Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Newly Independent Scotland: Lessons From
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Monetary and fiscal policy in a newly independent Scotland: lessons from the dissolution of Czechoslovakia? Frantisek Brocek, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde Abstract: This paper looks at the creation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and its transitionary monetary union to illustrate the challenges - and opportunities - that a newly independent Scotland might face. The paper provides a background to the economic consequences of the dissolution on both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, their divergent paths in terms of economic policy and growth and the reasons why their monetary union was short- lived. The lessons from this experience are then drawn with regard to the issues that might face a newly independent Scotland, were policy to follow the recommendations of the recent Sustainable Growth Commission report. Though not strict parallels, the economic experience of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia does have some lessons for a newly independent Scotland to consider. I Introduction The recent Sustainable Growth Commission report sets out the vision that Scotland could retain the pound sterling for an extended transition period after Scotland gains political independence from the UK. Clearly, retaining the pound post-independence would reduce transaction costs such as the costs of currency conversion or the need for businesses to revalue their assets and liabilities. Furthermore, it could help reduce exchange rate uncertainty and help ensure that business and consumer confidence remains in place immediately after independence. However, the question of whether there would be fiscal and macroeconomic tensions between Scotland and rUK post-independence would be crucial for the sustainability of any transitionary monetary union. There are few international case studies that can be used to judge the success or otherwise of monetary union between two countries. An interesting example is the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and the monetary arrangements that followed. The creation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia is sometimes referred to as the “two-step break up”, as it involved first the political creation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia on 1st January 1993 and a subsequent creation of an independent monetary position 38 days later on 8th February 1993. Fraser of Allander Institute This paper discusses the background of how the Czechoslovak transitory monetary union was formed, its fiscal implications, how the monetary union ended, and how the two countries fared in the years afterwards. This paper will also discuss the main lessons for a newly independent Scotland, such as the importance of expectations of financial markets and the need for symmetric macroeconomic developments with the rest of the UK for the sustainability of a transitory monetary union. II The Czechoslovak transitionary monetary union The federal state of Czechoslovakia was a twentieth century construct and dates back to 1918 when it was created in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During the Second World War, the state split with the First Slovak Republic created as a satellite state of Germany, with limited sovereignty. Subsequent seizure of power by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia after WWII led to the reunification of Czechoslovakia as a unitary socialist state under Soviet influence. During the Prague Spring in 1968 however, the Constitutional Law of Federation reinstated Czechoslovakia’s official federal structure, which promised a common state consisting of two equal nations. However, despite its federal structure, the communist government concentrated its centralised power and policy-making powers in Prague, which led to the build-up of discontent amongst many Slovaks. The modern day dissolution of Czechoslovakia was a result of the 1992 parliamentary elections. The decision to dissolve Czechoslovakia was taken by then Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, as a political decision without the constitutional backdrop of a referendum. At the time, the main points of disagreement between the Czech and Slovak governments were the redistribution of power between the federation and constituent republics and the design of future reforms. In order to mitigate the immediate negative economic effects of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, such as an abrupt decline in bilateral trade or cross- border investment, the decision was taken to retain a common currency, a customs union, and a common labour market. The monetary union would see both countries retain the Czechoslovak crown for a period of six months with further extensions to be considered after this period. The monetary union agreement stipulated that each side had the option to withdraw from the union if: (1) the fiscal deficit of either country exceeded 10%; (2) foreign exchange reserves in either country fell below one month’s worth of its imports; (3) inter-country capital transfers Economic Commentary, September 2018 exceeded 5% of total bank deposits; (4) the Monetary Policy Committee was unable to reach agreement on fundamental monetary policy issues (Fidrmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc, 1999). The former monetary policy authority, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia (SBCS), was replaced by an independent central bank for each country and a joint monetary board was established with a 50:50 representation from each central bank to take decisions on joint monetary policy. III Fiscal implications of the monetary union and independence It is hard to judge the immediate fiscal impact of the monetary union on both countries’ economies due to its (very) short-lived existence. However, post the ending of the monetary union in February 1993, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced a recession with Czech GDP falling by 1% and Slovak GDP falling by 4% (Fidrmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc, 1999). To a large degree, this was a reform-induced recession associated with the transition from centrally planned economies to free-market economies. The contraction in GDP could have also been partly induced by the after-effects of the 1991 global recession. Nevertheless, the costs associated with building new institutions, the decrease in mutual trade, and the cessation of any fiscal transfers between the two countries also contributed to the deepening of the recession. According to Sujan and Sujanova (1994), the overall costs associated with the dissolution were 2.1% of Czech and 5.7% of Slovak GDP. The liabilities of the federal state, such as banknotes, commercial bank reserves held by the federal central bank, and debt obligations towards the IMF, were divided 2:1 according to the population ratio between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Immovable assets were taken over by the country where they were located with all other assets being divided by their population ratio. Throughout the post-war history of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had consistently been a net recipient of fiscal transfers from the Czech Republic. The estimates of the size of the net fiscal transfer in 1992 vary in size from 13.5 billion Czechoslovak crowns (CSK) (Hajek et al., 1993) to CSK 25 billion (OECD, 1994), equivalent to between 4.4% and 8% of Slovak GDP. Given the non- zero sum nature of the fiscal transfers, with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Czech Republic gained and Slovakia lost the value of the implicit liability to continue these fiscal transfers into the future. Fraser of Allander Institute IV The ending of the Czech / Slovak monetary union The abrupt ending of the Czech / Slovak monetary union was associated with underlying and long-term structural tensions between the countries’ economies and immediate developments around the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Firstly, the monetary union and the Czechoslovak crown failed to achieve credibility in the financial markets. The newly-established joint monetary committee was comprised of the governors and two senior officials from each central bank. However, as the markets correctly anticipated, the countries’ divergence in macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and GDP growth before and after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia made decisions in pursuit of the common interests of the single currency impossible. Higher unemployment and weaker growth meant that Slovak authorities were in favour of lower interest rates and competitive devaluation of the Czechoslovak crown, whereas this was clearly not in the best interest of their Czech counterparts. Although the decisions on monetary policy were made by the joint monetary committee, the implementation of policy decisions was left to the national central banks. This contributed to a dysfunctional institutional design for conducting monetary policy and led to an undermining of the Czechoslovak crown’s credibility on financial markets. This lack of credibility was expressed in a parallel exchange rate of the Czechoslovak crown relative to the US dollar (i.e. the exchange rate quoted by commercial banks) which climbed to be 78% higher than the official exchange rate (Firdmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc, 1999). Furthermore, due to the poor competitiveness of the Slovak economy relative to its neighbours, a devaluation of the new Slovak crown was expected at the end of the 6-month transition period. In anticipation of this, large capital outflows from Slovak to Czech banks occurred in late 1992 and at the beginning of 1993. Furthermore, Slovak importers sought to repay their debts as soon as possible, while Czech importers wanted the exact opposite.