EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 Copyright of this publication is held by the European Council on Foreign Relations. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non-commercial use. EUROPEAN Any other use requires the prior written permission of the European Council on Foreign Relations. FOREIGN POLICY © ECFR January 2013. Published by the SCORECARD European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) 35 Old Queen Street London SW1H 9JA 2013 [email protected]

ISBN: 978-1-906538-73-6 STEERING GROUP Vaira Vike-Freiberga and António Vitorino (co-chairs) Lluís Bassets, Charles Clarke, Robert Cooper, Teresa Gouveia, Heather Grabbe, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, István Gyamarti, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Wolfgang Ischinger, Sylvie Kauffmann, Gerald Knaus, Nils Muiznieks, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Ruprecht Polenz, Albert Rohan, Nicolò Russo Perez, Klaus Scharioth, Aleksander Smolar, Paweł S’wieboda, Teija Tiilikainen

ECFR DIRECTOR Mark Leonard

ECFR RESEARCH TEAM Justin Vaïsse and Susi Dennison (project leaders) Hans Kundnani (editor) Jonas Parello-Plesner (China), Jana Kobzova and Kadri Liik (Russia), Justin Vaïsse (United States), Dimitar Bechev and Jana Kobzova (Wider Europe), Susi Dennison, Julien Barnes-Dacey, Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Levy and Nick Witney (Middle East and North Africa), Richard Gowan (Multilateral Issues and Crisis Management).

RESEARCHERS IN MEMBER STATES Verena Knaus (Austria), Hans Diels (Belgium), Antonia Doncheva and Marin Lessinski (Bulgaria), Philippos Savvides (Cyprus), David Kral (Czech Republic), Emma Knudsen (Denmark), Andres Kasekamp (Estonia), Teemu Rantanen (Finland), Olivier de France (France), Olaf Boehnke and Felix Mengel (Germany), George Tzogopoulos (Greece), Zsuzsanna Végh (Hungary), Ben Tonra (Ireland), Greta Galeazzi (Italy), Inese Loce (Latvia), Vytis Jurkonis (Lithuania), Hans Diels (Luxemburg), Cetta Mainwaring (Malta), Paul and Saskia van Genugten (Netherlands), Marcin Terlikowski (Poland), Lívia Franco (Portugal), Irina Angelescu (Romania), Sabina Kajncˇ (Slovenia), Teodor Gyelník (Slovakia), Laia Mestres (Spain), Jan Joel Andersson (Sweden), Catarina Tulley (United Kingdom). Acknowledgements Contents

The authors would above all like to thank the Steering Group for Foreword 6 their advice and input, which has been an enormous help. Numerous other policymakers, analysts, and specialists gave input to specific Preface 7 components and greatly contributed to the Scorecard’s depth and accuracy. In particular, Christina Markus Lassen commented on the Introduction 9 section on the Middle East and North Africa. However, any mistakes in the text are the responsibility of the authors. Chapter 1: China 24

Numerous members of ECFR staff helped in various ways, especially Chapter 2: Russia 40 Janek Lasocki, who coordinated the project and kept it on track. Once again Lorenzo Marini did a brilliant job in developing and Chapter 3: United States 58 managing the Scorecard website. Niall Finn and Madeline Storck helped with research. Chapter 4: Wider Europe 75

At the Brookings Institution, Antonia Doncheva worked tirelessly Chapter 5: Middle East to coordinate the research of the 27 researchers in the member and North Africa 92 states, manage tables and grades, compile dates, and check facts and figures, with great professionalism. Clara O’Donnell, Steven Pifer, Chapter 6: Multilateral Issues and Domenico Lombardi at Brookings provided very valuable input. and Crisis Management 109 Richard Gowan would also like to thank Edward Burke. Scores and Grades 129 (complete tables) Classification of Member States 134 (complete tables) Abbreviations 140 About the authors 141 Foreword Preface

The Compagnia di San Paolo is one of the largest independent foundations It is a pleasure for us to present the 2013 edition of the European Foreign Policy in Europe and one of the main private funders of research in the fields of EU Scorecard, an ECFR initiative that aims to achieve an overall evaluation of the affairs and international relations. Over the past few years, the Compagnia foreign-policy effectiveness of the EU during the course of the past year. We has progressively consolidated its profile in these fields, signing strategic were particularly pleased to note that EU foreign policy was reasonably resilient partnership agreements with institutions such as the German Marshall Fund in 2012 as the EU itself appeared to emerge from its period of crisis. of the United States and the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Our overall goal is to foster a truly European debate on the main issues the EU faces and to encourage The Scorecard is now in its third year and, as such, it is becoming an important the emergence of a European political space. tool for tracking trends in the development of European foreign policy. We therefore put emphasis on continuity in the methodology in order to enable In these fields, the Compagnia is also a founding member of an initiative of meaningful comparison between European foreign-policy performance in 2012 regional Cooperation, the European Fund for the Balkans, set up with three and in the previous two years. other European foundations – the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the King Baudouin Foundation and the ERSTE Stiftung – with the aim of contributing to the As in the first two years of the Scorecard, we assessed the collective performance improvement of the administration of the countries of the Western Balkans, of all EU actors, rather than looking at the action of any particular institution with a view to their integration in the EU. or member state. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of Europe as a global actor, we focused on policies and results rather than on institutional processes. It is against this background, and as part of the Compagnia’s commitment We assigned two scores – “unity” and “resources”, each graded out of 5 – for to support research on the European integration process, that we continued European policies themselves, and a third score – “outcome”, graded out of the cooperation with the European Council on Foreign Relations on the third 10 – for results. The sum of these scores was then translated into a letter grade. edition of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard. We highly appreciate this cooperation with ECFR and we sincerely hope that this project will intensify the We also continued to evaluate the role played by individual member states on dialogue among various European stakeholders – both institutional and from 30 out of the 80 components of European foreign policy in which they played a civil society – with the goal of strengthening our understanding of Europe’s role particularly significant role. With the help of researchers in the 27 EU member as a global player. states, we classified each member state into three nominal categories as being either a “leader”, a “supporter”, or a “slacker” in each of these 30 components. Piero Gastaldo Such a categorisation obviously involves a political judgment. However, we have Secretary General strived to continue refining the process this year by explaining the reasoning Compagnia di San Paolo that led to the assigning of each category.

6 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 7 One of the key developments in European foreign policy in the last three years Introduction was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Now fully operational, the EEAS has become a significant actor, not only in coordination and policymaking in Brussels, but also in EU delegations around the world. Given that the EEAS will be officially reviewed in 2013, and also in view of the significant impact that it now has on the implementation of foreign policy in the EU, we also undertook to examine its performance in detail alongside that of the other EU institutions and the member states. In particular, we tried to show where it was active and in what way. As the authors discuss in the introduction, a complex picture emerges of EEAS activity on different types of policy and in different regions. In the introduction to the first edition of the Scorecard, we wrote that in 2010 A full description of the Scorecard methodology can be found on ECFR’s Europe had been distracted by the euro crisis. In the introduction to the second website at http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard. However, we would like to reiterate edition, we wrote that in 2011 Europe had been diminished by the crisis. By the that the Scorecard project will continue to evolve as the EU itself evolves, and end of 2012, the crisis had become less acute but still not been solved – far from we therefore welcome your views and feedback on the way in which it assesses it. In fact, for the third year in a row, European leaders continued to devote European foreign-policy performance, as well the findings in this year’s edition. more time to worrying about Europe’s financial health than its geopolitical role. Europe’s image and soft power continued to fade around the world (though this Vaira Vike-Freiberga and António Vitorino is difficult to quantify), while its resources for defence and international affairs January 2013 kept eroding. But European foreign policy did not unravel in 2012. In fact, the EU managed to preserve the essence of its acquis diplomatique as the EEAS, which did not even exist two years earlier, continued to develop and consolidate its role.

The Scorecard’s granular assessment of European foreign-policy performance in 2012 shows timid signs of stabilisation and resilience. Across the range of issues that the Scorecard assesses, Europeans generally performed better than the previous year (see Figure 1). Europe improved its score in relation to Russia (from C+ to B-) and to China (from C to C+), and continued to perform solidly in other areas (United States (B-) and Multilateral issues (B), and adequately in the Wider Europe (C+) and the Middle East and North Africa (C+). Thus, although the EU had no high-profile successes comparable to the military intervention in Libya in 2011, it put in a respectable performance in its external relations – especially given the deep crisis with which it continued to struggle. In particular, it seemed to perform better when it continued to implement policies for which the foundations had been laid in previous years.

Clearly, whether the EU can turn a positive year against the odds into an upward trend in foreign-policy performance will depend to a large extent on whether it can overcome the crisis and restore growth and therefore increase its economic power. In that sense, European leaders are right to focus on solving the crisis even at the

8 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 9 Figure 1 European Performance on the six issues in 2012 guaranteeing European banks. Thus the crisis became less acute in the second half of 2012 than it was in 2011.

2012 2011 2010 However, while positive, these steps taken in 2012 do not yet go far enough to Score /20 Grade Score /20 Grade Score /20 Grade solve the crisis. As the crisis became less acute, European leaders – including German Chancellor Angela Merkel – seemed to become less determined to create Relations with China 9.7 C+ 8.5 C 9 C+ a genuine economic and political union and even watered down proposals for Relations with Russia 11 B- 10 C+ 9.5 C+ a banking union. Moreover, it is not clear that even the limited steps that the eurozone has taken are sustainable. In particular, while OMT was seen as a Relations with the United States 11.7 B- 11 B- 11 B- breakthrough by many in Europe and elsewhere in the world, it was seen as a defeat in Germany. Since the June summit, there has been a backlash, expressed Relations with Wider Europe 10.3 C+ 9.5 C+ 9.5 C+ most powerfully by Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, who even implicitly compared Draghi to the devil in a remarkable speech in Frankfurt in September. Relations with the Middle Germany may now have reached the limits of debt mutualisation under its East and North Africa 10.3 C+ 10 C+ – – existing constitution. In order to move further towards economic and political Multilateral issues and union, as the eurozone must, a referendum may be needed in Germany as well crisis management 12.6 B 13 B 14/11 B+ / B- as in other member states. The steps taken in 2012 to stabilise the euro crisis may therefore have produced a temporary respite, with further turmoil to come, rather than a lasting solution to the crisis. expense of a focus on foreign-policy issues. But it will also depend on whether Europeans can overcome their internal divisions and improve coordination and Furthermore, in the process of stabilising the eurozone in 2012, the EU itself coherence in foreign policy. In particular, it will depend on whether Europe can now faces difficult questions. A three-tier Europe consisting of the inner core turn the EEAS into an effective diplomatic service as envisaged in the Lisbon of the eurozone, pre-ins such as Poland, and outs such as the UK is emerging Treaty that is able to convert the EU’s huge resources into power. from the crisis. This raises huge institutional questions for the EU, which may take years and require treaty change to resolve, though European leaders are understandably reluctant to create the further uncertainty that would involve. In The eurozone, the EU, and the neighbourhood addition, a British withdrawal from the EU looks increasingly possible. If 2011 was the year of the “German question” – that is, the debate about Germany’s In 2012, the eurozone was stabilised. In June, following an inconclusive role in and commitment to the EU – 2012 was the year that the “British question” election a month earlier, the Greek people elected Antonis Samaras as prime emerged. Whether or not the UK decides to leave the EU – a step that we think minister. Mario Draghi showed bold leadership after he succeeded Jean-Claude would be disastrous for both Britain itself and for the EU as a whole – the Trichet as ECB president at the end of 2011. The new Long-Term Refinancing emergence of a three-tier Europe will have huge consequences for the single Operation (LTRO) programme he launched as soon as he took over – in effect, market and for European foreign policy. an injection of liquidity to European banks – went a long way to reassuring markets about their solvency. The Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Meanwhile, as Europe struggled with these complex problems, its neighbourhood programme he initiated in the summer – a promise by the ECB to step in and also remained challenging in 2012. Though an Israeli military strike against Iran buy unlimited quantities of certain bonds on the secondary market – turned the did not materialise ahead of the US presidential election in November, there ECB into the kind of lender of last resort for which many in Europe and beyond remains the possibility of such a strike in 2013. The conflict in Syria became the had been calling. In late June, European leaders also agreed on the creation of focal point of a broader regional struggle for influence along a sectarian Shia– a banking union, which they confirmed in December – a further positive step in Sunni faultline. In November, as tensions with Gaza increased, Israel launched

10 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 11 Operation Pillar of Defence. Meanwhile, the transitions in post-revolutionary Europeans also slightly improved their performance on the United States, North Africa remained fragile and renewed protests late in the year in Egypt especially in their cooperation with Washington on regional and global issues, forced President Mohammed Morsi to annul a decree granting himself new which helped them further their own goals while having the US respect their powers ahead of a constitutional vote. Although enlargement continued as red lines – for example, in sanctions on Iran. Finally, the only issue on which Croatia was set to become the twenty-eighth member of the EU and Serbia Europe performed worse in 2012 than in 2011 was multilateral issues and crisis became a candidate, the environment in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood was management (the overall score out of 20 went down from 13 to 12.5, or a B). New difficult, especially in the Western Balkans. CSDP missions were launched – something that had not happened in the last two years – and European policy towards Somalia grew more coherent. But the EU was rebuffed by Russia and China in the UNSC with two vetoes on Syria and A surprisingly good year by the United States on the arms-trade treaty; they failed to make an impact on the UN vote on Palestine; and the G20 was still dominated by the euro crisis as However, against this background of a challenging internal and external in 2011. environment, Europe performed surprisingly well in its foreign policy in 2012. Russia was a case in point. Relations with Moscow deteriorated, but Europe’s In the eastern neighbourhood, European performance was mixed. Europeans unity and the coherence of its policies towards Russia improved. The EU did not continued to struggle in the Western Balkans in 2012 (B, the same grade as in 2011), depart from its cooperative attitude, having been instrumental in getting Russia with political instability and economic difficulties from Bosnia and Herzegovina into the WTO, which it formally joined in August. But it was more attentive to Serbia and Montenegro, although the EEAS managed to make good progress to protecting its interests and norms, and more assertive – threatening, for on relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The EU also got mixed results in the example, to use the WTO dispute-settlement system when Moscow announced Eastern Partnership countries (C+). Its results were good in Moldova, and to new protectionist measures in late 2012. The European Commission launched some extent in Georgia, and it had a firm, coherent approach towards Belarus, an antitrust probe against Gazprom, while continuing to orchestrate efforts at but Europeans struggled to pursue a united approach to Azerbaijan and Ukraine. enhancing gas interconnections so as to decrease Europe’s energy dependency Lastly, Europeans continued to struggle on Turkey (C), with a muddled situation on Moscow. Europeans did not shy away from criticising human-rights abuses on bilateral relations and frustrating developments on foreign policy. during the crackdown on demonstrations that accompanied the election season and the re-election of Vladimir Putin as president in March. Europe’s southern neighbourhood was dominated by the conflict in Syria. Europeans could not break the frustrating diplomatic gridlock or prevent the There were also signs of modest improvement in relations with China, even though bloody tragedy that worsened as the year went on. Europe’s overall performance unity among member states continued to be in short supply, thereby undermining in the region remained fairly constant (the overall score was 10.1 last year and European leverage. Germany, which accounts for nearly half of European exports 10.3 this year, or a C+). Member states were generally united in their initiatives to China, seemed at times to speak for Europe in China. But even if Berlin does towards Iran and North Africa but, beset by the economic crisis, they couldn’t not want to replace the EU, its voice is naturally louder than others, and Beijing move beyond limited programmatic support to the transitions and struggled to has become adept at cultivating it. In some respects, Germany was a leader on make a positive political impact with governments and to construct collective China in 2012, but Merkel also undermined the European Commission when relations with newly politically engaged parts of society in the region. They it launched an anti-dumping case against Chinese solar-panel manufacturers. were still split on the Israeli–Palestinian issue, though to a lesser degree than Still, Europeans in general became more assertive overall in their trade disputes in previous years, as demonstrated by the November UNGA vote on upgrading with Beijing and in their criticism of human-rights violations. The panicked Palestinian membership. approach of 2011, when Europe was both hoping for and fearing massive Chinese investment in the continent to relieve the euro crisis, was replaced by a more We gave Europe four A grades – the same number as last year – for its performance restrained and balanced relationship. on specific components of European foreign policy (see Figure 2). Overall, it appears that, where the EU made progress in 2012 – in particular, in regions

12 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 13 Figure 2 Figure 3 Most successful policies in 2012 Least successful policies in 2012 Unity Resources Outcome Total Grade Unity Resources Outcome Total Grade

37 Relations with the US on Iran 54 Security sector reform and weapons proliferation 4 5 8 17 A- 2 1 2 5 D+

35 Relations with the US on the 11 Relations with China on reforming Syrian conflict 4 4 8 16 A- global governance 2 2 2 6 C-

41 Kosovo 4 4 8 16 A- 7 Relations with China on the Dalai Lama and Tibet 2 3 2 7 C- 48 Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood on trade 4 5 7 16 A- 26 Reciprocity on visa procedures with the US 2 2 3 7 C- 12 Relations with China on climate change 4 5 6 15 B+ 34 Relations with the US on the Middle East Peace Process 2 3 2 7 C- 27 Relations with the US on trade and investment 4 4 7 15 B+ 43 Bilateral relations with Turkey 3 2 2 7 C-

55 Tunisia 4 4 7 15 B+ 44 Rule of law, democracy and human rights in Turkey 3 2 2 7 C- 69 European policy on human rights at the UN 4 4 7 15 B+ 45 Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question 3 2 2 7 C- 74 Drought in the Sahel 4 4 7 15 B+ 58 Algeria and Morocco 2 2 3 7 C- 78 Somalia 4 4 7 15 B+ 66 UN reform 2 2 3 7 C- 13 Trade liberalisation with Russia 5 4 5 14 B+

33 Relations with the US on the Arab transitions 4 4 6 14 B+

39 Overall progress of enlargement in the Western Balkans 4 4 6 14 B+

60 Lebanon 4 3 7 14 B+

70 European policy on the ICC and international tribunals 4 3 7 14 B+

14 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 15 Figure 4 European performance on cross-cutting themes such as China and Russia, on enlargement in its neighbourhood, and on the E3+3 process with Iran – it was where a policy had been developed in previous years and member states worked together with the EU institutions to implement it. In Cross-Cutting Themes* in 2012 Score Grade 2011 2010 out of 20 these cases, there was less need for innovation than in some other cases such as Trade liberalisation, standards Syria, but a strong demand for member-state unity behind a pre-agreed strategy. and norms - “low politics” 14 B+ 12.5 B 13 B On these types of areas, the euro crisis did not seem to undermine European Iran and proliferation 13 B 13 B 16 A- performance.

Energy policy 12.5 B 12 B- 10 C+ An analysis of European performance on “cross-cutting themes” (see Figure 4)

Relations with Asia 12.5 B n/a n/a illustrates the type of issues on which Europeans did well in 2012 and those on which they did less well. It appears that Europeans tended to do well in those Climate change 12 B 14 B+ 12 B- components of foreign policy in which the EEAS or the European Commission plays a strong coordinating role, for example on trade issues, in negotiations Balkans 12 B- 13 B 12 B- with Iran, and in the Balkans. However, this pattern should not be overstated: Afghanistan 12 B- 10 C+ 10 C+ Europeans also performed relatively well in 2012 on components relating to the euro crisis and Afghanistan – issues on which member states are to a large extent Issues of war and peace - 12 B- 11 B- 11 B- “high politics” in the lead.

Arab transitions 11 B- 12 B- n/a Visa policy 10 C+ 10 C+ 12 B- The big three and “coalitions of the willing” Euro crisis 10 C+ 8.5 C n/a In the last edition of the Scorecard, we identified a trend towards the Israel/Palestine 10 C+ 8.5 C 9 C+ “renationalisation” of European foreign policy in 2011. Perhaps the most striking Protracted conflicts 9.5 C+ 8 C 10 C+ finding in our categorisation of member states in 2012 was the drop in the

Human rights 9 C+ 9 C+ 8 C leadership by the big three: Germany, France, and the UK. In 2011, Germany led Europe in 19 components of European foreign policy, France in 18, and Relations with Turkey 8 C n/a n/a the UK in 17. In 2012, Germany led only 12 times, and France and the UK 11 times (see Figure 5). In 2011, Sweden also emerged as one of the most frequent leaders in European foreign policy, particularly on multilateral issues and crisis management. Although in 2012 it led on 10 components of European foreign policy compared to 11 in 2011, this time that made it almost as much of a leader * The cross-cutting themes in 2012 are the following: “Climate Change” combines components 12, 24, 38, 71. as the big three. Like France and Germany, Sweden was categorised as a leader in “Iran and proliferation” combines components 8, 22, 37, 63, 67. “Trade liberalisation, standards and norms” combines components 2, 3, 4, 13, 27, 28, 48, 68. at least one aspect of each of the chapters of the Scorecard, which indicates that “Balkans” combines 32, 39, 40, 41, 42. “Arab transitions” combines 23, 33, 35, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 64, 75. it is engaged across the spectrum of European foreign policy and not simply in “Issues of war and peace” combines 8, 19, 22, 23, 30, 31, 32 , 33, 34, 35, 37, 41, 42, 51, 55, 56, 57, 59, 62, 63, 67, 75,76, 77, 78, 79. regions of specific interest. The Netherlands also punched above its weight. “Energy policy” combines 20, 21, 46, 49. “Visa policy” combines 14, 26, 50. “Israel/Palestine” combines 23, 34, 62. “Human rights” combines 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 40, 44, 47, 52, 69, 70. In 2012, the UK’s relationship with the EU made headlines as Eurosceptic “Euro crisis” combines 5, 29, 65. “Afghanistan” combines 23, 79. sentiment within the UK grew and a withdrawal from the EU became a real “Protracted conflicts” combines 19, 51. “Relations with Asia” combines 9, 36. possibility. Prime Minister David Cameron came under increasing pressure from “Turkey”combines 43, 44, 45, 46. the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and, at the beginning of 2013, promised

16 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 17 Figure 5 Of the big three member states, France underwent the most obvious change “Leaders” and “slackers” among EU member states in 2012 after François Hollande took over from Nicolas Sarkozy as president. In some areas, such as a reframing of the relationship with “Françafrique” in On no. of On no. of LEADERS components SLACKERS components political terms, there was a conscious effort to mark a departure from the Germany 12 Greece 5 previous administration’s policy. In particular, the Hollande government France 11 Latvia 5 was much more active in the second half of the year in efforts to gather United Kingdom 11 Romania 5 international support for an African-led intervention in northern Mali and, Sweden 10 Spain 5 as the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013 showed, this will Netherlands 8 Lithuania 4 clearly continue to be a priority as the year progresses. On other issues, such Poland 5 Portugal 4 Czech Republic 4 Cyprus 3 as the early indication of support for the Palestinian bid for observer status Denmark 4 Slovenia 3 at the UNGA in November, the new government followed a similar line to its Finland 4 Austria 2 predecessor. France and the UK have both played leading roles in developing Ireland 4 Bulgaria 2 contacts with and supporting the Syrian opposition, although this does not Austria 3 Czech Republic 2 appear to have been closely coordinated either with each other or with other Belgium 3 Estonia 2 Estonia 3 France 2 EU partners. Italy 3 Germany 2 Bulgaria 2 Italy 2 Within Europe, the political affinity between Merkel and Sarkozy was replaced Hungary 2 Malta 2 by a more difficult Hollande–Merkel relationship. Together with Italian Prime Luxembourg 2 Belgium 1 Minister Mario Monti and Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, Hollande Spain 2 Denmark 1 pushed for greater emphasis on growth in solutions to tackle the euro crisis. As Latvia 1 Hungary 1 a result, Merkel sometimes found herself in a minority in the eurozone in 2012 Lithuania 1 Luxembourg 1 Romania 1 Netherlands 1 – something that had not happened in 2011. Germany was also criticised on Slovakia 1 Poland 1 foreign policy – in particular in relation to the emerging “special relationship” Cyprus 0 Slovakia 1 between China and Germany. However, Germany also frequently led Europe in Greece 0 United Kingdom 1 foreign policy – in particular through a new assertive approach towards Russia. Malta 0 Finland 0 Overall, Germany was again the most prolific leader in European foreign policy. Portugal 0 Ireland 0 It led on 12 components, often by taking initiative, and was also often an active Slovenia 0 Sweden 0 supporter – that is, a cheerleader rather than a bystander.

However, what is clear from the Scorecard’s findings is that the Franco-German axis did not operate as a central driver for foreign-policy initiatives in 2012. an “in/out” referendum on British membership of the EU by 2018. However, With the exceptions of the E3+3 process on Iran and efforts to persuade Russia the Scorecard shows that, even as it was marginalised within the EU, the UK to take a tougher line on Syria at the UN (both of which were part of more continued to play a constructive role in European foreign policy – often by formal processes), none of the significant smaller “coalitions of the willing” example-setting. In particular, the UK played a leading role in the UN context – in European foreign policy this year included both Germany and France as for example, in the debates on a post-Millennium Development Goals framework leaders. Where Germany and France did work together as leaders, usually as for development aid – and in smaller coalitions such as the E3+3 process on Iran. part of much broader coalitions, this was often as sponsors, for example on Even where it did not lead, it was broadly supportive of the development of EU tackling the food crisis and drought in the Sahel and on financial support to the foreign policymaking, and was a “slacker” only once in 2012 (on an EU–China MENA region, rather than as initiative takers. investment treaty to enable reciprocity in access to public procurement).

18 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 19 However, there was also a drop in the number of “slackers”, which suggests against Iran or by minimising disagreement in order to avoid paralysis, as that member states were not quite as disruptive of coherent collective action in the Kosovo–Serbia negotiations (five EU member states do not recognise as they were in 2011. The top “slackers” were Greece (which we identified as Kosovo). It can powerfully represent Europe’s collective decisions, as it did a “slacker” two times less than in 2011), Latvia (once more than in 2011), and with the opening of an office in Burma in 2012 – a prelude to the opening of a Romania and Spain (the same number of times as in 2011). Cyprus (which full-fledged EU delegation in 2013. held the rotating presidency in the second half of 2011), Italy, and Poland were “slackers” four times less than last year. (In the case of Italy, this suggests that In other cases, the EEAS is able to be more assertive in exercising EU leverage, Monti and his foreign minister, Giulio Terzi, were successful in re-launching for example in visa policy towards Russia and the Western Balkans. It can also Italy’s international engagement.) This trend towards greater cooperation is take initiative independently of, but coordinated with, national diplomacies, as particularly clear on Russia, where we found no “slackers” (and in fact very few it has done in developing policy towards and organising financial support for leaders apart from Germany). In other words, member states did not invest the transition states in North Africa and coordinating it with the United States. heavily but were supportive of the overall EU effort. But for all the progress on this front, European foreign policy still functions most effectively when there are engines – often the EU3 or “coalitions of the willing” including other member states such as Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Poland. The role the EEAS plays is also different in different The challenge for the EEAS: technocratic Europe parts of the world: in Washington, the EU delegation finds itself working with and power Europe more powerful and often much larger embassies from all 27 member states; in countries where the EU gives out large amounts of aid, the EU delegation is Whether the trend towards the renationalisation of European foreign policy often de facto the most important Western diplomatic representation. that began with the euro crisis will continue in the years ahead will depend in part on whether the overall machinery of European foreign policy becomes Thus assessing the performance of the EEAS is a complex task. The Scorecard more efficient – in other words, to what extent Europeans are able to apply the suggests that, after a difficult first two years marked by high expectations, the various instruments that they have at their disposal. In particular, it was hoped euro crisis, and the Arab Awakening, the EEAS began to function better in 2012, that the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS would help Europe become although it is far from having reached its full potential. It is undoubtedly still more effective in bringing together in a coherent way the economic, diplomatic, preoccupied by organisational problems, Indeed, one of the main objectives and military resources of the member states on classical foreign-policy issues that High Representative Catherine Ashton has given herself is to establish a and the external competences of the European Commission on issues such as full-fledged and functioning diplomatic corps during the course of her five-year trade and aid. Reconciling these two Europes that interact with the world – the term in office. But the EEAS is structurally slowed down by the fundamental “technocratic Europe” and the “power Europe” – is the main challenge for the imperative of coordination between the 27 member states, which imposes a EEAS. The official review of its development that will be carried out in 2013 heavy constraint on its agility (even when it succeeds). Whether in Brussels or will offer an opportunity to test its record in this regard. in the major EU delegations, the EEAS is all about coordination, while modern diplomacy in the digital age requires ever-greater responsiveness and velocity. As the Scorecard illustrates, the EEAS plays very different roles in different policy areas. It interacts with national diplomacies in various ways, from full Within these constraints, the diplomatic culture of the EEAS seems responsibility to shared competence or sometimes marginalisation – usually gradually to be changing for the better. Initially, it was mostly staffed by high-level UN diplomacy or military crises such as Libya in 2011 or Syria in EU civil servants working for the European Commission, with a culture of 2012. But the EEAS can also support the big member states, for example by implementing programmes and managing only certain issues such as trade directly negotiating with Iranians on the nuclear issue. It can help deliver and the environment. However, the substantial infusion of diplomats from strong European policies, for example by helping to convince reluctant member states has brought a culture of power relations, emergency, and member states to diversify their energy supplies in preparation for sanctions crisis management – in short, a diplomatic culture. As a result, relations with

20 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 21 member states, including between EU delegations and embassies across the Internal and external challenges world, have improved markedly. A positive change in attitudes towards the EEAS in the large machineries of the biggest member states is also taking place TThe near horizon is marked by serious challenges – any one of which could as diplomats realise they will have to serve in it at some point in their careers. undermine the modest recovery in European foreign-policy performance in 2012. There are already indications from key strategic partners that they are beginning The Scorecard suggests that the lack of a consensus among member states does to see the euro crisis as the “new normal” – in other words, that they are planning not necessarily prevent the EEAS from playing a useful role on a given issue, for a future in which European power continues to decrease. Europe’s lack of a even if it means that it must play a different and reduced role than it can when collective defence strategy, and its declining investment in its defence capacity, there is consensus. But the danger is that the “technocratic Europe”, largely is also a serious obstacle to continuing global influence as a security actor. This led by the European Commission, will be increasingly cut off from the “power makes it even more important that the EEAS is able to bring together CSDP with Europe” of member states. In the Middle East and North Africa, EU task forces wider foreign-policy efforts. These matters are daunting enough with the EU’s were created to help bridge this gap. Unfortunately, a lack of clarity across the current structure. But the impact of a British withdrawal from the EU on these EU about the objectives of this policy tool meant that, while they were successful and numerous other questions would be potentially huge. as investment conferences and in developing lines of communication with broader sections of society than classic government-to-government relations Europe will also have to deal with these challenges at a time when the United allowed, they did not succeed as an EU initiative to support political reform in States is increasingly becoming what Michael Mandelbaum has called a “frugal countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. superpower” and is “pivoting” towards Asia. In January 2012, President Barack Obama outlined a new defence strategy based on the idea of a “leaner” military As the EEAS develops and feels more confident that it has the backing of and a shift of focus towards Asia. In the future, as this strategic rebalancing the member states’ diplomatic services, it may begin to innovate more and becomes a reality, the US presence in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood may develop effective mechanisms, diplomatic practices, and policy itself. There become more intermittent and low-cost. As it supplies its own energy needs, it were some examples of this in 2012, such as the joint visits by the Bulgarian, may also have less of an automatic interest in the southern neighbourhood and Polish, and Swedish foreign ministers to Lebanon and Iraq, and the inclusion aim instead to “lead from behind” in the Middle East. Although the US will not of an EEAS representative in the Danish foreign ministry’s team for a visit leave Europe altogether – in particular, Iran and Syria may continue to pull the by a senior Chinese delegation. Spanish diplomats were also housed by the US back in 2013 – it is likely to work with others as well as Europeans as part of EU delegation in Syria and Yemen after the Spanish embassies were closed what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called a “multi-partner” strategy. and the EEAS represented Bulgarian citizens sentenced to death in Malaysia in October. However, many member states are still expanding their bilateral This long-term shift in US foreign policy will further increase the pressure on representation and continue to take the EU presidency very seriously. While Europe to deal with its own neighbourhood. Although the EU has become more the EEAS became a much more significant actor in 2012, member states are effective towards Russia this year, tensions have, if anything, grown and may a long way from investing in it to the extent that it is able to realise the full continue to do so in 2013. Insecurity in the Sahel, which was already a growing potential range of roles that it could play and from reconciling “technocratic concern in 2012, has in the first month of 2013 led one EU member state to go to Europe” and “power Europe”. war in a region not far off the EU’s doorstep. Europeans are likely to be dealing with the fallout of the attempted takeover of Mali by Islamist rebel groups this time next year and feeling the consequences for years to come. Despite the euro crisis, the EU foreign policymaking machine has continued to function in 2012 and indeed has been moderately successful. But getting by for a second year is unlikely to be enough to deal with the challenges that 2013 looks set to present.

22 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 23 China Overall grade 2012 2011 2010 Overall grade 2011 C TRADE LIBERALISATION AND OVERALL RELATIONSHIP C+ C+ B- 1 Formats of the Europe-China dialogue B- C+ C+ Overall grade 2010 C+ C+ 2 Investment and market access in China B- B- B- 3 Reciprocity in access to public procurement C C C+ in Europe and China 4 Trade disputes with China B B- B- 5 Cooperation with China on the euro crisis C C- n/a

HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE C D+ C- 6 Rule of law and human rights in China C D+ D+ 7 Relations with China on the Dalai Lama and Tibet C- D+ D+

COOPERATION ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES B- B- C+ 8 Relations with China on Iran and proliferation B- B- B+ 9 Relations with China in Asia B n/a n/a 10 Relations with China on Africa B- B- C+ 11 Relations with China on reforming global governance C- C- C- 12 Relations with China on climate change B+ B+ B

2012 was a year of change in China as the new generation of leaders, headed by Xi Jinping, who will run China for the next five years, took over. The new number two, Li Keqiang, is widely viewed as a reformer and his pet project on sustainable urbanisation has already been identified by the EU institutions as a new area of cooperation. But, on most other issues, the new leaders are likely to be as intransigent as ever. Meanwhile, Europe was forced to think about how it should respond to the US “pivot” to Asia and what its response would mean for its relationship with what will likely become the world’s largest economy in the next decade. Should it support the US, engage more in Asia as an independent actor, or stay out of Asian security issues altogether?

Notwithstanding High Representative Catherine Ashton’s visits to Asia in the middle of the year – what she called her “Asian Semester” – Europe seemed to be uncertain on how it could play a role in Asian security or even to react coherently to the pivot. During the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), EU member states stayed ominously silent on the maritime disputes between China and its neighbours. At the ASEAN Regional Forum in July, Ashton and her American counterpart,

24 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 25 Hillary Clinton, issued a joint statement on coordinating Asia policy, but this went member states. It is symptomatic of this tendency that the high-level economic unnoticed by the Chinese and other Asians. Nor, so far, has the statement become dialogue between the EU and China has not been held since December 2010. The the blueprint for a more strategic approach to Asia even within the EU. Later in EU postponed its aviation carbon tax scheme but the fight with China on this issue the year, the EU wasn’t invited to or even associated with the East Asia Summit, is likely to resume in 2013. in which President Barack Obama participated before making a high-profile visit to Burma. It was an unimpressive year for the EU in its attempts to secure Chinese cooperation in the Middle East. In 2011, Europe and the United States persuaded the Chinese Nevertheless, Europeans put in a slightly improved performance than in 2011. In to support UNSC Resolution 1970 and 1973 on Libya. But in 2012, in part because 2012, the EU seemed to be slightly less panic-stricken in its approach to China than of China’s perception that the West had exceeded its mandate in Libya, China it was in 2011, when it even cancelled the EU–China summit as it dealt with the joined Russia in blocking action against Syria (although China did twice make euro crisis. Instead of massively diversifying its currency reserves into European independent suggestions for stabilising the conflict in order to placate the Arab bonds, China made a sober but not exactly game-changing contribution to solving League and in particular Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which were disappointed by the euro crisis by contributing to bailouts through the IMF and kept up its public China’s veto). By establishing official contacts with the Syrian opposition, China support for the euro. Chinese companies and state institutions continued to see is preparing itself for the fall of President Bashar al-Assad, but will still reject opportunities to buy up European companies as they had in 2011. But against any Western intervention. On Iran, the EU maintained tight diplomatic contacts the background of a record $10 billion in Chinese investments in Europe, the EU with China, particularly through Ashton and the EU3 (France, Germany, and the inched slowly towards starting talks with China on an investment treaty that could United Kingdom), but China nevertheless openly opposed the EU’s sanctions. entail a reciprocal deal for protecting Chinese investments while also increasing market access for European companies in China. China was slightly more cooperative in Africa. The Chinese showed pragmatism and cooperated with France in the UNSC and in October gave a green light to There were two EU–China summits this year but they had little impact as member intervention in Mali. China’s economic interests in Sudan meant it stayed engaged states put much more energy into their bilateral relations. Ireland was the latest in the simmering conflict between South and North Sudan, and it even worked member state to sign a bilateral “strategic partnership” with China. Meanwhile, with the EU for clear statements on conflict reduction through the UNSC. China Central and Eastern European member states led by Poland held their own also indicated a shift towards more civil-society engagement and capacity building regional summit with China, which established an Eastern European secretariat in Africa rather than just building roads, but this was a response to criticism from in its foreign ministry that is focused on investment opportunities which includes African partners. Thus, although Chinese policy in Africa is changing, this is more a soft loan package from Chinese banks that is reminiscent of Chinese practices due to local pressure and its larger national interest in conflict mediation than to in Africa. But the closest bilateral relationship is now with Germany. Chancellor Western or European influence. Angela Merkel visited China twice in 2012, including once as part of the so-called government-to-government consultation in August, the largest official gathering The EEAS delegation in Beijing helped improve European consistency on human- China has with a foreign power. In fact, she – rather than the so-called troika – rights issues. But in general the shift away from collective European action towards seemed to be the key interlocutor for the Chinese on the euro crisis. China continued as member states pursued their own bilateral strategies, with Germany increasingly the main interlocutor for the Chinese and other member In September, there was also uncertainty about whether Merkel was speaking states struggling to compete. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK for Germany or for Europe when she seemed to undermine the European put forward proposals for greater coordination of EU China policy. But when Commission in its case against China for providing unfair subsidies to its solar- European leaders took stock of the “strategic partnership” with China in October, panel manufacturers. Notwithstanding German government fears of a trade the result was simply a reiteration of the need to implement agreements reached war with China, the European Commission pursued the solar case. But the in 2010. commission’s tougher approach means that the Chinese increasingly shun the EU’s powerful trade negotiators and instead seek bilateral deals with individual

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01 FORMATS OF THE 02 INVESTMENT AND EUROPE-CHINA DIALOGUE MARKET ACCESS IN CHINA

The EU positioned itself well 2010 2011 2012 Chinese investments 2010 2011 2012 with the incoming Chinese in the EU reached new leadership but Germany Unity 2/5 2/5 3/5 records. Negotiations on an Unity 4/5 4/5 3/5 was seen as the go-to Resources 2/5 2/5 3/5 investment treaty that could Resources 3/5 3/5 4/5 partner and business deals improve market access for were brokered directly with Outcome 5/10 5/10 5/10 B- Europeans inched forward. Outcome 5/10 5/10 4/10 B- member states. Total 9/20 9/20 11/20 2010 C+ 2011 C+ Total 12/20 12/20 11/20 2010 B- 2011 B-

After last year’s EU–China summit was integrity and sovereignty”. But it omitted In 2012, Chinese investment in Europe hit negotiations at the EU–China summit postponed because of the euro crisis, two the urgent need for peaceful resolution another record of $10 billion. The Chinese in September. It hopes an investment summits took place in 2012. However, according to international law of maritime wealth fund CIC was behind several large treaty will protect China’s own growing both summits were overshadowed by disputes in East Asia such as that between deals in the UK, including the purchase investments in Europe. This Chinese the bilateral meetings between Germany China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu of a £600 billion stake in Thames Water interest is illustrated by the international and China that immediately preceded islands, which intensified in 2012. in January and a £450 million stake in arbitration claim filed in November by them. Following a regional summit led by Heathrow Airport in November. After Chinese insurer Ping An against Belgium Poland in April and attended by Premier China kept the pivotal high-level another agreement with CIC, the head of due to its losses on its investment in the Wen Jiabao, the Chinese foreign ministry economic dialogue on ice in 2012 and the Polish investment agency said that Belgian bank Fortis. also established a Central and Eastern thus avoided engagement with the “the sky is the limit”. The challenge for European secretariat under Vice Foreign European Commission’s trade negotiators’ Europeans is to leverage this increase in The main thing member states can do to Minister Song Tao to promote Chinese new approach to public procurement, Chinese investment in Europe to improve support the European Commission as it business interests in the region. The 16+1 investment, and reciprocal concessions. their own access to China’s market. In negotiates the treaty is to reiterate in their summit is likely to become an annual event. Instead, China dealt directly with member particular, Europeans aim to open up new bilateral discussions with China that the states, where investment deals were sectors of the Chinese economy in which treaty is a top priority. 2013 will show if Chinese premier-in-waiting Li Keqiang brokered, and maintained a symbolic foreign investment is not permitted, such member states will do this as negotiations met EU leaders in May. His main priority engagement policy at the European level. as finance, services, strategic industrial start. However, there still seems to is continued reform and sustainable Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and sectors, and key infrastructure. be some reluctance to get behind the urbanisation, which the EU identified the UK produced a non-paper on the need European Commission: the UK still seems as a new area of cooperation in 2012. for greater coordination of EU–China Since the Lisbon Treaty gave the to regret that competence has been moved High Representative Catherine Ashton policy. But although the European Council European Commission competence over to the EU level; Germany worries that, continued her top-level foreign-policy discussed the EU’s “strategic partnerships” investment policy, it has taken the lead on despite its greater size and power, the EU dialogue, which includes the Chinese in October, little strategic action ensued. a new EU investment treaty to supplant might deliver an investment treaty that is defence establishment, but talks on Syria Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning- bilateral treaties with China. In 2012, it weaker than its own. and Iran produced few results. In July, she Schmidt took a small but innovative step by completed an internal assessment and is and State Councillor Dai Bingguo issued including a high-ranking EEAS official in due to present its confidential negotiation a joint communiqué that proclaimed her delegation when President Hu Jintao directives to the member states at the the EU’s “respect for Chinese territorial visited during the Danish EU presidency. beginning of 2013. China agreed to start

28 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 29 CHINA / Trade liberalisation and overall relationship CHINA / Trade liberalisation and overall relationship

03 RECIPROCITY IN ACCESS TO PUBLIC 04 TRADE DISPUTES WITH CHINA PROCUREMENT IN EUROPE AND CHINA The EU won a WTO case 2010 2011 2012 on rare earth minerals and Procurement is where 2010 2011 2012 launched the largest anti- Unity 3/5 3/5 4/5 the strategy of reciprocal subsidy case on solar panels. Resources 3/5 3/5 3/5 engagement is put to the Unity 4/5 2/5 2/5 Europeans also had concerns test of practice, yet nothing Resources 2/5 2/5 2/5 about telecoms giants Huawei Outcome 6/10 5/10 6/10 B concrete has been decided in and ZTE. 2010 B- 2011 B- 2012 and Europe continued to Outcome 3/10 4/10 4/10 C Total 12/20 11/20 13/20 move at snail’s pace. Total 9/20 8/20 8/20 2010 C+ 2011 C

The EU seeks fair competition and equal the proposal would undermine value for Europeans want their companies to be able Europeans also have concerns about access to the Chinese market for public money in public procurement and lead to to compete fairly against Chinese rivals. the export subsidies that bolster rising procurement. European companies rarely unnecessary “tit-for-tat protectionism”. In 2012, they initiated 11 anti-dumping Chinese telecoms giants Huawei and ZTE, win contracts partly because China has not And while Chancellor Angela Merkel had and anti-subsidy cases against China. which are now competing with European yet joined the WTO’s Agreement on General seemed positive about reciprocity in 2010, The biggest and most significant was the companies such as Ericsson and Nokia. In Procurement (GPA), which regulates a leaked document from the German anti-dumping case against Chinese solar- 2012, the European Commission hinted public procurement. (In November China government similarly foresaw that the panel manufacturers which the European at opening a case against Huawei and made another offer, but it included only proposal heralded “serious problems for… Commission launched in September ZTE based on “solid evidence”, which one-tenth of its real public-procurement German companies”. Eastern European (see component 12). However, although prompted retaliatory warning shots from market.) In March, the European countries were more interested in getting the original complaint was brought by China. In the end, however, no European Commission proposed an instrument on investment from Chinese companies rather German companies such as Berlin-based companies that do business in China were reciprocity in public procurement that than waiting for guarantees of obtaining SolarWorld – a few years ago the global willing to support the case. Concerns about would potentially exclude bidders from reciprocal concessions by China, because market leader – Chancellor Angela security and in particular about Huawei’s countries with less open markets including they have few expectations for their own Merkel urged the European Commission alleged links with the Chinese military led China. In the words of Internal Market and companies there. At the same time, there not to pursue the case, which she feared US authorities to block investments in Services Commissioner Michel Barnier, it is a discussion on who would maintain could prompt Chinese retaliation against 2012. In Europe, where Huawei employs was about the EU no longer being “naïve”. the blocking power over incoming deals. other German companies and ultimately more than 5,000 people, there are similar In a resolution, the European Parliament France, otherwise a protagonist for the a trade war with China. In January, the concerns. For example, the British also came out in favour of stronger proposal, is also in the lead for demanding WTO ruled in the EU’s favour on Chinese government and Huawei staff collaborate reciprocity and better access to Chinese that blocking capacity remain at national export restrictions on raw materials. to provide assurance that their products public procurement. level, which in the worst case could lead However, after it became clear that China meet government security standards prior to a patchwork of 27 different practices did not intend to lift restrictions on the to being deployed on UK networks. Yet The proposal is currently being discussed rivalling China’s opacity. export of rare earth minerals in response Prime Minister David Cameron welcomed by member states and could end up to the ruling, the EU, Japan, and the US Huawei’s chief executive at 10 Downing stalled in internal wrangling for years. launched a second challenge in the WTO. Street on the same day as the US Congress Member states are divided and several EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht brandished his company a security threat. larger member states are against. The said he was “left with no other choice”. UK issued a clear rebuttal stating that

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05 COOPERATION WITH 06 RULE OF LAW AND CHINA ON THE EURO CRISIS HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

Europeans were less frantic 2010 2011 2012 As human-rights violations 2010 2011 2012 than in 2011, but the euro continued against the crisis continued to undermine Unity – 2/5 2/5 background of the transition, Unity 2/5 2/5 3/5 European coherence towards Resources – 2/5 2/5 Europeans were more vocal on Resources 2/5 1/5 3/5 China. Chinese bond human rights than they were purchases remain opaque. Outcome – 3/10 4/10 C in 2011. Outcome 1/10 2/10 2/10 C Total – 7/20 8/20 2010 – 2011 C- Total 5/20 5/20 8/20 2010 D+ 2011 D+

In 2012, China did not become Europe’s the year, tended to speak to the Chinese Human-rights violations continued in The slightly stronger push at EU level “red knight” by massively purchasing on behalf of the eurozone as a whole. China in 2012 against the background hasn’t reduced completely member sovereign debt, but it did continue to (China shares Germany’s view that the key of the leadership transition. In June, the states’ desire to follow up on the bilateral express confidence in the single currency. to solving the euro crisis – which Chinese EU adopted a new human-rights strategy, level, but either outsourcing to the EU The governor of China’s central bank, officials call a “sovereign debt problem” – which seeks to streamline the EU’s or outright bilateral denial of interest Zhou Xiaochuan, said that China would is debt reduction.) Although Europeans approach to human rights across countries remained a strategy for countries such not reduce “the proportion of euro were less frantic than in 2011, possible and regions. High Representative as Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Romania. exposure in its reserves”. Though it does bond purchases remained the most Catherine Ashton’s spokesperson said it Others such as the Czech Republic, not publish the breakdown of its foreign- important topic in discussions with China was “very clear” that the strategy applied Germany, Sweden, and the UK reinforced exchange reserves, it is estimated to hold for deficit countries such as Spain. Thus to China. The EU was also more vocal on the EU’s stance by taking the initiative on around 25 percent of currency reserves the euro crisis continued to undermine human rights in 2012 than it was in 2011. human rights in their bilateral dialogues in euro-denominated assets. At the G20 European coherence in relation to China For example, it included human-rights with China. Meanwhile, human-rights summit in June, China also announced in 2012. In fact, even the meeting between defenders, including Ai Weiwei, at the violations continued in China in 2012, that it would contribute $43 million High Representative Catherine Ashton EU Nobel Prize event in Beijing, where particularly as the regime sought stability through the IMF, which could be triggered and State Councillor Dai Bingguo focused the Chinese foreign ministry responded during the political transition. Ai Weiwei for European debt needs. Some European on the euro crisis rather than foreign by throwing an early New Year’s banquet went on trial and, although the authorities officials say in private that China has policy (Dai expressed “confidence in the the same evening to reduce the number let blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng go to bought significant amounts of sovereign future of Europe”). But there are signs that of attendees to the EU event. The EU the US, they subsequently persecuted bonds issued by southern eurozone Europe could become more coherent in human-rights dialogue was also held in his nephew. In fairness, the new long- countries, but, like other private investors, 2013. As the EU’s current-account balance Brussels, although it stayed within its awaited criminal procedure law did it also experienced the enforced “haircut” grows, some member states enjoy ultra- symbolic confines and China refused for provide certain improvements such as on Greek debt, which may have made it low interest rates, and as the European a third year to host a second round of outlawing evidence through torture, even more cautious in its European debt Stability Mechanism (ESM) becomes the dialogue in China. Finally, the EU but also guaranteed the legality of the purchases and thus increased rather than operational, China may have less leverage institutions didn’t manage to counter infamous “black jails” in which detainees reduced spreads in European bond yields. over Europe than it did during the acute China’s critical “press gag” at the EU– can be held without scrutiny for prolonged phase of the crisis. China summit in September and the end periods by the police. In 2012, German Chancellor Angela result was that no press conference was Merkel, who visited China twice during held at all.

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07 RELATIONS WITH CHINA ON 08 RELATIONS WITH CHINA THE DALAI LAMA AND TIBET ON IRAN AND PROLIFERATION

Europeans expressed 2010 2011 2012 Talks with China continued, 2010 2011 2012 concerns about human rights but China publicly criticised in Tibet but have not found Unity 2/5 2/5 2/5 EU sanctions against Iran. Unity 5/5 5/5 5/5 a way to protect individual Resources 1/5 1/5 3/5 Chinese reluctance also Resources 4/5 3/5 4/5 member states from Chinese delayed action against North bullying when politicians meet Outcome 2/10 2/10 2/10 C- Korea. Outcome 6/10 4/10 3/10 B- with the Dalai Lama. Total 5/20 5/20 7/20 2010 D+ 2011 D+ Total 15/20 12/20 12/20 2010 B+ 2011 B-

In 2012, tensions continued between the Europeans have still not found a way to Europeans seek to cooperate with China meetings and through bilateral channels, EU and China over visits to Europe by the protect individual member states from in stopping nuclear proliferation, in did not produce any more common Dalai Lama and the human-rights situation Chinese bullying. particular in Iran and North Korea. They ground on how to proceed. However, in Tibet, including cultural and religious are directly involved in negotiations on China’s Arab partners had more success rights. The European Parliament continued Several EU member states also raised Iran through the E3 (France, the UK, and than the Europeans. China’s increasing its active stance through a resolution concerns about the state of human rights Germany). In 2012, the EU wanted China dependence on the Gulf for oil meant that requesting the creation of a special envoy in Tibet at the UNHRC in June. The to support an international consensus on Wen Jiabao had to criticise Iran more for Tibet. High Representative Catherine most vocal were Denmark in its role as dealing with Iran or at least to agree to sharply than usual during a visit to Saudi Ashton didn’t act on the suggestion but rotating president, Belgium, the Czech not undermine or dilute such initiatives Arabia and other Gulf states. spoke clearly about the “deteriorating Republic, France, Germany, Sweden, and through its bilateral engagement with Iran. situation in Tibet”. The Dalai Lama met the UK. Latvia took issue with China on The EU kept open lines of communication Europeans are not directly involved in with the British prime minister, the Tibet when the Chinese defence minister with China, both in official talks and in the stalled Six-Party talks on the North Austrian chancellor and foreign minister, visited. Comments by Prime Minister the separate strategic dialogue, but China Korean nuclear programme. After Kim and the president of the Belgian Senate. Petr Nečas also prompted a debate in the remained non-committal. Although Jong-un took over from his father at the However, in Italy there were no political Czech Republic about human-rights policy. Beijing has no desire to see a nuclear- end of 2011, North Korea successfully meetings and political pressure even During former leader Vaclav Havel’s armed Iran, it does not believe in crippling launched a long-range rocket in December prevented the city of Milan from awarding lifetime, Czech politicians had always made sanctions or a military strike to prevent after a first launch in March spectacularly the Dalai Lama honorary citizenship. As a point of meeting with the Dalai Lama. Iran developing nuclear weapons. failed. The EU responded with statements expected, China retaliated against those But at a trade fair in Brno in September, of protest. But although China said it also countries that held political meetings with Nečas criticised the Dalai Lama and said China did not support the sanctions that regretted the rocket launch, Europeans the Dalai Lama. In particular, it cancelled that publicly supporting such “fashionable” the EU unilaterally imposed on Iran in and other international partners were a visit to the UK by a top Chinese official causes could have “consequences for 2012 and even criticised the EU publicly unable to persuade it to take immediate and high-level political relations between our exports”. Foreign Minister Karel by calling sanctions a tool to intensify action against North Korea in the UNSC the two countries remain frozen. However, Schwarzenberg said it was a “horrifying” “confrontation”. Instead, a foreign (though it agreed in early 2013 to tighten the UK does not seem to be considering mistake. ministry spokesperson said China wanted sanctions). apologising or issuing a statement drafted to continue “normal and transparent by the Chinese, as other countries such trade and energy exchanges” with Iran. as France and Denmark have done. But European pressure, both in the E3+3

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09 RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN ASIA 10 RELATIONS WITH CHINA ON AFRICA

Europeans have not yet 2010 2011 2012 The Chinese adopted a new 2010 2011 2012 decided how to respond to the approach to engagement US “pivot” to Asia but became Unity – – 4/5 in Africa that copies the Unity 3/5 4/5 3/5 more vocal about maritime Resources – – 3/5 EU on governance. Led by Resources 3/5 3/5 3/5 disputes in East Asia in 2012. France, Europeans reached Sanctions on Burma were Outcome – – 6/10 B agreement with China on Outcome 4/10 5/10 5/10 B- suspended. Mali. Total – – 13/20 2010 – 2011 – Total 10/20 12/20 11/20 2010 C+ 2011 B-

The EU has wide-ranging interests in Asia other occasions in 2012, the EEAS did start Europeans aim to cooperate with China China. It remains to be seen whether it is that go beyond trade. In particular, it seeks to speak up on the maritime conflicts in to limit the arms trade, support good implemented, but it already means that regional security. However, Europeans East Asia and Ashton’s spokesperson called governance, and apply criteria such as the Africans pay more attention to action plans have not yet decided how to respond to for “peaceful and cooperative solutions in UN Millennium Development Goals to from Beijing than policy documents from the US “pivot” to Asia or figured out what accordance with international law”. The aid in Africa. The EEAS holds an annual Brussels. their role might be in the region. On paper, East Asia Summit in November, convened dialogue on Africa and several member however, the EEAS did everything right by ASEAN, passed without European states such as France and the UK also hold In 2012, Europeans also sought Chinese in 2012. High Representative Catherine participation, but in July Ashton signed bilateral dialogues. Some member states cooperation in Mali, where the security Ashton visited the region in what she the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in such as the UK also seek to engage China situation deteriorated during the year as called an “Asian Semester”, participated in Southeast Asia (a non-aggression pact in trilateral cooperation on development Islamists took over the northern part of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and made a between ASEAN members and their aid and others such as Belgium and France the country. In October, China voted for joint statement with her US counterpart, partners), which is expected to allow the seek to cooperate with Chinese companies UNSC Resolution 2007, which declared Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on EU to participate in the future. in Africa. Denmark has partnered with the situation a “threat to international cooperation in Asia. But although some UN agencies to promote cooperation with peace” and opened the way for military saw in this focus on Asia a European “mini- As Burma moved towards democracy – China on Africa. intervention and a military training pivot”, it was mostly ignored in Beijing and and also to some extent away from Chinese mission led by the EU. In Sudan, China even in EU member state capitals. influence – the EU was quick to respond. Europeans attended the opening ceremony was motivated by its commercial interests British Prime Minister David Cameron was of China’s triennial Forum on China– to take a lead itself in managing the conflict In June, the EU published new foreign- the first Western leader to visit the country Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in July, but between North and South Sudan during policy guidelines on Asia, which included and met with Aung San Suu Kyi in Rangoon weren’t given the observer status they had 2012. China supported UNSC statements speaking out on the conflicts in the South in April. Shortly afterwards, the EU agreed wanted. At FOCAC, China announced a in March and April and Resolution 2046 China Sea. But during ASEM, the EU–Asia to suspend for a year most sanctions in renewed surge of cheap loans and a new in May, which demanded an end to the summit, which was held in Laos, most recognition of the “historic changes” in the focus on regional governance and capacity fighting between the two sides. The EU’s EU member states seemed as malleable country. building to Africans to complement special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, as ASEAN member states on addressing infrastructure deals and cheap Chinese Rosalind Marsden, also went to China. maritime disputes in the region after labour. This policy change seems to have pressure from China to keep silent. Still, on been the result of criticism from Africans rather than European engagement with

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11 RELATIONS WITH CHINA ON 12 RELATIONS WITH CHINA REFORMING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Europeans failed to get 2010 2011 2012 The EU managed to keep 2010 2011 2012 Chinese support for an the ball rolling at Doha and international response to the Unity 3/5 3/5 2/5 enhanced bilateral cooperation Unity 4/5 4/5 4/5 conflict on Syria. But China Resources 2/5 2/5 2/5 with China on energy. But the Resources 4/5 4/5 5/5 cooperated on Sudan and EU and China clashed over Mali. Outcome 2/10 2/10 2/10 C- solar panels and carbon taxes. Outcome 5/10 7/10 6/10 B+ Total 7/20 7/20 6/20 2010 C- 2011 C- Total 13/20 15/20 15/20 2010 B 2011 B+

Europeans want China to take responsibility its Arab League partners that it was being The EU aims to secure China’s cooperation to comply with the EU legislation and for global governance, especially at the constructive. The Chinese also made on climate change, including on associated continued to cooperate with Russia and UN and the IMF, commensurate with its contacts with, but did not recognise, the green technologies and energy efficiency. the US. The issue is likely to create further expanding economic power. However, Syrian opposition. If President Bashar al- In 2012, the EU took initiative with a large tension between the EU and China next with the euro crisis still the main focus of Assad falls and a transition ensues, these energy forum in May that was attended year. the G20, the EU was not in a position to Chinese steps open space for collaboration by Li Keqiang, China’s new number two. make demands of China in 2012. European with the EU and other powers since China This fits with China’s ambition to curb Solar panels were also a hot issue after the efforts to agree a conventional arms treaty wants to make friends with a new regime energy intensity in its economy and with EU decided in September to pursue an were thwarted by China, which insisted on quickly and is likely to be a more willing the EU’s ambition to get China to reduce anti-dumping complaint against Chinese linking the issue to the EU’s arms embargo, partner in international efforts. its carbon footprint. However, in the solar-panel manufacturers. Although the as well as the US (see component 67). international negotiations at the summit original complaint was brought by German China was also pragmatic on conflicts in in Doha, progress was back to snail’s pace companies, Chancellor Angela Merkel Europeans also failed to get Chinese Africa. In getting South Sudan and Sudan after last year’s breakthrough. “Frustration urged the European Commission not to support in the UNSC for an international back to talks, China led active shuttle is a renewable source”, said EU Climate pursue the case, which she feared could response to the conflict in Syria: together diplomacy and also was behind a firm Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard. prompt a trade war with China. The anti- with Russia, China opposed any UNSC international response from the UN on Still, the EU managed to further chip away subsidy case will affect more than $35.8 mandate for action against the Assad the issue. China’s national interest was in at the distinction between developed and billion in Chinese exports of solar products. regime on the basis of what State Councillor making sure oil continued to flow between developing economies and managed to get A Chinese business insider called it a Dai Bingguo called the “ironclad principle the two countries. China also allowed the China to stick to its previous commitments, “disaster for the Chinese solar industry”, of non-interference in others’ internal French-led EU initiative for intervention in including to a global deal by 2015. although the industry is surviving on a diet affairs”. Yet China did twice take initiative Mali to pass in the UN without invoking its of subsidies from state-owned banks. The on Syria: first with a six-point proposal principle of non-interference. On other areas, there was more friction. Chinese state retaliated with a WTO case similar to what became the Annan Plan; Following external pressure from China, against European polysilicon producers and then with a ceasefire suggestion in Russia, and the US, and internal pressure that export to China. October. China took these steps – perhaps from Airbus and France, the EU postponed small steps for any solution in Syria but the application of the carbon airfare tax giant steps for China’s normally reactive in 2013. China remains strongly opposed diplomacy – in order to demonstrate to to the tax and ordered its airlines not

38 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 39 CHINA / Cooperation on regional and global issues Russia Overall grade 2012 2011 2010 Overall grade 2011 C+ TRADE LIBERALISATION AND OVERALL RELATIONSHIP B B B- 13 Trade liberalisation with Russia B+ A- B- Overall grade 2010 C+ B- 14 Visa liberalisation with Russia B- B- C+

HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE C C- C- 15 Rule of law and human rights in Russia C+ C- C 16 Media freedom in Russia C C- C- 17 Stability and human rights in the North Caucasus C C- C-

EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES B- B- C+ 18 Relations with Russia on the Eastern Partnership B- C+ C 19 Relations with Russia on protracted conflicts C+ C+ C+ 20 Relations with Russia on energy issues B B- C+ 21 Diversification of gas-supply routes to Europe C+ B- B-

COOPERATION ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES B- C+ B- 22 Relations with Russia on Iran and proliferation B B- A- 23 Relations with Russia on the Greater Middle East B B- n/a 24 Relations with Russia on climate change C C+ C+ 25 Relations with Russia on the Arctic B n/a n/a

2012 was a good year for European unity and resolve in relation to Russia – for a long time one of the most divisive issues in European foreign policy. But although the year started with excitement and expectations of possible changes inside Russia, it ended in disappointment after Vladimir Putin was re-elected as president in March. Putin’s new regime is weaker than it previously was, but therefore resorts to coarser measures to deal with dissent. Although the pro-Putin consensus of the first decade of the century has collapsed, there are no credible challengers, and neither the regime nor the opposition has a viable strategy for the future. European disappointment and Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate with the EU on almost any issue made real dialogue almost impossible in 2012.

After meeting with force the first anti-Putin demonstrations that broke out after the December 2011 parliamentary elections, the regime changed tactics and, up until the presidential elections in March, allowed rallies to proceed

40 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 41 peacefully. It also relaxed controls on the media: between January and March, EU–Russia trade relations could have been the success story of the year. In many opposition figures who had been banned from the state-controlled August, Russia finally became a formal member of the WTO – the step that had television channels for years were invited to participate in talk shows and been strongly supported by the EU during the 18-year-long negotiations. But the state-controlled media also started to cover the demonstrations and did Russia’s application of new protectionist measures even after officially joining not hesitate to ask Putin inconvenient questions. Even though this new, open the WTO has made the EU visibly frustrated, prompting Trade Commissioner approach was clearly dictated by election-campaign logic rather than respect Karel De Gucht to complain in December that “Russia is doing exactly the towards rights and freedoms, the EU still welcomed it. It also gave a moderately opposite to what it is supposed to do” and to hint that EU retaliation – for positive assessment of the presidential elections: it asked Russia to address the which the WTO framework provides legal options – may be on the cards some shortcomings in the conduct of elections but did not question Putin’s victory. time soon.

However, immediately after Putin’s inauguration in May, there was a crackdown. In recent years the EU has made progress in diversifying its energy imports, Demonstrations were once again dissolved by force and many activists were especially gas-supply sources, by building interconnectors between member detained (quite a few still remain behind bars). New laws were adopted that states. However, the Nabucco project, one of the EU’s main projects to ensure re-criminalised slander and severely restricted freedom of assembly as well as gas supply from sources other than Russia, now seems to be viable – if at all – working conditions for NGOs. The vague way in which these laws are formulated only in its “lighter” version as “Nabucco West” after Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s means that they can be arbitrarily applied to punish almost any civic activism. announcement in 2012 that they would build their own pipeline. In December, Russia raised the stakes by announcing construction of the South Stream European leaders criticised these developments with unanimity and clarity. pipeline, a direct competitor to Nabucco – but so far it is unclear to what extent Most significant was the change of mood in Germany – in the past, Russia’s best this will actually influence the EU’s energy policies. friend in the EU. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s envoy for relations with Russian civil society, Andreas Schockenhoff, was publicly critical of Putin’s handling There was also little substantial cooperation between the Europeans and of the trial of members of the punk band Pussy Riot and of Russia’s response Russia on resolution of the protracted conflicts in the neighbourhood. to the Syria crisis. In November, ahead of a visit by Merkel to Moscow, the Germany remains heavily involved in the Transnistria dispute, but apart from Bundestag adopted a resolution (drafted by Schockenhoff) that was unusually re-launching the formal talks in the 5+2 format (including Moscow), there critical of developments in Russia, which was followed by a sharp exchange was little progress. However, the EU did occasionally stand up to defend its between Merkel and Putin about Russia’s human-rights record just a few days neighbours against Russian pressure and did so more vocally than in the past: later during their meeting. Thus Germany, which was once a problem for a Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger called on EU member states to stand coherent and effective European policy towards Russia, might slowly but surely by Moldova and called a possible gas-price hike from Russia “pure blackmail” be becoming one of Europe’s leaders on this issue. and Moscow’s behaviour “unacceptable”.

Despite this new resolve, however, the EU’s actual influence on conditions The EU and a number of individual member states also worked hard to persuade on the ground in Russia remains very limited. Still, the EU did not hesitate Russia to drop its opposition to more determined international action on Syria. to demonstrate its muscle on energy relations with Russia and, in September, But although the question was on the agenda of most bilateral exchanges with the European Commission took an unprecedented step by launching an anti- Russia, it had little success: Russia, together with China, vetoed resolutions competition probe against Russian state energy giant Gazprom for possible pushed by the EU and the US to impose UN sanctions on the Assad regime. abuse of its dominant market position in Central and Eastern Europe. In response, Putin issued a decree forbidding Gazprom and other “strategically Thus, although Europe has demonstrated laudable unity in its reactions to important companies that do business overseas” from providing information to the events and flexed its muscles on several important dossiers – namely, in foreign regulators unless they obtain approval from the Kremlin. energy and trade relations – it clearly lacks power to influence developments inside Russia. In handling relations with Russia, the EEAS was not in a lead

42 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 43 RUSSIA / Trade liberalisation and overall relationship

role – the most important issues were handled either by the member states or by the European Commission – but it has been instrumental in exchanging 13 TRADE LIBERALISATION WITH RUSSIA information and contributed more substantially to certain policies, such as the EU’s stance on human rights in Russia. The challenge for Europe is now to Russia’s accession to the WTO 2010 2011 2012 was an important step forward capitalise on its new unity and resolve and devise smart ways to contribute to but it was unwilling to obey the Unity 4/5 5/5 5/5 democratic change in Russia, while also engaging in diplomatic “contingency WTO rules and to engage in Resources 3/5 3/5 4/5 planning” in case things get worse before they get better. further liberalisation. Outcome 5/10 8/10 5/10 B+ Total 12/20 16/20 14/20 2010 B- 2011 A-

The EU wants to see further trade Economic Space with non-WTO liberalisation with Russia. There was an members Belarus and Kazakhstan makes important step forward in August when, any progress on this front practically after lengthy negotiations, Russia finally impossible. The EU has also been hoping to formally joined the WTO. The EU’s most negotiate a new wide-ranging partnership important objective now in this respect is to agreement with Russia, to replace the old make sure that Russia actually follows WTO Partnership and Cooperation Agreement rules. Currently, there are around dozen (PCA), but negotiations are stuck. The issues on which it is in breach of the rules: EU wants the trade-related clauses of this it has an import ban on livestock; it charges agreement to go further than what has so-called scrapping or recycling fees for been agreed in the WTO framework; it also imported cars; and there are ongoing anti- wants to prevent the agreement being tilted dumping cases. Russia also applies tariffs in Russia’s favour like the former PCA, higher than those allowed by WTO rules. which gave Russia “most favoured nation” The WTO dispute-settlement mechanism status without getting much in return. So has equipped the EU with a good arsenal far, there is no evidence of enthusiastic of legitimate ways for retaliation. But reciprocation from the Russian side. although the EU would prefer to solve the EU member states were unanimous in differences without resorting to these, its stressing that Russia needs to comply patience is close to being exhausted – as with the rules, with those most affected Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht made by non-compliance (such as automobile clear in December. manufacturers and livestock exporters) in the lead. The main reason for the lack of progress in 2012 was that Russia did not reciprocate. A mutual free-trade agreement between Russia and the EU has effectively been shelved, because Russia’s Common

44 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 45 RUSSIA / Trade liberalisation and overall relationship RUSSIA / Human rights and governance

14 VISA LIBERALISATION WITH RUSSIA 15 RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA Europeans stood firm as 2010 2011 2012 Russia pushed for visa freedom without fulfilling Unity 4/5 4/5 5/5 Europeans criticised the 2010 2011 2012 the agreed technical Resources 3/5 3/5 3/5 deterioration in political preconditions. But finding freedoms in Russia in 2012, Unity 4/5 3/5 4/5 unanimity on political Outcome 3/10 4/10 4/10 B- with Germany becoming one Resources 2/5 2/5 3/5 conditions will be a challenge. 2010 C+ 2011 B- of the more critical member Total 10/20 11/20 12/20 states, but did not take Outcome 2/10 2/10 2/10 C+ further action. Total 8/20 7/20 9/20 2010 C 2011 C-

Moscow wants visa-free travel with the EU visa-free travel under the deal – a condition In 2012, the EU sharpened its focus on Russia. It also convened two rounds of by the time of the 2014 Winter Olympics, that the EU refuses to accept. human rights and the rule of law, but it the human-rights consultations – both in which will be held at Sochi, on the Black did not manage to arrest or even slow the Brussels in 2012 because Russia refused Sea. But despite Russian pressure in 2012, Even though member states now agree deterioration of political freedom in Russia. to hold it in Moscow. Member states Europeans remained impressively united that Russia should have a perspective of a After demonstrations were allowed to also demonstrated greater unanimity in asking Russia to first fulfil a number of visa-free regime with the EU, a debate on proceed during the first few months of the than in the past. Potentially significant previously agreed conditions (specified its conditions effectively still lies ahead. year, a crackdown started after the elections. is Germany’s criticism of developments in the “common steps” towards visa Finding unanimity within Europe could be In early May, demonstrations were again inside Russia, which became more vocal in liberalisation between the EU and Russia a challenge because some member states broken up by force and many activists 2012. In November, the Bundestag adopted which were agreed in 2011) that they see as may tie technical requirements outlined were detained and charged for economic a critical resolution and there was a sharp a pre-condition for lifting the visa regime in the “common steps” to demands on crimes or for plotting to organise riots. exchange between Chancellor Angela with Russia. the human-rights situation and the rule In August, a Moscow court passed a two- Merkel and Putin a few days later. Many of law in Russia or to other issues. Some year-long jail sentence for three members smaller member states such as Sweden also In 2012, several mutual expert missions member states such as Italy and Spain are of the punk group Pussy Riot (one of them adopted a noticeably principled stand. took place. But Russia was slow to open to a shorter timeframe for abolishing was conditionally freed in October), who implement a number of conditions it agreed the regime; others such as Lithuania, were arrested in February after performing However, Europeans did not take any to in the “common steps” package and the Latvia, and the four Visegrad countries a song criticising the closeness between further action such as the adoption of the EU could have done more to explain to the point out that all technical requirements President Vladimir Putin and the Russian “Magnitsky law” to discourage perpetrators Russian public what the country has to do to must be met and Moscow should not get Orthodox Church in a prominent Moscow of human-rights violations inside Russia. get visa freedom – for example, by making a “geopolitical discount” compared to cathedral. Most importantly, Russia passed Although the Dutch parliament and the the “common steps” document public. Ukraine or Moldova. However, neither of several notorious laws that restrict freedom European Parliament pushed the issue, A visa-facilitation agreement that would these potential debates undermined the of assembly, re-criminalise slander, and Europeans did not move forward with such allow more groups (including students and EU’s dialogue with Russia in 2012. hamper work conditions for NGOs. legislation, unlike the United States, which businesses) to travel from Russia to the EU in December legalised visa and asset bans and vice versa with fewer documents and a Europeans were vocal in criticising these on Russian state officials involved in the smaller fee is close to completion, but kept developments in Russia. The EEAS murder of the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. hostage by Russia’s demand that the so- played a significant role by coordinating called service passport holders be granted the writing of a human-rights report on

46 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 47 RUSSIA / Human rights and governance RUSSIA / Human rights and governance

16 MEDIA FREEDOM IN RUSSIA 17 STABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS After the presidential election, 2010 2011 2012 the state reasserted its control over the media in Unity 3/5 3/5 4/5 The EU lacks both presence 2010 2011 2012 Russia. Preoccupied by other Resources 2/5 2/5 2/5 and influence in the North issues, the EU did little to help Caucasus and increasingly Unity 4/5 4/5 4/5 and had almost no impact. Outcome 1/10 1/10 2/10 C struggles even to get Resources 1/5 1/5 2/5 2010 C- 2011 C- information about what is Total 6/20 6/20 8/20 happening in the region. Outcome 1/10 1/10 2/10 C Total 6/20 6/20 8/20 2010 C- 2011 C-

At the beginning of 2012, Russia relaxed November, a law came into force that bans The EU’s stated objectives in the North Caucasus in 2011 and EU representatives state controls of the media: between more than 48 percent foreign-owned radio Caucasus are stability, development, did not pay a single visit to the region January and March opposition figures were stations. The new government also asked and improved human rights. However, in 2012. Russia also rejected an EU invited to participate in talk shows, and for more control over the internet and in 2012, the North Caucasus continued proposal to open a new programme on state-controlled media reported protests Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a its decline into a failed region inside the socio-economic development. Europeans and asked presidential candidate Vladimir degree to block access to a list of “harmful” Russian Federation. Dagestan, Kabardino- continued to work in the region via the UN Putin inconvenient questions (although websites. The State Duma is also preparing Balkaria, and Ingushetia stood out as the representation or local NGOs. However, this may have actually had the effect of a bill that would ban journalists who have most violent republics, but everywhere the latter’s ability to receive money from legitimising the state-controlled channels). foreign or dual citizenship from working on in the region there was an erosion of and to give information to any foreign However, after the March presidential state television if they criticise Russia. secular and state power. The population is powers was dealt a blow by the adoption election, the state once again reasserted becoming increasingly radical – especially of restrictive legislation in the summer its control over the media: several media Preoccupied by wider human-rights young people. The human-rights situation of 2012 – effectively causing the EU’s outlets scaled back criticism of the regime; issues, Europeans paid little attention in the North Caucasus also remained influence to wane even further. The North critically minded journalists lost their jobs to the specific issue of media freedom in dire. Extra-judicial killings, torture, and Caucasus does not figure prominently in or resigned, citing unacceptable demands Russia in 2012. A few member states such abductions continued to be common. exchanges between European leaders and and conditions; and owners of independent as Sweden did continue to make internet Murdered civilians were often presented Moscow. The issue is routinely raised at media outlets faced pressure and the offices freedom their priority and Estonia gave as insurgents. There were also cases of human-rights consultations, but European of critical websites were raided. asylum to a Russian blogger who was intimidation in Moscow: NGO Human diplomats admit that their influence is facing a jail sentence for criticising the Rights Watch said its lead researcher on close to zero. In the summer, a series of illiberal laws Russian Orthodox Church. But Europeans the North Caucasus received death threats; (see component 15) were adopted – often could take a more hands-on approach the newspaper Novaya Gazeta said its chief badly or vaguely drafted and therefore to supporting media freedom in Russia correspondent in the region was attacked. vulnerable to arbitrary interpretation – by offering financial and other support that have implications for media freedom to independent media organisations, The EU had neither a presence in the as well. In addition, anti-extremism laws engaging with the possibilities offered by region nor influence over this deteriorating and the new law protecting children “from social media and other internet-based situation in 2012. The EU concluded information harmful to their health and media, and training Russian journalists. its cooperation programme with North environment” will affect the media. In

48 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 49 RUSSIA / European security issues RUSSIA / European security issues

18 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 19 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP ON PROTRACTED CONFLICTS

The EU and Russia clashed 2010 2011 2012 Russia did little in 2012 to 2010 2011 2012 on trade and energy help solve protracted conflicts as Moscow’s belief that Unity 3/5 4/5 4/5 beyond agreeing to a Unity 3/5 4/5 4/5 the Eastern Partnership Resources 2/5 3/5 4/5 formal re-launch of the 5+2 Resources 3/5 3/5 3/5 undermines its own interests negotiation format. Europeans in the region prevented a Outcome 3/10 3/10 3/10 B- could do little except issue Outcome 4/10 3/10 3/10 C+ constructive dialogue. statements. Total 8/20 10/20 11/20 2010 C 2011 C+ Total 10/20 10/20 11/20 2010 C+ 2011 C+

In 2012, the EU and Russia clashed on The EU remained relatively united in In 2011, Germany’s Meseberg initiative Ossetia and parliamentary elections in trade and energy, just as they did in 2011. trying to pursue the goals under its Eastern offered Russia establishment of a Abkhazia earlier this year. The EU launched DCFTA negotiations Partnership initiative despite Russia’s joint EU–Russia Political and Security with Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia resistance. Some member states such as Committee in exchange for Moscow’s Since the EU is not part of the negotiations and signed an Association Agreement Germany and Poland were particularly constructive approach to Transnistrian framework, it was unable to do much (which includes a DCFTA) with Ukraine active in speaking out against Russian conflict settlement. However, Russia beyond issuing statements calling on both (see component 48). Meanwhile, Russia pressure on the EU’s eastern neighbours. did little in 2012 to help solve the parties to solve the conflict peacefully. established a Common Economic Space In particular, German Chancellor Angela conflict beyond agreeing to a formal re- The Safarov affair (see component 51) with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which Merkel took a personal interest in launch of the 5+2 negotiation format. tainted the image not just of Hungary built on the Customs Union they had Moldova. During a visit to Chisinau in By appointing the eccentric former but of the whole EU as an impartial created in 2010. Russia also continued August to celebrate 20 years of diplomatic ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin side in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. to encourage other countries, above all relations between the two countries, as Russia’s envoy to Transnistria and Europeans remained united, but except Ukraine, to join the Customs Union. Merkel even talked about a European chairman of the Moldovan-Russian on Transnistria, where Germany has In fact, various Russian government perspective for Moldova – which Moscow economic commission, Moscow signalled taken the initiative in recent years, they representatives suggested that Kyiv might would almost certainly oppose. The that it was not interested in real progress. invested little political attention into face restrictions on its exports to Russia if EU also pushed back forcefully against Russia was even less constructive on solving these conflicts. On the other hand, it did not become a member. Russia also Russia’s offer of a gas discount to the resolution of Georgia’s separatist the EU continued to fund its border- pushed back against the EU’s effort to Moldova in return for backtracking on its conflicts: Moscow continued to increase assistance mission to Moldova and extend its energy-liberalisation legislation commitment to unbundle its gas pipeline its military and political presence in Ukraine (to help improve management of to Ukraine and Moldova and offered system. In a statement in October, Energy both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and their border, which includes the separatist Chisinau a gas discount if it renounced Commissioner Günther Oettinger urged Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov region of Transnistria) as well as the EU the plan to separate the ownership of member states to resist “unacceptable” called on the new Georgian government Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia production and supply of gas and gas- Russian pressure on Moldova and said the to recognise the independence of both (where many member states stationed transmission networks, which it sees as EU would not tolerate “pure blackmail” entities. There was no progress on the their staff). However, the EU has thus far a direct threat to the interests of state- from Moscow. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict either – in been unable to persuade Moscow and the owned Gazprom. fact, tensions continue to escalate. Unlike secessionist authorities in South Ossetia the EU, Russia recognised the outcomes and Abkhazia to allow access of EUMM to of the presidential elections in South these regions.

50 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 51 RUSSIA / European security issues RUSSIA / European security issues

20 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 21 DIVERSIFICATION OF GAS ON ENERGY ISSUES SUPPLY ROUTES TO EUROPE

In 2012, the European 2010 2011 2012 Azerbaijan and Turkey 2010 2011 2012 Commission took a forced Europeans to rethink potentially important step Unity 4/5 3/5 4/5 their plans for the Nabucco Unity 2/5 3/5 3/5 to enforce its market rules Resources 2/5 3/5 4/5 pipeline and several member Resources 4/5 4/5 3/5 in the energy sector by states joined the Russian- investigating Gazprom. Outcome 3/10 5/10 5/10 B sponsored South Stream Outcome 5/10 5/10 4/10 C+ pipeline. Total 9/20 11/20 13/20 2010 C+ 2011 B- Total 11/20 12/20 10/20 2010 B- 2011 B-

Russia remains the EU’s most important “strategically important companies that Europeans aim to diversify their gas- was originally envisaged as a pipeline supplier of gas, providing over one third do business overseas” to obtain approval supply routes to reduce central and eastern starting all the way from the Georgian- of gas imports. But the relationship is from the Kremlin before providing members’ dependence on Russia and to Turkish border). There is an alternative interdependent: when it comes to its gas information to foreign regulators. Shortly ensure security of supply. Europeans want to the original route: a “Nabucco West” exports, the EU remains Russia’s most after the European Commission launched Russia to abide by the EU’s market rules and pipeline, which would be linked to the Trans- important customer. The EU hopes to the investigation, Lithuania announced to prevent it obstructing the construction of Anatolian pipeline and continue through anchor this strategic relation in the Energy that it would sue Gazprom for almost €1.5 alternative gas-supply routes. In 2012, they Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria, and Charter Treaty, which has been ratified by billion for overcharging the country for were partially successful in achieving these beyond. But even if final agreement on gas 48 countries but not by Russia (and four gas deliveries. In 2012, Gazprom paid $4.3 objectives, mainly because of the continued transportation is reached, the envisioned other countries). Moscow also remains a billion in “retroactive discounts” to settle construction of gas interconnectors annual capacity of this “lighter” version will staunch opponent of the EU’s plan to fully price disputes with its clients in Germany, (between states such as Hungary and be half of that originally planned. liberalise its energy market, which Russia France, Poland, and Italy; prices for its Romania) and the implementation of considers a direct threat to its business clients in Austria, Italy, and Slovakia were measures that allow reverse flows (such as in Moreover, the Nord Stream project, which interests in the EU. also lowered. Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia). links Russia and Germany through a A liquid-natural-gas terminal in Poland, seabed-laid pipeline in the Baltic Sea (and Although the Energy Charter Treaty Meanwhile, the exploration of which will reduce its and possibly other which thus increases rather than decreases remained unratified by Moscow, the unconventional gas, which could further Central Europeans’ dependence on Russian the EU’s dependence on Russian gas) was European Commission took a potentially reduce European dependence on Russia, gas deliveries, is expected to be completed given another boost as the second of the two important step to enforce its market rules proceeded at a rather slow pace as EU in 2014 despite financial problems. pipelines became operational on 8 October in the energy sector by launching an anti- member states took different views of 2012. Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovenia also competition probe against Russian state the dangers and potential of “fracking”. However, the Nabucco project – one of the joined the Russian-sponsored South Stream energy giant Gazprom for possible abuse Bulgaria, France, and Germany banned EU’s main projects to ensure gas supply project, which is seen as an alternative to of its dominant market position in Central the technique because of concerns about its from sources other than Russia – suffered Nabucco. Thus EU member states continue and Eastern Europe. Europeans held impact on the environment and Romania another blow in 2012 after Azerbaijan and to seek bilateral solutions to their energy together and let the European Commission imposed a moratorium, which, however, Turkey announced that they would build issues rather than joining forces to reduce carry on the investigation. But Russian the new government might lift in 2013. their own pipeline, the so-called Trans- their dependence on Russia. President Vladimir Putin responded with Poland and the UK were among the few Anatolian pipeline, connecting these two a decree that required Gazprom and other member states that continued exploration. states rather than joining Nabucco (which

52 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 53 RUSSIA / Cooperation on regional and global issues RUSSIA / Cooperation on regional and global issues

22 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 23 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON IRAN AND PROLIFERATION ON THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST

Russia cooperated with 2010 2011 2012 Russia blocked action against 2010 2011 2012 the West in the renewed Syria at the UNSC but, despite diplomatic push that took Unity 4/5 5/5 5/5 anti-NATO rhetoric, continued Unity – 3/5 5/5 place in 2012 but opposed Resources 4/5 4/5 4/5 to cooperate in supplying Resources – 4/5 4/5 EU sanctions. forces in Afghanistan. Outcome 8/10 3/10 4/10 B Outcome – 5/10 4/10 B Total 16/20 12/20 13/20 2010 A- 2011 B- Total – 12/20 13/20 2010 – 2011 B-

The EU and the US see blocking Iran also said Iran was neither seeking nuclear The EU and Russia found themselves on joint statements on the Israeli-Palestinian from acquiring nuclear weapons capacity weapons nor would attack other states with opposing sides of the conflict in Syria. conflict, and on a visit to Israel and the as one of their primary foreign-policy them, and implied that the threat of force Unlike on Libya the year before, Europeans Palestinian Territories, Russian President goals. As a member of the UNSC and an against Iran prevented the crisis from being were united in trying to persuade Russia Vladimir Putin reiterated his support for Iranian partner in military transfers and resolved. Despite participating in the E3+3, to change its policy on Syria. Nevertheless, the two-state solution. Although Russia did the construction of the Bushehr nuclear Moscow also continued its conventional Russia (together with China) vetoed not make much effort on the Middle East plant, Russia has the power to obstruct or arms sales to Iran. resolutions proposed by the EU to impose Peace Process, it successfully maintained facilitate Western objectives. Russia does sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria. As relationships with Fatah, Hamas, and not want a nuclear-armed Iran but neither Thus, although the EU and Russia Moscow dismissed criticism and continued Israel. Russia criticised what it called does it fully share the West’s analysis of cooperated in the renewed diplomatic its arms shipments to Damascus, the EU NATO’s “artificial deadline” for pulling the situation. In particular, Russia strongly push that took place in 2012, differences started to offer more significant support out of Afghanistan by 2014 and expressed disagrees with the EU policy of sanctions, in their approaches remained. Europeans to the rebels. Although Europeans did not fears that the country would turn into a which it thinks is at least partially counter- were frustrated by Russia’s reluctance to give up on attempts to change Russian major exporter of drugs and terrorism. productive. However, Russia still has more play a stronger role as a broker. Russia, on policy – Syria was on the agenda of nearly However, it also warned about staying common ground with the EU than it does the other hand, continues to see Western every European leader whose interaction longer and claimed any continued NATO with the US. policy as making conflict more rather with Russia involves global strategic issues bases would require a UN resolution to be than less likely. Strains developed towards – they may not have done all they could to legal. But despite its anti-NATO rhetoric, In 2012, as the impact of EU and US the end of 2012 when the EU tightened win Russian support at the UN. Given that Moscow continued its cooperation in sanctions brought Tehran back to the its sanctions towards Iran by imposing Moscow is on principle opposed to regime supplying NATO forces in Afghanistan. In negotiating table, Europeans were once measures targeting the banking, trade, change from outside, but at the same time an unprecedented move, it even allowed again led by the EU3 (France, Germany, and and energy sectors, which Russia opposes. does not necessarily see President Bashar a NATO transit centre to open at its base the UK) in attempts to get Russian support Russian President Vladimir Putin also al-Assad’s rule as a policy goal, Europeans in Ulyanovsk – a city about 500 miles on Iran. But although three meetings reiterated his support this year for Iran’s hope that cooperation with Russia on Syria southeast of Moscow, and the birthplace of of the E3+3 group were held, including right to nuclear energy and warned that will be more fruitful once Assad has fallen. Vladimir Lenin. one in Moscow, a breakthrough proved Israel would “regret” an attack on Iran. elusive. Russia cooperated in the meetings, Meanwhile, cooperation within the Middle but continued to oppose sanctions and East Quartet has stagnated but improved denounced the EU oil blockade. Russia in Afghanistan. The EU and Russia issued

54 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 55 RUSSIA / Cooperation on regional and global issues RUSSIA / Cooperation on regional and global issues

24 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 25 RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON THE ARCTIC ON CLIMATE CHANGE The EU made a U-turn in its 2010 2011 2012 vision of Arctic governance, In a generally uneventful 2010 2011 2012 which made Russian support Unity – – 4/5 year, Russia reaffirmed its for the EU’s bid for observer Resources – – 4/5 refusal to be part of a second Unity 3/5 3/5 3/5 status in the Arctic Council commitment period of the Resources 3/5 3/5 2/5 more likely. Outcome – – 5/10 B Kyoto Protocol on climate 2010 – 2011 – change. Outcome 3/10 3/10 3/10 C Total – – 13/20 Total 9/20 9/20 8/20 2010 C+ 2011 C+

The EU seeks to cooperate with Russia Belarus, Russia almost derailed the UN The melting of Arctic ice has created on the United Nations Convention on the – the world’s fourth-biggest emitter of climate talks in Doha in December. The economic prospects and geopolitical Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which defines greenhouse gases behind China, the United three countries insisted that they should be competition. The EU’s most concrete borders of territorial waters, exclusive States, and India – at both the global and allowed extra credit for the emissions cuts objective – and the one for which it wants economic zones, and continental shelves. regional levels in reducing climate change. they made when their industries collapsed Russia’s support – is observer status In other words, the EU now shares the Cooperation on climate-change reduction in the 1990s. Poland also voiced similar in the Arctic Council, for which it first Russian position that most of the Arctic was identified as a key priority in the EU– arguments and held back the rest of the applied in 2008. (The EU’s three Arctic should be divided up among the littoral Russia Partnership for Modernisation, EU until it received assurances that its states – Denmark, Finland, and Sweden states. But Russian pressure was not the which was agreed in 2010. However, emissions cuts would be treated flexibly. In – are members of the Arctic Council main factor behind this policy change. Russians do not in general see combating the end, the conference made it possible for and six other EU member states have Most Arctic states, including the EU’s three climate change as a high priority and there the Kyoto Protocol to be replaced by a new observer status). Canada and Russia were Arctic member states, had independently are differences of views among domestic treaty to tackle climate change by 2015. traditionally against involving outsiders in come round to that position. actors. When climate-related policies the Arctic Council’s work. Denmark also contradict economic interests, the latter Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev also had reservations but Copenhagen now The EU sees its engagement in the Arctic usually win. promised to slash carbon emissions to 25 officially supports the EU’s bid. A decision issues largely through the prism of “soft percent below 1990 levels by 2020 – not is due in 2013. issues” such as research, help to indigenous 2012 was a generally uneventful year. There exactly a tall order, given that Russian peoples, and combating climate change; was some debate in Russia over whether emissions dropped sharply after 1990 and Russian support for the EU’s bid was made Russia sees it in terms of economic interests or not to sign the Kyoto Protocol, whose stood 34 percent below that year’s level in more likely by the U-turn on governance and geopolitics. For example, Russia second period of emissions-reductions 2010. of the Arctic that the EU made in 2012. claims that the underwater Lomonosov commitments is due to start in 2013 and In its first joint communication on the and Mendeleyev ridges, which reach continue to 2020. In the end, however, the subject in 2008, the EU had said the Arctic the North Pole, are a continuation of its country stuck to the decision to stay out Ocean should be governed multilaterally continental shelf. If this claim is recognised which it had made in late 2011. But Moscow as humankind’s common heritage. by the UN Commission on the Limits of the did promise to be part of a new global But, in a second joint communication Continental Shelf, Russia’s economic zone climate treaty, which is to be negotiated published in July, it dropped all references would be extended by another 1.2 million by 2015 and made operational by 2020. At to multilateralism and argued that square kilometres. the same time, together with Ukraine and management of the Arctic should be based

56 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 57 United States Overall grade 2012 2011 2010 Overall grade 2011 B- TRADE LIBERALISATION AND OVERALL RELATIONSHIP B- B- B 26 Reciprocity on visa procedures with the US C- C- C Overall grade 2010 B- B- 27 Relations with the US on trade and investment B+ B- B- 28 Relations with the US on standards and norms, B B- B consumer protection 29 Relations with the US on the euro crisis C+ B- n/a

COOPERATION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES B- B- C+ 30 Relations with the US on counter-terrorism B- B+ A 31 Relations with the US on NATO, arms control and Russia C+ C- n/a 32 Relations with the US on the Balkans B- B B+

COOPERATION ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES B B B- 33 Relations with the US on the Arab Awakening B+ B+ n/a 34 Relations with the US on the Middle East peace process C- C- C 35 Relations with the US on the Syrian conflict A- n/a n/a 36 Relations with the US on Asia B- n/a n/a 37 Relations with the US on Iran and weapons proliferation A- A- A 38 Relations with the US on climate change B B+ B-

The American “pivot” to Asia, a policy which was developed further in the course of 2012, has often been interpreted as an attempt by the US to redirect its assets and attention away from Europe, which is seen as an increasingly cumbersome partner, to where the future of the world will be decided – that is, in the emerging economies in general and Asia in particular. According to this narrative, the combination of Europe’s recession in 2012, the deep cuts in its defence budgets, the constant distraction of rescuing and revamping the eurozone, and the associated loss of soft power would make Europe an afterthought in America’s grand strategy. As a result, Europe would essentially lose clout with the US.

In 2012, however, this was not the reality. First, the US had its share of domestic problems itself, from anaemic growth and the fiscal crunch to intense partisan bickering that was amplified by the upcoming election. Whether in Asia, on Syria, or on Arab transitions in general, the US did not demonstrate much appetite for new international ventures. In fact, President Barack Obama campaigned on the need to do nation building at home and keep the defence budget in check.

EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 59 This suggests that it is not just Europe that is losing power relative to other parts Jobs and Growth. If adopted, such an agreement would not only be a symbol of the world but the West in general. of both the resilience of transatlantic relations but would also give the West a further edge in defining the economic standards and norms of tomorrow. Second, although the implicit vision of world order that the pivot expresses represents a break with the traditional Western vision, there were signs of However, despite these signs of resilience, Europeans did not always get what resilience in the transatlantic alliance in 2012. A striking symbol of this was the they wanted from their relationship with Washington in 2012. The euro crisis success of the G8 summit at Camp David and the NATO summit in Chicago in continued to cast a long shadow on transatlantic relations and in particular May compared to the G20 summit in Los Cabos a month later, which attracted generated tensions between the US and Germany, with Obama supporting calls little attention and delivered precious few decisions. Obama had started his by France, Italy, and Spain for a growth strategy. The lack of full visa reciprocity first term extolling the virtues of the G20 and downplaying the G8. In fact, at is also still a sore point, especially for Poland. The Israel–Palestine issue also the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, in September 2009, he indicated that the remains a point of contention, with Europeans able to resist diplomatic US latter might gradually fade away and be replaced by the former. The president demarches but still too divided to influence US policy in any meaningful way, as certainly remains committed to paying greater attention to emerging powers the vote on the non-member state status for Palestine illustrated. Obama also and crafting a “multi-partner” strategy. But the G20 world is not yet a reality. allowed his Secretary of Transportation to exempt US airlines from complying This leaves Europe, with all its flaws, as the only dependable partner the US has. with the EU Emissions Trading System in spite of European gestures of goodwill. In the longer term, as the US energy revolution locks it into dependence on fossil In particular, for all his desire to shift the focus of US foreign policy towards Asia, fuels (shale gas and tight oil), transatlantic tensions over climate change could Obama has been constantly drawn back to the Middle East – where Europe increase. remains his most important partner. This is especially true on the Iranian nuclear issue, a top US priority. For the first time, the tighter sanctions imposed by the On this issue and a few others, including the defence of European interests in EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) in 2012 had a profound effect the face of US Iran sanctions, the EEAS in Washington plays an increasingly on the Iranian economy as dialogue continued through High Representative substantial role of coordination and advocacy, without pretending to substitute Catherine Ashton. The ultimate success of this policy, however, will depend itself to the still powerful embassies of the member states, especially on sensitive on whether negotiations, rather than war, can achieve the main objective: to diplomatic issues. While the EU delegation is still modest in size (it is comparable prevent Iran from getting nuclear capacity. In the meantime, Europeans have to that of a medium-sized European country), it is a place for consultation and defended their red lines, kept the international community united, and helped exchange of information, with regular meetings of the 27 ambassadors each avoid escalation of conflict in the region. Europeans were also at the forefront month and Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCM) each week and a growing ability to of joint Western efforts to support Arab transitions, especially in Egypt, and match the US bureaucratic machinery and hence to advance European interests. closely coordinated with Washington on the situation in Syria, whether on the ground, in the “Friends of Syria” group, or at the UN, in the face of Russian Meanwhile, it is hard not to notice how the differences between European intransigence. reactions to disagreements with the US have changed in the last few years. Drone strikes and cyber attacks under President Barack Obama pose the There were also efforts to tie Europe to the pivot. Regular meetings took same type of vexing legal and moral problems as Guantanamo prison, torture, place in Washington between Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and and extraordinary rendition under President George W. Bush did. However, European ambassadors. In Phnom Penh, in July, Hillary Clinton and Catherine Europe’s voice and normative ambitions on these issues – and more generally Ashton pledged US–EU cooperation and consultation in Asia. One concrete on multilateral governance – seem to have been muffled in the last few years. achievement was the successful lifting of sanctions on Burma in the first half Only greater European unity and an economic resurgence can ensure that of 2012, with the UK playing a key role. 2013 could also see negotiations for Europeans get the most of a resilient transatlantic relationship – and that they a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) following extensive and discreet reverse the declining clout of the West in general. preparatory work done in 2012 by the EU–US High Level Working Group on

60 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 61 UNITED STATES / Trade liberalisation and overall relationship UNITED STATES / Trade liberalisation and overall relationship

26 RECIPROCITY ON VISA 27 RELATIONS WITH THE US PROCEDURES WITH THE US ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Four member states still need 2010 2011 2012 There was some progress 2010 2011 2012 visas for travel to the US, and on the usual disputes, but Europeans did not exercise Unity 3/5 2/5 2/5 the energy on both sides Unity 3/5 3/5 4/5 their collective clout on this Resources 2/5 2/5 2/5 was focused on preparing a Resources 3/5 3/5 4/5 issue. major transatlantic free-trade Outcome 3/10 3/10 3/10 C- deal for 2013. Outcome 6/10 5/10 7/10 B+ Total 8/20 7/20 7/20 2010 C 2011 C- Total 12/20 11/20 15/20 2010 B- 2011 B-

Four EU member states – Bulgaria, get admitted in the near future, whereas 2012 brought mixed results in resolving (HLWG) on Jobs and Growth. The HLWG Cyprus, Poland, and Romania – are still the Schengen requirement may delay the the traditional transatlantic disputes in was established during the US–EU summit excluded from the Visa Waiver Program entry of Romania and Bulgaria. The EEAS trade and investment. On the one hand, of November 2011 to explore the possibility (VWP) with the United States, whereas pleaded with US authorities on behalf of the old rivalry between Airbus and Boeing of a far-reaching transatlantic free-trade Americans can travel visa-free to and the four countries, both in Washington continued. In September, the Europeans area, in particular through the removal of within the EU. The reasons are ostensibly through the EU delegation and in bilateral lodged a new request with the WTO to tariffs and non-tariff barriers. It released technical: their visa refusal rate is above talks with the US administration more impose annual sanctions of more than €9 its interim report in June 2012 and its final the 3 percent threshold fixed by the US generally, but there is little it can do to billion to Washington for failing to comply report in early 2013. Congress, and Bulgaria and Romania are influence Congress. Moreover, other EU with the previous no-subsidy ruling. The not yet part of the Schengen Area. But member states were not mobilised. EU is also pushing the US to relax its While nothing substantial came out of there is nothing a country can do to lower foreign-ownership rules for airlines, which these efforts in the course of 2012, the its visa refusal rate. Citizens are free to The European Commission has yet to requires approval by Congress. On the potential implications of the work done apply and reapply multiple times, thereby issue its final verdict on whether the other hand, however, there was notable during that year are momentous. If worsening the statistics. Furthermore, the US ESTA (Electronic System for Travel progress on longstanding disputes. For concluded, a Transatlantic Free Trade Area requirements for Schengen are much more Authorization), a mandatory registration example, in March 2012, the European (TAFTA) could boost trade and investment stringent than for the VWP. The real reason scheme with an attendant $14 fee per Parliament voted to end the transatlantic between the two sides of the Atlantic, is that some senators do not like the VWP person to travel to the US on the VWP, is beef war with the US, expanding quotas adding substantial activity in a time of slow and seek to limit the number of countries a visa in disguise or not. Regardless of the for high-quality, non-hormone-treated US growth and strengthening the ability of the benefitting from it. ruling, Europeans should keep pressing beef imports, in exchange for an agreement West to define industrial standards and Washington to drop the fee, for which by the US to lift restrictions on European norms. Among those member states that In 2012, several bills aimed at expanding the EU has no equivalent for Americans beef and veal imports. The issue had been were particularly active in the efforts to the VWP were nonetheless introduced travelling to Europe. contentious since 1996. pave the way for negotiations were the UK in Congress, most notably the JOLT Act, and Germany, as well as Poland and Spain, and the Obama administration was very While these traditional issues are and no member states opposed the efforts. supportive. However, nothing came out of important, in 2012 a large part of the work it. Of the four member states still not in the and efforts of the EEAS, including that of VWP, Poland was the most vocal on this the EU delegation in Washington, was in issue by far, and it may be the only one to support of the High Level Working Group

62 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 63 UNITED STATES / Trade liberalisation and overall relationship UNITED STATES / Trade liberalisation and overall relationship

28 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON STANDARDS 29 RELATIONS WITH THE US AND NORMS, CONSUMER PROTECTION ON THE EURO CRISIS

As in the trade and investment 2010 2011 2012 Anxious Americans were 2010 2011 2012 component, the mixture of supportive of European progress and failure of 2012 Unity 4/5 4/5 4/5 efforts to save the euro, while Unity – 2/5 2/5 was overshadowed by the Resources 3/5 3/5 3/5 siding with the pro-growth Resources – 3/5 3/5 prospect of a transatlantic free- camp in the crisis. trade deal in the coming years. Outcome 6/10 5/10 6/10 B Outcome – 6/10 5/10 C+ Total 13/20 12/20 13/20 2010 B 2011 B- Total – 11/20 10/20 2010 – 2011 B-

During 2012, a lot of energy was devoted Classification (CPC) system, to be launched In 2012, the Obama administration feared Hollande, Spanish Prime Minister to helping the EU–US High Level Working in 2013. The system incorporates the best an unravelling of the eurozone, which Mariano Rajoy, and Italian Prime Minister Group (HLWG) identify the areas in which practices of both sides of the Atlantic and would have triggered a new economic Mario Monti rather than the pro-fiscal trade and investment barriers need to be creates a harmonised classification system recession and endangered the president’s consolidation camp of German Chancellor removed in order to prepare negotiations that allows users to search for patents in chances of re-election in November. But Angela Merkel. But, here again, there was for a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA, the US and Europe at the same time, which the administration had few policy tools at little the US president could do. see component 27). Since tariffs between could be a step towards a global patent its disposal that could make a difference: the two sides of the Atlantic are already system based on Western preferences. it could not contribute to rescue funds The euro crisis was also at the centre of low, around 2 to 3 percent on average, directly and had no margin of manoeuvre the discussions at the G20 meeting in Los recommendations revolve largely around There were, however, some more to contribute more through the IMF. In Cabos the following month, with the US issues of standards and norms. They might disappointing results in other areas. fact, all it could do was publicly support and other powers insisting that European make or break the deal, with agriculture the There was no progress on the agreement European efforts and thus reassure leaders commit all possible resources to ever-difficult topic of contention. signed in 2011 on e-health because of the nervous markets – a task it usefully solving the crisis. This elicited an angry vast differences between the European fulfilled, and which satisfied Europeans’ response from European Commission Apart from this preparatory work, the and American healthcare systems. In expectations. As was the case in 2011, the President José Manuel Barroso, who said European Commission’s DG Trade and 2012, both the US and the EU legislated US Federal Reserve also kept swap lines that Europe didn’t need economic lessons the EEAS – which is on the front line separately on counterfeit products and open with the ECB in order to facilitate the from the US – where the crisis originated. on such issues – enjoyed success in will be introducing unique identifiers to provision of liquidity. The US administration was satisfied with various areas. In February, the US and mark products, using separate American the decision to create a banking union EU signed an agreement on the mutual and European systems. Transatlantic Privately, President Barack Obama, announced at the following European recognition of organic products, a deal compatibility has not been a priority. In Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, and Council in June, and, most importantly, which is encouraging in the perspective this area, the West is reducing its chances their emissaries urged eurozone leaders with the ECB decision to buy euro area of a possible TAFTA because each side to set the standards for tomorrow’s global to do more to contain the crisis. The US government bonds, thereby assuaging accepted the other’s definition of “organic” economy. preference for more action led to tensions fears of a collapse of the euro. despite substantial differences. In October, between Washington and Berlin, which the US Patent and Trademark Office and were visible at the G8 summit at Camp the European Patent Office announced the David in May. Obama sided with the pro- early completion of the Cooperative Patent growth camp of French President François

64 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 65 UNITED STATES / Trade liberalisation and overall relationship UNITED STATES / Cooperation on European security issues

30 RELATIONS WITH THE US 31 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON NATO, ON COUNTER-TERRORISM ARMS CONTROL AND RUSSIA

Europeans received support 2010 2011 2012 In spite of scattered efforts to 2010 2011 2012 from Americans in the fight limit the impact of the deep against terrorism, but their Unity 5/5 4/5 3/5 cuts in their defence budgets, Unity – 2/5 2/5 efforts at imposing stricter Resources 5/5 3/5 3/5 Europeans were still divided Resources – 2/5 2/5 rules and norms have met and their dependence on US with limited success. Outcome 8/10 7/10 6/10 B- leadership increased. Outcome – 2/10 5/10 C+ Total 18/20 14/20 12/20 2010 A 2011 B+ Total – 6/20 9/20 2010 C-/C* 2011 C-

*In 2010, Europeans got a C- for relations with NATO and a C for relations with the US on arms control and Russia.

Transatlantic cooperation on counter- In early 2012, the EEAS gathered comments Relations within NATO and with the US Republic launched a new cooperative terrorism is mostly conducted on a bilateral from member states regarding the new in 2012 were good, but European efforts at initiative to build a Multinational Aviation basis, with some coordination provided provisions for military detention and trials advancing their own defence capabilities Training Centre; and France, Germany, by the European Commission’s DG of suspected terrorists signed by President and vision of the European security and the Netherlands initiated a joint air- Home Affairs and the EEAS. Operational Barack Obama in December 2011. These architecture faltered. The NATO summit to-air refuelling programme. Many states, exchanges are hard to evaluate, but they comments influenced the implementing in Chicago in May was a success, at least however, kept cutting their budget without are reputed to be dense and fruitful. guidelines so as to minimise the negative superficially, and even the anticipated much NATO or ESDP coordination. On the other hand, European efforts at impact on transatlantic cooperation, for French withdrawal from Afghanistan establishing common norms in the fight example by making sure that the normal created few problems with Washington. More generally, shrinking defence budgets against terrorism met mixed success. criminal-justice track was preferred over There was broad agreement on the principle in the West combined with modest the military track when the suspect is a of “smart defence” and on missile defence. capabilities in Eastern European member The renegotiated PNR (“Passenger Name citizen of an allied country. states explain the timidity of European Record”) agreement on the transfer of In both cases, however, Europeans went positions on the security of their own airline data to US authorities approved Lastly, while the new aspects of the war on along with Americans largely as a way to continent. There was little activity in by the European Council in late 2011 was terrorism such as the use of drones often keep them engaged in a time of doubt about relation to Russia, for example on reviving ratified by the European Parliament in April present the same type of legal and moral US commitment, especially for the missile the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 2012. While some MEPs criticised the long dilemmas as Guantanamo or extraordinary defence plans, which are anyway mainly (CFE) Treaty. Europeans disagreed about retention period of data and insufficient rendition, Europeans have remained much financed by Washington. Many “smart the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture judicial redress, the new agreement strikes more silent and their normative ambitions defence” projects lack serious substance, Review, with Central and Eastern European a much better balance between security seem muted. A majority of people in many and while the coordination between NATO member states emphasising the importance and privacy than the 2007 one. There was European states disapprove of drone ACT (Allied Command Transformation) and of nuclear weapons, including tactical some concern, however, regarding the strikes, but the issue has simply not gotten the European Defence Agency’s “pooling ones, in the security balance with Russia, implementation of the SWIFT agreement much attention and European governments and sharing” programme was better than while Germany and the Benelux countries of 2010, as the transfer of financial data do not have an official position on the issue. ever before, concrete achievements were insisted on taking steps towards nuclear to the US for counter-terrorism purposes There is quiet diplomacy with the US, for somewhat limited. Under one of these disarmament. At the Chicago summit, didn’t follow the procedure it was supposed example through the bi-annual dialogue of two programmes, for example, Northern decisions were postponed. to, according to a EUROPOL report. the legal advisers, but it is restricted to an and Eastern European states cooperated exchange of views. around NATO Baltic air policing; the Czech

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32 RELATIONS WITH THE US 33 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON THE BALKANS ON THE ARAB TRANSITIONS

Even though transatlantic 2010 2011 2012 Europeans and Americans 2010 2011 2012 cooperation is good, tried – and to some extent persistent European disunity Unity 3/5 2/5 2/5 succeeded – in coordinating Unity – 5/5 4/5 over the Balkans ensured Resources 4/5 4/5 4/5 their aid to support Arab Resources – 3/5 4/5 a continued US presence countries in transition. and frustrated European Outcome 7/10 7/10 5/10 B- Outcome – 6/10 6/10 B+ aspirations. Total 14/20 13/20 11/20 2010 B+ 2011 B Total – 14/20 14/20 2010 – 2011 B+

The convergence of views on the Balkans (EULEX). In late October, US Secretary Americans and Europeans broadly agreed new mechanism to coordinate all donors is generally high: all agree that Americans of State Hillary Clinton travelled jointly in their analysis of what needs to be done including international organisations. should stay engaged while gradually to the region with her EU counterpart to support Arab countries in transition. Donor coordination, moreover, is not handing over responsibility to Europeans Catherine Ashton to express EU–US In 2012, American and European always effective on the ground because for their own neighbourhood. However, as determination in this regard. coordinators for aid to the region, most Europeans and Americans have their a result of European disunity, and because notably William Taylor for the State bureaucratic rigidities, and actual they fear they might have to come back if Clinton and Ashton also criticised Bosnian Department and Bernardino León for the cooperation with the Arab countries is they leave and the situation deteriorates, politicians for failing to implement reforms EEAS – but also Italian, German, French, mostly done on a bilateral basis. American scepticism that Europeans can and threatening to derail the Dayton and Spanish coordinators – conferred manage the situation entirely on their own Agreement framework. In a resolution in every three months or so in informal At a more general level, Americans and is being reinforced. March, the European Parliament called meetings, which also included Turkey. Europeans failed to come up with a more again for the dissolution of the Office of They exchanged evaluations and tried to ambitious initiative such as a joint Marshall This is especially true for Kosovo, whose the High Representative (OHR), while maximise the effectiveness of their action Plan for North Africa. The Deauville independence is still not recognised Americans remained opposed. The US and influence in transition countries such format launched by the G8 in 2011 did by five EU member states (Cyprus, often defers to Brussels on Bosnia and views as Egypt and Tunisia. For example, they not deliver as hoped either. Europeans Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain). Peter Sorensen, the Special Representative jointly agreed to condition significant cash have the feeling that Americans let them While their position is generally one of and Head of the EU Delegation to Bosnia transfers to Egypt to the acceptation of bear the brunt of support to countries in constructive abstention, this division and Herzegovina, very favourably. But an IMF agreement, thereby getting more transition; Americans, for their part, have remains a drag on European leadership. after a brief improvement at the beginning leverage (though the Turks didn’t go along the feeling that Europeans promised a It is all the more vexing that 2012 again of 2012, the situation deteriorated. As with this particular conditionality). lot but did not deliver commensurately. demonstrated that the EEAS has a clear a result, Americans still see the OHR as The US, however, has also been working lead on Serbia–Kosovo negotiations, a the guarantor of the Dayton Agreement Some countries in the region do not want with Central European member states lead that Washington acknowledges, as framework, even if it does not accomplish to see aid coordinated, as was the case (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, both Europeans and Americans insist on much. Lastly, Europeans and Americans for Egypt when Minister of International Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and the two countries getting to an agreement cooperate on facilitating Macedonia’s Cooperation Faiza Abou el-Naga was still in Slovenia), both in the Emerging Donors as a pre-condition to EU membership. progress towards joining the EU and office. On the other hand, the new Tunisian Challenge Fund and also the Community American personnel also contribute to NATO, but the obstacle of the name dispute government expressed an interest in such of Democracies. the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo remains. coordination and suggested to set up a

68 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 69 UNITED STATES / Cooperation on regional and global issues UNITED STATES / Cooperation on regional and global issues

34 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON 35 RELATIONS WITH THE US THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS ON THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

In a US election year, 2010 2011 2012 Americans and Europeans 2010 2011 2012 Europeans were unable to – most notably France and get Americans to refocus Unity 3/5 2/5 2/5 the UK – coordinated policy Unity – – 4/5 efforts on the peace process Resources 3/5 2/5 3/5 towards Syria but had limited Resources – – 4/5 and they went their separate impact on the ground. ways at the UN. Outcome 2/10 2/10 2/10 C- Outcome – – 8/10 A- Total 8/20 6/20 7/20 2010 C 2011 C- Total – – 16/20 2010 – 2011 –

With a US presidential election looming, states, including Germany, abstained. Europeans and Americans generally saw On the European side, the main diplomatic the emphasis in Washington in 2012 was on In the vote on Palestinian admission to eye-to-eye on Syria during the course players were the French and the British. damage control rather than new initiatives. UNESCO a year before, by contrast, five EU of 2012. All insisted – though without Apart from a brief period of tension As a result, there was no meaningful member states voted against admission, 11 success – that the Syrian government during the summer, when the French transatlantic interaction on the Middle East voted in favour, and 11 abstained. cease its repression and enter into a called for a no-fly zone at one point, both Peace Process during the year and the so- transition process, with President Bashar cooperated closely with the US, with called Quartet was at best marginal and at Europeans were thus more united in 2012 al-Assad removed from power. France often leading the way in exploring worst an excuse for inaction. than a year earlier in spite of US pressure, new options (the “Friends of Syria” group, but they are not yet voting as one. They Both the US and the EU were frustrated the free zones, and the recognition of Washington pressured EU member still also disagree on other issues such as by Russia and China, which in February the Syrian National Coalition), and both states to support its opposition to the the recognition of Hezbollah as a terrorist and July again vetoed action against Syria coordinating on non-lethal arms supply Palestinian bid to upgrade its status group – a cause pushed by the US and at the UNSC. In an attempt to create a for the resistance. Lastly, the EU as a at the UN. The US said in a private Israel, especially after the bombing in strong coalition and come up with viable whole also strongly supported the Western memorandum to EU member states in late Bulgaria in July that killed five Israeli solutions to the Syrian crisis beyond the effort, with new rounds of sanctions every September that such an upgrade would tourists and a local bus driver, and was UN, they formed the “Friends of Syria” month or so, in step with the US. These be “extremely counterproductive” and widely attributed to the Lebanese group group in February. Several meetings were sanctions were taken outside a UNSC threatened “negative consequences” for the (although the official investigation has yet held, at which Americans and Europeans resolution framework. They confirmed, Palestinians, but US pressure subsided as a to be published). However, there was better played an important role, but the value after the Iranian case, that the EU could result of Israeli intransigence. In the vote in European and transatlantic alignment of the group diminished as the year went apply sanctions effectively. the UNGA in November, Europeans were during the hostilities in Gaza in November. by. A crucial push to force the opposition divided: the Czech Republic voted alongside The EU and the US defended Israel’s right to organise itself and become more the US and seven other countries against to self-defence against rocket attacks by representative came from US Secretary of granting the non-member state status; 14 Hamas and other entities, while urging State Hillary Clinton, alongside Qatar, and other EU member states voted in favour proportionality in the response and pushing leading European states such as France, (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, both against a ground incursion by Israel leading to the Syrian National Coalition in Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and for a ceasefire that involved indirect November 2012. Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and negotiations (largely Egyptian-mediated) Sweden); and the remaining 12 member with Hamas.

70 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 71 UNITED STATES / Cooperation on regional and global issues UNITED STATES / Cooperation on regional and global issues

36 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON ASIA 37 RELATIONS WITH THE US ON IRAN AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION In 2012, the US tried to tie 2010 2011 2012 Europe to its “pivot” to Asia, but Europeans are right to Unity – – 3/5 Europeans and Americans 2010 2011 2012 chart their own course in the Resources – – 2/5 coordinated a decisive region. tightening of sanctions on Iran. Unity 5/5 4/5 4/5 Outcome – – 7/10 B- Their strategy will ultimately Resources 5/5 5/5 5/5 2010 – 2011 – be vindicated if a negotiated Total – – 12/20 deal comes through and could Outcome 8/10 7/10 8/10 A- prove counter-productive if not. Total 18/20 16/20 17/20 2010 A 2011 A-

If the US is not pivoting away from Europe, US announced the lifting of a 15-year ban The close coordination with the US example by making sure that SWIFT (the is it then pivoting with Europe? In other on American investment, opening up trade that Europeans have established on the financial transactions clearing house words, is there a transatlantic dimension to relations with the democratising state. Iranian issue continued in 2012 with a based in Belgium) or the Shah Deniz gas the new US focus on Asia? In 2012, there The US also nominated an ambassador, new tightening of sanctions, which for the consortium (which includes an Iranian were new developments in this respect. the post having been vacant for some first time had a visible impact on Iran’s company as well as EU ones) were not hit by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian time, while the EU opened an office and economy. In January, the EU adopted American sanctions. High Representative and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell stepped is upgrading to a delegation in 2013. Both sanctions banning imports of Iranian Catherine Ashton and Helga Schmidt of the up coordination with European countries partners worked with ASEAN to assist in crude oil, petroleum products, and key EEAS also negotiated with Iran in Istanbul, in Washington, holding a monthly lunch democracy building. equipment; freezing the assets of the Baghdad, and Moscow, thus keeping the with a number of ambassadors, including Iranian central bank; and prohibiting trade door open to a peaceful deal. But the EU3 the EU one. In July, while attending the While increased transatlantic coordination in gold, precious metals, and diamonds remained key in the discussions with the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phnom Penh, on Asia is welcome, there are limits to the between EU member states and the Iranian US, and managed to rally other member High Representative Catherine Ashton idea of a “joint pivot”. First, Americans do central bank. These sanctions entered states for the new rounds of sanctions – and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton not think of the “pivot” as a Western project, into force on 1 July in spite of the counter- even Sweden, which has misgivings about issued a joint statement that gave a new there has been little follow-up of the joint measures taken by Iran. European resolve the sanctions policy. impetus to US–EU cooperation in the Asia- declaration among officials of either side helped ease differences of views and Pacific region. Americans also supported in the region, and US policymakers tend to interests with the US. The EU is in favour of While some European objectives were met increased EU participation in regional see Europeans as insufficiently political in targeted sanctions but opposed to a general – like avoiding a regional war and punishing organisations such as the ASAEN Regional their approach to Asia. Second, Europe has trade embargo; and it does not want to bar Iran for flouting the non-proliferation treaty Forum and the East Asia Summit, though been culturally and economically present in the Iranian central bank from all activity (NPT) and UN resolutions – President admission still seems distant. Asia for some time, and is associated with like the US does. Barack Obama reminded the world that soft power, the rule of law, and commerce. ultimately the EU policy pursued in A good example of close EU–US It doesn’t necessarily want to be seen as Alongside British, French, and German conjunction with the US will be vindicated coordination was provided by Burma. playing the same role as the US. diplomats, the EU delegation in only if a deal is found. In March, he declared In May, the EU suspended economic Washington played a significant role by that he would not accept a nuclear Iran and sanctions for a trial period of one organising briefings of key congressmen rejected a strategy of containment, thereby year in response to the many positive and staffers on Capitol Hill to defend making military intervention more likely developments there. The same month, the European conceptions and interests, for for 2013 or later.

72 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 73 UNITED STATES / Cooperation on regional and global issues Wider Europe Overall grade 38 RELATIONS WITH THE US Overall grade 2011 C+

ON CLIMATE CHANGE Overall grade 2010 C+ C+ In spite of the crisis, Europeans 2010 2011 2012 kept pressing the US on the issue of climate change, but Unity 5/5 4/5 5/5 were rebuffed on many fronts, Resources 4/5 4/5 4/5 especially aviation-emissions regulations. Outcome 2/10 7/10 4/10 B Total 11/20 15/20 13/20 2010 B- 2011 B+

2012 was a frustrating year for Europeans for a year. But that didn’t prevent the US who advocate stronger action against House of Representatives from passing climate change by the US. The inclusion a bill a day later that allows the Secretary of aviation in the EU Emissions Trading of Transportation to exempt US airlines System (ETS) came into effect in January, from complying with the ETS. President even though airlines were already required Barack Obama signed it into law in spite to register and report their CO2 emissions of his commitment to renew his efforts in 2011 (no American airline had refused to against global warming during his election register). The negative reaction intensified campaign. during 2012, especially from China, India, and the US, in anticipation of the phasing- Europeans faced challenges on other fronts in of the associated tax in 2013. A loose as well. In particular, when they sought international group dubbed the “coalition support from the US for EU membership or of the unwilling” met in New Delhi in 2011, permanent observer status in international and in Moscow and Washington in 2012, to environmental organisations such as the try to derail the EU’s plans. Green Climate Fund and Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and After the meeting of the International Ecosystem Services (IPBES), or the Arctic Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Council, they did not get it: Americans November 2012 in Montreal, at which generally argued that Europeans would be member countries agreed to provide a overrepresented. Europeans also failed to mutually agreed framework for market- get much American commitment at the UN based measures dealing with carbon Conference on Sustainable Development, emissions by the autumn of 2013, EU (“Rio+20 Earth Summit”) in June. The Climate Action Commissioner Connie level of European unity was high, with a Hedegaard announced that, as a gesture of distinct role for the EEAS, but there was goodwill, the EU was “stopping the clock” little more that could be done to move the on the inclusion of aviation into the ETS US in an election year.

74 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 75 2012 2011 2010 became a candidate in March; and even Kosovo, unrecognised by five EU member WESTERN BALKANS B B B states, edged closer to signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 39 Overall progress on enlargement in the Western Balkans B+ n/a n/a with the EU. This progress was the result of efforts by key member states such as 40 Rule of law, democracy and human rights B- B+ B Austria, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the Visegrad quartet and by the European in the Western Balkans Commission and the EEAS. Thanks to the EEAS’s mediation efforts, Prishtina and 41 Kosovo A- B+ B+ Belgrade reached a key agreement with High Representative Catherine Ashton 42 Bosnia and Herzegovina C C C hosting unprecedented meetings between the two prime ministers, Ivica Dačić of Serbia and Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo, in October–December. TURKEY C C- C- 43 Bilateral relations with Turkey C- D+ D+ However, the EU struggled to impose itself in a stagnant Western Balkans. In 44 Rule of law, democracy and human rights in Turkey C- C- C- May, Boris Tadić lost the presidential election in Serbia; it is unclear how far his 45 Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question C- D+ D+ successor, former paramilitary fighter Tomislav Nikolić, will work with the post- 46 Relations with Turkey on regional issues B- C+ C- Milošević socialists to press ahead with reconciliation with Serbia’s neighbours. Pushing for democratisation and improved governance standards is a formidable EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD C+ C+ C+ challenge for the EU when there is a deficit of political will on the other side. 47 Rule of law, democracy and human rights C C C- Brussels has no choice but to deal with local leaders such as Macedonian Prime in the Eastern Neighbourhood Minister Nikola Gruevski and Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha, who polarise 48 Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood on trade A- B+ B+ public opinion and are accused of power grabbing. 49 Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood on energy C B+ B+ 50 Visa liberalisation with the Eastern Neighbourhood B- B- C+ It was also a difficult year for the EU in relation to Turkey. The election of François 51 Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood C+ n/a n/a Hollande as French president led to cautious optimism that 2012 might see an on protracted conflicts upturn in stalled relations. In May, the European Commission launched a Positive Agenda intended to sustain harmonisation with the acquis under policy chapters that have been frozen because of the lack of progress in Cyprus or French opposition to Turkish membership. But the mere fact that Hollande has not yet lifted any of the vetoes suggests that hopes are premature and an opening is not in sight. Equally, In 2011, the EU made progress in enlargement despite the euro crisis. However, Turkey has not made moves to implement the 2004 Ankara Protocol, which would in 2012, the EU’s power in the Wider Europe was diluted, not just because the unblock a host of chapters and revive the talks. On the brighter side, the European EU remains focused on the crisis but also because the emergence of a multi-tier Council agreed a roadmap for visa liberalisation with Turkey in November. The Europe is in effect downgrading the value of membership of the EU. The recession Cypriot presidency of the European Council in the second half of the year was not in the EU – a key trading partner for all Western Balkan countries – has also hit accompanied by a major crisis in bilateral relations, as some feared. local economies hard by depressing demand for exports and reducing FDI. Even the star performer in the Western Balkans, Croatia, is beset by negative growth In 2012, Turkey was preoccupied not by EU membership but by domestic affairs for a fourth consecutive year. In other words, the EU is now exporting the crisis and the situation in Syria, where the civil war has led to more than 100,000 to its already-troubled periphery and this is to some extent undercutting its policy refugees flocking into Turkish border towns and created new challenges on the in the region. Kurdish issue and political tensions within Turkey as well as with Iran and Russia. Despite the ongoing dialogue between the Turkish foreign ministry and the EEAS, That is not to say that the story of enlargement is over. The Western Balkans still see NATO and the US have been its partners of choice in dealing with challenges in membership as a strategic goal: Croatia is expected to become the twenty-eighth the neighbourhood, notably Syria. But European diplomats were unhappy with member of the EU in 2013; Montenegro started accession negotiations; Serbia the Turkish government’s exclusive backing for the Muslim Brotherhood and its

76 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 77 WIDER EUROPE / Western Balkans

alignment with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. On the other hand, Turkey continued to be a valuable intermediary between the EU and Iran, hosting the E3+3 talks on the 39 OVERALL PROGRESS ON ENLARGEMENT nuclear dossier in July. IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

In the Eastern Partnership region, in 2012 there was progress with Moldova There was considerable 2010 2011 2012 and Georgia. Moldova advanced its reforms and relations with the EU to the progress on enlargement, which continued despite the Unity – 4/5 4/5 point that both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission crisis, but political roadblocks Resources – 4/5 4/5 President José Manuel Barroso began to talk openly about the country’s European hampered several Balkan perspective – something that would have been inconceivable just a few years ago. countries’ progress. Outcome – 5/10 6/10 B+ Georgia, meanwhile, went through the first peaceful transition of power in its Total – 13/20 14/20 2010 – 2011 B modern history, despite the fact that the highly polarised election campaign led many to worry about possible instability. Georgia seems to be continuing to move towards democracy – albeit in a zigzag. The EU’s enlargement policy aims at obtain a negotiations date in December, On the other hand, there was little progress in relation to Ukraine – the biggest transforming and integrating the Western despite the European Commission’s and most important country in the Eastern Partnership region. The government Balkans. Despite the euro crisis, the EU has positive assessment. Greece, the principal avoided launching any painful reforms ahead of the October parliamentary not lost sight of this priority and there was blocker, demands a settlement of the elections, which fell short of democratic standards. The lack of reform means there considerable progress in 2012. By the end name issue before accession talks are has been little progress in Kyiv’s relations with the EU: although negotiations for of the year, 21 member states had ratified launched. Bulgaria similarly conditioned the Association Agreement and DCFTA were concluded, a number of member Croatia’s accession agreement. Montenegro its support to Macedonia on progress in states are unwilling to sign and ratify the documents. The failure by member states also launched accession talks in June, cross-border cooperation and demanded to coordinate their approach to the European football championship, which was having fulfilled pre-conditions set in the establishment of an intergovernmental held in Poland and Ukraine in May and June 2012, illustrated European divisions December 2011 and persuaded Sweden and council on the model set with countries on Ukraine. France to lift reservations. Serbia obtained such as Turkey or Israel. But in March, the candidate status in March after making commission inaugurated the High Level The situation in Azerbaijan and Belarus remained unchanged: the EU was unable to steps towards normalisation with Kosovo. Accession Dialogue (HLAD) to ensure push the governments of the two countries – both serious human-rights violators – In October, the European Commission’s the harmonisation with the acquis is not towards political liberalisation. In the case of Belarus, EU member states remained regular report recommended that Albania altogether blocked in Macedonia. united and adopted a series of visa bans and asset freezes on more than 240 be granted conditional candidate status individuals and companies linked to President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime. – but the European Council postponed With the European Council preoccupied However, there is no such consensus about Azerbaijan: President Ilham Aliyev’s the decision in December. Even Kosovo with the crisis, the European Commission regime has been effective in playing divide and rule among Europeans. There made headway (see component 41). The was in the driver’s seat on enlargement. was little progress on protracted conflicts in 2012: the 5+2 talks on Transnistria European Commission presented a positive The EEAS also played a key role in were formally re-launched but there was no breakthrough. As elsewhere in the feasibility study – a critical step towards mediating between Serbia and Kosovo, Wider Europe, the EU lacked resources, consensus and, perhaps most importantly, signing a Stabilisation and Association together with Germany as well as Austria partners in Eastern Europe. Agreement (SAA). and Italy, which have extensive economic interests in the area. Traditional advocate The outliers are Bosnia and Herzegovina Slovenia has been on the back foot owing and Macedonia: Bosnia failed to meet EU to a severe financial crisis at home and conditions for moving closer to candidacy unresolved issues with Croatia over savings (see component 42) and Macedonia didn’t in Nova Ljubljanska banka.

78 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 79 WIDER EUROPE / Western Balkans WIDER EUROPE / Western Balkans

40 RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY AND 41 KOSOVO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS The EEAS-mediated dialogue 2010 2011 2012 between Belgrade and Despite European unity, there 2010 2011 2012 Prishtina delivered first Unity 3/5 3/5 4/5 was no dramatic improvement results. Kosovo took initial Resources 4/5 4/5 4/5 in 2012. Conditionality remains Unity 3/5 4/5 4/5 steps towards integrating into indispensable for consolidating Resources 4/5 4/5 3/5 the EU while the international Outcome 7/10 8/10 8/10 A- the region’s weak democratic presence was downscaled. 2010 B+ 2011 B+ regimes. Outcome 6/10 7/10 5/10 B- Total 14/20 15/20 16/20 Total 13/20 15/20 12/20 2010 B 2011 B+

European goals in the Western Balkans but polarisation between the partisans of Kosovo was a European success in 2012 in advance of talks to sign a legally binding include strengthening the rule of law, centre-right Prime Minister Sali Berisha as EU-mediated talks between Belgrade agreement. The five member states that fighting corruption and organised crime, and opposition leader Edi Rama remains and Prishtina bore fruit. In March, the so- still do not recognise Kosovo themselves and helping consolidate democratic high. Montenegrin general elections were called footnote agreement was reached on (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and institutions and safeguard human rights. won, once again, by the ruling coalition Kosovo’s participation in Balkan regional Spain) plus others such as Italy and the The progress of the enlargement process led by Milo Djukanović’s Democratic Party forums. Added to the deal on integrated Czech Republic take a softer line towards in 2012 was not matched by noticeable of Socialists – the political force that has border management (IBM) struck in Serbia. improvement in domestic governance. governed Montenegro since the end of December 2011, the deal helped Serbia The electoral success of the populist Yugoslavia. The EU has decided to kick-off qualify for EU candidacy. Talks were The International Steering Group, Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) headed accession negotiations with the chapters resumed in October following elections in the body charged with overseeing the by Tomislav Nikolić, who was elected dealing with judicial reform and the fight Serbia in April/May. High Representative implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, president in May, remained a divisive issue. against organised crime and corruption, Catherine Ashton hosted an unprecedented closed the International Civilian Office Despite the popular mandate and its pro- universally seen as a formidable challenge meeting with the prime ministers, Ivica (ICO), the body supervising Kosovo’s EU rhetoric, the party, which is the senior in that country. Whether this choice Dačić and Hashim Thaçi, followed by independence, after concluding that partner in the governing coalition, is tainted makes a long-term difference is hard to another meeting in November. However, Kosovo had met all conditions, including by the radical nationalism of the 1990s and tell, especially given the prospects for there are lingering questions about whether the rights of the ethnic communities and has more recently ridden high on a populist Milo Djukanović’s return to active politics, and how Dačić’s coalition cabinet will be decentralisation of governance. In June, agenda. The government’s decision to which signals continuity rather than able to implement the IBM agreement and the European Commission also issued a place a core party member at the helm of rapid change. The European Commission make further necessary steps. positive feasibility study and a roadmap its central bank and to ban the regular Gay continued to judge Macedonia sufficiently for visa liberalisation. Top officials such Pride parade in Belgrade raised concerns compliant with the political criteria so as The EU has asked Serbia to “normalise as Enlargement and Neighbourhood among Europeans. However, Brussels to start membership negotiations. Still, relations with Kosovo” as a prerequisite Commissioner Stefan Füle have now begun cautiously welcomed the governing party’s local civil-society raises serious concerns for opening accession talks but it has yet openly to talk of Kosovo as an EU member popular anti-corruption campaign. regarding media freedom and corruption to be defined. Austria, the Netherlands, state and Kosovo was accepted as a recipient at high levels. Inter-ethnic relations, though Germany, and the UK want to press Serbia country by the EBRD in November. In In Albania, the government-opposition peaceful, were tense. to formally recognise Kosovo. In 2012, 2012 non-recognisers Greece and Slovakia deadlock was partly overcome in the some German Christian Democrats even also started accepting passports issued by interest of passing EU-oriented legislation, called for Belgrade and Prishtina to commit Prishtina.

80 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 81 WIDER EUROPE / Western Balkans WIDER EUROPE / Turkey

42 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 43 BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

Political bickering frustrated 2010 2011 2012 Relations with Turkey were 2010 2011 2012 hopes that Bosnia would improved by the election be able to move forward Unity 4/5 3/5 3/5 of François Hollande but, Unity 2/5 2/5 3/5 on its EU path. Bosnia Resources 2/5 3/5 3/5 despite modest gains on Resources 2/5 2/5 2/5 remains dysfunctional yet visa liberalisation, divisions constitutional reform isn’t Outcome 2/10 2/10 2/10 C among EU member states Outcome 1/10 1/10 2/10 C- forthcoming. continue to limit progress. Total 8/20 8/20 8/20 2010 C 2011 C Total 5/20 5/20 7/20 2010 D+ 2011 D+

In 2012, the EU struggled to influence parties approved the agreement seeing an The atmosphere in EU–Turkish relations and the readmission agreement is signed political disputes in the two Bosnian opportunity to use it as a stepping-stone was improved after François Hollande won depends on large EU member states. In entities. The conflicting parties failed to for changing the rules for electing a Croat France’s presidential race in May, defeating Germany, which holds the balance, the meet the August deadline set by the EU to member of the tripartite state presidency Nicolas Sarkozy – the leading opponent of interior ministry remains to be convinced implement the Sejdić–Finci decision of the in their favour. Critics have condemned Turkey’s membership of the EU – though that Turkey is a safe proposition, as do European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the deal as unprincipled power-grabbing France has not yet lifted any of the vetoes usual sceptics such as Austria and Cyprus. end discrimination of individuals not undermining democratic standards, in light it imposed on five negotiating chapters in belonging to any of the three “constitutive of certain changes to electoral laws that 2007. However, the European Commission Fortunately, the Cypriot presidency of the peoples”, and move closer to candidacy. ensued. capitalised on the change of mood and in European Council in the second half of the In June, the governing coalition in the mid-May put forward a Positive Agenda year did not lead to a standstill in bilateral Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina The EU had little leverage. In June, the that aims to speed up preparations in ties with Turkey. But nor did relations (BiH), the predominantly Bosniak European Commission issued a roadmap key policy dossiers that have been frozen improve dramatically in 2012. With Turkey and Croat-populated entity, collapsed to prompt all parties to implement Sejdić– within the negotiations. For its part, Turkey focused on Syria, Minister for EU Affairs because of squabbles between the Party Finci, agree on a coordination mechanism did not move on the implementation and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış used of Democratic Action (SDA) and Zlatko to pass EU legislation, and ultimately of the 2004 Ankara Protocol needed to his position to launch repeated rhetorical Lagumdžija’s Social Democrats over the launch a membership application at the end “unfreeze” chapters blocked over Cyprus attacks on the EU in order to build up his budget. The leader of the Bosnian Serbs, the year. But the roadmap was undercut (see component 45). political profile at home. There was little Milorad Dodik, said BiH was falling apart by internal bickering. Part of the problem formal exchange between Turkey and the but also suffered considerable losses to the is EU member states’ continued division There was also progress on visa EU on the future architecture of Europe in opposition Serbian Democrat Party at the over the closure of the Office of the High liberalisation. In November, the European the wake of the euro crisis, mainly because October local elections in Republika Srpska. Representative (OHR): Germany, France, Council approved a roadmap for visa Ankara has no interest in this issue. and others insist on a speedy transition to liberalisation, modelled on the process Meanwhile, individual member states, The instability in both entities rules out a EU Special Representative (EUSR) and already implemented in the Western from Bulgaria to Germany, scrambled to all efforts at upgrading and making more the UK opposes it (together with the US Balkans. In June, Turkey had initialled a deepen bilateral relations with Turkey and functional the central level of governance, a and Turkey). Still, 2012 saw the end of the readmission agreement, an instrument to reap economic and political benefits. key demand set by Brussels. What followed international supervision in the special fight illegal migration from third countries was a deal between Lagumdžija and Dodik district of Brčko, a precedent for the OHR. through the common border with the EU. resulting in SDA marginalisation. Croatian Whether the roadmap is implemented

82 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 83 WIDER EUROPE / Turkey WIDER EUROPE / Turkey

44 RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, 45 RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION

A disunited EU has little 2010 2011 2012 Cyprus’s presidency of the 2010 2011 2012 leverage to prevent the European Council didn’t authoritarian turn of Unity 3/5 3/5 3/5 derail EU–Turkish relations Unity 3/5 3/5 3/5 Turkey’s ruling AKP and the Resources 2/5 2/5 2/5 but produced no results Resources 1/5 1/5 2/5 criticism from the European either. Tensions remain high. Commission fell on deaf ears. Outcome 2/10 2/10 2/10 C- Outcome 1/10 1/10 2/10 C- Total 7/20 7/20 7/20 2010 C- 2011 C- Total 5/20 5/20 7/20 2010 D+ 2011 D+

As in other enlargement cases, the EU There were increasing concerns in the When Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, Cyprus co-opt allies, may lead to new seeks to promote democratisation, human EU in 2012 about the authoritarian turn the problem changed from an external confrontations, particularly after Turkish rights, and the rule of law in Turkey. But, in the ruling AKP, while the opposition to an internal matter with all attendant jets chased Israeli military aircraft that unfortunately, it is now widely accepted Republican People’s Party (CHP) fails complications. Indeed, Nicosia has not intruded in what it sees as its own airspace that Turkey is backsliding in the absence to present an alternative to government shied away from liberally using its veto in north of Cyprus. The plans to use gas as an of the EU pressure that anchored reforms policies. However, EU leverage continues the European Council to put pressure on incentive for a deal have not materialised. between 1999 and 2005, and a Turkish to be low, if not non-existent. Prime Turkey, notably on issues such as the 2004 interest in reform. Over the past year, Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan failed Ankara Agreement obliging Ankara to open The year saw no significant breakthrough in the Kurdish issue has also re-emerged to mention the EU in his speech before ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic. the reunification talks that began in 2008. with a new salience. The struggle between the AKP’s convention in September. In Given such constraints, the EU has been The issue of the hydrocarbons will be part the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party October, the EU published one of its most in damage-limitation mode rather than of the agenda, but there is no indication (PKK) and the Turkish armed forces led critical progress reports in years, which facilitating a comprehensive settlement that any of the sides are prepared to to more than 700 victims, the largest discussed at length deficits in areas of resulting from the ongoing talks between compromise. Meanwhile, politics in Greek escalation for years. Work on a new liberal human rights and democratic governance. Cypriot Greeks and Turks. Cyprus is focusing on immediate challenges constitution continues to be difficult, But Turkish Minister for EU Affairs such as the financial crisis that has hit the making a grand bargain on the Kurdish Egemen Bağış dismissed it as biased and Fortunately, Turkey did not freeze its island in the wake of the troubles in Greece issue as well as on the rights of other Burhan Kuzu, an AKP parliamentarian, relations with the EU during the Cypriot and the upcoming presidential elections ethnic and religious communities harder. threw a copy of it in the recycling bin while presidency of the European Council in the in February 2013. President Dimitris Still, President Abdullah Gül has tried appearing on a television show. As long as second half of 2012, as it had threatened to Christofias is in a weak position following to play a moderating role and enter into the negotiations remain stagnant, notably do. Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean the setback his party, AKEL, suffered in the dialogue with the parliamentarians of the over chapters unilaterally blocked by over prospective sources of gas and oil 2011 general elections. The lack of impetus pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party Cyprus and France, it is hard to envision that were so salient in 2011 went through from within the island has shifted both (BDP). By January 2013, it transpired that any credible EU policy to reignite change a lull, only to re-emerge in October when Turkey’s and the EU’s attention away from Hakan Fidan, head of the security service, in Turkey, which is praised as a source of Nicosia announced that it would license the Cyprus issue. was in talks with imprisoned PKK leader inspiration for the Arab Awakening. 15 companies (possibly including Italy’s Abdullah Öcalan. ENI, France’s Total, and Russia’s Novatek) to explore for natural gas southwest of the island. Such moves, though helping

84 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 85 WIDER EUROPE / Turkey WIDER EUROPE / Eastern Neighbourhood

46 RELATIONS WITH TURKEY 47 RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN ON REGIONAL ISSUES RIGHTS IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

The conflict in Syria brought 2010 2011 2012 Europeans were divided 2010 2011 2012 Turkey closer to Western about Ukraine but relatively allies. Yet forging a common Unity 2/5 3/5 4/5 united about Belarus – but Unity 3/5 4/5 3/5 EU–Turkish policy was difficult Resources 3/5 3/5 3/5 failed to achieve their Resources 2/5 3/5 4/5 because of the EU’s limited objectives in both cases. resolve and capacity to act. Outcome 2/10 3/10 4/10 B- Outcome 2/10 1/10 1/10 C Total 7/20 9/20 11/20 2010 C+ 2011 C- Total 7/20 8/20 8/20 2010 C 2011 C-

The EU aims to engage Turkey to welcomed its acquiescence to establish in The EU’s goal is to help the countries Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK address pressing issues across the shared November the Syrian National Coalition, in the Eastern Partnership region called for a boycott of matches taking place neighbourhood, notably in the Middle which aims to build a more inclusive transform into democratic and pluralist in Ukraine; Poland, Slovakia, and other East and North Africa. In 2012, the key opposition platform. societies. While none of the region’s four Central Europeans thought that isolating issue was the conflict in Syria, which parliamentary elections in 2012 fully met Ukraine would push it closer to Russia. dominated Turkey’s foreign policy and by Turkey played a complex role in relation to OSCE standards, the Armenian elections However, after the elections, all member extension its dealings with the EU. Both Western sanctions on Iran. Exports from (in May) and the Georgian elections (in states agreed to suspend the signing of the wanted President Bashar al-Assad out and Turkey to Iran, in large part gold, have October) were relatively competitive and Association Agreement and the related supported the efforts of UN mediators. more than doubled over the year, reducing peaceful. On the other hand, the OSCE free-trade deal (see component 48). There was an ongoing dialogue between the sanctions’ bite. Istanbul hosted E3+3 saw the elections in Belarus and Ukraine the EEAS and the Turkish foreign ministry, talks on the Iranian nuclear programme as a step back for democracy. The EU was The EU put more pressure on the which played a very positive role. Turkish in June and a bilateral meeting between vocal in calling for the release of political Lukashenka regime in Belarus by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu High Representative Catherine Ashton prisoners in Belarus (two prisoners were extending the list of individuals and participated in the EU’s Foreign Affairs and Iranian chief negotiator Saeed Jalili released but another ten remain in jail) companies on its visa ban/asset freeze list Council. in September. Turkey also continued to and much less vocal in Azerbaijan (where (though Slovenia lobbied for an exemption play a leading part in Europe’s energy dozens remain in prison). from these measures for an entrepreneur In December, NATO agreed to deploy politics. During a visit by Russian in business with a Slovenian company). In Patriot missiles, including from Germany President Vladimir Putin to Ankara in Europeans were particularly divided on February, all member states recalled their and the Netherlands, along the 900- December shortly after Gazprom signed Ukraine, where former prime minister Yulia ambassadors from Belarus after the Polish km border with Syria. Turkey has not a 30-year contract with Turkey, the two Tymoshenko and former internal affairs and EU envoys to Minsk were told by the openly called for humanitarian assistance countries agreed to disagree on Syria and minister Yuriy Lutsenko are imprisoned regime to leave – however, when Minsk to nearly 140,000 Syrian refugees but deepen economic ties. Meanwhile, the on charges that the EU considers politically expelled the Swedish ambassador in the informally indicated that aid should be EU encouraged Turkey’s diversification motivated. Europeans failed to send summer, member states took no similar channelled via Turkish charities. The EU is efforts, which also benefit the EU. Energy a coherent message to Kyiv when the action. Germany criticised the worsening therefore prevented from playing a role in Commissioner Günther Oettinger praised government was in the spotlight both human-rights situation in Azerbaijan but humanitarian relief. EU foreign ministers Turkey’s ratification of the Trans-Anatolian domestically and internationally ahead most other states remained silent. were critical of Turkey for promoting the gas pipeline agreement, a joint enterprise of the European football championship Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, though they with Azerbaijan’s SOCAR. in Poland and Ukraine in the summer.

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48 RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN 49 RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD ON TRADE NEIGHBOURS ON ENERGY

The EU was united on trade 2010 2011 2012 Moldova and Ukraine began 2010 2011 2012 issues and continued to to implement the provisions make progress towards free- Unity 5/5 5/5 4/5 of the EU’s Third Energy Unity 5/5 5/5 3/5 trade areas with Armenia, Resources 4/5 4/5 5/5 Package but progress was Resources 4/5 4/5 2/5 Georgia, and Moldova. But slow. there was little progress with Outcome 5/10 6/10 7/10 A- Outcome 5/10 6/10 3/10 C Ukraine. Total 14/20 15/20 16/20 2010 B+ 2011 B+ Total 14/20 15/20 8/20 2010 B+ 2011 B+

Trade liberalisation is one of the key (see component 47). However, there was There were mixed results on cooperation the beginning of the construction works objectives of the ENP and the Eastern no progress on initiating similar talks with in the sphere of energy between the EU on the South Stream pipeline in late Partnership. The EU hopes that trade Belarus (which is currently subject to EU and Eastern Europe in 2012. Moldova 2012 (both bypass Ukraine), made some liberalisation with its neighbours will sanctions) or Azerbaijan, which expressed and Ukraine, the only members of the progress on meeting its commitments increase levels of interdependence, help no interest in the EU’s free-trade offer. Energy Community from the Eastern as a member of the Energy Community, spread prosperity, and modernise the Partnership region, made little progress but key deep regulatory reforms economies of its neighbours, and that it will The EU was united in pursuing the goal of towards meeting their commitments and remain to be implemented. Although gradually contribute to consolidating the trade liberalisation, under the leadership of implementing the provisions of the EU’s the European Commission now has a rule of law and democracy in the region. the European Commission. However, it was Third Energy Package, which provides for mandate to negotiate with Azerbaijan and divided on how to approach Ukraine, and liberalisation of their energy markets. Turkmenistan on the construction of a In 2012, Europeans made significant in particular about whether it should sign Trans-Caspian pipeline, a key component progress towards achieving trade a DCFTA and the Association Agreement Following the expiry of Chisinau’s supply for the EU’s planned Nabucco pipeline liberalisation with three of its eastern amid concerns about the state of democracy contract with Gazprom at the end of 2011, (which helps diversify the EU’s imports neighbours after it launched negotiations and the rule of law in Ukraine: the Visegrad Russia started to mount pressure on away from Russia), there was no major on DCFTA with Moldova, Georgia, and quartet and the Baltic states argued that Moldova to refrain from liberalising its progress in the talks in 2012. Armenia in February. It is expected that ratification of the deal would bind Kyiv energy market, offering lower gas prices talks with at least some of these states could closer to the EU but Germany and the UK in return. Following a series of exchanges Europeans were relatively united on be finalised around the time of the EU– insisted that the Ukrainian government between Chisinau and Moscow as well as the need to promote greater energy Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in should first tackle the issues of selective the EEAS and the European Commission, cooperation with its eastern neighbours, November 2013. In the course of 2012, the justice and human-rights violations. It the Energy Community (most of whose with the European Commission taking EU also signed a DCFTA agreement with remains to be seen whether negotiations members are EU member states) gave a clear lead. However, in practice, steps Ukraine, the EU’s most important economic with other partners can be completed and Moldova almost four more years to by states such as Hungary, Slovenia, partner in the Eastern Neighbourhood. But a free-trade area between the EU and its unbundle its gas pipeline network in an or Bulgaria, which joined the Russian- the agreement is not in force yet due to the eastern neighbours can be established. attempt to grant more breathing space to sponsored South Stream project, EU member states’ concerns over the state Chisinau. Ukraine, which remains even undermine the viability of the EU’s own of democracy and human rights in Ukraine, more vulnerable to Russia’s pressure diversification project, the Nabucco especially in light of the imprisonment of following the start of the operation of the pipeline, whose own future remains former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko Nord Stream pipeline in late 2011 and uncertain (see component 21).

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50 VISA LIBERALISATION WITH THE 51 RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD AND THE

The EU made slow but 2010 2011 2012 PROTRACTED CONFLICTS steady progress towards visa liberalisation with Moldova, Unity 3/5 4/5 3/5 The EU maintained relative 2010 2011 2012 Ukraine, and Georgia, and Resources 2/5 3/5 3/5 unity and made some towards visa facilitation with progress on Transnistria, but Unity – – 4/5 Armenia and Azerbaijan. Outcome 5/10 5/10 5/10 B- it was unable to achieve its Resources – – 2/5 2010 C+ 2011 B- objectives in the Caucasus. Total 10/20 12/20 11/20 Outcome – – 3/10 C+ Total – – 9/20 2010 – 2011 –

The EU’s objective in the region is to with Georgia with the aim of abolishing The EU’s objective is to support the government in Georgia would develop a offer some of its neighbours an easing visas at some point in the future. The EU peaceful settlement of the conflicts in policy of constructive engagement with of visa policy in exchange for measures also offered Azerbaijan and Armenia visa- Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia the two regions. However, the position of such as border-management reform, the facilitation agreements that would allow and Nagorno-Karabakh. With a new leader Russia, the provinces’ principal backer, introduction of more secure documents, specific categories of citizens from these in Tiraspol, talks on Transnistria gained remains unchanged when it comes to or signing readmission agreements. To countries to obtain Schengen visas under some momentum in 2012 and the two insisting that Tbilisi acknowledge their achieve these goals the EU has a policy of a more relaxed regime (Ukraine, Moldova, sides agreed several confidence-building independence, a proposition the new visa facilitation, which implies the easing and Georgia have benefited from such measures such as restarting train links and government isn’t willing to entertain. of conditions for the issuance of visas, and agreements for several years already). reducing trade restrictions. Europeans, visa-liberalisation policies that presuppose especially Germany, supported the process Neither the EEAS nor member states the abolition of visas for short-term trips However, there were signs of increasing through diplomatic engagement and played an active role on Nagorno- for up to three months. However, although divisions among member states on invited Tiraspol to the EU–Moldova trade Karabakh in 2012. The French, Russian, all EU member states have signed up to visa liberalisation. Germany and the talks. The EU also increased funding for and US ambassadors, the three co-chairs the objective of visa liberalisation for the Netherlands called for the reintroduction of conflict-settlement efforts. Progress was of the OSCE Minsk Group, met the foreign Eastern Partnership states, they disagree visa requirements for the Balkan countries such that, in September, EU member ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in on how fast the EU should move towards and their interior ministries remained states cancelled visa restrictions for several Paris and New York, in September, but that objective. Anti-immigration sentiment sceptical about pursuing visa liberalisation former Transnistrian leaders, which had the talks did not produce any concrete in the EU means visa liberalisation can be with the EU’s eastern neighbours. This been in force since 2003. results. In September, the image of the a particularly divisive issue. is not a good omen for the Eastern EU as an impartial observer was tarnished Europeans. Meanwhile, the three Baltic However, little progress was made in by Hungary’s decision to release Ramil In 2012, the EU continued its dialogue countries, the four Visegrad countries, and the conflicts in the Caucasus. The EU Safarov, an Azerbaijani officer serving a life with Moldova and Ukraine on visa Romania remained committed to swift unanimously refused to recognise local sentence for killing an Armenian officer with liberalisation. Moldova made significant visa liberalisation with the region and elections in Abkhazia in March and South an axe in Budapest in 2004. The decision progress in meeting the conditions for visa continued to push for it at the EU level. Ossetia in April, but it made no progress not only caused predictable outrage in liberalisation and was moved to the second Overall, however, the EU continued to at the Geneva talks between Russia and Armenia but also showed how shallow the phase. Ukraine, on the other hand, made make slow but steady progress towards the Georgia. There is some hope that, after EU’s consensus on Nagorno-Karabakh is: less progress. In mid-2012, the EU also achievement of its objectives. the longstanding Saakashvili no-contact Budapest was widely suspected of angling launched a visa-liberalisation dialogue policy with the breakaway regions, a new for an Azerbaijani loan.

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2012 2011 2010 and North Africa REGIONAL ISSUES C B- – 52 Rule of law, human rights, and democracy C C+ – Overall grade Overall grade 2011 C+ 53 Financial instruments C+ B- – 54 Security sector reform D+ n/a – C+ Overall grade 2010 n/a NORTH AFRICA B- B- – 55 Tunisia B+ B+ – 56 Egypt B- C+ – 57 Libya B- B+ – 58 Algeria and Morocco C- C+ –

LEVANT C+ C – 59 Syria C C – 60 Lebanon B+ n/a – 61 Jordan C+ n/a – 62 Middle East peace process and state-building C+ C-/C+ – in Palestine

PERSIAN GULF B- C+ – 63 Iran B- B- – 64 Yemen B- B- –

2011 was a tumultuous year in which the EU recovered from its surprise at the Arab Awakening, regrouped, and began revamping the ENP. 2012 should therefore have been the year in which the preparatory work was consolidated and Europe moved to a new, more political approach with the changed Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. But it didn’t quite turn out that way. Although the EU now has ENP action plans for Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, and Tunisia, the onus remained on programmatic support for a broad aspiration to support democratic transitions. The EU failed to bring its significant influence to bear in other ways such as through political, diplomatic, and security engagement.

The EU appeared to conceive of its response only within the framework of its neighbourhood policy, when stronger, more frank and strategic relationships at a political level might have achieved much more. Thus it tends to focus its energies

92 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 93 largely on improving the technical aspects of cooperation, usually engaging to press collectively for political reform in non-transition countries, particularly in politically with the leaders in the region – both longstanding and new – as part of Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco, where various member states such as France, Spain, set-piece dialogues with little broader impact. The EU–Arab League Ministerial and the UK have strong bilateral ties. meeting in November was a case in point. Meanwhile, member states have jockeyed with one another to deepen their bilateral ties and understanding with the Muslim The most serious crisis of the year was of course the ongoing civil war in Syria. Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia. However, the joint visit of the Bulgarian, Polish, While Russian and Chinese positions at the UN blocked the possibility of a united and Swedish foreign ministers, on behalf of the High Representative, to Lebanon international response, the EU – together with the US – also failed to fully back and Iraq in June showed both a united European front and a willingness to move political efforts and contributed towards the curtailing of much-needed diplomatic to a more political collective relationship. channels and non-UN-based problem solving. The EU strongly welcomed the creation in Doha in November of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary More candid diplomats acknowledge that there remains a lack of vision about what and Opposition Forces, and by December most states had recognised it as the the EEAS can do in the MENA region. There are some notable exceptions to this legitimate representative of the Syrian people. At the end of the year there were rule such as in Yemen, where the active EU delegation has identified a niche for some indications that France and the UK might be willing to move towards arming itself in supporting the aid aspects of the GCC transition plan and in cooperating the rebels in 2013, though this is only likely to occur if the US decides to support closely with the “Group of 10” national embassies that are influential in the the effort. country, which includes the UK and France from within the EU. But in general, given Europe’s geographical, diplomatic, and commercial assets in relation to When Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defence in Gaza in November, the EU the region, there was potential for better results than were achieved on EU policy came out in support of Israel’s right to defence almost immediately but it was in the Middle East and North Africa in 2012. This year, European diplomats no unable to play a mediating role or engage when Arab leaders went to Gaza because longer had the excuse that there was no clear role for international actors until their hands were tied by their policy on Hamas. The successful Palestinian bid for transitions got underway. observer state status at the UN in late November again exposed divisions among EU member states. Those that abstained, including Germany and the UK, were In Libya, Europeans put considerably fewer resources into supporting the process left disappointed a day later when Israel announced the construction of thousands of state building after the intense focus there during the intervention in 2011. In of new homes in settlements. However, the year ended more positively with an Egypt and Tunisia there was genuine demand for Europe to take a more influential agreement in principle among EU parties, spearheaded by Germany, to reactivate role instead of allowing the US to be in the strategic driving seat, but the EU did not the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) at Rafah in order to support take that opportunity. The most visible aspect of EEAS activity in these countries development in the Gaza Strip. has been the task forces that have now met in Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan. As investment conferences, they proved quite effective, but their willingness to accept The EU had a better story to tell in relation to Iran. It led the E3+3 process the sidelineling of political reform , particularly in the case of Egypt and Jordan, and adopted two sets of sanctions in January and October that sent a clear and set a problematic precedent for a longer-term strategy to support the development consistent signal about the importance that Europeans (alongside the US) place of democracy in these countries. on the dismantling of the Iranian weapons programme. Although the EU was led by France, Germany, and the UK on Iran, other states, notably Greece, Italy, and Clearly, European influence in the region was limited by austerity. Leaders in the Spain, made important contributions by diversifying their oil imports in order southern Mediterranean region say in private that they would welcome a more to make the embargo bite when it came into force in the second half of the year. strategic relationship with the EU, but the EU needs to “pay to play”. But even However, European unity and resolve did not produce a change of course by taking into account the euro crisis, European contributions – the promise of the Iranian regime. Meanwhile, the sanctions are weighing heavily on the wider money, markets, and mobility – have been disappointing. They are perceived on population of Iran, who are now suffering from high inflation, the spiralling costs the southern side of the Mediterranean as incommensurate with the scale of the of basic commodities and energy, and increasing shortages of essential items. challenges that the post-revolutionary Arab countries face. The EU also struggled

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52 RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS 53 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND DEMOCRACY Bilateral aid continued and 2010 2011 2012 the European Commission Member states struggled to 2010 2011 2012 requested a 50 percent Unity – 4/5 3/5 agree on how to implement increase in funds from 2014. Resources – 3/5 2/5 conditionality and a lack of Unity – 3/5 2/5 However, Europeans have European unity undermined Resources – 2/5 2/5 not yet delivered on the Outcome – 5/10 5/10 C+ the EU’s political reform promises they made in 2011. 2010 – 2011 B- message. Outcome – 5/10 4/10 C Total – 12/20 10/20 Total – 10/20 8/20 2010 – 2011 C+

2012 saw less widespread turbulence member states – notably Hungary, Poland, After a series of eye-catching By contrast, overall foreign direct than the previous year in the Middle East Slovakia, and Sweden – have made pledges announcements on financial support to investment from the private sector in EU and North Africa, but the EU’s goals in of financial support. North Africa in 2011, 2012 was supposed countries in the Mediterranean region backing the rule of law, human rights, to be a year in which the EU followed recovered in 2012 after a drop in response and democracy were even more complex: However, the EU was less united in 2012 through and put the promised funds to the Arab Awakening. €19 billion in new to protect fundamental rights in the than in 2011, particularly on the issue of the to good use on the southern side of the investments was announced in the first transitions in Tunisia and Egypt; support use of conditionality to promote political Mediterranean. In particular, last year’s half of 2012, compared with €17 billion the construction of a democratic state in reform. Germany held back some promised increase in EIB lending ceilings, the in the first half of 2011. The European Libya; push reluctant reformers such as support from Egypt until after the elections, extension of the EBRD mandate, and the Commission has requested an increase Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan; maintain and Finland and the Netherlands were launch of a new Support for Partnership, of 50 percent in funds for the southern a consistent line on rule of law with Gulf firmly of the view that “more for more” Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) Mediterranean under the next financial states such as Bahrain; and guarantee should also mean “less for less”, whereas fund and civil society facility in the perspective for the period 2014–2020. The accountability in the Syrian conflict. Italy and Portugal were against penalising region created many delivery challenges. current environment of heated summit- non-revolutionary countries for a lack of However, by the end of the year, the wider level negotiations over the EU budget will The EEAS made important advances in reform. This divergence led to a lack of EBRD mandate was not yet operational – test European unity around the priority 2012 in developing an effective foreign- coherent European red lines on human there are a number of technical changes of southern neighbourhood spending, policy machinery, including the adoption rights. For example, EU representatives needed, for example around the central but to date bilateral funds to the region of a global Human Rights Strategy in simply accepted the Egyptian foreign banking systems in Egypt and Tunisia, in have continued. In fact, many member June and the appointment of Stavros ministry’s last-minute withdrawal of an order to allow lending to begin – and the states, notably Denmark, Finland, Lambrinidis as EU Special Representative invitation to Egyptian human rights NGOs expenditure of money under the new funds France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, for Human Rights in July. Expert missions to attend the EU–Egypt Task Force in still required extensive preparation. In Romania, Spain, and Sweden, increased were sent to Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, November. Similarly, the EEAS was unable fact, according to a Joint Communication their bilateral aid to the Middle East and and Iraq, and EU election observation to hold the line when the civil society published in May this year, only around North Africa in 2012. missions to Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. component at the Jordanian Task Force €200 million of extra money had been The European Endowment for Democracy was relegated in the face of business and spent on the southern neighbourhood in was further developed in 2012 and is next economic priorities on the insistence of the 2011; the figure for 2012 is likely to be at year expected to begin disbursements, with Jordanian government. a similar level. a priority on the neighbourhood. Some EU

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54 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 55 TUNISIA

Individual member states 2010 2011 2012 The EU consolidated its 2010 2011 2012 and groupings such as the relationship with the Tunisian 5+5 carried out some security Unity – – 2/5 government and supported Unity – 3/5 4/5 sector reform projects, Resources – – 1/5 broader development Resources – 3/5 4/5 including training, exchanges, while taking a “hands off” and arms sales, but the EU Outcome – – 2/10 D+ approach on domestic Outcome – 8/10 7/10 B+ itself is not involved. political debates. Total – – 5/20 2010 – 2011 – Total – 14/20 15/20 2010 – 2011 B+

Security sector reform (SSR) will be key to Within the 5+5 forum (which brings The EU had two aims in its relationship by Special Representative Bernardino consolidating the democratic transitions in together the five Maghreb states with the with Tunisia in 2012: supporting a stable León, also met for the second time in 2012. the Arab world. The military and security five southern member states of the EU), democratic transition and economic services can be a brake on political reform, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have also development, and establishing itself as Progress on the EU’s second objective – as in Jordan, Algeria, and Morocco, or even sought to revive or supplement their long- Tunisia’s main partner. that is, encouraging Tunisia to view the threaten counter-revolution, as the generals standing bilateral military cooperation EU as its preferred partner – is harder to in Egypt did in June. Democratically agreements across the Mediterranean On the first objective, progress in 2012 assess. The signature at the EU–Tunisia elected governments in the region will that typically focus on training, exchanges, was good. Tunisia focused on the key Association Council in November 2012 of need to deliver on security – that is, law and exercises, as well as arms sales. In building blocks of a new democracy a “Privileged Partnership” underlined the and order and control of borders – as much 2012, the Slovaks and Dutch worked with and in particular on drawing up a new EU’s collective commitment. However, as on the economy. This is something on Tunisia; Germany and the UK also assisted constitution. The EU was relatively united: there were other indicators in 2012 that which the EU – with its vaunted civilian/ in North Africa and the Gulf. However, the it took a “hands off” approach to domestic parts of Tunisian society felt less affinity military expertise and experience in places EU itself is not involved in such efforts. As political debates about constitutional with the West. Tunisia struggled with the such as the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, the European Parliament noted in relation references to blasphemy and the role return of political violence, with attacks and Afghanistan – should be well placed to Libya in November, “it is regrettable of women, and focused instead on the against members of opposition parties, to help. In practice, however, there has that the EU contribution in the security process and the precarious economic and excessive use of force against unions. been little demand for EU help. In 2012 the sector is slow to materialise, and that situation. New announcements of EU The Salafi movement grew in prominence, EU did launch small advisory missions on difficulties in planning and implementing support punctuated the year. On a visit with high-profile incidents such as the maritime capacity-building in the Horn of this contribution are leaving the field to Tunisia in July, Enlargement and ENP replacement of a Tunisian flag by a black Africa, aviation security in South Sudan, open to bilateral initiatives of doubtful Commissioner Stefan Füle pledged €20 Islamist flag at Manouba University in and gendarmerie training in Niger. A visibility and consistency”. A Special million for competitiveness and €7 million Tunis in March. In September, rioters more substantial effort to train the Malian Security Representative for the region for civil society. The European Commission attacked and burned the American embassy army is under consideration. Under UN could champion more vigorous use of the launched a €12 million package for and school in Tunis. Although senior auspices, the EU also carried out a border- CSDP in support of the Arab transitions, healthcare support in August and a four- EEAS officials argued that the Tunisian management needs assessment for Libya, including in SSR. year, €25m Support for Partnership, government was “more European than but this was delayed and has not yet elicited Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) ever”, Commission representatives feared requests for follow-up assistance. programme for justice sector reform in that Tunisian society was less focused on October. The Tunisia Task Force, convened Europe than a year ago.

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56 EGYPT 57 LIBYA

In a year of crises and 2010 2011 2012 As Libya languished in post- 2010 2011 2012 confrontations in Egypt, the revolutionary disorder, the EU’s soft-spoken approach Unity – 3/5 4/5 EU provided little support Unity – 3/5 4/5 ultimately meant it forfeited Resources – 2/5 3/5 in 2012 except by making Resources – 5/5 2/5 any chance of influencing preparations for a mission the standards by which the Outcome – 5/10 5/10 B- to support border-security Outcome – 7/10 5/10 B- transition would be judged. management. Total – 10/20 12/20 2010 – 2011 C+ Total – 15/20 11/20 2010 – 2011 B+

This was a year of complex and sometimes on incremental cooperation and sectoral For much of 2012, Libya seemed to policymaking towards Libya. While an EU fast-moving political change in Egypt. A reform seemed poorly aligned with the languish in post-revolutionary disorder. delegation was opened in November 2011, series of crises and confrontations between realities of Egyptian political life. While elections in July went smoothly it was only in the early autumn of 2012 that the army, the Muslim Brotherhood, and (and reassured some nervous onlookers a critical mass of staffing was achieved. civil/liberal opposition groups ended with In the first half of the year, the EU could by producing a non-Islamist majority), it President Mohammed Morsi pushing have taken a stronger line against the was not until November that a functioning Member states supported a variety of through a controversial constitution that Supreme Council of the Armed Forces for government took office. The killing of the training and civil-society initiatives during entrenched presidential and military its opaque and divisive handling of the US Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens the year, but the EU’s main focus was on power and fell short on human rights. transition, which poisoned the political during an attack by a jihadist militia in helping Libya manage the security of While the EU achieved some success in scene for the rest of 2012. The EU was Benghazi on 11 September highlighted the its borders. Progress was slow: a needs- building relations with new forces and also notably reticent over the Egyptian security problems in the country, in which assessment mission was dispatched in mobilising economic support, it was government’s crackdown on civil society many militias continued to operate outside March; its report was considered by unable to make any real mark on Egypt’s in February. In November, the EEAS- central control. Nevertheless, by the end foreign ministers in December; this laid the turbulent political scene. led Task Force showcased the priorities of the year, there was some hope that the groundwork for a possible CSDP mission and limitations of the EU’s relationship new prime minister could get a grip on the in 2013. The administrative weakness of It was always going to be difficult for with Egypt. The meeting managed to country’s halting transition. the Libyan state clearly made it a difficult Europe to find a way of inserting itself into find the significant sum of €5 billion in partner, but Europeans might have a political process that is driven above all loans and grants for 2012–13, but EU After the intense involvement of several achieved more if they had attached greater by domestic Egyptian factors. At times, representatives were unable to prevent the European countries in the military resources and energy to pushing forward it was also wise to avoid responding Egyptian government from withdrawing intervention in Libya in 2011, European with their core priority of constructing a to every twist and turn of events, for an invitation for human rights groups attention seemed to shift away from Libya stable state governed by the rule of law. example during the manoeuvring between to attend the Task Force meeting. This this year. Some southern EU member states the army, the courts, and the Muslim suggested the lack of a clear vision of how continued to follow events in the country Brotherhood in the summer. But the EU’s the EU’s commitment to democracy and closely. In particular, Italy remained soft-spoken approach ultimately meant human rights should be advanced in this focused on Libya and Prime Minister Mario it forfeited any chance of influencing the strategically important country. Monti led an official visit in January. But standards by which the transition would across the EU as a whole, there was a sense be judged. The EU’s policy of focusing that much of the urgency had gone out of

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58 ALGERIA AND MOROCCO 59 SYRIA

The EU was ineffective in 2010 2011 2012 European diplomacy, led 2010 2011 2012 encouraging political reform by France and the UK, was in Algeria and Morocco Unity – 3/5 2/5 unsuccessful in leveraging Unity – 3/5 3/5 this year and failed to use Resources – 2/5 2/5 help to end the conflict in Resources – 3/5 3/5 opportunities such as the Syria. Election Observation Mission Outcome – 5/10 3/10 C- Outcome – 2/10 2/10 C in Algeria. Total – 10/20 7/20 2010 – 2011 C+ Total – 8/20 8/20 2010 – 2011 C

The challenge for the EU in Algeria and Algerian partnership had deepened or that As the Syrian crisis intensified in 2012, and non-lethal support, which in turn gave Morocco is to pool influence in national meaningful reform had taken place. Europeans sought to advance a political them little leverage among internal actors capitals to drive much-needed political transition to meet the aspirations of the and in particular the moderate forces they reform. While technical cooperation There was little evidence of real reform population and save the country from a wanted to support. driven by the European Commission and in Morocco either. In February, the descent into deep conflict. France and the EEAS continued in 2012, and in the European Parliament signed off on a deal the UK led efforts to secure international At the end of the year, France, Spain, case of Algeria expanded, there was little on agriculture and fisheries after years of action in the UNSC, but this was and the UK recognised the new Syrian evidence of real reform in either case. After negotiations, but as an incentive rather predictably and repeatedly blocked by National Coalition opposition body as years of procrastination, Algeria agreed than a reward: the ENP progress update in Russia and China. However, Europeans, as the sole legitimate representative of the in early 2012 to come to the negotiating May had no substantive reform in Morocco part of the “Friends of Syria” initiative, also Syrian people. Other EU member states table regarding an ENP Action Plan; and in to report. In the autumn, scoping reviews contributed to the failure of international followed suit at the year-end “Friends of May it invited an EU observation mission were completed, allowing negotiations for diplomacy by failing to fully back the Syria” meeting. France (which has been (EOM) to its legislative elections for the a DCFTA to begin. Morocco’s Autonomy efforts of the UN–Arab League envoys, most forward-leaning in providing support first time (though there were concerns for Western Sahara plan, launched in through their unconditional support for an to the rebels) and the UK have suggested about malpractice by the ruling party and 2012, was the first move on this frozen opposition unwilling to countenance any considering arming the rebels but the allegations of voter fraud in municipal conflict in a number of years but, as the deal with the regime, thereby excluding key EU arms embargo was renewed in early elections in December). But in the second year closes, the situation remains blocked. Assad backers Iran and Russia. Europeans December for three months (instead of half of the year, as France and the US A Joint Communication on a Maghreb were also quick to engage in finger pointing the default option of a year). In the face focused on efforts to win Algerian support Strategy, published in December, proposed at the expense of serious problem solving, of these efforts, the civil war – which has for an ECOWAS-led mission in Mali, measures to increase regional integration which further damaged much-needed growing sectarian and jihadist undertones the centre of gravity in the EU–Algerian through a range of economic, energy, and diplomatic channels. Having failed to give – worsened, with at least 40,000 Syrians relationship shifted back to member-state security measures, but only alluded to the the political track full support, Europe now dead. While Bashar al-Assad is slowly capitals with a focus on energy ties – Western Sahara as a challenge and did not also only offered half-hearted support for losing ground, he remains in power. particularly Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the propose a solution. strengthening the rebel movement and its The country and wider region now face a UK. In November the Netherlands joined ability to win the battle militarily. A lack of growing humanitarian crisis, with four this group as it signed a deal for shale-gas political appetite for involvement in a new million Syrians in desperate need of exploration in Algeria. By the end of the conflict and an EU arms embargo meant support within the country and external year, there were few signs that the EU– Europeans offered only meagre financial refugees numbering over 600,000.

102 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 103 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA / Levant MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA / Persian Gulf

60 LEBANON 61 JORDAN

The EU strongly supported 2010 2011 2012 European support for the 2010 2011 2012 Lebanon’s commitment to Jordanian monarchy’s plans stability instead of aligning Unity – – 4/5 for reform was challenged Unity – – 3/5 itself with either side in the Resources – – 3/5 by growing protests and the Resources – – 3/5 Syrian conflict. slow pace of meaningful Outcome – – 7/10 B+ change. Outcome – – 4/10 C+ Total – – 14/20 2010 – 2011 – Total – – 10/20 2010 – 2011 –

European efforts towards Lebanon were quickly blamed on Hezbollah. The British Jordan, a longstanding European ally, Europe failed to changed tack in 2012 or centred on preventing violent spillover and Dutch governments responded by has over the last year been singled out as acknowledge the shortfalls of the king’s from the conflict in Syria. Given President calling for European sanctions on the a role model for pre-emptive, government- much-praised efforts. Bashar al-Assad’s longstanding influence movement. However, this was resisted led reform efforts. Europeans, led by High and in particular his close relationship by other member states in the context of Representative Catherine Ashton and the The size and nationwide scope of protests with Lebanon’s dominant force, Hezbollah, the Bulgarian investigation not yet being EEAS, have offered King Abdullah firm in November in response to fuel price Europeans were very wary of a potential completed and therefore the absence of political support and praise for his reform increases highlighted deepening economic flare-up. Europeans remained united in clear proof of Hezbollah’s complicity. efforts. Given the tight security relationships and political problems. While the tone supporting political stability and offered between Jordan and European states, a of the opposition remains moderate and firm backing for the country’s stated policy There were limited increases in support desire to protect the Jordanian peace treaty the threat of upheaval is limited, the of non-association towards the Syrian to the Lebanese armed forces, particularly with Israel, and fears about the potential king’s unwillingness to establish a more conflict (even if the country has acted as a on border-security issues. EU member for regional implosion due to the Syrian inclusive political order able to manage hub of support for both sides). Central to states continued to play a lead role in crisis, Europe has cautioned against any the economic challenges could result in this European approach was a continued supporting maintaining peace along the attempts to destabilise the country. wider instability. Yet, both the EEAS and willingness to support the Hezbollah- southern border with Israel by contributing member states failed to channel their backed government of Prime Minister significant troops to the 11,260-strong On the back of an EU–Jordanian task political and economic leverage towards Najib Mikati. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon force in February, the EU offered increased pushing the king towards implementing (UNIFIL). However, France withdrew a economic backing, allocating €220 million more meaningful change aimed at securing There were a number of high-level visits third of its troops and Spain has announced in neighbourhood support for 2011–2013. stability. Europeans now risk a repeat to the country, including a joint one by that it will cut its contribution by half. Member states, led by the UK, France, of their failed strategy towards North the Bulgarian, Polish, and Swedish foreign During a tempestuous year, with violent and Germany, committed approximately Africa prior to the 2011 uprisings. While ministers in June. Europeans resisted clashes breaking out in Tripoli and Beirut, €1.2 billion over the coming three years European heads of missions in Amman increased pressure from the US government the October assassination of Wissam al- in the form of bilateral loans and grants. called for greater implementation of the to place sanctions on Hezbollah, and many Hassan, a key anti-Assad Lebanese security The preparatory process for the launch of “more for more” strategy in late 2012, this EU member states continued to engage official, and an increasingly dysfunctional DCFTA negotiations also began. However, was rejected in favour of increased levels of with the movement. However, the July government, Lebanon succeeded in in the face of growing concerns about the financial support from Brussels. bombing of a tourist bus in Bulgaria, which forestalling a broader descent into conflict. slow pace of the king’s reform efforts, killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian, was coupled with widening economic tensions,

104 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 105 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA / Persian Gulf MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA / Persian Gulf

62 MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 63 IRAN AND STATE-BUILDING IN PALESTINE Led by the E3, Europeans 2010 2011 2012 were united around the In 2012, Europeans failed to 2010 2011 2012 diplomatic and the sanctions Unity – 4/5 5/5 find a response to Operation tracks against Iran, but the Resources – 3/5 4/5 Pillar of Defence, settlement Unity – – 3/5 policy has still not led to a expansions, and the UNGA Resources – – 3/5 change in Iranian nuclear Outcome – 4/10 3/10 B- vote on Palestinian observer policy. 2010 – 2011 B- status. Outcome – – 3/10 B- Total – 11/20 12/20 Total – – 9/20 2010 – 2011 C-/C+*

*In 2011, Europeans got a C- for the Middle East peace process and a C+ for state-building in Palestine

Judging by their own criteria for success, as the Israeli government again withheld The EU presented a united and active Europeans do not seem to have a plan B if 2012 was a failure for Europeans. Above some of its revenues. front in 2012 on the nuclear programme negotiations fail in 2013. all, they wanted a return to negotiations, in Iran, with a dual-track approach of but after a brief Jordanian-facilitated Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defence in sanctions and dialogue. In the context of EU member states largely left the EU negotiation in January, there were no November showed that the EU still has the E3+3 negotiations, the UK, France, institutions to take the lead on the more talks. They called for an end to no coherent policy on Gaza four years and Germany continued to take the lead human-rights situation in Iran. In March, Israeli settlement expansion, but instead after the devastation of Operation Cast in communicating the EU’s strategy. however, they did renew and extend the it proceeded at breakneck pace (some Lead. As Arab League ministers flocked to In a joint statement in January, they travel ban and asset freeze on targeted 5,500 units built in 2012, a threefold Hamas’s side, Europe was relegated to the announced the adoption of the EU oil members of the Iranian government increase from 2011). They also urged the margins. European ministerial-level visits embargo on Iran and asset freeze on the implicated in violations. Ashton issued US to re-engage but this did not happen to Israel may have helped to some extent Iranian central bank. High Representative a series of statements on human-rights either. Europeans failed to persuade in advancing a ceasefire. A possible EU- Catherine Ashton and the EEAS also violations, majoring on condemnation of the Palestinians to postpone their bid to resumed border role at Rafah, on which played a leading role in diplomatic Iran’s use of the death penalty. In October, upgrade their status at the UN, although Germany has played an instrumental role, negotiations throughout the year. The a long-postponed and controversial at the vote in the UNGA in November could be constructive but a bolder rethink EU oil embargo and asset freeze agreed European Parliament delegation visit to Europeans were at least slightly more is long overdue. The EU also struggled to in January came into full force in July Tehran was again cancelled at the last united than at UNESCO a year earlier: only respond meaningfully to further settlement in order to give Greece, Italy, Portugal, moment, reportedly because of the lack the Czech Republic opposed the Palestinian announcements immediately after the UN and Spain – significant importers of of guarantees that it would be able to upgrade, with 14 voting in favour and 12 vote, notably in the E1 area of occupied Iranian oil – time to adjust. In October, meet human-rights defenders. As with its abstaining. Despite the euro crisis, the EU’s Palestinian land around Jerusalem. the EU introduced a new set of restrictive dual-track strategy on the Iranian nuclear continued financial support for the PA and However, the EU appears to be considering measures. EU sanctions are now biting but programme, the EU’s human-rights policy for the United Nations Relief and Works some limited steps to leverage its influence. are also beginning to have humanitarian was implemented quite consistently but Agency (UNRWA) remained impressive: in Led by Denmark, Ireland, and the UK, and consequences, with rising prices for basic yielded few clear results in 2012. 2012 it allocated €156 million towards the building on the impressive reporting work commodities and shortages pushing the PA’s recurrent expenditure (in addition to undertaken by EU member-state missions cost of living up to unmanageable levels an annual UNRWA contribution in excess on the ground, European foreign ministers for parts of the Iranian population. of €100 million). But the PA nevertheless moved in the direction of taking action on However, this strategy has still not led to ended the year in worse financial straits settlement products. a change in Iranian nuclear policy – and

106 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 107 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA / Persian Gulf Multilateral Issues 64 YEMEN & Crisis Management Overall grade The EEAS and member states 2010 2011 2012 Overall grade 2011 B actively supported the GCC Unity – 4/5 4/5 transition process and the Overall grade 2010 B+/B- response to the humanitarian Resources – 2/5 3/5 B crisis in Yemen, but both projects hang in the balance. Outcome – 5/10 5/10 B- Total – 11/20 12/20 2010 – 2011 B-

The transition in Yemen is the least August the EU announced €18 million to reported – but perhaps the most complex help train electoral teams, develop capacity – in the Middle East and North Africa. at local level, and register the population It is complicated not only by tribal ahead of the 2014 elections. In the context divisions, corruption, and high levels of of the “Group of 10”, the EU delegation terrorist activity, notably from Al-Qaeda and the British and French embassies in the Arabian Peninsula, but also by a were particularly active on the ground, humanitarian crisis linked to chronic encouraging the different parties to come food and water shortages. However, to the table in the National Dialogue. there is an internationally agreed process France also chaired a working group to for the transition in the context of the develop plans for constitutional reform. GCC initiative for national dialogue and However, the transition process is still constitutional reform. The EU’s aim in very precarious and dialogue did not begin relation to Yemen is to support the GCC as planned in November. If it slips too process, and international efforts to combat far into 2013 without results, this could the humanitarian crisis and terrorist lead to a further deterioration in stability activity. The security situation remained as various parties become disillusioned unstable, with frequent attacks on urban with the process. On the ground, the EU targets in 2012, including the Bulgarian delegation and Germany were active in embassy in May and the US embassy in the international community’s response September. to the humanitarian crisis but significant challenges remain in delivering aid to the Following the national vote in February, more remote parts of the country. Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had replaced Ali Abdullah Saleh on an interim basis at the end of 2011, was confirmed as president. In October, High Representative Catherine Ashton met with him, and in

108 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 109 2012 2011 2010 cost-effective alternatives to larger military and civilian deployments, but it is KEY ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM B- B- n/a possible that they lack the resources and ambition to make much of an impact. 65 European policy in the G8 and G20 B- C-/B- C+ and Bretton Woods Institutions Diplomacy at the UN was dominated by the issue of Syria as it became clear 66 UN reform C- C+ C+ that the Arab League could not manage the crisis on its own. The European 67 European policy on non-proliferation B- B A-/B+ members of the UNSC in 2012 (France, Germany, Portugal, and the UK) led 68 European policy on the World Trade Organization B B A- efforts to address the crisis, despite Chinese and Russian opposition and US doubts about the value of the UN-based approach. France and the UK were INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE B+ B+ n/a initially strong backers of Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts but lost faith as the 69 European policy on human rights at the UN B+ B+ C+ war escalated. After Annan’s resignation in August, they increasingly looked 70 European policy on the ICC and international tribunals B+ B+ B+ for alternatives to UN diplomacy over Syria and increased support to the opposition. However, they continued to invest in UN-based responses to other CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT B- B+ n/a crises. The UNSC responded firmly to the threat of war between Sudan and 71 Climate change B A- B+ South Sudan early in the year and the UN and the AU made some military and 72 Development aid and global health B- B- n/a political progress towards stabilising Somalia. The UK took a prominent role on the issue – an EEAS priority – by organising an international conference HUMANITARIAN RELIEF B+ B n/a on the country in February. 73 Humanitarian response B n/a n/a 74 Drought in the Sahel B+ n/a n/a By contrast, the EU, the UN, and African powers have struggled to agree a response towards the collapse of Mali, much of which is now under the control PEACEKEEPING B- B n/a of Islamist forces. France led on the issue, both within the EU and at the 75 UN Security Council and Syria B- n/a n/a UNSC, gradually orchestrating a plan for an African intervention with UN, 76 The Sudans and the DRC B- B- n/a European, and US support. However, much of this delicate diplomacy was 77 Mali and the Sahel C+ n/a n/a rendered pointless in January 2013, when an Islamist advance in southern 78 Somalia B+ B+ B Mali led France to intervene militarily. The EU launched a police support 79 Afghanistan B- C+ C+ mission to neighbouring Niger but, after more than a year, is still trying to devise an operation to help Libya secure its borders – which might hamper the flow of fighters and arms into Mali and Niger.

European diplomats were also incensed when rebels backed by Rwanda won The EU’s member states endured a frustrating year of multilateral diplomacy. a significant military victory in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo They were unable to persuade Russia or China to approve action over Syria at (DRC) in November. Reports of Rwanda’s destabilising role in the DRC led a the UNSC, while the Obama administration blocked progress towards a UN number of EU member states, led by the Netherlands, to cut development aid conventional arms-trade treaty – a European priority. For the second year to Kigali earlier in the year. Others, including the UK, followed suit as the crisis in a row, the G20 summit was overshadowed by the euro crisis, which put mounted, and European and US pressure seems to have persuaded Rwanda European leaders on the defensive. However, the EU did take tentative steps to rein the rebels in, at least for now. The weakness of the DRC after 12 years towards revitalising its crisis management operations, authorising small, new of UN peacekeeping and European aid remains a tragic embarrassment. security assistance missions to Niger, South Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. The European Council also mandated a larger mission to train Malian troops However, there were frequent strains between the EU and US over crisis as part of a broader response to the country’s collapse. These missions may be management in 2012. These reflected differences over how to allocate scare

110 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 111 resources and, in the Syrian case, the Obama administration’s concerns over deferring to Brussels. The multilateral directorate within the EEAS, which getting dragged into a new war in the Middle East especially during an election lagged behind other parts of the new organisation, is finding its feet but may year. Electoral concerns also appeared to drive the US approach to negotiations struggle to influence the big European powers. on a conventional arms-trade treaty in July. European governments publicly invested a great deal of political capital in the negotiations, but the US, in tandem with Russia and China, eventually blocked an immediate agreement – and, in doing so, averted a clash with the domestic gun lobby.

There were more open transatlantic tensions, and splits within the EU, over the Palestinian Authority’s bid for recognition as an observer state by the UNGA. The Czech Republic was the only EU member to vote against the Palestinian bid in November, along with the US and Israel. Meanwhile, traditional backers of Israel including Germany and the Netherlands abstained and a majority of the remaining member states voted in favour. This split suggests that the Obama administration and its European allies may face further clashes at the UN in the future. The US and most EU members lined up to oppose a new UN treaty threatening internet freedom at the end of the year.

Europe’s position in other multilateral institutions also seems to be deteriorating. The G20 had an indifferent year, despite solid chairing by Mexico, but its main summit in Los Cabos centred on the euro crisis. The European Commission and European Council presidents stole headlines with a press conference defending the eurozone, which made them look rattled rather than reassuring, but the meeting had little concrete effect. Russia will chair the G20 in 2013, further reducing the likelihood that the forum will achieve great things. There was no progress towards a new international trade deal in 2012 either. The newly re-elected Russian President Vladimir Putin did not even attend the G8 summit hosted by the US. Talks on climate change in Doha delivered very limited procedural gains. Although the EU committed to the extension of the Kyoto Protocol, a number of other Kyoto signatories (including Japan, Canada, and Russia) have already withdrawn from the agreement.

While the European Commission continues to lead for the EU on climate and trade issues, the EEAS is beginning to play an important role on Africa, and EU officials dealing with crisis management – a relatively low priority in Brussels in recent years – now have their hands full with new, albeit small, missions. The EEAS also provided useful technical help to the short-lived UN monitoring mission in Syria. Yet bigger European states – notably France – have continued to drive policy over Syria, Mali, and other crises rather than

112 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 113 MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / Key Elements of the International System Key Elements of the International System

65 EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE G8 AND G20 66 UN REFORM AND BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS UN reform was a low 2010 2011 2012 priority in 2012 as diplomats EU leaders were on the 2010 2011 2012 focused on immediate crises, Unity 4/5 2/5 2/5 defensive over the euro at although the EU continued Resources 2/5 3/5 2/5 the G20 summit. Reforms to Unity – – 3/5 to split over even limited European representation in the Resources – – 5/5 suggestions for Security Outcome 3/10 4/10 3/10 C- IMF were delayed but the IMF Council reform. 2010 C+ 2011 C+ continued to give credibility to Outcome – – 4/10 B- Total 9/20 9/20 7/20 eurozone bailouts. Total – – 12/20 2010 C+ 2011 C-/B-*

*In 2011, Europeans got a C- for policy in the G8 and the G20 and B- for Bretton Woods institutions. In 2010 they got a C+ for both.

Mexico’s presidency of the G20 in 2012 convened the G8 leaders at Camp David UN reform was a low priority in 2012. In UN’s members elected Serbian Foreign was dominated by the euro crisis just as (newly elected Russian President Vladimir 2011, Germany and three partners (Brazil, Minister Vuk Jeremic to act as the assembly the French presidency in 2011 had been. Putin pointedly did not attend). World India, and Japan) had made a major push president in 2012–2013. Jeremic, heavily Mexico pursued a number of substantive leaders put pressure on Chancellor Merkel to win permanent seats on the UNSC but supported by Russia, defeated Dalius and procedural initiatives – including the over Germany’s approach to the euro crisis this lost momentum. In 2012, the UNGA Čekuolis of Lithuania by 99 votes to 85. first G20 foreign ministers’ meeting and but did not deliver notable results. Britain held desultory discussions of UNSC reform This was widely perceived as a diplomatic negotiations on banking regulations – but chairs the G8 in 2013. but made no real progress. While India defeat for the EU, and Jeremic is unlikely the group’s June summit in Los Cabos continued to pursue the topic aggressively, to initiate bold reform ideas. came during an especially tense period in The IMF continued to be a valuable ally German officials adopted a more cautious the euro crisis. The summit generated new to the EU in managing eurozone bailouts, approach, in part because immediate The EEAS took a useful step towards pledges of support to help finance the IMF’s despite off-the-record grumbling by IMF concerns such as Syria dominated the UN improving operational cooperation response, including over $60 billion from officials over a perceived lack of rigour agenda. This was a success for Italy and between the EU and the UN in the first half the BRICS countries, but the media focused among their European counterparts. Spain, which are among the main opponents of the year by devising a new agreement on the defensive stance of the presidents However, the EU faced tensions over the of Germany’s ambitions for a permanent on collaboration in peacekeeping. But of the European Council and European implementation of a 2010 agreement to seat on the UNSC. It is less satisfactory for Scandinavian officials, leading advocates Commission, who insisted that they would reduce its influence on the IMF board. the UK and France, which are increasingly of EU–UN cooperation, were disappointed not be lectured on financial issues. (While This was meant to be completed by convinced that UNSC reform is necessary when Finland failed to win a seat on the High Representative Catherine Ashton October 2012, but the US Congress has to protect their interests at the UN (the UNSC this year (losing to Australia and attended the foreign ministers’ meeting, not yet ratified the agreement. While EU other permanent members of the council, Luxembourg), and Sweden was unable to G20 diplomacy is a field in which the EEAS member states cannot be blamed for delays China, Russia, and the US, are less open secure a place on the UNHRC. This has led has little influence.) in Washington, they struggled to agree to change). While the EU remained split, to talk of a decline of the “Nordic model” on promised cuts to the number of seats Belgium and the Netherlands have made a at the UN. Despite the IMF pledges, Los Cabos did they hold on the IMF board: Belgium, the series of unsuccessful attempts to find ways not mark a turning point in the euro crisis, Netherlands, and Austria have made some to revitalise the debate. underlining the G20’s limitations. In concessions to rebalance the EU’s overall 2013, Russia presides over the G20 and representation. The prospects of serious debates of reform is unlikely to perform better. The G8’s of the UNGA receded in June, when the ambitions are also reduced. In May, the US

114 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 115 MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / Key Elements of the International System Key Elements of the International System

67 EUROPEAN POLICY 68 EUROPEAN POLICY ON ON NON-PROLIFERATION WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Renewed EU-led talks with 2010 2011 2012 Russia joined the WTO but 2010 2011 2012 Iran on nuclear issues failed EU officials believed Moscow to deliver major results. A Unity – – 4/5 was not following all of its Unity 5/5 5/5 5/5 major European push for a Resources – – 4/5 rules. International trade Resources 4/5 4/5 4/5 UN arms-trade treaty was negotiations remained blocked by the US. Outcome – – 3/10 B- deadlocked. Outcome 8/10 4/10 4/10 B Total – – 11/20 2010 A-/B+* 2011 B Total 17/20 13/20 13/20 2010 A- 2011 B

*In 2010, Europeans got a A- for Iran and proliferation and a B+ for policy on the NPT review conference

2012 saw intensive but often frustrating event in 2012 proved insurmountable, After negotiations concluding in 2011, for an Atlantic free-trade area, which will negotiations over nuclear non- and in the third quarter of the year it was 2012 saw Russia enter the WTO in August, be a priority for the British G8 presidency proliferation and arms-control issues. postponed until 2013. a long-term goal for Europeans. But, by the in 2013. In the meantime, the EU The main challenge for the EU was the end of the year, EU officials were accusing concluded negotiations for a free-trade revitalisation of the E3+3 talks with Iran European policymakers were also heavily Russia of taking a series of protectionist area with Singapore and also concluded led by High Representative Catherine involved in efforts to agree a conventional measures that conflicted with its WTO negotiations with Ukraine, but the deal is Ashton. Iran signalled its willingness arms-trade treaty in July. Bulgaria was commitments and raised the possibility of on hold due to wider tensions over the rule for talks in January, and meetings were one of the states involved in facilitating a formal European complaint. The issue of law (see component 47). held in April, May, and June. Ashton was negotiations and other EU member states was one of a number that overshadowed reported to have performed well in these including France, Germany, Sweden, and the EU–Russia summit in December. The WTO passed a long-awaited ruling negotiations, but there was no substantial the UK made a major political investment on US subsidies to Boeing in March, progress towards agreement with Iran. in the process. The US, however, If Russia’s behaviour surprised the EU, the following a similar ruling on European By the end of the year, many analysts eventually undermined the process by fact that no progress was made towards subsidies to Airbus. While the WTO argued that the best remaining option for insisting on more time for negotiations, the conclusion of the Doha Development concluded that both the EU and the diplomacy was bilateral talks between the possibly to placate its domestic gun lobby Round was less unexpected. The Mexican US had unfairly subsidised the aircraft US and Iran. China and Russia opposed before November’s elections. Russia also presidency of the G20 raised the issue, but makers, the two sides continued to new UN sanctions on Iran, although raised concerns, and China linked its it had no impact, not least because of the argue over the matter through the year. EU sanctions have put Tehran under potential support for the treaty to the end US elections, which made an agreement Conversely, the US and the EU cooperated increasing pressure. of the EU arms embargo against it. China unlikely. This failure is a disappointment with Japan to raise Chinese restrictions also opposed efforts by the EU and African for WTO head Pascal Lamy, who is on the export of rare earth minerals, and 2012 was also meant to see a conference organisations to allow regional bodies stepping down in 2013. None of the nine China clashed with Western powers over on creating a Nuclear-Weapons-Free to be party to the treaty. In November, candidates bidding to replace him are solar-industry subsidies. More positively, Zone in the Middle East, mandated by the the UNGA passed a resolution calling from EU member states, so Europe will the EU persuaded the WTO to allow it to 2010 NPT Review Conference. Finland for completion of talks on the proposed soon hold one fewer top multilateral offer Pakistan “trade aid” (preferential agreed to convene this, with support treaty. A further conference is scheduled position. treatment for some exports) to help from the UK as well as the US and for March 2013. alleviate the country’s economic distress. Russia. As many analysts had foreseen, In the absence of progress on Doha, EU the diplomatic obstacles to holding the member states focused on the potential

116 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 117 MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / Key Elements of the International System International Justice

69 EUROPEAN POLICY ON 70 EUROPEAN POLICY ON THE ICC HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

European countries and their 2010 2011 2012 The ICC made its first verdicts, 2010 2011 2012 allies successfully used the but its political status remained UNHRC and the UNGA to Unity 3/5 4/5 4/5 uncertain. Europeans avoided Unity 4/5 4/5 4/5 maintain pressure on Syria. Resources 3/5 4/5 4/5 citing the ICC over Syria, and Resources 4/5 4/5 3/5 EU states were dissatisfied the UK raised fears that the with talks on a UN internet Outcome 4/10 7/10 7/10 B+ Palestinians might use it as a Outcome 7/10 7/10 7/10 B+ threat in December. tool against Israel. Total 10/20 15/20 15/20 2010 C+ 2011 B+ Total 15/20 15/20 14/20 2010 B+ 2011 B+

While European and American diplomats on peace and security. Germany used The ICC handed down its first guilty The ICC was also a concern for some EU were frustrated by Chinese and Russian its temporary seat on the UNSC to press verdict in March 2012, concluding that member states during the debate over opposition to do anything decisive about accountability issues especially hard. a Congolese warlord had recruited child recognising Palestine as an “observer Syria in the UNSC, they were able to get soldiers (it also found another Congolese state” in the UNGA. The UK in particular broad support for resolutions raising While the EU and the US worked closely defendant not guilty). The ICC’s successful expressed concerns that this would the human rights situation there in UN with non-Western majorities over Syria – completion of these cases was a relief for give the Palestinians access to the ICC, forums. In May 2012, the EEAS mission to and there has been increased support for supporters of the court, including EU allowing them to raise Israeli activities the UN in Geneva co-sponsored an HRC resolutions addressing the human-rights member states that have waited for this there (which in turn fuelled the accusation resolution on the “deteriorating situation” situations in Iran and North Korea – many moment for over a decade. But a series that the ICC was a tool only for the West). in Syria with Denmark, the US, and Arab fundamental debates over rights and of crises raised questions about the ICC’s The Palestinians refused to promise not to states (the EEAS had previously sponsored freedoms remained unresolved. This was role in European foreign policy and there do this, causing the UK to abstain on the a similar resolution in 2011, strengthening highlighted outside the normal UN human- were controversies over Balkan war- recognition vote. While EU member states its status as a voice of the EU at the HRC, rights framework during negotiations on a crimes prosecutions. In 2011, the UNSC remain strongly committed to the ICC in although US diplomats complain that treaty addressing government control of had also authorised the ICC to investigate principle, concerns about its political role internal European negotiations have been the internet convened by the International war crimes in Libya. But while the court are clearly mounting. There were also time-consuming). A UNGA resolution Telecommunications Union (ITU) in has pursued individuals including Saif debates about the political implications on human rights in Syria was passed by December. The treaty was signed by 89 al-Islam Gaddafi (son of the late Colonel of international justice at the end of the a large margin in December. The EU’s other countries, including not only China Gaddafi), the new Libyan authorities year when the ICTY terminated a number stance has been reinforced by strong and Russia but also Turkey. But the US have refused to send them to The Hague of long-running cases against high- statements of concern over Syria by the and EU member states refused to sign for trial. Alternatives, including a trial profile Croat and Kosovar defendants. UN High Commissioner for Human the treaty, arguing that it would open the in Libya, remain under discussion. Although the tribunal justified this on Rights, Navanethem Pillay, who secured a way for curbs on internet freedom, which Meanwhile, proposals by some EU technical grounds, critics argued that it second term in 2012. means that it is effectively dead for the member states including France to involve demonstrated that it had an anti-Serb time being. the ICC in Syria failed to win US support, bias. This was an uneasy moment for European diplomats also made a point which feared that this would complicate Europeans, who have insisted that the of raising Syrian human-rights abuses in negotiations. former Yugoslav states should cooperate the UNSC, despite Chinese and Russian with ICTY if they want to accede to the EU. complaints that it should focus narrowly

118 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 119 MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / International Justice Climate Change and Development

71 CLIMATE CHANGE 72 DEVELOPMENT AID AND GLOBAL HEALTH

EU member states committed 2010 2011 2012 Some EU member states 2010 2011 2012 to an extension of the Kyoto increased aid while others Protocol but were accused Unity 4/5 5/5 4/5 made cuts. The UK took a Unity – 3/5 2/5 of making vague promises Resources 4/5 4/5 3/5 prominent role in discussions Resources – 3/5 3/5 on climate-related funding to on the post-2013 development poorer countries. Outcome 7/10 7/10 6/10 B agenda. Outcome – 6/10 6/10 B- Total 15/20 16/20 13/20 2010 B+ 2011 A- Total – 12/20 11/20 2010 – 2011 B-

After UN talks in late 2011 produced a deal The EU worked out a complex formula In 2012, European development aid There were also growing criticisms to negotiate a globally binding agreement to preserve the Polish carbon credits, budgets continued to come under of EU member states’ allocations of on limiting climate change by 2015, there although other member states waived sustained pressure from the financial aid to countries affected by the Arab was much less progress in 2012. The similar credits. Critics argue that this is crisis. Against the background of the Awakening. Most donors continued to UN convened negotiations in Doha in part of a wider pattern of Polish objections crisis, some EU member states cut aid pursue technocratic projects that do not November and December. After difficult to EU climate policy in recent years. severely. Preliminary figures suggest that contribute enough to democratisation or negotiations, the EU, Australia, and Norway Italy slashed development spending by social stability (equally, however, Egypt has agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol – Developing countries assailed the EU as a 50 percent and Spain by 20 percent. The rejected some EU aid). The EBRD revised placing limits on their carbon emissions – bloc for failing to fulfil promises of aid to overall picture for the EU is better. France, its goals to focus on Arab countries as well until 2020. However, a significant number fund projects relating to climate change. which cut funds heavily in recent years, as established projects in Eastern Europe, of other countries, including Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, and did not make further major reductions. but governments were slow to ratify this Japan, and Russia refused to extend their the UK made pledges to make up some of The UK resisted intensifying domestic change of mission. The last year also saw a Kyoto commitments. the missing money. Western negotiators pressure for cuts, although it had to lower debate over what targets, if any, will replace also promised to set up a procedure for its projections for future funding in light of the Millennium Development Goals, which The extension of the Kyoto Protocol compensating developing countries for its poor growth figures. Finland, Germany, are set to expire in 2015. The UK took a (originally meant to finish at the end of “loss and damage” resulting from climate and Sweden, already significant donors, prominent role in this debate, and British 2012) is meant to place a partial cap on change. This was particularly important to marginally increased their aid budgets Prime Minister David Cameron is co- emissions until a global deal comes into small island states such as the Seychelles, and the Danish government has promised chairing a UN panel on the issue. Further force. There was little substantial progress which have been important EU allies in further increases. Even smaller EU donors discussions about developing “sustainable” towards this final deal at Doha, although previous climate change talks. Nonetheless, – such as Malta and many countries in development goals were launched by a some procedural complications were critics noted that the Doha talks did not Eastern Europe – raised aid a little over disappointing conference in Rio in June. ironed out. The European Commission involve any major concessions by China the last year. The European Commission But if European aid spending has stabilised continues to lead talks on behalf of the and the US, the two powers that are central remains a leading donor, but concerns for the moment, there may still be further EU, although its role was complicated by to any final global deal. were raised in the last quarter of the year cuts ahead. Poland, which opposed modifications to that governments would cut its aid budget the Kyoto Protocol that threatened its by up to 10 percent in deal-making on the holding of “carbon credits” (internationally overall EU budget. tradable rights to extra carbon emissions).

120 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 121 MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / Climate Change and Development Humanitarian Relief

73 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE 74 DROUGHT IN THE SAHEL

Apart from Spain, EU 2010 2011 2012 The overall European 2010 2011 2012 member states maintained response to the Sahel levels of humanitarian aid. Unity – – 4/5 drought was significant and Unity – – 4/5 Overall, Europeans did better Resources – – 4/5 played an important part in Resources – – 4/5 than on development aid. averting mass fatalities. Outcome – – 5/10 B Outcome – – 7/10 B+ Total – – 13/20 2010 – 2011 – Total – – 15/20 2010 – 2011 –

Humanitarian agencies faced major crises step forward in policy terms in October, In late 2011, it became clear that drought in unable to make large-scale contributions. including a drought in the Sahel and releasing a communication committing it the Sahel threatened to create widespread For example, Italy pledged €2.5 million for massive displacement in Syria in 2012. The to promoting poor communities’ resilience food shortages, with the potential to affect food relief, in contrast to €14 million of aid humanitarian response in the Sahel was to unforeseen shocks, as well as crisis nearly 20 million people in the region from the Netherlands, and Portugal was effective (see component 74), but by the response. Warnings of forthcoming food- in 2012. This humanitarian crisis was not able to give any aid to the region. end of the year it was increasingly clear that price spikes, which are likely to lead to compounded by the implosion of Mali in the humanitarian situation in Syria was shortages, increased the need to focus on March 2012 (see component 77). But a These overall figures do not reflect how out of control. Having faced major crises, resilience. concerted humanitarian response meant well funds are used, but the UN and including the Libyan war and famine in that a major disaster was averted, in part its partners generally moved quickly Somalia, in 2011, most EU member states Nonetheless, the scale of the ongoing thanks to prompt EU action. in the Sahel throughout 2012. The maintained levels of humanitarian aid crisis in Syria threatened to overwhelm success of the aid effort has prompted in 2012. This was true not only of major European donors, with around 2.5 million The European Commission’s humanitarian governments in the region to work on donors such as Germany, the Nordic citizens displaced inside the country or arm, the European Community options for managing future crises. The countries, and the UK but also of relatively forced to flee elsewhere. By the end of 2012, Humanitarian Office (ECHO), reacted crisis also heavily informed the European small donors. For example, Poland the European Commission had devoted quickly to the crisis with initial aid in late Commission’s communication on increased its humanitarian spending by 30 €165 million to the crisis and the UK had 2011. Of over €700 million spent on the promoting resilience (see component 73). percent, though it amounted to less than donated over €80 million, according to food crisis throughout the year, nearly Overall, the discrepancy between aid from €2 million. The main exception was Spain, figures collected by the International €350 million came from the European member states and that given by ECHO which cut its humanitarian budget from Rescue Committee. Germany set aside an Commission. The US was the next biggest demonstrated the growing power of the over €300 million to under €150 million. additional €40 million for Syria during the donor, while EU member states gave nearly European Commission in humanitarian year. Yet the limits of this funding were €100 million. These included some EU affairs. However, the continuing conflict As in past years, the European underlined when the UN announced in late member states, including the UK and the in Mali and its potential to spill over to Commission was a leading donor through 2012 that it would need over €1 billion in Netherlands, that had limited experience of other countries in the region threatens its humanitarian arm, the European humanitarian aid for Syria in the first half supporting projects in the region. Germany to confront the EU with even greater Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), of 2013. The figure is likely to rise further also moved quickly to respond to the humanitarian crises in the future. disbursing €1.3 billion in 2012, including as the war goes on. crisis. By contrast, some southern member all available emergency resources. The states, which arguably have the greatest commission also took an important direct interest in events in the Sahel, were

122 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 123 MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / Humanitarian Relief Peacekeeping

75 UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND SYRIA 76 THE SUDANS AND THE DRC

The European members of the 2010 2011 2012 The limits of European 2010 2011 2012 Security Council maintained a power were demonstrated high degree of unity and often Unity – – 5/5 in Sudan and the DRC as the Unity – – 4/5 took the initiative over Syria at Resources – – 4/5 US and China took the lead Resources – – 3/5 the Security Council but could in averting a new war. EU not sway Russia and China. Outcome – – 3/10 B- member states suspended Outcome – – 4/10 B- aid to the DRC. Total – – 12/20 2010 – 2011 – Total – – 11/20 2010 B- 2011 B-

The European members of the UNSC in political transition process for Syria in Europeans were actively involved in The DRC was shaken by rebel attacks 2012 – France, Germany, Portugal, and June. In July, the Europeans and the US efforts to end the crises in both the Sudans in the east that culminated in the last the UK – invested a great deal in resolving supported a further UNSC resolution and the Democratic Republic of the Congo quarter of the year. The EU’s response the Syrian crisis in the first half of 2012 but putting pressure on Assad, but China and (DRC), but had less leverage than the US in to rebel activity in the eastern DRC was became increasingly disillusioned as the Russia once again cast their vetoes. Annan both cases. Sudan and South Sudan came complicated by evidence of links between year progressed. European officials were resigned in August. close to war in April after an escalation the rebels and Rwanda, a major recipient initially much keener on the “UN route” of tensions, driven by disputes over oil of EU aid. Germany, the Netherlands, and than their American counterparts, who Even after that, France tried to keep revenues and border areas, between the the UK suspended some aid to Rwanda in did not believe Russia would be willing to talks at the UN alive and led a ministerial two parts of the country that separated in the summer (although there was confusion bargain. meeting of the UNSC in August. France’s 2011. The AU took the lead in negotiating over UK policy) and the European Laurent Fabius and the UK’s William a peaceful outcome, backed by threats of Commission also did so in September. In February, the European members of the Hague were the only foreign ministers to sanctions from the UNSC. The US worked This did not stop Rwandan-backed rebels UNSC tabled a resolution effectively calling attend. Thereafter France, followed by the hard publicly and privately in support of seizing the important city of Goma in for President Bashar al-Assad to resign. UK, shifted away from the UN, increasing the AU and China, which was concerned November. The US blocked an effort by Russia’s ambassador to the UN signalled support to the rebels. European officials about threats to its energy investments France to “name and shame” Rwanda in willingness to compromise but reversed have given lukewarm support to Annan’s and played a crucial role in averting war. the UNSC and focused instead on quiet course after instructions from Moscow. replacement as UN envoy Lakhdar In the past, the UK played a prominent diplomacy leading to a rebel withdrawal. China vetoed the resolution along with Brahimi. The UN may still have a role in role in Sudanese affairs but its influence The EU has two CSDP missions in the Russia. As the crisis continued, British and stabilising Syria after the fall of Assad. The has reduced in recent years. South Sudan DRC, dealing with security sector and French officials hoped that China might EEAS deserves credit for rapidly providing also suffers from significant internal police issues, but some member states split with Russia over Syria, but this proved technical assistance to the deployment of security problems. In June, the European – notably Germany – have questioned impossible. The UNSC gave unanimous UN peacekeepers in Syria in April and May. Council launched a CSDP mission to help whether they still have value. support to Kofi Annan’s mediation efforts But Europe’s overall investment in UNSC build up security at the country’s main and a small UN peacekeeping deployment, diplomacy over Syria delivered painfully airport. Critics argued that the EU could but he made little progress. France, the UK, little in 2012. have provided this assistance without a and the US tried to negotiate with Russia CSDP mission. and China outside formal UNSC structures, culminating in a weak agreement on a

124 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 125 MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / Peacekeeping Peacekeeping

77 MALI AND THE SAHEL 78 SOMALIA

The EU and the UN struggled 2010 2011 2012 EU-backed African forces 2010 2011 2012 to find a solution to the crisis continued to make progress in Mali. France coordinated Unity – – 4/5 and anti-piracy operations Unity 4/5 4/5 4/5 the response and the EEAS Resources – – 4/5 were successful. There was Resources 4/5 4/5 4/5 developed a regional also political progress in strategy. Outcome – – 2/10 C+ Somalia. Outcome 5/10 6/10 7/10 B+ Total – – 10/20 2010 – 2011 – Total 13/20 14/20 15/20 2010 B 2011 B+

Fighters retreating from Libya after the The EEAS also made the Sahel a priority The consortium of organisations involved The EU runs a training mission to build up 2011 civil war have helped destabilise the in 2012 and developed a comprehensive in Somalia – including the AU, the EU, Somalia’s armed forces. There had been already-weak countries of the Sahel (Mali, strategy for the region. In July, the and the UN – made major progress signs of waning enthusiasm in the EU for Mauritania, and Niger). The situation in European Council authorised a CSDP towards stabilising the country in 2012. the operation, which was set to close at the Mali deteriorated in early 2012, as Islamist mission to assist the authorities in Niger But their gains remain fragile and end of 2012. In December, however, the rebels seized the north of the country and fight terrorism and strengthen the rule could still be reversed. The EEAS has European Council agreed to extend the military officers mounted a coup in the of law. This mission, which may evolve played a significant role in coordinating mission by two years, with a new focus south, initiating a year of deep political to operate in other states in the region, European strategy towards Somalia for on offering strategic guidance rather than confusion. France was particularly arguably took too long to get going given some years, and in November 2011 the direct training. The EU also maintains a concerned about the situation in the the urgency of the situation. In November, European Council adopted a new strategic high-profile anti-piracy mission off the Sahel, in part because Islamist groups the European Council gave initial approval framework for the Horn of Africa. The UK coast of Somalia (in parallel with NATO have taken French citizens hostage. for a further mission to help strengthen has taken a lead among member states and other operations), which has been Other EU member states and the US Malian forces in parallel to the proposed and in February 2012 hosted a major increasingly successful. There were fewer were also concerned that northern Mali African intervention. French officials were intergovernmental conference at which than 100 pirate attacks in 2012 – less could become a terrorist haven, and there relieved that Germany, which increasingly EU and non-European governments than half the figure for 2011. In July, are links between Islamists in the Sahel questions the role of CSDP missions in pledged increased aid to the country. the European Council mandated a new and insurgent groups elsewhere in West Africa, supported this proposal in light mission, codenamed Nestor, to assist Africa, including Nigeria. France took the of the potential terrorist threat. Overall, The African Union Mission in Somalia regional states build up their own maritime lead both at the UN and in the EU. Paris however, the international response to (AMISOM) continued to mount successful security capabilities, though this is not yet has negotiated with West African states the crisis in Mali was too slow. In January operations against Islamist rebels in fully operational. Meanwhile, the UN, to plan an African-led and UN-backed 2013, an Islamist advance towards 2012. A Kenyan intervention early in the which has been involved in the Somalia intervention in Mali – ultimately aimed the capital, Bamako, caused France to year significantly strengthened the force. conflict since the 1990s, moved political at regaining the north – for 2013. This intervene militarily and speed up the The EU’s African Peace Facility (APF), personnel into the country in January (a process was prolonged by differences over proposed African intervention. which uses development funds to support sign of increased security) and supported the scale of the force involved, and US African peace operations, provided a gradual but promising progress towards scepticism towards the plan. significant part of AMISOM’s budget in creating a representative government. 2012. However, the APF will run out of funds if it is not replenished in 2013.

126 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 127 MULTILATERAL ISSUES & CRISIS MANAGEMENT / Peacekeeping Tables 79 AFGHANISTAN

Europeans continued to cut 2010 2011 2012 back their contributions to NATO, despite mixed evidence Unity 2/5 3/5 4/5 of Afghan capabilities. France Resources 4/5 3/5 3/5 sped up its departure, but US decisions overshadow all Outcome 3/10 4/10 4/10 B- European choices. Total 9/20 10/20 11/20 2010 C+ 2011 C+

Europeans have now largely ceded decision- which has previously been the target of making over Afghanistan to the US. Their major criticisms. The mission has focused common goal remains a smooth transfer of on developing the Afghan National responsibility for security to Afghan forces Police staff college, and (sometimes very in 2014. By the end of 2012, there were just limited) training continued at a good over 100,000 NATO troops in the country, pace throughout the year. However, the of which approximately 28,000 came from mission was frustrated by slow progress EU member states, compared with 68,000 in constructing the college’s long-term Americans. The majority of European home. More fundamentally, there are governments have stuck to pre-existing serious concerns about corruption in the plans to reduce their deployments over police and its ability to maintain order after the next two years. For example, Spain, international forces depart (the Afghan which has cut back military commitments army is making better progress). in response to its financial problems, has not pulled back from this mission. The There are still questions over the size of main exception is France. Then-president the US presence in Afghanistan after 2014, Nicolas Sarkozy had promised to bring but European governments are keen to forces home before the 2014 deadline, but leave. Germany used its two-year stint on President François Hollande accelerated the UNSC in 2011–2012 to help the UN this process. French troops ceased combat prepare for post-NATO Afghanistan and operations in November, although some resolve problems over sanctions blocking remain in training and technical roles. The talks with the Taliban. There are signs largest European force contributors are that negotiations with Taliban leaders, the UK, Germany, and Italy. The UK will frequently delayed, will now gather significantly cut its presence in 2013. pace. But the prospects for stability in Afghanistan remain grim and Europe’s 2012 was a relatively successful year for ability to shape events very limited. the EU’s Police Mission in Afghanistan,

128 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 129 COMPONENTS BY ISSUE Unity Resources Outcome Total Score COMPONENTS BY ISSUE Unity Resources Outcome Total Score (out of 5) (out of 5) (out of 10) (out of 20) Grade (out of 5) (out of 5) (out of 10) (out of 20) Grade

RELATIONS WITH CHINA 9.7 C+ RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 11.69 B- Trade liberalisation and overall relationship 10.2 C+ Trade liberalisation and overall relationship 11.25 B- 01 Formats of the Europe-China dialogue 3 3 5 11 B- 26 Reciprocity on visa procedures with the US 2 2 3 7 C- 02 Investment and market access in China 3 4 4 11 B- 27 Relations with the US on trade and investment 4 4 7 15 B+ 03 Reciprocity in access to public procurement in 2 2 4 8 C 28 Relations with the US on standards and norms, Europe and China consumer protection 4 3 6 13 B 04 Trade disputes with China 4 3 6 13 B 29 Relations with the US on the euro crisis 2 3 5 10 C+ 05 Cooperation with China on the euro crisis 2 2 4 8 C Cooperation on European security issues 10.67 B- Human rights and governance 7.5 C 30 Relations with the US on counter-terrorism 3 3 6 12 B- 06 Rule of law and human rights in China 3 3 2 8 C 31 Relations with the US on NATO, arms control and Russia 2 2 5 9 C+ 07 Relations with China on the Dalai Lama and Tibet 2 3 2 7 C- 32 Relations with the US on the Balkans 2 4 5 11 B- Cooperation on regional and global issues 11.4 B- 08 Relations with China on Iran and proliferation 5 4 3 12 B- Cooperation on regional and global issues 10.6 B 33 Relations with the US on the Arab transitions 4 4 6 14 B+ 09 Relations with China in Asia 4 3 6 13 B 34 Relations with the US on the Middle East 10 Relations with China on Africa 3 3 5 11 B- peace process 2 3 2 7 C- 11 Relations with China on reforming global 35 Relations with the US on the Syrian conflict 4 4 8 16 A- governance 2 2 2 6 C- 12 Relations with China on climate change 4 5 6 15 B+ 36 Relations with the US on Asia 3 2 7 12 B- 37 Relations with the US on Iran and weapons proliferation 4 5 8 17 A- 38 Relations with the US on climate change 5 4 4 13 B RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 11.02 B- Trade liberalisation and overall relationship 13 B 13 Trade liberalisation with Russia 5 4 5 14 B+ RELATIONS WITH WIDER EUROPE 10.3 C+ 14 Visa liberalisation with Russia 5 3 4 12 B- Western Balkans 12.5 B 39 Overall progress on enlargement in the Western Balkans 4 4 6 14 B+ Human rights and governance 8.33 C 40 Rule of law, democracy and human rights 15 Rule of law and human rights in Russia 4 3 2 9 C+ in the Western Balkans 4 3 5 12 B- 16 Media freedom in Russia 4 2 2 8 C 41 Kosovo 4 4 8 16 A- 17 Stability and human rights in the North Caucasus 4 2 2 8 C 42 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 3 2 8 C

European security issues 11 B- Turkey 8 C 18 Relations with Russia on the Eastern Partnership 4 4 3 11 B- 43 Bilateral relations with Turkey 3 2 2 7 C- 19 Relations with Russia on protracted conflicts 4 3 3 10 C+ 44 Rule of law, democracy and human rights in Turkey 3 2 2 7 C- 20 Relations with Russia on energy issues 4 4 5 13 B 45 Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question 3 2 2 7 C- 21 Diversification of gas-supply routes to Europe 3 3 4 10 C+ 46 Relations with Turkey on regional issues 4 3 4 11 B-

Cooperation on regional and global issues 11.75 B- Eastern Neighbourhood 10.4 C+ 22 Relations with Russia on Iran and proliferation 5 4 4 13 B 47 Rule of law, democracy and human rights in the 23 Relations with Russia on the Greater Middle East 5 4 4 13 B Eastern Neighbourhood 3 4 1 8 C 24 Relations with Russia on climate change 3 2 3 8 C 48 Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood 4 5 7 16 A- 25 Relations with Russia on the Arctic 4 4 5 13 B on trade 49 Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood on energy 3 2 3 8 C 50 Visa liberalisation with the Eastern Neighbourhood 3 3 5 11 B- 51 Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood on protracted conflicts 4 2 3 9 C+

130 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 131 COMPONENTS BY ISSUE Unity Resources Outcome Total Score COMPONENTS BY ISSUE Unity Resources Outcome Total Score (out of 5) (out of 5) (out of 10) (out of 20) Grade (out of 5) (out of 5) (out of 10) (out of 20) Grade

RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND AND NORTH AFRICA 10.29 C+ CRISIS MANAGEMENT 12.6 B Regional Issue 7.67 C Key elements of the international system 10.75 B- 52 Rule of law, human rights, and democracy 2 2 4 8 C 65 European policy in the G8 and G20 and 53 Financial instruments 3 2 5 10 C+ Bretton Woods institutions 3 5 4 12 B- 54 Security sector reform 2 1 2 5 D+ 66 UN reform 2 2 3 7 C- 67 European policy on non-proliferation 4 4 3 11 B- North Africa 11.25 B- 68 European policy on the World Trade Organization 5 4 4 13 B 55 Tunisia 4 4 7 15 B+ 56 Egypt 4 3 5 12 B- International justice 14.5 B+ 57 Libya 4 2 5 11 B- 69 European policy on human rights at the UN 4 4 7 15 B+ 58 Algeria and Morocco 2 2 3 7 C- 70 European policy on the ICC and international tribunals 4 3 7 14 B+

Levant 10.25 C+ Climate change and development 12 B- 59 Syria 3 3 2 8 C 71 Climate change 4 3 6 13 B 60 Lebanon 4 3 7 14 B+ 72 Development aid and global health 2 3 6 11 B- 61 Jordan 3 3 4 10 C+ 62 Middle East Peace Process and state-building 3 3 3 9 C+ Humanitarian relief 14 B+ in Palestine 73 Humanitarian response 4 4 5 13 B 74 Drought in the Sahel 4 4 7 15 B+ Persian Gulf 12 B- 63 Iran 5 4 3 12 B- Peacekeeping 11.8 B- 64 Yemen 4 2 5 12 B- 75 UN Security Council and Syria 5 4 3 12 B- 76 The Sudans and the DRC 4 3 4 11 B- 77 Mali and the Sahel 4 4 2 10 C+ 78 Somalia 4 4 7 15 B+ 79 Afghanistan 4 3 4 11 B-

132 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 133 CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES Unless otherwise stated, member states are supporters RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA RELATIONS WITH CHINA Ensuring Russia Promoting Promoting Co-operating Persuading adheres to WTO human rights in media freedom with Russia to Moscow to Enhancing Europe’s Improving the Adopting a stronger Promoting human rules Russia in Russia solve protracted support EU strategic dialogue vetting of Chinese stance on anti- rights in China (see component 13) (see component (see component conflicts positions on with China investments in dumping e.g. on (see components 15) 16) (see component Syria (see component 1) Europe solar panels 6 and 7) 18) (see component (see component 2) (see component 3) 23) Austria Austria Belgium Belgium Bulgaria Slacker Bulgaria Cyprus Cyprus Czech R. Slacker Leader Czech R. Denmark Denmark

Estonia Slacker Estonia Finland Finland France France Leader Germany Slacker Leader Germany Leader Leader Leader Greece Greece Hungary Slacker Hungary Ireland Ireland Italy Slacker Italy Latvia Slacker Slacker Latvia Lithuania Slacker Lithuania Luxembourg Luxembourg Malta Slacker Malta Netherlands Netherlands Leader Poland Slacker Poland Portugal Slacker Portugal

Romania Slacker Slacker Romania Slovakia Slacker Slovakia Slovenia Slacker Slovenia Spain Spain

Sweden Leader Sweden Leader

UK Slacker UK Leader

134 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 135 CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH WIDER EUROPE Developing a joint Joint defence Resisting US pressure Countering the US Encouraging Pushing visa Encouraging Putting pressure Pushing visa European approach projects within NATO and developing offensive against EU Serbia to liberalisation for Turkey to adopt on Belarus liberalisation to the use of drones or CSDP to limit the a joint European regulation of aviation normalise Turkey the European for political for Russia, (see component 30) effects of budget approach on the UN emissions relations with (see component position towards liberalisation Ukraine and cuts vote on Palestine (see component 38) Kosovo 43) the Syrian (see component Moldova (see component 31) (see component 35) (see component 41) opposition 47) (see component (see component 50) Austria Slacker 46) Belgium Austria Leader Bulgaria Belgium Cyprus Bulgaria Czech R. Leader Cyprus Slacker Slacker Denmark Czech R. Leader Estonia Leader Denmark Finland Estonia Leader France Leader Leader Leader Finland Leader Germany Leader Leader France Slacker Leader Greece Germany Leader Leader Slacker Hungary Greece Slacker Ireland Hungary Leader Italy Ireland Latvia Slacker Italy Lithuania Slacker Latvia Slacker Leader Luxembourg Slacker Lithuania Leader Malta Luxembourg Netherlands Leader Malta Poland Leader Netherlands Slacker Portugal Poland Leader Leader Romania Portugal Slovakia Romania Slacker Leader Slovenia Slovakia Leader Spain Slacker Slovenia Slacker Sweden Leader Spain Slacker UK Sweden Leader Leader UK Leader Leader

136 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 137 CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES CLASSIFICATION OF MEMBER STATES MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT Improving Supporting Putting Supporting Increasing Supporting Increasing Increasing Supporting Contributing to Facilitating Contributing financial security pressure on a common pressure on political development humanitarian an arms CSDP missions the to the support for sector reform Algeria and position on Iran through transition in aid to reach assistance, trade treaty (see consolidation mission in MENA in MENA Morocco for the labelling sanctions Libya and agreed especially in at the UN components of European Afghanistan (see (see political reform of products (see Yemen targets the Sahel (see 74, 76, 77, and seats at the (see component component (see from illegal component (see (see (see component 78) IMF component 53) 54) component 58) settlements 63) components component 72) components 67) (see 79) (see 57 and 64) 73 and 74) component component 65) 62) Austria Slacker Leader Leader Austria Belgium Leader Leader Leader Belgium Slacker Bulgaria Leader Leader Bulgaria Slacker Cyprus Slacker Cyprus Czech R. Leader Czech R. Slacker Denmark Leader Slacker Denmark Leader Leader Leader Estonia Leader Slacker Leader Estonia Finland Leader Leader Finland Leader France Leader Leader Leader Slacker France Leader Leader Leader Germany Leader Leader Germany Leader Leader Greece Greece Slacker Slacker Slacker Hungary Hungary Leader Ireland Leader Ireland Leader Leader Leader Italy Leader Leader Italy Slacker Leader Latvia Slacker Latvia Lithuania Lithuania Slacker Slacker

Luxembourg Luxembourg Leader Leader Malta Malta Slacker

Netherlands Leader Netherlands Leader Leader Leader

Poland Leader Poland Leader

Portugal Slacker Portugal Slacker Slacker Romania Romania Slacker Slacker Slovakia Slovakia Slovenia Slovenia Slacker Spain Leader Spain Slacker Slacker Leader Slacker Sweden Leader Sweden Leader Leader Leader Leader UK Leader Leader Leader Leader UK Leader Leader Leader Leader

138 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 139 Abbreviations About the authors

Julien Barnes-Dacey is a Senior Mark Leonard is co-founder and Policy Fellow at the European Director of the European Council on Council on Foreign Relations. Foreign Relations.

Dimitar Bechev is a Senior Policy Daniel Levy is the head of the Fellow at the European Council on Middle East and North Africa ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations Foreign Relations and the head of programme and a Senior Fellow at AU African Union its Sofia office. the European Council on Foreign CFE Conventional Forces in Europe Relations. CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy Susi Dennison is a Policy Fellow at DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area the European Council on Foreign Kadri Liik is the head of the Wider EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Relations. Europe programme and and a ECB European Central Bank Policy Fellow at the European ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States Anthony Dworkin is a Senior Policy Council on Foreign Relations. EEAS European External Action Service Fellow at the European Council on EIB European Investment Bank Foreign Relations. Jonas Parello-Plesner is a Senior ENP European Neighbourhood Policy Policy Fellow at the European GCC Gulf Cooperation Council Richard Gowan is a Senior Policy Council on Foreign Relations. IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Fellow at the European Council on ICC International Criminal Court Foreign Relations and Associate Justin Vaïsse is a Senior Fellow ICJ International Court of Justice Director for Managing Global Order in Foreign Policy at the Brookings ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at New York University’s Center on Institution and an Associate Fellow IMF International Monetary Fund International Cooperation. at the European Council on Foreign ISAF International Security Assistance Force Relations. OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Jana Kobzova is the co-ordinator PA Palestinian Authority of the Wider Europe programme Nick Witney is a Senior Policy UN United Nations and a Policy Fellow at the European Fellow at the European Council on UNGA United Nations General Assembly Council on Foreign Relations. Foreign Relations. UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council UNSC United Nations Security Council Hans Kundnani is Editorial WTO World Trade Organization Director at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

140 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 141 Among members of the European Council on Foreign Erik Berglöf (Sweden) Maria Livanos Cattaui Pavol Demeš (Slovakia) Jaime Gama (Portugal) Sasha Havlicek Relations are former prime Chief Economist, European (Switzerland) Senior Transatlantic Fellow, Former Speaker of the Parliament; (United Kingdom) ministers, presidents, European Bank for Reconstruction and German Marshall Fund of the former Foreign Minister Executive Director, Institute for Development Former Secretary General of United States (Bratislava) commissioners, current and the International Chamber of Strategic Dialogue (ISD) former parliamentarians and Timothy Garton Ash Jan Krzysztof Bielecki Commerce Kemal Dervis (Turkey) (United Kingdom) Connie Hedegaard ministers, public intellectuals, Vice-President and Director of business leaders, activists and (Poland) Professor of European Studies, (Denmark) Chairman, Prime Minister’s Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) Global Economy and Development, Oxford University cultural figures from the EU Director of Melak Investments/ Brookings. Commissioner for Climate Action member states and candidate Economic Council; former Prime Journalist countries. Minister Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) Steven Heinz (Austria) Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) Chairman of the Portuguese Carmen Chacón (Spain) President, DEMOS Hungary Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, Carl Bildt (Sweden) Former Minister of Defence Institute of International Relations Lansdowne Partners Ltd Asger Aamund (Denmark) Foreign Minister Hanzade Dog˘an Boyner (IPRI) President and CEO, A. J. Aamund Charles Clarke Annette Heuser (Germany) Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) (Turkey) Teresa Patricio Gouveia Executive Director, Bertelsmann A/S and Chairman of Bavarian President, Polish Confederation of (United Kingdom) Chair, Dog˘an Gazetecilik and Nordic A/S (Portugal) Foundation Washington DC Private Employers – Lewiatan Visiting Professor of Politics, Dog˘an On-line Trustee to the Board of the Urban Ahlin (Sweden) University of East Anglia; former Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation; Diego Hidalgo (Spain) Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Home Secretary Andrew Duff (United Co-founder of Spanish newspaper Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Founder, Communitas Foundation former Foreign Minister Affairs Committee and foreign Kingdom) El País; Founder and Honorary and President of Venture Equity Nicola Clase (Sweden) Member of the European Heather Grabbe President, FRIDE policy spokesperson for the Social Bulgaria Ltd. Ambassador to the United Democratic Party Kingdom; former State Secretary Parliament (United Kingdom) Executive Director, Open Society Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Ingrid Bonde (Sweden) Mikuláš Dzurinda (Slovakia) (The Netherlands) CFO & Deputy CEO, Vattenfall AB Daniel Cohn-Bendit Former Foreign Minister Institute – Brussels Chairman of the Board, Crisis (Germany) Former NATO Secretary General Management Initiative; former Emma Bonino (Italy) Charles Grant (United President Member of the European Hans Eichel (Germany) Danuta Hübner (Poland) Vice President of the Senate; Parliament Former Finance Minister Kingdom) former EU Commissioner Member of the European Valdas Adamkus (Lithuania) Director, Centre for European Parliament; former European Former President Robert Cooper Rolf Ekeus (Sweden) Reform Commissioner Stine Bosse (Denmark) (United Kingdom) Former Executive Chairman, United Chairman and Non-Executive Nations Special Commission Jean-Marie Guéhenno Giuliano Amato (Italy) Board Member Counsellor of the European Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) Former Prime Minister; Chairman, External Action Service on Iraq; former OSCE High (France) Member of the European Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna; Franziska Brantner Commissioner on National Director of the Center for Parliament Chairman, Istituto della Gerhard Cromme (Germany) Minorities; former Chairman International Conflict Resolution, Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani; (Germany) Chairman of the Supervisory Stockholm International Peace Columbia University; former Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) Chairman, Centro Studi Americani Member of the European Board, ThyssenKrupp Research Institute, SIPRI Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the Former Ambassador; former Parliament United Nations and the League of Executive Director, Crisis Gustavo de Aristegui (Spain) Maria Cuffaro (Italy) Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Arab States on Syria Management Initiative Diplomat; former Member of Han ten Broeke Anchorwoman, TG3, RAI (Denmark) Parliament (The Netherlands) Chairman, Baltic Development Elisabeth Guigou (France) Toomas Ilves (Estonia) Member of Parliament and Daniel Daianu (Romania) Forum; former Foreign Minister Member of Parliament and President Viveca Ax:son Johnson spokesperson for foreign affairs Professor of Economics, President of the Foreign Affairs (Sweden) and defence National School of Political and Steven Everts (The Committee Wolfgang Ischinger Chairman of Nordstjernan AB Administrative Studies (SNSPA); Netherlands) (Germany) John Bruton (Ireland) former Finance Minister Adviser to the Vice President of Fernando Andresen Chairman, Munich Security Gordon Bajnai (Hungary) Former European Commission the European Commission and EU Guimarães (Portugal) Conference; Global Head of Former Prime Minister Ambassador to the USA; former Massimo D’Alema (Italy) President, Italianieuropei High Representative for Foreign Head of the US and Canada Government Affairs Allianz SE Prime Minister (Taoiseach) and Security Policy Division, European External Action Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) Foundation; President, Foundation Service Minna Järvenpää (Finland/ Member of Parliament; former Ian Buruma (The for European Progressive Studies; Tanja Fajon (Slovenia) US) Foreign Minister Netherlands) former Prime Minister and Foreign Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Minister Member of the European International Advocacy Director, Writer and academic Parliament (Germany) Open Society Foundation Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland) Former Defence Minister Professor of Economics at the Erhard Busek (Austria) Marta Dassù (Italy) Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Mary Kaldor (United Warsaw School of Economics; Chairman of the Institute for the Under Secretary of State for Foreign President, Chamber of Deputies; István Gyarmati (Hungary) former Deputy Prime Minister Danube and Central Europe Affairs Kingdom) former Foreign Minister President and CEO, International Professor, London School of Centre for Democratic Transition Lluís Bassets (Spain) Jerzy Buzek (Poland) Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) Joschka Fischer (Germany) Economics Deputy Director, El País Member of the European Foreign Minister Former Foreign Minister and vice- Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) Parliament; former President of the Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey) Marek Belka (Poland) Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Chancellor Former Chairman, Defence Senior Advisor to the Prime European Parliament; former Prime Poet and Cultural Critic Commission; former Defence Governor, National Bank of Poland; Minister Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) Minister of Turkey on foreign policy Minister and public diplomacy former Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) Chairman, Alliance Trust Plc Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) Heidi Hautala (Finland) Roland Berger (Germany) Minister for International Member of the European Lykke Friis (Denmark) Sylvie Kauffmann (France) Founder and Honorary Chairman, Parliament; former Prime Minister Minister for International Editorial Director, Le Monde Development Cooperation Member of Parliament; former Development Roland Berger Strategy Consultants Minister for Climate, Energy and GmbH Gianfranco Dell’Alba (Italy) Olli Kivinen (Finland) Director, Confindustria Delegation Gender Equality Writer and columnist to Brussels; former Member of the European Parliament

142 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 143 Ben Knapen Sonia Licht (Serbia) Kalypso Nicolaïdis Charles Powell Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) Teija Tiilikainen (Finland) (The Netherlands) President, Belgrade Fund for (Greece/France) (Spain/United Kingdom) Member of Parliament; former Director, Finnish Institute for Former Minister for European Political Excellence Professor of International Relations, Director, Real Instituto Elcano Chancellor International Relations Affairs and International University of Oxford Cooperation Juan Fernando López Andrew Puddephatt (United Karel Schwarzenberg Luisa Todini (Italy) Aguilar (Spain) Daithi O’Ceallaigh (Ireland) Kingdom) (Czech Republic) Chair, Todini Finanziaria S.p.A; Gerald Knaus (Austria) Member of the European Director-General, Institute of Foreign Minister Member of the Board of Directors, Director, Global Partners & RAI Chairman, European Stability Parliament; former Minister of International and European Affairs Associated Ltd. Initiative; Carr Center Fellow Justice Giuseppe Scognamiglio Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Vesna Pusic´ (Croatia) (Italy) Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece) Caio Koch-Weser (Germany) Adam Lury (United Kingdom) Editorialist Professor, University of Athens and Foreign Minister Executive Vice President, Head President, ELIAMEP Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank CEO, Menemsha Ltd of Public Affairs Department, Group; former State Secretary Andrzej Olechowski (Poland) Robert Reibestein Monica Macovei (Romania) Former Foreign Minister UniCredit S.p.A Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) Bassma Kodmani (France) Member of the European (The Netherlands) Foreign Minister Dick Oosting (The Director, McKinsey & Company Narcís Serra (Spain) Executive Director, Arab Reform Parliament Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Daniel Valtchev, (Bulgaria) Initiative Netherlands) Emma Marcegaglia (Italy) George Robertson Vice President of the Spanish Former Deputy PM and Minister of CEO, European Council on Foreign Government Education Rem Koolhaas CEO of Marcegalia S.p.A; former Relations; former Europe Director, (United Kingdom) Former Secretary General of NATO (The Netherlands) President, Confindustria Amnesty International Radosław Sikorski (Poland) Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia) Architect and urbanist; Professor Albert Rohan (Austria) Foreign Minister Former President at the Graduate School of Design, Katharina Mathernova Mabel van Oranje (Slovakia) Former Secretary General for Aleksander Smolar (Poland) Harvard University (The Netherlands) Foreign Affairs Antonio Vitorino (Portugal) Senior Advisor, World Bank Senior Advisor, The Elders Chairman of the Board, Stefan Lawyer; former EU Commissioner David Koranyi (Hungary) Batory Foundation I´ñigo Méndez de Vigo Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland) Deputy Director, Dinu Patriciu Marcelino Oreja Aguirre Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Andre Wilkens (Germany) Eurasia Center of the Atlantic (Spain) Javier Solana (Spain) Director Mercator Centre Berlin (Spain) Co-Chairman of Polish-Russian Former EU High Representative for Council of the United States Secretary of State for the European Member of the Board, Fomento de Group on Difficult Matters, and Director Strategy, Stiftung Union the Common Foreign and Security Mercator Bernard Kouchner (France) Construcciones y Contratas; former Commissioner of Euro-Atlantic Policy & Secretary-General of the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs David Miliband EU Commissioner Security Initiative Council of the EU; former Secretary Carlos Alonso Zaldívar General of NATO Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria) (United Kingdom) Monica Oriol (Spain) Norbert Röttgen (Germany) (Spain) Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal Member of Parliament; Former CEO, Seguriber Minister for the Environment, George Soros (Hungary/ Former Ambassador to Brazil Strategies Secretary of State for Foreign and Conservation and Nuclear Safety Commonwealth Affairs Cem Özdemir (Germany) USA) Stelios Zavvos (Greece) Aleksander Kwas´niewski Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen Olivier Roy (France) Founder and Chairman, Open CEO, Zeus Capital Managers Ltd Alain Minc (France) (Green Party) Professor, European University Society Foundations (Poland) President of AM Conseil; former Institute, Florence Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia) Former President chairman, Le Monde Ana Palacio (Spain) Teresa de Sousa (Portugal) EU Representative to Kosovo; Member of the Council of State; Daniel Sachs (Sweden) Journalist former Foreign Minister Mart Laar (Estonia) Nickolay Mladenov former Foreign Minister; former CEO, Proventus Minister of Defence; former Prime Senior Vice President and General Goran Stefanovski Minister (Bulgaria) Foreign Minister; former Defence Counsel of the World Bank Group Pasquale Salzano (Italy) (Macedonia) Vice President for International Playwright and Academic Miroslav Lajcˇák (Slovakia) Minister; former Member of the Simon Panek (Czech Governmental Affairs, ENI Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign European Parliament Rory Stewart (United Minister Republic) Stefano Sannino (Italy) Dominique Moïsi (France) Chairman, People in Need Director General for Enlargement, Kingdom) Alexander Graf Lambsdorff Senior Adviser, IFRI Foundation European Commission Member of Parliament (Germany) Pierre Moscovici (France) Chris Patten (United Alexander Stubb (Finland) Member of the European Finance Minister; former Minister Javier Santiso (Spain) Minister for Foreign Trade and Parliament Kingdom) Director, Office of the CEO of for European Affairs Chancellor of Oxford University and European Affairs; former Foreign Telefónica Europe Minister Pascal Lamy (France) Nils Muiznieks (Latvia) co-chair of the International Crisis Honorary President, Notre Europe Council of Europe Commissioner Group; former EU Commissioner Marietje Schaake Michael Stürmer (Germany) and Director-General of WTO; for Human Rights (The Netherlands) Chief Correspondent, Die Welt former EU Commissioner Diana Pinto (France) Member of the European Hildegard Müller (Germany) Historian and author Parliament Ion Sturza (Romania) Bruno Le Maire (France) Chairwoman, BDEW President, GreenLight Invest; Former Minister for Food, Jean Pisani-Ferry (France) Bundesverband der Energie- und Director, Bruegel; Professor, Klaus Scharioth (Germany) former Prime Minister of the Agriculture & Fishing Wasserwirtschaft Dean of the Mercator Fellowship Republic of Moldova Université Paris-Dauphine on International Affairs; former Mark Leonard Wolfgang Münchau Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) Ambassador of the Federal Paweł S´wieboda (Poland) (United Kingdom) (Germany) Member of Parliament; Chairman Republic of Germany to the US President, Demos EUROPA - Centre Director, European Council on President, Eurointelligence ASBL of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs for European Strategy Foreign Relations Committee Pierre Schori (Sweden) Alina Mungiu-Pippidi Chair, Olof Palme Memorial Fund; Vessela Tcherneva (Bulgaria) Jean-David Lévitte (France) Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) former Director General, FRIDE; Spokesperson and advisor, Former Senior Diplomatic Advisor (Romania) former SRSG to Cote d’Ivoire Ministry of Foreign Affairs Professor of Democracy Studies, Member of Parliament; former and former Sherpa to the President Foreign Minister of the French Republic; former Hertie School of Governance Ambassador to the United States

144 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2013 145 ECFR Publications

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