Ties That Bind: Chivalric Loyalty in the Late Twelfth Century according to Major Angevin Chroniclers
by
Courtney Hubbart, B.S.
A Thesis
In
History
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
Approved
John Howe, PhD Chair of Committee
Jacob M. Baum, PhD
Mark Sheridan Dean of the Graduate School
August, 2015
Copyright 2015, Courtney Hubbart Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project would not have been possible without the loving support of my husband and family who ensured that I did not give up and continued to push myself towards this end goal. I can now say with some degree of confidence that they now know much more about knights behaving badly and the code of chivalry than they ever cared to. I love you all.
I have also been lucky to have the support of many of the amazing faculty here at Texas Tech, especially from within the History Department. With their instruction and encouragement I have progressed in my studies, writing, and understanding of teaching at the university level. The faculty, staff, and fellow students deserve a great deal of recognition and appreciation for their continued support of new scholars and panicked, over-stressed graduate students. I could not have managed this without you.
Thank you a thousand times over.
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Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... iii
ABSTRACT ...... iv
I. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTS, CHRONICLERS, AND TERMINOLOGY ...... 1
Chivalric Historiography ...... 3 Methodology ...... 6 Source Material ...... 9 Historical Intervention ...... 12 Chapter Outlines...... 15 II. HIGH MEDIEVAL LOYALTY AND TREASON ...... 18
III. THE WAR BETWEEN TWO HENRYS ...... 40
The Great Revolt of 1173-1174 ...... 45 IV. THE ROYAL RATIONALES FOR REVOLT ...... 62
The Fate of the Young Princes ...... 76 V. KNIGHTS BEHAVING BADLY ...... 83
The Stain of Treachery ...... 86 The Business of Clemency ...... 99 VI. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF CHIVALRIC LOYALTY 108
EPILOGUE ...... 115
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 120
iii Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
ABSTRACT The reign of Henry II of England was one of constant power struggles, most spectacularly the rebellion of his sons in 1173-74. These conflicts caused several splits in the elite communities of England—especially among knights associated with the fighting. English knights were forced to choose the side that they would fight for—their king or their liege lord. The purpose of this examination is to uncover the perspective of knights in the nobility on the complicated subject of loyalty during the tumultuous reign of Henry II of England. It seeks to illuminate how the evolving code of chivalry was operating the late twelfth century, focusing primarily on the rebellions of his sons in 1173-1174. Although chivalry’s definitive coalescence is usually located in the thirteenth century, the early stages of chivalric ideology among English knights can be seen in the cultural habitus, established long before the twelfth century, and becoming solidified in the conflicts in the reign of Henry II. This shift can be seen through a case study of how disloyal rebel knights were treated in new ways throughout the twelfth century, culminating in the rebellion of 1173-74.
iv Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
CHAPTER I
A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTS, CHRONICLERS, AND TERMINOLOGY As Henry II of England attempted to consolidate the power of the English monarchy in the twelfth century, the old king faced numerous power struggles led by the princes and barons of England. These conflicts split the religious and noble communities of England and especially affected the English knights who were torn in their loyalties between their immediate lords and the king. When a knight performed homage to his lord, he included a loyalty oath that promised future support in later conflicts—his lord was in turn meant to remain loyal to the king who had granted him his land, power, and title. For some knights, the rebellions became too risky and they retreated from the potential problems by breaking their loyalty oaths, thereby removing themselves from the equation or to a more successful side. Because members of the nobility believed in the importance of fidelity and loyal service, breaking loyalty oaths presented new moral quandaries in a period where the ideal characteristics of chivalry and knighthood were becoming more influential at court.1
How could these behaviors be justified according to the emerging code of chivalry?
This research attempts to bridge the gap between the works of chivalric historians and those researching twelfth century England by analyzing the rebellion of Henry II’s sons and its effects on concepts of chivalric virtues.
1 Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New York: Yale University Press, 1984), 1-2. 1 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
Rebellions led by princes and incumbent heirs were not uncommon for
European monarchs—if anything they were increasing in the late twelfth century.2
Yet one revolt in the reign of Henry II was unusual compared to others in this century.
The rebellion of 1173-74 was not driven by a need to change the current line of succession or to take control over the government of an underage king.3 It was a rebellion publically justified by a number of religious, social, and chivalrous claims and both sides sought to right a perceived wrong in England.
This examination seeks to uncover the chivalric perspective of noble knights on the complicated subject of loyalty during the tumultuous reign of Henry II of
England and focuses primarily on the rebellions led by his sons in 1173-74. Because this conflict took place just before the birth of a more defined and organized code of chivalry among the nobility of the thirteenth century, it can be argued that events like the rebellion of Henry II’s sons affected how chivalric virtues were defined and policed by medieval society. It represents one of the final phases before the Age of
Chivalry truly begins in England and France. The debates and trials of the knights and nobility fighting in the rebellion as well as their treatment after its conclusion can be applied to what behaviors were given value in the emerging chivalric habitus and how this rebellion affected the treatment of loyalty or disloyalty between knights and their lords in the twelfth century and beyond.
2 Georges Duby, The Chivalrous Society, trans. Cynthia Postan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 112-118, describes the “revolt of the juvenes.” 3 Bjorn Weiler, "Kings and Sons: Princely Rebellions and the Structures of Revolt in Western Europe c. 1170-1280" Historical Research, 82 (Feb 2009): 17-40, at 17-18. 2 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
Chivalric Historiography Violence and chivalric virtues in the medieval world have been topics of interest for medieval military, cultural, and social historians. A philosophical split appeared in the works of early chivalric historians centered around the issue of knightly violence and the effects of chivalry on tempering it. Some, such as Léon
Gautier writing in the nineteenth century, saw the age of chivalry as a romantic and spiritual world featuring knights in shining armor fighting bravely for God and country.4 He claimed that knights lived by ten commandments of chivalry which demanded honorable conduct, defense of the weak, and respect for the Church.5 In these commandments were several admonitions for knights to perform their duties loyally, most notably in the fifth, seventh, and eighth.6
Others saw the code of chivalry as a cultural phenomenon which encouraged violence as a way of gaining honor through displays of military prowess. In 1939,
Norbert Elias, a German sociologist, published The Civilizing Process which addressed the issue of violence in the medieval period and the effects it had on medieval society.7 His work suffered from a narrow range of sources and pointed to changes only occurring in post-medieval Europe, but it inspired many medieval
4 Léon Gautier and D. C. Dunning, Chivalry, ed. Jacques Levron (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965), esp. in his introduction and description of the ten commandments that knights were meant to live by. 5 Ibid, pp. 25. The majority of the ten commandments of chivalry that were cited by Gautier were not directly found in any medieval historical or literary sources and represent his own interpretations of chivalric mentality. However, in a historiographical context they illustrate the importance of loyalty to the structure and study of chivalric Europe. 6 Ibid, 9-10; The fifth commandment states: ‘Thou shalt not recoil before thine enemy.” The seventh: “Thou shalt perform scrupulously thy feudal duties, if they be not contrary to the laws of God.” And the eighth: “Thou shalt never lie, and shalt remain faithful to thy pledged word.” 7 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process. Volume I: The History of Manners and Volume II: Power and Civility, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978 and 1982), esp. the final section of II, chapter 9. 3 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 historians to begin to investigate the causes of violence and what was being done to control it. Elias’ work has become foundational for many discussions of knightly behavior, good and bad, and its role in the development of European society and government. In 2009, Thomas Bisson pointed to the twelfth century as one of turmoil and disorder due to the large numbers of knights rampaging through the countryside; the disorder of knights would then lead to stronger governments established to control them.8 Although his work was more focused on the growth of medieval government,
Bisson does acknowledge knightly violence as an important motivator for the creation of stricter codes and law regarding their behavior.
According to Maurice Keen in Chivalry, chivalry would have its greatest influence in the thirteenth century, after the problems of the twelfth century referenced by Bisson and Kaeuper.9 He defines chivalry as an ethos in which martial, aristocratic, and Christian elements were fused together; each of these elements can be further split up into various subcategories of behaviors and situational expectations.10
David Crouch’s work, The Birth of Nobility, also relates to this investigation insofar as it discusses how the nobility of France and England used behavioral norms such as loyalty to distinguish themselves from the lower classes of society.11 Knights would use this mentality to develop their own norms first by outlining which actions would
8 Thomas N. Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of the European Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), esp. chapter 3: “Crisis of Power.” 9 Keen, Chivalry, 33-43 and 125-29. This date is also supported by the research of David Crouch who places the date more specifically from 1170-1220: see his The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France 900-1300. (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005), 80-86. 10 Keen, Chivalry, 16. 11 Crouch, Birth of Nobility, esp. the introduction. His model also provides the definitions for nobility and aristocracy which will be used throughout this work. 4 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 not be accepted and then by enforcing these behaviors. Events such as the murder of
Charles the Good proved that knights needed to be given strict guidelines and punishments to ensure that they would not be tempted to step out of line.
Basing the premise of his research on Elias’ discussion of the disorderly period, Richard Kaeuper examined the problem of public order in the “age of chivalry” in France and England through the lens of three medieval chroniclers or
“witnesses,” including Galbert of Bruges. He argued that knights played an ambivalent, problematic role in the notion of public order and that the codes for their combat were as complex as they were problematic for medieval society. Kaeuper posits that chivalric ideas “may not have been fully compatible with the ideal of a more ordered and peaceful society that also advanced during the “age of chivalry.”12
Though Kaeuper discussed concept of knightly prowess, and the rampant violence it caused, there remains an intriguing angle of research where the existing chivalric historiography remains predominantly silent.
More research is needed to elucidate how the knights themselves attempted to control and enforce chivalric standards on each other. Prowess through violence is clearly an interesting and intriguing element of many fields of high medieval research but it is not the only virtue that martial society considered vital. Knights clearly had a different set of key values or moral standards when compared to other parts of medieval society, especially the clergy. Using the treatment and enforcement of
12 Richard W. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 12 Galbert of Bruges, The Murder of Charles the Good, trans. James Bruce Ross (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 4. 5 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 chivalric behaviors as a method of analysis one could recreate the rate and level of influence that the code of chivalry had on noble society. The rebellion of Henry II’s sons presents an opportunity both to add to the dearth of research done on this conflict as well as to illuminate the development of chivalric ideals. With this analysis, one could begin to postulate when chivalry was internalized by members of martial society and which virtues they felt needed to be strictly upheld and regulated. As loyalty in knightly society was a value of particular importance for controlling and limiting knightly violence, it will be the focus of this study.
In terms of the rebellion itself, the article “Kings and Sons: Princely Rebellions and the Structures of Revolt in Western Europe” written by Bjorn Weiler provides the structure of comparative analysis for princely rebellion during this period.13 Weiler places the young king’s rebellion into the perspective of princely rebellions and argues that by looking at rebellions by the nobility, especially led by princes, historians are able to understand the norms and values of medieval society. However, where his examination was focused on the political aspects that would lead to a princely rebellion, my approach is founded on the chivalric perspective of the non-royal armigerous men that inspired specific behaviors and reactions during the rebellion.
Methodology Although the chivalric historiography will form the foundation for the terminology I employ, the basis for my approach in this work is interdisciplinary. In
The Rules of Sociological Method, the French sociologist Émile Durkheim wrote that a society defines itself by labeling the behavior that it considers to be deviant and
13 Weiler, "Kings and Sons," 17-40. 6 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 unacceptable.14 When defining deviant behavior, a society can affirm cultural norms, promote social unity, and clarify any moral questions or debates. Based on this idea, it is possible for historians to reverse engineer the beliefs and impact of the code of chivalry by looking at the reactions of medieval knights to behaviors of other knights that they considered aberrant. With this in mind, I hope to be able to use what was perceived as “deviant” behavior among knights to be able to discuss an evolution of the “code” of chivalry in the century before its true emergence centered on the treatment of loyalty and disloyalty. This argument will be based on the scholarly consensus that by the thirteenth century there was a more defined concept of chivalry among the knights and nobility of Europe, backed by legal theories and public debates that were in some ways enforceable.
In the 1980s, another French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, approached the topic of power within the context of a comprehensive “theory of society,” most notably in
Logic of Practice (1980).15 This theory posits that power and control are culturally and symbolically created through consistent re-legitimization through the interplay of agency and structure. Put simply, societies enforce acceptable societal norms through
“cultural capital” which can be transferred from one arena to the other without any conscious efforts by participants. Although this theory was based on information
14 Émile Durkheim and W. D. Halls, The Rules of Sociological Method, ed. Steven Lukes (New York: Macmillan Press, 1982), esp. the introduction. 15 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), esp. book I, chapter three, with more detailed discussion in book II. 7 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 gleaned from the study of Algerian and French society, its structure and basic premise can be applied to much older concepts of power and social norms.16
In the medieval world, this sociological concept of habitus can be seen in many of the ritual behaviors between a knight and his lord that were meant to ensure that specific virtues would be upheld. Through loyalty oaths and homage ceremonies, the nobility of Europe ensured the continuation of the structure of power by creating a habitus that encouraged practical virtues among the martial elite. Specific behaviors were rewarded by courtly society. Cultural capital encouraged these ideologies, which were developed at court through punishment, reward, and literature that presented specific historical or fictional characters as behavioral icons. Bourdieu’s theory combines easily with the work of Elias in The Civilizing Process and with Durkheim’s theory of social deviance.
Roger of Howden’s chronicle describes Henry II’s army as composed of barons, nobles, and non-noble warriors. These categories will provide the medieval class distinctions used here as a basis for analysis. The barons were separated from the lower ranks in terms of importance and their relatively small numbers amongst the army. The “nobles” consisted of a variety of men holding honors or great fees to someone of higher rank, the lesser or middling nobility of the banneret, landed and un-landed knights who owed service through “money fiefs,” and the king’s household knights or familia.17 For Henry II especially, the familiae regis represented a group of
16 "Bourdieu and 'Habitus'," Powercube: Understanding Power for Social Change, http://www.powercube.net/other-forms-of-power/bourdieu-and-habitus/. Accessed April 29, 2015. 17 Hosler, Henry II, 103. 8 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 men who were entrusted with the great power and influence of running the government of England when Henry II was otherwise engaged. Therefore, based on this contemporary analysis of the military structure of Henry II and his sons” armies as well as the chronicle evidence, this study will be limited to a discussion of the treatment and behavior of non-royal armigerous men during and after the rebellion’s end.
Thus, this study will focus on a moment in medieval history when ideals for knightly behavior clashed and where political or social upheavals among the nobility led to a better definition of the pre-existing habitus related to treason and loyalty.
During these conflicts, knights made decisions that would be labeled by other knights as dishonorable or practical, depending on a variety of societal norms that were still in the process of being defined. It is in these moments of turmoil and struggle that one can begin to uncover what was important to knights and their society in regards to chivalry and behavior. Because medieval authorities struggled to control knightly violence, they sought ways to channel the violence into more productive targets through the establishment and popularity of chivalric ideals. The rebellion of 1173-74 represents one of the final events before the emergence of a self-aware chivalric society in England and France in the thirteenth century.
Source Material This research will be limited to notions of loyalty and treason among the non- royal armigerous men serving on either side of conflicts within the reign of Henry II of
England. Henry II and his sons are commemorated in a large number of written
9 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 sources, most importantly in chronicles. Many of the available chronicles were written by members of the king’s household. With each of the sources discussed within this investigation, one must be aware of a variety biases.
An investigation into the military and societal impact of the mini-civil wars involving the rebellions of Henry II’s sons is long overdue. The difficulty is that the majority of chroniclers focus on the political and governmental changes of Henry II’s reign instead of on the military movements of the era. Fortunately for an analysis of this period, there are a number of surviving accounts by chroniclers as well as correspondence from key characters. In terms of available perspective and details, the best chroniclers to use in a discussion of the reign of Henry II come from the English side of the channel, though French chroniclers can be used for an alternate perspective.18 For this study, evidence from chronicles will be limited to Angevin writers living in the generation of the rebellions or the one immediately following.
This limitation has been placed in order to ensure that the information reflects contemporary perceptions.
Of these Angevin chroniclers, the most prolific was Roger of Hovedon (or
Howden), a clerk and sometime emissary from Yorkshire who spent several years traveling alongside Henry II as he went about ruling England. His works were almost completely original, with only occasional samplings from Scottish sources, and more importantly, he himself witnessed the rebellions of 1173-74.19 The Augustinian canon
18 Hosler, Henry II, 18. 19 Roger de Hoveden, The Annals of Roger of Hoveden Comprising the History of England and of Other Countries of Europe from A.D. 732 to A.D. 1201 Vol. 1, trans. Henry T. Riley (London: J. Billing, n.d.). 10 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
William of Newburgh’s Historia Rerum Anglicarum, which discussed the years 1066 to 1198, is a valuable source for the life of Henry II as well as the events that followed his death. William also attempted to describe events within a broader context and paid special attention to the movements of King Henry II. As a cleric, he was very interested in the morality of both sides and revealed a Christian perspective on the conflict.
Although it is not an official chronicle for the reign of Henry II, Jordan
Fantosme's lyrical La Chronique is especially useful as it focuses on the knights of the rebellion of 1173-74. Matthew Strickland deemed the Chronique a source “of primary importance for the study of war, diplomacy, and knighthood in the Anglo-Norman world.”20 Fantosme writes a detailed eye-witness account of the military proceedings associated with the rebellions and portrays the warrior mentality of the men marching to battle. He is also careful to mention the names and deeds of specific men fighting in the conflict and to note the personal hesitation of many to take part in such a complicated dispute.
Any discussion of the events of Henry II’s reign would be incomplete without the input of the Norman chronicler, Robert de Monte or Robert de Thorigny. Robert was privileged to entertain both kings of England and France while living and writing at Mount St. Michael and stood as sponsor for one of Henry II’s children in 1161. He authored several treatises but the most significant was his chronicle describing the history of the archbishops of Rouen and the kings of England based on several
20 Matthew Strickland, “Arms and the Men: War, Loyalty, and Lordship in Jordan Fantosme’s Chronicle,” in Medieval Knighthood IV: Papers from the Fifth Strawberry Hill Conference, ed. Christopher Harper-Bill and Ruth Harvey (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1992), 220. 11 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 manuscript sources, especially on numerous passages from Henry of Huntington.21
Robert was very supportive of the reign of Henry II, duke of Normandy, but does shed some light on the perspective of both camps. With these chroniclers alongside letters and courtly literature, it is possible to recreate the culture and ideology of loyalty at the courtly level within which these knights interacted.
Historical Intervention Research in the notions of loyalty during such a chaotic time for medieval knights and nobility will shed light on development of chivalric values, their notions of what was expected from knights, and how society used punishment to promote ideal behavior through punishment. The rebellions of Henry’s sons and neighbors have been largely ignored by modern historians creating a lacuna of secondary analysis of a period that is well chronicled. This study looks to investigate one of the core virtues of knighthood—loyalty—during the reign of Henry II using the rebellion of his sons, neighbors, and barons from 1173 to 1174. This work will not be a political history or even a history of rebellion in the high middle ages but a discussion of the development of a core principle of chivalry as it was understood by the knightly class of England on the cusp of the “Golden Age” of chivalry as defined by Maurice
Keen and supported by David Crouch and Richard Kaeuper.
One of the most commonly extolled chivalric qualities was loyalty—naturally this theme continued when England become the setting for a familial rebellion.
Leaders at every level needed to ensure that their military encampments and barracks
21 The Chronicles of Robert de Monte, ed. Joseph Stevenson (Lampeter, Dyfed: Llanerch Publishers, 1991), 5-7. 12 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 would not be settings for treasonous plots or attacks. It was a fundamental necessity for knights to uphold their fealty oaths in order to maintain the feudo-vassalic relationships in Western Europe which would be at the heart of the code of chivalry.22
Attacks on members of the upper nobility were not to be tolerated by other knights or higher ranking nobles—not only because disloyal violence was harmful to their realm but because it could be harmful for the positions of the nobility and the honor that was becoming a vital aspect of knighthood.
In the medieval period, loyalty was expected from and was much discussed by chivalrous knights. It was more than a “strong feeling of a support or allegiance”—it implied anticipation of service due to the duty that went hand in hand with an oath of fidelity.23 In medieval society, it was synonymous with constancy, honesty, and even legitimacy. The institution of loyalty allowed for the princes and the high nobility of
Europe to manage their lands without falling into the chaos of the warrior tribes that reigned after the fall of Rome. By the twelfth century, courtly culture articulated the ideal of loyalty fostered by the literature available at court, the rewarding of land or power to loyal vassals, and the social mobility of governments like Henry II’s.24
The most public display of loyalty among knights was through military service. This service consisted of providing aid through goods, court services, or more
22 Keen, Chivalry, 234. 23 Definition of loyalty based on the modern description of the term. "Loyalty." Dictionary.com. Accessed April 14, 2015. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/loyalty. 24 For a discussion of the social mobility available to members of Henry II’s administration see Ralph V. Turner, Men Raised from the Dust: Administrative Service and Upward Mobility in Angevin England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988). In this work he discusses the lives of several men raised from humble origins to become important and influential members of the Angevin court and government for the purpose of establishing loyal men in Henry II’s government. 13 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 commonly coming to your lord’s aid in a war. Knights were sometimes rewarded for their military service with manors that could produce the revenue required to fund the costs of providing aid to their liege lord(s).25 Even the decision to remain neutral in a military conflict could be considered disloyal as Robert de Vaux discovered. Because of this, rebellions such as those of Henry II’s sons provide multiple examples of how loyalty was interpreted and enforced in twelfth century Europe.
When a knight performed homage and pledged his fealty to a lord, a ritual binding of the two men to one another publically proclaimed their new relationship.
The knight knelt before his lord to show his submission before giving the kiss of peace to symbolize the new accord and friendship. The giver of this oath of homage and fealty could be known by a number of titles but was most commonly referred to as a
“vassal.”26 The subordination of a vassal was emphasized by the terminology used in the ceremony; the connotation of “vassal” translated from Latin was “young boy” which implied that the lord would serve as a new master and guardian.27 New vassals would swear to be faithful (foi in French, treue or hulde in German) to their master and to protect and serve their interests. Since the rule of the Merovingians, this oath of loyalty was particularly important for lords because they could not maintain their
25 A. J. Robertson, The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925), 281. 26 Chronicles from various regions of Europe alternately call the giver of the oath his "man" or "man of mouth and hands" (homme de bouche et de mains). In pre-twelfth century culture, this person was also referred to as a "commended man" (commende): see Marc Bloch, Feudal Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 146. 27 Bloch, Feudal Society, 155. 14
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 prestige, fortune, or even safety without securing, by coercion or persuasion, subordinates sworn to their service.28
Chapter Outlines The first chapter of this project will discuss and define the expectations and concepts of loyalty characteristic of medieval nobility of this period. By using earlier discussions of loyalty as well as previous monarchs' attempts to curb rebellion, one can begin to define the chivalric habitus of fidelity in the late twelfth century. The medieval perspective on knighthood and its virtues will play a key role in how Henry
II punished or rewarded the men of the rebellion in relation to the legal and social norms of punishment. This will be used to compare and contrast the punishments and behavior discussed in later chapters as well as provide context for the expectations for knights.
The second chapter seeks to provide contextual information about the rebellion and what took place during the conflict. It will also introduce many of the knights who will be discussed in greater detail in the final chapter and place them in the historical context of their actions. With this information a broader narrative can be discussed of why the rebellion took place and what non-royal knights were involved in the campaign against Henry II as well as those who were particularly useful in their loyalty to the old king. In addition to providing context, this information shows how important securing the fidelity of members of martial society was in preventing rebellion and defending against it.
28 Bloch, Feudal Society, 145-147. 15 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
In the chapter following the military overview there will be a brief description of the justifications used by competing kings to validate their claim over the throne of
England and, in Henry the Younger’s case, the right to rebel against his father. In these justifications, one can see the effects of chivalric habitus and just war ideology of western rulers. Further, this information describes the political and religious context that drove many of the nobility to war. Included in this chapter is the fate of
Henry II’s rebellious sons after their father was able to quell their uprising. The relatively light punishments for members of royalty will add some perspective on how disloyalty was perceived and treated compared to barons, earls, and lesser nobility.
Lastly, the final chapter is a discussion of the behavior of individual knights in the conflict and how they were treated after Henry II was victorious. Each of the knights discussed performed deeds on the side of Henry the Younger that were deemed important or deviant enough to merit additional discussion in historical chronicles. With this information as well as the data from “Lists of Castles,” which depicts which properties were taken or destroyed by the old king during and after the rebellion, it is possible to begin to define what knightly behavior needed punishment.29
This study produced by R. Allen Brown uses chronicles and charters to record who controlled which castles in England during this period for the purpose of political, military, and societal studies.30 It is particularly useful in analyzing the reaction of
Henry II to the rebellion as well as interpreting which members of the rebellion were punished and to what degree. Brown’s work also adds to the political motivations of
29 R. Allen Brown, "A List of Castles, 1154-1216," The English Historical Review, 24, no. 291 (April 1959): 249-280. 30 Ibid, esp. 270-280. 16
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
Henry II as there is some evidence that the confiscation of castles after the rebellion was part of a long term push by English monarchs to augment royal power. This can be seen most clearly in the data that shows that the confiscations of castles after the revolt were not limited to the disaffected.31
The issue of loyalty was a key problem in the tumultuous reign of Henry II and regularly appeared in the chroniclers” discussion of the rebellions of his family. The belief in loyalty to your lord and your cause was an important element, balancing out other knightly characteristics, such as prowess, that could have harmed the functionality of their society. Kaeuper referred to loyalty as the rudder for controlling and directing knightly prowess and violence.32 By controlling and developing knightly beliefs regarding chivalry and their behavior in conflicts between lords, the upper nobility and royalty could channel knightly violence to more acceptable targets.
If chivalric ideals were not upheld to the satisfaction of the upper nobility and princes of Europe then public punishments could be used to promote or discourage behaviors.
31 Ibid, 252-254 32 Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, esp. the introduction. 17 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
CHAPTER II HIGH MEDIEVAL LOYALTY AND TREASON
In 1125, King Henry I of England ordered a series of mutilations, which
included blinding and castration, to be performed on knights who had been caught
and charged with rebellion. This violent treatment caused Henry I to be reproached,
in defense of the knights, by a court visitor, Charles the Good of Flanders. Although
Charles was not against violent punishments for serious crimes, he argued that one
could not justly mutilate captives “taken in service to their lords.”33 Henry I
responded that,
“God has now delivered him [Luke de la Barre] into my hands for punishments so that he may be compelled to renounce his wicked behavior, and so that others, hearing of this punishment of his outrageous conduct, may be corrected.”34
Henry I's defense of his choice of punishment centered on the idea that if he did not
punish these men to the furthest extent of the law, that they could go on to cause
problems for others or even bring his rule into question. The king of the English was
particularly unrepentant of his treatment of Luke de la Barre who was double guilty
of treason because he had broken the code of surrender by rejoining the fight after
giving his word to his captor. Further, these knights were English vassals and as their
liege lord Henry I wanted to choose their punishment to convey a specific message of
33 Galbert of Bruges, Murder of Charles the Good, 17, 20, and 45. While in power in Flanders, Charles threatened a disturber of church lands with being boiled in a cauldron which had been the punishment for such crimes given by his predecessor. 34 Orderic Vitalis, Historia Ecclesiastica, ed. Auguste Le Prevost, 5 vols. (Paris, Broadview Press, 1852), 4:461. 18 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
censure against any other would-be traitors. The chronicler Orderic concludes his
description of this event by recording that after hearing Henry I”s justifications, “the
count of Flanders said nothing, because he had no reasonable objections to offer.”35
This incident in the reign of Henry I displays the typical reaction of monarchs
when dealing with disloyal subjects in a pre-chivalric world. Henry I”s goal, through
the administering of punishment, was to inspire such fear that his men would not
stray so easily again. Allowing guilty men to live, emasculated and helpless, would
ensure that their presence would spread the message beyond the royal court. It was a
story that was meant to encourage the noble elite to remain true to the behavioral
norms that kept them useful and the rest of society relatively safe. By the end of the
twelfth century, the enforcement of fidelity would shift from graphic punishments to
public censure, a change which testifies to the growing influence of chivalric virtues
and concepts in noble society.
The late twelfth century was the final period before the establishment of a
“code” of chivalry, that is before the establishment of a more solidified set of
knightly behaviors, expectations, and virtues in the thirteenth century.36 The courts
of the nobility of Western Europe had begun to house and modify the shifting cultural
ideas pertaining to knighthood. It was slowly becoming possible to modify knightly
values and violence through cultural means instead of relying on legal efforts.37
Social behavior was thus softened and directed towards more acceptable pursuits on
and off of the battlefield. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries in particular greatly
35 Ibid, 4:461 36 Keen, Chivalry, 168. 37 Crouch, Birth of Nobility, 23. 19 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
influenced which knightly behaviors would be expected and supported in later
centuries.38 These virtues stemmed from modifications of behavior adopted by
warriors in order to improve their chances of gaining position and reward through the
patronage system.39 In particular, chivalric loyalty was carefully fostered and
enforced by the ruling elite as a method of controlling the endemic violence of the
twelfth century.
The knights of England gained many of their concepts of etiquette and proper
martial behavior from the French ideology of chevalerie, which would transition into
English as chivalry. Because of the unique connection of land, nobles, and loyalty
shared between military elites who owned territory on each side of the Channel, it
was easy for French chivalric ideals to make their way over to the English courts.
Bourdieu saw the power of these ideas as culturally and symbolically created, and
constantly re-legitimized through the interplay of agency and structure. The main
way this happens is through what he calls “habitus” or socialized norms or
tendencies that guide behavior and thinking.40 Societal norms created lasting
dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel and act in
determined ways, which then guided the knightly class.41
As chivalric habitus became instilled and integrated into noble medieval
society, so too did its exalted virtues—loyalty, prowess, largesse, honor, and
courtliness. The principle Latin word for loyalty, fidelitas, was translated into twelfth
38 Ibid, 80-86. 39 Ibid, 41. 40 Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, esp. ch. 1. 41 Loic Wacquant, "Habitus," International Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology. ed. James Becket and Zane Milan (London, Routledge, 2005), 316. 20 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
century vernacular as leiauté and feauté and became the basis for the English pseudo-
technical terms “fealty” and “loyalty”.42 In the twelfth century, loyalty was seen as a
vital quality for the nobility as it ensured that treaties and less formal agreements
would be upheld, ransoms would be paid, and trust might exist among the bellatores.
Although concepts of loyalty obviously existed before this century, it is in the twelfth
century that the nobility began to define chivalry’s expectations of knights and the
ideology of fidelity.43 As Europe’s aristocracy became increasingly martial, it
became necessary to outline the structure of loyal behavior as well as imbue noble
culture with a value system that would enforce chivalric standards and reward loyal
knights.
In a letter to Duke William of Aquitaine in 1021, Fulbert of Chartes was
asked to discuss the oaths of loyalty in regards to what behaviors were expected from
vassals to their lords. He argued that a good vassal should always keep six terms in
mind: “safe and sound, secure, honest, useful, easy, and possible.” In short, a vassal
must not cause his lord physical harm; not endanger him by betraying his secrets or
fortresses; not do anything that would detract from his lord’s sense of justice or
honor; not cause him any losses of property; and not do anything that would deprive
his lord of anything of value. A loyal vassal must support and defend the rights and
interests of his lord at all times as well as give good counsel. The lord must in turn
provide the same level of honorable service and loyalty to his followers. If the vassal
or lord fails to uphold this standard of behavior, then he or she would rightly be
42 Ibid, 57. 43 Bloch, Feudal Society, 146-147. 21 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
considered perfidious and perjured.44 Such expectations for loyal service between a
vassal and a lord were the basis for the forma fidelitas and later discussions on the
topic of loyalty.
Long before the twelfth century, the complex relationship of loyalty between
knight and his lord were a topic of much debate. Fulbert argued that just as a knight
must be faithful to his lord by giving honest advice, assisting his lord, and
safeguarding his lord’s interests, so too must the lord support and defend a man in his
service.45 This naturally led to problems among the knightly class and upper nobility
in deciding how far a truly faithful man must go to fulfill the needs of the forma
fidelitatis (the oath of loyalty) and the nature of loyal service. Achieving the
reputation of a “most loyal man” (li plus leials) could mean job security, wealth, and
honor for a knight who was competing for a limited number of positions in medieval
society.
Multiple examples of knights and nobles ritually severing their ties to their
lords through gestures and words display how important the image of loyal service
was to courtly society. There was a very practical side of this public behavior which
allowed knights to cut their losses if needed and remain relatively free to choose who
they would serve. An example of this was the knights of Thomas Becket’s household
choosing to break their oath and leave their liege lord to avoid falling out of disfavor
of the king. By publically announcing it, a knight was further protected from being
accused of subterfuge or dishonorable conduct even as he displayed his loyalty to
44 Fulbert of Chartres, The Letters and Poems of Fulbert of Chartres, ed. and trans. Frederick Behrends (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 92-93. 45 Ibid, 90-92. 22 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
another party. However, this did not allow knights to easily jump from one
household to another without some degree of scrutiny.
In the civil war between Stephen and Matilda, Mathilda’s brother Earl Robert
chose to support Stephen’s claims, not his family’s. To do this without losing honor,
the earl publically proclaimed that he was breaking ties with his sister and had his
chronicler record it for posterity. Earl Robert’s story, and his need to defend himself
through his chronicler, implies that his support of a force against his lord was
frowned on by society. Before leaving his lord’s service, a knight had to publically
break his oath, which thereby warned his lord of the change. Otherwise, disloyalty
could be deadly. The rule of Henry I--through the harsh, bloody punishments meted
out to disloyal men--set a precedent for how rebellion could be treated by his
grandson Henry II. Punishments could be inflicted to ensure that vassals would be
bound to their lords by fear if not by favor.46
The virtue of loyalty has long been a practical and essential element of a
martial society based on patronage and warfare between competing nobles. It served
as a rudder for the unrestrained violence that often came with knights seeking to
prove their prowess and is, therefore, one of the most important facets of chivalrous
society.47 After the power struggles that were typical in Merovingian France,
powerful men realized that they could not maintain their prestige, fortune, or even
safety without binding subordinates to their service.48 The upper nobility needed to
46 C. Warren Hollister, "Royal Acts of Mutilation: The Case against Henry I," Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 10, no. 4 (1978): `338. 47 Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 185. 48 Bloch, Feudal Society, 147. 23 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
engender loyalty among the knightly class as a foundation for obedience and good
military service. The murder of Thomas Becket proved that knights needed to be
closely watched and controlled by their liege lords as the temptation of gaining honor
and favor could lead to more problems for their ruler.49
Having a reputation for loyal service at court could mean a position of service
and influence to a prince or employment from a lord. Jordan Fantosme wrote, “You
have often heard the proverb which says: he who acts falsely towards his rightful lord
or does any wrong which causes him annoyance can be sure of getting his merited
punishment; and he who serves him loyally is greatly to be esteemed.”50 Medieval
sources harken back to the loyalty of Roman soldiers as an example of the all-
important loyalty of soldiers to their lords. The early medieval epic, The Song of
Roland, also exalts knights who serve their lords faithfully saying that “a man should
be willing to suffer no end of trials for the sake of his lord” as heroes of the tale did.51
Obviously courtly discussions of loyalty existed before the twelfth century
and their influence on knightly ideologies cannot be ignored in the progression of
chivalric virtues. The “Conventum” letters written by Hugh de Lusignan in 1030
describe how his lord, William count of Poitou, had failed to live up to the standards
of knightly and noble behavior. Hugh views himself as a model of loyalty and claims
that William failed to be honest, loyal or trustworthy in his dealings, seeking instead
49 William of Newburgh, History , 479-480. 50 Jordan Fantosme, Chronicle, 65. 51 The Song of Roland, trans. Robert Harrison (New York: New American Library, 1970), 52. 24 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
to further his own interests at the cost of others.52 Examples like this show that the
nobility of Europe were holding each other up to the same standards that were being
praised in the romances of the court.
By 1200, the urge to define and regulate noble behavior was becoming
increasingly popular and was standardizing the virtues of the developing aristocratic
class.53 Knighthood’s connection to specific qualities and characteristics, otherwise
known as chivalry, was also becoming more concrete alongside this solidification of
political and societal ideals.54 Knightly behavior began to transition from being
based on habitus to a more recognizable and enforceable set of rules. The “code” of
chivalry, according to the literature and the various treatises that would begin
appearing in later centuries focused on a knight’s display of several key virtues—
namely, valor, largesse, loyalty, and honor.
The issues and moral conflicts that were created when a vassal knight had
multiple oaths of fidelity to more powerful lords were discussed in the courtly
literature. Raoul de Cambrai, one of these chansons de geste, focuses on the issue of
loyalty to a lord clashing with the loyalty each knight still held to his own ancestral
home and family. Bernier, a loyal knight sworn to the young and impetuous Raoul,
was forced to choose either to follow his lord’s orders to burn and kill his biological
52 Hugh of Lusignan Le Conventum (vers 1030): un précurseur aquitain des premières épopées, ed. George. Beech, Yves, Chauvin and Georges Pon (Geneva: Droz, 1995), 123-153. 53 Crouch, Birth of Nobility, 35. 54 Constance Brittain Bouchard, Strong of Body, Brave, and Noble (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 24. 25 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
family and ravage their lands or to be cast aside as a traitor.55 Proving that there is
more than a little grey area in the issue of loyalty and dishonor, Bernier’s actions are
not seen as treacherous or wicked by the author of the tale but as noble and godly as
he fights the wrongs heaped against his family and their lands. 56 However, Berner’s
choice to break his oath to Raoul was only acceptable after he attempted to reason
with his lord, was humiliated publicly, and finally physically struck in front of
Raoul’s household knights. The author’s description of Raoul’s reaction to Bernier's
indecision drew the line for the testing of loyalty oaths in fiction.
The namesake of the epic Raoul de Cambrai has often been referred to as the
anti-hero of the twelfth century.57 He was violent, disrespectful, and dishonorable to
the men who served him. He followed his own whims. Although when he was a
young knight Raoul is lauded as having many of the qualities of a great knight, his
loyal vassal, the bastard Bernier, was the one who receives praise in practice for his
unwavering loyalty and honor in the face of his lord’s brutal behavior. Raoul served
as a warning to the nobility of Europe of the dangers of acting without restraint and
ignoring the true core virtues of chivalry. It also created an everyman hero in
Bernier, whose chivalric nature was centered on his dedication to loyal service.58
Often the term chivalry is used to describe not just the ideals but the social
rituals of the military nobility.59 Any knight who broke with the societal norms of
55 Jessie Crosland, Raoul De Cambrai: An Old French Feudal Epic (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc, 1966), 41-53. 56 Ibid, 98-99. 57 Crouch, Birth of Nobility, 47. 58 Ibid, 54. 59 Keen, Laws of War, 3. 26 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
accepted behavior from knights was likely to receive a physical or social punishment,
depending on the level of severity of the infraction, which could be meted out by his
fellow knights or in the more severe cases, by his lord. The fear of dishonor and
shame through public reprobation was the most effective sanction of the laws of arms
which were established in greater detail in the later middle ages based on the
examples given in earlier centuries.60 Through this social contract among knights
unwanted behavior might be controlled and redirected to more appropriate tasks. A
knight aspired to become known as a chevalier sans reproche which implied not
necessarily perfect character and behavior but a career as a knight without a technical
fault. By the late middle ages, many of the prestigious knightly orders required their
members to have obtained this status before being admitted into their ranks.61
Keen describes a “technical fault” as an action or non-action performed by a
member of knightly society that was perceived by other knights as dishonorable or
unchivalrous. By the late middle ages, the expectations of knighthood were firmly
established into what would be referred to as the “law of arms” which described the
technical faults and behaviors of good knights. These “technical faults” often were
obtained when a knight was accused of refusing to pay a ransom after surrendering in
battle or on the tournament field, having breached his pledged faith, having
dishonored a women of high birth, or having committed numerous other offenses that
were not considered awful enough to merit a physical punishment (unless through a
judicial duel) but which required some sort of redress to the wounded party.
60 Ibid, 20. 61 Keen, Chivalry, 174. 27
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
Technical faults would be recorded in popular memories of punishments or social
stigma, but also might appear in discussions of chivalric behavior in chroniclers or
added into minstrel’s tales.62
Arguments over slanderous accusations against a knight’s honor and character
frequently resulted in duels, although the Church frowned on the practice.63 In 1163,
a duel between Robert de Montfort and Henry de Essex, who had been accused of
fleeing from a battle against the Welsh, resulted in the latter being beaten,
disinherited, and eventually forced to become a monk at Reading because he was no
longer trusted to act honorably in battle.64 Duels were a popular occasion for other
knights to attend as they offered all of the attractions of a tournament made heady
with the spice of potential risk. They allowed knights to obtain justice for themselves
without having to wait for an appeal to be made to their superiors or to risk
potentially losing their claim by assigning their fortunes to third parties. The act of
initiating a duel included a public description of the opposing side as a disloyal
coward or traitor which helped ensure that the challenge would be met.65
Of all the technical faults a knight could be accused of, cowardice and treason
were perhaps the most serious offenses, which was to be expected in a martial
culture. Germanic law considered treason against one’s lord to be a supreme
offense.66 The legal tracts of the twelfth century promise dire consequences for any
62 Keen, Laws of War, 31. 63 Ibid, 30-32, 41. 64 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 97. 65 Keen, Laws of War, 42. 66 See Floyd Seaward Lear, Treason in Roman and Germanic Law (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965) 28 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
man who dared to attack and kill his lord with the intent that “he may declare, if it
were possible, that he found more mercy in hell than had been shown to him on
earth.”67 King Alfred’s laws allowed no mercy to a person guilty of treason against
his lord because Christ himself had allowed no mercy to Judas.68 Henry I earned his
gruesome reputation for enforcing punishments for treason or disloyalty after
ordering the blinding of three captive rebels in 1125. He defended his actions by
claiming that these men had because they had given him homage with the consent of
their lords before choosing to violate their faith to him of their own free will, rightly
incurred the penalty of death or mutilation.69 The king’s actions, while harsh by
modern standards, were lauded by men such as Eadmer of Canterbury for halting the
devastations of their kingdoms by threatening future criminals with similar
punishments.70
The punishments of crimes such as treason, arson, murder, and major theft by
loss of limbs or life occurs in laws of Normandy that existed long before and after the
reign of Henry II.71 A chronicler of the reign of King Stephen in England laments the
rampage of wicked men under the king when they saw that he “did not exact the full
penalties of the law.”72 This was the legacy that Henry II would enter into after
winning back the crown from his predecessor. Punishment for treason would become
67 Leges Henrici Primi, ed. L. J. Downer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 174, 232; Crouch, Birth of Nobility, 56. 68 Hollister, "Royal Acts of Mutilation,” 333. 69 Orderic Vitalis, Historia Ecclesiastica, 460-461. 70 Hollister, “Royal Acts of Mutilation,” 335. 71 Ibid, 334. 72 Guibert, Histoire de sa Vie, ed. Geroges Bourgin (Paris: Broadview Press, 1907), 178-179; quoted in Hollister, “Royal Acts of Mutilation,” 336. Henry of Huntington also criticized this decision in his Historia Anglorum. 29 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
even more severe in thirteenth and fourteenth century England, when drawing and
quartering, disemboweling, and burning at the stake were introduced to the legal
codes.73 Many medieval clerical chroniclers gave their kings large amounts of
leeway when describing the violence or punishments assigned as long as they were
given with just cause and benefitted the kingdom. Events that involved the
punishments of traitors received mixed responses from society depending on who
was being punished—aristocrats would not think twice of rejoicing at the pain of a
disloyal townsman but would be shocked at the death of a rebellious earl.74
Treason was a behavior that was considered incredibly cowardly and was
punishable by death whereas lesser cowardice might only result in a loss of status and
insignia or the expulsion from a knightly order. Even in the earliest days of chivalry
to betray your lord or to plot against your king was considered the darkest of all
crimes, and therefore a knight accused of treason was treated to more dramatic
punishments. For this knight, the full panoply of humiliation would be enacted
through a ritual display of dishonor and pain. Henry of Huntington records an event
where William count of Mortain, who broke his homage to Henry I in 1104 and
became his captive in 1106, was blinded while imprisoned in the Tower of London.75
The punishment of blinding a captured traitor appears in several accounts in the early
and high middle ages in accordance to the orders of the king.76 In the later middle
73 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law, 2nd ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 500-501. 74 Hollister, “Royal Acts of Mutilation,” 338. 75 Henry of Huntington, Historia Anglorum, ed. Thomas Arnold, Rolls Series 74 (London: Longman, 1879), 255-256. 76 William the Conqueror also blinded a number of the men who rebelled against him in 1075: see Henry of Huntington, Historia Anglorum, 206. 30 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
ages, the traitor knight could have his spurs cut from his heels with a knife to signify
his loss of knighthood, his coat of arms ripped from his body and then worn upside
down, and his sword broken over his head in a public scene of degradation.77 In
short, lords killed a knight’s honor followed by his body so that both the spirit and
flesh would suffer. The treatment of dishonored knights was symptomatic of a
martial society’s conception of secular values centered on the virtues of courage,
loyalty, and the keeping of faith.
Cowardice was treated in chronicles like a disease that could sweep through
the ranks of soldiers and fester into other sins. Abbot Suger writes that a twelfth-
century knight who left his fellow in a battle in the Holy Land was physically drained
by the guilt of his actions. Worse still was the fact that his “bad faith made loyal men
disloyal, and disloyal men treacherous.”78 In 1356, a knight who was charged with
cowardice in the face of his enemy during the Hundred Years War was hung
publically in full armor so that his heraldry and identity would be permanently linked
to his behavior.79 Even if the accused knight claimed to have been working towards
the repayment of his ransom through military service if he had raised arms against his
lord without breaking his oaths first he would be sentenced to death.80 Once
ransomed, one of the only ways a captured knight could be legally killed by his
captor was if the prisoner committed treason against him.81 The brutality of the
77 Keen, Chivalry, 175-176. 78 Suger, The Deeds of Louis the Fat, ed. Richard Cusimano and John Moorhead (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 40-41. 79 Keen, Laws of War, 31. 80 Ibid, 162. 81 Ibid, 179. 31 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
punishments given to disloyal men by other members of martial society shows the
level of importance of enforcing this element of chivalric habitus.
On March 2, 1127, count Charles the Good of Flanders was brutally assaulted
while praying in the church of St. Donation in Bruges by Burcard, one of the knights
who had pledged their loyalty to him two years after his famous discussion with
Henry I. The event would spark a civil war between the knights loyal to the
murdered count who wished to avenge him and those that had plotted his demise.
Any knights who were associated with the crime were labeled traitors and suffered a
variety of very public punishments at the hands of the nobility and commoners.
These punishments were designed and performed ritualistically to reinforce the ideals
of loyalty and to safeguard the continuity of power in existing feudo-vassalic
relationships.
During the retreat of the traitorous knights, several were captured by vengeful
citizens and loyal knights and given a variety of punishments meant to bring shame
and dishonor as well as enforce the ideals of chivalric habitus. Walter of Thérouanne
describes two of the accomplices being “run down, captured, and tortured, as was
right in various and shameful ways…”82 Once the men finally died, the citizens hung
one from a gibbet and tossed the other into a sewage ditch facing the castle so that
their besieged comrades could continue to see what gory fate awaited traitors. Isaac,
Charles’ former chamberlain, was captured while trying to escape and was beaten
until he gave up the names of all the people involved. Once they were certain he did
82 Walter of Thérouanne, "Warfare in Flanders According to Walter of Thérouanne," De Re Militari, http://deremilitari.org/2014/02/warfare-in-flanders-according-to-walter-of-therouanne, accessed March 1127. 32 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
not have any other useful information for the loyal lords and knights, he was hung
like a commoner.83 Much like the punishments given to heretics, the punishments
given to these traitors were spectacular public events that carried a specific message
and threat to potential malefactors. Eustace of Steenvorde was captured by citizens
and burned alive as punishment for his treachery as though he were a heretic among
other knights.84
During the retreat of the disloyal forces, one of the traitors” most formidable
knights, George, was intercepted by the loyal knight Didier; their battle represents the
strongest example of knights internalizing and enforcing ideals of loyalty. After
recognizing his foe, Didier quickly managed to throw the other knight from his horse
and cut off his hands. Bleeding and weak, George attempted to flee to a place where
he could hide and potentially recover but he was discovered by another unnamed
loyal knight and dragged out into the street. The knight ordered one of his
swordsmen to kill the wounded, dishonorable knight. The unnamed swordsman
struck him to the ground and dragged him into the sewer where George was drowned
in the filth.85 By cutting off the hands of the other knight, Didier took away the
knight’s only way of gaining honor, prowess, and maintaining any sort of
functionality within his society. Adding insult to injury, the knight, George, was not
given an honorable or respectable death from the loyal knight who had fought him—
he was struck down by a common foot soldier and dragged into the sewers to a death
by drowning. Drowning the knight instead of killing him outright held heavy
83Galbert of Bruges, Murder of Charles, 89. 84 Ibid, 207. 85 Ibid, 154-155. 33 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
connotations in the medieval mind; drowning was a slow death, reserved for
especially heinous criminals without the rank to protect them from it. The honorable
knight Didier and his unnamed knightly compatriot did not give George the honor or
respect of an honorable death by their blade or a chivalrous battle because in their
minds George had given up any claim to a respectful death after being a part of the
treasonous plot.
There was no mention of honorable burials for any of the traitors, although
the handling of the count’s body remained a matter of contention and great anger
among the loyal forces. In fact, one of the disloyal knights, Gilbert, who had been in
the castle with the traitors, had attempted to escape during the chaos of the siege and
was killed after falling into some muck around the walls. Some village women found
the body and began to prepare it for an honorable burial but a few of the loyal knights
discovered their plans. When the castellan Thierry heard of their actions, he tied
Gilbert’s body to the tail of his horse and dragged him through the town for all to see.
Once the body had been dragged to the market in the center of the town, Thierry
threw the knight’s corpse into the sewers and decapitated him as the final marker of
his dishonor.86 Borsiard, the murderer of the count, was captured at Lille and bound
to a wheel tied to a tree and left to suffer until his death; after his death he was hung
and displayed like his uncle.87 Suger writes that his body, after being mangled by
birds, beasts, and the angry crowds, was thrown into a sewer to rot without Christian
86 Ibid, 175. 87 Ibid, 249-250. 34 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
burial.88 This story shows an early example of chivalric habitus before fully accepted
into noble society and culture.
If medieval societies could create a culture steeped in virtues such as loyalty
to feudal lords, they could ensure that knightly violence would be somewhat limited
to the targets approved by liege lords. At the very least, the existence of chivalric
romances proved that nobles in the twelfth century were concerned with how knights
were behaving. In the chaos at Bruges after the murder of Charles the Good, several
of the attacks on the disloyal knights were done before the upper nobility arrived, by
knights loyal to the fallen count and his vassals. This indicates that knights were
becoming indoctrinated to the idea of remaining loyal to their lord even without
pressure or guidance from the king or other high ranking nobles. It is another
indication of the loyalty-centered chivalric habitus that pervaded high medieval
martial society.
In the Ordene of Chivalry, written in the thirteenth century by Ramon Lull, it
was argued a knight should defend his temporal lord and school himself in the virtues
necessary to achieve his duties honorably—wisdom, charity, loyalty, and above all
courage. He must seek honor in all things and reject pride, lying, laziness, lechery
and especially treason. The ultimate treason was to slay your lord, to surrender your
castle, or sleep with your lord’s wife. “Loyalty and truth, hardiness, largesse and
humility will be the principal qualities of character that we ought to expect in him.”89
The Ordene is the product of centuries of habitus being conceptualized more firmly
88 Suger, Deeds of Louis, 141. 89 Keen, Chivalry, 8-11. 35
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
into the order of chivalry based on the events in the twelfth that provided the impetus
for controlling knightly behavior, most especially in regards to loyalty.
It should be no surprise then that by 1352, Geoffrey de Charny included
loyalty as among the most highly ranked attributes of a chivalrous knight. In his
mind, loyalty was more important than the cleverness displayed by heroic icons such
as Oliver because cleverness could be twisted into calculation and ambition or
cunning.90 Loyal behavior could be carried over into religious faithfulness and was
therefore to be supported by Christian societies. It represented a vital element of a
martial society that depended on maintaining a class of warriors who could be trusted
to maintain the necessary level of service to the lord that they had sworn to serve and
protect without being easily tempted to be recruited by their enemies. In the pre-
chivalric world, loyalty was seen as a principal martial quality and therefore became
a principal virtue of the nobility of Western Europe.91 In the realm of chivalry, the
etiquette of war was a key element of a knight’s ability to gain honor and prestige
among his peers. Loyalty and the honor associated with it were woven into the
cultural belief system that was expanding in the courts of nobility.
Keen describes chivalry as an ethos in which martial, aristocratic, and
Christian elements were fused together.92 Because of this, the religious ideologies
associated with chivalric virtues should also be discussed as they would have had
some impact on the accepted behavior of knights. Gautier argued that to the
90 Geoffroi de Charny, A Knight's Own Book of Chivalry, trans. Elspeth Kennedy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 148, 154. 91 Crouch, Birth of Nobility, 62. 92 Keen, Chivalry, 16. 36 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
medieval mind chivalry was the eighth sacrament which connected it firmly to the
Church.93 The influence of the Church should not be overstated in this vein as there
is a constant struggle between the clergy and knights over violence in Europe. Even
as clerics condemned knightly violence, they acknowledged the honor of knights who
fought loyally for their lords. Walter of Thèrouanne compares the inducement of
men to betray their lord to the temptations of evil and laid the sin of contempt of God
and his saints at the feet of disloyal men.94 Suger’s brief account of the murder of
Charles the Good even went so far as to say that the loyal knights who were killed
during the initial attack on Charles would have “found death profitable. Sacrificed
like this out of fealty to their lord, they were found praying in church; and as is
written: “Where I find you, there I shall judge you””—implying that these knights
would be divinely rewarded for their behavior.95 Further, it is important to note that
much of this analysis was influenced by a clerical bias due to the fact that the
majority of the chronicles were written from the clergy’s perspective.
Clergymen believed that sinners could be ritually punished by God on earth
through physical attacks. The sin of treason by Judas was one that even Christ had
not allowed to go unpunished. Medieval Christendom saw such attacks on earthly
offenders as a foreshadowing of the horrors that awaited the unrepentant in hell.
Suger recorded that the lord of Chaumont, having disturbed the lands of Notre Dame
of Rouen against the wishes of the king, was struck with a dreadful malady and died
93 Gautier and Dunning, Chivalry, 6. 94 Walter of Thérouanne, "Warfare in Flanders according to Walter of Thérouanne." 95 Suger, Deeds of Louis, 139-140. 37 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
after long and agonizing suffering.96 Torments for sinners and other malefactors
were vividly portrayed in contemporary sermons and contemporary art: the suffering
sinners in Last Judgment scenes at Conques, Autun, and elsewhere; the illumination
in Henry of Blois’ Psalter showing an angel locking the damned into the mouth of
hell to burn with Judas "in the devouring flames and blazing tortures in punishment
without end."97 With such graphic examples of heavenly retribution for those who
did not follow the law of heaven and its earthly leaders, it is no surprise that the
people of Bruges did everything in their power to ensure the besieged men were
tormented.
Using the enforcement and punishment of traitors, cowards, and oath breakers
from the early and high Middle Ages compared to later examples as a lens for the
virtue of loyalty in knights, a pattern emerges. Even as consequences for these
behaviors became increasingly harsh for non-nobles, within the world of chivalry
punishments appear to be shifting into more ritual castigations which targeted the
honor and public figure of a knight. Instead of hanging the literal offender up for all
to see as was done after the murder of Charles the Good, the law of arms in the Late
Middle Ages called for a figurative hanging of the guilty party by hanging his shield
upside down or using an effigy.
This shift in behavior implies a change in how knightly behavior was being
regulated throughout the medieval period. Instead of attempting to maintain control
over your knights through fear of physical attack by the king as in the days of Henry
96 Ibid, 194. 97 Hollister, "Royal Acts of Mutilation,” 332. 38 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
I, knights would become governed and censured by their peers with the support of the king. This evolution can be seen even as soon as the reign of Henry I’s grandson,
Henry II who chooses to use the public nature of chivalry and censure to ensure that the nobility of England would not rebel against him so easily. As chivalric virtues were enforced and discussed by royalty and the clergy, the topic of proper loyal behavior was also enshrined and promoted through popular courtly literature of the twelfth century and later. These later examples of punishment and enforcement of earlier concepts of proper loyal behavior among knights display the far reaching consequences of conflicts in the twelfth century as chivalric virtues were coming to fruition.
39 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
CHAPTER III
THE WAR BETWEEN TWO HENRYS
“A king without a realm is at a loss for something to do: at such a loss was the noble and gracious Young King. When through his father’s actions he could not do what he wished, he thought in his heart that he would stir up trouble for him.”98
Where the previous chapter was concerned with establishing trends in the treatment of knights in regards to the loyalty their lords expected from them, this chapter will set the scene for how these notions of loyalty affected military movements and the growth of the 1173-1174 revolt. The rebellion of Henry the Younger and his foreign allies reveals pre-chivalric virtues and behaviors that were inculcated through courtly habitus and culture. Before discussing the motivations, beliefs, and treatment of the men involved in the rebellion, the events that caused the rebellion as well as the military campaign must be described in order to provide context for later chapters.
Loyalty is obviously a central issue in any rebellion amongst family members but is even more so for the men who were sworn to the service of a lord who may or may not have chosen the winning side. How disloyalty among the military elite was handled by Henry II will be described in more detail on an individual basis in the final chapter but here it is necessary to present the historical details of the crisis of 1173-74.
In the spring of 1173, Henry the Younger of England began a year-long campaign against his father, King Henry II, in an attempt to take by force the land and power that he felt was owed to him. This rebellion would be the starting point for the
98Jordan Fantosme, Chronicle, 4. 40 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 familial warfare that plagued the reign of Henry II and caused a great deal of political, cultural, and social chaos. The king of France and the count of Flanders supported the military might of Henry the Younger, Geoffrey, and Richard; across the Channel many of the earls of Britain and the king of Scotland became allies in the attempt to change the government of England. Both sides of the Great Revolt attempted to legitimize their claims with political, social, and religious arguments. The behaviors of the men at war as well as the justifications of both parties demonstrate an underlying culture of chivalric loyalty in medieval England and France: the old king relied on the men that he considered to be the most loyal to him, his familiae regis, while the young king had to establish extreme abuses by his father in order to justify to a larger European audience his decision to rebel.
Problems began after the death of William, his firstborn son, when Henry II designated his second eldest son and namesake the heir to the English and Norman states and potentially his successor in Anjou.99 He decided to confirm this line of succession by crowning Henry the Younger co-ruler of England in 1170 at age fifteen, without the support of the archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket.100 Henry II’s decision was hardly surprising considering the chaos that had preceded his own rise to power in England. Since the early eleventh century, no king of England had been able to pass on his title to his oldest son without some sort of dispute, and Henry II wanted
99 Thomas K. Keefe, "King Henry II and the Earls: The Pipe Roll Evidence," Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 13 (1981): 191-222, esp. 205. 100 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 111. Becket was unable to perform the traditional duty of the archbishop of Canterbury because he was in exile, avoiding Henry II’s wrath. 41 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 to ensure his legacy and safeguard the English crown.101 However, the old king was not willing to concede actual power so long as he himself still could rule. Even when in September of 1170 Henry II came close to dying of an illness, in the emergency will he wrote he added no lands to Henry the Younger’s inheritance. After his recovery, the old king remained adamant that his son’s position of dependence would remain unchanged.102 Thus he never gave the young king access to any of the powers of an
English monarch and Henry the Younger was not pleased.
When Henry II decided to crown his eldest son as co-ruler, he had already established a very solid and efficient government based on the support and council of several of his closest advisors. The inner circle of his administration was made up of men who were unswervingly loyal and competent. An efficient court and bureaucracy allowed him to comfortably leave England, without needing to return regularly to reestablish order or reaffirm his authority. Unfortunately for the young king, this administration was not designed to accommodate another member of the royal family.
The real governors of the realm of England were Richard de Lucy, Richard Fitz Nigel, and Geoffrey Ridel, along with their support staffs; later joined by Humphrey de
Bohun and Ranulf Glanville.103 The established structure had no need for the young king and his equally young household of ambitious, fledgling knights. Therefore they were disregarded.
101 Thomas M. Jones, "The Generation Gap of 1173-74: The War between the Two Henrys," Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 5 (Spring 1973): 24-40, esp. 29. 102 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 112. 103 Jones, "The Generation Gap of 1173-74," 26 and 34. 42 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
Henry the Younger was allowed to demonstrate a very few ceremonial powers, such as performing homage for his land holdings in France, maintaining a court as elaborate and lavish as he could manage on his father’s budget, and receiving homage from his brother Geoffrey. But two years after being crowned, he had not yet even been formally knighted. The upper nobility continued to swear fealty and perform homage to Henry II alone.104 Even the young king's seal seemed to symbolize his dependent status: its lack of a sword might be putatively ascribed to his lack of knighthood, but if the sword on the royal seal and on the ducal seal represented active authority, then the young king’s swordless seal was at best the sign of an heir in waiting.105 The largest limitations on the younger Henry’s power lay in his lack of resources and income—everything he spent on his court or household had to be approved by his father’s men. The financial records of Henry II’s reign tell the story of a frustrated, impotent new king dependent upon an allowance he found inadequate.
The division of power was beginning to grate on his pride.106
While the old king was in Normandy, Wales, and Ireland, the young king drifted aimlessly on the continent, “not consulted, not sought after for leadership in matters of state, and completely outside the range of policy and decision-making.”107
The chroniclers of the period describe only one event of note in the young king’s reign
104 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 115, other examples throughout. 105 R. J Smith, "Henry II's Heir: The Acta and Seal of Henry the Young King, 1170-83," The English Historical Review, 116, no. 466 (April 2001): 297-326, esp. 306 and 312. At the outbreak of the first rebellion, Richard Barre, one of the men assigned to the Young King’s household, deprived Henry the Younger of the symbol of his royal authority when he returned the royal seal to Henry II. Henry (III) had to get a new seal from Louis VII, which gave his opponents more ammunition for their argument that this was a war led by foreign influences. 106 Ibid, 33. 107 The Great Roll of the Pipe for the Eighteenth Year of the Reign of King Henry II (London: Pipe Roll Society, 1894), 212; Jones, "The Generation Gap of 1173-74," 34. 43
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 as regent—a humorous feast he hosted.108 The young king was only nominally in charge in England; in practice he was placed under the control of Henry II’s trusted ministers. This arrangement was made even clearer after the elder king left for the continent in June 1170. The charters produced during this period show Henry the
Younger was regent of England in name only during Henry II’s absences in France and Ireland; the young king did nothing more than add his signature to documents that were designed and enacted by Henry II’s trusted advisors.109 By the time Henry II returned to England in the spring of 1172, the young faux-king was seething with resentment against his father and his administration’s treatment of him.
This growing tension was exacerbated by the Plantagenet custom of distributing powerful tracts of land to sons. Geoffrey Plantagenet’s grant of
Normandy to the future Henry II had set a precedent for placing an Angevin heir in control of a major fief during his father’s lifetime.110 The younger Henry had been quickly married off to Margaret, daughter to the king of France with the hope that
Louis VII”s lack of an heir would give the Angevins a claim to both the French and
English crowns, but this did not immediately transfer any property to the young king.111 On the other hand Richard, as Eleanor’s favorite, was named presumptive heir to her lands in the duchy of Aquitaine and he contracted a beneficial match with
108 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 116. At this feast, William de St. John, William Fitz-Hamo, and prince Geoffrey decided to forbid anyone whose name was not William from dining in the same hall with them. After the non-Williams left the hall, there still remained one hundred and seventeen men who shared the same name. 109 Smith, "Henry II's Heir,” 298; Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 354. 110 Smith, "Henry II's Heir," 313. 111 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 254; Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 118. 44 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 the daughter of the count of Barcelona;112 Geoffrey was given lands in Brittany and inherited the entire earldom after the death of Conan, earl of Brittany;113 and many of the baronages were meant for John, on whose behalf Henry II went after the largest of the English earldoms.114 Henry II’s preferential treatment of John caused anger and jealousy among his brothers who did not wish to have their youngest male sibling given wealthy and strategic holdings that might make him a threat to their own power.
When Henry II attempted to give John control of three castles within Anjou, Henry the
Younger refused to allow John lordship or power within the his largest piece of inherited land.115
The Great Revolt of 1173-1174 On All Saints Day in 1172, the Young King and his wife Margaret traveled to
Paris to visit his father-in-law and future ally, King Louis VII of France. There the
French monarch and his Flemish allies encouraged Henry the Younger to go to his father and demand control over Normandy or England, carefully sowing the seeds of rebellion. The young king returned to his father’s court later that month, and flew into a rage when the old king removed Asculf de St. Hillary and several other knights from his household and forbade them from attending him or his council.116 Humiliated by
112 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 88. 113 Ibid, 114. 114 Keefe, "King Henry II and the Earls," 205-207; Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 362-363. 115 Ibid, 206; Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 366-367. After the rebellion, Henry II would give the earldom of Cornwall to John for his personal income and security. 116 Ironically, these knights were removed because members of the old king’s council believed that they were encouraging the young king to rebel. 45
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 his powerlessness and public shame, Henry the Younger snuck away in the night and returned to the king of France for help.117
The king of France was, of course, delighted at the turn of events. It presented a way to cause trouble for England and disrupt the power of Henry II. Several of young Henry’s advisors and friends had already argued that after crowning his son as king the old king should have ceded the right to rule and thereby allowed his reign to expire. Henry II sent messengers to the court in Paris to represent himself as king of the English and reestablish his authority over his son, but Louis VII sent them away saying that the true king of the English was already at court. Louis VII supported his son-in-law by claiming,
“Behold the king of England is here; and he sends no message to me by you—but if, even now, you style his father king, who was formerly king of England, know ye that he, as king, is dead: and though he may act as king, yet that shall be soon remedied, for he resigned his kingdom to his son, as the world is witness.”118
The newfound support and justification of his right as king of the English by Louis
VII was a balm on the stinging pride of young Henry. He soon added his brothers to the growing number of allies willing to depose the old king in favor of the new and less experienced monarch. Richard as duke of Aquitaine could ensure the loyalty of the southern nobility while Geoffrey’s support meant the inclusion of the Bretons into the ranks of the rebellion.119 Henry II was now in trouble: according to William of
Newburgh, “Then the elder king at length saw (for so it was commonly reported) how
117 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 117-118. 118 William of Newburgh, History, 484. 119 Ibid, 484-485. 46 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 unadvisedly, in fact how foolishly, he had acted by prematurely creating a successor to himself…”120
Bolstered by his growing support, the young king went to his father at Limoges in February of 1173 to protest the unequal distribution of land rights among Henry II’s children and the current division of power in English government.121 Knowing that giving in to the young king’s request would mean a loss of power and control over the
English government to a son that was clearly being influenced by foreign interests,
Henry II refused. Furious at the turn of events, Henry (III) returned to his new friends in Paris and was soon joined by his brothers Richard and Geoffrey after being encouraged to revolt by their mother, Eleanor of Aquitaine.122 Unfortunately for
Eleanor, she was captured by her husband before she could escape to the relative safety of her lands in France and she was sent off to a fifteen year imprisonment at
Salisbury.123
Rebellion was now in motion. By Easter of 1173, Louis VII had helped to assemble a rebel force whose members swore at the council of St. Denis to serve the interests of Henry the Younger. In return for the help of the king of France and count of Flanders, Henry (III) in his excitement promised to pay impossibly large sums of money and surrendered the rights to several castles.124 With that settled, he sent notice to King William of Scotland, who had paid homage to him in 1170, that a rebellion
120 Ibid, 485. 121 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 367. 122 Jean Markale, Eleanor of Aquitaine: Queen of the Troubadours, (Rochester, Vt.: Inner Traditions, 2007) 48; Hosler, Henry II, 196. 123 Peter of Blois, "Letter 154 to Queen Eleanor (1173)," in Internet Medieval Sourcebook, ed. Paul Halsall. http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/source/eleanor.asp, accessed July 13, 2015. 124 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 367-368. 47
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 would be taking place against his father and that he anticipated Scottish support in the upcoming campaign. William’s participation would force Henry II to split his army, and a two-front war would improve the rebellion’s chances of success against the more experienced warrior king. In return, the young king promised to give William the whole region of Northumberland as far as the River Tyne and the earldoms of
Huntington and Cambridgeshire.125
When William the Lion received the letter from the Young King, he found himself being pulled into a war where he had conflicting ties of vassalage. He had sworn to aid Henry (III) if he were called upon, but he had also paid homage to the old king. Further, William had no major conflicts with Henry II and therefore no interest in disturbing the peace. The Young King offered an incentive for supporting his side by promising to return the lands of William’s ancestors which had been taken by the
English kings. Ever the practical leader, William sent missives to Henry II discussing his potential part in the rebellion and offering to send 1,000 Scottish knights to fight on the side of the old king if the lands of Northumberland were given to him. The old king refused. Although William still hesitated to become a part of a rebellion that was largely foreign, his advisors eventually convinced him to join the rebellious sons' cause.126
When Henry II’s sons began their revolt, their odds for success appeared highly favorable—they had the support of France, Flanders, and Scotland, as well as a
125 Ibid, 368. 126 Hosler, Henry II, 197. 48 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 great number of English noblemen.127 As the Easter holiday passed, the rebel cause was joined by the young king’s brothers Richard and Geoffrey as well as nearly all of the earls and barons of England, Normandy, Anjou, Aquitaine, and Brittany.128
Newfound allies continued to trickle into his camps throughout the war, enticed by his extravagant promises of rewards.
These powerful nobles would direct military campaign against Henry II, who since early 1155 had had ample experience dealing with sporadic rebellions. They concentrated the brunt of their attacks against the borders of Normandy in the hope of weakening Henry II’s most strategically important duchy. The initial movements in
May and June of 1173 were primarily sieges because the leaders of the revolt were attempting to avoid an actual field battle against Henry II’s well-trained forces. 129
Henry II’s armies, effective at thwarting rebellious nobles throughout his reign, were better avoided.130
Moving quickly, Phillip of Flanders led a large army into Normandy, laying siege to Aumarle Castle and capturing it before continuing his march through Henry
II’s center of power.131 Phillip’s easy victory over Aumarle led some to believe that the lord of the town had been in collusion with the Flemish.132 Normandy was littered with castles that had been built by Henry II and his ancestors in order to monitor and prevent incursions into their holdings. These castle garrisons were a key element of
127 Ibid, see chart on 198. 128 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 368. 129 Hosler, Henry II, 199. 130 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 255, 257, 278-279. 131 Ibid, 369; Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 118. 132 William of Newburgh, History, 486. 49
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
Henry II’s defense against the rebel forces.133 Military success required the young king’s army to advance against this fortified wall that Henry II had so carefully constructed.
In May, the young king moved against his father’s allies in Pacy and Gournay in the Vexin, but without much success. He eventually retreated to the south, to
Verneuil, to the safety of his allies and Louis VII.134 There the rebel leaders could use their numbers to their advantage—when Henry II marched north to respond to the aggressive attacks by Phillip of Flanders, Louis VII and Henry the Younger laid siege in the south to the town of Verneuil. It was defended successfully by the constables
Hugh de Lacy and Hugh de Beauchamp who held out until August when their supplies began to run out. Louis VII and the young Henry allowed them to send word to their liege lord to bring help within three days or the town would surrender, confident that the old king would not be able to arrange anything in time.135 Unfortunately for the rebellion, Henry II was able to manage some support for his loyal vassals and at the end of 1173 the rebellion had managed only three major military movements against the old king’s holdings in France, none decisive.136
Yet these attacks on the Continent were enough to convince the uneasy king
William of Scotland to join the rebel cause against the older king. He was able to muster many of his men as well as several English knights who took advantage of their king’s preoccupation with the war to switch sides, leaving Henry II with an
133 David Bates, “The Rise and Fall of Normandy, c. 911-1204,” in England and Normandy in the Middle Ages, ed. Bates and Anne Curry (London: Hambledon, 1994), 33. 134 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 122. 135 Ibid, 118-119. 136 Hosler, Henry II, 200-201; Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 370. 50 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 alarming lack of support in the north. Although the chroniclers have varying accounts of the number of men William was able to muster—Fantosme claims 40,000, William of Newburgh 80,000—it was clear that in this two-front war the king of the Scots was a strong opponent for Henry II.137 William led the Scots in an invasion of
Northumbria while his brother David was sent to provide assistance to Leicester, which was under siege by Henry II’s justiciar Richard de Lucy. William marched south past Wark and Warkworth Castle to Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Its lord Roger fitz
Richard refused to surrender the city, and William, lacking proper siege equipment, razed the lands surrounding the castle and continued westward.138
Next William targeted the most strategically valuable castle in the earldom of
Cumbria, Carlisle. There he was met by its castellan Robert de Vaux. A melee left the Scots unable to fully blockade the fortress, allowing Robert’s men ample provisions. Then, William received word that Richard de Lucy was marching north to meet the Scots in battle. Fearing the potential battle, William left a portion of his army to continue the siege of Carlisle and took the rest of his army into the countryside where they were able to take a few minor strongholds. Like the French campaign, William was able to raise a large enough army to do damage against the old king’s most strategic castles but had no plan for what to do next. He was also hesitant to truly commit to a scorched-earth campaign in England and gave some castles, like
Wark, plenty of time to reach out for aid from their king.139 William’s failure to wage
137 Jordan Fantosme, Chronicle, 71; Hosler, Henry II, 201. 138 Hosler, Henry II, 202. 139 Ibid, 203-204; Wark was allowed to call a truce against the Scots for forty days in order to receive succor from its liege lord, Henry II. In the context of a rebellion it was able to ask for help 51 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 a more aggressive campaign against Henry II’s castles may have been an attempt to mitigate punishment if the rebellion was unsuccessful and to spare lands he hoped to acquire if it succeeded.
The rebels on the Continent and across the Channel found themselves largely out-maneuvered and out-fought by an older, more experienced military leader. They hesitated to meet the old king in an actual pitched battle and instead attempted to attack his fortresses. They could not make much headway because they retreated from their sieges whenever his armies moved within range. Although attacking Henry
II’s borders presented a prime opportunity to disrupt some of his carefully laid defenses, none of the rebel forces was able to counter Henry II’s ability to march quickly against his foes. Louis VII had attacked Verneuil assuming that the old king was unable to fight two enemies at once, but Henry II promptly proved he could. The
French forces were met with fierce resistance from the besieged loyal castles and towns which often proved too much for the ineffectual leadership of Louis VII.140
William the Lion also proved to be a reluctant and weak general: according to Jordan
Fantosme, he was often misled by bad advice from his counselors.141
On the other hand, Henry II’s goal throughout his campaigns was to get his enemies to meet him in battle; when that was not an option, he sought to destroy castles and towns in their territories. He was well versed in defending his claim to the
from the old king on the basis that its castelan had done homage for the castle and was therefore his vassal. 140Hosler, Henry II, 205. 141 Jordan Fantosme, Chronicle, 69. 52
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 throne and lands of England from nobles who wished to usurp him.142 On his way to provide relief for his men at Verneuil, Henry II paused his campaign at Breteuil Castle to address the problem of one of the rebellion’s co-conspirators, Earl Robert III of
Leicester. The old king was able to make quick work of the defenses but the young earl managed to flee the scene before being captured; in irritation, Henry II burned the castle to the ground and continued his march toward Louis VII. Henry II also had an established network of supporters in key areas of his kingdom; as he marched, he sent his subordinate, William de Humet, to handle the Breton threat in Normandy while the familia regis successfully provided support throughout the region.143
Henry II’s campaign was joined by attacks led by his trusted justiciar Richard de Lucy who marched against the key rebel stronghold of Leicester in July 1173.
Robert of Leicester was away in Normandy and the attacks were fielded by his constable, Anketil Mallory. Accompanied by Humphrey de Bohun, Richard was able to quickly take the town after a fire broke out among the houses and marketplace which forced the residents who were not protected in the castle to flee. Meanwhile
Humphrey and his men successfully burned nearby Berwick Castle to the ground, crippling the earldom of Leicester. Proving that he was a savvy politician as well as a military leader, Richard de Lucy organized a truce between his men and William the
Lion. This treaty allowed Richard to focus on the attacks in the south and across the
Channel without having to defend against movements in the North. Now
142 The Chronicle of Battle Abbey, ed. Eleanor Searle (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 159-161, 225-229. 143 Hosler, Henry II, 206-207. 53 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 unencumbered by a two front war, Richard was able to organize the loyal earls, administrators, and nobility to support the old king’s claim to the throne.144
By the fall of 1173, the rebels were becoming dispirited. As their chances of victory diminished, they began to consider their Plan B: making peace before they were destroyed in another successful attack by Henry II. But before a meeting could take place between the leaders, a group of French knights were defeated in a skirmish with some of Henry II’s knights and in the fray William de Mandeville was able to apprehend Engelram the castellan of Trie and bring him hostage to Henry II. This put the conspirators at a disadvantage when they met for peace talks on the 25th of
September 1173. Henry II’s sons attended the meeting, alongside the French monarch, and voiced the grievances that had caused them to rebel in the first place.145
In a manner that would typify his relations with his rebellious sons, Henry II chose to be magnanimous and forgiving, offering them land and money in return for peace. He made the following offer: young Henry would receive half of Henry II’s revenues from England and four castles there or half of the revenues from Normandy along with one castle each in Anjou, Maine, and Touraine; Richard was offered half of the revenues of Aquitaine and four castles in that region; and Geoffrey was given all of Brittany if he would agree to marry Constance, the daughter of Duke Conan IV. It was a tempting offer for the Angevin princes but their fellow co-conspirators were more interested in their own profit than in assuring land for potential competitors.
Louis VII and the other foreign allies declined the offer and the peace talks were
144 Hosler, Henry II, 209-211. 145 These grievances will be discussed in greater detail in the following subchapter. 54 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 concluded after the fiery Robert of Leicester shouted obscenities at the old king and attempted to draw his sword. 146
Although their attacks in 1173 had met with very limited success against
Henry II’s well-honed war machine, the leaders of the rebellion may still have had some hope for victory. Many of Robert of Leicester’s men had been killed or captured, but they were hired men who could easily be replaced. They also retained the armies of Phillip of Flanders, the French knights and infantry, as well as the armies that William the Lion had already proven capable of raising.147 Their strategy would still rely on their ability to keep the old king away from their primary targets for attack and across the Channel in England where he was less of a threat. The rebel leaders could not attack with their full force until the truce signed with William the Lion had expired. However, as resentment against the truce reached a boiling point, Henry the
Younger with Phillip of Flanders and Theobold of Blois broke the truce with de Lucy and began an unsuccessful attack on Sées. Soon they were forced to agree once again to halt their fighting for a winter truce until the spring thaw after Easter allowed for better fighting conditions. This failed attempt at a sneak attack against the old king was the only time Henry the Younger was given an opportunity for military leadership, and it highlighted the young king’s inexperience and his dependence upon foreign supporters.148
After the spring thaw, Henry II continued his typical approach to warfare and moved to secure his physical assets and defensible positions before beginning to lead a
146 Ibid, 207-208. 147 William of Newburgh, History, 488. 148 Hosler, Henry II, 211-212. 55
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 march against his enemies. He moved from Normandy to Le Mans in order to secure his lands in Maine and Anjou. As he ensured the fortifications and safety of key towns and castles, Henry II received news that the Anketil Mallory had attacked the king’s men in Mallory, William, earl of Ferrars, had sacked Nottingham and set it ablaze, and William the Lion of Scotland had reentered the conflict after Easter and had managed to maneuver his army into position at the castle of Wark.149
William’s army had grown considerably since the last season, reinforced by the soldiers of Roger Mowbray and Adam de Port, a group of Galwegians, rebellious
English knights from Scotland, and the infamous rebel of Gereford, Eric the Wild. By late April, the Scottish army had captured seven castles; two others were under obligations to surrender if they were not relieved by their lord; a tenth was under siege; and the bishop Hugh of Durham, one of the most powerful of the northern magnates, was working with the enemy.150 As William marched, he sent sections of his army to attack Bamburgh Castle and lay waste to the town of Belford. He arrived at Wark which was still being defended by Roger de Stuteville and if he were able to capture it, the Scottish would have complete control of the north of England above
Newcastle.151
With the threat of invasion and unrest encroaching on the English peace,
Richard of Ilchester requested that Henry II return to England to reestablish his control there. This was exactly the move that the leaders of the rebellion were hoping for, because with Henry II safely across the Channel in England they would have a greater
149 William of Newburgh, History, 490. 150 John Beeler, Warfare in England, 1066-1189 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 180. 151 Hosler, Henry II, 212-213. 56 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 chance of breaking down his heavily fortified series of castles and making advances against his control of the prosperous duchies in France. Within two weeks of Henry
II’s departure for England in July, Henry the Younger, Louis VII, and Phillip of
Flanders reentered Normandy and besieged the city of Rouen with the hope of capturing the Norman capital and forcing the old king into negotiations in their favor.
However, the rebels did not expect the strong resistance made by the citizens of the city, who successfully held off the siege and kept the French forces stalled around the city.152
The situation at Wark Castle was also looking grim. Yet, although Roger de
Stuteville had asked for a truce and considered surrendering when the castle was attacked in 1173, he was now more confident now about his king’s ability to provide aid, and, he held out against rebel attacks. He had only twenty knights alongside a small group of sergeants to oppose the large Scottish army. During the winter truce,
William had acquired siege equipment which his forces used against the small castle, supported by borrowed Flemish troops and archers.153 Unfortunately, William was not able to use his new machines with any great effect against Work’s defenses and the careful arrows shot by the besieged continued to pick off his men as they attempted to batter down the gate. William’s timid nature as a general became highlighted once more as he made the decision to abandon the attack of Wark, regardless of his superior numbers, and to move on to another target to prevent further losses of his men.
152 Ibid, 213. 153 Jordan Fantosme, Chronicle, 122-135. 57
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William chose to return to the decidedly more difficult Carlisle Castle, where he had left a number of his army the year before. Learning from his mistakes in the previous siege attempt, he used his large army to securely blockade the keep, and the castellan Robert de Vaux agreed that, if he did not receive support from Henry II by the end of September, he would surrender the castle. Believing that Carlisle was no longer a threat, William marched his men back east to besiege the castle of Prudhoe but his failure at truly capturing the key fortresses of the area caught up with him there. Before William could overtake Prudhoe, a loyalist army arrived to relieve the garrison of Carlisle and provide aid, led by the king’s man, Ranulf de Glanville and by
Robert de Stuteville, sheriff of York.
Once more William was forced to retreat from a vital target and maneuver between the force of Glanville at Prudhoe and the army of Richard de Lucy in the south. Now, the king of the Scots headed east to the castle of Alnwick on the coast, which he had attempted to attack before in 1172 without success. With his army in desperate need of supplies and morale running low, William chose to plunder the countryside by splitting his army into three sections commanded by Duncan, earl of
Fife, Gilbert, earl of Angus, and Richard de Morville.154 On the morning of July 13,
1174, misfortune fell upon the king of the Scots as he waited for the return of his divisions. He was surprised by a group of Yorkshire knights who had followed the
Scots from Prudhoe, and in the melee he was captured. Upon news of his capture, the
Scots turned on the Englishmen and Galwegians and the army quickly dissolved.
154 William of Newburgh, History, 491. 58 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
After surrendering to Robert de Glanville, the king of the Scots was taken into custody in Richmond to await a convenient time to be sent to Henry II.155
Henry II landed in July to save England from the threat of invasion from the
Scots in the North. He was accompanied by several prisoners, including his wife
Eleanor, and a large mercenary force of Brabanters he had contracted while in
Normandy. Suddenly deciding to make good his vow after the murder of his former friend, the old king marched straight to Kent and began the pilgrimage to the tomb of
St. Thomas Becket at Canterbury. To show penitence, the king walked barefooted to the crypt where he lay prostrate on the ground to be lashed by the monks as penance for his involvement in the crime. By happy coincidence, Henry II’s move to appease the Church occurred on the same day that William was captured by loyal forces in northern England.156 Ecstatic at the news, Henry II gave thanks to God and St.
Thomas and marched out to complete his victory. England, which it had been nearly lost to him, had been recovered within thirty days and returned to a state of tranquility, and the king would soon be able to lead his men back into Normandy.157
The capture of William the Lion inspired many loyal and rebellious lords to come forward to pay homage to the ruling king of England. Rebel forces in England were quickly captured or chose to surrender to avoid further punishment.158 By
August 1174, the old king’s enemies had been defeated in England, Brittany, Maine, and Anjou by the king’s hand or by members of his household. Many of the principal
155 Jordan Fantosme, Chronicle, 137; William of Newburgh, History, 490-492. 156 William of Newburgh, History, 494. 157 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 123. 158 William of Newburgh, History, 497. 59 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 rebels had been captured: William the Lion, Robert of Leicester, Hugh Bigod, Ralph de Fougères, and Hugh of Chester were all in Henry II’s custody. Moving across the
Channel, Henry II gathered a force to relieve his subjects at Rouen and effectively stamp out the last hopes for the rebellion.159
Immediately afterward, Louis VII agreed to meet with Henry II for peace talks. He preferred to retreat to safety within France rather than risk another embarrassing defeat, but later came forward to settle things with his neighbor. After multiple meetings they were finally able to gather each of the leaders involved with the revolt and to conclude the Treaty of Mont Louis which stated:160
1. Henry’s sons are absolved of all oaths between themselves and vassals of Henry II; the vassals connected to the sons are also absolved of their oaths. This was conditional upon all men who regarded Henry II as their liege lord. 2. Henry II, his sons, and his liegemen are to retain possession of the lands that they legally held fifteen days before the start of the rebellion. 3. As long as they serve him as their lord, Henry II’s liegemen are pardoned of guilt associated with participating in the rebellion and would not receive further harm from the king. 4. The captured rebel leaders were to give hostages and/or oaths of allegiance in exchange for their freedom. The treaty also described concessions given to his sons by Henry II as an attempt to appease some of their original complaints about his rule and demonstrated the old king’s continued belief in the importance of family unity. Regardless of his sentiments about his sons, Henry II increased their lands and revenues, but the young
Henry was still not given lordship over Anjou, Normandy, or England.161 The
159 Ibid, 495-496. 160 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 374. 161 Hosler, Henry II, 217-219. 60 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 rebellion ended with Henry II remaining victorious, with his power firmly established on foundations of loyalty and service provided by his household.
61
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CHAPTER IV
THE ROYAL RATIONALES FOR REVOLT Just as vassals were expected to announce publically when they chose to break their ties with a liege lord and to explain how that action conformed to chivalric practice, so too the leaders of a rebellion had to describe how their decision to rebel conformed to the norms of martial society. Therefore, before launching a military campaign, an argument had to be made that it was not dishonorable according to the standards of chivalric habitus. These rationalizations were a key element of the establishment and enactment of chivalric ideologies at all levels of society. Members of royalty were both legitimizers and participants. Because of this, as well as the attention given to them by chroniclers, it is necessary to make them an important element of discussion before analyzing non-royal armigerous men.
The Great Revolt was seen by many of the chroniclers as divine retribution for
Henry II’s involvement in the murder of Thomas Becket in 1170—a crime for which the old king had not performed his penance as he had agreed.162 Although Henry II vehemently denied any relation to the murderers or to the plot to kill Becket, it could not be denied that his conflict with the archbishop had led to the murder.163 The chroniclers described the rebellion as a “consequence of the sins of mankind” but it was clear that one sin in particular had attracted divine punishment.164 Indeed, in the letter of justification sent by Henry the Younger to Pope Alexander III, the young king
162 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 355-357. 163 William of Newburgh, History, 481. 164 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 121. 62 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 cited this lack of penance as one of the reasons he felt that it was necessary to rebel against his father.
The murder of Thomas Becket was a major scandal and Henry II’s involvement with it was debated fiercely by his supporters and detractors. There is also evidence that the young king felt a personal loss at the archbishop’s death because he and Becket were close. Thomas Becket had been one of Henry the Younger’s earliest mentors and as a boy he spent several years in Becket’s household where he was treated as a son. The news of the archbishop’s death in 1170 marked a break in the relationship between father and son.165 Henry the Younger even attempted to prevent his father from selecting the next archbishop of Canterbury. He wrote letters to the pope and other religious men of England opposing the consecration of any man without the approval of the pope.166 Adding fuel to the fire was the fact that Henry II had placed many of Thomas Becket’s enemies into key positions after his death and did not sufficiently punish the men responsible for the attack.
The letter from Henry the Younger to the pope continues to describe the crimes that had been committed by Henry II and more importantly, the ways that the old king was preventing his son from being able to perform his own royal duties. Although
Henry II had crowned his oldest son as a co-ruling king in the summer of 1170, against the young king’s will, there was no established division of power between the two English monarchs.167 Henry II was hesitant to give his son power that could be used against him or that could even lead to another civil war in England. Instead, he
165 Keefe, "The Generation Gap of 1173-74,” 30. 166 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 118. 167 Weiler, "Kings and Sons,” 19-20. 63
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 continued to treat Henry the Younger as one of his vassals and as though the young king had not yet reached an age where he would be allowed to make decisions without his father’s approval. The young king was forced to rely on the money that his father granted him sparingly to meet the expenses of a royal establishment and was not allowed the same freedoms as his brothers.168 The young king chaffed under these limits and complained to Pope Alexander III that the behavior of his father was nearing tyranny and was wholly unjust.
Henry the Younger’s letter centeres on the idea that as king he should be freely able to fulfill the most noble of a king’s duties, to protect the weak and ensure justice in his realm—Henry (III) is very careful not to base his argument on any personal ambition. He laments that he had been prevented from being able to perform the most basic duty given to a king, that is to “do justice and to protect those who could not protect themselves: to perform, that is, the most noble and basic functions of his office.”169 Each day since his coronation, he claims, he has been forced to listen to the pleas of the oppressed and witness numerous acts of cruelty while his useless crown weighs heavily on his brow. Henry (III) admits that he is fully aware that the
Bible commands that a son honor and respect his father but he expresses his hope that the end result of his revolt might justify this sin. According to William of Newburgh,
Henry the Younger “was not terrified from violating the great law of nature by the
168 William of Newburgh, History, 484. 169 Weiler, “Kings and Sons,” 20. 64 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 example of the undutiful Absalom.”170 This was a favored analogy of chroniclers when discussing the perfidy of the sons of Henry II.
Both parties were well aware of the religious tension caused by the murder of
Becket as well as the parallel between the story of David’s rebellious progeny and rebellion’s role as punishment from God in the Old Testament. Ever the political manipulator, Henry II took advantage of this story and likened himself to David, claiming that the rebellion of his sons was a form of divine punishment. In the Old
Testament, the famous king David suffered several punishments sent from the Lord because of his affair with Bathsheba and the murder of her husband Uriel that culminated in the betrayal and rebellion led by his son Absalom. After David allowed
Absalom to return to his court and forgave him of the murder of one of his other sons,171 Absalom began to spread discontent among the people of Jerusalem. Each morning, Absalom went to the gate of the city to intercept people on their way to plea a case before the king and claimed that the king had no judges to hear their case—if only he were allowed to give justice to the people of Jerusalem! Eventually Absalom was able to gain enough support from the people of the city and surrounding area to begin a rebellion against his father and David was forced to flee to regroup. Only through the Lord’s interference with the plans of Absalom’s advisors was David
170 William of Newburgh, History, 484. 171 Absalom had a beautiful sister named Tamar whom their half-brother Ammon lusted after. Through trickery, Ammon gets Tamar alone and rapes her; afterwards he sends her away with disgust and she flees to Absalom’s house in shame. David chooses to forgive Ammon of the crime (perhaps because of his own sexual indiscretions) but Absalom does not forgive or forget the attack on Tamar. Some time later, Absalom invites Ammon to a dinner and has his men murder Ammon in cold blood to avenge his sister’s honor. To avoid punishment, Absalom flees from Jerusalem and goes into hiding until one of David’s advisors, Joab, cajoles the king into allowing his son to return (2 Samuel 13-14, 540-543). 65
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 finally able to muster his army and defeat his son’s forces in battle. In the melee,
Absalom was unable to escape and was brutally killed by one of the king’s advisors, against David’s wishes, and his body was thrown into a pit in the forest.172 Although his son had betrayed him, David mourned the loss of Absalom bitterly but by the grace of God he was able to quickly restore order in his kingdom.173
The story of David and Absalom offered parallels to Henry II and his rebellious sons. The old king acknowledged these to establish his contrition and attempt to reconcile with the Lord and his children as a way to avoid some of the political and symbolic damage to his kingship. Realizing that there were more than a few people taken aback by his treatment of the attackers of Thomas Becket, Henry II chose to perform public religious penance for the murder. The Chronicle of Battle
Abbey records that between the moment of the outrage at the murder of his old friend and the attack against him led by his son, Henry II “learned humility” and was forced to “forget his fierceness” and go to Canterbury.174 His actions placed an emphasis on remorse, shame, repentance, and an acknowledgement of his past sinfulness.175
Robert de Monte recorded that Henry II’s devotion to his prayers and tears at the tomb of his old friend brought onlookers to tears.
That night he remained at the tomb, fasting and keeping vigil, before submitting to the scourging of the monks that was administered the next day in front
172 One of Absalom’s defining physical features was his long, thick hair which he trimmed once a year. When he realizes the battle has been lost, Absalom attempts to flee on his mule but is caught in the lower branches of a tree by his hair and is found hanging there. David’s advisor Joab stabs him in the heart with three daggers and his shield bearers beat him to death. 173 2 Samuel 15-19, 543-553. 174 Chronicle of Battle Abbey, 277. 175 Weiler, “Kings and Sons,” 36. 66 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 of an assembly. In his punishment he imitated Christ “who gave His back to the smiters: there was this difference, however, the one did it for his own sins, the other for ours.”176 Fortunately for Henry II and his biblical imagery, soon after his dramatic and humbling whipping on the steps of Canterbury by Becket’s former clergymen,
William, king of Scotland and several other leading rebels were captured by his army.
This lucky turn of events reinforced the idea that the revolt was the old king’s punishment for his earlier crimes against the Holy Church. Some historians have even pointed to the old king’s pilgrimage to Canterbury, his public flogging, and his show of contrition as being highly influential to his reestablishment of his authority as king.177 Even the treaty that ended the rebellion with the surrender of the rebel leaders was ascribed to divine providence as it took place on the vigil of the assumption of
Mary, mother of Jesus.178
Although the young king had been gifted with the crown of England, his father still held tightly to the administrative power of the king and refused to allow his son to hold court and hear the complaints of his subjects or even choose the members of his household. The helplessness of the young king had been witnessed by many of his fellows, which added to the insult of being treated as though he were still a child.179
Even William of Newburgh, who was supportive of the old king, acknowledged this
176 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 122. 177 Weiler, “Kings and Sons,” 36. 178 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 123. 179 Weiler, “Kings and Sons,” 21. 67
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 imbalance of power between the father and son.180 Henry (III)”s dishonor and shame brought to light the other fundamental issues of the old king’s governance.
In the young king’s mind, the sins of his father—especially the murder of
Thomas Becket and the failure to protect the people of his realm—had made him an unfit ruler of England. In short, Henry II acted like a tyrant by promoting unsuitable people, making promises which he failed to keep, and refusing to perform his duties as king—more importantly refusing to allow others to perform their duties.181 Through his rebellion, the young king maintained that he could right the wrongs of his father and reestablish true spiritual and earthly authority in England. Although Henry the
Younger would be censured by the chroniclers of his father for having “thirsted for the blood of a father, the gore of a parent,” he felt that the justifications he gave to Pope
Alexander III would absolve him from being spiritually punished for rebelling.182
Thus the Young King satisfied St. Augustine’s definition of a just war that was
“waged so that peace may be had.”183
The rebellion was also necessary for the young king to be able to ensure smooth transition from co-ruler to an independent ruler. Without the revenues and influence gained from owning landholdings across the Channel, Henry (III) would be considerably weakened as a leader and could have become the target for a rebellion of his own. One of Henry II’s goals as a father and king was to establish each of his sons with holdings and defensible power bases that would provide income and promote the
180 William of Newburgh, History, 484. 181 Weiler, “Kings and Sons,” 22. 182 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 307. 183 Keen, Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, 8. 68 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 strength of England. The ability of the sons to get along during the rebellion was most likely caused by their common enmity to their father, and it was very clear that this relationship might not last. Since Henry II was unable or unwilling to cede power to the young king in the Norman and Angevin lands, Richard’s establishment as principle lord of his own holdings placed the second son in some respects in a more favorable position than the first-born.184 Henry the Younger knew that after establishing a tradition of rebellion against the current ruler of England, he could very well become the target for his brothers if he managed to take the throne. The best defense against his brothers would be stable and well-fortified land holdings on either side of the
Channel to provide personal income, loyal vassals, and a method of raising an army should the need arise. To the young king, control over Normandy, Anjou, and/or
England was vitally important for his power and influence as co-ruler of England and the old king should have accepted his request without the threat of rebellion.185
Unlike Henry (III), his brothers were allowed to maintain their positions as rulers of their personal holdings and use the revenues from them for their personal needs and households. Richard had almost complete control of his mother’s inheritance in Aquitaine and Poitou—even when he was forced to surrender to his father in the years of rebellion he was able to hand over control only to Eleanor.
Geoffrey was also comfortably situated in the lands of Brittany that he acquired and ruled through his marriage to the heiress Constance in 1181.186 His charters carry no overt reference to Henry II, save in his title, but instead we notice the consent of his
184 Smith, "Henry II's Heir," 313. 185 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 307. 186 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 102. 69
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 wife to his grants; and there is even, on occasion, a parallel charter from Constance.187
Henry II also did not appear very concerned about helping the young king establish himself among his brothers as their future ruler. Although the diplomatic Geoffrey agreed to do homage for his lands in Brittany, it was not until late 1182 that Henry II stepped in and demanded that Richard do homage to his eldest brother for his lands in
France and England, exposing the emptiness of the young Henry’s associate kingship.188 Both brothers only deigned to give homage to the young king after their father required it of them, showing the limited scope of the co-ruler’s actual power.
In contrast to his siblings” relative autonomy, the younger Henry appears in the charters before and after his coronation as only an extension of his father’s authority. Even after he was crowned, the majority of charters signed and approved by Henry (III) just reaffirmed the actions or charters of the old king, with only a few grammatical changes to mark the difference. Clues to the amount of control and restriction placed on the Young King’s power can also be seen in who signed as witnesses to these governmental documents. Among the administrators who were placed by Henry II to supervise his son, was Thomas “de Sigillo,” who was associated with Henry II’s minister Geottrey Kidel. Osbert “de Camera was also Henry II’s servant. Peter fitz Guy witnessed at least one charter of Henry II and was his man, as was John de Soligny. Within the household of the young king, Henry II was even said to have informants who could help him identify and remove courtiers that might be potentially dangerous influences. It is not until after the end of the first rebellion in
187 Smith, "Henry II's Heir," 312. 188 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 109; Smith, "Henry II's Heir," 313. 70 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
1174 that the young king’s charters began to be witnessed primarily by members of his personal household instead of by the agents of his father.189
Even before his sons began to fight for power and holdings within his government, Henry II had been well versed with defending his claims to power through military might. In 1152 and again in 1156, Henry II marched against his brother Geoffrey.190 In contrast, the Capetian lineage had not suffered from infighting or family-led rebellions at all, which gave them an advantage over their neighbors.191
Kate Norgate argues that this inclination to fight amongst themselves was an inherited trait from the Angevin line.192 For this theory to be valid, one must ignore the relatively peaceful tenth and eleventh centuries and look to the intermittent warfare between Fulk IV and his brother Geoffrey the Bearded and postulate the existence of a familial vengeance gene. The struggle between the two brothers was only halted after
Geoffrey was deposed and imprisoned to prevent further attacks. Fulk's family drama did not end there; he met a similar fate at the hands of his own son, Geoffrey Martel II, who opposed his authority over the Angevin lands in 1103.193 Interestingly, the chroniclers of this period refer to the conflict between father and son as a discordia, not a bellum, and do not give a clear reason for why the rebellion began. William of
Malmesbury implies that the conflict between father and son stemmed from Fulk
189 Smith, "Henry II's Heir," 297-298, 300-301. 190 Bernard S. Bachrach, "Henry II and the Angevin Tradition of Family Hostility," Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 16, no. 2 (1984): 111-130, esp. 111. 191 Bachrach, “Henry II and the Angevin Tradition,” 112. 192 Kate Norgate, England Under the Angevin Kings (New York: Haskell House, 1969), 249-250. 193Bachrach, “Henry II and the Angevin Tradition,” 113-114. Fulk would regain control of the Angevin lands after the death of his son in 1106. 71
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 turning over the governance of Angevin lands to his son and forcefully taking back the lands when it was perceived that his son was abusing his role.194
Henry II’s Norman ancestors had a much more aggressive history of military movements against family members. William the Conqueror, as duke of Normandy defended against revolts by his uncle Guy in 1046, his uncles Mauger and William in
1052, repeatedly by his eldest son Robert (1078, 1083), and his half-brother Odo in
1082. Henry II’s grandfather, Henry I, may very well have arranged the murder of his brother William Rufus in 1100 in order to ensure that he would have no competition for the throne. Henry II’s brother Geoffrey only ceased his campaigns against his brother after being defeated in battle and agreeing to a truce that promised him one thousand pounds of English money and two thousand pounds from the income of
Anjou in return for a halt to attacks and control of the holdings that Geoffrey had been attempting to retake.195 Between the years 1027 to 1106, historian Bernard Bachrach argues that one can identify no less than fifteen major acts of hostility among family members. 196 As a relatively well educated king, Henry II would have been well aware of the tumultuous history of his family which may have had an impact on his attempts at peacekeeping and reconciliation with his children.
Revolts against English monarchs marked every king’s reign to varying degrees from 1100 to 1272.197 However, the way that Henry II and his sons resolved their disagreements was qualitatively different from the tradition of the Angevin line.
194 Bachrach, “Henry II and the Angevin Tradition,” 124-127. 195 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 79. 196 Bachrach, “Henry II and the Angevin Tradition,” 128-129. 197 Jones, “The Generation Gap of 1173-74,” 24. 72 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
This difference in strategy has been the basis for many historians to lay the blame on a psychological issue rather than an inherited trait. The estranged relationship between
Henry II and Eleanor created a rift between the children and their father in a way that is perhaps somewhat familiar to a child of divorce in the modern world. When the sons’ relationship with their father became strained due to questions of inheritance and power, their mother was able to capitalize on the growing tension as an opportunity to lash out at Henry II.198 It should also be noted that the decision of the sons to begin their rebellion in 1173 came on the heels of the rumors of the notorious affair between the old king and his “fair Rosamund” Clifford.
The young king’s continued frustration with his father’s reign and tight control of England provided a means for all those threatened by or disillusioned with the actions of Henry II to channel their protest and voice their demands. With Henry the
Younger on their side, the rebellion had greater legitimacy for the barons and earls by providing them with support from within the royal family. Acquiring the support of segments of the royal family was a key element of baronial revolts throughout the medieval period. This royal legitimacy could be used as a smokescreen for the political ambitions of the more powerful members of the rebellion.199 It also contributed to the legal justifications of waging war through the authority of a superior. Kings and their advisors had advanced the idea that the right to declare war was limited to absolute sovereigns as they represented public authority in their
198 The first rebellion by Henry II’s sons occured very near to his illicit romance with the fair Rosemond. 199 Weiler, “Kings and Sons,” 34. 73
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 kingdoms.200 Unfortunately for Henry II, he was not the only king in his kingdom. By having the young king as a figure to rally behind, the nobility of England could justify their disloyal actions and potentially avoid being labeled a traitor and singled out for punishment.
The barons’ transition to open rebellion was largely the result of pent up frustration caused by the old king’s expansion of royal power at the expense of his noble and ecclesiastical followers and his handling of patronage practices and noble inheritances.201 Henry II chose a few, powerful English earls to hold key government posts, travel great distances on the king’s business, act as justices, attend the great councils, witness important documents, supervise the maintenance of castles, and when needed, lead the king’s armies. Their service was rewarded with lands, strategic marriages, and freedom from many taxes.202 But after inheriting an exchequer that was almost completely depleted, Henry II’s goal was to regain the lands and income that had been given to the earls by his predecessors.203 Henry II’s use of extra-legal levies and taxes to support the royal bank account by burdening his earls has earned him some censure from modern historians—even his most supportive biographer,
Warren writes that there was “an element of financial extortion” in Henry’s dealings with the barons.204 The old king was not above capturing castles and heirs/heiresses or
200 Keen, Laws of War , 72, 77-78. 201 Weiler, “Kings and Sons,” 33. 202 Keefe, “King Henry II and the Earls,” 196. 203 Keefe, “King Henry II and the Earls,” 192. 204 Warren, Henry II, 387. 74 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 buying tracts of land in order to increase the holdings of the crown—especially if that meant depriving a disloyal family from inheriting.205
It is clear after reviewing the events leading up to and during the Great Revolt of the young king, and the various defenses of their actions by both sides, that this conflict cannot be simplified to one element of causation. For the young king, this rebellion was an opportunity to take the power that he felt was owed to him after many years of being under his father’s thumb. The murder of Thomas Becket also played a key role in young Henry’s religious justifications for moving against his fathers and may have helped to gather allies among supporters of ecclesiastical liberties—at least superficially. It was also an attempt to force his father to acknowledge him as a co- ruler and, perhaps more importantly, give him enough power to be able to compete with the growing power and influence of his siblings by granting him more land and autonomy. More likely the rebellion of 1174 was a symptom of wider issues with the government and kingship of England under Henry II as well as an opportunity for his competing royal neighbors.
The various justifications for the rebellion of 1173-74 served an important purpose for the military nobility who would be participating in the conflict. The reasons presented for rebellion by the king’s sons and military nobility allowed them to claim that the conflict was a just war. According to the medieval canon lawyer,
Nicholas Tudeschi, “Knights who take part in a war without just cause should be called robbers rather than knights.”206 By claiming to fight for a return of the status
205 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 127-128. 206 Nicholas of Tudeschi, Lectura Super V Libros Decretalium, 2 Decretal, Lib. II, Tit. 24, ch. 29. 75 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 quo ante of the Church’s relationship with England, Henry the Younger could meet the first qualification for a just war in pursuit of peace set forward by Augustine and satisfy the protestations of church members who disliked wars fought amongst
Christians. According to Augustine, “Wars are defined as just when their aim is avenge injury, that is when that people or city against whom war is be declared has neglected to redress the injuries done by its subjects, or to restore what they have wrongfully seized.”207
The Fate of the Young Princes Based on these justifications, the young king could claim a right to wage war on his father in order to remedy the old king’s neglect of his subjects, to restore the lands which had been kept from him as co-ruler, and to reestablish the Church’s proper position in England. His rebellion against his father, while not necessarily biblical, was justifiable according to at least two of the principles of just warfare: that the war was waged for an acceptable cause and that it rested on lawful, princely authority. In a war fought under the banner of a sovereign prince, the soldiers and military nobility in his command could fight and have legal title to his gains of war.208
These excuses offered Henry II some latitude, allowing him to be flexible in the severity of the punishments he gave to his disloyal sons without looking weak or going against chivalric expectations.
During the Easter celebrations of 1175, the old king reconciled with his sons who offered oaths of fealty and humility which he considered satisfactory. After two
207 Keen, Laws of War, 66. 208 Keen, Laws of War, 83-85. 76
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 attempts to discuss a peace treaty, Henry II was able to ensure that the leaders of the rebellion and their followers were at his mercy. The terms were dictated in favor of the old king and erased any rewards or land rights that had been promised by the young king to his followers. Thus, Henry the Younger was returned to the same dependent position he had had before the short rebellion. The young king’s knights were left to beg mercy from the old king and to apologize for the actions they had taken against him.
Henry II dispatched Richard and Geoffrey back to their respective holdings but assigned Roland de Dinan as the warden of Geoffrey’s lands in Brittany. The beaten duke of Brittany, Geoffrey, also regained possession of the lands that had been taken by forces loyal to Henry II led by the count Eudo. Henry II’s favorite son, John was given the lands that belonged to the earldom of Cornwall in England, Normandy, and
Wales. The behavior of the younger sons over the last years was excused as an example of their youth and the influence of their elder sibling.209 On the other hand, the young king had to remain in his father’s retinue for the next several months while
Henry II reestablished his power and influence over territories that had been rebellious.210 It was clear that the old king wanted to make sure that any residual urges to rebel could be squashed before they came to fruition. He also maintained a large retinue of knights at his court whenever his sons came to visit.211
209 William of Newburgh, History, 499. 210 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 123-124. 211 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 129. The only other times that Henry II kept so many knights at court was at his own coronation and the coronation of his son the Young King. 77 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
After the rebellion, the Young King suffered the most from his father’s watchful eye. He was forced to promise obedience and filial reverence for the future
“by the surety of many persons who swore to answer for his fidelity.” The old king also adopted a new precaution of requiring his sons to perform homage to him, destroying any residual beliefs in the existence of an equal co-ruler in England. In the future the son would be bound not only by the laws regarding a son’s treatment of his father but now by those by those binding a vassal to his liege lord.212 Henry II would take no more risks related to the behavior of his sons and heirs. From this point on, the young king was openly under the control of his father and his trusted advisors. For example, when he was traveling to witness the coronation of Phillip, the new king of
France, his father assigned a large retinue of knights to watch over him. To prevent him from reuniting with any of his old allies, he was not allowed to accept free quarters from anyone as he traveled.213
The young king of the English died at Chateau-Martel on June 11, 1183 after suffering from a fever that was most likely caused by dysentery. He died prematurely, according to William of Newburgh, but his age was “far advanced if his actions be considered; for he had blemished his earlier years by an indelible stain.”214 As he drew near to his death, Henry the Younger sent a letter to his father asking forgiveness for the disloyal and treasonous behavior that he had been guilty of, encouraged by wicked advisors. He also requested to make amends for the offenses that he had committed against God and the holy Church; he asked that Henry II would be merciful
212 William of Newburgh, History, 498-499. 213 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 135. 214 William of Newburgh, History, 521 78
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 to his mother the queen, his wife, and his loyal knights and retainers inasmuch as his death would prevent him from upholding the promises he had made to them.215
Although the young king had requested that his father visit him on his deathbed, the old king’s advisors argued against it. The rebellious nature of Henry II’s sons made it unwise to venture into an area where the men who had followed Henry the Younger lurked and waited for their chance to rebel once more. Instead, the old king sent his signet ring to his son who kissed the symbol of his father’s power once before surrendering to the fever.216
Bertrand de Born, a late twelfth century French knight and poet, was partially responsible for the development of the knightly ethic in response to the ideals and fears of the aristocracy. Bertrand saw the ideals of knightly virtue as fully embodied in adventuresome princes like Henry II and showed great interest in the familial conflicts of the Angevins; the poet was involved in the rebellion of 1183 and was even punished by Richard for his defiance.217 Oddly, this French poet was most critical of the behavior of the French monarchs and their military followers. He believed that war functioned as a source and emblem of the moral value of its participants and upheld the secular virtues of the age. This standard demanded that a knight be courageous, generous, courtly, and slightly mad.218 Bertrand discusses the courtly elements of knightly behavior and the relationship between a knight and his lord as one of the
215 Ibid, 522 216 Ibid, 522 217 Bertrand de Born, The Poems of the Troubadour Bertran de Born, ed. William D. Paden, Tilde Sankovitch, and Patricia H. Stablein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 1-10, 21. 218 Ibid, 34. 79 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 three main themes of his poetry.219 The heroes of Bertrand’s poems and songs are those that uphold the heroic epic, the men who fight with honor by remaining steadfast to their cause and their lord.
Robert de Monte talks of the young King’s handsome continence, pleasing manners, his incredible liberality towards the men who served him and his
“unrivalled” skill in military matters which had caused counts and princes—“yea, even kings”—to fear him. Under William Marshal’s tutelage he had developed a reputation for prowess and courage in battle that rivaled that of his lion-hearted younger brother.220 Despite this, the young king died without any landed inheritances to “satisfy the largeness of his heart.” He was buried by the archbishops of Rouen and
Canterbury at the left hand side of the altar to the blessed Mary in the church of
Rouen.221 After his burial, it was said that the sick were miraculously cured when in contact with the tomb as though he were the patron saint of the chivalric virtues that he was believed to have embodied. Kate Norgate wrote that the Young King was “one of the most puzzling figures in the history of the time…this undutiful, rebellious son, this corruptor and betrayer of his younger brothers, this weak and faithless all, was loved and admired by all men while he lived, and lamented by all men after he was gone.”222
Throughout this conflict and the years that followed, themes of loyalty and dishonor were associated with participants on either side. For the old king, his
219 Alongside courtliness, he also discussed the conflicts of war and love. 220 Jones, “The Generation Gap of 1173-4,” 32. 221 Robert de Monte. Chronicles, 146-147 222 Norgate, England under the Angevin Kings, 220-221. 80
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 intricate network of men loyal to him—be they noble or of elevated common stock— continually was used to his advantage and the defense of his kingdom. The powerful barons of his personal household maintained and defended the old king’s lands in his absence; they ran the English government while the old king was marching against his enemies across the Channel. The young king also appealed to the loyalty of his subjects and his men to their country in order to garner support and legitimacy among the nobility. The issue of loyalty is an underlying theme for each of the leaders as they attempted to defeat their opposition. The amount of effort each side used to establish its cause as a “just” and appropriate shows how seriously they believed in loyalty between father and son, knight and lord, baron and king.
Before any fighting could be done, both sides had to publically defend themselves with religious, social, and cultural justifications which also served to publically break any ties of loyalty that officially remained between combatants. The ritual breaking of ties shows the power of pre-chivalric notions of loyalty and the relationship between a lord and his man. This conflict was carried out in a cultural habitus that was steeped in notions of honorable conduct for the high nobility, and increasingly for knights; their actions would affect the establishment of chivalry in the thirteenth century in Europe. The extent of the defenses used and circulated by members of the rebellion showed a need to justify the decision to be disloyal to a liege lord and king.
Regardless of the excuses, the fact remained that members of the royal house had participated in treasonous plots against their father and king. According to the
81 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 habitus of loyalty that had been enforced by previous monarchs, something had to be done. Unfortunately, with all of Henry I’s legitimate sons choosing to participate in the rebellion against his reign, if he responded sternly he risked destabilizing the
Angevin legacy and the control of the English throne. The royal participants of the rebellion had to be treated in a way that would not harm the royal succession while also ensuring that they would not rebel against their father again. This hesitation to cause physical or long term damage did not necessarily extend to non-royal armigerous men. The next chapter discusses perceptions and interpretations of loyalty by the men who were not part of the Angevin royal family and the relationship of their treatment to the developing ideals of chivalry in England and France.
82
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
CHAPTER V KNIGHTS BEHAVING BADLY
The end of the rebellion left the non-royal members of the young king’s army at the mercy of Henry II. Without the protection of Angevin royal blood, their fates were entirely in the hands of the old king. Their punishments had to make a statement about how loyal or disloyal behaviors in war would be treated in the future. Henry II could easily have followed the brutal example of his grandfather, Henry I, and ordered outstanding rebels to be blinded or castrated as examples to future generations.
Instead it would appear that he decided to try a new tactic—relying on other knights to enforce loyal service as a key element of chivalric habitus and to promote the public honor of working knights.
The goal of this chapter is to first describe the actions of the knights of the
Angevin Empire on both sides of the Channel after joining the rebellion and then to discuss how they were punished after the treaties were signed. As this research is attempting to delve into a period where concepts of chivalric values and virtues were in a transitional phase, a goal of this chapter is to describe the unique perspectives of specific nobles, chosen based on the amount of sources available. Because of the limited number of sources, only a few knights have enough written about them to draw any real conclusions about how their behavior was interpreted by their compatriots and one must rely on the often biased descriptions of chroniclers. In order to analyze the actions and reactions of English society to rebellious knights after the revolt failed, this chapter will discuss the cases of William Marshal, Ralph de Fougères, Earl Robert
83 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
III of Leicester, and William, king of the Scots, and to compare their treatment to the previously described treatment of Henry the Younger and his brothers.
These men who were not Angevin royalty were chosen based on the amount of attention their actions received from chroniclers. By observing the treatment of individual knights who participated in the rebellion, some conclusions can be made about what behavior in relation to loyalty was deemed deviant enough to warrant special punishment from the victorious king. This data can also be applied to discussions of the impact and influence of chivalric habitus in the late twelfth century.
The rebellion of 1173-74 took place on the cusp of an era where chivalry was emerging as a more concrete idea.223 With that in mind, the actions of nobility while in the formative stages of chivalric habitus would have had a great deal of impact on how the behavior of knights would be perceived and responded to under these new ideals. The late twelfth century was essentially the dress rehearsal for the true performance of chivalry beginning in the thirteenth century. With the title of knighthood came a growing belief that knighthood was more than a mark of distinction—it was a symbol of a moral framework that placed the deeds of its members above other segments of society based on the embodiment of its virtues.
Loyalty, in particular, was a recurring theme of discussion consciously and subconsciously during the Great Rebellion. Henry II’s government relied heavily on the continued loyalty and service from the men who made up his familia regis.
Richard de Lucy, Earl Reginald of Cornwall, Richard du Hommet, and a select group of knights formed the foundation of Henry II’s administrative and military arm in
223 Keen, Chivalry, 1, 42. 84 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
England. With these men carefully maintaining the duties of the government of
England, the old king was able to spend much of his time across the Channel at his holdings there as well as confidently march out with his forces against his foes. He turned to them for advice when given a political, religious, or social controversy to sort out; their position of influence was certainly envied.224 It was therefore vital for
Henry II’s style of government to have liegemen in government that he could trust to remain faithful.
The Chronicle of Battle Abbey has multiple accounts of how the familia was involved with the king’s affairs, and it repeatedly describes how he depended on their advice. Certain names appear regularly as advisors to the king and queen, present when he needed them at every turn and seeming to take the place of his sons’ involvement in government. This position allowed greater vassals to settle disputes in a way that would benefit their own familial interests, creating almost an oligarchy based on proven loyalty to their king.225 Those men who had not earned the old king’s trust, like the young earl of Leicester, found themselves replaced from positions of power “in order that he might not be endangered and impeded by their treasonously surrendering them to his enemies.”226
Henry II’s supremacy in England and parts of France owed much to his ability to seek out competent, dedicated men to staff key parts of his government at all levels.
His success against his sons was possible because of castellans who continued their resistance even when outnumbered and besieged at all sides; a justiciar who helped
224 Chronicle of Battle Abbey, 161, 177, and other examples throughout. 225 Ibid, 197. 226 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 122 85
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 direct the old king from one pocket of resistance to another; and former enemies that he was able to convert into firm supporters. The old king was credited with the halt of the destructive civil war that preceded him and many of the townspeople reacted with particular bitterness towards those that had allowed the alien Flemish into their lands.
Henry II’s movements were sped by a dedicated and swift fleet of loyal sailors willing to take to the sea on short notice in any weather, invaluable for retaining holdings on both sides of the Channel.227
The young king, on the other hand, was without pledged and loyal supporters outside of his court and he had to rely on the French, Flemish, and Scottish monarchs to provide him with the armies, intelligence, and resources needed to fight against his firmly established father. Where his father could call upon the loyalty of his men to perform impressive feats of speed and military skill, Henry the Younger could only hope to gain support through extravagant promises of rewards. Although young
Henry was popular, generous, appealing, and a useful symbol for the rebellion’s legitimacy, there is no evidence that his baronial allies ever viewed him as a monarch except in the sense that he provided them with a myth to justify a shift of feudal allegiance. The rebel forces were not able to create a significant base of support in any segment of the population except discontented barons.228
The Stain of Treachery Contrasting sharply against the well placed bulwark of loyal administrators and government officials was the growing number of men who pledged their allegiance to
227 Jones, “The Generation Gap of 1173-4,” 35-38. 228 Ibid, 37-39. 86 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 the young king when he threatened rebellion. Since 1163, Henry the Younger had been receiving homage and fealty from the knights of England as heir to the crown and co-ruler of England.229 He had been lauded by chroniclers as well as by the biographer of William Marshal as a paragon of knightly virtues and the savior of chivalry.230 Against the tightly knit group of the familia regis that maintained its dominant position in politics, government, and noble society, the rebellion of Henry the Younger represented an opportunity for young ambitious knights and noblemen to redistribute power. The decision to rebel was not made lightly, inasmuch as being labeled a traitor or captured as a rebel could mean death or mutilation regardless of station. However, with the number of legal and religious justifications that had been outlined by the young king to the pope as well as the recent scandals Henry II had faced, these rebellious knights could claim some credible justifications for their
“treason.”
There is some indication in the chronicles of the loyalty that the young knights of Henry the Younger’s household felt for their lord. Many of the young king’s companions were his courtiers and friends who were with him in 1172 and who continued to follow him on the tournament circuit as members of his court. After several members of his household had been removed by the old king and the offended co-king had left the court, many of his retinue still followed him at their own expense.
Knights such as Gerald Talbot, William of Dive, Robert of Melun, and William
Humet remained at the young king’s side during the events of 1173-74, their presence
229 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 96. 230 L’Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, ed. Paul Meyer (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1901), vv. 2640-41. 87
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 documented by their signatures on his charters.231 These young knights and courtiers had tied their fates and reputations to Henry the Younger’s title and implied royal authority, and they did not abandon him quickly.
The young king was quickly successful in gathering support and luring many of the English nobility for his cause. Outwardly the nobility appeared to adhere to the will of the old king, judging from several promises and several clandestine letters offered when Henry II attempted to bring them over to his side, but for a time they were wavering. William of Newburgh writes that after the first year of the rebellion there were only a few noblemen in England who were not ready to desert the old king unless some check be speedily placed upon their intentions.232 Henry II was not pleased. He was also quickly deserted by his queen Eleanor and his sons Richard and
Geoffrey, leaving him enraged and publically embarrassed by their betrayal. The old king destroyed the houses, woods, and forests of William Patric the elder, Hugh, earl of Chester, Robert, count of Bellent, and many other knights of inferior rank for choosing to remain loyal to his son. 233
The old king attempted to call forward all the knights of Brittany who owed him fealty to assess the popularity of the rebelliousness of his sons. Ralph de
Fougères “played the traitor,” according to Robert de Monte, and refused to appear at his king’s summons. Ralph had a history of rebellion and punishment from Henry II so it was not surprising that he was willing to risk the old king’s ire once more. After it became known that he would not be coming to the king’s side, Ralph began to
231 Jones, “The Generation Gap of 1173-73,” 31. 232 William of Newburgh, History, 490. 233 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 117-118. 88 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 rebuild the castle of Fougères which had been destroyed by the old king previously.
His bold rejection of the king inspired Hasculf de St. Hilary and William Patric and his three sons to join in with him and make their way to the prince’s camps. The earl of Chester and count Eudo soon followed.
Furious at the open dismissal of his authority, Henry II sent his mercenary
Brabançons to lay waste to Ralph of Fougères’ lands but they were defeated by his troops. In response, Ralph burned the castles of St. James and of Tilleul. The old king himself led a march against the men of Ralph de Fougères and successfully captured the horses, herds, cattle, and substance that the rebel knights had been attempting to drive into the forest. While attempting to take the castle of Combourg and the city of
Dol, the king’s mercenaries were able to capture Hasculf de St. Hilary and William
Patric, but Ralph de Fourgères and the earl of Chester fortified themselves within a tower.234 On the run from the king’s forces, Ralph de Fourgères gave the old king hostages in an attempt to prevent himself from being taken prisoner and continued to hide and flee before the old monarch’s forces.235 From the forests, he launched guerilla attacks that harassed the king’s lands and men. Henry II, meanwhile, methodically destroyed each of Ralph’s castles and levelled them to the ground.
Ralph de Fourgères died while in hiding without regaining any of his lands; William
Patric died in captivity.236 William of Newburgh claimed that the old king treated his captured nobles with “very much more clemency than they deserved” and that the
234 William of Newburgh, History, 487; In William of Newburgh’s account, the earl of Chester and Ralph de Fougères were captured when the castle and town was taken by Henry II. 235 William of Newburgh, History, 491; Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 372-372. 236 Robert de Monte, Chronicle, 119-121. 89
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 nobles were released after giving oaths of fealty.237 He gives no mention of the men or lands destroyed by the old king while marching against them.
Of these barons, one of the most infamous members of the rebellion of 1173-
74 was Robert III, earl of Leicester. The earls of Leicester had long been powerful land holders on both sides of the Channel and Robert II, the current earls’ father, had been an influential member of Henry II’s court. According to William of Canterbury, an English monk and biographer of Thomas Becket, the two most powerful earls in
England in the 1150s and 1160s were Robert II of Beaumont earl of Leicester and
Reginald of Dunstanville earl of Cornwall.238 Robert II possessed the large Norman fiefs of Breteuil and Pacy along with the English earldom of Leicester and had strong ties to other powerful nobles. Capitalizing on Robert II”s connections to the nobility of England and France, Henry II called upon him to become chief justiciar in England, an office that oversaw the workings of the English courts and exchequer and gave tremendous influence at court and abroad.239 Like many of the earls that were loyal or served Henry II closely, the earl of Leicester was not called upon to give funds through the exchequer’s scutage or aid taxes.240
After the death of his father, Robert III did not inherit the privileges that had been a boon to his family.241 The old king was not as trusting to the new earl as he had been to his father. Like the young king, Robert III was not given powers to which
237 William of Newburgh, History, 488. 238 Materials for the History of Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, ed. James Craigie Robertson and Joseph Brigstocke Sheppard, 7 vols., Rolls Series 67 (London: Macmillan and Company,1875-1885), 1:16. 239 Keefe, "King Henry II and the Earls,” 194. 240 Keefe, "King Henry II and the Earls," 197. 241 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 108; Keefe, "King Henry II and the Earls," 202. 90 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 he felt entitled. He began to look for ways to regain his family’s former preeminence, and the rebellion of the young king offered a perfect opportunity for Robert III to reestablish the position of the earls of Leicester in a more welcoming king’s court.
Especially problematic to Henry II was the fact that the young earl, thanks to his family ties, was able to bring many other nobles to the rebellion.242 To minimize problems with Robert III of Leicester, Henry II sent Richard de Lucy to lay siege to the earl’s lands and cripple the forces that he had begun to accumulate. Richard successfully captured the lands of Leicester and forced the young earl to retreat to nearby territories held by his allies.
Robert III was joined on the coast of East Anglia by his ally Hugh Bigot and a hostile fleet from Flanders. They attempted to regain the lands that had been lost.
Although Robert III and his new forces were able to retake the lands of Norwich, he was slowed by the aggressive defense of the people of Dunwich. While Hugh pushed to make as much use of their army as possible, the earl of Leicester hesitated to cross into enemy territory where Richard de Lucy waited and watched his march. Foolishly
Robert III decided to risk capture by relying on his noble friends—many of whom were discovered to have remained loyal to the old king. Thus the forces of the earl were ambushed by Richard de Lucy’s men; Robert III and his wife were taken captive, along with Hugh of Castello and almost all their cavalry; their foot soldiers were
242 William of Newburgh, History, 488. 91
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 slaughtered.243 Over ten thousand Flemish soldiers allegedly were captured in the battle and starved to death while in captivity.244
After capturing the earl of Leicester, Henry II sent word to the men still holding the rebellious earl’s castles and demanded that they surrender to the king’s men or risk the death of their lord. Robert’s vassals, fearing the mark of cowardice, hesitated, and before surrendering they attempted to get permission to speak to their lord, but the old king would take no chances. He responded to their request by stating that the earl of Leicester would receive no sustenance in captivity until the last of his’s castles were surrendered and all his knights and castellans had submitted. The vassals of Robert III were left with no choice but to open the gates of the castles and request the king’s mercy. Following their example, Earl David surrendered the castle of
Huntington and quickly retreated to Scotland to avoid the king’s vengeance. Hugh
Bigot and the earl of Ferrars, terrified by the changing tide of the war, came forward to the king of their own accord and struck a deal that gave them security in return for peace and fidelity.245
Disloyalty among knights if left unchecked could become like a disease, spreading through the countryside and leaving disasters and chaos in its wake. The knights who had followed the earl of Leicester against Henry II were a danger even after their lord was captured. Without the direction of their liege lord, they began to wreak havoc through the countryside. They sought vengeance for their lord’s capture
243 William of Newburgh, History, 488-489; Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 372. 244 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 375. This large number could be an exaggeration by Hoveden intended to emphasize the heroism of the loyal fighters and the association of foreign invaders with the rebellion. 245 Ibid, 497. 92 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 and the deaths of many of their fellows; this group was joined by a multitude of other
“wicked men” and their incursions began to infest the neighboring counties. Naming
David, earl of Huntington and brother of the king of Scotland as their chief, the small army continued to wreak havoc and gather more allies as it moved through the countryside under the princely legitimization of their leader. Soon it was joined by the earl of Ferrars and the nobleman Robert de Mowbray, who openly declared their intentions against the old king. William of Newburgh describes their evil and sacrilegious ways, claiming that their pillaging and fury could not be halted even by the sacred time of Lent.246
Although William Marshal (c. 1146-1219) would one day serve Henry II and his successors at court, he began his involvement with the Angevins serving as a member of Henry the Younger’s personal household where he was a role model of knightly behavior and prowess.247 Until he was over forty, William relied entirely on tournaments and his patrons to provide his room and board as well as for the equipment necessary for his vocation. Because of this, his reputation for loyal service was absolutely vital for not only attaining wealth but also ensuring his continued survival as a lesser noble. Without inheriting lands, he was without income and perhaps found a kindred spirit in the frustrated and tightly controlled young king.
After being named a member of Henry the Younger’s household, William helped train
246 Ibid, 489-490. 247 William was captured while protecting Queen Eleanor as she traveled across France; in return for his service, she ransomed him and gave him a position in the young king’s court as an instructor of chivalry: see Sidney Painter, William Marshal, Knight-errant, Baron, and Regent of England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933) 31. 93 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 him in the nature and practice of knighthood: he knighted his lord while he was in rebellion against the old king.248
William was with Henry the Younger when events led up to the call for rebellion, and he traveled with his king to France and his new allies. He had been hired as a member of the young king’s household to instruct him in the art of chivalry and knighthood based on the impressive reputation that he had acquired and maintained through tournament participation. However, his position as a landless knight made him especially vulnerable when rumors were spread in the young king’s court that his knightly instructor had been dallying with the young queen. Stung by the rumors and unable to prove his innocence, William left the young king’s household to do what he did best: participate in tournaments. This decision was perhaps the best thing that could happen to the so-called “Flower of Chivalry,” as he was no longer put in the awkward position of choosing between the two kings of
England. While participating in the tournament season, the knight errant received several lucrative contract offers to fight for other nobles but he refused to serve anyone except Henry the Younger. His loyalty was rewarded—in 1183, William was given permission by Henry II to rejoin the court of his son while in rebellion (again) in the hopes that he would be able to convince the young king to follow William’s example of loyalty.
The case of William Marshall shows the importance of loyal service and reputation as well as the difficulties involved in attempting to always live according to
248 Crouch, William Marshall: Court, Career, and Chivalry in the Angevin Empire 1147-1219 (London: Longman, 1990). 94 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 the cultural standard of behavior. Twice in his career William was forced to defend himself against accusations of disloyalty (fals) to his lord and had to publically defend himself and the actions in question. Likewise even as Earl Robert, brother to Henry
(II) duke of Normandy, in 1138 chose not to support the cause of his family in favor of potentially acquiring more land, he was very careful to ensure that his chroniclers described how he went through the appropriate measures to publically break his loyalty oath before supporting the opposing side. After reaching the limit of usefulness for his oath to his lord, Earl Robert found it necessary to prove that he had signaled this change through traditional and acceptable ways.249 In the reign of Henry
II, the knights who were members of Thomas Becket’s household severed their bonds to Becket after reaching the extent of their loyalty and willingness to risk their king’s ire.250 These examples show the carefully structured ritual behavior expected from knights regarding ties of loyalty, procedures intended to insure that, regardless of power or influence, they would not switch sides without hesitation or when under duress.
Interestingly, William Marshal’s position of influence on the royal Angevin family was not ultimately damaged by his involvement in the short rebellion. After
Henry the Younger’s death, William’s reputation for being completely loyal to his lord and skillful in battle helped him transition into the household of his old enemy, Henry
II. By holding fast to his faithful service, William was able to prove to the old king that any movements he made against him had been made at the command of and for
249 Crouch, Birth of Nobility, 59-60. 250 Herbert of Bosham, Vita S. Thomae, in Materials for the History of Thomas Becket, 3:323-325. 95 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 the benefit of the young king to whom he had pledged his service. William Marshal had conducted himself within the context of honorable and chivalrous conduct and was therefore without fault. He was protected further by being a small threat in the eyes of the old king: he had no lands or title and he did not bring men or resources to the rebellion aside from his own services.
Where Malcolm, the previous king of Scotland, had been considered almost saintly, his brother and successor William was described as worldly and flawed.251 He was said to be a leader in name only and one that was consistently led astray by his advisors. In battle, he lacked the courage of Henry II or Richard, and he did not have the chivalrous reputation that made the young king so popular. His greatest contribution to the cause of the rebellion was his ability to call forth his Scottish banner men and rally the wavering lords of northern England to his cause.
According to William of Newburgh, the Scottish soldiers who had been in arms when King William was captured by Robert de Glanville and company were so
“thunderstruck” that they halted their plundering and began to turn on each other.
This was seen as the manifest vengeance of God which would not allow the “most hateful army to go unpunished.” Continuing this theme of divine punishment,
William of Newburgh includes a story of two Scottish brothers, Gilbert and Uctred, who succumbed to the blood thirsty chaos that followed the Scottish king’s capture.
Nursing a hatred of his brother in a way akin to Cain and Abel, Gilbert slaughters his
251 William of Newburgh, History, 470-471. William of Newburgh also writes that the new king resorted “to the benefit of marriage, either for the issue, or as a remedy for incontinence. After some time, the king’s advisors were able to convince him to marry the daughter of a foreign prince “and afterwards…[he] lived more correctly…[and] reigned more happily.” 96
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 brother, using excruciating tortures, once he is sure that he will be safe from the fear of royal displeasure. Scotland’s involvement in the rebellion ended as quickly as it started leaving the country in anarchy and chaos. “That is to say, those who shortly before had disturbed the peace of a harmless people, and had thirsted for the blood of the English, by a most beautiful ordinance, received retribution from each other.”252
Phillip of Flanders, although he supported the Young King’s rebellion—and more importantly the chaos it caused in England—was more than willing to lend his knights to either side. Henry II had a history of using Flemish knights to add to his armies and maintained a contract with Count Phillip’s father, Thierry, which extended to his son Phillip, to pay five hundred marks a year in return for one thousand knights.253 These knights were required to swear their fealty to Henry II before being used in the English army.254 Although Phillip was helpful to the rebel cause in the early days of the rebellion by quickly capturing the castle of the count of Aumarle— who was wavering in his adherence to the old king—Phillip did not remain a participant for long. His victory at Aumarle was cut short after news that his successor and brother had been fatally injured by an arrow during the siege.
The death of his heir and kin grieved the count of Flanders so much that he called off his expedition and returned home under the impression that this unhappy event was a punishment “for having attacked as an enemy for the sake of a wicked
252 William of Newburgh, History, 493. In his account, William was attempting to cast the Scots in as bad a light as possible due to his personal bias and the disdain of the general populace for the foreign soldiers who were waging this war supposedly in the name of an English king. 253 From the National Archives, document E 30/3 [1163] March 19 Agreement by Henry II. and Henry, his son, to pay Thierri, Count of Flanders, and Count Philip, his son, 500 marks a year in return for the services of 1,000 knights. Dover, 14 Kal. April. 254 From the National Archives, E 30/4 [1164], an acknowledgment by the barons, castellans and other men of Flanders in the King's fee of their fealty to him. 97 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 son, a king who was his cousin-german and by whom he had never been injured, but by whom he had frequently been loaded with favors.”255 Ironically after his involvement with the rebellion of Henry II’s sons and barons, Phillip of Flanders soon found himself the target of rebellion in his own lands. After accusing his vassal
Walter de Fontaines of having relations with his wife, Phillip ordered the man to be beaten with clubs, hung upside down in a sewer, and suffocated to death. In retaliation, Walter’s sons fortified their castles and began a rebellion that ravaged the count’s lands.256
Throughout the narrative of the rebellion of 1173-74, chronicles often discuss the theme of righteous punishment for disloyal nobles and they take great care to describe the downfall of those men who had dared raise arms against the true king of
England for personal gain. This discussion was advanced by a series of helpful coincidences that favored Henry II’s righteous justifications. The first was the death of Phillip of Flander’s heir and kin during the earliest battles of the war which halted the momentum of the count of Flanders after the fall of Aumarle. The old king’s luck continued after he submitted to the punishment of the Church for his part in the murder of Thomas Beckett on the very day that King William of the Scots was captured and his army dissolved. It was incidents like these that allowed the old king to be able to defend his claim to the throne and authority in England within the framework of chivalric habitus. It was a simple step to associate treason and
255 William of Newburgh, History, 486. 256 Hosler, Henry II, 219. 98 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 disloyalty with the seemingly divine attacks on prominent members of the rebellion which coincided with their movements against Henry II.
The Business of Clemency “In this business the clemency of so great a prince towards most treacherous betrayers and most atrocious enemies is beyond a doubt to be justly admired and applauded.”257
The rebellion quickly dissolved after the Angevin princes and their foreign allies were forced to accept the terms of Henry II’s peace treaty, leaving the old king free to decide who deserved special retribution for their part in it. Henry II, well aware of the tradition of his processors when dealing with rebellious members of noble society, could not afford to appear weak or to allow threats to his authority to continue. Yet his choice of punishments revolved around public shame, representing a distinct shift in the treatment of rebels from the reign Henry I to Henry II. This is probably related to the growing relevancy and internalization of chivalric values through habitus. With these new cultural methods of controlling and redirecting deviant behavior in a martial society, kings could now rely more heavily on the use of shame and dishonor associated with not following “chivalrically” approved virtues like loyalty. Unlike the young king, these non-royal (with the exclusion of William of
Scotland) armigerous men did not have the same bargaining power and were subject to the king’s choice of punishment.
With the insistence of the king of France, Henry II released the earl of
Leicester and the rest of his captives, except for the king of the Scots, and restored to them their lands, honors, and liberties. Although the old king was willing to act with
257 William of Newburgh, History, 488. 99 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 some prudence towards his disloyal nobility, he was not willing to risk future rebellion. He ordered the walls of Leicester to be thrown down and the fortifications of all who had risen up against him or deserted him to be levelled.258 With this action,
Henry II left the earl of Leicester vulnerable to attack from his neighbors and showed publically that the earl no longer had the king’s favor—if Robert III were to attempt to seek justice for an attack, he would probably not receive succor. Earl Robert III found himself in an awkward position when the young king signed the treaty that would end the war. Although he could claim that he was driven to serve the king of the English, or at least one of them, Robert III had drawn attention to himself during the campaign.
His situation worsened after his temper caused him to attempt to insult and attack
Henry II with his sword during peace talks, thus breaking conventions related to both arms and chivalry.259 The old king, whose Angevin temper was legendary, was not one to forget a threat like that. Captured and helpless, Robert III could do nothing less but wait for the old king to decide the punishment for his treachery. After the walls of his main fortress were destroyed, he was incredibly vulnerable to the political and military attacks of his fellow nobles. In 1173, the earl of Leicester’s Brackley Castle was destroyed and would never again be rebuilt; followed by Groby Castle and
Leicester Castle in 1176; Castle Mountsorrel was confiscated and remained in royal control from 1174 to 1215.260
William, king of the Scots, was ultimately able to make peace with the king of the English by doing homage for all of his lands, a ritual that the old king had delayed
258 William of Newburgh, History, 499. 259 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 374-375. 260 Brown, “List of Castles,” 263, 268, 271, 273. 100 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 for a considerable time. William was also required to surrender three key fortresses to
Henry II, who placed his own governors within them but required William to pay for their maintenance and necessities.261 The beaten king of the Scots had to pledge in front of the princes, nobles, and several powerful clergymen his homage and oath of service to Henry II, his liege lord. At the same ceremony, all of the nobility of England were required to pledge an oath which acknowledged the king of England as their liege lord and by solemn obligation to act with him and for him against all men, even before their own sovereign.262 Like any punishment meted out against deviant members of society, these oaths were taken publically to ensure that all of society knew what had taken place and would remember the stipulations and the implied shame. With his enemies conquered and bound by new oaths, Henry II had reestablished his control and governance over England and her territories.
Earl Hugh of Chester, who had followed Ralph de Fougères in open dismissal of the king’s summons, had Chester Castle confiscated from 1174 to 1177 by the old king.263 The brother of King William of Scotland, David, had claimed the earldom of
Huntington during the rebellion by right of conquest—Henry II responded by having his men level the castle of Huntington and burn it to the ground in 1174.264 Even the bishop of Durham had two castles destroyed and one confiscated for his association
261 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 123. 262 William of Newburgh, History, 499. 263 Brown, “List of Castles,” 265. 264 Brown, “List of Castles,” 269. 101 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 with the rebellion.265 Castle Tutbury, which had been gifted to the earl of Ferrars from
1154 to 1174, was destroyed after the rebellions in 1175.266
The punishment against a guilty knight was generally public and meant to bring dishonor to the name and heraldry of the knight in question while also ensuring that others would take heed of the consequences of betraying the “code” of knightly behavior. In some cases, the heraldry or a picture of the dishonorable knight was brought forward at a gathering of his peers such as a tournament and displayed upside down or in some type of embarrassing position. This process of deshonnoirement was a very serious attack on the reputation of member of noble society who earned their living based on the support of their peers and noble sponsors. As such, if a slanderous claim was made against a member of the chivalric community the accused member could seek death or punishment for the knight who made the accusation.267 According to Gautier, it was “better to be dead than to be called a coward.”268 The weight placed on personal honor and reputation would allow chivalric virtues to be enforced through peer pressure and shame.
The bonds of feudal and sovereign alliance were considered the most important and the most complicated legal and chivalrous vow for knights to uphold. A man was not normally regarded as entitled to wage war if his liege lord was a principal on the other side unless it was for his own cause and he had formally defied him or broken his oath of loyalty to him. There were also clashes of loyalty when a nobleman held
265 Ibid, 274, 267. 266 Ibid, 279. 267 Keen, Chivalry, 175. 268 Gautier and Dunning, Chivalry, 20. 102 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 land through service to more than one lord, or because two lords claimed the same alliance from him, or if there was a conflict between allegiances to his liege lord and his sovereign.269 This problem for members of martial society was highlighted by the example of William, king of the Scots, who hesitated to take up arms against Henry II, his sovereign, in favor of Henry the Younger who was also king and to whom he had made homage. The loyalty oaths of Fulbert of Chartres describe in detail the correct actions to take if two liege lords came into conflict and offer examples of the conflicts of loyalties that medieval vassal could face.270 In practice, the rules regarding the mire of chivalrous ideas towards loyalty and warfare were not often consistent or clear cut for many, even in later centuries.271 Bloch’s belief that “the devotion of the vassal [in feudal relationships] was blind, excessive, and insensate…” has been disproven by the documentation of knights choosing to break their faith to pursue their own agenda.272
Knights who found themselves with connections to both sides of a war, were left with two options. The first was to attempt to remain neutral to both parties and ride out the war, as Roger de Stuteville attempted in the rebellion in 1173-74.273 If successful, the neutral party stood a reasonable chance of achieving a measure of recognition for his purely private neutrality while also not losing resources or men to either side. In practice, remaining neutral during fighting could lead to various reactions. William of Newburgh considered the men who chose to be inactive in the rebellion as weak and lacking confidence in their ability to participate. When many
269 Keen, Laws of War, 86-88. 270 Fulbert of Chartres, Letters, 21. 271 Keen, Laws of War, 90. 272 Bloch, Feudal Society, 22. 273 Jordan Fantosme, Chronicle, 39-43. 103 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 nobles retired into their lands in France to stay out of the war, he presented their decision to avoid choosing a side as inherently hostile to the old king.274 The second option would be to choose to make war against one of the lords that he had performed homage or sworn loyalty to. If his connections to the opposing side of the war were purely personal, then he could denounce his ties publically and avoid being labeled treasonous or disloyal as earl Robert did during the conflict between Stephen and
Matilda. However, if the knight in question held lands of someone in the opposing party, he would be considered guilty of treason. If captured after avowing his connections to the opposition, the knight would be treated as an enemy and therefore given privileges like ransoming. If the knight in question had not broken faith with his lord before taking up arms, he was to be treated and punished for treason.275
Crimes against kings especially were considered one of the greatest sins in and out of the world of chivalry. Although the Old Testament portrays a virtuous ruler as both compassionate and stern, it also affirms that, “His word is a rod that strikes the ruthless; his sentences bring death to the wicked.”276 Rulers such as Henry I swore to enforce laws against treason and felony in order to maintain peace in their lands.277 A virtuous king was most concerned with the establishment of royal justice and peace.
Under this rule, Louis VI ravaged the lands of nobles he deemed tyrants by destroying them with fire and leaving them vulnerable to raids. “The plunderers themselves were
274 William of Newburgh, History, 485. 275 Keen, Laws of War, 91-92. An earlier example of this practice can be found in Suger’s Deeds of Louis, 26-27, where captured French knights were forced to either languish in captivity or agree to perform military service for the English king against their lords. 276 Isaiah 11: 3-5. 277 “Henry I’s Coronation Charter,” Chapter 8 and 12, from Select Charters and Other Illustrations of English Constitutional History, ed. William Stubbs, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913), 119. 104 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 plundered and the torturers tortured with the same or even more pain than they had used to torture others.”278 This was the sacred obligations of kings—to protect their people by punishing wrong doers. And what was more criminal than betraying your faith to your ruler through rebellion or treason? Or to break the king’s peace for personal gain? According to this custom, Henry I was well within his rights to punish a chamberlain who plotted to kill him by ordering him to be blinded and castrated instead of the traditional punishment of a public hanging.279
Death and/or mutilations were a common response to any major crime committed throughout medieval Europe. To medieval Christendom, it represented an earthly version of the trials and tortures that awaited the criminal in hell. Public punishments ensured that potential criminals were aware of the gory fate that might await them, hopefully ensuring that they would cease any actions that could lead to such dire consequences. By virtue of holy anointing, a medieval king was God’s regent on earth and could mete out punishments to those he deemed guilty.280 This right of kings was taken very seriously—Henry the Younger in his justifications for rebellion claimed that his father did not love the poor or punish the wicked and therefore was not maintaining sacred kingship. After the rebellion, Henry II was well within his rights to punish the captured rebels like Henry I had done. Instead he chose to release them after they gave a public oath of loyalty and performed homage.
While writing his chronicle of Henry II’s rule, Roger de Hoveden is very careful to include the names of each of the knights who were captured or surrendered
278 Suger, Deeds of Louis, 34-35. 279 Hollister, "Royal Acts of Mutilation,” 332. 280 Hollister, "Royal Acts of Mutilation,” 331. 105 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 to the old king. Although he describes some of the knights as “remarkable in their valor,” the fact remained that they had become prisoners of the king for waging war against him.281 With this record, Henry II could keep track of men who acted against him in order to decide appropriate punishment or future appointments of land or power. In this way, chroniclers added to the public shame associated with defeat and surrender to the dishonor of participating in a failed rebellion. Roger de Hoveden also specifies those who were sworn vassals of the knights who had been captured, perhaps attempting to distinguish the men who fought for personal gain from those who fought out of loyal service.282
In previous conflicts between the kings of France and England, Henry II had proven to be generally forgiving to knights who fought for either side.283 However, especially early in the rebellion, the old king was particularly vengeful against the early deserters and their lands. Some of this can be attributed to the anger that the old king felt as news of his sons’ and nobles’ disloyalty began trickling into his court. The violent retribution performed by the old king and his men in early months of the rebellion served an important purpose for ensuring that the rebellion would not spread quickly. Henry II was sending a clear message to any nobility considering rebellion about the risks and damage that would occur to their holdings if they chose incorrectly. However, once he was once again secure in his position as undisputed king of England, he chose to use the growing influence of chivalric habitus to impede future rebellions. This decision acknowledged the importance of chivalry as a tool for
281 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 372-373, other examples throughout. 282 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 376. 283 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 92 106 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 kings and the utility of the upper nobility in controlling and enforcing acceptable knightly behaviors.
107 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF CHIVALRIC LOYALTY IN THE LATE TWELFTH CENTURY The drama and conflict of the Angevins has been the subject of numerous historical works as well as a few soap operas. Their ruthless competition for power amongst themselves took place during the growth in popularity and authority of chivalric virtues among the nobility. Inadvertently, their attempts to wrest power from one another became the staging ground for large scale debates on the efficacy of loyalty and chivalric habitus. With two kings both claiming religious and social control over England and her holdings across the Channel, the nobility of England were pressured to choose to support a side. Those that chose to add their men to the rebellion of Henry the Younger were labeled dishonorable and destructive of honorable combatants and defenseless bystanders. Any brutal action taken against them was therefore the opposite, and was just and necessary in order to return England to a state of prosperity and peace. With that duty of restoring peace came the added benefit of obtaining royal favor and the potential benefit of gaining ownership of rebel lands.
The rebellion of the young king was a conflict that occurred in a very useful period in terms of chivalric historiography that has unfortunately been overlooked by many historians. The nature of the conflict was also useful in terms of its location in
English holdings, forcing the upper nobility to choose a side or risk being caught in the crossfire. By applying to this revolt Bourdieu’s habitus theory alongside
Durkheim’s discussion of how deviant behavior creates social norms, a new
108 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 perspective on a familiar period can be reached. Before describing what was different or new about the treatment of rebels, a baseline of the expectations for knights in regards to loyalty needed to be described. Loyalty was a quality that required service from both the liege lord and the vassal and represented a bond that could not be quietly broken. When one of the members of this relationship fell short, physical and/or psychological punishments were meted out by members of noble society.
The historical description of the events that triggered to the rebellion as well as the major military events provided the setting for the allegiances created during the conflict. This information is a necessary element in the later discussions about which knights were punished for their behavior and which were not. Lesser knights did not represent the same threat to Henry II as the traitorous earls and barons except as an organized force. To protect themselves from the potential backlash that would follow failure as well as to encourage new allies to join their cause, members of the rebellion justified their decision with religious, cultural, and social rationales that excused their disloyalty.
After the rebellion was defeated, the young king and his brothers were forced to face the reckoning of their father. Surprisingly, the old king chose to lenient with his sons’ punishments, though he negated the outlandish rewards promised by his eldest son and returned them to their positions before the outbreak of hostilities. The greatest change for the young princes was the added security that surrounded the old king and the armed escorts that now travelled with them. For those non-royal rebels like Ralph de Fougères and Earl Robert III of Leicester, the aftermath was more
109 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 devastating. Henry II made certain that they would not have the holdings or resources to risk open warfare against him again. Interestingly, for un-landed and lesser knights who participated in the rebellion in response to their liege lords’ allegiance or the hope of advancement in the young king’s court, Henry II’s ire was satisfied with public loyalty oaths made in the presence of their peers and superiors.
Henry II was able to shape discussions of the rebellion in his favor by choosing to respond to the disloyalty of his sons and nobility with temperance. As a result he was described by all of the chroniclers as a wise and forgiving ruler, not a harsh and vengeful one. Choosing to be lenient towards his heirs and his allies also ensured that his original goal of securing his lineage and legacy remained intact. It even added to the biblical parallels that had been drawn between Henry II’s rebellious offspring and the story of David and Absalom. The old king had learned to take no more risks with his children and their supporters. Although young Henry would remain severely restricted while the old king remained alive, he would retain his following of knights and nobility alongside his inherited power when he became sole ruler of England.
Through this, Henry II ensured that his heir would not become a symbol of martyrdom and potentially staved off another major rebellion.
Henry II used the chaos and discord of the rebellion as a vehicle to reestablish royal control of England by crippling his foes and to confiscate holdings to be redistributed to his loyal knights and lords. Many of the lands that were confiscated would never be returned to their original owners. Without the income from the lands their families’ once held, the rebellious nobility would lose much of their power and
110 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 influence in their region and at court while the king only gained. It could take generations of effort to return a rebellious noble family to a position of trust or favor in the king’s court. With so many new and enterprising knights and lower nobility using the relative social mobility of Henry II’s courts to further their own claims, this could mean the end of the families of these unfortunate rebels in aristocratic society.
In contrast to this aggressive and opportunistic conquest of the lands of rebellious nobles, William Marshal and many other knights were allowed to go free without major backlash. This was due in part to the fact that they had no major castles or holdings that were worth taking. The first and foremost defense of any knight was that any slight done to Henry II had been done in service to their lord and, possibly, the young king. To attempt to break their loyalty oath in order to support Henry II could mean the loss of a patron’s support, income, and shelter without any guarantee that the old king would take up this role. Further, if they were pledged to the winning side of the rebellion and had made a name for themselves for loyal and able military service, they could potentially find themselves in influential positions in the familia regis.
Throughout the historical narrative, Angevin chroniclers of the late twelfth century used the actions of the rebellious knights to highlight the dishonorable natures of men who would rebel against their king or liege lord. These were men who broke truces in order to catch their enemies unaware; earls who attacked their king while discussing terms of peace; and sons who destroyed the peace of two kingdoms to further their own power and influence and who would carry the stain of treachery on
111 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 their souls to their death beds.284 These rebellious knights had earned a reputation that went beyond the normal endemic violence of the twelfth century, because they had betrayed the core principle of knighthood, loyal service. Their allies, especially the
Scots, were able to use the rebellion as an opportunity to wreak havoc in England.285
Without a habitus that internalized honorable and loyal service, pre-chivalric knights would have been tempted to abuse or manipulate the rules of combat that were displayed even in rebellion. Earl Robert III, for example, received special mention in the chronicle of Roger of Hovedon because he dared to draw his sword against the old king while in peace talks. This moment of anger and violence would live forever in the historical record as an example of the type of knight it would take to rebel against his king. It was written to bring shame to the actions and leadership that allowed such an action to take place. The earl and other members of the rebellion were depicted as bloodthirsty fiends who were willing to sacrifice the peace and safety of England for their personal gain.
This shame and public punishment is what allows this study to draw some conclusions on how the chivalric habitus was created, defined, and used by twelfth century society. Somewhere between the reigns of Henry I and Henry II, the violent, physical punishments issued to disloyal nobility were eclipsed by public loyalty oaths.
This development is an exemplification of the growing influence of public chivalry
284 Roger de Hoveden, Annals, 377. 285 Roger of Hoveden, Annals, 377. “For his men ripped asunder pregnant women, and, dragging forth the embryos, tossed them upon the points of lances. Infants, children, youths, aged men, all of both sexes, from the highest to the lowest, they slew alike without mercy or ransom. The priests and clergy they murdered in the very churches upon the altars. Consequently, wherever the Scots and Galloway men came, horror and carnage prevailed.” 112 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 which emerging in the twelfth century and codified fully in the following. The old king’s preference for public shaming and oaths shows the growing public nature of shame and dishonor that was used to enforce chivalric virtues. To the lords who chose to willfully join in the rebellion of his sons even after performing homage to Henry II, the old king administered the harshest punishments. From knights like William
Marshal who had been bound by their oaths of service, Henry II accepted new oaths of allegiance that would ensure that their loyalty to their liege lord would not encourage them to participate in a war against the old king again.
The actions of the old king demonstrate a shift away from the bodily punishments favored by his processors toward a more ritualistic castigation that relied on knights as a group to enforce their own behaviors. Henry II did not require captured rebellious knights to be placed under the watch of his own men after their release because, after making their new public oaths, he knew that their peers would provide subtle pressure for more honorable behavior. In this way, the habitus of loyalty and honorable behavior via chivalric ideology added to the “civilizing processes” of England in a way that favors Elias’ theory.286 Henry II had created a chain of mutual dependence within his court that rewarded loyal actions with lands, titles, and wealth—after the rebellion, he reinforced this structure by legitimizing approved violence directed by the state and punishing those who attacked without his consent.
The rebelliousness of his sons was controlled, for the time being, and Henry II was once more left in a position of cultural, military, and political significance. His
286 Elias, Civilizing Process, esp. intro and ch. 1. 113 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 power and authority power was culturally and symbolically created through courtly literature and constantly re-legitimized through the interplay of agency and structure thereby designing and enforcing the structure of chivalric loyalty. Regardless of how often his sons struggled against his power or disgruntled members of nobility attempted to join together, Henry II had the growing influence of the chivalric code of conduct and loyal habitus on his side. This protection went both ways as knights who were caught up in the conflict due to their oaths to their liege lord were not treated as harshly as rebellious lords themselves. Henry II chose to punish the liege lords who had pledged their support to the old king’s enemies instead of the men who were required by oath to serve them. In this way, the victorious Henry II recognized the necessity of loyalty among the knights of England even if it was used against him.
Instead of punishing those who remained faithful to their liege lords, Henry II helped deter further rebelliousness against his rule as well as encourage his captured knights to transition their loyalty to him, all without using physical force, by relying on conscious and subconscious chivalric habitus.
114 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015
EPILOGUE Ten years after the defeat of the rebellion led by his sons, nobles, and their foreign allies, England would once more become a place of conflict. Henry II’s efforts to pacify his sons were not enough to appease their desire for more power and the young king’s demands for independent land holdings in Normandy or Anjou.287
However, this conflict did not have the far-reaching support of its predecessor nor did it achieve any real results for those fighting. This second rebellion was not even mentioned as more than an argument in the chronicles of Robert de Monte and never reached the level of popularity as the first rebellion, especially after the death of the young king. It did not have the dramatic murder of Thomas Beckett to lend to the righteousness of the cause, just the same disputes between the same family members in their struggle for power and authority.
In 1181, a great dispute arose between Henry II and his sons over the castle of
Clairvaux, situated in the fief of Angers, which was being fortified by Richard as though he had claim to it. Richard and Geoffrey had also had their duchies returned to them by their father, returning the imbalance of power to the way it was before the rebellion.288 The dispute was never settled to the satisfaction of either side which helped reignite some of the old anger between the old king and his sons.289 Once again, Richard was in a potential position of power while the young king could only rely on the handouts given by his father. Perhaps realizing that there was a potential for more unrest, in 1182 Henry II kept his court at Caen and forbade any barons from
287 William of Newburgh, History, 522 288 William of Newburgh, History, 522. 289 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 144. 115 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 holding court—instead they would have to come directly to him. This succeeded in bringing forth more than one thousand knights as well as several high ranking nobles into the sphere of influence and control of the old king.290 However, after the death of the young king in the midst of the rebellion—followed shortly after by that of
Geoffrey of Brittany—the revolt lacked the legitimacy of the previous conflict.
Henry II was now once more the sole ruler of the kingdom of England.
According to William of Newburgh, he tempered the grief of his eldest son’s passing with the knowledge that he had one less enemy. Soon after, his son Geoffrey while disputing the power given to Richard in France, also passed away.291 It was Richard, the wealthy count of Aquitaine and Poitou, who managed to ascend to the throne of
England, outlasting his brothers and rivals. A different type of chivalric hero, Richard was known for his valor in battle as well as the inherited violence and temper of Henry
II. His reign was the swan song of the Angevin dynasty as his youngest brother John, known more infamously as Lackland, would soon lose the power and authority that had been acquired and defended so aggressively by Henry II.
Although this analysis was arranged to discuss this conflict from a chivalric perspective, it could easily be shifted to add to many other historical discussions. The development and implementation of royal justice especially throughout the conflict compared to earlier examples, for instance, is an interesting example of the evolution of the “soft power” of the state. Henry II is one of the last monarchs of the high
Middle Ages to enjoy a government that he controlled almost entirely through selected
290 Robert de Monte, Chronicles, 145. 291 William of Newburgh. History, 522-523 116 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 government officials and military power. He showed a great capacity for using royal favor as well as political rituals to control and manipulate politics in favor of his own agenda.292 In this way, this project relates to the institutional history of England and could be developed more fully in that vein.
As this study was relatively select in the nature and geographic region discussed, a broader analysis of this period might provide more diverse evidence of this element of chivalric habitus. In the future, results could be analyzed using more of the cultural explorations of ideologies of loyalty by expanding the analysis to include a broader range of literary sources. Further, the methodology used to investigate notions of loyalty and treason during the twelfth century could also be applied to other chivalric virtues or sins, such as prowess or cowardice. By discussing reactions to knights behaving badly, the early and influential elements of chivalry can be uncovered.
The punishment and social castigations that were implemented by Angevin kings did not signal the end of loyalty conflicts in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries— in many ways, these struggles would only become more widespread in later medieval governments. However, this familial violence does signal a new method for dealing with rebellious knights and lords, namely through the growing influence and public nature of chivalry. Henry II acknowledged this new method of controlling knightly
292 For more discussion of this concept, see Gerd Althoff, “(Royal) Favor: A Central Concept in Early Medieval Hierarchical Relations,” in Ordering Medieval Society: Perspectives on Intellectual and Practical Models of Shaping Social Relations, ed. Bernhard Jussen, trans. Pamela Selwyn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 243-69 and Phillippe Buc, “Political Rituals and Political Imagination in the Medieval West from the Fourth Century to the Eleventh,” in The Medieval World, ed. Peter Linehan and Janet Nelson (London: Routledge, 2001), 189-213. 117
Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 behavior when he allowed the knights associated with the rebellion to go free after pledging a new oath of loyalty to him while the rebellious upper nobility had their lands confiscated or destroyed by Henry II’s loyal retainers. With these public oaths to the old king, the knights had agreed to uphold this agreement or face censure and public dishonor if they broke it. Henry II did not punish the majority of the knights who fought against him because he acknowledged that their position required them to serve their liege lord.
Although the old king could not let these captured knights go free without any punishment, his choice of public oaths was a relatively mild response compared to the blinding, castrating, and mutilation that his predecessors preferred. In this way, the king of the English subtlety acknowledged the increasing utility of notions of honor, loyalty and chivalrous virtues as methods of controlling knightly behavior. This habitus was encouraged by the cultural capital of the day: courtly literature and chivalric virtues which helped shaped societal power relations and distinguished the noble class without economic measures. Therefore, through investigations into deviant behavior among knights and how such instances were treated, historians can gauge the spread of chivalric values in the knightly class as well as related segments of society.
Loyalty, for knights, included specific duties and behaviors—such as military service—done for the benefit of a noble to whom they had sworn allegiance. A key element of the success of knighthood and the code of chivalry was an introduction of a specific set of virtues that were meant to encourage behavior that was necessary for
118 Texas Tech University, Courtney Hubbart, August 2015 the safety and security of the kingdoms of Western Europe. In many ways, knights behaving badly via rebellions or uncontrolled violence were responsible for the internalization of chivalric virtues in noble society as they helped create the setting for the legitimization or re-legitimization of power structures and cultural ideologies.
This case study, though it only discusses a brief period in English history, deals with an intriguing moment in the evolution of chivalric concepts and its intersection with European rulers. These chivalric virtues were founded on ancient warrior traditions and were proving to be a useful addition to courtly life in the high middle ages. Consciously or not, Henry directed knightly behavior towards loyal service enforced both by public vows and by peer pressure that promoted chivalric honor. Loyalty was a virtue that has been encouraged for warriors for all of human history, but the new rules and structured forms of dishonor and punishment through the chivalric ideology ushered in a new era of martial society. Through his choice of a punishment that broke with the traditions of kings like Henry I, Henry II inadvertently acknowledged the growing power of chivalric virtues as well as their potential use in controlling knightly behavior.
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