Fall 2014
The Wilson Journal Of International Affairs Wilson Journal From the Editor
Dear Reader, This year marks the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I, a global conflict that not only influenced the history of the twentieth century but one that has resounded to the present day. Being a total war—a modern war, and a global war—it was a conflict of extraordinary intensity. It precipitated the collapse of European global dominance through the dissolution of the empires of its member states and had vast inter-continental implications. Hardly a “war to end all wars,” the first World War signaled the arrival of a new system of global power based on a vision of liberalism and democracy, the political conse- quences of which are relevant on the world stage today. The primary champion of this new world vision was Woodrow Wilson, the 28th President of the United States, the first effective anti-imperialist states- man of the twentieth century, a graduate of the University of Virginia, and the namesake of this journal. The foundations of Wilson’s political thinking based on his personal commitment to human rights rooted in his Christian ethical values had large implications for his foreign policy. Wilson believed that democracy was the most advanced and effective form of government, and that all people were capable of self-determination. While Wilson’s vision was admirable, his policy was a shortsighted failure. Wilson did everything within his legal authority to restore peace during the first two and a half years of the First World War, but failed. Wilson desired to keep the United States out of the war, but failed. After the war, he attempted to persuade the Senate and the American people to join the League of Nations and play an increased role in the rebuilding of the international community, but failed. However, the impacts of the Wilsonian concepts of self-determination were enormous, especially upon non-Western peoples. From Wilson’s ideals stem the international origins of anticolonial nationalism. The political trans- formation of the colonial world in the aftermath of World War I represents many contemporary conflicts at their moments of genesis.
Fall 2014 j1 Even though a century has passed, there are many parallels to be drawn between 1914 and 2014. Growing nationalism accentuating territorial disputes is present in the current geopolitical standoffs between Russia and the West, Is- raelis and Palestinians, and in the dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the South China Sea. This reflects how Serbian nationalists, Russia, and Austria-Hungary jockeyed for influence over the successor states of the crumbling Ottoman Em- pire and how Alsace Lorraine was caught in the crosshairs of an age-old Fran- co-Prussian rivalry. Economic, social, and political interdependence frame the relations between powers today, just as they did in 1914. Entangling alliances are still prevalent and have come to define the nature of U.S. involvement in recent conflicts. Terrorism is cited as one of today’s most predominant security concerns especially with the growing threat of ISIS, but radicalism is nothing new considering how the Black Hand murdered Archduke Franz Ferdinand and sparked global conflict. The nightly news can leave anyone feeling discouraged. With so many com- plex and seemingly insurmountable problems, it seems as though international political solutions are unable to resolve the disputes between peoples whose misunderstandings of one another seem deep, ancient, and impenetrable. How- ever, solutions must be discovered, and the burden of this responsibility will be passed categorically to the next generation. Critically analyzing the past gives us historical perspective, which is useful in crafting innovative and peaceful solutions to contemporary issues. By training a new generation of informed global citizens who can overcome differences, tolerate one another, and pro- mote discourse about international affairs with a firm human rights emphasis, we can begin to pursue substantive change. Perhaps Wilson’s idealism is the most important aspect of his legacy; it provides us with the vision of a better world for which we must strive. This year also marks the 10th anniversary of the formation of The Wilson Journal of International Affairs. The research completed by undergraduates at The University of Virginia presented in the journal’s fall 2014 edition is meant to promote discourse amongst scholars and citizens. By providing insightful analysis of contemporary world issues, The Wilson Journal seeks to inspire members of the University of Virginia community and beyond to explore and
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j2 develop possible solutions. The research topics presented in this journal reflect diverse areas of interest ranging from conflicts in the Middle East, to human rights issues in Africa and Tibet, and the political atmosphere in Ireland. I invite you to read and consider these articles while paying close attention not only to their historical origins, but also to their implications for the future. Our generation must seek understanding, tolerance, a respect for human rights, and peaceful solutions in the face of adversity.
Sincerely,
Michael Breger Editor-in-Chief
Fall 2014 j3 Editorial Staff
Editor-in-Chief Michael Breger
Managing Editor Dani Psimas
Outreach Chair Roshni Gorur
Production Chair Rachel Boisjolie
Submissions Coordinator Caroline Wittinghill
Editors Laura Adjei Brandon Allen Ali Amirghassemi Jessica Blusiewicz Alycia Chau Neil Desai Sara Fitzgerald Roshni Gorur Robert Harland Gabrielle Jorgensen Henry Knight Katherine Krudys Jackson Simon Greyson Spencer
Editorial Design Lucas Alexander Czarnecki
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j4 Information
About the Wilson Journal
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs is the University of Virginia’s pre- eminent publication for undergraduate research in international relations. The Wilson Journal is developed and distributed by the student-run International Relations Organization of the University of Virginia. The Wilson Journal is one of the only undergraduate research journals for international relations in the country, and aims to showcase the impressive research conducted by UVA students and spark productive conversation within the University community. The Wilson Journal seeks to foster interest in international issues and promote high quality undergraduate research in foreign affairs.
Submissions
Interested in submitting to the Wilson Journal of International Affairs? The Wilson Journal seeks research papers on current topics in international relations that are at least ten pages in length and have received at least a B+. Only under- graduates or newly-minted graduates are eligible to submit. Submissions should be sent to [email protected] with the subject line “Wilson Journal Submission Spring 2015”, and should be submitted as either a .doc or .docx file.
Contact
Please direct all questions and comments to [email protected]
Cover photograph: Fitri Arsika v Cover design: Lucas Alexander Czarnecki
Fall 2014 j5 Contents
From the Editor Michael Breger 1
Editorial Staff 4
Information 5
Contents 6
The Neighborhoods of Baghdad Patrick Hoover 7
The Atypical Irish Political Erica Johnson 38 Spectrum
Iraqi Women and Mental Katharyn Gadient 57 Health Initiatives
What the Dalai Lama Could Jessica DeJesus 68 Learn From Gandhi
Politics of Resistance Naguib Bebawi 86
The Responsibility to Protect Eric Sutherland 109 Initiative and UN Intervention in Darfur
Politics in a Gendered World Lila Kelso 122
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j6 The Neighborhoods of Baghdad
The Role of Meso-Level Actors in Sec- tarian Warfare in Post-Saddam Iraq
By Patrick Hoover
On April 30th, 2014 Iraq conducted its first parliamentary elections since the withdrawal of American troops at the end of 2011. While many may hail this as a monumental transition of democratic power, nobody can ignore the fact the country is experiencing its highest levels of sectarian-driven violence since the U.S. occupation. Despite being criticized harshly for marginalizing Sunnis, current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki won this election. After ousting then- Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni, in 2012, and then sidelining other Sunni politicians, Maliki turned to the western city of Ramadi and launched an all-out assault to rid it of any anti-government protesters. Maliki now faces a vicious Sunni insurgency primarily in Anbar province -- one that has gained a serious advantage under the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) and a number of Sunni tribes. Despite trillions of dollars spent on the war effort, how has Iraq once again descended to the brink of sectarian civil war at the fingertips of al-Qaeda? This paper serves to provide an explanation of Iraq’s descent into mayhem, particularly in Baghdad during 2006. Moreover, the research looks at an entity that is often overlooked in mainstream media concerning civil conflicts: community leaders. Baghdad lacks the necessary resources to deliver public goods and services - forcing local figures and organizations to step in and fill the gap.
Fall 2014 j7 he Iraq War began in rather than pre-disposed sectarian or March 2003 with the inva- ethnic identities. sion by the American-led Literature Review TMulti-National Force. The key water- Toby Dodge, Senior Research shed point occurred nearly a month Fellow at the Centre for the Study of later with the toppling of Saddam Globalisation and Regionalisation at Hussein, who had ruled the country the University of Warwick who also for nearly 24 years, but the war is served as adviser to General David better known for its rapid descent into Petraeus in Iraq, argues that violence a massive insurgency-based sectarian on civilians is part of a larger political conflict, rupturing the political insti- conflict determined by political actors. tutions and social fabric of Iraq. This He attributes the violence to the paper primarily focuses on answering collapse of Saddam’s centralized state, the question: what explains varying compounded by the resulting security degrees of sectarian violence in the city vacuum and widespread decentral- of Baghdad during the rise of sectarian ization of authority into the hands of war in 2006? Accordingly, the levels of criminal gangs, ideologues, and other violence on civilians in the year 2006 local leaders bent on using violence as in Baghdad district are measured and a means of de-legitimizing the fragile then analyzed for variable patterns: Iraqi state and cementing their own high/low frequency of incidents of position in a emerging new society.1 attack, exponentially increasing vio- More acutely, Dodge blames the lence, severity of attacks—all based lackadaisical, inept energy of coalition on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood forces to produce a coherent strategy basis. Because existing theoretical for post-invasion re-stabilization. frameworks remain unable to explain Leslie Gelb, President Emeritus the patterns of violence, the research and Board Senior Fellow at the turns to eye-witness accounts to con- Council on Foreign Relations and clude that the behavior and actions of First American Ambassador to Cro- local leaders in times of sectarian ten- atia, and Peter Galbraith postulate sion and crisis ultimately determine that Iraq’s spiral into sectarianism is the behavior and beliefs of individual simply a product of its pre-configured residing in the same neighborhood, ethnic divisions. Put simply, sectarian
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j8 warfare was an inevitable result of framework that includes all of Iraq, or nearly a hundred years worth of ho- the entirety of the conflict itself, this mogenous Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish research enjoys more specific scope identities slowly becoming more and conditions, leading to a meso-level more mutually suspicious and hostile argument. Such an approach mirrors of each other. the works of two authors who have Jonathan Steele, former Chief already explored this area Correspondent for The Guardian, The first is a joint project from argues that the continuing presence Northwestern University’s John Ha- of American troops is the chief cause gan, Joshua Kaiser, and Anna Hanson of sectarian violence—creating a qua- and University of Toronto’s Patricia si-culture of resistance, hostility, and Parker. These scholars explore psycho- uncontrollable violence. Such an idea logical rationalization, attributing the weaves into the pattern of a historical socially constructed concept of “fear” argument—the Americans are seen as as the primary tool used by armed neo-colonizers, modern-day versions groups to produce the necessary mo- of the Christian knights who led the mentum for sectarian displacement Crusades. This may lend a hand to and violence. While their argument ideologues that have used this concept describes the mechanism used to pro- as a means of indoctrinating youth to duce such sectarian violence, my paper their cause. will emphasize the necessary neigh- While all three arguments ap- borhood-level conditions regarding proach violence from different angles: meso-level leadership behavior that Dodge from a political standpoint, allow this mechanism of “fear” to be Gelb and Galbraith from a histori- used. cal-ethnic position, and Steele from The second scholar drawn upon is a religious-focused perspective, they Ami Carpenter, assistant professor remain entrenched in macro-level at the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace analysis in answering the initial ques- Studies at the University of San tion. The argument contained within Diego, who focuses on particular this paper, in contrast, shifts the level neighborhoods and areas in Baghdad. of inquiry to the meso-level. Rather She attempts to explain how certain than attempting to devise a theoretical neighborhoods were able to resist
Fall 2014 j9 the sectarian onslaught while others eral for Iraq Reconstruction issued a around them descended into chaos. report indicating that the population While Carpenter leaves room for of Baghdad is 6,995,000, with 70% debate on what exactly led to shifts in Shias, 29% Sunnis.2 Prior to the surge conflict escalation and coping strat- in ethnic violence in 2006, over two egies, this paper attempts to specify thirds of Baghdad’s neighborhoods this. and districts were considered “mixed” It is the goal of this research to between Sunnis and Shias.3 There shed light on an otherwise neglected were few areas with a distinct Sunni segment of the participants of the or Shia majority. Iraqi conflict: local leaders of neigh- Moreover, 2006 marks the first borhoods, communities, and districts year of escalated Sunni-Shia violence. and understanding their motivations, Insurgent groups that emerged in interests, and inclinations in regards the post-invasion vacuum of power to sectarian strife. In addition to directed their attacks mainly against considering the tool of “fear”, I also coalition troops. Nils B. Weidmann, attempt to explore the type of com- Professor of Political Science at the munity and its connection to higher or University of Konstanz in Germany, lower scales of violence. notes that “ethnic violence” became Scope Conditions the “dominant mode of violence”, as In order to investigate the role of sectarian killings surged between meso-level community leaders during Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds from the Iraq’s sectarian-charged conflict, I tail end of 2005 through 2006.4 chose to focus on Baghdad province in According to the Iraq Body Count the year 2006 because of two reasons. (IBC), from May 1st, 2003 to March First, Baghdad’s diverse demographic 19th, 2004, there was an average of 20 conditions created a ripe environment civilian deaths per day.5 From March for sectarian violence, and second, 20th 2005 to March 19th 2006, how- 2006 can be characterized as the first ever, the average more than doubled, year of dramatic escalation in Sun- and from March 20th, 2006 to March ni-Shia killings. 16th 2007, the daily body count sky- Highlighting the sectarian diversi- rocketed to 73 per day.6 Weidmann ty in Iraq, the Special Inspector Gen- declares that the bombing of the
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j10 Shia al-Askari Mosque in Samarra in enfranchised youth, Sunni and Shia February 2006 “precipitated a spiral tribesmen, members of authority (e.g. of violence.”7 Based on these statistics, policemen, members of parliament, sectarian civil war in Iraq emerged ministry officials), and revered figures sometime between the end of 2005 to of civil society. “Civilian” deaths, the beginning of 2006, then escalated moreover, are easier to record and in spring of that year, and continued are seen as a more accurate measure to climb through December and into of sectarian violence, notably because 2007. civilians are often targeted based on This research focuses on Janu- ethnicity in these types of conflicts. ary, February, July, November, and War-fighting elites constantly target December. Despite lacking data on civilians as a means of justifying their seven full months, it is still possible discriminatory character and recruit- to find out which areas in Baghdad ing more fighters to their cause. Thus, experienced the heaviest bouts of when civilians of a particular ethnic sectarian violence and which ones group are attacked, an atmosphere did not. Most importantly, data is of fear and polarization is created, available to to track the progression heightening the sense of paranoia and of violence from a point (January and driving individuals to side with their February 2006) where ethnic conflict ethnic group in order to kill or be first emerged, to another (November killed. and December 2006) where it had be- Research Design come fully prevalent. July, the month The Iraq Body Count database with the highest number of civilian serves as the source for measuring the deaths standing at 1,872, serves as the dependent variable: the degree of sec- middle point for the study, giving a tarian violence. The research method more accurate picture of which areas of this study includes recording every of Baghdad were hit hardest.8 incident of attack (civilians only) re- It should be noted that the focus re- ported for months January, February, mains on “civilian” deaths. Due to the November, and December of 2006 nature of the conflict, the term “civil- and tabulating the number of deaths ian” represents a plethora of different caused by each incident, the type of demographics: women, children, dis- weapon used, the location, the date,
Fall 2014 j11 and target/victims. The raw data is ing between differing accounts of pri- initially documented on a spreadsheet. mary sources, such as eyewitnesses on I then tabulate this data according to the street, police, medics, and govern- neighborhood/area of Baghdad, not- ment officials.11 This “process” is not ing the number of incidents, deaths, explored deeply enough to warrant an and death per incident. explanation. Moreover, the boundary Inaccuracies between civilians and non-civilians The Iraq Body Count data base re- is not always “clear-cut.”12 The IBC ceives its information from “a compre- excludes those 18 and over who at the hensive survey of commercial media moment of incident, are reported as and NGO-based reports, along with “active members of a military or para- official records that have been released military organization”, or members of into the public sphere…[thus], reports an overseas contracting firm.13 How- range from specific, incident based ever, policemen are included because accounts to figures from hospitals, they are a “customary part of civil morgues, and other documentary society.”14 The civilian-non-civilian data-gathering agencies.”9 While the distinction can be troublesome, as it is IBC database provides a highly-de- not always obvious who is part of what tailed, day-to-day documentation paramilitary insurgency. necessary for this research project, Additionally, the bulk of reported there are a number of inconsistencies. incidents and deaths cannot always For example, the number of people been located with precision. For killed in a given incident varies across example, a number of reports of sources. Differentiations in reporting incidents are labeled as occurring in can derive from “on-the-ground simply “Baghdad”, “North Baghdad”, uncertainties” to “potential political “South Baghdad”, or “Central Bagh- bias.”10 The IBC reconciles this issue dad.” Because of this lack of precision by developing a range with a low end in reported location, it is impossible to and high end. For the sake of sim- match many violent attacks to specific plicity, this study only considers the neighborhoods or areas in Baghdad. maximum number of people killed. The most accurate takeaway from In regards to political bias, the IBC these reports was that they occurred adopts a “pragmatic process” in choos- in the city of Baghdad, precipitating
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j12 their exclusion from this study. Some hood because it did not consistently reported locations were more specific record high numbers of attacks and than others, such as “Central Bagh- deaths. dad” vs. “Palestine Street, Sadr City, The area that met both criteria East Baghdad”. Using Google Maps, (consistency and exponential increase) resolves this inconsistency to some most effectively was Sadr City in extent through the location of specific northeastern Baghdad. Appendix A streets and areas and the categori- shows the frequency, intensity, and zation of those areas under a larger escalation in violent attacks. district. The continuous rise in number of Data Collection and Analysis attacks demonstrates a consistency of In order to accurately measure violence within Sadr city. The inten- sectarian violence, two patterns are sity of attacks is best demonstrated considered: 1) consistency in both by the high D-I (deaths per incident) frequency and number of deaths of ratios: 15.67 in July and 17.53 in No- attacks and 2) exponential increase vember. On July 1st, a car bomb went in frequency and intensity of attacks. off in Al-Ula market in Sadr City, Omitting the consideration of either killing 68. On November 23rd, various of these patterns risks irresponsible areas of Sadr City were hit by a flurry data misinterpretation because, for of car bombs and mortars, killing example, Saadoun has a Death/Inci- 215. The graph in Appendix A charts dent Ratio of 22.00 in January (shown the incremental increase in violence, in Appendix F), implying that it was peaking in November, slowing down a highly dangerous area and probably in December, but still maintaining its would be for the coming months and sectarian character. years. However, this high ratio stems Doura, located in southern Bagh- from a single, albeit deadly attack. dad in the district of Rasheed, also In February and July, there were no shows a troubling consistency in vio- attacks, while in December, there was lence. While the incidents in Doura one attack causing 2 deaths. Despite lack dramatic intensity, such as the the high intensity of one attack in ones in Sadr City, they have remained January, Saadoun would not be con- quite consistent through 2006. The sidered a highly dangerous neighbor- results for Doura are shown in Ap-
Fall 2014 j13 pendix B. ber of attacks and deaths in January, The graph in Appendix B reveals February, July, and November, and the consistency in number of civilian then a dramatic spike in violence in deaths, with a low of 21 in January December. See the graph in Appendix and a high of 76 in July. The high C. frequency of attacks keeps the D-I Excluding February, the Bayaa- ratio low. However, the high number Aamel area saw a consistent increase of attacks implies constant infiltration in number of attacks and deaths. of insurgent groups. Considering the two previous criteria: The next area of analysis, the Bayaa- 1) consistency in both frequency and Aamel neighborhoods in the south- number of deaths of attacks and 2) western district of Rasheed, consists exponential increase in frequency and of two neighborhoods because they intensity of attacks, the areas of Sadr are directly next to each other, share City, Doura, and Bayaa-Aamel were similar demographic (both are mixed exceptionally dangerous in 2006. Sunni/Shia areas), and are relatively Explanations of Violence small neighborhoods as compared What explains the consistent and/ to Sadr City and Doura. Moreover, or rise in violence in these three there exists a parallel increase in areas during 2006, the symbolic both number of incidents and deaths starting point of sectarian civil war (January: Bayaa-6 incidents, 11 in Iraq? Toby Dodge would argue deaths, Aamel-4 incidents, 5 deaths, the phenomenon of state collapse and February: Bayaa-3 incidents, 5 deaths, the subsequent creation of a security Aamel – none, July: Bayaa-2 incidents, vacuum is what led to violence inter- 6 deaths, Aamel-2 incidents, 7 deaths, nal conflict, regarding the charging November: Bayaa-4 incidents, 7 of ethnic identities as a byproduct deaths, Aamel-6 incidents, 13 deaths, of local actors vying for control and and December: Bayaa-19 incidents, influence. 76 deaths, Aamel-20 incidents, 67 Gelb and Galbraith would attribute deaths). Appendix C reveals frequen- Iraq’s pre-existing ethnic and religious cy, intensity, and D-I ratio for Bayaa divisions as the cause of sectarian and Aamel combined as one area. strife. Steele and British Chief of De- We see a relatively consistent num- fence Richard Bennet would consider
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j14 the US-led foreign occupation of an shows the progression of violence in otherwise hostile culture as a spark Palestine Street. plug of violence. There is a slow rise in violence in More instructive than explaining Palestine Street, but essentially not a the breakout of violence in Iraq single report in January and Febru- with a macro-level, comprehensive ary. Ami Carpenter used eyewitness explanation, looking at specific areas accounts to explain the divergence of within a limited scope explains the Palestine Street from the rest of Sadr localized patterns of violence to a City district. In her account, “Havens greater extent. Examining violence in a Firestorm: Perspective from on the neighborhood level demands a Baghdad on Resilience to Sectarian neighborhood-level explanation, or in Violence”, Ami quotes a resident of other words an answer that deals with Sadr City on the question how sectar- a number of social, sectarian, and ian violence was deterred there: tribal dynamics on the meso-level. Sectarian violence spread easily in poor neigh- Dodge primarily borhoods that were harmed by the previous blames the inability of regime and in regions with people of low edu- coalition forces to pro- cational and economical levels [because] those vide adequate security factors offered a good environment to develop for Iraqis, thus creating [sectarian] thoughts. (Sadr City) 15 a power vacuum of un- regulated looting and violence. This From here, the suggestion arises significant decentralization of power that low socioeconomic standards following the removal of Saddam starting from the Saddam era and then Hussein may represent a pre-condi- exacerbated by the US-led invasion in tion to the violence experienced in spring of 2003 may determine pockets 2006. However, it fails to address why of vulnerability and desperation easily certain areas experienced more vio- exploited by sectarian forces. From a lence than others. For example, Pal- historical perspective, it can be argued estine Street runs through the heart as well that political oppression of a of Sadr City, but did not suffer from group can enhance and harden its high levels of violence. Appendix D extremist views. Hatred towards the
Fall 2014 j15 “previous regime”, which High socioeconomic status and education level happened to be Sunni of its residents, the quality of infrastructure and in character, may evolve home sizes, and its numerous shops and restau- into hatred of all Sunnis. rants.17 High violence levels in Sadr City thus can be explained by a Another resident of Palestine Street combination of historical patterns and even admits: “the education and good ideological indoctrination. This cor- living standards protected my neigh- relation is parallel in Bayaa, explained borhood.”18 by a resident: The socioeconomic argument runs consistent through the Unemployed, desperate and less educated people Karada neighborhood in can be recruited easier to those militias that Karada district as well. were paying well . . . and also giving them kind Carpenter notes that of ‘social position’ as those young men became the Karada area is the powerful. (Al Baya’a)16 home to many Sunnis and Christians, “many In Sadr City, conventional wisdom of whom had high levels of education, tells us that low socioeconomic levels and moderate-to-high socioeconomic created ripe conditions for sectarian status.”19 The neighborhood is close to dogmatism and exploitation by elites. Baghdad University, and is the home On the other hand, the poor and to many enterprises, NGOs, restau- uneducated in Bayaa were attracted rants, hotels, and other indicators of to Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) by gentrification.20 Its levels of violence practical grievances, such as earning are shown in Appendix E. enough money to physically and fi- Despite a particularly brutal sum- nancially survive. mer, the Karada area experienced Carpenter notes that Palestine much lower levels of violence than Street, in contrast to the rest of Sadr Sadr City, Doura, and Bayaa-Aamel. City, enjoys relatively healthy stan- The drop off in violence is notable in dards of living. A resident of Palestine an otherwise destructive month, De- Street attributes the low violence cember. A resident attributes Karada’s levels to: relative safety to standards of living:
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j16 In wealthy areas, JAM was not able to get estab- examined, which may lished. I have seen JAM try to come to Karradah be a product of the local and essentially they couldn’t get supporters environment, encom- there. They could get people from other regions passing cultural, social, and bring them in, but they would be rejected by and tribal inclinations. the people. (Al Karradah)21 Contrary to the tes- timonial of a resident of Perhaps dismal educational and Bayaa’a, Carpenter notes that Bayaa’a economic standards make sectarian was a “middle-class, mixed district in violence more likely, acting as a western Baghdad, along the Baghdad contributing factor or pre-condition. Airport Road…[with] an active econ- Despite evidence for the socioeco- omy; its hub was 20th Street, lined nomic argument, it does not have to with hundreds of retail and whole- be conditioned on the belief that low sale shops attracting people from socioeconomic levels are necessary, the surrounding regions to shop.”23 acting as prerequisites to sectarian Compounded by the fact that the un- violence. employed were recruited from Bayaa’a, In “Do Working Men Rebel? In- the socioeconomic argument fails in surgency and Unemployment in Iraq dealing with contradictions. While and Philippines”, Berman, Callen, there is positive correlation between Felter, and Shapiro argue that there is violence and unemployment in Sadr no positive correlation in unemploy- City and Bayaa’a, there exist moments ment and violence. They hypothesize of negative correlation—demonstrat- that when “local economic conditions ing that high levels of unemployment deteriorate, government forces and may contribute to sectarian violence their allies are able to buy more intel- but may not be the singular causal ligence on insurgents (i.e., the price of factor. information falls); and (2) actions tak- A secondary approach used to en to enhance security—establishing explain Iraq’s sectarian violence is “a checkpoints, building walls, and the priori assertion of a society deeply like—damage the economy.”22 How- divided by ethnic and sectarian ten- ever, the willingness of the insurgents sions.”24 This approach is promoted to defect to government forces is not by Leslie Gelb and Peter Galbraith,
Fall 2014 j17 both retired US diplomats, who claim of method of counter-insurgency. The that Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds are Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds were des- “homogenous” and “mutually hostile” tined to clash. Carpenter notes that who have been “locked in an artificial, Palestine Street, al-Dhubat Street (1 Sunni-dominated state for 85 years”, incident, 1 death in all five months leading supporters of this view to of 2006) located in Muthana Zayuna believe that the civil war post-Sadd- district, and al-Kuraiaat (no incidents am was an “unavoidable tragedy.”25 or deaths recorded) in al-Ad’hamiya Pre-conflict demographic conditions, district are all composed of Sunnis, thus are the cause of sectarian violence. Shias, and Christians, but also man- Dodge calls this approach a “static aged to stave off sectarian violence. caricature that does great damage to An interviewee tells Carpenter: a complex, historically grounded reality.”26 Sunnis and Shiites had good relations with each Dodge concludes that other and they worked and cooperated to main series of nation-wide security in the neighborhood. The people respect polls carried out from and value the old relationship. (Al Kuraiaat)28 2004 to 2009 revealed that 64-70% respondents backed Moreover, in Palestine Street, the “one unified Iraq with a central gov- need for security and self-defense ernment in Baghdad” as the most became apparent as it transcended preferred form of governance.27 While sectarian differences amongst the ethnic differences are required for any community: type of ethnic civil war, they are not necessarily Some alleys formed self-protection groups, only the direct cause of war. for a limited period of time, played a role only at Galbraith and Gelb can the beginning, when they faced the extremists. argue that there was They were all our friends. The people had good absolutely no chance relationships with them. They didn’t make prob- for coalition or Iraqi lems with the people. They prevented the entry of government forces to extremists to the neighborhood and they didn’t prevent the outbreak of misuse their power. (Palestine Street)29 sectarianism, regardless
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j18 While Gelb and Galbraith make a in levels of violence according to me- logical correlation between pre-con- so-level environments. flict ethnic demographics and ethnic On the contrary, the presence of internal conflict, they do not address American and foreign troops seem to important anomalies to the patterns have the opposite effect: the creation of violence, like that of Palestine of security. After British Chief of the Street, that occurred in certain parts Defence Staff, General Sir Richard of Baghdad. Why were certain com- Dannatt advocated the withdrawal of munities immune to sectarian atti- British troops form Basra City in Sep- tudes and provocations of violence? tember 2007, the entire area was left A respondent from al-Dhubat stated, vulnerable to “militias and criminal “No one gave the armed groups the gangs fighting amongst themselves chance to become in control.”30 De- for control of the city and the revenues spite low socioeconomic levels and a from the lucrative oil smuggling in demographic pretense for sectarian the nearby port of Umm Qasr.”33 No violence, it is possible for particular surprise, then, in 2005 when Bush an- communities to resist descending nounced a plan for troop withdrawal into such violence—in part due to a he was blindsided by the increasing combination of community trust, co- security vacuum that the Iraqi gov- operation, and constructive leadership ernment could not fill on its own at behavior. the time. The failure of previous arguments The arguments above highlight to fully explain degrees of sectarian possible macro-level explanations of violence leads us to examine the violence: Dodge’s security vacuum, constant variable – “continuing pres- low socioeconomic levels, Gelb and ence of American troops.”31 Jonathan Galbraith’s demographic precedent, Steele argues that methods in US and Steele’s focus on counterinsur- counterinsurgency, or lack thereof, gency. However, contradictions exist “created resistance” simply by itself.32 in all of them, rendering the consider- This constitutes a wholly different ation of a meso-level explanation nec- debate on counter-insurgency strategy essary. This research paper measures and its relations to sectarian violence, sectarian violence on a meso-level. It but it does not fully address variations seems the resistance to sectarian vi-
Fall 2014 j19 olence in Palestine Street, al-Dhubat, organize” criminal tactics as a means al-Kurraiaat, and Karada can be ex- of legitimizing one’s state-building.36 plained by endogenous factors specific This theoretical framework can to each neighborhood. Likewise, the be applied to Sadr City, Doura, and high levels of sectarian violence in the Bayaa-Aamel. Sadr City was quickly areas of Sadr City, Doura, and Bayaa- taken over by JAM. Sadr’s movement Aamel did not seem inevitable per consisted of the “young, uneducated, se, but rather can be explained by an and intensely religious, with the kinds endogenous process. In this case, we of socio-economic grievances and must examine the roles of local com- feelings of injustice emphasized by munity leaders: sheikhs, clerics, tribal Cloward and Ohlin.”37 Thus, al-Sadr heads, respected families, and so on capitalized on historical patterns of in the encouraging or discouraging of Shia marginalization and created an violence. aggressive, anti-Sunni identity as a Hagan, Kaiser, Hanson, and Parker result. In response to the American in “Neighborhood Sectarian Displace- occupation and growing threat of ment and the Battle for Baghdad: The Sunni insurgencies such as al-Qaeda Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Crimes in Iraq, led by Ayman Zawahiri, Against Humanity in Iraq”, argue that al-Sadr molded his Mahdi Army into local actors create sociological and an organized, hierarchical, effective psychological pressures drawing from fighting force which provided an a number of mechanisms (historical “illegitimate opportunity structure for grievances, coercion, fear, religious young, underemployed Shia men.”38 A differences) that force individuals to respondent in Carpenter’s study from behave in a certain way.34 Charles Til- Bayaa explains how al-Sadr’s men ly calls this a product of state-making began to exert coercive measures: by local actors who “create and facil- With time other members of JAM, itate threats and then market protect who were children, wanted to take from these threats to build power advantage of their positions, took and capital.”35 This combined with the houses of the Sunnis that they Cloward and Ohlin’s opportunity liked; some of them rented them for theory of crime that states “perceived 100,000 Iraqi Dinars. They started to economic injustice” can “motivate and extort the shop-keepers telling them
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j20 “You have to pay us be- Another Imam refused cooperating or having cause you are working in any connections with them, refused using the the neighborhood under mosque as an ammunition stash and as a distrib- our protection.”39 uting site for kerosene and cooking gas. He tried The [Iraqi Security to help a Shiite man who was chased, and he [the Forces] (ISF) and the Imam] was shot.43 army began to enter the neighborhood and didn’t accept As opposed to the imam in Doura, the presence of militias and armed Carpenter reports that the cleric of groups. Armed confrontations erupt- Abu Hanifa mosque in al-Adhamiya ed between JAM and the ISF. JAM neighborhood had “direct relations members began to ask for more money with AQI and facilitated their en- from the shop-keepers for providing try.”44 Al-Adhamiyah neighborhood protection. It reached a point where experienced some of the most brutal they took monthly rentals from people Sunni-Shia fighting through from living in their own houses; they want- 2005 through 2007, scoring 11 in- ed 100,000 Iraqi Dinars per month cidents and 40 deaths in November, from them in return for protection.40 2006 and 14 incidents that caused Other local leaders swayed individ- 47 deaths in December according to ual behavior and the prospect of vio- Appendix F. lence. In Sadr City, Carpenter notes In addition to highlighting the that a respondent states, “a number role of clerics and imams, reports in of clerics told the people that it is ok Sadr City and Bayaa-Aamel indicate to loot the state-owned institutes.”41 that tribes were heavily involved. Similarly in Doura, a resident stated: For example, Carpenter notes that Bayaa’a’s tribes interfere Some clerics went along with the groups. The in inter-neighborhood Imam in the mosque, he would never have been disputes and daily able to protect his neighborhood because if he incidents, like car acci- criticized them or objected to their acts, they dents.45 People in Bagh- might have killed him. Having good relations dad’s neighborhoods with the fighters had provided protection [..].42 depended on such lead- ers as a means of moral
Fall 2014 j21 direction, survival, and financial sup- men’), respected families, and the port, thus these Sheikhs and Imams ‘street’ intervention of friends and played a significant role in influencing passersby. To avoid paying bribes, behavior and perceptions. As a result, tribes or families were the primary when insurgent groups infiltrated loan-makers.”46 such neighborhoods either to recruit These findings both demonstrate members of cause mayhem, the local the prominent role of meso-level leaders were often seen as representa- leaders and indicate their capability tive of the people of the neighborhood. of accommodating sectarian-charged Local tribal Sheikhs and Imams either identity groups, such as al-Sadr’s complied with coercion or did not and Mahdi Army into neighborhoods. suffered consequences as a result. For Thus, the behavior of local leaders is example, Sheikh Muhammed Sadde- a key factor in patterns of “sectarian” eq al-Battah was killed in Bayaa area violence. on January 18th. Sheikh Shakir Hiriz The inverse argument is that local al-Yasiri was killed in Ma’amil district actors also generate modes of cooper- in eastern Baghdad on the same day. ation, identity, and defensive instinct In Shula district, Rashid Safi, a Sunni that influence the individual’s psy- tribal leader was killed on February chological and sociological position. 7th. In Dora, Sheikh Hamid al-Nu- This argument still supports the sig- man of the Rabiea tribe was killed on nificance of local leaders, proving that July 23rd. Sheikh Hamed Mohammed certain neighborhoods due to good Suhail, the Sunni leader of the Banu leadership can resist sectarian violence. Tamim tribe was killed on December One of Carpenter’s respondents noted 31st. that in al-Kuraiaat, “clerics chose ‘a Moreover, all of Carpenter’s number of good people to protect the respondents reported “people in neighborhood . . . arranged in shifts.’”47 the neighborhood relied on local, More non-sectarian defense groups non-state governance to resolve both were formed in Palestine Street and simple and complex problems. Meth- al-Dhubat to resist the Sunni-Shia ods of conflict resolution included onslaught. inter-family dialogue, tribal dialogue, Moreover, in al Karada, the “Imam respected individuals (i.e. ‘wise old of a Shiite mosque denied the request
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j22 of a group of youths to attack nearby ronment more prone to sectarian at- Sunni mosques after the Samarra tacks or whether non-tribal neighbor- bombing, telling them that it was hoods that depended on less coercive forbidden.”48 Carpenter’s respondent methods of conflict resolution led by from Karada continues describing his respected families played a factor in neighborhood’s non-confrontational deterring the spread of sectarianism. identity due a solidification of good The logic of the argument claims leadership build by modes of coopera- that the meso-level structure (trib- tion and trust: al, “respected, old families”, clerics, imams) plays a far The good relationship between the people that more significant role in was built in the previous years was sufficient to shaping neighborhood face those tensions. (Al Karradah)49 identity. These local leaders, especially in People in small neighborhoods knew each other times of a security vacu- well. (Palestine Street)50 um, will be looked upon by ordinary citizens for We kept Al Qaida out because the people were provision of some type supportive to each other. (Al Dhubat)51 of security, welfare, or direction—influencing More specifically, Carpenter no- their behavior and perceptions. The ticed a greater reliance on “respected, removal of Saddam Hussein created old families”, rather than tribal a massive wave of decentralization authorities, in the less-violent areas. of political power, placing much of The question remains if there is a the onus of state-building on known connection between different types of members of the community. It is local leaders and levels of violence— the behavior of these leaders that whether areas heavily populated and ultimately determine whether their controlled by tribes fostered an envi- neighborhood descends into chaos or resists it.
Fall 2014 j23 About the Author
Patrick Hoover graduated in 2014 from the College of Arts & Sciences with a bachelors in Foreign Affairs and Middle Eastern Languages and Literatures. His academic career focused sharply and deliberately on the analysis of foreign policy and international affairs. He speaks and reads Arabic proficiently by virtue of having studied full-time immersion Arabic in the summer of 2012 and 2013. The latter involved a two-month immersion program at Yarmouk University in Irbid, Jordan nearly 10 miles from the Syrian border in the midst of the unfolding crisis there. Apart from improving his Arabic, listening to Amr Diab, and keeping up with current events, he plans on one day attending graduate school.
Appendices
Appendix A: Sadr City
January February July November December Number of attacks 4 7 9 17 22
Number of deaths 11 38 141 295 81
D-I Ratio 2.75 5.43 15.67 17.35 3.7
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j24 Appendix B: Doura
January February July November December Number of attacks 11 14 22 12 22
Number of deaths 21 65 76 36 72
D-I Ratio 1.91 4.64 4.46 3 3.27
Fall 2014 j25 Appendix C: Bayaa-Aamel
January February July November December Number of attacks 10 3 4 10 39
Number of deaths 16 5 13 20 143
D-I Ratio 1.6 1.67 3.25 2 3.66
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j26 Appendix D: Palestine Street
January February July November December Number of attacks 0 0 2 6 9
Number of deaths 0 0 3 12 23
D-I Ratio 0 0 1.5 2 2.56
Appendix E: Karada
January February July November December Number of attacks 4 5 8 8 2
Number of deaths 15 11 50 25 2
D-I Ratio 3.75 2.2 6.25 3.13 1
Appendix F
January Adhamiya Baghdad – 18 incidents, 586 deaths Shaab – 1 incidents, 1 deaths › 1.0 death/ East Baghdad – 1 incident, 5 deaths incident ratio West Baghdad – 10 incidents, 14 deaths Ur – none Central Baghdad – 1 incidents, 2 deaths Adhamiyah – 1 incidents, 2 deaths › 2.0 North Baghdad – none death/incident ratio South Baghdad – 5 incidents, 48 deaths Waziriya - none
Fall 2014 j27 Maghrib - none Mustansirya – none Qahira – none Rusafa – 1 incidents, 29 deaths › 29.0 Al-Kurriaat -none death/incident ratio Sadr City Bab al-Sharqi – Sadr City – 4 incidents, 11 deaths › 2.75 Rasheed death/incident ratio Doura – 11 incidents, 21 deaths › 1.91 Palestine Street - none death/incident ratio 9 Nissan Saydiyah – 3 incidents, 4 deaths › 1.33 Amin – none death/incident ratio Mashtal - none Abu Disheer – none Baladiat – 2 incidents, 6 deaths › 3.0 death/ Shurta - none incident ratio Risala - none Kamaliya - none Bayaa – 6 incidents, 11 deaths › 1.83 death/ Baghdad al-Jadida – 1 incidents, 8 deaths › incident ratio 8.0 death incident ratio Aamel – 4 incidents, 5 deaths › 1.25 death/ Muthana Zayuna – none incident ratio Al-Ubaidi – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 death/ Jihad – none incident ratio Furat – none Al-Husseiniya - none Al-Ma’alif – none Karadah Al-Dhubat- none Rustamiya – 8 incidents, 47 deaths › 5.88 Mansour death/incident ratio Washash - none Jisr Diyala - none Mansour – 3 incidents, 8 deaths › 2.67 Zafaraniya – none death/incident ratio Jamia – 1 incidents, 10 deaths › 10.0 death/ Yarmouk – none incident ratio Iskan - none Karada – 4 incidents, 15 deaths › 3.75 Adl – 5 incidents, 6 deaths › 1.20 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Wehda – 1 incidents, 6 deaths › 6.0 death/ Jamia - none incident ratio Khadra – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 death/ Rusafa incident ratio Saadoun – 1 incident, 22 deaths › 22.0 Ameriya – 2 incidents, 4 deaths › 2.0 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j28 Abu Ghuraib – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 Sadr City death/incident ratio Sadr City – 7 incidents, 38 deaths › 5.43 Ghazaliya – 5 incidents, 19 deaths › 3.80 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio P Palestine Street - none Kadhimiyah 9 Nissan Kadhimiya – 1 incidents, 4 deaths › 4.0 Amin – 3 incidents, 42 deaths › 14.0 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Hurriya – 3 incidents, 6 deaths › 2.0 death/ Mashtal - none incident ratio Baladiat – 1 incidents, 1 deaths › 1.0 death/ Shula – 2 incidents, 2 deaths › 1.0 death/ incident ratio incident ratio Kamaliya - none Karkh Baghdad al-Jadida – 4 incidents, 22 deaths Salhiya – 1 incident, 5 deaths › 5.0 inci- › 5.50 death/incident ratio dent/death ratio Muthana Zayuna – none Green Zone – none Al-Ubaidi – none February Al-Husseiniya - none Baghdad – 4 incidents, 509 deaths Karadah East Baghdad – none Rustamiya – 4 incidents, 12 deaths › 3.0 West Baghdad – 2 incidents, 5 deaths death/incident ratio Central Baghdad – 1 incidents, 1 deaths Jisr Diyala - none North Baghdad – 3 incidents, 7 deaths Zafaraniya – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 South Baghdad – 3 incidents, 6 deaths death/incident ratio Adhamiya Jamia – 1 incidents, 1 deaths › 1.0 death/ Shaab – 2 incidents, 3 deaths › 1.50 death/ incident ratio incident ratio Karada – 5 incidents, 11 deaths › 2.20 Ur – 2 incidents, 6 deaths › 3.0 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Wehda – 1 incidents, 2 deaths › 2.0 death/ Adhamiyah – 1 incidents, 4 deaths › 4.0 incident ratio death/incident ratio Rusafa Waziriya - none Saadoun – none Maghrib - none Mustansirya – none Qahira – none Rusafa – 1 incidents, 4 deaths › 4.0 death/ Al-Kurriaat - none incident ratio
Fall 2014 j29 Bab al-Sharqi – 1 incident, 7 deaths › 7.0 Abu Ghuraib – none death/incident ratio Ghazaliya – 4 incidents, 5 deaths › 1.25 Rasheed death/incident ratio Doura – 14 incidents, 65 deaths › 4.64 Kadhimiyah death/incident ratio Kadhimiya – 1 incidents, 14 deaths › 14.0 Saydiyah – 3 incidents, 3 deaths › 1.0 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Hurriya – 4 incidents, 30 deaths › 7.5 Abu Disheer – 1 incidents, 2 deaths › 2.0 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Shula – 11 incidents, 49 deaths › 4.46 Shurta - none death/incident ratio Risala - none Karkh Bayaa – 3 incidents, 5 deaths › 1.67 death/ Salhiya – none incident ratio Green Zone – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 Aamel – none death/incident ratio Jihad – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 death/ July incident ratio Baghdad – 28 incidents, 1,244 deaths Furat – none East Baghdad – 10 incident, 14 deaths Al-Ma’alif – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 West Baghdad – 8 incidents, 24 deaths death/incident ratio Central Baghdad – 1 incidents, 2 deaths Al-Dhubat - none North Baghdad – 2 incidents, 3 deaths Mansour South Baghdad – 1 incidents, 16 deaths Washash - none Southwest Baghdad – 3 incidents, 3 deaths Mansour – 1 incidents, 1 deaths › 1.0 death/ Southeast Baghdad – 2 incidents, 4 deaths incident ratio Adhamiya Yarmouk – 1 incident, 5 deaths › 5.0 death/ Shaab – 3 incidents, 3 deaths › 1.0 death/ incident ratio incident ratio Iskan - none Ur – 2 incidents, 2 deaths › 1.0 death/ Adl – 1 incident, 4 deaths › 4.0 death/ incident ratio incident ratio Adhamiyah – 3 incidents, 6 deaths › 2.0 Jamia - none death/incident ratio Khadra – none Waziriya – 2 incidents, 2 deaths › 1.0 Ameriya – 3 incidents, 3 deaths › 1.0 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Maghrib – 1 incident, 19 deaths › 19.0
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j30 death/incident ratio Saadoun – none Qahira – 2 incidents, 10 deaths › 5.0 death/ Mustansirya – none incident ratio Rusafa – 3 incidents, 7 deaths › 2.3 death/ Al-Kurriaat - none incident ratio Sadr City Bab al-Sharqi – none Sadr City – 9 incidents, 141 deaths › 15.67 Rasheed death/incident ratio Doura – 22 incidents, 76 deaths › 3.46 Palestine Street – 2 incidents, 3 deaths › death/incident ratio 1.50 death/incident ratio Saydiyah - none 9 Nissan Abu Disheer – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 Amin – none death/incident ratio Mashtal - none Shurta - none Baladiat – 3 incidents, 11 deaths › 3.67 Risala - none death/incident ratio Bayaa – 2 incidents, 6 deaths › 3.0 death/ Kamaliya - none incident ratio Baghdad al-Jadida – 6 incidents, 25 deaths Aamel – 2 incidents, 7 deaths › 3.50 death/ › 4.17 death/incident ratio incident ratio Muthana Zayuna – none Jihad – 4 incident, 60 deaths › 15.0 death/ Al-Ubaidi – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 death/ incident ratio incident ratio Furat – none Al-Husseiniya – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 Al-Ma’alif – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Karadah Al-Dhubat - none Rustamiya – none Mansour Jisr Diyala - none Washash – 3 incidents, 20 deaths › 6.67 Zafaraniya – 2 incidents, 9 deaths › 4.5 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Mansour – 9 incidents, 28 deaths › 3.11 Jamia – none death/incident ratio Karada – 8 incidents, 50 deaths › 6.25 Yarmouk – 3 incident, 5 deaths › 1.67 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Wehda – 1 incidents, 6 deaths › 6.0 death/ Iskan - none incident ratio Adl – none Rusafa Jamia - none
Fall 2014 j31 Khadra – 2 incidents, 11 deaths › 5.50 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Ur – none Ameriya – 3 incidents, 13 deaths › 4.33 Adhamiyah – 11 incidents, 40 deaths › death/incident ratio 3.63 death/incident ratio Abu Ghuraib – none Waziriya – 4 incidents, 9 deaths › 2.25 Ghazaliya – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 inci- death/incident ratio dent/death ratio Maghrib – none Kadhimiyah Qahira – 6 incidents, 12 deaths › 2.0 death/ Kadhimiya – 1 incident, 4 deaths › 4.0 incident ratio incident/death ratio Al-Kurriaat - none Hurriya – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 inci- Sadr City dent/death ratio Sadr City – 17 incidents, 295 deaths › 17.35 Shula – 7 incidents, 24 deaths › 3.43 inci- death/incident ratio dent/death ratio Palestine Street – 6 incidents, 12 deaths › Karkh 2.0 death/incident ratio Salhiya – none 9 Nissan Green Zone – 2 incidents, 8 deaths › 4.0 Amin – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 death/ incident/death ratio incident ratio Haifa Street – 2 incidents, 8 deaths › 4.0 Mashtal – 3 incidents, 15 deaths › 5.0 incident/death ratio death/incident ratio November Baladiat – none Baghdad – 41 incidents, 911 deaths Kamaliya – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 death/ East Baghdad – 9 incident, 16 deaths incident ratio West Baghdad – 5 incidents, 6 deaths Baghdad al-Jadida – 4 incidents, 5 deaths › Central Baghdad – 5 incidents, 10 deaths 1.25 death/incident ratio North Baghdad – 3 incidents, 15 deaths Muthana Zayuna – none South Baghdad – 4 incidents, 4 deaths Al-Ubaidi – none Southwest Baghdad – 1 incidents, 1 deaths Al-Husseiniya – 2 incidents, 13 deaths › Southeast Baghdad – 1 incidents, 4 deaths 6.5 death/incident ratio Northeast Baghdad – 1 incident, 1 death Karadah Northwest Baghdad – 1 incident, 4 deaths Rustamiya – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 Adhamiya death/incident ratio Shaab – 1 incidents, 20 deaths › 20.0 Jisr Diyala – 1 incident, 6 deaths › 6.0
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j32 death/incident ratio Furat – none Zafaraniya – none Al-Ma’alif – 2 incident, 14 deaths › 7.0 Jamia – none death/incident ratio Karada – 8 incidents, 25 deaths › 3.13 Al-Dhubat – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Wehda – 1 incidents, 3 deaths › 3.0 death/ Mansour incident ratio Washash – 1 incidents, 1 deaths › 1.0 Rusafa death/incident ratio Saadoun – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 death/ Mansour – 6 incidents, 46 deaths › 7.67 incident ratio death/incident ratio Mustansirya – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 Yarmouk – 6 incident, 12 deaths › 2.0 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Rusafa – 12 incidents, 56 deaths › 4.67 Iskan - none death/incident ratio Adl – none Bab al-Sharqi – 3 incidents, 7 deaths › 2.33 Jamia – 1 incident, 3 deaths › 3.0 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Rasheed Khadra – none Doura – 12 incidents, 36 deaths › 3.0 Ameriya – 5 incidents, 8 deaths › 1.60 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Saydiyah – 4 incidents, 11 deaths › 2.75 Abu Ghuraib – 2 incidents, 6 deaths › 3.0 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Abu Disheer – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 Ghazaliya – 5 incidents, 14 deaths › 2.80 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Shurta – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 death/ Kadhimiyah incident ratio Kadhimiya – 4 incidents, 10 deaths › 2.50 Risala – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Hurriya – 5 incident, 40 deaths › 8.00 Bayaa – 4 incidents, 7 deaths › 1.75 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Shula – 3 incidents, 16 deaths › 5.33 death/ Aamel – 6 incidents, 13 deaths › 2.17 incident ratio death/incident ratio Karkh Jihad – 1 incident, 1 deaths › 1.0 death/ Salhiya – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.00 death/ incident ratio incident ratio
Fall 2014 j33 Green Zone – none Mashtal – 2 incidents, 5 deaths › 2.50 Haifa Street – 2 incidents, 6 deaths › 3.00 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Baladiat – none December Kamaliya – 8 incident, 26 deaths › 3.25 Baghdad – 48 incidents, 830 deaths death/incident ratio East Baghdad – 1 incident, 1 deaths Baghdad al-Jadida – 11 incidents, 26 West Baghdad – 2 incidents, 2 deaths deaths › 2.36 death/incident ratio Central Baghdad – 2 incidents, 16 deaths Muthana Zayuna – 2 incidents, 15 deaths › North Baghdad – 3 incidents, 7 deaths 7.5 death/incident ratio South Baghdad – 3 incidents, 8 deaths Al-Ubaidi – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.0 death/ Southwest Baghdad – 1 incidents, 2 deaths incident ratio Southeast Baghdad – 1 incidents, 20 deaths Al-Husseiniya – 5 incidents, 10 deaths › Northeast Baghdad – none 2.0 death/incident ratio Northwest Baghdad – none Karadah Adhamiya Rustamiya – none Shaab – 7 incidents, 12 deaths › 1.71 death/ Jisr Diyala – 1 incident, 3 deaths › 3.0 incident ratio death/incident ratio Ur – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.00 death/inci- Zafaraniya – 1 incident, 2 deaths › 2.0 dent ratio death/incident ratio Adhamiyah – 13 incidents, 47 deaths › 3.61 Jamia – 2 incidents, 2 deaths › 1.00 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Waziriya – none Karada – 2 incidents, 2 deaths › 1.00 death/ Maghrib – none incident ratio Qahira – 6 incidents, 30 deaths › 5.00 Wehda – 2 incidents, 2 deaths › 1.00 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Al-Kurriaat - none Rusafa Sadr City Saadoun – none Sadr City – 22 incidents, 81 deaths › 3.70 Mustansirya – none death/incident ratio Rusafa – 5 incidents, 139 deaths › 27.8 Palestine Street – 9 incidents, 23 deaths › death/incident ratio 2.56 death/incident ratio Bab al-Sharqi – 2 incidents, 14 deaths › 9 Nissan 7.00 death/incident ratio Amin – none Rasheed
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j34 Doura – 22 incidents, 72 deaths › 3.27 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Iskan – 2 incidents, 3 deaths › 1.50 death/ Saydiyah – 16 incidents, 29 deaths › 1.81 incident ratio death/incident ratio Adl – 10 incidents, 15 deaths › 1.50 death/ Abu Disheer – none incident ratio Shurta – 4 incident, 8 deaths › 2.00 death/ Jamia – none incident ratio Khadra – 2 incidents, 3 deaths › 1.50 Risala – 5 incident, 10 deaths › 2.00 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Ameriya – 6 incidents, 12 deaths › 2.00 Bayaa – 19 incidents, 76 deaths › 4.00 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Abu Ghuraib – none Aamel – 20 incidents, 67 deaths › 3.35 Ghazaliya – 8 incidents, 47 deaths › 5.88 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Jihad – 13 incident, 32 deaths › 2.46 death/ Kadhimiyah incident ratio Kadhimiya – 14 incidents, 22 deaths › 1.57 Furat – 5 incidents, 9 deaths › 1.80 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Hurriya – 18 incidents, 100 deaths › 5.55 Al-Ma’alif – none death/incident ratio Al-Dhubat – 1 incident, 2 death › 2.00 Shula – 11 incidents, 33 deaths › 3.00 death/incident ratio death/incident ratio Mansour Karkh Washash – 3 incidents, 4 deaths › 1.33 Salhiya – 1 incident, 1 death › 1.00 death/ death/incident ratio incident ratio Mansour – 10 incidents, 16 deaths › 1.60 Green Zone – none death/incident ratio Haifa Street – 8 incidents, 29 deaths › 3.63 Yarmouk – 11 incident, 17 deaths › 1.54 death/incident ratio
Works Cited
1 Dodge, Toby. What Were the Causes and Queen Mary University of London, 2009. Consequences of Iraq’s Descent into Vi- 4. n.d. Print. olence after the Initial Invasion? Thesis. 2 “Interactive Map of Iraq.” Interactive Map
Fall 2014 j35 of Iraq. Special Inspector General for Iraq Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro. “Do Working Reconstruction, n.d. Web. 10 May 2013. Men Rebel? Insurgency And Unemploy- 3 “Baghdad: Mapping the Violence.” BBC ment In Iraq And The Philippines.” Thesis. News. BBC, n.d. Web. 10 May 2013. 2009. National Bureau Of Economic Re- 4 Weidmann, Nils B., and Idean Salehyan. search. 4. Web. 23 “Violence and Ethnic Segregation: A Carpenter, 190. 24 Computational Model Applied to Bagh- Dodge, 2. 25 dad.” International Studies Quar- Ibid. 26 terly (2011): 2. Web. Ibid. 5 27 “Iraqi Deaths from Violence 2003– Ibid. 28 2011.” Iraq Body Count. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Carpenter, 196. 29 May 2013. Carpenter, n.p.. 6 30 Ibid. Carpenter, 196. 7 31 Weidmann, Nils B., and Idean Salehyan, Dodge, 3. 32 2011 Ibid. 8 33 BBC News n.p. Ibid. 9 34 Iraq Body Count. n.p. Hagan, John, Joshua Kaiser, Anna Han- 10 Ibid. son, and Patricia Parker. Neighborhood 11 Ibid. Sectarian Displacement and the Battle for 12 Ibid. Baghdad: The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of 13 Ibid. Crimes Against Humanity in Iraq. Thesis. 14 Ibid. Northwestern University and University 15 Carpenter, Ami. Havens in a Firestorm: of Toronto, n.d.: n.p., n.d. Print. 35 Perspectives from Baghdad on Resilience Hagan, 5. 36 to Sectarian Violence, Civil Wars, 14:2, Hagan, 6. 37 193. n.d. Hagan, 7. 16 38 Ibid. Hagan, 8. 17 39 Carpenter, 190. Carpenter, 194. 18 40 Carpenter, 198. Ibid. 19 41 Carpenter, 190. Carpenter, 194-195. 20 42 Ibid. Carpenter, 195. 21 43 Carpenter, 198. Ibid. 22 44 Berman, Eli, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Carpenter, 194.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j36 45 49 Carpenter, 199. Carpenter, 196. 46 50 Carpenter, 198-199. Ibid. 47 51 Carpenter, 197. Ibid. 48 Ibid.
Fall 2014 j37 The Atypical Irish Political Spectrum
Evaluating Competing Theories of the Irish Political Space
By Erica Johnson
Since its conception in 1922, the Republic of Ireland’s politics have been characterized by the deep divide between Fianna Fáil (the Republican Party) and Fine Gael. The parties split from the greater Republican whole due to the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which was ratified in 1922. Despite this historical divide, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael can both be characterized as center-right parties and are opposed to the Labour Party (center-left). The two largest parties in Ireland, therefore, are both located on the right side of the political spectrum, which defies traditional logic set forth by scholars such as Anthony Downs. Perhaps there is another incentive or factor in Irish politics that pushes the two largest parties to be closest to each other on the ideological spectrum, rather than being diametrically opposed to compete for the most votes.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j38 his research paper seeks The Downsian Model to find this factor and to In 1957, Anthony Downs’ seminal further delve into related piece, “An Economic Theory of Polit- Timplications about Irish political ical Action in a Democracy,” changed space. It evaluates why Fianna Fáil the way scholars, parties, and voters and Fine Gael are diametrically thought about politics and how po- opposed when their respective party litical parties arrange themselves on manifestos seem to be quite simi- a linear spectrum. He claimed that lar. It also tries to explain why the voters are highly rational and attempt Irish Labour Party has not become to extract the most utility from polit- a viable left-of-center option for the ical parties. Furthermore, parties will Irish electorate. It is first crucial to arrange themselves on the political explain how the Irish political spec- spectrum in a fashion that will gar- trum does not conform to the tradi- ner them the most votes. Parties in tional model found in most Western a two-party system gravitate toward European democracies by discussing the center of the political spectrum the assumptions of the Downsian in order to capture the most voters model and observing the relation- on the left or right without being too ship between voting and ideology extreme as to alienate voters. How- in Ireland. Ultimately, defying the ever, they also catch more extreme assumptions of Downs’ theory, Irish voters, as all voters are incentivized to voters do not appear to vote along choose the party closest to their own the policy dimension assumed to ideological point of view. These larger reflect the respective ideologies of parties overwhelm (most) attempts for different parties. The correlation be- smaller parties to penetrate either the tween voting and ideology is insig- right or left of the spectrum. nificant, and the standard deviation Conversely, a multiparty system for each mainstream party’s vote encourages a party to “[link] itself share is very low. If ideology does to a definite ideological position and not appear to coincide with voting, stresses its differences from other 1 Irish voters choose certain parties parties.” Especially significant in this due to incentives other than their relationship is the role of ideology: distinct ideological orientations. “parties cannot adopt identical ideolo-
Fall 2014 j39 gies, because they must create enough dynamics of Irish politics in a historical product differentiation to make their perspective. Each party developed as output distinguishable from that of a result of the changing circumstances their rivals, so as to entice voters to the within Ireland, and evaluating the 2 polls.” Indeed, Downs concludes that context of party development is crucial ideology in multiparty systems mat- in explaining how parties articulate ters greatly, as it generates the wider their policy preferences and ideology field of choice that voters possess. This today. For instance, Fianna Fáil and effectively raises the stakes of voter Fine Gael, separated from the general participation, because it makes “much Sinn Féin (Ourselves, Alone) political [more of a] difference which party movement after the ratification of the 3 gets elected. Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922. The “true The Irish political system does not Republicans,” Eamon de Valera and conform to Downs’ line of reasoning. his supporters, refused to accept the While the Irish political space is com- Treaty, claiming that it did not unite prised of several parties – four or more the whole of Ireland (Northern Ire- parties are consistently represented land would remain in British hands), in the Dáil – the largest and most and clashed against the Pro-Treaty successful parties are characterized faction led by Michael Collins. Ea- as center-right. Voters then, perhaps, mon de Valera’s faction evolved into have less choice in party selection. Par- Fianna Fáil (The Republican Party) ty ideology appears to have very little and the Pro-Treaty group evolved into to do with voter behavior. Therefore, Fine Gael (loosely translated into “the where parties would normally empha- Tribe of the Irish”). To this day, Irish size the space between themselves and voters have an attachment to either their competitors, Irish parties must side; however, “placing one’s family 4 appeal to voters with something other might be easier than placing oneself.” than ideological positions. Historically, Fianna Fáil has long Historical Background & dominated the Irish political party Political Context system. Contributing to their hege- Before delving into the specifics of mony is the importance of dedication possible explanations of this phenom- to the party. In fact, “loyalty to the enon, it is worthwhile to examine the party cause seems more steadfast than
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j40 9 that exhibited by those affiliated to Republic was exceptionally low” the other parties. Indeed, member- and advocated the immediate imple- ship of the Fianna Fáil fold tradition- mentation of greater social welfare ally demanded a loyalty to the party programs. Fianna Fáil countered the 5 above all else.” Fianna Fáil’s long Just Society Program by adopting the hegemony also coincided with their “rising tides lift all boats” mantra and government record, in that the party stressing that economic growth could could “retain such a loyal following solve the problems of the poor and because its longevity in government disadvantaged in Ireland. Certainly, afforded it greater access to sources of Fianna Fáil’s emphasis on growing patronage. The other parties’ appear- Ireland’s economy helped transform ances in government were too few and Ireland from a “predominantly rural fleeting to reward the loyalty of their and highly traditional society to a 6 supporters on a consistent basis.” Fi- relatively industrialised and urbanised 10 anna Fáil also tried to appeal to more one” in the 1970s and 1980s. voters by utilizing populist rhetoric Ireland’s ascension into the realm 7 and symbols of Irish tradition. This of advanced industrialized countries marks one of the few distinguishing also allowed the political space to factors between Fine Gael and Fianna incorporate new dimensions. With Fáil: while Fianna Fáil attempted to increasing industrialization, new left- market itself as a radical populist par- wing parties claiming to represent ty in the 1950s, Fine Gael was seen as industrial laborers entered the arena, 8 “more fiscally conservative.” such as the Workers’ Party. Addi- The 1960’s, however, ushered in tionally, the “right-wing (or possible a new era of the public’s demand for centre-right) Progressive Democrats increased social services and greater widened the political spectrum, while expenditures on public welfare. Fine the arrival of a Green Party spelled a 11 Gael tried to preempt Fianna Fáil’s new dimension of competition.” New dominance of the issue by marketing identities for Fine Gael and Fianna its “Just Society” program in 1965. Fáil emerged, with “Fine Gael rep- In the program, Fine Gael “pointed resenting a new, modern and secular out that the proportion of resources Ireland while Fianna Fail had a more 12 allocated to social welfare in the traditional, conservative mindset.”
Fall 2014 j41 Beyond the added dimensions in the early years of Ireland’s nationhood. political spectrum and the identity Looking at vote shares for the three of Ireland’s two major parties, in- major political parties – Labour, Fine dustrialization welcomed an attitude Gael, and Fianna Fàil – between 1965 of clientelism into the Irish political and 2011, what is striking is the level system. “As agriculture continued to of consistency of vote shares for each decline in significance, the increasing party, represented by the standard problems experienced in the state’s deviation. The chart below details the industrialisation drive, together with standard deviations in vote share for the political importance of job cre- the three major Irish political parties. ation …after 1957, impelled the state A visual representation of parties’ vote itself to become a crucial factor in shares over time is detailed in the 13 employment creation.” With voters’ Appendices. increasing dependence on the state, Fianna Mean & Standard Deviation of Party Vote Fáil could more fully Share, 1965-2011 protect its hegemony by promising patronage to Labour Fianna Fàil Fine Gael its constituents. Data Mean 12.29 42.51071 30.81357 To emphasize this lack of a definitive Standard ideological position Deviation 4.03590 7.89730 5.03115 related to voting, we can observe the association between vote In stark contrast to the relatively share and changing ideological posi- stable vote share among political par- tions over time. Specifically, the paper ties in Ireland, the political ideology uses data from elections between “score,” as measured by the Manifesto 14 1965 and 2011; beginning this study Research Project, shows a higher in the 1960s allowed for the develop- degree of variation as measured by ment of political ideologies beyond standard deviation. Republican or Nationalist politics or constitutional issues found in the
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j42 Mean & Standard Deviation of Party Ideology who support Sinn Féin Score, 1965-2011 likely have an ideolog- ical bias that the other Labour Fianna Fàil Fine Gael mainstream parties lack. Still, between these Mean -18.5429 1.62858 -2.57143 three smaller political parties – the Progressive Standard Democrats, the Green Deviation 8.5753 20.9319 11.7394 Party, and Sinn Féin – their national electoral From these two charts, it is plain strength is marginal in relation to the that party vote share is relatively three mainstream parties this research stable, even while party ideology paper examines. fluctuates. However, it is crucial to To gain further insight on the note why some parties were excluded relationship between party ideology from this analysis. The Progressive and vote share, I correlated the two Democrats added depth to the Irish variables to see if they have a relation- political spectrum, but did not appear ship outside of very different standard for long enough and did not make deviations. The results made it clear enough of an electoral impact (purely that party ideology is not significantly on the basis of numbers) for them to correlated with party vote share (see be included in the bulk of this analysis. Appendices A and B for a detailed Their vote share over time is depicted chart of each variable over time). in Appendix G. Based on a similar Not only are the correlations very justification as the Progressive Demo- weak as a whole, but the significance crats, the Green Party is not included. level of each party is very low as well, Sinn Féin also does not enter this showcasing the ineffectiveness of par- analysis because of its unique ideolog- ty ideology as a predictor of vote share. ical dimension; Sinn Féin continues However, interesting insights can still to advocate an “All-Ireland” policy be gleaned from observing these two agenda, and emphasizes the struggle variables over time. Firstly, we can see between the Republic of Ireland and how Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have Northern Ireland. Therefore, voters consistently competed for the highest
Fall 2014 j43 percentages in vote share since 1965, so dramatically between the two elec- with Fianna Fáil winning the highest tions, while the percentage of votes for percentage in most elections. The La- Fianna Fáil did not shift in an equally bour Party, in contrast, has remained dramatic fashion. relatively weak compared to the two Additional observations can be center-right parties, with Labour’s made when looking at Appendices A vote share never exceeding 20 percent and B. For instance, it is clear that a of the vote. major reversal in fortunes took place during the most recent Party Correlation* p-value election in 2011. For the first time since 1965, Labour .387 .171 Fine Gael received a higher percentage for Fine Gael .123 .676 the vote than its main competitor, Fianna Fianna Fàil .039 .895 Fáil. The Labour Party also received its highest *Independent Variable: Ideology Score, Dependent percentage of the vote in Variable: Vote Share forty-six years. Usually, analysts are content in Another insight to emphasize the explaining this transition by pointing lack of an association between party out that 2011 was the first election for ideology and party vote share is the Irish voters after the crash in 2007. general election in 1977 (for reference, The introduction of the bailout pro- see Appendix A). In 1977, Fianna Fáil gram devised by the European Union had a score of -4.2, which typifies a and International Monetary Fund, as center-left position on the political well as growing dissatisfaction with spectrum. However, this represents economic policies, led Irish voters to a drastic change from Fianna Fáil’s respond to the crises by electing the ideology score of 57.1 (a position lo- opposing party into office. Perhaps cated squarely in the right side of the voters identified the crises with the spectrum) in 1973. It is puzzling that caretaker government at the time of Fianna Fáil’s ideology score changed the crash, Fianna Fáil, and reacted
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j44 by voting for the opposition. An British rule. On an individual level, economic collapse is an event of such Catholicism can be an important de- magnitude that it is reasonable that terminant of voter behavior. Catholic an electorate’s voting patterns would voters are much more likely to vote for be significantly altered. However, the either Fianna Fáil or Labour than for idea that Irish voters respond to eco- Fine Gael. There are also noted differ- nomic factors is inconsistent through- ences within Catholic voters. Regular out the data. Periods of economic church-goers generally show greater decline, especially in the 1960s and support for Fianna Fáil, while those 1970s, were still witness to Fianna who are Catholic by association vote 15 Fáil dominance over the Irish party more consistently for Labour. system. The impetus for Irish voting Beyond the individual level, Ca- behavior, it seems, does not rest on tholicism also entered into Irish ideological or economic factors alone. political institutions in the early years To get a better sense of what other el- of its nationhood, but this theological ements are at play in determining the influence has since gradually eroded behavior of Irish voters, we evaluate from Ireland’s institutional frame- competing interpretations of Ireland’s work. In 1937 for instance, a promi- atypical party system. nent Jesuit community was allowed Evaluating Alternative to form a committee that would give Explanations guidelines and provide insights on the 16 With this puzzle in mind, we can formation of the new Constitution. evaluate alternative theories to explain While Ireland’s Constitution was Ireland’s atypical party system and initially grounded in Catholic values political spectrum. One such theory is and views, which were “so important the idea that Ireland’s political culture to the national vision of de Valera,” – marked by being an overwhelm- they are also “the very views of Ireland ingly Catholic country – inherently that have weakened in recent years shifts politics to the right side of the and that in November 1995 received a spectrum, causing the spatial model significant blow in the referendum on 17 to be skewed. Catholicism in Ireland divorce.” Most recently in 2013, the coincides with nationalist sentiments, “Protection of Life During Pregnancy as Protestantism is associated with Bill” further chipped away at the
Fall 2014 j45 Catholic ethic of Irish politics. Indeed, a consistent basis. Proponents of the the bill was seen to be so alienated political culture theory in Ireland ar- from Catholic values that several gue that “electoral demand for a stable members of Fine Gael were whipped and cohesive government, preferably 18 after refusing to vote for the bill on a of the single-party variety” perpetu- moral and religious basis. ates the center-right skew and allows Therefore, while Catholicism may Fianna Fáil to consistently govern. account for the original government This electoral demand is “the product ethic after the creation of the 1937 of the markedly authoritarian charac- Constitution and in the subsequent ter of Irish political culture, and the twenty years of the country’s political concomitant predilection for strong 19 history, it does not necessarily exert political leadership.” While there is as great of an influence as it once did. a kernel of truth to this – certainly, Even with this in mind, the lack of as- leaders like Eamon de Valera contin- sociation between party ideology and ue to imbibe a great deal of pride and party vote share makes the “Catholic strength for Irish people – this view is theory” difficult to substantiate -em perhaps inconsistent with the fact that pirically at the party level. Moreover, the party composition of Ireland’s it is dubious that the Catholic theory government over time has indeed would predict the results of the 2011 changed. While Fianna Fáil dominat- election, where Fianna Fáil witnessed ed the Dáil on a consistent basis over a major reversal in fortune and lost a time, Fine Gael, the Labour Party, significant portion of its formerly con- and the Progressive Democrats did sistent electoral strength. Catholicism join together in coalition governments certainly was an important founda- between 1965 and 2011. If Irish voters tional element of the Irish political did indeed exert an electoral demand system but can no longer be posited for a single-party government, there as a determining factor in electoral would be no incentive to have the outcomes. multiparty system that characterizes Similar in its normative orientation, Irish politics. Certainly, Fianna Fáil some scholars claim that Ireland’s po- is a strong party, but it is not singular litical culture encourages a hegemonic – there is a demonstrated electorate, party to control the government on while relatively smaller than Fianna
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j46 Fáil’s, which votes for Fine Gael and logic of this system is that voters are Labour. more inclined to vote for the candi- Perhaps more convincing in the date rather than the party, as voters political culture theory is that the rank their preferences of individual political process in Ireland is a result candidates. This does not necessarily of purely political cleavages rather indicate that party is not an important 20 than sociopolitical cleavages. This consideration when voting. Indeed, “… represents an unusual take on the it would seem more usual to expect political culture theory, which is nor- that the policy packages of the parties mally grounded in sociological norms are important determinants of choice and values. However, it is possible even in a supposedly highly personal- for political culture to refer to purely ized and candidate-centered system 22 political processes and structures, such as Ireland’s.” Reinforcing this especially in light of the weak asso- idea is the notion that voters would be ciation between party ideology and required to be well-informed about all vote share. “The endemic brokerage eligible candidates in order to vote ra- and clientism which characterizes tionally, so “the voter relies even more the relationship between a political heavily on the party label as a guide representative and his constituents… to vote choice as a means of cutting has encouraged a concern for the the costs of information necessary to 23 administration of political structures, making a decision.” as opposed to a conflict along purely Even with this consideration, Irish 21 substantive issues of policy.” voting behavior does not conform to This emphasis on clientelism and the model of straight-ticket voting, patronage ushers in another sig- which one would expect with a higher nificant theory as to why the Irish consideration for party labels. Still, political spectrum is atypical in there is evidence that the top of the Western Europe. Ireland is one of preference list reinforces bias toward the few European countries to use party labels. “Since it is these prefer- the single transferable vote system (a ences which are counted most heavily form of proportional representation, by the electoral system, there is an in- known commonly as STV-PR) in teraction between the electoral system 24 their electoral laws. The traditional and individual preferences” which
Fall 2014 j47 undergirds the stability Party identification in Ireland can make a much in vote shares for the weaker contribution to political stability… Even three mainstream polit- if everyone with some degree of attachment to ical parties. This theory a party did vote for that party, the other half of is not inconsistent with the electorate could still be responsible for huge the idea that Irish voters changes… These unattached votes may be very do take into account the stable in their behaviour, but on this evidence personality of the candi- we cannot ascribe that stability to anything like date, or the influence of party identification.26 constituency work. Policy also appears to […] Under circumstances […] where the par- be a weak predictor of ties are ideologically indistinct or where voters party performance, as themselves do not have preferences over policy Irish political parties are per se, it may be the case that voters will care typically seen to be of- more about constituency service than other fice-seeking, according 25 matters. to the next theory. Office-seeking par- In the Irish case, it is important to ties “seek to maximize, not their votes, 27 realize that these circumstances may but their control over political office.” be more common than expected, es- They have a different orientation pecially given the lack of an associa- toward politics than do policy-seek- tion between party ideology and vote ers, who compete with the intention share (recall the earlier data analysis of maximizing their influence over of Irish party vote share correlated public policy coinciding with their with party ideology score). Given ideological position. Ireland’s political what we know about the weakness parties do not reflect an orientation of association between party ideolo- toward policy, because, as previously gy and vote share, it is feasible that stated, ideology cannot account for attachment to a party comes from fluctuations in vote share. Addition- something other than shared norma- ally, Irish political parties cannot be tive values between voters and parties. characterized as vote-oriented; as we Moreover: have already seen, the two largest
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j48 parties are positioned very close to own party, but Fianna Fáil was able each other on the political spectrum, to enter coalition governments and contrary to Downs’ model. Because manipulate them from a position of electoral value is not variable, repre- strength, not of weakness. Fianna sented by the relatively consistent vote Fáil could weaken their opposition shares, parties care more about coa- by bringing them into government as lition formation in government than it “neutralises the protest nature of its 28 garnering votes in the election itself. new-found partner. Rather than being The predictability of voters’ behavior a challenging voice on the opposition also explains Fianna Fáil’s confidence benches, the latter becomes an ally in to control coalition formation in gov- government, while also inclined to oc- ernment. casional internal crises of conscience 30 Fianna Fáil played a major role in over its ties with Fianna Fáil.” shaping the structure of the Irish par- Discussion ty system today, due to its dominance With these theories in mind, we and office-seeking orientation. In fact, return to the three research questions “the ability of Fianna Fáil to shape presented in the beginning of this competition and, by implication, analysis. As a general trend, the of- maintain its dominance, should not fice-seeking theory appears to provide be underestimated. By rejecting coa- the best answers to these central issues. litions, Fianna Fáil stifled the growth First, what explains Ireland’s lack of a 29 and evolution of the party system.” traditional left-right spectrum, where For the majority of Ireland’s political the two largest mainstream parties history, Fianna Fáil has refused to are represented on both the left and enter into a coalition government and right of the spatial model? Common insists to govern alone. However, this themes in answering this question policy changed in 1989 when the par- include theories on the impact of ty leader, Charles Haughey, entered Catholicism in skewing the political into a coalition with the Progressive spectrum toward the center-right, as Democrats (who had branched off of well as the political culture of Ireland Fianna Fáil in the 1980s). Haughey that perpetuated the dominance of made this political gamble during a the right party, Fianna Fáil. Yet these period of internal disputes within his theories fare poorly when considering
Fall 2014 j49 changes in governing coalitions over standard deviation values – can be time. On an empirical level, it is chalked up to changing circumstances also difficult to measure preferences in each election. The 2011 election is toward an “authoritarian” style of gov- especially indicative of this pattern. ernment, and no such data appears in The second point in answering the the literature on Irish political culture. central question also addresses the In addition, religiosity in Ireland is on second research question: why are Fi- the decline with the advent of secular- anna Fáil and Fine Gael diametrically ized amendments to the constitution. opposed, when their respective party More effective at explaining the manifestos seem to be quite similar? lack of a left-right spectrum in Ireland The answer focuses on the context in are two factors: first, that Fianna áF il which the Republic Ireland became hegemony in government stunted the a sovereign state in 1922. Unlike growth of a diverse multiparty system, most Western European democracies, and second, that Ireland did not de- Ireland was born out of a civil war, velop in the same way as most West- where the two factions were united in ern European countries (representing generalizable nationalist sentiments more of a contextual argument). but varied in degrees of dedication to As aforementioned, Fianna Fáil’s the nationalist cause. “The dominant office-seeking orientation toward po- cleavage…divided the Irish political litical competition encouraged them parties not into nationalists and to adopt strategies that kept their anti-nationalists but into moderate 31 opposition entirely out of government. nationalists and strong nationalists.” Thus, smaller parties were unable to Nationalism is no longer a pervasive fully develop ideological positions issue in Irish politics, so the particular or implement meaningful policies. ideological difference between Fianna This cyclical pattern was reinforced Fáil and Fine Gael has dissipated. by stable vote shares for each of the The two are diametrically opposed in mainstream parties, so that voters’ historical memory but appear close on behavior was so predictable as to the political spectrum because of the make it effectively insignificant. Any disappearance of their characteristic fluctuations in vote share – which are divergence. relatively small, according to the small The office-seeking theory -con
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j50 vincingly answers the last research this ideological adjustment to win question presented in this analysis: more votes. Instead, it is plausible that why hasn’t the Labour Party become Fianna Fáil shifted left to appease a viable left-of-center option for the competing factions in the party. It is Irish electorate? As previously men- crucial to keep in mind that the 1970s tioned, Fianna Fáil stifled the growth was a period of industrialization, and of additional parties in the political that Fianna Fáil could have moved to system by not including them in gov- the left in order to preempt the loss of erning coalitions. However, Labour votes to left-wing parties who claimed has entered into several coalitions to protect workers. Additionally, be- with Fine Gael, allowing it to have cause Fianna Fáil is an office-seeking enough influence in policy to consis- party, its success in becoming a sin- tently garner an average of approxi- gle-party government is dependent on mately 12 percent of the vote. Perhaps the internal strength of the party. this percentage remains relatively low In conclusion, it is important to because of the weakness of the asso- note the significance of the 2011 elec- ciation between party ideology and tion. This election displays an enor- vote share. It is possible that Labour’s mous shift from the norm of Fianna left-wing agenda has very little impact Fáil dominance and represents the on voters, and its electoral strength is impact of context and circumstance inherently weakened because of its in Irish elections. With the collapse lack of an association with nationalist of the Irish economy in 2007 and the politics during the Republic’s found- introduction of the EU/IMF bailout ing. The weakness of the Labour in 2010, Irish voters were highly Party combined with its paradoxical incentivized to exchange Fianna Fáil persistence in general elections still for the opposition parties in govern- 32 leaves a puzzle to be solved. ment. The 2011 election signifies Another puzzle left unanswered is that Fianna Fáil dominance is not the reason for Fianna Fáil’s major shift inevitable. Ireland’s atypical party in ideology between the 1973 and system and unique contextual factors 1977 elections. Given that ideology is make an interesting case to study in a weak predictor for voting behavior, relation to other Western European it is unlikely that Fianna Fáil made democracies, and further analysis
Fall 2014 j51 following the 2015 election – notably, the constitution – will hopefully shed after Ireland exits the EU/IMF bail- more light on the dynamics behind out and votes on a gay marriage ban in the Irish political spectrum.
About the Author
Erica Johnson (CLAS ‘14) is a recent third-year graduate. She majored in Foreign Affairs and participated in the Distinguished Majors Program in Politics after transferring from the University of Nebraska as a second-year. Erica developed a passion for Irish politics after interning in the Irish Parliament last summer and becoming familiar with the complexities of Irish politics firsthand. Erica often uses the Irish case study to evaluate the relationship between voters and party strategies and ideologies. Ireland’s political system represents an anomaly from the majority of Western European democracies, which creates a puzzling case study in which Erica assesses the internal mechanisms that shape the Irish political spectrum in comparison to other countries.
Appendices
Appendix A: Party Ideology “Score” 1965-2011 *
Year Labour Fine Gael Fianna Fáil Progressive Dems. 1965 -15.8 -7.9 -0.5 - 1969 -16.6 -7.3 34.5 - 1973 -19.1 -19.1 57.1 - 1977 -16 -16 -4.2 - 1981 -8.7 7.4 -1.4 - 1982 -20.7 14.1 -8 - 1982 -40 16.1 -30.2 - 1987 -21.3 -12.8 -3 7.9 1989 -29.3 -10.8 -8.4 -2.9
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j52 Year Labour Fine Gael Fianna Fáil Progressive Dems. 1992 -14.6 9.7 -3.4 19.3 1997 -5.9 8.9 4.8 19.6 2002 -22.3 -9.3 -6.2 -10 2007 -18.7 -9.7 -11.2 -5.8 2011 -10.6 0.7 9 -
* Data obtained from the Manifesto Project Database, https://manifesto-proj- ect.wzb.eu/countries/Ireland
Appendix B: Party Vote Share 1965-2011 *
Year Labour Fine Gael Fianna Fáil Progressive Dems. 1965 15.38 34.08 47.67 - 1969 17.02 34.1 45.66 - 1973 13.67 35.08 46.24 - 1977 11.63 30.47 50.63 - 1981 9.89 36.46 45.26 - 1982 9.12 27.3 47.26 - 1982 9.36 39.22 45.2 - 1987 6.45 27.07 44.15 11.85 1989 9.48 29.29 44.15 5.49 1992 19.31 24.47 39.11 4.68 1997 10.4 27.95 39.33 4.68 2002 10.77 22.48 41.48 3.96 2007 10.13 27.32 41.56 2.73 2011 19.45 36.1 17.45 - Average 12.29 30.8136 42.5107 5.565
* Data obtained from the Manifesto Project Database, https://manifesto-proj- ect.wzb.eu/countries/Ireland
Fall 2014 j53 Appendix C
Party Correlation* Corresponding p-value Labour .387 .171 Fine Gael .123 .676 Fianna Fàil .039 .895
*Independent Variable: Ideology Score, Dependent Variable: Vote Share
Appendix D: Labour Party Vote Share 1965-2011
Appendix E: Fine Gael Vote Share 1965-2011
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j54 Appendix F: Fianna Fáil Vote Share 1965-2011 **
Appendix G: Progressive Democrat Vote Share 1965-2011**
** Please note discrepancy in scale – the Progressive Democrats participated in only six elections between 1987 and 2007.
Works Cited
1 Downs, Anthony. “An Economic Theory 3 Downs, p. 144 of Political Action in a Democracy.” Jour- 4 Marsh, Michael, et al. The Irish voter: The nal of Political Economy. no. 2 (1957): nature of electoral competition in the Re- 135-150. p. 144. public of Ireland. Manchester, UK: Man- 2 Downs, p. 142 chester University Press, 2008. p. 60.
Fall 2014 j55 5 Weeks, Liam. “Parties and the party sys- 175-226. p. 178. tem.” Coakley, John, and Michael Galla- 18 Mair, Peter. “The Autonomy of the Polit- gher. Politics in the Republic of Ireland. ical: The Development of the Irish Par- London, UK: Routledge, 2010. p. 148. ty System.” Comparative Politics. no. 4 6 Ibid. (1979): 445-465. http://www.jstor.org/sta- 7 Bew, Paul, Ellen Hazelkorn, and Henry ble/421870 .(accessed October 08, 2013). p. Patterson. The Dynamics of Irish Poli- 456. tics. London, UK: Lawrence and Wishart, 19 Ibid. 1989. p. 95. 20 Mair, p. 458 8 Weeks, p. 141 21 Ibid. 9 Bew, et al, p. 95 22 Bowler, Shaun, and David M. Farrell. 10 Bew, et al, p. 102 “Voter behavior under STV-PR: Solving 11 Weeks, p. 141 the puzzle of the Irish party system.” Po- 12 Ibid. litical Behavior ,13, no. 4 (1991): 303-320. 13 Bew, et al, p. 109 p. 306. 14 https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/coun- 23 Bowler and Farrell, p. 308 tries/Ireland. 24 Bowler and Farrell, p. 316 15 McAllister, Ian, “The Political Sociology 25 Bowler and Farrell, p. 306 of Party Support in Ireland: A Reassess- 26 Marsh, et al, p. 63 ment,” Comparative Politics, 16, no. 2 27 Strom, Kaare, “A Behavioral Theory of (1984): 191-204, http://www.jstor.org/sta- Competitive Political Parties,” Ameri- ble/421606. (accessed October 8, 2013). p7. can Journal of Political Science, 34, no. 2 16 Faughnan, Seán. “The Jesuits and the (1990): 565-598, http://www.jstor.org/sta- Drafting of the Irish Constitution of ble/2111461 (accessed October 26, 2013). 1937.” Irish Historical Studies. no. 101 p. 567. (1988): 79-102. http://www.jstor.org/sta- 28 Ibid. ble/30008505 (accessed December 12, 29 Weeks, p. 150 2013). 30 Wgalleeks, p. 151 17 James, Christine P. “Cead Mile Failte? 31 Marsh, et al, p. 31 Ireland Welcomes Divorce: The 1995 Irish 32 Little, Connor. “The General Election Divorce Referendum and the Family (Di- of 2011 in the Republic of Ireland: All vorce) Act of 1996.” Duke Journal of Com- Changed Utterly?” West European Poli- parative and International Law. (1997): tics. no. 6 (2011): 1304-1313.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j56 Iraqi Women and Mental Health Initiatives
A Cultural Perspective
By Katharyn Gadient
The staggering level of mental illness in the Iraqi population is one of the most serious hurdles to reconstruction efforts. Recent studies investigating common mental health disorders in the general population- including anxiety, depression, PTSD, behavioral conditions, and substance abuse- found that mental health disorders are the fourth leading cause of ill health in Iraqis over the age of 5 years, with 1 in 5 women and 1 in 7 men likely to suffer from one in their lifetime (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2013). Iraqi women in particular face unique challenges within Iraq’s cultural context, making them both more susceptible to mental illnesses and less likely to receive care. For these reasons, policies aimed at mental health in Iraq must adopt a two-pronged approach aimed at reducing stigma and improving treatment options for Iraqi women both in the immediate and distant future.
Fall 2014 j57 n their efforts to rebuild Doctors Without Borders launched Iraq following the War on its mental health initiative in 2009.4 Terror, intergovernmental orga- This initiative focuses on anxiety Inizations, NGOs, and government and depressive disorders specifically, organizations have promoted public as “research shows [these] are the health and women’s issues as key focal most common of the mental health points for aid and policy. Conflating disorders experienced by the Iraqi these two issues, such organizations population and [they] are considered tend to focus on gendered divisions of highly amenable to psychological physical wellness, such as maternity counseling approaches.”5 Key to this and childbirth.1 However, studies program is the creation of new insti- from Iraq highlight the staggering tutions in Iraq to educate the public levels of mental illness in the pop- about mental health and increase ac- ulation, particularly resulting from cess to mental health services.6 While the Saddam Hussein regime and the having the right goals in mind, this 2003 US Invasion of Iraq. One study program does not take into consider- assessing the prevalence of common ation cultural institutions or gender mental health disorders in the general norms in the region. When taking population in Iraq, including anxiety, these considerations into account, a depression, PTSD, behavioral condi- two-pronged approach is necessary tions, and substance abuse, found that to increase awareness of and access to mental health disorders are the fourth mental health when focusing on Iraqi leading cause of ill health in Iraqis women, by both targeting negative over the age of 5 years, with 1 in 5 stigmas in Iraqi society surrounding women and 1 in 7 men likely to suffer mental health and utilizing Islamic from one in their lifetime.2 For these teachings and Islamic institutions reasons, it is crucial that conversations in treatment in ways that take into pertaining to Iraqi women’s health account Iraq’s limited resources. utilize a “broad-based definition of Though not typically thought of health… that addresses well-being as a gendered issue, mental health across the life cycle and in domains of and gender are closely intertwined. both physical and mental health.”3 Globally, gender differences arise Taking this task into consideration, particularly in the areas of depression,
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j58 anxiety and somatic complaints, in definitions of gender.10 It is important that they affect women more than to be cognizant of the fact that gender men.7 Often, these disorders present varies among and within societies, just themselves in local idioms such as as any other part of cultures. However, “nerves, attacks, heaviness of the heart research shows that Iraqi women face and intrusions by unwanted spirits,” similar societal issues to those Del a “high prevalence” of which are Vecchio Good describes, which result consistently found in women.8 While in mental illness, particularly evident “nature” of the “nature/nurture” make- with increases in violence, explaining up of mental health can be taken as the current mental health crisis in the given, gender is a key predictor as region.11 Firstly, conflicts such as the to how societal components affect US Invasion of Iraq and the current individuals and their mental health. political instability in the region have Medical Anthropologist Mary-Jo Del created an environment that can Vecchio Good explains: trigger disorders such as depression and anxiety. Research The origins of much of the pain and suffering shows conflicts such as particular to women can be traced to the social these affect the lives of circumstances of many women’s lives. Depres- women and children to sion, hopelessness, exhaustion, anger and fear a greater extent than grow out of hunger, overwork, domestic and men.12 For example, civil violence, entrapment and economic depen- in Iraq today, 10% of dence. Understanding the sources of ill health households are headed for women means understanding how cultural by women, who are ei- and economic forces interact to undermine their ther widowed, divorced, social status.9 separated, or caring for sick spouses as a result In anthropology, current discourse of these conflicts and instability.13 contends that gender is socially con- One widow tells her story: structed, thus drawing into question arguments I started attending the mental health counseling such as this that are sessions when I fe[el that] I’m so tired and very based on homogenized sad… I lost my husband two years ago and that
Fall 2014 j59 incident affected my life. It changed my life, it illness.18 This is very turned my life upside down. I’m now the only significant, as honor one left responsible [for] raising the kids.14 and shame, like familial ties, are key cultural Secondly, cultural standards for values across much of Middle Eastern women can also be very taxing. For society, including Iraq.19 While honor example, households headed by and shame affect both men and wom- females are increasingly exposed to en, women are often held to a higher poverty and lack of food due to lower standard than men, acting as a sort of income levels, as cultural values tend litmus test for their family’s dignity.20 to limit women’s educational and One of the more recent studies on economic opportunities.15 Without Iraqis’ perceptions of mental health homogenizing the experiences of all found: Iraqi women into a sin- gular narrative, the cur- Almost two thirds of the 418 respondents viewed rent situation along with mental illness as a matter of personal weakness. cultural gender norms Four fifths believed that people with mental ill- place a heavy burden on ness were to blame for their disorder. Half of the many individuals. respondents thought that people with mental When struggling with illness were dangerous and half believed they such a difficult societal should not marry.21 atmosphere, psycholog- ical support from family, friends, and Even more worrisome is that this health providers is extremely import- study also reports that more than half ant.16 Given the prominent role of of respondents said that they would the family, particularly the extended be ashamed if a family member had family, in Iraqi culture, such support a mental illness.22 In counseling ses- is vitally important for Iraqi women sions, many patients describeed their battling mental illness.17 However, feelings of isolation from their family. recent studies reveal a high level of One woman explained, “My family stigma against mental health among says I’m mentally ill. That’s why I try the Iraqi population, particularly due to be isolated from the family and I’m to the shame surrounding mental so stressed when I’m around them.”23
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j60 In this way, cultural emphasis on hon- To combat this stigma, mental or and shame permeates Iraqi society health awareness must be made a and kinship, resulting in the rejection priority in order to normalize such of those with mental health issues. conditions among Iraqi society as a This lack of acceptance is particularly whole. A 2010 report on Iraqi per- damaging because of the important ceptions of mental health sums up role of kinship in treating mental the plethora of research on the topic, illness. stating that Iraqis have a significantly The stigma surrounding mental ill- negative understanding about “the ness also hampers treatment of these nature of mental illness [and] its disorders. Oftentimes, both patients implications for social participation and their families fear backlash from and management.”28 Education about the rest of society if a family member’s mental illness is an important first mental illness were to become widely step in reducing stigma and allowing known and consequently, both parties those with mental illness to integrate are reluctant to seek out treatment.24 into society seamlessly. While lessen- Furthermore, even if patients may ing stigma would be beneficial to all want treatment, they often cannot to Iraqis battling mental illness, be they seek it out without familial consent.25 women or men, detaching perceptions Women are often dependent on male of familial shame and honor from such family members to escort them out- conditions would be particularly ben- side of the home due to cultural gen- eficial to women due to their unique der norms in relation to the public and position in Iraqi society, as Bolton and private spheres.26 Also, due to limited Del Vecchio Good describe.29, 30 educational and economic opportu- Islam can also be a useful tool for nities for women, they do not have the support of mental health initia- the means to pay for treatment and tives in Iraq. Demographically, 97% must rely on their family for funds.27 of Iraqis identify as Muslim, with the In both cases, the ability of women to majority being Shia Muslim, while receive treatment is contingent upon the remaining 3% identify as “Chris- the wishes of their family. Negative tian or other.”31 Identity is multifolded, stigmas surrounding mental health and specifically, these statistics do not can impact treatment. give a break down on what percentage
Fall 2014 j61 of Iraqis are practicing their religion preted in such a way that they have or the ways in which they may be increased the stigma surrounding practicing, such as conservatively mental illness. In particular, certain or liberally.32 This is an area where verses suggest that mental illness is further research would be highly a punishment from God.35 Recent beneficial. Though this research is not studies on Iraqi perceptions of mental currently available, taking Islam into health have found that Iraqis view account is important as a vital part of “God’s Punishment” as a major factor Iraqi culture. In particular, Islamic in mental health, with one-third of values and institutions are closely the test population stating that they intertwined with cultural norms and believe mental illness to be a Godly everyday life.33 punishment.36 However, this report Using Islamic viewpoints in col- does not include rural areas of Iraq, laboration with community outreach which historically tend to be more intertwines policy goals with Iraqi conservative.37 In these areas, it is cultural standards. For example, possible that this stigma could be certain Islamic teachings encourage more pervasive. Iraqis’ association of seeking out treatments for illnesses, as illness with punishment adds to the the human body is viewed to be a gift shame surrounding mental illness, from God and must be cared for both because it suggests that sufferers have physically and mentally.34 Exposing committed wrong in order to draw the Iraqi public to such interpretations God’s wrath. This view coincides with of scripture would help sway public the belief that mental illness comes opinion towards allowing treatment from personal weakness. While this for mental health. Given women’s research suggests fewer Iraqis hold a dependence on the family in such religious view of mental health than matters, educating society as a whole would be expected, further research would reach members of most fami- shows that many Iraqis believe in lies, improving familial support for an association between personal treatment, and thus, increase women’s weakness and mental illness, with access to such treatments. one study in particular finding that On the other hand, certain verses two-thirds of participants agreed that from Islamic texts have been inter- personal weakness was a major factor
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j62 in mental illness.38 Thus, even though in an open and helpful manner, but some Iraqis may not be practicing Is- ultimately leave beliefs to individuals. lam, their opinions still coincide with Mental health issues must be han- some Islamic viewpoints. dled with the aid of Islamic leaders, While certain interpretations of who give advice to believers on a scripture stigmatizing mental illness regular basis. In Iraq, Islamic leaders may be the most prevalent, other represent an established, powerful in- interpretations of the same literature stitution, and their educational efforts combat this stigma. For example, one about pro-mental health interpreta- Sunni hadith tells of the Prophet’s tions of Islam can be highly beneficial. special accommodations for a mentally With regards to health, they are “seen ill woman who had sought him out.39 as indirect agents of Allah’s will and In this way, Islamic teachings can also facilitators of the healing process” be reinterpreted to lessen the stigma and “may also play central roles in surrounding mental illness, especially shaping family and community atti- with the acclimation of such interpre- tudes and responses to illness.”40 In tations in Iraqi society through educa- particular, they give advice to patients tion and outreach. Thus, Islam offers a with regards to receiving treatments gateway through which foreign ideas that complement an Islamic lifestyle, about mental health can integrate such as medication during Ramadan with Iraqi society. This methodology fasting and the use of pork products avoids sinking into moral imperialism in many Western-developed med- or Western paternalism by grounding ications.41 For women especially, itself in indigenous culture, while religious leaders offer private con- still considering that religion is very sultation, which a woman could seek personal to individuals. Issues such as out without breaching cultural gender these must be handled in a culturally norms. In this way, Islamic leaders can sensitive way. In particular, the act often promote treatment, and thus, of informing Iraqis of different reli- lessen stigma. Furthermore, studies gious interpretations must not order show that combining religion with individuals to think a certain way treatment has been highly effective for or to abandon their beliefs. Instead, practicing Muslims. For example, in education should offer new opinions the initial phase of treatment, patients
Fall 2014 j63 who received traditional therapy, websites and forums where Muslims which included a religious perspective can ask Islamic experts about their showed more rapid improvement in problems anonymously have been very the initial 3 months of treatment than popular. Of course, these initiatives those who received traditional therapy require a baseline infrastructure and alone.42 Thus, while the Western literacy initiatives to be truly effective. medical tradition focuses on a secular However, technology can open doors approach, given the demographics of to rural areas of Iraq and to women Iraqi society and the influence of Is- in particular, dispersing advice and lam in Iraqi culture, intertwining reli- information relatively cheaply. gion and medicine appears to be more As for treatment, group therapies culturally appropriate and effective. are an effective method of treating Finally, any mental health initiative Iraqis on a large scale. With limited in Iraq must take into account its resources, group therapies allow psy- severe shortage of resources. Histor- chiatrists to meet with more patients ically, mental health services have at once, thus maximizing their pro- been centralized in urban hospitals ductivity. Furthermore, group thera- with only one psychiatrist per million pies would allow patients to connect patients.43 Policy initiatives must with one another, acting as further also be able to accommodate large support networks. Given the current populations throughout Iraq, espe- level of stigma in Iraqi society and the cially targeting rural areas. With the patient’s feelings of isolation, a group United States lessening their financial setting [provides a support network]. commitments to Iraq, every dollar With women in particular, a group must be spent in the most economi- setting also removes the problems cally sound way possible.44 Education associated with a one-on-one session initiatives could be highly effective with a male psychiatrist, though while being relatively inexpensive, ideally group therapies should be sex particularly with the aid of local segregated given cultural standards Islamic leaders and existing institu- and recent Islamic fatwas.45 Group tions. Technology initiatives would therapies are not only economically also be useful in outreach programs. efficient but also culturally preferable For example, in the United States, to traditional one-on-one Western
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j64 therapy sessions. oric.49 That being said, anthropology To get to the root of the mental does not espouse cultural relativism, health crisis, Iraqi society must eval- especially with respect to cultural uate cultural power dynamics that norms that harm members of society can be detrimental to women’s mental such as gender barriers.50 Thus, while health. In particular, women must be United States policy in Iraq should able to assert themselves in society. If address sensitive cultural topics, the Iraqi society intends to reduce mental lessons of the recent past show us the health problems in the future, they importance of understanding of Iraqis must invest in “state gender ideologies cultural and societal milieu before that encourage investment in women’s engaging in these discussions. health in broad ways, from educa- In conclusion, mental health in tion to economic empowerment and Iraq is a multilayered issue. Topics through legal and political mecha- such as culture and gender are partic- nisms that enhance the status of wom- ularly important in policy discussions. en.”46 However, it is important to un- One cannot simply cut-and-paste derstand that goals such as these will traditional western therapies and come into direct conflict with current approaches into other cultures. While cultural norms in Iraq.47 [Such opin- major topics concerning Iraqi culture ions, especially coming from United and mental health have been outlined, States policy makers, could cause more anthropological research is cross-cultural misunderstandings. In urgently needed, particularly with this case, anthropological methodol- an emphasis on gender and mental ogy offers tools for different cultures health in the region. Current research to interact positively, particularly by is sorely lacking the voices, opinions, trying to see the world through the and stories of Iraqis themselves. eyes of individuals in other cultures.48 While statistics give an overview of Understanding these cultural norms Iraqi society, they gloss over the de- and creating sensitive policies can tails of individual experience. Public allow historically dominant powers health initiatives can only be success- such as the United States to interact ful if they take individual needs into with other societies without falling consideration, including Iraqis’ own into patronizing, neocolonialist rhet- visions for their country’s future.
Fall 2014 j65 About the Author
Katharyn Gadient is a fourth year, Middle Eastern Studies (Arabic) Major. She is currently an intern with the UVA Women’s Center Media and Communications Department and an ESL tutor with various local organizations. Katharyn has also participated in the US Department of State’s Diplomacy Project and recently studied abroad with the UVa in Jordan program.
Works Cited
1 Del Vecchio Good, Mary-Jo, Women and lottesville, VA. Fall 2013. UVA Lecture. Mental Health, United Nations, http:// 11 United Nations, Women in Iraq Fact- www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/men- sheet, http://unami.unmissions.org/ tal.htm LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=xqx9gxy- 2 Medecins Sans Frontieres, Healing 7Isk%3D&tabid=2790&language=en-US, Iraqis: The Challenges of Providing Accessed September 8, 2014 Mental Health Care in Iraq, Doctors 12 World Health Organization Without Borders, http://www.doctor- 13 United Nations swithoutborders.org/publications/article. 14 Medecins Sans Frontieres cfm?id=6746&cat=special-report 15 United Nations 3 Del Vecchio Good 16 World Health Organization 4 Medecins Sans Frontieres. 17 Wattenmaker, Patricia. 5 Ibid. 18 Bolton, Paul, “Mental Health in Iraq: 6 Ibid. Issues and Challenges,” The Lancet 7 World Health Organization, Gender and 381:9870(2013): 879-881. Women’s Mental Health, http://www. 19 Wattenmaker, Patricia. who.int/mental_health/media/en/242.pdf 20 Ibid. 8 Del Vecchio Good 21 Bolton, 2013 9 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 10 Wattenmaker, Patricia. “ANTH 3590: 23 Medecins Sans Frontieres Anthropology of the Middle East”. Char- 24 Bolton, 2013
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j66 25 Ibid. 39 Niamatullah, Abu Eesa 2010 The Prophet 26 Ibid. Muhammad’s Concern for Mental Illness. 27 United Nations http://www.1stethical.com/2010/10/10/ 28 Sabah Sadik, Marie Bradley, Saad Al-Ha- the-prophet-muhammads-con- soon, and Rachel Jenkins, “Public Percep- cern-for-mental-illness/, Accessed Sep- tion of Mental Health in Iraq,” Interna- tember 8, 2014 tional Journal of Mental Health Systems 40 Ciftci, Ayse, Jones, Nev, and Patrick W. 4:26(2010) Corrigan 2012 Mental Health Stigma in 29 Bolton, 2013 the Muslim Community. Journal of Mus- 30 Del Vecchio Good lim Mental Health 7(1). 31 United States Central Intelligence Agen- 41 Sabry, Walaa M., and Adarsh Vohra. 2013 cy, The World Factbook: Iraq, https:// Role of Islam in the Management of Psy- www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- chiatric Disorders. Indian Journal of Psy- world-factbook/geos/iz.html chiatry 55: 205-214. 32 Wattenmaker, Patricia 42 Azhar, M. Z., and S. L. Varma 1995 Re- 33 Ibid. ligious Psychotherapy in Depressive Pa- 34 Inhorn, Marcia C., and Gamal I. Serour tients. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics 2011 Islam, Medicine, and Arab-Muslim 63:165-168. Refugee Health in America after 9/11. The 43 Sadik, Sabah, et al.(26). Lancet 378(9794): 935-943. 44 Kelley, Matt 2008 U.S. Rebuilding aid in 35 Boston University School of Medicine Iraq Winding Down. USA Today, Febru- 2001-2012 Boston Healing Landscape ary 2. Project: Islam and Health. http://www. 45 Inhorn, Marcia C., et al. 935-943 bu.edu/bhlp/ Resources/Islam/health/ill- 46 Del Vecchio Good, Mary-Jo n.d. ness.html, Accessed September 8, 2014. 47 United Nations 2013 Women in Iraq Fact- 36 Sadik, Sabah, Marie Bradley, Saad Al-Ha- sheet. soon, and Rachel Jenkins. 2010 Public 48 Wattenmaker, Patricia. Perception of Mental Health in Iraq. In- 49 Abu-Loghod 2002 Do Muslim Wom- ternational Journal of Mental Health en Really Need Saving? Anthropologi- Systems. International Journal of Mental cal Reflections on Cultural Relativism Health Systems 4(26). and Its Others. American Athropologist 37 Wattenmaker, Patricia. 104(3):783-790. 38 Medecins Sans Frontieres 50 Wattenmaker, Patricia
Fall 2014 j67 What the Dalai Lama Could Learn From Gandhi
Evaluating the Dalai Lama’s Political Strategies
By Jessica DeJesus
China’s continued occupation of Tibet since 1951 has resulted in the loss of Tibet’s autonomy and has left Tibetans increasingly dissatisfied with their lack of political freedoms. The Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader for Tibetans, has worked endlessly to find a solution to the conflict. Unfortunately, the Dalai Lama has not made much progress towards his goal of gaining autonomy for Tibet. This unresolved conflict has important implications for the realm of international relations. First, it demonstrates the unique struggle for leaders with a dual political and spiritual role in attempting to reach certain political goals for the states and peoples they represent. And secondly, China’s ability to strip Tibet of its autonomy is an important indicator of how China is permitted to act upon other nations without consequence and may be an indicator of how China will interact with other, less powerful, nations in the future.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j68 uring times of conflict, for the consequences of violating a nation turns to its leaders international norms. China must be for guidance. Leaders, in held more accountable for its actions Dturn, strive to develop the most ef- concerning violation of other nations’ fective political strategies for a nation sovereignty because China’s actions to successfully overcome conflict. send a message to other states that This is undoubtedly a difficult task. if a state has enough power, it can However, in some instances this task violate another state’s sovereignty becomes an even greater challenge without other countries questioning when a leader must find a solution to a or investigating its actions. As a result conflict that is not only politically ef- of that message, smaller states, such as fective, but is also in accordance with China’s own neighbors, may come to religious or cultural ideals. This was fear more powerful states, increasing the challenge once faced by Mahatma interstate tensions and the likelihood Gandhi during his fight for India’s in- of conflict. dependence from the British and it is The 2008 protests in Tibet con- now the challenge faced by the Dalai firmed that the Tibet-China conflict Lama, Tibet’s most prominent polit- is still an issue that is relevant today. ical and religious figure. This paper Witnesses say that the protests started will compare the strategies of Mahat- as small and peaceful, but the protest- ma Gandhi and the Dalai Lama, then ers were nevertheless arrested by the consider what lessons from the former police. These arrests upset Buddhist could be applied by the latter. monks, who then voiced their objec- The Tibet-China conflict is an issue tion through protests of their own. The that deserves examination because monks’ protests were also suppressed it is a reflection of the way in which by police, but continued to escalate China has handled disputes involving over the course of the next week1. On the violation of other nations’ inde- March 14, masses of Tibetans began pendence and autonomy. The more burning and pillaging businesses in China’s power and prominence in Lhasa, killing both Tibetan and Han the international arena increase, the Chinese merchants. China’s police more China will feel empowered to forces increased their numbers in Ti- deal with other states without regard betan areas as a response to the 2008
Fall 2014 j69 protests2, and China manipulated that could improve the approaches coverage of the protests by claiming currently employed by the Dalai that the protests began on March 14 Lama. My recommendations are that instead of the actual date of March 10, the Dalai Lama make independence thereby excluding any accounts about the explicit goal of his movement, call the early, peaceful phase of the protests. for large-scale non-violent protests in These facts indicate that tension is still Tibet, make more effective use of the high between Tibetans and Chinese. media to expose Chinese atrocities, Tibetans remain dissatisfied with the and involve a third party government current state of affairs, and now also or organization to mediate the Ti- appear to be placing less confidence bet-China conflict. in the effectiveness of non-violent ap- History proaches. Thus, it is especially urgent Before fully investigating the right now for the Tibetan movement approaches taken by the Dalai Lama to learn as much as possible from the in response to China’s occupation of non-violent methods of Mahatma Tibet, it is necessary to provide a brief Gandhi. overview of the history of relations In this paper I will first identify between China and Tibet. Tibet’s the Dalai Lama’s past and current ap- relations with China have been rocky proaches to the Tibet-China conflict. throughout much of Tibet’s history, Then I will evaluate their effective- and disputes over Tibet’s indepen- ness in advancing Tibet’s interests. I dence from China date back centu- will then compare the Dalai Lama’s ries3. Although it was unclear whether approaches to those of Mahatma China ever previously possessed the Gandhi during his struggle to liberate right to rule Tibet, China took the India, and relate them to the Tibetan opportunity to occupy Tibet in 1951, conflict to provide insight into the when the death of the 13th Dalai Lama effectiveness of those strategies in left the nation vulnerable. During the a modern context. Finally, I will occupation, the Chinese government argue that many of the Dalai Lama’s curtailed the Dalai Lama’s political approaches can be improved to be powers until mounting tensions led more politically optimal and propose the current Dalai Lama to flee to a series of specific recommendations India, where he has resided ever since,
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j70 advocating for Tibet’s autonomy As Tibet’s most prominent religious from abroad. Throughout the Dalai leader, the Dalai Lama’s actions and Lama’s exile, he has claimed that opinions concerning the conflict will China is enacting cultural genocide in naturally be informed by his religious Tibet, which has included destroying role and religious background. The religious artifacts and monasteries. Dalai Lama is thus adamant that Representatives of the Chinese gov- conflict must be solved through peace ernment retort these claims, claiming and compassion, even when facing that they are bettering Tibet through oppression or violence6. Accordingly, modernization and economic devel- the Dalai Lama advocates only for opment. Chinese officials claim that political strategies which conform to the Chinese government is liberating Buddhist beliefs of pacifism, rather Tibet from serfdom4. Additionally, than formulating strategies through China claims that they are freeing a decision-making process that only Tibetans from their “god-king”, the considers political effectiveness. Dalai Lama5. These competing views Approaches on Tibet’s right to independence as One aspect of the Dalai Lama’s well as China’s activity within Tibet political approach to the Tibetan have created significant tensions be- conflict involves developing concrete tween Tibetans and the Chinese gov- “plans” or “peace proposals” to present ernment, resulting in protests in 1959 to China’s leaders as well as other during the Tibetan Uprising, 1989, world leaders. The Dalai Lama’s plans and most recently in 2008. The long were designed to represent Tibet’s de- history of these protests demonstrates sired changes regarding their status as that the Tibet-China conflicts have a state and their political and religious been long lasting and, in light of the freedoms. However, this strategy is 2008 protests, still relevant. not simply about the plans themselves. Religious Motivation Peace plans also serve as a means of The Dalai Lama’s dual role of opening up communication with political and religious figure to Ti- foreign governments, and can thus be betans influences how he determines best understood as a tactic to negoti- his optimal political approach to ate with governments. The content of handling the Tibet-China conflict. the peace proposals identifies specific
Fall 2014 j71 desired changes, but Respect for the Tibetan people’s fundamental the more salient aspect human rights and democratic freedoms. of the peace proposals is their role in allowing Restoration and protection of Tibet’s natural the Dalai Lama to environment and the abandonment of China’s interact with foreign use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weap- governments in a way ons and dumping of nuclear waste. that introduces the is- sues of the Tibet-China Commencement of earnest negotiations on the conflict while gaining future status of Tibet and of relations between support for the Dalai the Tibetan and Chinese peoples8. Lama’s cause. The Dalai Lama began his strategy The Five Point Peace Plan was well of presenting peace proposals during received by the U.S. Congress and the 1980s. The goal of these peace galvanized Congressional support proposals was to gain support from for the Dalai Lama’s cause. Con- foreign governments, particularly gressional activity regarding Tibet the United States. In 1987, the Dalai increased, especially when working Lama presented his Five Point Peace on legislation focusing on China9. Plan for Tibet to the Congressional This activity included the addition Human Rights Caucus, claiming that of clauses similar to the Five Point that his plan could be the solution to Peace Plan into the post-Tiananmen the worsening state of Tibetan affairs sanctions of 1990. Congress also in- and a step towards peace7. The Five cluded provisions relating to Tibet in Point Peace Plan read as follows: the Foreign Relations Authorization Act in 1994, which included Transformation of the whole of Tibet into listing Tibet separately in the a zone of peace. State Department’s annual reports regarding human Abandonment of China’s population rights issues10. In short, the transfer policy that threatens the very exis- Five Point Peace Plan gained tence of the Tibetans as a people. significant support in Con- gress and increased political
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j72 attention to the Tibet-China conflict. omous Tibetan region will not have The Dalai Lama’s most recent any separatist intentions from China. peace proposal is the Middle-Way Tibet will still remain a part of the Approach. It is considered a moderate People’s Republic of China and China and compromising position between will control Tibet’s foreign policy and Tibetans seeking independence and security. The Tibetan government China’s desire to hold full control over will be responsible for domestic is- Tibet. The Dalai Lama believes that sues, such as culture, education, and this approach will be effective because economic development12. The Dalai it is designed to encourage more pos- Lama believes that his Middle Way itive lines of communication between Approach will provide peace and sta- Tibetan and Chinese leaders. It is bility between Tibet and China. intended to benefit both Tibet and Democratization of the Tibetan China and it treats Tibet and China Government-in-Exile is another polit- as equals. The Middle-Way Approach ical approach the Dalai Lama believes proposes to protect Tibet’s culture and will aid Tibet’s cause. He believes that national identity while still providing democratization will hasten Tibet’s China with Tibet’s commitment path to gaining its freedom. The Dalai to remain part of the “motherland.” Lama began efforts to democratize When discussing the approach, the the Government-in-Exile in 1963 Dalai Lama stated: when he drafted a constitution to reform the organization I continue to believe that my ‘Middle-Way into a democratic body13. Approach’ is the most realistic and pragmatic The constitution and course to resolve the issue of Tibet peacefully. it’s vision of a Tibet The approach meets the vital needs of the Tibet- with freedom of speech, an people while ensuring the unity and stability religion, and assembly of the People’s Republic of China.11 demonstrates that the Dalai Lama believes Specifically, the goal of the propos- in traditional Western “liberties” for al is to create an autonomous Tibetan the people of Tibet. One aspect of state with a democratic government. the proposed constitution that was The Dalai Lama claims that an auton- actually brought to fruition was the
Fall 2014 j73 democratization of the Tibetan ad- has consistently chosen to exclusively ministration in exile, which currently pursue non-violent strategies, and resides in India. Members of the to actively discourage his followers cabinet, previously appointed by the in Tibet from engaging any kind of Dalai Lama, were elected by Tibetans violence. living outside of Tibet from various countries The only alternative for the future is to learn to in 1990. Another suc- get along and live in harmony with our neigh- cessful move towards bors. We must seek a solution between the democratization oc- Chinese and the Tibetans that will offer mutual curred in 2001 when benefits. Because of our nonviolent attitude, the Tibetan electorate Chinese people both within China and abroad elected the top official have already expressed sympathy and concern of the cabinet, a position for our cause; some have even said they greatly always held by the Dalai appreciate our nonviolent attitude15. Lama. This was the first time Tibetans had elected their As stated above, the Dalai Lama political leader. The Dalai Lama at believes that violence will not solve this point had less political power, but the problems in Tibet and would in was still considered the head of state. fact worsen the situation. Further, the In 2011, the Dalai Lama told the Ti- Dalai Lama believes that Tibet’s de- betan government that he wished to cision to not pursue violent strategies step down from his political position has been benefiting their cause and and that all of his political powers will continue to benefit their cause will be transferred to the democrat- in the future. These are his primary ically elected political leader14. This reasons for disavowing potentially ef- moment was very significant because fective but violent political strategies. it would end the Dalai Lama’s role of Evaluation simultaneous religious and political After examining the various po- leadership, a convention that had litical strategies of the Dalai Lama, continued for over 360 years. the most important question to ask is Concurrently with all of the afore- whether his methods have improved mentioned strategies, the Dalai Lama the welfare of Tibetans and Tibet’s
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j74 relations with China. I will evaluate expectations, pacifist strategies have the Dalai Lama’s approaches and how garnered the Tibetan cause interna- those approaches compare to the ones tional sympathy, which in turn has Gandhi used during India’s own inde- prevented China from cracking down pendence struggle. further. The Dalai Lama’s other polit- Unfortunately, the Dalai Lama’s ical strategies of negotiating directly efforts have made little substantial with governments through peace progress towards gaining political proposals such as the Five Point Peace freedom for Tibet. China’s govern- Plan and the Middle Way Approach ment has as much power and control and democratizing the Tibetan over Tibet as when China’s forces first government-in-exile have not been occupied the nation in 195116. Addi- sufficient to improve Tibet’s situation. tionally, recent protests, violent out- While none of these approaches are breaks, reports of human rights abuses, necessarily harmful because they do and immolations among the Tibetan promote peace and compromise, we population suggest that humanitarian have clearly seen that they are also not conditions in Tibet have not substan- effective in actually changing China’s tially improved either. What’s more, policies towards Tibet or in improving China’s recent statements on relations the status of Tibet. with Tibet and the Dalai Lama do not Advocating for non-violent strat- demonstrate any signs of willingness egies has been politically optimal for to compromise on Tibetan autonomy. several reasons. First, in the event of The stagnant status of the Tibetan violence China would be much less movement over the past few years is likely to compromise with Tibet and a reflection of the ineffectiveness of the Dalai Lama on policy issues and the Dalai Lama’s political approaches instead place greater restrictions on towards the conflict. the Tibetan population. In fact, if The only approach that the Dalai Tibetans resorted to violence, human Lama has employed in trying to rights violations would probably only resolve the Tibet-China conflict that escalate. China’s police would respond has truly been both religiously and aggressively, which would result in a political optimal is the advocacy for great number of fatalities. Violence non-violence. In accordance with his would also be politically detrimental
Fall 2014 j75 to Tibet’s cause because it would vilify importance of Tibet, only restrained Tibetans. Part of the reason the in- and indirect acknowledgements of the ternational community has supported Tibetan conflict are made. Presidents the Tibetan cause is because of their have met with the Dalai Lama, but non-violent attitude. Resorting to vio- the meetings are always advertised as lence would greatly harm the chances being very informal and even these of the conflict coming to a resolution, informal meetings with the Dalai therefore non-violent approaches are Lama have upset Chinese leaders19. politically optimal. Thus the peace proposals that the Da- The Dalai Lama’s peace initiatives lai Lama develops cannot be seriously have been effective in increasing the implemented if U.S. and other world salience of the Tibet-China conflict leaders remain fearful of disturbing among world leaders. The Dalai La- their relations with China. A way ma’s Five Point Peace Plan influenced must be found to successfully con- the U.S. Congress in particular, but vince governments of the importance no binding legislative or policy chang- of Tibet or else real policy change will es have been made. This is partly due not be made. Advocates of the Dalai to frequent disagreement between Lama’s peace plans must continue to Congress and the US administration stress that the Tibetan cause concerns on how to handle the Tibet conflict a state which is being unlawfully op- and whether it is a priority17. Con- pressed and deprived of independence, gress has been very supportive of the and that allowing such behavior on Dalai Lama and his cause, as seen in China’s part would set a dangerous their numerous pieces of legislation precedent for a rising and increasingly regarding Tibet. However, the US confrontational regional power. administration is usually less support- The Dalai Lama’s current pro- ive of Tibet due to a fear of harming posed solution to the conflict is the US-China relations. The Obama Middle Way Approach. The Middle administration has repeatedly stated Way Approach can be praised for its that they consider Tibet to be a part peaceful and compromising nature, of China, not a separate country18. but the strategy is flawed and is not a Even when Congress pushes the US politically optimal solution. First, by Administration into considering the seeking autonomy, the Middle Way
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j76 Approach compromises the goal of even if some agreement is reached independence, which has consistently over autonomy. China’s lack of ac- been the goal of successive Tibetan countability and transparency mean administrations for the past century, that China cannot be trusted to honor ever since the 1913 declaration of in- any promises on autonomy or political dependence. This issue is particularly and religious freedom. In fact, there is important, given that China’s legal already a historical example of China and historical entitlement to Tibet is reaching just such an autonomy agree- somewhat murky. The Tibetan gov- ment with Tibet and then preceding ernment in exile asserts that the Dalai to break it. In 1951, China signed the Lama declared Tibet’s independence Seventeen-Point Agreement with the in 1913 and Tibet was thus indepen- Dalai Lama, which was supposed to dent when China’s army invaded in guarantee Tibet’s religious freedoms 1949. Even the current Dalai Lama and grant some degree of autonomy. has stated that Tibet was indepen- Those promises were quickly broken, dent20. Hence, autonomy is not a and just eight years later the Dalai politically optimal strategy because Lama fled to India21. Autonomy it goes against the Tibetan govern- without independence may seem like ment’s own stated view of China’s a peaceful approach, but it is not one right to rule Tibet as well as its own that will actually lead to democracy stated goals for their country. and human rights for Tibetans. Over- Second, autonomy without inde- all, it can be argued that the current pendence would send the message and past methods used by the Dalai to China and other nations that it is Lama have had the right intentions acceptable to strip weaker countries and were not bad political strategies, of their sovereignty and independence but nevertheless they do still need even without a valid claim. Third, the to be either improved, or replaced by Middle Way Approach is not optimal better alternatives. This will be neces- because China’s history of oppressive sary in order for Tibet to make sub- rule and human rights abuses means stantial progress towards achieving that Tibetans’ freedoms will not be goals of gaining religious and political guaranteed so long as China still freedoms. has territorial sovereignty over Tibet, Democratization is certainly a pos-
Fall 2014 j77 itive process for most states by which their principles. In particular, another they provide freedoms to their popula- struggle with strong parallels to the tions, and the Dalai Lama’s initiative Dalai Lama’s is the Indian movement in democratizing the Tibetan govern- for independence from Britain. India’s ment-in-exile is a good step in that relationship with Britain resembles respect. However, democratizing the Tibet’s relationship with China in Tibetan government-in-exile doesn’t that both Tibet and India struggled actually help Tibet gain its freedom for independence against a militarily because the government-in-exile has and economically superior state. Great very little influence over the state of similarities can also be seen between affairs inside Tibet. Democratization the Dalai Lama’s and Gandhi’s ap- doesn’t grant Tibetans within Tibet proaches to conflict. Both religious any greater political freedoms, es- figures strongly advocated for non-vi- pecially as only Tibetans outside of olent solutions. Instead of focusing Tibet can participate in voting for the on similarities between the strategies exiled government’s newly democratic employed by the Dalai Lama and administration. Democratization Gandhi, however, it is more useful outside Tibet will produce few effects to focus on why Gandhi’s movement so long as Chinese officials keep a succeeded in gaining independence, tight grip on political liberties. Thus, whereas the Dalai Lama has thus far although the Dalai Lama embracing not succeeded. democracy should be viewed posi- There exist three main reasons why tively, his efforts will not truly benefit Gandhi found such success.The first Tibetans until their government can reason is likely that Gandhi was phys- come out of exile and become the sole ically present in India and thus able to political authority for the nation of mobilize large gatherings. This differs Tibet. from the Dalai, who has been living The Dalai Lama and Gandhi in exile in India since 1959. Thus, Ti- The Tibet-China conflictbetans may feel that the Dalai Lama is certainly not the first in which is more distant and less capable of adherents of a non-violent religious effectively rallying Tibetans. Further- tradition have sought to fight for their more, protests are inherently fluid sit- sovereignty in a way consistent with uations, and the presence of a revered
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j78 leader with a charismatic personality India’s fight for independence, Britain could dramatically change the nature and other colonial powers were facing and scope of Tibetan protests. The social, political, and economic chal- Dalai Lama himself, again in contrast lenges. Imperial powers were strug- to Gandhi, also seems less intent on gling to deal with the nationalism rallying Tibetans. Second, the protest emerging within their colonies, and movements that Gandhi was able to the British were already questioning mobilize were massive. The size of Ti- the cost effectiveness of controlling betan protests is much smaller and this India. Britain was also becoming in- is likely due to Tibet’s much smaller creasingly concerned that the conflict population of around 3 million versus was tarnishing their reputation24. In India’s pre-independence population contrast, China is a rising power that of 400 million22. This ability to mo- has the economic means to control bilize large numbers of people is an Tibet and does not appear to find it important difference between India to be overly costly. Moreover, a second and Tibet because it can produce large limiting factor is that China, unlike effects. Britain knew it couldn’t resist Britian, does not seem to feel social thousand-people protests forever and pressures to grant Tibet freedom. The that if these protests sparked violent international community has thus far unrest, it would be overwhelming23. been reluctant to challenge China on Third, Gandhi’s protests and move- this issue. However, there are signs ments, such as the Salt March, were that when criticism in the internation- consciously political, and reactionary, al community is high, China is more whereas the Dalai Lama does not ac- willing to reevaluate policies. tively mobilize Tibetans for political Gandhi’s non-violent in- ends and instead pursues peace with a dependence movement is likely the focus on order and stability. closest historical parallel to the Dalai Limiting Factors Lama’s movement today, and thus the The first limiting factor on the -Da closest to being both religiously and lai Lama’s ability to adopt the above politically optimal according to the strategies is that there are important Dalai Lama’s standards. As discussed differences between the oppressors in earlier, it is not likely that Gandhi’s India and Tibet. During the time of methods would be quite as effective
Fall 2014 j79 in Tibet as they were in India because repressive rule over Tibet and it is China has both greater means and therefore best if Tibet cuts political political will to hold onto Tibet than ties with China. If China were to Britain did for India. However, the promise Tibetans autonomy, Tibetans strategies identified in Gandhi’s ap- are not likely to find this promise reli- proach can contribute to formulating able due to China’s past infringements strategies that can find an optimal on Tibetans religious and political solution for Tibet. freedoms. China’s lack of accountabil- Recommendations ity and transparency would also make I propose that the best path for the any agreements on autonomy unre- Dalai Lama going forward would be liable. The other strategies proposed to take a more active approach in his below will presume an explicit goal of efforts to liberate Tibet. This should independence for Tibet. involve several specific steps outlined Second, the Dalai Lama should below. be willing to call for large-scale, The first specific recommendation I non-violent protests to liberate Tibet. propose is that, the end goal for these Such protests can be very effective, as strategies should be complete inde- seen in Gandhi’s movement in India. pendence for Tibet. The goal should Certainly, Tibetans face significant not be autonomy because, as men- restrictions on such mobilizization tioned before, China cannot be trust- because China keeps the areas with ed to respect any autonomy agreement. Tibetan population separated and Furthermore, it must be remembered closely monitored. However, the Brit- that Tibet has the fundamental right ish had instituted many of the same to independence, because similarly restrictions in India, and Gandhi was to past decolonization processes, and still able to prevail by being unabashed especially when China’s claims to in encouraging protest and civil dis- Tibet are so tenuous, Tibet should be obedience, even if it resulted in going allowed to be independent whether or to jail. Similarly, if Tibetan monks be- not outside parties think Tibet would gan to actively work to mobilize and be better off as an independent nation. inspire the population towards protest, Autonomy is not an adequate end goal China would be less able to ignore the for Tibet because China has enforced dissatisfaction of the Tibetan people.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j80 In the past, whenever Tibetans have far, the Dalai Lama has not supported protested, they have in fact gained in- active gathering of protesters because ternational attention. After the 2008 of the possibility of it leading to vio- protests occurred, many members lence and decreasing China’s trust in of Congress took active measures to the Dalai Lama, which would also work towards a solution to the conflict. complicate ongoing negotiations even Some suggested a boycott of the 2008 further. However, the Dalai Lama Olympics in Beijing, some formed a should accept the use of more active Tibet Caucus to protect the rights of and resistance-based approaches, like Tibetans, and others worked on legis- those of Gandhi. The Dalai Lama lation calling on China to change its should also no longer be concerned actions regarding Tibet25. Effective with his reputation with the Chinese and strategic protests can thus help government because, even though increase pressure on China to change. the Dalai Lama has consistently been Unfortunately, it is likely that such advocating only for peaceful relations protests would result in violence, and with China for decades, the Chinese in some cases such violence may even still mistrust him. At this juncture, it be initiated by Tibetans. This would be seems pointless for the Dalai Lama to a very unfortunate outcome, but pro- still be concerned with attempting to tests must still be used to demonstrate build a relationship with China. the Tibetans’ dissatisfaction what the The third recommendation is that current state of affairs in Tibet. It the Dalai Lama use the media to put will be very important for the Dalai more focused pressure on the interna- Lama not to give up the cause or cease tional community to become involved protests because of minor incidents of and convince China to change its violence, even while condemning any policy towards Tibet. That pressure and all acts of violence on both sides. should be specific in identifying which Historically, successful protests have aspects of China’s policy towards Ti- often involved at least some violence bet are harmful, and document those at the hands of the police, but the out- harmful effects as well as specific comes of independence and freedom atrocities through photographic and are worth the effort. Thus, hopefully video evidence that can be circulated the ends will justify the means. Thus through the global media. In the past,
Fall 2014 j81 China has often demonstrated little China that they strongly disapprove responsiveness towards efforts made of China’s actions. In particular, the to convince them of changing their Dalai Lama should implement this policies, but a combination of the strategy of involving third parties by large-scale protests mentioned earlier setting up three-party interactions, and direct media exposure of China’s eventually leading to explicitly po- harsh policies may spur more respon- litical negotiations, with China and siveness to change. Already, Tibetans the U.S. This would allow the Dalai claim that China lessens its brutality Lama to utilize his relationships with when there is media exposure of their US political leaders to indirectly ex- actions, so it can be assumed that plain to China the benefits of chang- there will be an even greater chance of ing their harsh policies in Tibetans China improving its attitude towards and of granting Tibet independence. Tibet if international leaders make it First, the US could emphasize on the known that they disapprove of Chi- Dalai Lama’s behalf that controlling na’s actions. Tibet creates security risks for China The fourth recommendation is that, because Tibetans are clearly unhappy Tibet involves third parties, such as with China’s occupation. The recent the U.S., in its talks with China. Tibet wave of terror attacks in China by needs a third party to become involved disgruntled Uyghur separatists can be in the conflict because the Dalai an impetus for China to take action Lama and Tibetans alone have been to avoid a similar radicalization of the ineffective in improving Tibet’s status. Tibetan movement. Second, the US Outside help will thus be needed to can point out that China’s efforts to place a sufficient amount of pressure appease Tibetans through economic on China for policy to actually change. development and modernization Pressure from the international have not succeeded in quieting their community should not be aggressive, demands, and so continued occupa- although it is of course unlikely that tion in Tibet increases the risk that leaders or states would be willing to Tibetans will rebel and incite a major take an aggressive approach towards uprising. Even if China is able to China anyway. However, there should suppress such movements, continued be enough pressure to signify to control of Tibet could become very
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j82 costly. Third, the US should play on Lama’s choice to pursue non-violent China’s desire to be a major player strategies has been the only one that in the world’s affairs and economy. is truly politically optimal. The Dalai Committing human rights abuses Lama’s approaches of using peace that go against international norms proposals as a basis of interaction with can negatively affect China’s standing foreign governments and democra- in the international community26. tization of the government-in-exile These suggestions made to China by have not been able to change China’s the United States on the Dalai Lama’s policies or improve the state of affairs behalf can allow the US to come off in Tibet. as supportive of China rather than The most effective approaches that confrontational, and to say that it is the Dalai Lama can take are larg- only suggesting that Tibet be given er-scale protesting, more effective ex- independence for China’s own bene- posure of atrocities, and involvement fit. This diplomatic approach reduces of third parties, all with an explicit the risk of US-China relations being goal of independence rather than harmed, which in turn makes it easier autonomy. The combination of these to convince US officials to cooperate, strategies would demonstrate to the and increases the chances of China international community that Tibet is granting Tibet independence. a cause worth caring about and would Conclusion force China to reevaluate its policies China’s occupation of Tibet in Tibet. These strategies would not has caused great turmoil in the lives of be easy to implement because China millions of Tibetans. The Tibet-Chi- is a difficult nation to bring into nego- na conflict has resulted in the loss of tiations. However, if the Dalai Lama Tibet’s autonomy and political free- and Tibetans value political freedom doms. The Dalai Lama has worked for Tibet, then striving to implement ceaselessly to develop methods that these strategies will be worth the are politically optimal in handling the struggle. conflict. So far, however, the Dalai
Fall 2014 j83 About the Author
Jessica DeJesus spent her formative years living in England and moved to the United States when she was five years old. She now resides in Newport News, Virginia, after recently graduating from the University of Virginia. Jessica graduated as a member of the University of Virginia’s Class of 2014, double majoring in Foreign Affairs and Psychology. Jessica’s interest in the Dalai Lama and the Tibet-China conflict was sparked while reading the Dalai Lama’s autobiography, “Freedom in Exile” and becoming exposed to an international relations issue she knew very little about. After reading the Dalai Lama’s personal account of the Chinese invasion of Tibet during the early 1950’s, Jessica casually researched what the current state of Tibet looked like, hoping significant progress in Tibet gaining autonomy would have occurred since the Dalai Lama’s autobiography was released in 1991. However, to Jessica’s surprise, not much had changed in the 23 years since the book was written, inspiring her to attempt to find potential answers to the questions, “Why hasn’t there been more change in Tibet?”, “Why hasn’t the Dalai Lama been more effective in his attempts to achieve autonomy for Tibet?” and, “What potential changes can be made to the Dalai Lama’s strategies to increase his chances of reaching his political goals for Tibet?”.
Works Cited
1 Dumbaugh, K. (2008). Tibet: Problems, 12/5, 2013, from https://sites.google. prospects, and U.S. policy. (Congressio- com/a/macalester.edu/refugees/tibetan/ nal). Facts & figures. (n.d.). Retrieved history-of-tibet-china-conflict from http://is.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/ 5 Dalai lama’s birthday offers rare reason ChinasTibet/t427565.htm to celebrate; tibetan leader is no closer to 2 Ibid. achieving greater political freedom from 3 Ibid. china. (2013). The Irish Times 4 History of Tibet-china conflict. Retrieved 6 Ramanujan, K. (2007). Dalai lama preach-
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j84 es message of peace and compassino to china. (2013) sold-old campus audience. Retrieved 12/6, 17 Dumbaugh, K. (2008). 20013, from http://www.news.cornell. 18 Ibid. edu/stories/2007/10/dalai-lama-brings- 19 Ibid. message-peace-and-compassion-campus 20 Ibid. 7 Dumbaugh, K. (2008). 21 History of Tibet-china conflict. Retrieved 8 His Holiness’ Five Point Peace Plan, re- 12/5, 2013, from https://sites.google. trieved 12/5, 2013, from http://www.da- com/a/macalester.edu/refugees/tibetan/ lailama.com/messages/tibet/five-point- history-of-tibet-china-conflict peace-plan 22 Population of india 2013. (2013). Re- 9 Dumbaugh, K. (2008). trieved from http://www.populationofin- 10 Dumbaugh, K. (2008). dia.info/ 11 His holiness’s middle way approach for re- 23 Zuiderveen, J. (2001). Colonial india, solving the issue of Tibet. gandhi, and eventual independence. Re- 12 Ibid trieved 12/14, 2013, from http://www. 13 Brief biography. (n.d.). Retrieved from wmich.edu/dialogues/themes/indiagand- http://www.dalailama.com/biogra- hi.html phy/a-brief-biography 24 O’Connor, C.British withdrawal from in- 14 Ibid. dia, 1945-1947. Retrieved 12/14, 2013, 15 Tibet and china, marxism, nonviolence. 25 Dumbaugh, K. (2008). (1996). Retrieved 12/14, 2013, from http:// 26 Stokes, D. (2010). Conflict over tibet: hhdl.dharmakara.net/hhdlquotes1.html Core causes and possible solutions. Re- 16 Dalai lama’s birthday offers rare reason trieved 12/13, 2013, from http://www.be- to celebrate; tibetan leader is no closer to yondintractability.org/casestudy/stokes-ti- achieving greater political freedom from bet
Fall 2014 j85 Politics of Resistance
By Naguib Bebawi
Hezbollah’s rise from a secterian militia born in the Lebanese Civil War to its current standing as legitimate political actor in the Middle Eastern political arena provides a model for other non-state actors, such as al-Nusra Front (NSF) and Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS), for how to coerce mass support from a target population. Twenty-five years after the signing of the Taif Agreement, Hezbollah is not only a vital political pillar of the Lebanese government, the group has also maintained its militant wing which provides it with ability to intervene in regional conflicts.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j86 he emergence of Hezbol- patronage.”1 While the government lah as a major regional power purportedly provides universal health player over the past thirty care to its citizens, in reality someone Tyears has caused many to wonder requiring care in a government hospi- about the nature of the relationship tal must approach his or her legislator between the Lebanese people and the and ask for a bed in the hospital as a U.S Department of State-designated “favor.”2 This favor would be “repaid terror-group. Many scholars contend with political loyalty from the sick that the religiosity of Lebanon’s individual and the extended family Shiites is what gives Hezbollah legit- at election time.”3 For example, Amal imacy and popular support. On the leader Nabih Berri and Progressive contrary, it can be argued that the Socialist party leader Walid Jumblat lack of infrastructure in the State of have used resources belonging to the Lebanon and the historical margin- government development agency, alization of Lebanese Shiites are two the Council of the South, and the viable reasons which explain Shiites’ Ministry of the Displaced to provide support for Hezbollah. The Israeli social services to their constituents. invasion of southern Lebanon and the Since Hezbollah was not an official onset of the Civil War to produce the party until the 1992 elections, Abdel Party of God triggered the growing Samad contends that this made it “es- notion of “resistance” amongst Shiites. sential for Hezbollah to create its own The framework of this paper pits the social-service organizations in order social work provision in Hezbollah’s to compete with other political parties platform against religion as the main that are able to access services for their cause behind the group’s growth. supporters through the government The Absence of the State apparatus.”4 Interestingly, a publica- Lebanese Public Policy professor tion from a Hezbollah NGO portrays Mounah Abdel Samad found that Hezbollah’s services as a gift to the in the absence of the Lebanese loyal as well, although in this case the state, “Health and social services “loyal” rewarded were not necessarily have become an essential element in voters, but resisters. the political process of the country, While the number of people particularly as a tool of political receiving services from Hezbollah
Fall 2014 j87 is unknown, Hezbollah: Social Jihad tion of Lebanon’s Shiite community.”7 found reports that claim the number Partially as a result of these events, of service recipients to be more than “rural-to-urban migration has harmed 200,000, while other estimates claim the economic conditions of the Hezbollah provides services to about Shiite community.”8 In addition, the 10 percent of all of Lebanon’s citizens, civil war created increased religious or about 350,000.5 Hezbollah did not segregation in Beirut, with “neighbor- introduce NGOs to Lebanon, but hoods often controlled by sectarian over the past 30 years the group has militias.”9 While Hezbollah’s original managed to become more effective goal was to end the Israeli occupation than any other NGO. Their success of southern Lebanon, it soon found could be attributed to the “large array itself playing a broader role in Leb- of services they provide, the efficient anese society. During the civil war, manner in which they operate, and Christian forces “bombarded Beirut’s the specific location and constituency southern suburb, leaving its estimated they serve.”6 The absence of the Leb- half-million mostly Shiite residents to anese state outside of certain parts of face disastrous conditions.” Emergen- Beirut is astounding. For an NGO to cy action was needed, and Hezbollah’s be in charge of sustaining the lives of already well-organized social and 10 percent of a country’s population public services came to the rescue. speaks volumes to the capacity of the In her research of the southern sub- central state to govern its territories urb of Beiurt, Mona Fawaz found that with respect to the social contract. “Hezbollah’s popularity is due not only The lack of a central state, coupled to meeting acute community needs with brewing sectarian tensions and such as providing drinking water and triggered by the growing Israeli threat, collecting garbage, but also to its suc- culminated in the Lebanese Civil War. cess in adopting rhetoric that validates While affecting much of the Shiites’ frustration and desire for social Lebanese population in some form justice.”10 Similar to many world pol- or another, the Civil War of 1975 to iticians who infuse social issues into 1991 and the struggle against Israel their politics, Hezbollah has worked have “further damaged the already tirelessly to make poverty a religious precarious social and economic condi- issue and tie it to their political and
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j88 military struggle. As Saad-Ghorayeb in southern Lebanon”12 and then states, “It is not poverty per se that portrays this struggle as a “religious determines whether one is oppressed, duty.” This categorization of Shiites as but deprivation and exploitation. It oppressed people has no place in the is only when poverty is the result of Quran but, as will be mentioned later, state discrimination, negligence and is a product of Ayatollah Khomeini’s abuse that it becomes synonymous teachings. Hezbollah has linked so- with oppression. Otherwise, poverty cial injustice with their political and is merely a social description.”11 military struggle in a religious frame- Poverty alone cannot be the causal work making it difficult to define variable in the fundamentalization of the motives for community support. a community. The investigative ac- However, in historical context, it count of the story of the 9/11 hijackers becomes much easier to understand as presented in Terry McDermot’s why Shiites would coalesce behind Perfect Soldiers would suggest that Hezbollah. poverty is not really what motivated Theoretical Explanation fundamentalists to sacrifice their lives Harvard professors Eli Berman for the cause. Mohamad Atta and his and David Laitin’s work Religion, followers lost belief in the political Terrorism and Public Goods poses the system of their various nations. This is question of why individuals choose exactly how Hezbollah portrays their to belong to a sect. They found that struggle against the Israeli threat, as “local public goods usually provided a “resistance” movement rather than a by government such as public safety, terrorist organization. law and order, and welfare services There’s a clear political objective in are poorly provided or absent”13 and Hezbollah’s effort to draw attention to that “neither public nor private sectors the Lebanese government’s historical efficiently deliver education, health and continuing neglect of the Shiite services or insurance.”14 Those affect- community as it paints the group as ed are more likely to “band together a legitimate alternative. Hezbollah into communities that provide public also emphasizes that Shiites have safety, education, welfare services, been “disproportionately affected by and other local public goods through Hezbollah’s confrontation with Israel mutual aid.”15 Ghorayeb points out
Fall 2014 j89 that religion is a natural organizing must maintain a militia or else it risks node for community provision of local losing the ability to enforce dominion public goods.16 In that environment, over their territories. But Hezbollah group affiliation is a source of “mu- became more than just a militia; it tual insurance; providing protection, transformed from a non-state actor to health care, income, food, clothing a legitimate political entity to almost and the like.”17 Though “money need a state within a state. Hezbollah rep- not change hands, that insurance resents an ideology based in resistance relationship is nonetheless economic.” and strives to reflect this mentality Such relationships with a group much through all units of its group, includ- smaller than the state have been ubiq- ing the Social Unit and not merely the uitous historically. They survive in the political and militant wings. West in the form of radical religious History sects like ultra-orthodox Jews and Hezbollah is principally a Shiite Christian Anabaptists (such as Hut- party or club whose services are terites and Mennonites) who provide directed mainly towards a Shiite extremely high levels of mutual aid to population. It is necessary to under- community members.18 stand the history and grievances of The idea that a group of people can the Shiite community in Lebanon in become more united as a product of order to understand the rise to power historical sectarian oppression is not of Hezbollah. Eastern and western unique to Muslims. The existence of scholars alike dispute the specific date the Jewish State of Israel and all it that the Shitte communities were represents to Jews across the globe established in modern-day Lebanon. affirms this notion. Shiites’ support However, according to the Lebanese for Hezbollah can be viewed in a sim- historian Andrew Arsan, “It is clear ilar manner. Shiites have no reason to that Shi’a population had settled be loyal to a government that doesn’t across the Levant by the tenth centu- provide for the majority of them. It ry.”19 It wasn’t until the arrival of the would make more sense for the group First Crusade in the eleventh century to band together and, as a ‘mini civi- that the flourishing Shiite Amirates lization,’ put forth their own player in of Tyre and Tripoli were forced to the clash of civilizations. That group withdraw into the rural hinterlands.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j90 The predominatelyJabal Amil and the Biqa were relegated to the Sunni Mamluk Dynas- margins, regarded as significant only for the ty, which expelled the grain they produced and receiving few of the Crusaders in the twelfth benefits of Ottoman reform from an adminis- century, also persecuted tration that looked upon their populations with the Shiites and pushed a mixture of contempt and wariness. Regarding them southwards into Shi’sm as little more than a heretical affront to the Bekka Valley. The Sunni orthodoxy, the Ottoman Porte saw its Shiite migration con- adherents as inherently suspicious because of tinued for centuries their ties to Persia against which it frequently until the Ottomans waged war.22 defeated the Mamluks and gained control of the ‘Greater The Characterization of Syria’ region in 1516. The Shiite mi- Shiites as ‘Others’ gration into Lebanon was faced with The French Historian Comte de a “formidable demographic expansion Volney described the Shiite commu- of the Maronites Christians which nity as a ‘distinct society’ in 1787.23 created an ever greater competition for Other Lebanese groups maintained scarce land.”20 It isimportant to note the same belief regarding Shiites. the historical competition between Arsan notes that “Sunni, Druze, and the various Lebanese sects. Maronite scholars and ideologues, The geographical nature of South- unsure what to make of a community ern Lebanon further alienated the they regarded as the epitome of refrac- Jabal Amel and Bekka Valley from tory rural backwardness, largely saw it their immediate surroundings. This as peripheral to their aspirations for isolation was compounded with the a Lebanese nation.”24 Yet it is within incorporation of Mount Lebanon the framework of that nation that the into the world economy. This area Shi’a have sought greater political and was granted a degree of administra- economic recognition, following the tive autonomy in the wake of brutal incorporation of their rural heartlands confrontations between its Maronites into the State of Grand Liban estab- Christian and Druze inhabitants over lished by the French in September access to land and resources in 1860.21 1920. Lebanese independence from
Fall 2014 j91 the Colonial French state established lassiez-faire policies of the 1950’s.”27 A Lebanon as a confessional ticking report of 1961 found “only two doctors bomb state. The guideline of the in Bint Jbeil, a town of 10,000, and ‘National Pact’ of 1943 decreed that but eleven phone lines in the entire the Christian communities would surrounding district.”28 The notable maintain a 6:5 majority in parliament, distance between the two major Shiite in accordance with the 1932 census, strongholds in southern Lebanon, Ja- while the presidency would go to a bal Amel and the Bekaa valley, posed Maronite, and the premiership to a problem for the community as they a Sunni, and the largely symbolic were viewed as divided and under the office of Speaker of the Assembly to control of the zu’ama (Shiite Leaders). a Shi’a.25 This agreement ensured that Ahmed Beydoun argues that the rea- notable Shiite families (zu’ama/lead- son Shiites were not able to get a larg- ers) would maintain their positions er share of power from the National as representatives of their sects while Pact was due to their not being able tenants and laborers were struggling to organize under a single religious against the endemic poverty which entity (club) such as the Maronites reigned through the Shi’a areas of and Sunnis had accomplished during Lebanon. As a result, Shiites began the mandate period.29 However, few migrating towards the urban centers among Shi’a working-class seem to of Tyre and Beirut. Even in Beirut, have contemplated communitarian the Shi’ites lived in miserable social political mobilization, pledging their circumstances in the “Belts of Misery” allegiance instead to Arab nationalist surrounding the capital and its “urban” and leftist organizations such as the population.26 Lebanese Communist Party and the Urban life did not merely expose Syria Social National Party.30 This the Shi’a to the radical political changed in 1959 when Sayyid Musa currents of the time, Nasserism and al-Sadr arrived from Qom, his Irani- Communism; it also “sharpened their an birthplace, to take up position as sense of relative deprivation as they Mufti--or religious judge--of Tyre, observed the affluence of the Sunni the highest religious authority in the and Christian middle classes of Bei- Lebanese Shiite hierarchy. Sadr’s ar- rut, which had benefitted from the rival, coupled with the Israeli threat,
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j92 forced the Shiites to begin searching to capture the imaginations of Shi’a for their political identity. enthralled by leftist ideologies led to The tall and affable Sadr was a the creation in 1969 of the Harakat striking and exceptionally char- al-Mahrumin, or ‘movement of the ismatic figure, and was explicitly dispossessed’, though, according to hostile to the leftist parties, which, Arsan, he was “careful to emphasize he argued, “regarded the Shi’a as its non-sectarian character,” Sadr was no more than foot-soldiers, there to the highest Shiite leader in Lebanon serve their ideological battles with and his religious rhetoric drew mainly the Lebanese state.” He wished frustrated Shiites who blamed their initially to redress the economic and conditions and the growing insta- political marginalization of the Shi’a bility in the country on the failing through top-down reform31. Sadr Lebanese government and Palestin- sought the assistance of the country’s ian militias scattered across the south. political and intellectual elite, which This frustration didn’t lead into mobi- he courted through the early 1960s. lization, as noted by Arsan, and Sadr Furthermore, he brokered alliances “remained incapable of mobilizing the with the new Shi’a bourgeoisie, men majority of Shi’a, who remained com- who had made their money in Beirut mitted to the leftist parties.” Only his or abroad, and who found their po- mysterious disappearance in Libya in litical and social ambitions frustrated 1978, and the Israeli invasion of Leb- by the continuing power of the old anon that same year, “succeeded in Shiite families.32 In 1967, thanks to bringing Amal (Shiite militia created this network of allegiances, Sadr suc- by Sadr) the support of many Shi’a, ceeded in establishing the Supreme exhausted by the depredations they Islamic Shi’a Council to regulate the blamed on the Palestinian presence in affairs of the community--thereby their midst.”34 In the middle of a Civil putting the Shi’a on the same footing War and an invasion by a formidable as the Maronites, the Sunnis and the foe who has already conquered a more Druze, who all had their own corpo- valuable area (Palestine), a resistance rate institutions.33 ideology was formed and the Shiite Sadr’s growing understanding of community of Lebanon was to be the the need for a populist movement center of global attention.
Fall 2014 j93 Religious Social Contract In the early years of the 1970’s, Religion had no real role in Shiite Ayatollah Khomeini became the politics until the Israeli invasion and religious and political leader of the the increasingly high presence of Pal- Iranian opposition. Understanding estinian militant groups in the south. that the rise of Capitalism and Com- During the early 1980’s the Lebanese munism had clearly been a factor in Shiite were influenced by Ayatollah a number of revolutions following Komehini’s radical interpretation of World War II, the ayatollah began the Shiite religious tradition. Kho- infusing his political ideology with meini perceived the martyrdom of concepts of state legitimacy from Husain (last rightful Shiite imam) Shiite Islam and a “brand of Marxist at Karbala under a different light populism propounded by the Shi’ite than most Shiites. Husain’s death intellectual Ali Shariati.” Khoemini had traditionally been viewed much contended the state’s main purpose in the same way Christians view the was to “implement sacred law, provide crucifixion of Jesus Christ, as an act of law and order...[and] keep a healthy sacrifice on behalf of mankind. How- balance between the social strata.”37 ever, Khomeini invested the story The third point made by the Ayatollah with a more urgent political meaning, required the maintenance of a signif- which “celebrated his valor in battle icant social services provision. Alexus and his martyrdom as noble gestures Grynkewich argues that the “Shi’a to be emulated by the Shi’a in their community has come to accept a wel- struggle for justice.”35 We should be fare-inclusive contract between peo- wary, however, according to Arsan, ple and government.” Indeed, leaders “of seeing an irreducible strain of rev- of the Iraqi Shi’a majority agree one olutionary activism running through of the main goals of the “new social Shi’a history as some commentators contract” for their country should be have done. Though by no means an effort “to reform the social services unprecedented, this interpretation of network and rehabilitate safety nets, Husain’s martyrdom had largely been in order to be able to respond to the disfavored in the past by scholars who needs of marginalized and impover- had counselled a quietist stance in the ished groups.”38 The Iraqis weren’t the face of oppression.”36 only Shiites to respond to Khomeini’s
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j94 rhetoric. Soon enough the Lebanese Lebanese confessional system. The Shiites would rely on what Michael book Syrian Intervention in Lebanon Fisher calls the “Karbala paradigm,” contends that the revelation of Amal’s the use of Husain’s death in Karbala existence “aroused Christian appre- for revolutionary purpose to inspire hension about active Shi’i involvement, martyrdom, sacrifice and commit- not in defending the South but rather ment to the cause. 39 in the next round of the civil strife.”42 Hope The Shiites perceived the Christian re- Sadr saw the right-wing Israe- sponse as a cover for their war crimes li-supported Christians as a threat to and as an excuse Christians could use the Shiites of the south. He stated the for their next cycle of violence. At that need to establish a militia “to defend time, however, Amal consisted of 800 the Shi’i community from both gov- unpaid or poorly paid volunteers.43 ernment neglect and deprivation, and James Reilly contends that “the from the Israeli aggressions against re-emergence of Amal was spurred the South.”40 According to Asaad by Israel’s 1978 invasion.”44 Amal’s Abu Khalil, the Shiites were already failure to expel the Israeli forces from “fascinated by the armed struggle Southern Lebanon increased the need practiced by the Palestinian resistance for a bigger, more organized actor to movement, especially in heavily-Shi- intervene on behalf of the Shiites. The ite populated southem Lebanon.”41 Shiites soon got their wish. The Shiite militia came in the form of The Birth of Hezbollah the military wing of the “movement of In the wake of the 1982 Israeli the dispossessed,” which was created invasion of Lebanon a group of clerics by Sadr in 1969. Officially namedAf - and laymen seceded from Amal and waj al-muqawama al-Lubnaniya, the established a militia to resist the Israe- organization shortened to its acronym li occupation. This group, according to (AMAL), the Arabic word for hope. Rola Al Husseini’s Hezbollah and the It’s important to note that the emer- Axis of Refusal, became the “nucleus gence of Amal saw the power of the of Hezbollah,” which formally an- zua’ma decline in the south. Amal’s nounced itself in February 1985 with rise to power alarmed the Maronites a manifesto entitled ‘An Open Letter: to the potential risk it posed to the The Hezbollah Program’, addressed
Fall 2014 j95 ‘to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and Islamic rule would not be established the world.’ Husseini found that the by force but only through the will of document “elaborated a perspective the people. 48 in which the world is sharply divided Consolidation of Power between oppressors and oppressed, Hilal Khashan argues in Hezbol- and in which the perceived imperialist lah’s Plan for Lebanon that Hezbollah ambitions of the US are identified as “needed physical space to spread its the ‘primary root’ of the su ering that propagandizing mission and to carve was inflicted on Lebaneseff Muslims out a constituency in the hearts of during the Israeli occupation.”45 This Lebanon’s Shiites.”49 Even before statement of intent declared the rai- the party’s official formation, pro- son d’être of the Party of God and its to-Hezbollah militants clashed with armed wing, the Islamic Resistance– the police in the southern suburbs the ousting of Israeli forces occupying of Beirut. They seized on President southern Lebanon. Moreover, it ac- Amin Gemayel’s (1985-88) attempt to knowledged the authority of Ayatol- clamp down on Muslim militias and lah Khomeini as the ‘single wise and restore state authority as evidence of just leader’, the party’s marja’ al-taqlid, his hostility to Muslims in general, its ‘source of emulation’ or juridical taking into account previous Chris- direction-though individual followers tian atrocities towards the South, remain free to choose another marja’, Shiites in particular. It soon targeted reflecting the relative latitude allowed the “Shiite Left and eliminated its in such matters in Shi’a Islam.46 What prominent activists and ideologues, is more, it called for the establishment such as Hassan Bazzuni, a member of of an Islamic state in place of the the central committee of the Political ‘rotten sectarian system’ prevailing in Action Organization, the communist Lebanon, though it remained deliber- thinker Hussein Mrouei, and acade- ately vague on the form such a state mician Hassan Hamdan (aka Mahdi would take.47 Indeed, the Open Let- Amel), through assassination.”50 ter refused to espouse explicitly the After decimating the Shiite Left, notion of wilayat al-faqih, or govern- Hezbollah turned its attention to ment of the Juris consults elaborated fighting the Israel Defense Forces by Khomeini, and maintained that (IDF) and its local surrogate, the
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j96 Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). resistance” became nonnegotiable Between 1985 and 1988, Hezbollah precepts of the Lebanese political “cemented its control over the poor parlance. Khasan notes “questioning Shi’a suburbs of Beirut in a series of the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s military increasingly bitter confrontations wing and its arsenal became synon- with Amal,” which ended only with ymous with ‘conspiracy against the a truce brokered by Syria and Iran resistance, collusion with Zionism in 1989.51 In tandem with its effort and U.S. imperialism.’”52 to gain control of Lebanese Shiites, Legitimate Political Actor Hezbollah “moved to monopolize the The importance of Hezbollah to fight against Israel, which had begun Lebanese politics goes beyond its in 1982 as the objective of the largely paramilitary activities. Since 1985 secular National Resistance Front Hezbollah has come to be a major (NRF).” But by 1987, Hezbollah had political player in Lebanon. Hezbol- taken control of the access routes to lah controls a parliamentary block the Israeli-established security belt in composed of 14 deputies, most of southern Lebanon, which effectively them Shiites, but the party has come rendered the NRF useless and led to to realize the importance of appear- its disbanding. ing to be inclusive in a confessional These power consolidation moves system. This led Hezbollah to appeal were important to the existence of to Michel Aoun, a Maronite Army Hezbollah in its early stages. Before general who believed the Phalanges the party could spread its social ser- party kept him from the presidency vice works, it had to monopolize the in 1988.53 Together they formed a for- fight against Israel in order to main- midable bloc that presently controls tain the militant and political wings nearly 20 percent of power in Leba- of the group as of legitimate need. non. Additionally, in Lebanon, each Hezbollah soon introduced its own religious sect has a veto power over reductionist definition for patriotism; national policies. Hezbollah is one of terms such as “the liberation of Shib’a the holders of the Shiite veto, reflect- Farms and Kfar Shuba Hills,” “Hez- ing the group’s significance. Moreover, bollah’s deterrent military capability,” Hezbollah has gained control of 60 and the “sanctity of the triumphant percent of municipalities in southern
Fall 2014 j97 Lebanon and 27 out of 30 contested party. Palestinian Islamist leaders in municipalities in the Bekaa Valley. three camps maintained that, while Hezbollah’s strong political presence they were not allied with Hezbollah, makes it difficult for government they found the group to be the “most agencies and international entities to popular, not only because the party avoid interacting with the group.54 fights Israel, but because it provides While the importance of Hezbollah’s the largest amount of assistance to military and political wing is not to Palestinians in the camps. This as- be understated, it’s the sophisticated sistance includes not only health and network of social services that allows social services, but even provision of Hezbollah to gain Shiite’s trust and internal security in some camps.”57 support in elections. Social Service Provision Interviews conducted with Hez- Hezbollah has a highly organized bollah NGO workers for Hezbollah system of health and social-service Social Jihad indicate that the exact date organizations (see figure below). The that Hezbollah began assisting poor service system is made up of the Shiites remains unknown. Hezbollah Social Unit, the Education Unit and expert Judith Harik makes the point the Islamic Health Unit, which to- that the early history of Hezbollah gether make up an elaborate network is quite murky and it is therefore of service providers that primarily difficult to know whether the group’s benefit Lebanon’s Shiites. Many of political or social work began first.55 Hezbollah’s service organizations are In Hezbollah: a Short History, Richard legally registered with the Lebanese Norton notes that poor Shiites came government as NGOs, a status that to view Hezbollah as a movement for provides certain legal protections and the deprived.56 A survey about social, eases collaboration with other organi- health and education services found zations that may be wary of the “Hez- that 64 percent of Shiite participants bollah” name. Hezbollah’s NGOs indicated Hezbollah as the biggest eagerly cooperate with other local and provider of services of any entity in international organizations in their Lebanon. The same survey found that efforts to serve the community.58 72 percent of the poor said that Hez- The Social Unit is comprised of four bollah was their preferred political separate organizations: the Founda-
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j98 Executive Council
Social Unit Islamic Health Unit Education Unit • Jihad Construc- • 0 hospitals • Provides financial tion Foundation • 12 health centers aid and scholar- • Foundation for • 20 infirmaries ships the Wounded • 10 civil defense • Operates nu- • Martyrs Founda- departments merous primary, tion • Social health pro- secondary, and • Khomeini Sup- grams technical schools port Committee
Adapted from Hezbollah brochures and interviews with Hezbollah staff (2004)
tion for the Wounded, The Jihad Con- Beirut. 59 struction Foundation, the Khomeini Under the umbrella of the Social Support Committee and the Martyrs Unit, Hezbollah’s Martyrs’ Foun- Foundation. Ahmed Hamzeh, author dation provides assistance to those of In the Path of Hezbollah, claims that affected by Hezbollah’s military the Jihad construction foundation, Ji- operations against Israel, offering had El Binaa, is responsible for infra- monetary support along with health structure construction and in the early and social benefits to the families 2000’s, “delivered water to nearly 45 of “martyrs” who have been killed percent of Beirut’s Shiite dominated in battle.60 The Foundation for the southern suburb thus making it one Wounded works with civilians who’ve of the most important NGOs in been wounded during Israeli attacks.61 Lebanon today.” Following the Israeli The assistance Hezbollah provides attack on Lebanon in 2006, Jihad El to their constituency has made the Binaa was responsible for assessing group indispensable in various parts damage and paying for reconstruction of Lebanon. This also worked to gain to residents of southern Lebanon and the trust of the Lebanese under the
Fall 2014 j99 assumption that Hezbollah will come schools reportedly serve approximately to the rescue if they were to become 14,000 students. The lack of a quality victims of the resistance. public education system Hezbollah’s Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Unit Education Unit puts the party at “the operates 3 hospitals, 12 health centers, center of people’s daily lives.” 64 20 infirmaries, 20 dental clinics, and What motivates Hezbollah to 10 defense departments. The Islamic engage in Social Welfare? Health Unit has become just as, if not The modern state gains legitimacy more, effective than the Red Cross from providing social services to their organization as the Red Cross faces populace regardless of the involve- many hurdles in gaining access to ment of religion. Studies in Conflict & active battle scenes, a problem the Is- Terrorism found that the “regime that lamic Health Unit doesn’t share. The fails to uphold its end of the bargain effectiveness of the Islamic Health can find itself bereft of the loyalty Unit led the Lebanese government to and legitimacy it requires to maintain ask Hezbollah to assume operations of power.” The study also found that most government hospitals in southern “some opposition groups (whether Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.62 The peaceful, insurgent, or terrorist) have health-service unit provides health learned that they, too, can benefit (or care to low-income Shiites and other suffer) from fulfilling (or ignoring) low-income populations at little or no their constituent society’s idea of the cost. The Islamic Health unit is in- social contract.” volved in a number of initiatives, such The study highlighted the benefits as offering free health insurance and non-state actors gain from providing prescription-drug coverage through a public goods. First, the creation network of local pharmacies.63 of a social welfare infrastructure Hezbollah’s Education Unit offers “highlights the failure of the state to an alternative to Lebanon’s public fulfill its side of the social contract, school system, which is considered thereby challenging the legitimacy to be of “extremely low quality, a last of the state.” Second, non-state so- resort for only the poorest of families, cial welfare organizations offer the who cannot afford to send their chil- population “an alternative entity in dren to private schools.” Hezbollah’s which to place their loyalty.” Third,
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j100 a group that gains the loyalty of the The nature of recruiting Hezbollah populace commands a “steady stream “warriors” remains a mystery. It would of resources with which it can wage be logical to assume that education, battle against the regime.”65 health and social benefits would The second benefit highlighted in afford the group the sympathy and this report suggests that employment support from Shiites. The implied of a social welfare provision increases social contract between Hezbollah the legitimacy of the group among and Shiites also serves as a means for their target population. As non-state counterinsurgency actions. High lev- groups offer populations more and els of support for Hezbollah in Shiite more benefits, they pose an alternative dominated areas makes it difficult to to the state and, over time, populations locate the mysterious “warriors.” The may begin to exhibit more loyalty to a study found that, despite Hezbollah’s group than to the state. Samuel Hun- legal status as a political party, it still tington refers to this phenomenon as “undermines the legitimacy of the “institutionalization, the process by Lebanese government by challenging which organizations and procedures the state’s monopoly on the legitimate acquire value and stability.” The use of force and through an extensive third benefit that groups reap from social welfare network.” The near ab- providing social services is the ability sence of social welfare from the central to trade those services for recruits and Lebanese government, compounded support from the target population. by the Civil War, turned Hezbollah As Grynkewich notes “once a group into the country’s “largest and most co-opts the loyalty of the populace reliable social service providers.” and gains social legitimacy, a new NGOs of Resistance social contract emerges between the Besides providing a great deal of group and population.” Mouin Rab- services to Lebanese Shiites, Hez- bani of the International Crisis Group bollah has become famous in the (ICG) noted providing social welfare NGO community for being regarded services “fits into a broader pattern of as “highly efficient.”67 This efficiency popular mobilization and becomes can be attributed to the organization another way of seeking support for the of the Social Unit and the motivation organization.”66 of its social-service employees. In his
Fall 2014 j101 interviews with Hezbollah NGO problem, because some said the workers, Abdel Samad explains that typhoid came from the meat, many of them are volunteers with a and some people said the sewage strong belief in the morality of their had run into the water. The gov- work. He also notes that both Islamic ernment didn’t know the source. ideology and the belief that service So while the government was provision is an act of resistance con- busy dealing with the political tribute to this sense of morality. One problem, we were on the ground Hezbollah NGO worker states that and started working.69 “our institution members feel excited about their work because they are The organizational structure and helping people. They are happy to the nature of the constant struggle serve lower classes rather than higher against Israel forces Hezbollah NGOs classes, especially by providing loans to be ready at all times to assist those without interest.”68 in need. As one NGO worker put: Another Hezbollah staff member explains why their NGO is more For war, we have different efficient than the government: tasks and duties, we are always prepared and we are ready to If there is a problem in [one move to help refugees and those region of Lebanon], for the who are injured. The Red Cross government to move with its cannot always go in when some bureaucracy, it would take like a areas are bombarded, but we go month. As for us, we move the in. When they are encircled, very next day. In [one village], they cannot get to them, but there were 340 cases of typhoid, we can get to them. The people so we took our medical teams, who work here do not work for medicine and our equipment salary, or for position, or for and went there, and we stayed personal benefit. It’s an internal for a week, ten days, until we commitment that is strong. finished the case. Last year, in We’re highly motivated. There- [another village] there was ty- fore, ten of us will produce more phoid, but there was a political than 1,000 civil servants.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j102 This grassroots network in the the community and staying in their community allows Hezbollah to good graces. locate the needy and react quickly. In Aside from Hezbollah’s political her New York Times article, Sabrina and military missions, its charity Tavernise tells the story of a man who organizations are openly political and receives his groceries from Hezbollah see themselves as part of a resistance without knowing who brings them.70 movement. Hezbollah’s NGOs de- Hezbollah’s close ties to the com- clare publicly that they are serving the munity through its party apparatus resistance, and Fawaz describes how allow service providers to have inside Hezbollah’s NGOs perceive their knowledge about individual needs. mission as building the “resistance Another example of this was Hez- society.” 72 These NGOs perceive their bollah’s distribution of compensation mission as complementary and essen- after the 2006 Israeli bombardment tial to Hezbollah’s military resistance of Lebanon. Hezbollah’s Jihad in and display pictures of martyrs and Construction visited each village leaders of the party on their walls. and based all compensation on the Fawaz quotes Hezbollah NGO direc- recommendations of Hezbollah’s tor Hajj Kassem Aleik: official representative in that village. Hezbollah’s The resistance society is our vision. It is the task representative “directed to build a society that will refuse oppression and the engineers and fi- fight for its rights. All the rest — water provi- nancial officer of Jihad sion, garbage collection, agricultural training in Construction to the — is only a working strategy.73 houses and their owners, and afterward people received com- This resistance culture is evident pensation immediately, even without in publications from Hezbollah’s identification.”71 However, while health-service NGOs. A publication this closeness to the community may by Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Society make service provision more efficient, quotes Health Minister Dr. Karam it certainly highlights the importance Karam: of maintaining a positive relationship with Hezbollah’s political leaders in
Fall 2014 j103 The services provided by the Islamic Health activities have increased Committee strengthen the heroic efforts of confidence in Hezbol- fighters and reduce their worries about who lah, but they constitute will take care of those who support them. This only a small part of the network is a shield that protects the resistance party’s social services.” fighter and assures those in need and protects By September 2006, those fighting for dignity, for the country and Hezbollah reportedly for sovereignty.74 had spent $281 million for rehabilitation and This view that the Social Unit compensation purposes with reports is complementary to Hezbollah’s that the party was prepared to spend military and political objectives is $300-400 million in compensation essential in order to understand the to the victims. This figure stands in importance of social services to the contrast to the $21.1 million spent group. Hezbollah and its NGO em- by the Lebanese government’s High ployees consider social work as a form Relief Commission on rehabilitation of jihad. and compensation.75 Following the Broad Support 2006 War with Israel, polling found In 2006, Hezbollah’s health and 87 percent of the Lebanese population social services occupied a central supported Hezbollah. Support for role in the fight against Israel and in Hezbollah was broad based, including the aftermath of the war. Following “96 percent of Shiites, 87 percent of the 34-day Israeli bombardment, Sunnis, 80 percent of Christians; and Hezbollah’s first action was “to stop 80 percent of Druze.”76 This would its military efforts and divert all its suggest that the group’s resistance of energy toward social services and Israel and its efforts to rebuild have reconstruction.” Moreover, Hezbollah managed to achieve their objective, “provided displaced people with water, which is to gain mass support. food and shelter, and also promised Opposing Argument to pay compensation to people whose There’s a view among some scholars, houses had been destroyed, offering which can be seen in R.T Naylor’s $12,000 for rent and furniture until Wages of Crime, that asserts that Hez- homes were reconstructed. These bollah’s Social Unit is nothing but
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j104 a front for the terror group to raise Conclusion funds and gain sympathy amongst Whether this support is genuine or their target population.77 However, not, the fact is that Hezbollah’s role as the amount of resources, including a social service provider, coupled with monetary and human capital, that its control over how other humanitar- Hezbollah devotes to their Social ian organizations operate within Leb- Unit would suggest otherwise. The anon and the lack of a capable central effectiveness of the Social Unit state forces, dominated communities provides Hezbollah with loyalty to rally behind the group. Hezbollah’s amongst Shiites and other Lebanese social services have increased the stan- who have come to view the party as dard of living of many poor Shiites. the only one capable of confronting Hezbollah’s efforts have generated Israel. Through social work, Hez- allegiance and political support. The bollah has increased its popularity poor conditions of the Shiite commu- and votes and, in return, received a nity and the lack of alternatives may larger share of power in Lebanese have subtly coerced the Shiites into government. Judith Harik points supporting Hezbollah, but this does out that Hezbollah’s NGOs alienate not negate that their support is out many of those in need but whose of need, rather than religiously moti- religious and political ideology are vated. The new Hezbollah manifesto at odds with the group.78 However, issued in November 2009 steered clear “for those in desperate need, choosing of Islamizing the group. No references to exclude oneself from services may can be found to the previously men- be a privilege many simply cannot tioned ‘Islamic State.’ The fact that afford.” In many communities, Hez- Hezbollah changed their position on bollah has become a sole provider the nature of the Islamic State, which of services. Its high level of compe was vague to begin with, coupled with tence combined with the absence of their outreach to out-groups, contra- the state has increased the party’s dicts the notion that their actions are control over certain areas, to the ex- solely motivated by religion. Religion tent that it is difficult for other service is a tool to organize; the need for organizations to operate without organizing is usually spurred on by Hezbollah’s approval.79 other factors. Upon organizing the
Fall 2014 j105 group consolidates power by defeating support of the target population. The all competing entities and works to initial need to organize is not caused undermine the state’s legitimacy by by religion. Instead, it is caused in this providing social services to gain the case because Lebanon is a failed state.
About the Author
Naguib Bebawi is a member of the Class of 2014 from Cairo, Egypt majoring in Foreign Affairs with a minor in Middle Eastern Studies. He wrote this paper for professor Peter Furia’s Religion and War seminar. In Summer 2013 Naguib interned at the Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and hopes to one day be part of the Foreign Service Officer Corps.
Works Cited
1 Flanigan, Shawn Teresa, and Mounah the Service Provision of Islamic Organi- Abdel-Samad. “Hezbollah’s Social Ji- zations in the Southern Suburb of Beirut, had: Nonprofits as Resistance Organiza- Lebanon.” Paper presented at the UN- tions.” Middle East Policy 16.2 (2009): ESCO Conference on NGOs and Gov- 122-37. Print. ernance in the Arab Countries, Cairo, 2 Ibid, Egypt, March 2000. 3 Ibid, 11 Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. Hizbullah: Poli- 4 Ibid, tics and Religion. London: Pluto, 2002. 5 Ibid, Print. 6 Ibid, 12 Ibid 7 Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short 13 Berman, E., and D. Laitin. “Religion, History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Print. Club Model.” Journal of Public Econom- 8 Ibid, ics 92.10-11 (2008): 1942-967. Print. 9 Social Jihad 14 Ibid, 10 Mona M. Fawaz, “Agency and Ideology in 15 Ibid,
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j106 16 Saad-Ghorayeb Beat of the Revolution in Iran.” Cultural 17 Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods Anthropology 25, no. 3 (2010): 497-543 18 Ibid, 40 Knudsen, Are J., and Michael Kerr. Leb- 19 Arsan, Andrew. “Lebanon’s Shi’as: A anon: After the Cedar Revolution. N.p.: Long March out of the Shadows: History n.p., n.d. Print. Today 1 Dec. 2006: Print. 41 Ibid, 20 Ibid, 42 Weinberger, Naomi Joy. Syrian Interven- 21 Ibid tion in Lebanon: The 1975-76 Civil War. 22 Ibid, New York: Oxford UP, 1986. Print. 23 Saad-Ghorayeb 43 Ibid, 24 Arsan 44 Ibid, 25 Ibid, 45 El Husseini, Rola. “Hezbollah and the 26 Ibid, Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syr- 27 Ibid, ia.” Third World Quarterly 31.5 (2010): 28 Social Jihad 803-15. Print. 29 Beydoun, Ahmad. Al-´Arab Wa-al-´ālam 46 Ibid, Ba´da 11 Aylūl/Sibtambir. Bayrūt: Markaz 47 Ibid, Dirāsāt Al-Wah´dah Al-´Arabīyah, 2002. 48 Beydoun Print. 49 Khasan, Hilal “Hezbollah’s Plan for Leba- 30 Ibid, non” Middle East Quarterly Spring (2013) 31 Ibid, 50 Arsan 32 Ibid, 51 Ghorayeb 33 Beydoun 52 Khasan 34 Ibid, 53 Arsan 35 Ibid 54 Social Jihad 36 Ibid 55 Harik, Judith P. Hezbollah: The Chang- 37 Beydoun ing Face of Terrorism. London: I.B. Tau- 38 Grynkewich, Alexus G. “Welfare as War- ris, 2004. Print. fare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use 56 Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short Social Services to Attack the State.” Stud- History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. ies in Conflict & Terrorism 31.4 (2008): Print. 350-70. Print. 57 Social Jihad 39 Fischer, Michael M. J.. “The Rhythmic 58 Ibid,
Fall 2014 j107 59 Ibid, The New York Times, 06 Aug. 2006. Web. 60 Ibid, 17 Dec. 2013. 61 Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of 71 Social Jihad Hizbullah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ., 72 Fawaz 2006. Print. 73 Ibid, 62 Social Jihad 74 Social Jihad 63 Ibid, 75 Ibid, 64 Ibid, 76 Ibid, 65 Welfare as Warfare 77 Naylor, R. T. Wages of Crime: Black Mar- 66 Ibid, kets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld 67 Social Jihad Economy. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002. Print. 68 Ibid, 78 Harik 69 Social Jihad 79 Social Jihad 70 Tavernise, Sabrina. The New York Times.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j108 The Responsibility to Protect Initiative and UN Intervention in Darfur
By Eric Sutherland
Under Article twenty four of the UN Charter, the United National Security Council is entrusted with “the maintenance of international peace and security.” Through its authority as an international body, and the resources of its member states, the Security Council wields considerable capabilities toward to this end. Each of the one hundred and ninety three sovereign members of the UN have voluntarily accepted the obligations of membership as detailed in the UN Charter. “In granting membership of the UN, the international community welcomes the signatory state as a responsible member of the community of nations… the state signing the Charter accepts the responsibilities of membership flowing from that signature”.3 However, the UN has proved generally unable to compel countries to adhere to their resolutions. Security resolutions lose their effectiveness when the UN universally applies an interventionist policy and then fails to act. This paper examines how the UN response in Darfur, both in managing the humanitarian crisis and in stopping the violence, was inadequate-- and symptomatic of a larger dysfunction.
Fall 2014 j109 n this ongoing civil war The idea of a global Responsibility turned humanitarian disaster, to Protect is relatively new. The Inter- the ethnic, religious and region- national Commission on Intervention Ial tensions of the Sudan ignited in and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a what became a slow-motion tragedy group composed of UN members, spanning a decade. Most culpable for drafted a report in 2001 concluding the disaster, the Sudanese govern- that the “large-scale loss of life or ment-backed militia response to a civ- ethnic cleansing, whether deliberately il war, displaced millions, and killed caused by the state or facilitated by over three hundred thousand either neglect or incapacity.” Overrides from direct conflict or disease and a state’s claim of sovereignty and malnutrition due to displacement.15 necessitates humanitarian interven- Throughout the conflict, most notably tion.7 Ideal conflict resolution would during the initial outbreak of violence, start with the host country trying to not enough was done by the UN to fix the conflict internally. Upon the halt the violence. failure of internal mediation, outside The UN is still debating how it international bodies. The ICISS also should respond to mass violence stated that the decision for interven- performed by a government to its tion, including military intervention own people. Its failure to act during should be decided by the UN Security the Rwandan genocide inspired Council. the adoption of the Responsibility When the UN was deciding if, to Protect Doctrine, which asserts and how to distribute its resources, that if a government is unwilling or it emphasizes the uniform appli- unable to prevent large-scale loss of cation of this Charter across all life, the international community has conflicts. However, all peacekeeping the responsibility to protect the pop- actions must be approved by the UN ulation with or without the consent Security Council, whose members of- of the sovereign government.12 This ten have political agendas apart from Doctrine could have been the basis the well-being of the belligerents in for a UN intervention in Darfur, and question. The subsequent UN inter- would have established a precedent to vention in Darfur was fails to meet the deter future violence. standards of the Doctrine. The UN’s
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j110 unwillingness and inability to provide members on the UN Security Council substantive aid and peacekeeping held deep reservations. China and support in Darfur is the most recent Russia voiced concern, and generally in a litany of examples. The UN se- opposed intervention that impeded curity resolutions are often idealistic, state sovereignty. The United States, unrealistic, and impractical-- and only on the other hand, did not want to be more clearly highlight the disparity constricted to a set criteria of when to between lip service and the goals es- apply force—a sentiment echoed by tablished within the Doctrine. the UK and France, who traditionally To further examine foreign in- only intervene in very limited cir- tervention and the Responsibility cumstances where they have political to Protect Doctrine in Darfur, this will and an established coalition.7 The paper will begin by explaining the dissent of the permanent members to Charter and its origins and provide a the proposal was debilitating, as under brief history of Sudan and the conflict the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine there. It will then examine the UN’s the UN Security Council permanent actions in Darfur, and detail the members must unanimously approve intervention effort during the initial of any intervention.1 While the Re- violence. This paper cites only the first sponsibility to Protect Doctrine was few resolutions from the early years being debated, the violence in Darfur of the conflict, and contrasts Darfur began to escalate. with the UN’s handling of a potential Sudan, the largest country in Afri- genocide in Libya and the citation of ca, has been locked in a state civil war the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine since its independence from the UK by the United States. In discussing in 1956. The larger, Arab-populated these points, it will become clear that north has perpetually clashed with a the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine disenfranchised Christian-populated should have been used as justification south. Home to over six million peo- for greater intervention in Sudan. ple, Darfur is the largest region in the In practice, the ICISS policy faced country.14 Located in the southwest of serious challenges. When the Re- the country, apart from current-day sponsibility to Protect Charter was South Sudan, Darfur is diverse. It proposed in the UN, most permanent contains numerous minority groups
Fall 2014 j111 ranging from Arab Bedouin tribes to the attacks were a concerted effort to African farmers, within the Fur and “change the demography of Darfur Masalit ethnic groups. As is common and empty it of ethnically ‘African’ when post-colonial state structures tribes.”14 The mass killing in Darfur “tend toward the institutionalization did not make international headlines of ethnic entitlements, rights, and until 2004 when the UN coordinator privileges, which create differentiated in Sudan Mukesh Kapila compared and unequal status of citizenship,” it to the early stages of the Rwanda the predominantly Muslim Arabs genocide, and Jan Engle delivered have historically been favored by the a speech to the UN Security Coun- government and given jobs and overall cil claiming that over one million preferential treatment by the govern- people had been displaced and over ment.5 In February 2003, a rebel force one hundred thousand killed. He ex- named the Sudan Liberation Army pected a continuing death toll of ten comprised mostly of black African thousand per month.14 Engle’s speech groups of Furs and the Masalits at- ignited a large push for international tacking military forces in Darfur.14 In intervention from nongovernmental response, the Sudanese government organizations and watchdog groups sponsored a militia named the “Jan- like Amnesty International. Almost jaweed,” comprised predominantly of overnight, the crisis became a pressing Arabs to fight against the rebels. The agenda item for the Security Council. Janjaweed attacked villages, targeting The first record of discussion about Fur and Masalit communities. They Darfur was documented in UN min- aggressively depopulated entire areas utes in June 2004, a full year after the by killing civilians, destroying vil- start of the Janjaweed attacks. Ini- lages, contaminating water supplies tially, all action was lip-service to and systematically raping woman. The supporting the peace process between Sudanese military used military heli- the north and the south – the entirely copters to bomb the villages prior to separate conflict in Darfur was hardly Janjaweed attacks, indicating explicit acknowledged.14 That July the UN and close coordination.14 According to Security Council delivered a similar- Musa Hilal, a Janjaweed official with- ly-rhetoric filled resolution that called in Sudanese government intelligence, on the Janjaweed militias to voluntari-
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j112 ly disarm within forty days. Notably, community that the uncooperative the resolution did not criticize the government had something to hide.15 Sudanese government, or state any On July 30, 2004, when the Securi- consequences for the Janjaweed if they ty Council was weighing its options in did not comply.14 It is naive to think Darfur, the Responsibility to Protect that a government would stop over a Doctrine was dismissed by the per- year of violence in its country because manent members, who disagreed on of a call from the UN with no real whether the standards for automatic consequence given because rhetoric interventions under the Doctrine had is not powerful enough to invoke real been met. The eventual UN response change. “In an ideal world, non-co- was far too little too late, and did not ercive efforts would produce better prevent further disaster in Darfur. The behavior. But states persecuting their violence could have been stopped early own people are rarely responsive to on with a determined response of the peaceful gestures.”1 Based on this ini- Security Council. tial information that the UN Security Rhetoric over action is something Council received, the Responsibility the UN has been criticized for in the to Protect Doctrine intervention past. The UN has habitually struggled could have easily been employed. define a policy that its members will Darfur represented an opportunity stand behind, and the UN Security for the UN to establish a strong prec- Council members will support with edent of international interventionist their votes and resources. For this policy. The Sudanese government reason, oftentimes UN action is timid clearly failed to protect its citizens rather than affirmative as a worldwide from mass killings, directly harming police-keeper. The Responsibility to them through their deployment of Protect Doctrine is an opportunity for government helicopters in village the UN to bring authority that it cur- bombings, their financial support of rently lacks and better deter violence the Janjaweed. The Sudanese gov- in the future. Unfortunately, the ernment denied the UN access to the example of Darfur is no different and country to inspect the situation during the UN’s proposed actions were never the initial violence, which should have strong enough to stop the violence or been a clear sign to the international if they were, they were not invoked for
Fall 2014 j113 political reasons by various dissenting Rwanda in 1994, nor have they halted countries. the killing in Darfur today. In these As the facts of the Darfur violence cases, U.S. interests have not been became apparent, it seems puzzling sufficiently salient to drive either the why the international community generous deployment of U.S. power did not intervene especially after the or the fashioning of effective part- unilateral “never again” pledges fol- nerships”.11 Without leadership from lowing the Rwandan genocide only the UN or the efforts at coalition ten years earlier. Some of the world’s building around the military powers, most powerful military countries less powerful countries hesitate to act committed themselves to an inter- unilaterally. ventionist doctrine along those lines: Historically, the reception of UN “British prime minister Tony Blair and other coalition humanitarian promised that ‘if Rwanda happens interventions in the region was neg- again we would not walk away as the ative. A decade earlier, Somali war- outside has done many times before,’ lords actively engaged UN-sanctioned and insisted that international society forces operating under the aegis of had a ‘moral duty’ to provide military Operation Restore Hope. An effort and humanitarian assistance to Africa to capture Mohamed Farrah Aidid whenever it was needed”.8 However, ended in Operation Gothic Serpent, neither the United States nor the colloquially known as Black Hawk United Kingdom seriously considered Down. Following the immediate military intervention in Darfur due American withdrawal upon being to the military realities of waging bloodied, Aidid was accepted as the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. When country’s president after a disarma- describing US intervention policy, ment conference attended by all the foreign policy expert analysts Charles prominent parties in the civil war.10 Kupchan and Henry Kissinger as- With both the ghosts of Rwanda sessed that, “Washington has been and Somalia in mind, the UN was forthright in assessing the severity of slow to substantively involve itself crises in the developing world. But in Darfur. Its hesitancy is visible in such assessments did not translate into the initial resolutions drafted about forceful efforts to stop the genocide in the conflict, which are drenched in
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j114 rhetoric and light on action. Gradu- including measures as provided for.”15 ally, statements of concern became to The problem with action depen- proposed sanctions, and then threats dent on international consent is that of force. While the UN was trying to it is not always in the best interest protect itself from scrutiny for entering of the conflict in question but in the Darfur for political reasons, the delay interest of the deciding countries. was extremely harmful to the citizens While the draft of the resolution in- of Darfur. The United Nations Office cluded proposed economic sanctions of the High Commissioner of Human against Sudan as a punishment for Rights took up the issue in 2004 and noncompliance, it was removed after issued a “draft of concern” that did protest from Algeria, China, and not name or indict the government of Pakistan. Their hesitancy to pursue Sudan for the violence, largely because sanctions highlights the collective fear Sudan sits on the fifty three member nations have of precedent trumping commission Resolution 1556 three sovereignty. Acting out of self-inter- months later condemned “all acts est, nations oppose the Responsibility of violence and violations of human to Protect Doctrine, and all strong rights and international humanitari- UN intervention. Following the Sec- an law by all parties to the crisis, in ond World War, the Allied Tribunal particular by the Janjaweed, including at Nuremberg also struggled with indiscriminate attacks on civilians.”15 sovereign immunity, never charging Because of the UN structure, Nazis with crimes committed against participating members are needed their own people. The United States to authorize entry into the problem was one of the strongest supporters of countries. It is understandably dif- sanctions against Darfur in the event ficult when those countries are also of noncompliance, but Pakistan and members of the UN, and capable of Algeria both cited their disapproval effectively lobbying against sanctions. with the American occupation of Iraq Resolution 1556 gave the government and voiced a concern for the value of of Sudan thirty days to show progress, sovereignty over intervention as their and dispatched international moni- reasons against sanctions. Addition- tors. Notably, it left the consequence ally, Russia and China had political of inaction vague as, “further actions, reasons to block sanctions; China is
Fall 2014 j115 the largest investor in Sudan’s oil pro- automatic intervention. Under the ductions, and Russia a major supplier current policy, countries often only of arms.14 intervene when action is in their own The UN Security Council has the self-interest. Voluntarily, inconsistent power to, “decide on ‘measures not in- response is a defective way to deal volving the use of armed force,’ includ- with humanitarian crises. ing ‘complete or partial interruption Perhaps the largest blunder of of economic relations and of rail, sea, UN action in Darfur came with air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and oth- Resolution 1591, passed in March er means of communication, and the 2005. Resolution 1591 called for the severance of diplomatic relations,’”.15 creation of a “United Nations Mission However, no measures were taken in Sudan” with ten thousand military against Sudan besides international troops to “support implementation of monitoring of the conflict. Without the comprehensive peace agreement; any threat of punishment to cease facilitate and coordinate, within violence, Sudan had no imperative to its capabilities and in its areas of do so. Historically, leaders are rarely deployment, the voluntary return of convinced to stop their actions by refugee…and provide humanitarian international disapproval alone. “Sub- assistance.15 This resolution resem- jecting the Sudanese government to bled substantive intervention in the criminal scrutiny has had no discern- interest of the citizens of Sudan, but ible impact on the level of violence the conceptualized peacekeeping against civilians in Darfur and, if the force was barred from the country past is any indication, is unlikely to do because the Sudanese government did so unless there is international politi- not give its consent.2 While the UN cal will for tough action, either within could have legally still entered Sudan or outside the Security Council.”14 on the basis of humanitarian grounds, Once again, UN action was it would have risked its diplomatic stalled and later halted because of relations with Sudan, and would have the political interests of UN member eliminated any possibility of future countries. The Responsibility to Pro- peaceful cooperation with the govern- tect Doctrine is centered on the idea ment. Most troubling, it could have that certain acts of violence trigger led to direct confrontation between
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j116 the peacekeepers and Sudan.2 the Darfur violence since. In Darfur, While the UN struggled against international action was more contin- its own political inertia, other inter- gent on politics incentive than on the national bodies had the legal basis to preservation of life.8 act. The African Union reserves “the A recent example of foreign inter- right to intervene in a Member State vention in concert with the idea of pursuant to a decision of the Assem- the Responsibility to Protect and one bly in respect of grave circumstances, that supports Bellamy and Williams’ namely: war crimes, genocide and argument is the UN and US response crimes against humanity;” Sudan, as a to Libya. The outbreak of conflict was signed member of the African Union much more different than in Sudan; was fully subject to AU resolutions.2 uprisings in Libya occurred in in However, the word “right” is problem- March 2011 after revolutions in Tu- atic because it leaves AU intervention nisia and Egypt in the months before, as a voluntary act, not required even in during the “Arab Spring”.7 One of the the face of genocide. The Responsi- earliest signs that the leader of Libya, bility to Protect Doctrine, in contrast, Qadhafi was going to be “unwilling defines intervention an obligation. or unable to prevent large-scale loss The Doctrine values the well-being of life” was with the threats he made of any state’s citizens over that state’s against his own people, namely in a sovereignty. speech where he said, “‘officers have Foreign intervention has often been deployed in all tribes and regions served as justification for fulfilling so that they can purify all decisions political agendas. Ideally, the Doc- from these cockroaches’ and ‘any Lib- trine could be used only in conflicts yan who takes arms against Libya will meeting its objective criteria, thus be executed’”.8 rendering intervention apolitical and In contrast to the Darfur conflict solely humanitarian. Authors Alex J. where the US and the UK were putting Bellamy and Paul D. Williams have strong pressure on the UN to act but argued that, “international society is could not offer military help because now explicitly focused on civilian pro- of engagement in other conflicts, tection,” but this is a apparently recent regional petitioning from the Gulf phenomenon-- even more recent than Cooperation Council for a no-fly zone
Fall 2014 j117 in Libya lead the UK, France, and tion: protecting the country’s people.”6 NATO to rally behind a tough inter- The gradual shift of international national response, support the no-fly intervention becoming more centered zone and offer ships for humanitarian on the best interests of civilians is con- purposes.8 Another contrast is that ducive to the idea of a Responsibility while the African Union was hesitant to Protect, and stands as an example of to infringe on Sudan’s sovereignty with what could have happened in Dardur. intervention, Qadhafi was widely un- Instead, the political interests of UN popular among neighboring countries’ member states trumped the protection governments, who offered no protest of Sudanese citizens. While global of international intervention. After military powers claimed that they the passing of UN Resolution 1973 would not let genocide like Rwanda which legalized the no-fly zone in happen again, the lack of will to inter- Libya and allowed for “all-means vene in Darfur is proof that countries necessary”, including military inter- were content to not intervene if they vention, President Obama famously personally had nothing to gain from invoked the Responsibility to Protect the experience. While countries are Doctrine to justify NATO.8 On gradually shaking off their apathy, the day US air power was deployed, Darfur should be held as one of the President Obama asserted that he was examples of the consequences of inac- “proud that we are acting as part of a tion. coalition that includes close allies and The largest counter-argument partners who are prepared to meet against intervening on the grounds their responsibility to protect the people of the a Responsibility to Protect of Libya and uphold the mandate of Doctrine is the value of respect for the international community.” Gareth state sovereignty. Since 1648, and the Evans, one of the authors of the orig- signing of the Treaty of Westphalia, inal Responsibility to Protect docu- Western conceptions of sovereignty ment agreed with NATO actions in have established a “duty on the part of Libya, especially since it was justified the states to refrain from intervention as in the interest of the Libyan people. in the internal or external affairs of He said, “Legally, morally, politically, other states.”15 However, UN mem- and militarily it has only one justifica- ber states have already ceded some
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j118 sovereignty by agreeing to the terms and deter future violence. of membership. This is not to say that Darfur has demonstrated that the countries should not have autonomy, current model for intervention is in- The UN Charter calls this an “inher- adequate to protect the innocent from ent right” of any state. However, the sovereign government persecution. UN Security Council was vested with The UN Security Council should the power to, “determine the existence make a commitment to authorize of a threat to the peace, breach of the intervention automatically, consistent peace, or act of aggression, and to take with the ideals of the Responsibility measures to maintain or restore inter- to Act Doctrine. In the case of an national peace and security, including unwilling or unresponsive presiding the use of force.”15 Therefore, if the government, as in Darfur, intervention UN Security Council decides to base should be aggressively pursued. As future intervention on the basis of the was done in Libya in 2011, the UN Responsibility to Protect, they have sanctioned intervention to protect the legal basis to do so and countries Libyan citizens. should respect their authority to make Abiding by absolute criteria is the that decision. most just way to govern humanitarian Other critics of foreign intervention intervention, because it insures the cite the UN as incapable of providing equal application of resources. The adequate, favoring instead a “coalition power to legitimately intervene should of the willing” countries to intervene remain exclusively with the UN Se- when necessary.16 However, even curity Council, who vote according to multilateral action undermines the automatic and objective criteria. The UN as the legitimate global authority. adoption by the UN of the Respon- The UN does not have a monopoly sibility to Protect Doctrine would on force, but instead a potential mo- prevent mass killings like in Darfur nopoly on humanitarian intervention, from happening again by allowing for under whose authority these coalitions swift action to stop violence. Though should act. If the UN was able to uni- some critics protest the Doctrine’s formly apply sanctions under absolute infringement on state sovereignty, criteria, it could both become the le- the welfare of global citizens under gitimate means to deploy force abroad extraordinary circumstances overrides
Fall 2014 j119 political autonomy at the behest of intervention Darfur and should be international law. For these reasons, uniformly applied by the UN in future the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine conflicts. should have been cited as cause for
About the Author
Erin Sutherland is a third year Arts and Sciences student majoring in Foreign Affairs and minoring in Spanish. Now living in Colorado Springs, she has moved around the country because of her father’s career in the Air Force which has helped to develop her interest in international affairs. In addition to academic endeavors such as being a Teaching English as a Second Language (TESOL) candidate, Erin is a member of the Workers and Students United for a Living Wage campaign, a tutor for Abundant Life Ministries and is a member of Catholic Student Ministry and the University Singers.
Works Cited
1 Abramowitz, Morton and Pickering, national Law Review, 54. 2207: 415¬440 Thomas. “Making Intervention Work.” doi:10.1017/S0165070X07004159 Foreign Affairs 87.5 (2008): 100- 5 Ajejumobi. Said “Citizenship, Rights and 108. Military & Government Collection. the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Wars Web. 1 May 2013. in Africa.” 23 Human Rights. Quarter- 2 Ademola Abass. “The United Nations, The ly. 23 2001: 148-170. Johns Hopkins Uni- African Union And The Darfur Crisis: Of versity Press. 3 May 2013. Apology and Utopia” (2007) Netherlands 6 Bajoria, Jayshree. “Libya and the Respon- International Law Review sibility to Protect.” Council on Foreign 3 “An Introduction to the Responsibility to Relations. N.p., 24 May 2011. Protect.” (2011): n. pag. Responsibility to Web. 04 May 2013. Protect.org. Web. 7 Bellamy, A. J. Responsibility to Protect 4 Apology and Utopia.” Netherlands Inter- or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j120 and Humanitarian Intervention af- Responsibility to Protect. International ter Iraq. Ethics & International Affairs, Coalition for the Responsibility 19: 31–54. 2005. doi: 10.1111/j.1747- to Protect, n.d. Web. 05 May 2013. 7093.2005.tb00499.x Web. 2 May 2013. 13 Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the Presi- 8 Bellamy, A. J. And Williams, P. D. (2011), dent on Libya.” Speech. Brazil, Brasilia. 19 “The New Politics of Protection? Côte Mar. 2011. Office of the Press Secretary. d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsi- The White House. Web. 4 May 2013. bility to Protect.”. International Affairs, 14 Rodman, Kenneith A. “Darfur and the 87: 825–850. Wiley Online L i - Limits of Legal Deterrence.” Human brary. 2011. Web. 4 May 2013. Rights Quarterly 30.3 (2008): 9 “Charter, United Nations, Chapter V: The 529-560. Project MUSE. Web. 2 May. Security Council.” UN News Center. UN, 2013.
Fall 2014 j121 Politics in a Gendered World
Women’s Entry into Parliaments and its Effect on National Policy
By Lila Kelso
The creation by the United Nations of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000 focused the global discussion of development largely on disparities between opportunities afforded to men and women around the globe today. Because national governments are largely responsible for implementing laws that dictate the course of their citizens’ lives, it is imperative to understand women’s role in politics in developing states. If the MDGs are truly going to influence issues of gender equality and women’s rights, scholars must recognize the state of women in the highest formal institutions of society. Today, there exist both barriers and aids (most importantly quotas) to women’s entry into politics. Once in power, there are specific impacts that female legislators have on policy agendas and policy implementation that differ from men’s. Overall, while female legislators have a powerful ability to change the policy agenda of their parliaments, they are unable to truly effect the policies that are implemented. A case study of Rwanda, a country with the highest percentage of female legislators in parliament, reinforces the more broad discussion. Despite the increasing presence of women in parliaments throughout the world, there is still a glaring discrepancy between the number of men and women who serve in the legislative sphere. The onus of ensuring that women can truly pass policy initiatives should therefore be placed on individuals rather than governments.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j122 hile the global popu- primary education, and improving lation is made up of maternal health. While all eight dis- nearly equivalent num- tinct goals do not explicitly address bersW of males and females, females gender equality, each goal can only make up only 21.3% of national be accomplished with this parity. The parliaments worldwide.1,2 This stag- population can only realize goals such gering discrepancy between the total as reducing child mortality and com- female population and the percentage bating HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and oth- of women in parliaments is a bleak er diseases if women are empowered reminder of the inequalities that with the tools by society to effectively women continue to face around the achieve these objectives. Stemming world today. In recent years, the topic from this, a recent United Nations of gender has come to the forefront Development Report has shown that of global discussion regarding devel- improvements in the lives of women opment, as it has become evident that will allow populations to achieve all men and women have different oppor- MDGs, including those that do not tunities and experiences in economic directly address gender or women’s and political realms. Research on rights.3 development in a variety of countries The Millennium Development has reinforced the idea that there is a Goals necessitate that women be giv- distinct “feminization of poverty,” in en equal treatment in the private and which females specifically are subject public sector, including government. to an increasing number of barriers to In order to ensure that the MDGs economic prosperity. are met by their 2015 deadline, it is Under the Millennium Develop- the responsibility of governments ment Goals (MDGs), established by throughout the world to ensure that the United Nations in 2000, a distinct females receive the same opportunities emphasis was placed on promoting as males. It is essential that both gen- gender equality throughout the world. ders have equal ability to voice their These MDGs provided a blueprint for concerns regarding gender-based pol- development throughout the world, icies. Yet, as the introductory statistic with goals including the eradication of illustrates, there is a large imbalance extreme poverty and hunger, universal between the proportion of females in
Fall 2014 j123 national parliaments and their actual socioeconomic, cultural, and electoral numbers in society. Because national structures all play roles in both helping governments are largely responsible and hindering women from entering for implementing laws that dictate the politics. Within this discussion, heavy course of their citizens’ lives, it is im- emphasis is placed on the importance perative to understand women’s role of quotas for increasing the number in politics of developing states. If the of women in government. It is also MDGs are truly going to influence imperative to understand what effects issues of gender equality and women’s women have on policy once in office. rights, scholars must recognize the Through discussion of the entrance of state of women in the highest formal women into parliaments, it becomes institutions of society. There are both evident that female parliamentarians barriers and aids to women’s entry do not have a large direct effect on ac- into national parliaments, and, once tual policy implementation. However, in power, there are specific impacts female legislators are able to redirect that female legislators have on policy the policy agenda during parliamen- agendas and policy implementation. tary sessions, and therefore indirectly While national parliaments represent promote more gender-conscious poli- only a small portion of government cies. institutions that women can partic- Barriers and Aids to Increasing ipate in, it is important to focus on Female Representation in only one branch of government at a Parliaments time in order to provide a more nu- Many of the negative causal factors anced understanding of how women that the MDGs attempt to address in can affect government at a multitude the sphere of gender equality also serve of levels. A detailed case study of to hinder female political participa- Rwanda, a developing country that tion. In terms of cultural values, many has a majority-female parliament, developing states still subscribe to a will serve to reinforce the more broad system of “patriarchy,” in which men discussion of women’s participation in are seen to be the leaders in society, national parliaments. The MDGs and those who should control capital and women’s inclusion in government are act as the head of the family. These inextricably tied to one another, and systems of patriarchy reinforce men’s
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j124 dominance in families, communities, political participation. and societies at large. In patriarchal While studies have shown that societies, men also have the ability the overall GDP of a country does to dictate the actions of women, of- not affect the entrance of women into tentimes barring them from seeking politics, the more specific economic political office. Similarly, throughout position of individual women does. the world, and particularly in develop- In many developing states, women ing countries, women are seen as an are still prevented from fully entering inferior gender to men. In Uganda, for the formal economy, and therefore example, succession laws bar women, are unable to earn as much as their who are seen as unequal to their male male counterparts. As discussed spouses, from inheriting their familial above, women are often forced to land if they are widowed, thus leav- take on unpaid tasks in the home, a ing them outcasts in a society that position which prevents them from has a poor record of equal rights for having greater earning potential, thus women. Further analyses of Ugandan underutilizing half of the labor force. society has shown that many women Similarly, these economic factors who are single, divorced, or widowed create barriers to female entry into are deprived of many state resources politics in a variety of ways. available to males via the govern- First and foremost, with a lack ment and private citizens.4 Women of economic means comes a lack of throughout patriarchal societies are access to education.7 Because women therefore relegated to live in informal are oftentimes more impoverished sectors of society, tasked with taking than men in developing states, they care of the home and children, seen are often unable to receive a formal as unfit for professional matters such education, and are therefore less likely as politics.5 Even when women do run to understand the political process, or for political office, patriarchal norms what role they might be able to play often cause parties to support male within it.8 In terms of education, less candidates.6 Overarching cultural than thirty percent of girls in sub-Sa- norms of patriarchy and perceptions haran Africa (with the exception of of the inferiority of women in many southern Africa) are enrolled in sec- developing countries hinders female ondary education. Looking to Malawi
Fall 2014 j125 as an example of economic disparity, archal economic networks, are cut off 51% of male-headed households live from campaign funding. Overall, eco- in poverty, while 59% of female-head- nomic earning potential dramatically ed households live in poverty. While impacts women’s ability to participate this difference might appear negligi- in the political sphere. ble, this divide increases dramatically While the above factors are mu- when the household only has a single tually reinforcing, serving to hinder parent, and also does not take into ac- women’s development in society and count that many women are forced to their subsequent ability to enter the maintain a formal job and informally political sphere, some factors have take care of households simultaneous- more ambiguous effects on women’s ly, thus exacerbating the experience of rights and political potential. In a poverty with a lack of time to access recent study conducted on the effects political education.9 of democracy and democratization on Similarly, running for political women’s political participation, Fal- office often requires candidates to lon, Swiss, and Viterna found that in have a source of funding for their developing countries, democratization campaigns outside of their personal can serve to assist women in gaining wealth. In terms of economic means, political power. This can be primarily men are much more likely have access explained by the disruptive nature of to money to fund their campaigns, democratization, a process defined as just as they are able to access more the transition from a non-democratic means of capital accumulation on a regime to a democratic one. Democ- daily basis.10 Therefore, it becomes ratization often upsets prior social evident that funding provides prestige norms, thus making it more likely in governments around the world. for women to participate in political In sub-Saharan Africa, where patri- systems that had once been closed to archal societies exist in abundance, them. networks of male relations also allow Building on this, researchers found for easier access to sources of funding, that states undergoing democrati- as party support often comes from the zation, particularly those that had rich, who are more likely to be male.11 recently experienced civil conflict, Women, not included in these patri- were more likely to see levels of fe-
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j126 male political participation initially of proportional representation allot a drop, but quickly rise with subsequent certain number of seats in parliament elections. While this initial lag might based on percentages won by parties, appear to be a negative occurrence, it parties are able to support a variety of actually serves to give females more candidates.14 They are therefore more political power in later elections. likely to support female candidates, Whereas under the political systems who would appeal to certain inter- that existed prior to democratization, ests.15 In developing countries, this women often had ceremonial political affect is much more negligible, due to positions with no real power, later disorder that often exists in political elections in democratizing countries systems. allowed those women who mobilized The widespread implementation of and were elected by popular sup- quota systems following the Fourth port to have the ability to gain real, World Conference on Women in substantial power in government.12 Beijing in 1995 represented a large Therefore, while democracies are seen turning point in the field of women’s as slightly hindering women from ability to participate in the field of pol- political participation, the process of itics.16 At this conference, members of democratization serves to aid them. the United Nations reinforced the idea A small space must be given to the that a “critical mass” of thirty percent positive effects that certain electoral of women in parliament is necessary systems can have on female political to ensure that women can effect real representation. This topic will not change in policy.17 Today, over ninety receive a large amount of discussion, countries have either voluntary or le- because many scholars have found that gally mandated quotas implemented. electoral systems largely only effect An emphasis must be placed on the results in developed countries (though differing types of quotas, and their there may be some small impacts in resulting effectiveness. Voluntary developing countries).13 However, it is quotas are adopted by parties at their important to note that electoral sys- discretion, which allows parties to tems based on proportional represen- set certain guidelines regarding the tation increase women’s ability to en- number of party candidates that are ter the political field. Because systems of a certain gender. These voluntary
Fall 2014 j127 quotas have been incredibly effective, them to receive positions of power giving parties the flexibility to ensure within certain government commit- gender equality at their discretion. tees and cabinets. The increase of fe- Similarly, countries with quotas that male parliamentarians in legislatures manifest themselves in reserved seats throughout the developing world has in parliament for women have seen also reduced tensions between male success in ensuring that women par- and female legislators, who are now ticipate in politics.18 However, legal able to better interact and understand quotas, which mandate that parties each other’s goals. have a certain number of female can- On a more broad level, female leg- didates, have been largely inefficient, islators have proven to have a dramatic as governments often fail to enforce impact on the policy agendas of their them.19 Despite this inefficiency, quo- countries’ governments. Studies have tas have overall dramatically improved found that women are more inclined the numbers of women in parliaments to support grassroots programs than worldwide. are men, promoting laws that improve Effects of Female Parliamen- healthcare and provide assistance to tary Inclusion on the Political women and children. During parlia- Process mentary sessions, women are more Once in legislative office, it is -im likely to “introduce sex equality legis- portant to understand whether wom- lation and amendments”, and are more en have any effect on parliamentary likely to open debate on “reproductive procedures, the policy agenda, and rights, equal pay, etc.” In turn, male policy-making, particularly pertain- legislators, who often do not focus on ing to issues of gender equality. First gender specific topics, will be more and foremost, within the structure of likely to discuss these issues in further the parliament itself, female legislators parliamentary sessions.20 Similarly, oftentimes have the ability to pressure women in government often have parties to nominate more females for input in the budgetary process, and office, thus increasing the number of can fight to allot more funding to- females represented in parliament. ward already existing programs that Women can also support their fellow help those most in need, particularly female parliamentarians, lobbying for women and children.21 Female parlia-
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j128 mentarians are incredibly effective in of both genders, have actually lowered transforming the policy agenda of a child mortality rates, and have led to country into one that has a larger fo- an increase in the number of children cus on gender equality issues, as well who are able to access vaccines. In as the rights of women and children. countries that met a twenty percent In terms of policy output, however, threshold of women in parliament female parliamentarians have largely between 1980 and 2005, rates of failed to implement much change. measles immunizations increased Studies of developed and develop- by ten percentage points and child ing countries alike show that while survival rates increased by one percent women can affect the policy agenda of in the same time period. While these governments, they are often unable to improvements are not the direct result implement true structural change.22 A of policy implementation, women in single causal explanation for this ineffi- parliament are still able to better the ciency has not yet been found. Rather, conditions of development for those it varies from country to country, and most in need.23 Despite an inability in many non-democratic developing to directly implement new policy, countries, is a result of women having an increase in the number of female little true power in their positions, as- parliamentarians alone can further suming largely ceremonial roles rather contribute to achieving Millennium than truly transformative ones. Development Goals, particularly It must be noted, however, that al- those that speak directly to women though women’s ability to implement and children’s rights. new policies is relatively limited at The Case of Rwanda this point in time, the fact that there Of the twenty countries worldwide are increasing numbers of women that have the highest percentage of in parliaments serves to improve female legislators in their parliaments, development measures, especially in seven of these countries are located in the area of children’s health. Female Africa, a notably high number when politician’s emphasis in the policy compared with Western countries.24 agenda on the welfare of women with With 63.8% of its parliament made children, and the resulting debates up of women, Rwanda has the high- about the issues between politicians est representation of women in the
Fall 2014 j129 legislature in the world.25 Rwanda is prior to 2003, women still represented therefore the perfect case study to bet- less than one fourth of parliament. ter understand the barriers and aids to While women had played a prominent women who wish to run for political role in rebuilding Rwandan society office, as well as what change they after the genocide, societal customs have been able to effect, particularly in of patriarchy were still in place, and regards to women’s rights and gender women were still prevented from full equality, while in office. Further dis- equality in daily life, which in turn cussion will show that while Rwanda mutually reinforced women’s lack of provides a promising outlook for other access to political office. An attempt countries fighting to further open the to alter these preexisting cultural political realm to women, it also (with norms was introduced in 2003, when some exceptions) reinforces previous a gender quota was implemented that findings that show that female parlia- mandatorily reserved 30% of seats for mentarians are largely unable to affect women in both parliamentary cham- policy implementation. bers.26 A quota system such as this, as The subject of an incredibly swift discussed previously, is a major aid to and bloody genocide in 1994, Rwan- increasing female governance, and in da has been forced to restructure its Rwanda, it is the major impetus that society and political system in the has led to ever-increasing numbers of aftermath of the gruesome conflict. women in parliament. The genocide largely targeted men, While there are a large number and as a result, 70% of the population of female legislators in Rwanda, it is was comprised of females immediately important to understand whether or following the end of the genocide. By not these parliamentarians have been 2008, the number of men had increased able to affect any real policy change to levels close to those before the in crucial sectors such as the welfare genocide, yet still 56% of the popula- of women and children. Through the tion today is female. In post-genocide foundation of the Forum of Women Rwanda, women were forced to take Parliamentarians, Rwandan female roles typically assigned to males, and legislators have been able to change interest in political matters was often the focus of the policy agenda in widespread among women. However, parliamentary sessions, bringing forth
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j130 crucial issues such as the AIDs epi- implementation, rather than the policy demic among women and children in agenda alone. Overall, Rwanda pro- the country, as well as violence against vides scholars with an opportunity to women.27 In terms of effectiveness in understand how to more successfully actual policy implementation, howev- ensure that women are represented in er, women in the Rwandan parliament government. largely mirror their counterparts in How Much Change Do Women developed and developing countries.28 Really Effect in Office? While there are laws in place in Despite the increasing Rwanda that protect women, such as presence of women in parliaments a law that defines prosecution guide- throughout the world, there is still lines for rape, these were passed before a glaring discrepancy between the women gained the majority in the number of men and women who legislature in 2003. Similarly, while serve in the legislative sphere. While Rwanda is technically a democratic it is imperative that women are given state, the executive branch largely political power in order to ensure wields the power to pass laws, a fact the success of the Millennium De- which generally prevents the legisla- velopment Goals, particularly ones ture from implementing real change. pertaining to women’s rights and gen- The role of the legislature is therefore der equality, they are often unable to largely ceremonial rather than truly access political office due to many of transformational.29 the mutually reinforcing hindrances One recent bright spot, one that that the MDGs are attempting to fix. might offer future hope for future Economic status, cultural norms, and female-led policy implementation in the structure of political systems often Rwanda, was the passage of a 2006 bar women from succeeding both in female initiated and implemented their personal lives and in politics, bill enforcing the illegality of gen- perpetuating the idea of the “femi- der-based violence, including rape of nization of poverty.” In the field of wives by their husbands.30 A combined parliamentary politics, quota systems effort of female and male legislators, have been instrumental in ensuring this bill was one of the first examples the election of more women to par- in Rwanda of women affecting policy liament. While the actual number of
Fall 2014 j131 women in legislatures is important, ensuring that women can truly pass it is equally important to ensure that policy initiatives should therefore be they have the ability to affect policy placed on individuals rather than gov- change. ernments. Because the structure of the Looking at the data presented government sphere often falls under throughout this paper, it becomes the influence of a status quo, one that increasingly evident that we may does not have the power to promote have arrived at a standstill for what equal gender politics, it is the respon- governments can do to ensure that sibility of private citizens to smooth women truly have a voice in the polit- inequality between the genders, those ical sphere. While the focus has been furthering the Millennium Devel- more largely on developing states, opment Goals and future political the United States and other western developments. The further inclusion democracies are no less guilty in fail- of women in politics will serve to ben- ing to include women in the field of efit global populations, as the voice of politics, a failure that we must work billions is further included. resolutely on. Overall, the onus of
About the Author
Lila Kelso received her B.A. in Foreign Affairs and German from the University of Virginia in May 2014. She is currently attending the London School of Economics earning her Masters of Science in Public Policy and Administration.
Works Cited
1 “Women in National Parliaments.” In- 2 “World Demographics Profile 2013.” ter-Parliamentary Union. 1 Feb 2013. Index Mundi. 21 Feb 2013.
The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j132 3 “En Route to Equality: A Gender Re- versity Press, 2011, 20.
view of National MDG Report,” Unit- 12 Kathleen M. Fallon, Liam Swiss, and ed Nations Development Programme, Jocelyn Viterna, “Resolving the De- 2005, 7, 18-22. mocracy Paradox: Democratization 4 Valerie Bennett, Ginger Faulk, Anna and Women’s Legislative Represen- Kovina, and Tatjana Eres, “Inheri- tation in Developing Nations, 1975 to tance Law in Uganda: The Plight of 2009,” American Sociological Review, Widows and Children,” The George- 77.3 (2012): 2-21.
town Journal of Gender and the Law 13 Fallon et al., 20. 7:451 (2004): 453. 14 Aili Mari Tripp and Alice Kang, “The 5 Frazana Bari, “Women’s Political Par- Global Impact of Quotas: On the Fast ticipation: Issues and Challenges,” Track to Increased Female Legislative United Nations Division for the Ad- Representation,” Comparative Politi- vancement of Women, 3 Nov 2005, 3-5. cal Studies, 41.3 (2008): 349-352.
6 Richard E. Matland, “Enhancing 15 Matland 101-103. Women’s Political Participation: Leg- 16 “Fourth World Conference on Wom- islative Recruitment and Electoral en: Beijing Declaration.” United Na- Systems,” Women in Parliament: Be- tions. 1995.
Stockholm: International IDEA, 2005, 17 Fallon et al., 6. 95-97. 18 Tripp and Kang, 339-341. 7 “En Route to Equality,” 13-14. 19 Drude Dahlerup, “Increasing Wom- 8 Bari, 5. en’s Political Representation: New 9 “The World’s Women 2010: Trends Trends in Gender Quotas,” Women in and Statistics,” Department of Eco- Parliament: Beyond Numbers. A Re- nomic and Social Affairs, United Na- vised Edition, Ed. Julie Ballington and tions Statistics, 2010, 59, 160-61. Azza Karam, Stockholm: Internation-
10 Matland, 94. al IDEA, 2005, 150-151. 11 Torben Iversen and Frances McCall 20 Azza Karam and Joni Lovendus- Rosenbluth, Women, Work, and Poli- ki, “Women in Parliament: Making a tics: The Political Economy of Gender Difference,” Women in Parliament: Inequality, New Haven, CT.: Yale Uni- Beyond Numbers. A Revised Edition,
Fall 2014 j133 Ed. Julie Ballington and Azza Karam, Countries,” Social Forces 91.2 (2012): Stockholm: International IDEA, 2005, 1, 11-14.
201. 24 Stern, Eric. “Female Leadership in Af- 21 Elizabeth Powley, “Rwanda: The Im- rica.” The Politic. 8 Jan 2013.
Families,” The State of the World’s 25 “Women in National Politics.” Children, Dec 2006, 15. 26 Devlin and Elgie, 241-43. 22 Claire Devlin and Robert Elgie, “The 27 Powley, 6. Effect of Increased Women’s Repre- 28 Karen Hasse. “Quotas are not Enough.” sentation in Parliament: The Case of Good Governance Africa. 1 Aug 2013. Rwanda,” Parliamentary Affairs, 61.2 23 Liam Swiss, Kathleen M. Fallon, and enough>. Giovani Burgos, “Does Critical Mass 29 Devlin and Elgie, 249-51. Matter? Women’s Political Represen- 30 Id., 250-252. tation and Child Health in Developing The Wilson Journal of International Affairs j134 Fall 2014 j135 The Wilson Journal of International Affairs Fall 2014 University of Virginia Published by James River Press Richmond, Virginia Sponsored by the International Relations Organization, a contracted independent organization