Border Crossings Between Palestine
Palestine Border Crossings Study
DRAFT Terms of Reference (Oct. 14 2009)
1. Background:
Border crossings between Palestine and Israel (the Parties) are one of the issues to be negotiated between the Parties as part of Permanent Status Negotiations between them. Indeed, during the 2008 Annapolis negotiations, the Parties established a specific committee to negotiate all issues related to bilateral border crossings. However, the negotiations were interrupted before the parties reached any agreements or understandings on border crossings issues.
Strong linkages exist between border crossings issues and other Permanent Status issues related to borders, security and economic relations between the parties: the location of the crossings will be determined according to the agreed borders between the States of Palestine and Israel; the number and operation of these crossings will depend on the economic relations that will exist between the Parties and the agreed security arrangements between them. At the same time, the location, number and modes of operation of these crossings will have serious implications on the movement of cargo (trade) between the Parties, as well as the movement of passengers – labor, businessmen, visitors, tourists, people in transit and any others wishing to use the crossings.
a. Israel Unilaterally Established Crossings in the West Bank and Gaza – Facts on the Ground:
Since 2001, Israel has unilaterally established a number of "crossings" along the route of the Separation Wall (Wall) in the West Bank that function for the movement of either goods (cargo), people, (labor and passengers) or both, between areas located east of the Wall and areas located west of the Wall. Some of these crossings are designated for Israeli settler use, while others are designated for Palestinian use. The main crossings that serve Palestinians are: (1) Bisan Crossing (at the northern edge of the Jordan Valley); (2) Jalameh Crossing (north of Jenin); (3) Tulkarem Crossing (south-west of Tulkarem) and the (4) Tarqumya Crossing (north-west of Hebron). Only the Bisan Crossing is located directly on the 1967 Green Line. All of the other crossings are located east of the line – the Jalameh and Tulkarem Crossing are closer to the Green Line, whereas the Tarqumya crossing is located deep inside the West Bank. In addition to the aforementioned four crossings, and as part of its closure regime, Israel established a number of cargo and passengers crossings near several of the main Palestinian cities (e.g. Betunya Crossing [cargo] and Qalandya Crossing [passengers] in Ramallah). Israel unilaterally controls and operates all of the crossings discussed above.
In Gaza, Israel established a number of crossings. The main two crossings are Erez (for passengers) and Karni (for cargo). The other, smaller, crossings are: Kissufim (for fuel); Sufa (for bulk and heavy cargo) and; Kerem Shalom (intended for commercial imports from Egypt, but used mainly for humanitarian aid after the closure of the Karni crossing).
These unilaterally controlled and operated Gaza crossings were designed to function as security checkpoints rather than as commercial crossings. Waiting times at the crossings are very long. Additionally, they employ an outdated Back to Back system, wherein cargo is unloaded from one truck and loaded to another truck with forklifts, which is time consuming and results in considerable damage to cargo. These crossings allow loaded containers to enter the Palestinian side but do not allow loaded containers to travel in the other direction, into Israel. In addition, these crossings lack the requisite equipment to facilitate the efficient movement of cargo.
As a result, these crossings have had severely negative effects on the movement of both cargo and people and have resulted, and continue to result, in substantial economic damages and losses to the Palestinian private sector and Palestinian economy because they raise transaction costs considerably for Palestinian businesses and limit such business’ ability to compete in local and international markets.
The yet to be agreed bilateral crossings between the States of Palestine and Israel need to be designed to serve not as security checkpoints that hamper the movement of goods and passengers but, rather, as commercial crossings that facilitate the movement of goods and passengers, while applying agreed, efficient and reasonable security measures. b. Crossings with Jordan and Egypt:
The official Palestinian position during the Annapolis negotiations was that the crossings with Jordan and Egypt are a bilateral issue to be negotiated with these countries and not with Israel. In the event, the Parties agreed to limit the negotiations between them to the bilateral crossings between the Parties and to delay discussions on Palestine’s crossings with Egypt and Jordan to a later stage.
Notwithstanding this prior negotiation history, the Palestinian negotiating position should be developed to encompass all issues related to the operation of all envisaged crossings, including options for possible third party operations and security roles, in preparation for negotiations with these countries and possibly Israel.
There are currently two crossings with Jordan – the Allenby Bridge and the Damya Bridge. For a brief period, the Palestinian Wing at the Allenby Bridge was operated by the PNA in accordance with the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement. However, in 2001, Israel expelled the Palestinian presence at Allenby and unilaterally assumed operation of the bridge, in direct breach of the Interim Agreement. The Damya Bridge was operated unilaterally by Israel previously but has now been closed since 2005. Israel claims that the Damya was damaged and needs to be rehabilitated. A third crossing, the Prince Abdullah Bridge, exists but also is not operative.
Historically, the Rafah Crossing provided for the movement of passengers and goods between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. In November 2005, and as part of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, control over the Rafah Crossing was transferred to the PNA, which operated it in accordance with the AMA and its Annexes. The Crossing
2 provided for the movement of Passengers and Commercial Exports to Egypt and in a later stage also should have served commercial imports from Egypt. The Kerem Shalom Crossing was built to provide, on a temporary basis, for commercial imports from Egypt but was never operated for that purpose. In July 2007, Israel unilaterally closed the Rafah crossing in retaliation for the capture of one of its soldiers in Gaza.
2. The Study: a. Bilateral Border Crossings with Israel:
The external Advisor should provide the NSU with a comprehensive study with clear recommendations on:
(1) the optimal number of border crossings between the States of Palestine and Israel;
(2) the optimal locations for these crossings on the 1967 Green Line;
(3) the services to be provided at these crossings – designated crossings for cargo/people/fuel or multifunctional crossing/s that provide all services;
(4) procedures for operating the crossings in an efficient and secure manner.
These recommendations need to be developed closely with internal NSU Advisors, after the external Advisor visits the oPt meets and confers with the NSU and relevant Palestinian stakeholders (as necessary) and collects required data and materials for the successful completion of the study. b. Crossings with Jordan and Egypt:
The study should also provide recommendations on:
(1) a possible third party operating and security role on the border crossings with Jordan and Egypt and possibly also with respect to Palestinian air and sea ports (based on prior experience with the EUBAM role at the Rafah Crossing);
(2) procedures for operating these crossings.
3. Time for completing the Study and Final Outcome:
We foresee that 15 consultancy days will be required to complete the study, which would consist of a written report addressing all issues noted above. The exact length of the report shall be agreed upon further discussion of these draft ToRs with the External Advisor.
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