Marx's Theory of Working-Class Precariousness
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Econ792 Reading 2020.Pdf
Economics 792: Labour Economics Provisional Outline, Spring 2020 This course will cover a number of topics in labour economics. Guidance on readings will be given in the lectures. There will be a number of problem sets throughout the course (where group work is encouraged), presentations, referee reports, and a research paper/proposal. These, together with class participation, will determine your final grade. The research paper will be optional. Students not submit- ting a paper will receive a lower grade. Small group work may be permitted on the research paper with the instructors approval, although all students must make substantive contributions to any paper. Labour Supply Facts Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Guy Laroque. Labor supply and the extensive margin. American Economic Review, 101(3):482–86, May 2011. Richard Blundell, Antoine Bozio, and Guy Laroque. Extensive and Intensive Margins of Labour Supply: Work and Working Hours in the US, the UK and France. Fiscal Studies, 34(1):1–29, 2013. Static Labour Supply Sören Blomquist and Whitney Newey. Nonparametric estimation with nonlinear budget sets. Econometrica, 70(6):2455–2480, 2002. Richard Blundell and Thomas Macurdy. Labor supply: A Review of Alternative Approaches. In Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 3, Part 1 of Handbook of Labor Economics, pages 1559–1695. Elsevier, 1999. Pierre A. Cahuc and André A. Zylberberg. Labor Economics. Mit Press, 2004. John F. Cogan. Fixed Costs and Labor Supply. Econometrica, 49(4):pp. 945–963, 1981. Jerry A. Hausman. The Econometrics of Nonlinear Budget Sets. Econometrica, 53(6):pp. 1255– 1282, 1985. -
Unemployment As a Hiring Problem
UNEMPLOYMENT AS A HIRING PROBLEM Robert J. Flanagan CONTENTS Introduction ............................... 124 1 . What is different about the European unemployment experience? . 125 Unemployment flows ........................ 126 II . The failure of supply-side explanations ............... 127 111 . Hiring decisions and unemployment ................. 129 A . Fixed employment costs .................... 129 B. Uncertainty about employee quality .............. 130 C . Uncertainty about future demand ............... 132 D. General implications of the "reluctance to hire" view ..... 133 E . Hiring relationships ...................... 144 Conclusions ............................... 147 Annex: Sources and definitions .................... 151 Bibliography ............................... 152 The author is Professor of Labor Economics. Graduate School of Business. Stanford University. Stanford. California. This paper was prepared as part of a consultancy for the OECD .The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and should not be interpreted to reflect the views of the OECD or its Member Governments. The author is grateful to Janice Callaghan and Rita Varley for research assistance and to David Coe. Franpoise Cor6. David Grubb. John Martin. Franciscus Meyer.zu.Schlochtern. and participants at a seminar held at the OECD for helpful comments and assistance. 123 INTRODUCTION The rise in unemployment in OECD countries during the 1970s and 1980s remains one of the central concerns of economic analysis and policy. Within the general growth of unemployment are several varieties of unemployment experience, however. For example, developments in the 1970s and 1980s reversed one of the previously accepted facts of comparative macroeconomics: average unemployment rates in Europe, which were persistently lower than in the United States before the 1970s, have been persistently higher in the 1980s. Moreover, there is significant variation in the unemployment experience within Europe. -
Efficiency Wages in Cournot-Oligopoly
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 12351 Efficiency Wages in Cournot-Oligopoly Marco de Pinto Laszlo Goerke MAY 2019 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 12351 Efficiency Wages in Cournot-Oligopoly Marco de Pinto IUBH University of Applied Science and IAAEU Trier Laszlo Goerke IAAEU, Trier University, IZA and CESifo MAY 2019 Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world’s largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. ISSN: 2365-9793 IZA – Institute of Labor Economics Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9 Phone: +49-228-3894-0 53113 Bonn, Germany Email: [email protected] www.iza.org IZA DP No. 12351 MAY 2019 ABSTRACT Efficiency Wages in Cournot-Oligopoly* In a Cournot-oligopoly with free but costly entry and business stealing, output per firm is too low and the number of competitors excessive, assuming labor productivity to depend on the number of employees only or to be constant. -
Methods and Applications to Labour Economics Phd Programme In
STRUCTURAL ECONOMETRICS: Methods and Applications to Labour Economics PhD Programme in Economics European University Institute Department of Economics Instructor Ylenia Brilli Contact details: [email protected] Office hours: by appointment, either at my office (BF342 at Badia Fiesolana) or at Villa San Paolo Course Information Spring Term, A.Y. 2014-2015 Schedule: Monday, 8:45-10:45, from April 13 to May 11. Room: TBA, Villa San Paolo Course overview During the last decades, the use of structural estimation methods has gained a growing relevance for the understanding of labor market and education dynamics. This course introduces structural econometric approaches in the field of labor economics. The course is structured in two parts. In the first part, we overview the overall methodology for the model solution and estimation. The first lectures are devoted to the solution and identification of static and dynamic models, with a special attention to models of labour supply. This part is concluded by presenting the methods used for the estimation of structural models. First, we review the methods not using simulation (Maximum Likelihood and Method of Moments), and then we describe the main simulation-based methods (Method of Simulated Moments and Simulated Maximum Likelihood). We also discuss the identifying assumptions needed for the model estimation and the validation techniques used in the literature so far. The second part mainly involves the discussion of empirical applications in the fields of labour economics and economics of education. Particular attention will be devoted to papers analyzing the determinants of female labor supply and of the schooling decisions. Prerequisites The 1st year exams on Econometrics represent a prerequisite for this course. -
Labour Process and the Division of Labour, a Reading Bruno Tinel
Labour process and the division of labour, a reading Bruno Tinel To cite this version: Bruno Tinel. Labour process and the division of labour, a reading. 2009. halshs-00435252 HAL Id: halshs-00435252 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00435252 Submitted on 24 Nov 2009 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Documents de Travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne Labour process and the division of labour, a reading Bruno TINEL 2009.74 Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13 http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CES-docs.htm ISSN : 1955-611X Labour process and the division of labour, a reading1 Bruno TINEL Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne [email protected] Abstract This article proposes an analysis of the labour process and the division of labour in capitalist production through a reading of Marx and a few others like Babbage and Braverman. The distinction between labour and labour power is used to expose the specificity of the labour process. Cooperation constitutes the fundamental form of capitalist production, which entails a double-sided command (coordination to produce use-values and despotism to extract surplus-value). -
LABOUR ECONOMICS I ECONOMICS EC3344A-001 Department of Economics Western University
LABOUR ECONOMICS I ECONOMICS EC3344A-001 Department of Economics Western University Instructor’s Name: Chris Robinson September 2017 Office: 4011 SSC Phone: (519) 661-2111 ext. 85047 E-mail: [email protected] Office Hours: Wed 2.30-3.30, Friday 1.00-2.00 Classroom meeting time & location: Mon 1.30-3.30, Wed 1.30-2.30 UCC 54B Course website: https://owl.uwo.ca/portal Undergraduate inquiries: 519-661-3507 SSC Room 4075 or [email protected] Registration You are responsible for ensuring you are registered in the correct courses. If you are not registered in a course, the Department will not release any of your marks until your registration is corrected. You may check your timetable by using the Login on the Student Services website at https://student.uwo.ca. If you notice a problem, please contact your home Faculty Academic Counsellor immediately. Prerequisite Note The prerequisite for this course is Economics 2261A/B You are responsible for ensuring that you have successfully completed all course prerequisites, and that you have not taken an anti-requisite course. Lack of pre-requisites may not be used as a basis for appeal. If you are found to be ineligible for a course, you may be removed from it at any time and you will receive no adjustment to your fees. This decision cannot be appealed. If you find that you do not have the course prerequisites, it is in your best interest to drop the course well before the end of the add/drop period. Your prompt attention to this matter will not only help protect your academic record, but will ensure that spaces become available for students who require the course in question for graduation. -
Labor Economics I MIT (14.661) D
Labor Economics I MIT (14.661) D. Acemoglu Fall 2019 J. Angrist TA: Clemence Idoux ([email protected]) This course covers traditional and contemporary topics in labor economics and aims to encourage the development of independent research interests. Prerequisites are intermediate microeconomics and a course in econometrics. The class is offered in two versions, Ultimate and Lite. Participants are asked to select one of these by our second meeting on Tuesday, September 10. Class requirements (new in 2019) All 661 participants are expected to: • Miss no more than two classes over the course of the term • Take an out-of-class final during exam week • Complete 4 problem sets with a grade of at least 7/10 • Answer questions when called upon in class In addition, Ultimate 661 participants are expected to: • Deliver a brief oral presentation • Complete an empirical project involving replication and extension of published work MIT Economics Ph.D. (MEP) students wishing to satisfy major field requirements for labor should take Ultimate 661. Minor field requirements can be met by passing 661 Lite. Undergraduates and other non- MEP students take 661 Lite. Grading • Ultimate: 4 problem sets (10 points each); final (25 points); empirical project (25 points); oral presentation (10) points; attendance (10 points) • Lite: 4 problem sets (10 points each); final (60 points); attendance (10 points) LMOD has our readings, assignments, and recitation material. Recitations will be held every Friday at 10 am in 432. READINGS First Part - Angrist Articles, handbook chapters will be made available through Stellar. Books are also on reserve. An (M) flags studies done as part of an MIT thesis. -
Employment in the Keynesian and Neoliberal Universe: Theoretical Transformations and Political Correlations
Munich Personal RePEc Archive Employment in the Keynesian and neoliberal universe: theoretical transformations and political correlations Ioannidis, Yiorgos University of Crete May 2011 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45062/ MPRA Paper No. 45062, posted 15 Mar 2013 08:10 UTC Employment in the Keynesian and neoliberal universe: theoretical transformations and political correlations Ioannidis Yiorgos Paper prepared for CUA’s (Commission on Urban Anthropology) Annual Conference, “Market Vs Society? Human principles and economic rationale in changing times”, Corinth 27-29 May 2011 Abstract The question this paper poses relates to the role of economic theories in gaining wider support around political agendas. That is their ability to describe a problem in such a way, so that the “answer” would appear not as a political demand in favor of one class, but as a prerequisite for the general well being. The main argument is that in the context of Keynesian economics, labour cost has been set in the periphery of the theory, allowing labour relations to become a subject of social-political regulation. By contrast, neoclassical economic theory and its successors place the cost of labour at the core of the theory, which in turn means that any attempt to regulate labour relations by non- economic criteria undermines the common wellbeing. Neither the first nor the second theoretical setting predetermines or abolishes class and political conflicts. But they both produce general attitudes with political consequences. Keywords: employment theory, unemployment theory, political agendas In 1944 Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 159) wrote that “class interests offer only a limited explanation of long-run movements in society. -
Karl Marx Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
Karl Marx Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Progress Publishers, Moscow 1959; Translated by Martin Milligan, revised by Dirk J. Struik, contained in Marx/Engels, Gesamtausgabe, Abt. 1, Bd. 3. First Manuscript Wages of Labor Wages are determined through the antagonistic struggle between capitalist and worker. Victory goes necessarily to the capitalist. The capitalist can live longer without the worker than can the worker without the capitalist. Combination among the capitalists is customary and effective; workers’ combination is prohibited and painful in its consequences for them. Besides, the landowner and the capitalist can make use of industrial advantages to augment their revenues; the worker has neither rent nor interest on capital to supplement his industrial income. Hence the intensity of the competition among the workers. Thus only for the workers is the separation of capital, landed property, and labour an inevitable, essential and detrimental separation. Capital and landed property need not remain fixed in this abstraction, as must the labor of the workers. The separation of capital, rent, and labor is thus fatal for the worker. The lowest and the only necessary wage rate is that providing for the subsistence of the worker for the duration of his work and as much more as is necessary for him to support a family and for the race of laborers not to die out. The ordinary wage, according to Smith, is the lowest compatible with common humanity6, that is, with cattle-like existence. The demand for men necessarily governs the production of men, as of every other commodity. -
Karl Marx: an Early Post-Keynesian? a Comparison of Marx's Economics with the Contributions by Sraffa, Keynes, Kalecki and Minsky
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Hein, Eckhard Working Paper Karl Marx: An early post-Keynesian? A comparison of Marx's economics with the contributions by Sraffa, Keynes, Kalecki and Minsky Working Paper, No. 118/2019 Provided in Cooperation with: Berlin Institute for International Political Economy (IPE) Suggested Citation: Hein, Eckhard (2019) : Karl Marx: An early post-Keynesian? A comparison of Marx's economics with the contributions by Sraffa, Keynes, Kalecki and Minsky, Working Paper, No. 118/2019, Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht Berlin, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE), Berlin This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195935 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. -
Undeclared Labour in Cournot Oligopoly
Undeclared Labour in Cournot Oligopoly Minas Vlassis †ǂ Stefanos Mamakis ‡ǂ Abstract In a duopoly where firms are competing by adjusting their quantities and the wages are exogenously determined, we analyze the undeclared labour phenomenon and its side effects in product market. Our analysis focuses on the opportunity cost between the taxation and the contributions for social security. The findings of our analysis indicate that there is a strong relationship between the tax rate, the rate of contributions for social insurance and undeclared labour. It is furthermore determined that any combination of tax (t) / contributions (k) rates under the curve, will lead firms to practice undeclared labour, in order to avoid paying contributions for social security, since the alternative choice is more costly. Keywords: Undeclared Labour, Cournot Duopoly, Labour Unions, Unionisation, Endogenous Objectives JEL Classification Numbers: J50; J51; L13; E26; H26 †Corresponding Author: Department of Economics, University of Crete, University Campus at “Gallos”, 74100 Rethymno, Crete, Greece. Tel: ++2831077396, Fax: ++2831077404, e-mail: [email protected] ‡Department of Economics, University of Crete, E-mail: [email protected] Page 1 / 9 Introduction Undeclared work is defined as "any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to public authorities". It is a complex phenomenon associated with tax evasion and social security fraud. Undeclared labour concerns various types of activities, ranging from informal household services to clandestine work by illegal residents, but excludes criminal activities. It is a process that may engage both employers and employees voluntarily, because of the potential gain in avoiding taxes and social security contributions, social rights and the cost of complying with regulations. -
The Division of Labour, Capitalism and Socialism: an Alternative to Sayer
The Division of Labour, Capitalism and Socialism: An Alternative to Sayer JAMIE GOUGH AND ARAM EISENSCHITZ Introduction In a recent article in this journal, Andrew Sayer (1995) argues that most of the division of labour within capitalism is technically rather than socially constructed, and is thus necessary for an efficient economy. In particular, as Hayek argued, the division of labour between enterprises is determined by their acquisition and use of fast-changing specialist knowledge. Much marxist work has therefore been wrong in seeing problems of economic coordination as arising from capitalist social relations rather than as being technical problems which would arise in any industrial society. Any alternative to the present economy must therefore respect these divisions of labour if it is to avoid economic stagnation. Sayer argues for a form of ‘market socialism’ based on cooperatives in which the division of labour between enterprises is similar to capitalism, though there could be changes within the enterprise (see also Sayer, 1992; Sayer and Walker, 1992: Chapters 1 and 6). We present here a critique of the major parts of Sayer’s argument and reply to criticisms which Sayer makes of our work as representative of orthodox marxism; we develop an alternative analysis of the division of labour and political perspectives on it. We agree with Sayer that the issue of economic coordination is of central importance and that the possible forms that this might take within capitalism or models of socialism is a difficult, non-trivial question. However, we find Sayer’s contribution to this debate unhelpful. We will argue that, in analysing capitalism, Sayer greatly underestimates the ways in which the division of labour both within and between enterprises is shaped by the process of exploitation, the fragmented form of investment and the guidance of individual profit, that is, by distinctively capitalist processes.