects of Sanctuary policy in improving the undocumented populations relationship with law enforcement

As of 2010, in examining the potential effects that sanctuary cities may have had on the migration patterns of undocumented individuals across the fifty United States,

Cebula (2016) denotes that the creation of sanctuary cities are in fact achieving their goals of providing sanctuary to undocumented individuals. The study denotes a 1% statistical significance level for the relative size of the undocumented immigration population within a state is increasing because of the number of sanctuary cities in a given state. It also implies that that the well-being of undocumented individuals who

9 reside in the United States is positively affected by the larger number of sanctuary cities and the luxury that it affords its citizens to contact law enforcement without the fear of deportation. The fear of contacting the police for fear of deportation is one that Ridgley touches upon. Ridgely (2008) notes from his study that the sensitive nature of police relations with the undocumented population is one which requires an ideal separation.

The author posits that sanctuary cities can not only assist in increasing basic entitlements to the residents of a city but that it could reduce the fear which prevents the undocumented individuals from fully participating and becoming part of their community.

Sanctuary Policies within the broader community and its benefits

Ultimately, the effects of sanctuary policies have had an effect on more than just crime rates, and these effects have begun to expand beyond the scope of the United

States. Bauder’s 2017 study explored the international literature pertaining to sanctuary cities in an effort to compare the sanctuary city practices of the international arena with those of the United States. By examining the sanctuary policies across the United States,

Canada, and the United Kingdom, he was able to conclude that there is not a single set of policies and or practices that can fully define or encompass what a sanctuary city is.

Essentially, sanctuary policies routinely involve “... legal, discursive, identity-formative, and scalar aspects.” The idea and notion of sanctuary for undocumented individuals is something that has not been contained within a single national territory; instead, it is a concept that has managed to travel across international borders. The concept of traversing across multiple faucets has extended to college campuses.

10 Safstrom, in 2018, investigated sanctuary campuses, colleges, and universities that have enacted policies to protect undocumented students from the fear of deportation, which are analogous to sanctuary cities. The author examined the policies that higher institutions can initiate in order to protect students within sanctuary campuses and the legal ramifications these sanctuary campuses face in the forms of retaliation. One central aspect amongst the study is the profound effect that sanctuary policies are having on giving colleges the strength to implement their version, which increases diversity amongst the student population.

Again, exploring the concept of sanctuary policies within the larger scope of the international field, Bauder & Gonzalez (2018) analyzed local policies across the United

States, Canada, and the United Kingdom in order to see if there are any commonalities to be discovered in the ways local law enforcements tackle the issues of disenfranchisement, exclusion, and illegalization brought forth by enacting sanctuary policies. They highlighted the notion that these policies put in place on a national scale are assisting in tackling the problems of disenfranchisement and illegalization.

The benefits of Sanctuary implementation

The benefits of implementing sanctuary policy extend further than just a discernable difference in crime rates. In 2017 Tom K. Wong analyzed the residual effects that sanctuary city policies have on counties that have chosen to implement them (2017).

Utilizing coarsened exact matching (CEM) to match the sanctuary cities against comparable non-sanctuary counties, Wong discovered that crime was significantly lower within sanctuary counties and that these counties noticed an economic benefit which manifested across multiple variables e.g., less poverty, higher employment rates, lower

11 unemployment, etc. Specifically, the study highlights the notion that on average there is

35.5 fewer crimes permitted for every 10,000 individuals in sanctuary counties juxtaposed to non-sanctuary counties. The unemployment rate is on average 1.1% lower, the poverty rate is 2.3% lower, and the median household income is on average $4,353 higher in sanctuary counties than their non-sanctuary counterparts.

12 Advocacy Coalition Framework

To address the emergence of sanctuary-states, I rely on the advocacy coalition framework. Sabatier and Jenkins ACF model differentiates itself by accounting for both policy actors and organizations that influence the policy making process (Weible &

Sabatier 2018). Previous theories merely mention or allude to the iron triangle which consists of the common policy actors - legislators, interest groups, and the bureaucracy

(Gais, Peterson, & Walker 1984). While the ACF theory broadens participation by including other policy actors that are not affiliated with the government such as academics, members of interest groups, and members of the news media (Weible &

Sabatier 2018).

Sabatier & Jenkins (1988) inspirations for the ACF were drawn from a desire to apply theoretical insight into the role of scientific and technical information in policy debates; a need to provide a comprehensive approach to understanding politics and policy change over time which transcended the traditional emphasis of political science on the governmental institutions, and a response to what they believed to be the inadequacies of the existing models that primarily focused on incremental change (Weible & Sabatier

2018). In essence, the framework takes on an ambitious attempt at capturing the entire policy making process by attempting to explain the policy change or stability through the lens of coalitions.

According to the ACF theory, people engage in politics in order to translate their beliefs into action (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, and Weible 2014). The ACF model highlights three main types of beliefs: core, policy core, and secondary (Sabatier &

Pelkey 1987). Actors, who share similar beliefs, become part of the same advocacy

13 coalition, and these coalitions compete with each other. The main focus of the ACF theory is the subsystem, which represents a key venue, that has its own particular rules of engagement, for coalition interaction. The policy subsystem is the primary unit of analysis for understanding policy processes. So, policy subsystems are related to a specific topic and contain several components and factors, such as belief systems, political resources etc., that interact to produce outputs and outcomes for a given policy topic (Weible & Sabatier 2018). Policy subsystems are semi-independent but overlap with other policy subsystems and said subsystems must have some form of authority or potential for authority. The policy subsystems can experience times of stability, slow change, and major changes.

The ACF’s conceptualization of subsystems is essentially distinctively focusing on actors beyond government and interest groups (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, and Weible

2014). The set of relevant subsystem actors can include any person that is regularly attempting to influence the subsystem’s affairs. This assumes that there are more policy actors who influence the policy-making process that are outside of the iron triangle.

These actors can take the form of researchers, scientists, nonprofit organizations, news media, etc. The ACF’s diagram identifies spillover effects from other policy subsystems and events, such as a change in government or a shift in governmental priorities, on subsystems. However, its focus lies mainly on how coalitions interpret and respond to events; events that are categorized as external or internal shocks. Major responses to shocks are far less frequent than policy learning and the revision of secondary aspects of coalition beliefs. Overall, the ACF covers all the major elements of the policy process as well as interactions among these elements (Weible & Sabatier 2018)

14 The ACF differentiates between major and minor policy change. Major changes are those that affect the goals constituting the policy subsystem, whereas minor changes affect the instrumental means in achieving those goals. There are four pathways to policy change (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, and Weible 2014). The first two pathways include events either external or internal to the policy subsystem. The central hypothesis is that the necessary but not sufficient conditions for policy change are significant events, either external or internal to the policy subsystem; learning; negotiations; or some combination of these. The sufficient condition in many situations is a coalition willing to capitalize on the opportunity for policy change that the different pathways provide (Jenkins-Smith,

Nohrstedt, and Weible 2014).

15 Research Methods & Case Selection

In order to address my research question, I rely on multiple sources. To analyze the state level policies, I examined statistics provided by the United States Census

Bureau, data provided by the respective state departments, reviewed state laws and ordinances, examined information provided by various news outlets, and utilized secondary sources in the form of scholarly journals and books regarding sanctuary policies. Since the unit of analysis is the individual states themselves, all attempts were made to focus on primary sources before examining secondary sources of information. The unit of analysis is the individual states reactions to dealing with sanctuary jurisdictions. The state is the appropriate unit of analysis since this qualitative descriptive case study examines the coalitions that have formed in response to President

Trump’s disdain for sanctuary cities and the legislative behavior and reactions to the exogenous shock of Executive Order 13768.

California and Texas are excellent case studies for comparison. Despite demographic similarities, the two states have taken opposite stances on their sanctuary status. According to the United States Census estimates for 2018, the United States two largest states, California and Texas populations amasses to 39,557,045 (QuickFacts:

California 2019) and 28,701,845 (QuickFacts: Texas 2019). Geographically, both states encompass quite a substantial amount of land, with Texas having 268,597 miles placing it as the second largest state after Alaska (DeVore 2018). California makes up the third largest state with 163,696 square miles of land (DeVore 2018). The United States and

Mexico share about 2,000 miles of border with 1,200 of said miles lying between Texas and Mexico (McDonald 2019)

16 Each of the states have been remarkably successful to the extent that Texas’ GDP, at $1.6 trillion, and California’s GDP, at $2.6 trillion, would respectively place them as the tenth and sixth largest economies in the world if they were classified as their own countries (Wright 2018). Texas ranks just behind California, placing it in second place, in the number of individuals without a high school diploma, and while California has steadily begun to increase its monetary support of public schools, Texas has taken the opposite direction by decreasing the funding to its schools. This matter extends far beyond the state of Texas since ten percent of all schoolchildren in the United States reside in Texas (Wright 2018).

Both states house a majority-minority population (Bolter 2019) with Hispanics accounting for 40% of both states’ total population. California’s racial and ethnic diversity stands at Hispanic’s accounting for most of the state’s population with 38.6%, followed by Whites/Non-Hispanic, Asian/Non-Hispanic, and Black/Non-Hispanic at

38.4%, 13.7%, and 5.6% respectively (California Counties and the States They Resemble

2019). The racial and ethnic diversity of Texas currently places Whites/Non-Hispanic,

Hispanic/Any Race, Black/Non-Hispanic, and Asian/Non-Hispanic at 43.4%, 38.6%,

11.6%, and 4.3% respectively (California Counties and the States They Resemble 2019)

17 In terms of undocumented immigrants, California currently houses the largest population of undocumented individuals with 2.2 million as of 2016 (Pew Research

Center 2019). These 2.2 million individuals represent 5.6% of California’s total population (Pew Research Center 2019). The state of Texas is home to 1.6 million undocumented individuals which represent 5.7% of the state’s total population (Pew

Research Center 2019). The number of undocumented individuals residing within Texas places it just behind California as the second largest state with the largest population of undocumented individuals. Approximately half, 46%, of Texas’s newcomer population is unauthorized, which translates to 1.8 million residents (Brannon and Albright 2016).

Nevertheless, while both states share similar sets of demographic characteristics, each of these states have taken vastly different approaches as to how they deal with sanctuary policies. Senate Bill 54 (SB-54), also referred to as the California Values Act, was officially signed into law by then Governor Jerry Brown on October 05, 2017 (SB-54

Law enforcement: sharing data 2017). SB-54 not only establishes California as a

“sanctuary state” but also implements vast protections for California’s undocumented population and is lauded as the most comprehensive set of protections in the country

(Steinmetz 2017). SB-54’s vast set of protections include barring any state or local law enforcement from investigating, interrogating, detaining, or arresting individuals for immigration enforcement purposes (Kopetman 2018). It establishes that no money or personnel can be utilized in these purposes. It also prevents individuals from being held past their release date because of a request from the ICE, certifies that law enforcement cannot provide office space for federal immigration authorities within local jail facilities, provide the exact release date of an inmate or other pertinent information unless that

18 information is available to the public or has a criminal conviction for one of several specified crimes, and prevents local law enforcement from cooperating with ICE in cases when an individual has been arrested, detained, or convicted for a misdemeanor but was constituted as a felony prior to the implementation of Prop 47, which reduced the penalties for certain crimes within the state of California (Kopetman 2018)

SB-54 builds and improves on the California Trust Act of 2013, which specifically prohibited state and local law enforcement from detaining any individual for longer than 48 hours for federal immigration purposes (AB-4 State government: federal immigration policy enforcement 2017), by aiming to quell the deportation fears of the undocumented population within California (Kopetman 2018). On May 7, 2017 Texas

Governor Greg Abbott officially signed Texas Senate Bill 4 (SB-4) into law (LegiScan

2017). SB-4, also commonly referred to as the “Sanctuary Cities Bill” (Senate Bill 4

Frequently Asked Questions 2017), aims to strictly outlaw sanctuary cities and forbid any policies and practices that would impede the enforcement of immigration laws (Perry

2017).

The aforementioned bill does more than just simply prohibit sanctuary city policy from being implemented within the state of Texas. SB 4 explicitly allows any uncooperative jail administrators, sheriff, constable, or police chief to be fined, under a

Class A misdemeanor, as little as $1000 for the first offense to upwards of $25,500 for every other subsequent offense (Gamboa 2017). It allows state officials to remove any elected official from office who impede or attempt to limit cooperation with immigration enforcement officials (Gamboa 2017). This crackdown on undocumented individuals goes even further by instituting even more provisions, such as allowing state officials to

19 turn in other officials who refuse to comply, allowing taxpayer dollars to be utilized to defend individuals who are sued for upholding the bill etc., (Gamboa, 2017) that makes life difficult for the undocumented population of Texas.

20 The Exogenous shock that divided two states

External shocks affect the positions of the coalitions. Shocks are the combination of external events, such as President Trump’s implementation of EO 13768, and the offsetting reaction by the coalitions. These external shocks can lead to major change as members of coalitions are not only influenced by them, but they assist in influencing how key actors understand, interpret, and respond to them. One of the first actions administered by the Trump administration was the signing of Executive Order 13768 on

January 25, 2017 (Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United

States 2017). President Donald J. Trump signed EO 13768 into order under the guise of

“enhancing public safety of the interior of the United States”. This executive order announced a substantial expansion of interior immigration enforcement in the form of hiring 10,000 ICE agents to arrest and deport undocumented individuals residing within the United States (Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United

States 2017). EO 13768 more specifically was implemented as a direct attack on sanctuary cities across the United States. Citing the Immigration and Nationality Act

(INA), the order sought to directly punish any jurisdictions by withholding federal grants and funds, except those that were deemed necessary for law enforcement (Executive

Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States 2017). Additionally,

EO 13768 sought to inform the public of the supposed “potential dangers” of sanctuary jurisdictions and to direct an investigation into the amount of federal grant funds that have been administered to said jurisdictions (Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States 2017).

21 Prior to being elected, Trump vehemently campaigned on a direct opposition to immigration within the United States. He proposed and praised mass deportations, akin to

Eisenhower’s “Operation Wetback”, that would specifically remove the estimated eleven million undocumented individuals residing within the confines of the United States

(Linthicum 2015). Laid out a ten-step plan that specifically aimed to deal with “illegal immigrants” who committed crimes, overstayed their visas, and or sought legalization

(Epstein, Hook & Luhnow 2016); and denoted plans to implement a nationwide E-verify system, a temporary ban on Muslim individuals, and a proposal to erect a border wall

(Corasaniti 2016). His newly elected U.S. attorney general, Jeff Sessions, continued

Trump’s anti-immigration rhetoric with his inauguration remarks stating that “We need to end this lawlessness that threatens the public safety, [and] pulls down the wages of working Americans” in regard to immigration (Attorney General Jeff Sessions: End

Migrant Lawlessness 2017). Following the implementation of EO 13768, the attorney general distributed letters of warning to several sanctuary jurisdictions (Justice

Department Sends Letters to 29 Jurisdictions Regarding Their Compliance with 8 U.S.C.

1373, 2017) and proceeded to give speeches that condemned and vilified sanctuary jurisdictions for the “public safety” risks they introduced through their noncompliance

(Attorney General Sessions Announces Immigration Compliance Requirements for

Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs 2017); (Attorney General

Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions 2017); (Attorney General Jeff

Sessions Delivers Remarks About Carrying Out the President’s Immigration Priorities

2017).

22 In direct response, cities and states began challenging the Department of Justice

(DOJ) with lawsuits that oppose the DOJ and EO 13768 in their attempts to withhold funding and place conditional limits on federal grants (Six states and NYC sue Trump admin over requiring “sanctuary cities” to work with feds 2018). A few cities and states have taken the opposition even further by implementing legislation that directly challenges the administrations Executive Order. In the following section I will discuss specifically why California and Texas chose to adopt their respective stances on sanctuary cities, how and why they implemented their sanctuary laws, and the ideologies that fueled the coalitions.

23 THE CASE OF CALIFORNIA

The different philosophies of the two states can be encapsulated with their stance on the southern borders. California’s governor, Gavin Newsom, chose to withdraw several hundred National Guard troops in a symbolic gesture that was meant to protest

President Trump’s stance on immigration (Immigration shapes the politics of California and Texas 2019); Joined a coalition of fifteen other states suing to stop Trump from utilizing his emergency powers to build a border wall (Steinmetz 2019) and most recently, California’s Attorney General, Xavier Becerra, along with New Mexico filed a lawsuit to permanently halt the president’s border wall under the notion that it would cause irreparable harm, threaten democratic institutions, is unlawful, and has manifested in the illegal diversion of $2.5 million in funding to finance the border wall (Gregorczyk

2019). While Texas spends $400 million annually to police the border (Immigration shapes the politics of California and Texas 2019). Most recently, Texas Governor Greg

Abbott earmarked one billion dollars in order to help the United States secure the southern border with Mexico (McDonald 2019). Citing an “escalating crisis” occurring at the border, Texas chose to respond by sending an additional 1,000 National Guard troops, that will back up the already 1,200 National Guardsman stationed there, (Barragan &

Gillman 2019). Texas also chose to pass Senate Resolution 535 which endorses and supports Trump’s efforts to move forward with emergency action at the border (Hooks

2019)

The ACF framework communicates a simple story within the complex policymaking process by suggesting that policy actors form coalitions with other individuals who share their beliefs. These coalitions then compete with individuals from

24 other coalitions operating under different beliefs. The beliefs about how to interpret the cause and or solutions to policy issues are what provide the proverbial glue that holds these coalitions together. These different coalitions then compete with one another in order to secure policy outcomes that align with their beliefs. If the issue is highly charged, like the debate surrounding sanctuary cities, then the individuals within their coalitions tend to romanticize their cause while demonizing opposing coalitions.

Both states operate under the mentality that they are implementing their legislation in order to protect the people. However, Texas seems to ostracize the vast number of undocumented individuals whom reside within the state since they tend to operate within an immigration-restrictionist mentality, juxtaposed to California’s pension for open borders. Texas Governor Greg Abbott states that the political rhetoric of Texas is not “anti-immigrant” but is “anti-illegal immigrant” and the lieutenant governor, Dan

Patrick, has gone on record stating that illegal immigration is an “invasion” (Immigration shapes the politics of California and Texas 2019). Nonetheless, Texas establishes SB-4 as preventive measures that will ensure the safety of its citizens. The state is portraying itself as a protector while blanketly generalizing the undocumented population as criminals waiting in the wings. Similar to California’s Proposition 187, SB-4 aims to specifically cripple the lives of the undocumented population within the state until it ultimately becomes insufferable for them to continue to reside within the state. SB-4 has become Texas’s open acknowledgement that it supports the current administration’s immigration policies and how they are dependent on local law enforcement enforcing the administrations agenda. While California’s Governor, Jerry Brown, established that SB-

54 would ensure the safety of all citizens within California, including the large amount of

25 its undocumented residents. Although, the governor has no intentions of defying the federal government, SB-54 does that by signaling that the State of California does not agree with the administration’s handling of immigration. A conflict between two different views of right and wrong essentially ensues in regard to how each state interprets and reacts to the Administrations views on immigration and the states respective views on how to protect its residents.

SB 54’s main author was Democratic Senate Leader Kevin de Leon as well as twelve other Democratic members who served as the bills principal coauthors (SB-54

Law enforcement: sharing data - Status 2017). SB-54 was authored by Senate President

Kevin de Leon to limit local and state law enforcements engagement with immigration enforcement (De Leon 2017). The bill was realized and conceptualized on the basis of protecting the safety and well-being of all individuals within California (De Leon 2017).

After the President's Executive Orders and the Department of Homeland Security memorandums outlined a specific goal of mass deportations utilizing local law enforcement officials, De Leon believed that a relationship of trust needed to be established between California’s undocumented population and the states local agencies

(De Leon 2017). This establishment of trust was needed to ensure that state and local resources were not utilized to “fuel mass deportations, separate families, and ultimately hurt California’s economy” (De Leon 2017). Essentially, State Senate Leader Kevin de

Leon, envisioned the bill as a safety measure that would ensure that California’s undocumented population would be unafraid to report crimes and or send their children to school (Steinmetz 2017).

26 On April 3, 2018, the California State Senate passed SB-54 with a party-line vote of twenty-seven Democrats in favor vs twelve Republicans who opposed the measure

(Sanctuary jurisdictions policy by state 2019). The bill was then sent to the California

State Assembly which passed it by a fifty to twenty-six vote on September 15, 2018

(Sanctuary jurisdictions policy by state 2019). The State Senate agreed to the changes made by the Assembly and sent the bill to Governor Brown for his signature (Sanctuary jurisdictions policy by state 2019). Supporters of the bill included Los Angeles Police

Chief Charlie Beck, who argued that SB-54 would assist in improving relations between law enforcement and the undocumented population (Sanctuary jurisdictions policy by state 2019, the Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC), who aided in drafting the language of SB-54 and was a member of the coalition that supported its passage (Bradley

& Media 2017), former U.S. Attorney Eric Holder, who supports SB-54 and released a letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions thoroughly explaining why SB-54 is legally sound (Holder 2017), over one hundred law professors, who submitted a letter to the

Governor and California State Legislature detailing support and justifications as to why

SB-54 is legally sound (Letter supporting California Values Act 2017), and the District of

Columbia’s Attorney General Karl A. Racine, who led a coalition of thirteen state attorney generals in filing a friend-of-the-court brief to defend SB-54 (AG Racine Leads

13-State Coalition Fighting Trump’s Attempt to Block State Law That Protects All

Residents, Regardless of Immigration Status 2018).

While the bill has faced some extreme opposition from the law enforcement community, most notably the Los Angeles County Sheriff Jim McDonnell, it gained a major endorsement on June 19, 2017, when the Los Angeles Police Chief, Charlie Beck,

27 offered his full support and endorsement of the bill (Ulloa 2017). Beck stated that the bill was an important proposal which would go on to protect the trust that his department has with the neighborhoods they service (Ulloa 2017). This ringing endorsement was desperately needed since Senate President De Leon grappled with opposition from law enforcement agencies which believed that the bill would ultimately weaken or impede their abilities to detain dangerous criminals (Ulloa 2017).

Another one of SB-54’s main obstacles to overcome was that of California

Governor Jerry Brown. Brown is of the mindset that undocumented individuals should not receive protection from the state if they have committed serious crimes (Bruck 2018).

This specific issue is one that he personally confronted with SB-54’s predecessor the

Trust Act. The Trust Act was passed by the legislature in 2012 but was vetoed by Brown because of the strong relationships that he had fostered with the law enforcement community who believed that the bill would prevent them from keeping dangerous criminals off of the streets since it limited their cooperation with the federal authorities

(Bruck 2018). Ultimately, Brown would go on to sign the Trust Act into law the following year after the list of offenses for which individuals could be retained was expanded to include over eight-hundred crimes (Bruck 2018). While SB-54 had several amendments added to it, it still did not appease the governor who was not deterred by the activists who protested outside of his office daily (Bruck 2018). He rejected a version of the bill that removed several crimes from the Trust Act’s list and remained adamant on the notion that sheriffs be able to allow ICE to interview immigrants in jail (Bruck 2018).

On October 5, 2019 Governor Jerry Brown signed SB-54 into law while stating that the bill does not impede or prohibits the Department of Homeland Security or Immigration

28 and Customs Enforcement from completing their work; it simply means that local authorities are not allowed to inquire about an individual's immigration status (Bruck

2018). When the bill came under fire by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Brown was quick to object by stating that the final version was “written carefully to recognize the supremacy of federal law” and that he had no interest or intention of “defying the federal government” (Bruck 2018).

To that effect, Brown ensured that it was not defying the federal government since on January 4, 2017, the California Legislature announced that it had hired the former

United States Attorney General Eric Holder to serve as outside counsel (Mason 2017).

This was done in effort to protect existing state policies that conflict with the Trump administration and to advise on the state’s legal strategy against the Trump administration

(Mason 2017). One of the policies that Holder and his firm assisted on was California’s

SB-54. Holder and his law firm analyzed the legislation and concluded that California has the constitutional power and authority to prioritize its limited resources within the areas of state concerns and that SB-54 represented its constitutional exercise of sovereign authority (Ulloa 2017).

California’s current balance of power made it easier to pass SB-54 since

Democrats are fully in control of three-fourths of the seats in both legislative houses

(Skelton 2018). The Democratic party is in control of sixty-one of the eighty seats on the

State Assembly and twenty-nine of the forty seats within the State senate (California

State Legislature 2019). This leaves Republicans with only eighteen State Assembly seats and eleven State senate seats (California State Legislature 2019). It has been one-hundred and thirty-six years since the Democrats in California wielded this much power (Skelton

29 2018). To place the magnitude of their power into more context only a two-thirds supermajority is necessary to place amendments on the ballot or pass tax increases

(Skelton 2018).

California’s justifications for its bold actions in implementing SB-54 are predicated on the mentality that the California “legislature finds and declares [that] immigrants are valuable and essential members of the California community” (Henderson

2017).

30 THE CASE OF TEXAS.

Shortly after the passage of EO 13768, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed an amicus brief in support of a ten-state coalition “supporting the constitutionality of

President Trump’s Executive Order regarding sanctuary cities” (CBS Austin 2017). The formation of this coalition was devised to not only support EO 13768 but to also challenge a federal court ban that was placed on said order (Price 2017). This was not the only incidence in which Texas facilitated the advancement of the current administration's disdain for sanctuary cities. On March 6, 2018, the Trump administration escalated its attack on sanctuary cities with the Justice Department filing a lawsuit targeting three

California state statutes that were designed to aid undocumented individuals (Johnson

2018). The lawsuit specifically names AB 450, AB 103, and most importantly SB 54, also known as the sanctuary state law, as laws that interfere with immigration efforts and hinders the United States “sweeping authority” over immigration (Johnson 2018). Shortly after filing its lawsuit against California, Texas, along with eighteen other Republican led states, sided with the Trump administration's lawsuit by forming a coalition and filing a friend-of-the-court brief in support of the Trump lawsuit against California (Associated

Press 2018). This coalition of states believes that California’s laws are designed and implemented in such a way that they explicitly hinder or block federal immigration enforcement; enforcement that California does not have the authority to supersede

(Associated Press 2018). They are also operating under the mindset that California’s laws make it easier for undocumented individuals who commit crimes to go to other states and avoid punishment (Associated Press 2018).

31 On May 7, 2017, Texas Governor Greg Abbott, officially signed SB-4 into law, which was authored by Republican State Senator Charles Perry (Elizondo 2017). SB-4, also known as the “Anti sanctuary cities” law and or the “Show me your papers” law, aims to enforce compliance with federal immigration law onto Texas’s state and its local entities (Elizondo 2017). Even though Texas already complies with ICE, DHS, and the

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), this measure has made Texas the first state to officially ban sanctuary cities under the Trump administration (Elizondo 2017). SB-4 was proposed in response to a statement made by the sheriff, Shelly Hernandez, of Travis

County stating that she would comply with ICE at the minimum level, which equates to her office only notifying ICE for serious offences (murder, sexual assault etc.) and not minor offenses (Burnett 2017). This was well within the sheriff’s legal right since “Cacho v Gusman” determined that law enforcement only needed to adhere to ICE detainer requests in manners that constituted a serious crime and prohibited officers from investigating an individual's immigration status (How Ice Uses Local Criminal Justice

Systems to Funnel People Into the Detention and Deportation System 2014). Governor

Abbott utilized sheriff Hernandez’s comments as a means to make an anti-sanctuary bill one of his top priorities during his State of the State address (Svitek 2017). He also latched on to crimes committed by an undocumented immigrant, Juan Rios, as a way to frame the would be “anti-sanctuary” bill as a means to address public safety concerns (Lt.

Gov. Patrick: NTX murder suspect never should've been in the U.S. 2016).

SB-4 was authored by Texas Republican Senator Charles Perry under the guise that “banning sanctuary cities will help prevent criminal aliens from being put back on our streets” (Perry 2016). Perry’s mentality for enacting the legislation now was the

32 election of a Republican president, Donald Trump, and the Republicans gaining a majority within Congress (Perry 2016). This was the signal to him that the American populous was clamoring for a solution to the “immigration crisis” and the expulsion of sanctuary cities was the first step in solving the crisis (Perry 2016). SB-4 was officially set into motion on November 5, 2016, one week to the day after Donald Trump’s election, as a priority item within the Texas Senate (Neely 2017). Texas Governor Greg

Abbott showcased his support of SB-4 by declaring it an “emergency item” during his

State of the State address on January 31, 2017 (Neely 2017). This designation allowed

SB-4 to circumvent a restriction that only allowed lawmakers to vote on items after sixty days into the legislative process (Neely 2017). Travis County Sheriff Shelly Hernandez fought back by announcing that the county would only honor ICE detainer requests for individuals who were suspected of violent crimes (Neely 2017). Two weeks later

Governor Abbott retaliated by cutting $1.5 million in criminal justice grants with the promise of stiffer penalties if the county did not end what it deemed as a sanctuary policy

(McGlinchey 2017).

Ultimately, SB-4 would pass the Republican controlled Texas State Senate in a strict party vote of twenty to eleven on February 8, 2017 (Neely 2017). Within this stage the bill experienced seven amendments, including one that allowed for the removal of elected officials who did not comply with SB-4 and one that made it a crime to not honor

ICE detainers (Neely 2017). April 27, 2017 would see SB-4 pass the Texas House in a ninety-four to fifty-four vote after a grueling sixteen-hour debate (Cohen 2017).

Governor Abbott officially signed SB-4 into law on May 7, 2017 while stating that the

33 law specifically cracks down on policies like those exhibited in Travis county and that

“those policies are sanctuary policies [that] won’t be tolerated in Texas” (Neely 2017)

However, while the Governor originally stated that the bill would specifically target individuals who had committed crimes within the state, its original intent was deviated. The bill became more punitive to undocumented individuals during its time in the floor of the Texas House of Representatives (Elizondo 2017). One of the most controversial aspects of the bill is an amendment which was added on the house floor.

The original Senate and House versions only allowed local officers to inquire about the immigration status of an individual during a lawful arrest; the change, implemented by the House, allows officers to question the immigration status of any individual that they detain (Elizondo 2017).

While Republicans have for the most part avoided antagonizing the almost 40% of Latinos that make up its population, the passage of SB-4 could prove to have severe ramifications. While SB-4 does not target a specific race, opponents in Texas view the bill as a direct attack on the Hispanic community at large. During the ten hours of testimony in front of the House State Affairs Committee, members of the Texas immigrant community argued that the legislation was unconstitutional, redundant, based on fear mongering tactics directed towards the immigrant communities, and viewed it as a direct attack amongst Texas’s Hispanic community (Elizondo 2017). This basis is not unfounded since Cardoso, Scott, Faulkner, and Lane found that deportations disproportionately impacted the Latino community and that while the undocumented community is not solely comprised of Latinos, they are specifically stereotyped at a

34 higher disproportionate rate for being undocumented because of the medias portrayal of said group (2017).

35 Conclusion

The passage of SB-4 resulted in the State of Texas being deemed one of eighteen states hostile towards immigrant populations by a study conducted at the University of

Washington and Dartmouth college (Ellis, Wright, Townley 2018). This could potentially lead to severe ramifications for Texas. Several states that have been classified as hostile have not only witnessed a decrease in the number of undocumented individuals residing in said state but have also experienced severe economic repercussions from implementing restrictive immigration policies. After the passage of SB-1070, the city of Phoenix witnessed a loss of $141 million in business and tourism revenue within the four months following the implementation of SB-1070 (Fitz, Kelley 2010). Alabama, in 2011, faced more than just an economic loss when it implemented HB-56; a law that at the time was regarded as the toughest anti-immigration bill within the United States. The state noticed a significant reduction in the number of Hispanic children attending public schools as well as a severe impact on the number of industries who were reliant on migrant labor workers, since Americans were unwilling to work for low pay under the harsh conditions that the migrant workers were forced to tolerate (Elizondo 2017). Zhang, Palma, and Xu discovered in their research that HB-56 contributed to an increase in the amount of violent crimes that Alabama experienced after its implementation (2016). There was also research that predicted a net loss of $11 billion to Alabama’s annual GDP due to the implementation of HB-56 (Addy 2012). However, the true economic impact of HB-56 could not be assessed since a number of courts ultimately deemed a number of HB-56 provisions as unconstitutional (Elizondo 2017) Lastly, the state of Georgia experienced an estimated $140 million in agricultural losses after its passage of HB-87, due to a

36 substantial labor shortage (Elizondo 2017). The resulting labor shortage was so severe that the state had to dispatch prisoners to work the fields and harvest the fruits and vegetables from the state-owned farms (Elizondo 2017).

Some recent sanctuary policies have been predicated and implemented on the grounds of political resistance against the immigration policies being put into effect by the current administration. The City of Richmond, California, enacted sanctuary policy, and vowed to continue sanctuary policies no matter the threats, to directly oppose the hateful bigotry that the president campaigned on (Resolution No. 106-16 2016). New

Jersey’s South Orange city chose to implement sanctuary policy after the election of the current president in order to wear it as “a badge of honor” against the changing ethos of the political climate (Mazzola 2017)

I would submit that because of California’s passage of 187 in 1994, there was already a loosely established and organized coalition in place. Which in turn made it easier to mobilize in California then in Texas. This along with California having higher rates of Latino voters, along with the partisanship aspect, is what helped to place both states on opposite ends of the spectrum. Researchers have noted that changes in state legislatures and leadership from Republican to Democrat facilitate a shift from that of anti-immigration policy legislation to pro-immigration legislation. These changes have fostered the acceptance of sanctuary policy in states like Boulder and Denver which were previously anti-immigration and sanctuary policy (Berardi 2014). While Cain and

Kiewiet (1984) and Graves and Lee (2000) posit that while ethnicity influences partisanship (e.g., Mexican-Americans are more likely to be Democrats), which in turn influences their voting choice, ethnicity does not directly play a role in influencing

37 voting. States and cities that are predominantly comprised of strong Republican leadership and legislatures are not only more likely to pass restrictive immigration legislation but they are less likely to enact sanctuary policy (Tsiklauri 2017)

The proliferation of sanctuary city policies also requires a critical analysis of how the cities stand at the forefront of the ever-evolving debate about immigration policies; and how these policies can possibly affect future laws. The state of Texas officially banned sanctuary cities and yet several of its cities and counties elected to sue the state over its implementation of SB-4 (Fernandez 2018). These cities and counties are illustrating the conflict between the state leaders and the local elected officials who are teetering on the precipice of complying with the state law while limiting its impact within their jurisdictions. There are also cases of the state suing police chief’s for not fully complying with SB-4 (Merchant 2018). The state of California is no exception either since it is in the midst of facing its own legal pushback. Los Alamitos in Orange County was the first one to pass an ordinance to exempt itself from California's SB-54’s law (Hitt

2018). The state now faces 121 charter cities that have chosen to sue the state and exempt themselves from SB-54 (Hayoun 2018). The United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against California over SB-54 and two other laws (California’s ‘Sanctuary’ Laws

Aren’t Pro-Immigrant—and Local Leaders Are Pushing Back 2018) The fight over sanctuary policies lends itself to future discussion and research over how much discretion do cities have to abide by state and federal laws.

The Maintenance of the status quo poses significant dangers for the undocumented individuals residing within the U.S. While the problem with immigration may remain a difficult issue for the federal government to fully resolve, states and

38 localities have taken their abilities to implement policies that may present a feasible solution to an important component of the issue. The lack of agreement on a viable solution for managing the mass influx of undocumented individuals has left the sub federal governments on their own to develop policies that manage the safety and welfare of their populations. This devolution of immigration policy has allowed states and localities to incrementally shape immigrant relations throughout the U.S. in the forms of sanctuary city policies. Undocumented individuals are a major national issue, one that specifically has significant historical ties with this country. The groups future will continue to be a topic of heated debate for the foreseeable future. The mere complexity of the underlying issues and solutions that this nation must employ makes it an even more difficult issue to fully comprehend.

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