The Accusation of Otherworldliness in Works of Love
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Robert R. Cook S~Ren Kierkegaard
EQ 87:4 (1987), 311-327 Robert R. Cook S~ren Kierkegaard: Missionary to Christendom It was, we understand, Professor Gordon Rupp who coined the usejUl word 'rebunk' to denote a more positive activity than the much more common practice of 'debunking' ideas and people. Mr Cook, a teapher at the Scott Theological College in Kenya, offers an essay which falls into this helpful category of showing us what we may learn from a figure who has not always been appreciated by evangelical Christians. I. A Reappraisal Evangelicals have tended to be very wary of Kierkegaard. His profound influence on the early Barth is well known and the consequent Neo-Orthodox obsessions with God as utterly trans cendent and revelation as irrational and non-propositional have been profoundly regretted. Similarly Bultmann's lamentable disinterest in the Jesus of history can clearly be traced back to Kierkegaard,1 In fact a wide variety of modernist themes are embryonically present in lesser known strands of his thought. For example, does not the following sound like an extract from a Tillich sermon?: '.. while the jesting phrase winds its way drolly through the rest of the conversation, the speaker may privately have a rendezvous with the deity, who is present as soon as the uncertainty of all things is thought infinitely.'2 Or when Kierkegaard asserts that the sincere idol worshipper is enjoying a relationship with the living God for ' ... if only the mode of this relationshp is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if it should happen to be thus related to what is not true',3 he is surely an unwitting precursor of such religious pluralists asJ. -
Joshua Cockayne Thesis.Pdf
The God-Relationship: A Kierkegaardian account of the Christian spiritual life Joshua Luke Cockayne PhD University of York Philosophy July 2016 Abstract By drawing on the writings of Søren Kierkegaard, I address the question of what it is to live in relationship with God. In answering this question, it is important to recognise that God, as he is described in the Christian tradition, is a personal God. For this reason, the account of the Christian spiritual life I outline is described as a life of coming to know God personally, rather than as a life of coming to know about God by learning about him. As I argue, a minimal condition for knowing God personally in this way is that an individual has a second-person experience of God. However, one of the barriers which prevents relationship with God from occurring in this life is that the human will is defective in such a way that human beings cannot will to be in union with God. Because of this problem, human beings cannot live in union with God in this life. And so, in order to allow for the possibility of union with God in the life to come, the human will must be repaired; consequently, one of the key tasks of the spiritual life is this task of repairing a person’s will by re-orienting it so that union with God is possible. Since a person cannot be in union with God in this life, it is important to give an account of what it is to be in relationship with God in the spiritual life. -
Kierkegaard on Selfhood and Our Need for Others
Kierkegaard on Selfhood and Our Need for Others 1. Kierkegaard in a Secular Age Scholars have devoted much attention lately to Kierkegaard’s views on personal identity and, in particular, to his account of selfhood.1 Central to this account is the idea that a self is not something we automatically are. It is rather something we must become. Thus, selfhood is a goal to realize or a project to undertake.2 To put the point another way, while we may already be selves in some sense, we have to work to become real, true, or “authentic” selves.3 The idea that authentic selfhood is a project is not unique to Kierkegaard. It is common fare in modern philosophy. Yet Kierkegaard distances himself from popular ways of thinking about the matter. He denies the view inherited from Rousseau that we can discover our true selves by consulting our innermost feelings, beliefs, and desires. He also rejects the idea developed by the German Romantics that we can invent our true selves in a burst of artistic or poetic creativity. In fact, according to Kierkegaard, becom- ing an authentic self is not something we can do on our own. If we are to succeed at the project, we must look beyond ourselves for assistance. In particular, Kierkegaard thinks, we must rely on God. For God alone can provide us with the content of our real identi- ties.4 A longstanding concern about Kierkegaard arises at this point. His account of au- thentic selfhood, like his accounts of so many concepts, is religious. -
Søren Kierkegaard's View of Faith Found in Fear And
SØREN KIERKEGAARD’S VIEW OF FAITH FOUND IN FEAR AND TREMBLING AND PRACTICE IN CHRISTIANITY David Pulliam Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy Indiana University September 2016 ii Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee __________________________________ Dr. Samuel J.M. Khan, PhD __________________________________ Dr. Cornelis de Waal, PhD __________________________________ Dr. David Pfeifer, PhD iii David Pulliam Søren Kierkegaard’s view of Faith found in Fear and Trembling and Practice in Christianity In this paper I discuss two key works written by Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Practice in Christianity, under the pseudonyms Johannes de Silentio and Anti-Climacus respectively. I focus on three questions: what is Johannes view of faith, what is Anti-Climacus’ view of faith and how are these Kierkegaard’s conclusions? I argue that stemming from Johannes’ and Anti-Climacus’ points of view, Kierkegaard’s view of faith is the aligning of the self in a trusting relationship with the God-man. One outside of faith can perceive faith to be a paradox or find faith offensive; one must have faith to avoid offense and overcome the paradox. Chapter 1 focuses on the connection between Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms using his work The Point of View. In this chapter I map out Kierkegaard’s method of communication and the purpose for his use of pseudonyms. Chapter 2 focuses on Johannes’ view of faith in Fear and Trembling. -
Militant Liturgies: Practicing Christianity with Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer, and Weil
religions Article Militant Liturgies: Practicing Christianity with Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer, and Weil J. Aaron Simmons Department of Philosophy, Furman University, Greenville, SC 29613, USA; [email protected] Abstract: Traditional philosophy of religion has tended to focus on the doxastic dimension of religious life, which although a vitally important area of research, has often come at the cost of philosophical engagements with religious practice. Focusing particularly on Christian traditions, this essay offers a sustained reflection on one particular model of embodied Christian practice as presented in the work of Søren Kierkegaard. After a discussion of different notions of practice and perfection, the paper turns to Kierkegaard’s conception of the two churches: the Church Triumphant and the Church Militant. Then, in light of Kierkegaard’s defense of the latter and critique of the former, it is shown that Kierkegaard’s specific account gets appropriated and expanded in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s account of “costly grace” and “religionless Christianity,” and Simone Weil’s conception of “afflicted love.” Ultimately, it is suggested that these three thinkers jointly present a notion of “militant liturgies” that offers critical and constructive resources for contemporary philosophy of religion. Keywords: Kierkegaard; Bonhoeffer; Weil; philosophy of religion; liturgy; practice; Christianity Citation: Simmons, J. Aaron. 2021. 1. Introduction Militant Liturgies: Practicing It is often the case that philosophical discussions of Christianity overstate the unity Christianity with Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer, and Weil. Religions 12: by which the Christian traditions operate. In the name of referential precision, perhaps 340. https://doi.org/10.3390/ we should only ever speak of “Christianities” or, as this special issue theme admirably rel12050340 does, “Christian traditions”. -
Community in the Theology of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard
College of Saint Benedict and Saint John's University DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU School of Theology and Seminary Graduate Papers/Theses School of Theology and Seminary 2008 Community in the Theology of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard Nicholas Coffman College of Saint Benedict/Saint John's University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/sot_papers Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Coffman, Nicholas, "Community in the Theology of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard" (2008). School of Theology and Seminary Graduate Papers/Theses. 751. https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/sot_papers/751 This Graduate Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Theology and Seminary at DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Theology and Seminary Graduate Papers/Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Community in the Theology of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard by Nicholas Coffman 2720 Beartooth Drive Billings, MT 59102 USA A Paper Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Theology ·Seminary of Saint John’s University, Collegeville, Minnesota, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Systematic Theology. SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY · SEMINARY Saint John’s University Collegeville, Minnesota 6.10.08 2 This paper was written under the direction of ____________________________________ Dr. Bill Cahoy, Dean, St. John’s School of Theology Director 6.10.2008 3 Community in the Theology of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard Description: This work began as a term paper for an Independent Learning Project with Dr. -
"A Human Being's Highest Perfection": the Grammar and Vocabulary of Virtue in Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 33 Issue 3 Article 4 7-1-2016 "A Human Being's Highest Perfection": The Grammar and Vocabulary of Virtue in Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses Pieter H. Vos Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Vos, Pieter H. (2016) ""A Human Being's Highest Perfection": The Grammar and Vocabulary of Virtue in Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 33 : Iss. 3 , Article 4. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil201661461 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol33/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. “A HUMAN BEING’S HIGHEST PERFECTION”: THE GRAMMAR AND VOCABULARY OF VIRTUE IN KIERKEGAARD’S UPBUILDING DISCOURSES Pieter H. Vos Focusing on the grammar and vocabulary of virtue in Kierkegaard’s upbuilding works, it is argued that the Danish philosopher represents a Christian conception of the moral life that is distinct from but—contrary to Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim—not completely opposed to Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics. Although the realities of sin and salvation transcend virtue ethics based purely on human nature, it is demonstrated that this does not prevent Kierkegaard from speaking constructively about human nature, its teleology (a teleological conception of the self) and about the virtues. -
Kierkegaard and Anti-Rationalism
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Asbury Theological Seminary Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 13 Issue 2 Article 5 4-1-1996 The Offense of Reason and the Passion of Faith: Kierkegaard and Anti-Rationalism Karen L. Carr Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Carr, Karen L. (1996) "The Offense of Reason and the Passion of Faith: Kierkegaard and Anti-Rationalism," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 13 : Iss. 2 , Article 5. Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol13/iss2/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. THE OFFENSE OF REASON AND THE PASSION OF FAITH: KIERKEGAARD AND ANTI-RATIONALISM Karen L. Carr This essay considers and reject~ both the irrationalist and the supra-ratio nalist interpretations of Kierkegaard, arguing that a new category Kierkegaard as "anti-rationalist" -is needed. The irrationalist reading overemphasizes the subjectivism of Kierkegaard's thought, while the supra rationalist reading underemphasizes the degree of tension between human reason (as corrupted by the will's desire to be autonomous and self-sustain ing) and Christian faith. An anti-rationalist reading, I argue, is both faith ful to Kierkegaard's metaphysical and alethiological realism, on the one hand, and his emphasis on the continuing opposition between reason and faith, on the other, as manifested in the ongoing possibility of offense (rea son's rejection of the Christian message) in the life of the Christian. -
Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter
Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter A Publication of the Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library NUMBER 66: December 2016 Contents ‘ ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NEWS 2 BOOK REVIEWS The Isolated Self: Irony as Truth and Untruth in Søren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony by Brian Söderquist 2 Reviewed by Will Williams Kierkegaard and the Refusal of Transcendence by Steven Shakespeare Reviewed by Lucas Piccinin Lazzaretti 5 Unto the Abyss of Despair—Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic Sphere of Existence (走向绝望的深渊——克尔凯郭尔的美学生活境界) by Wang Qi (王齐) 6 Reviewed by Chingshun J. Sheu ARTICLES Philosophical Fragments: The Infinite Comic Drama Anthony Eagan 8 Tribute to David Kangas Martin Kavka 16 Tribute to Per Lønning Rune Engebretsen 18 Editor: Gordon D. Marino Editorial Intern: Lucas Shurson Assistant Editorial Intern: Emily Shimota Managing Editor: Eileen Shimota Assistant Editor: Begonya Saez Tajafuerce Assistant Editor: Rafael García Pavón Assistant Editor: Catalina Elena Dobre Assistant Editor: Leo Stan Assistant Editor: Christina Danko 1 ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NEWS Professor Anthony Rudd will deliver the lecture in spring 2017. International Kierkegaard Conference Though an exact date has not been established yet, the Library will host the Eighth International Kierkegaard Conference in the summer of 2018. Dr. Richard Purkarthofer will give the plenary lecture. In addition, for more information from the Hong Kierkegaard Library and other news from Kierkegaard scholars and related groups around the world, please see the website of the Hong Kierkegaard Library at http://wp.stolaf.edu/kierkegaard/. K. Brian Söderquist. The Isolated Self: Irony as Truth and Untruth in Søren Kierkegaard's On the Concept of Irony Copenhagen: Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre and C. -
Søren Kierkegaard Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Scientific Postscript – Excerpts1 PHIL101 Prof
Søren Kierkegaard Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Scientific Postscript – excerpts1 PHIL101 Prof. Oakes updated: 3/18/13 10:24 AM Section III: How do I know? Reading III.5 Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was a Danish philosopher who is best known for his interpretation of Christian faith and for his contributions to what would become known as ‘existentialism’. In both cases, a primary focus of Kierkegaard’s work is the immediate quality of our lived experience. What, exactly, is it like to be a human? What constitutes the best form of human life? As we will see, both in the following excerpts and in those in our Ethics section (Section IV), Kierkegaard thinks that our conceptual thought poses a significant potential obstacle to living well – or, more precisely, an obstacle to our living at all, in a sense. Not that Kierkegaard is anti-intellectual in either the theological or ethical context: conceptual thought plays a crucial role in proper human life, he maintains. But we can become “lost” in our concepts, he thinks, and thus fail to live the vital, vivid lives that are otherwise possible for us. In the following passages, Kierkegaard calls attention to this dualism in our relationship with God, the dualism of our objective, conceptual form of thought, on the one hand, and a subjective, “inner” state, on the other. Conceptual thought is the province of reason, and so Kierkegaard first considers belief in God in terms of what reason and the conceptual mind can tell us. Finding this approach unsatisfactory, Kierkegaard then considers belief in God in subjective terms. -
Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion Antony Aumann Northern Michigan University, [email protected]
Northern Michigan University The Commons Faculty Works 2010 Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion Antony Aumann Northern Michigan University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.nmu.edu/facwork Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Esthetics Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Antony Aumann, “Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion,” in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Point of View (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2010) 295-324. This Conference Paper in Published Proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by The ommonC s. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of The ommonC s. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication, the Crowd, and a Monstrous Illusion Antony Aumann One thing that continues to attract people to Kierkegaard’s writings is his inexhaustible literary creativity. Unlike many thinkers, he does not express his philosophical insights in straightforward academic prose. He delivers them to us under pseudonyms, through narratives, and in an ironic or humorous style. Even in his seemingly straightforward works, we find trickery and “profound deception.”1 Part of what makes Kierkegaard’s literary style of philosophical interest is the theory that lies behind it, his so-called “theory of indirect communication.” The most exciting and provocative aspect of the theory concerns the alleged importance of indirect communication. In several places throughout Kierkegaard’s writings we find the claim that there are some ends only indirect communication can accomplish—a claim not meant to entail the guaranteed success of indirect communication, only its ability to do what direct communication cannot. -
Kierkegaard on the Transformative Power of Art Antony Aumann Northern Michigan University [email protected]
Kierkegaard on the Transformative Power of Art Antony Aumann Northern Michigan University [email protected] 1 Kierkegaard’s Therapeutic Project Kierkegaard’s project is first and foremost a therapeutic one. Although he makes theological points and defends philosophical theses, he is not primarily a theologian or philosopher. Instead, he is a “physician of the soul.”1 He aims to help us get better, existentially speaking—to cure us of our spiritual ills. And what he thinks we need to overcome our anxiety and despair is a transformation. In particular, we have to turn our backs on the goal of self-gratification. We must devote our lives to God or the Good rather than ourselves. In sum, Kierkegaard’s prescription for our existential ailments is that we leave behind “the aesthetic life” and head in an ethical or religious direction.2 The central question facing Kierkegaard is thus a practical one. How can he inspire such transformations? How can he get his readers to change who they are at a fundamental level? Following Ryan Kemp and others, I will argue that reason is not the proper tool for the task.3 No mere argument, even if cogent or sound, can move people in the way Kierkegaard wants to move them. Yet, I will maintain that where reason fails, art can succeed. Indeed, to the degree that Kierkegaard ever inspires transformations, it is in virtue of the beauty of his words and the aesthetic appeal of his stories rather than the force of his logic.4 2 Transformational Change To appreciate the challenge facing Kierkegaard, we need to understand the kind of change he wants to effect.