In Donald Favereau, Paul Cobley and Kalevi Kull, eds. A More Developed : Interpreting the Work of . Library 10, Tartu University Press, Tartu 2012: 175-177.

John Collier, University of KwaZulu-Natal:

Interpretants

In the biological world, certainly, signs incite the generation of in the form of actions which are future-oriented, inasmuch as living beings always seek signs for survival and for reproduction. 1

Hoffmeyer’s work is so rich that it is difficult to comment on bits in isolation. I believe, however, that I have a few words that might help to illuminate the quote above. Hoffmeyer (2008) takes a distinctly Peircean approach to semiotics both for exosemiotics and endosemiotics, so one must assume that he thinks that the basic principles are much the same. Indeed, he points out that the distinction between exo and endo in biology is not clear-cut (2008: 213ff). His view is in contrast to well-known arguments by Barbieri that the two differ significantly, with endosemiotics satisfied by codes. Codes do not have, in any obvious way, a requirement for a Peircean (Collier 2008a: 778ff). I believe that Hoffmeyer has it right.

However, I think the differences between Hoffmeyer’s and Barbieri’s views can become obscured when we look primarily at details of individual signs and sign systems. Peirce’s semiotics, however, allows for systems of signs in which one sign can serve as an icon for another sign, which gives a further interpretant. In principle this allows for a hierarchical network of signs, with interpretation becoming more general as we move upwards. To be more specific, a Peircean sign is an indecomposable triad of icon, object and interpretant. The icon is the “bare feel”, or presentation; the object is picked indexically, and the interpretant brings them together in a unified context. This triad can then form the presentation for a further triad that is more general, if not more abstract. There is no reason why several signs together cannot provide the presentation for a more general sign. It does seem, however, that this regress (or perhaps “recursion” would be a better term) must come to an end somewhere in some most general sign, with its interpretant being ultimate.

This raises the question of ultimate interpretants in biology. I will try to illustrate with a couple of simple examples how looking at biological signs in this hierarchical way can illuminate the opening quote. Suppose we have smell A (icon) of something dangerous (interpretant), then it is incumbent to avoid (object). For good biological reasons, this sort of interpretation has very short chains.

1 Hoffmeyer (2008: 65).

In Donald Favereau, Paul Cobley and Kalevi Kull, eds. A More Developed Sign: Interpreting the Work of Jesper Hoffmeyer. Tartu Semiotics Library 10, Tartu University Press, Tartu 2012: 175-177.

Chains related to survival are typically longer. A slightly longer chain: Suppose we have smell B (icon) that indicates food (interpretant) that can be eaten (object). This itself is a sign (icon) that falls under survival (interpretant) indicating it should be accepted (object). Typically there will be longer chains both for the interpretant and often the icon. In particular there will be many molecular and cellular processes in the two cases described that I have suppressed in these examples. These processes will also have semiotic properties, and can be integrated into the respective chains.

Is survival just an accidental property of these cases, or is there something more general going on? I think the latter. Biological organisms are autonomous, and their functional components are functional just because they contribute to that autonomy (Collier 2008b). The autonomy of organisms is exactly what constitutes their survival. Inasmuch as biosemiotic conditions are functional, and I think that they must be, then they will also contribute to survival (and reproduction). I suppose that there could be biosemiotic conditions that don’t contribute to survival, but they are very likely to be weeded out by evolution, so they would be rare and temporary at best.

I think, then, that it is safe to say that biological interpretants are functional, that functionality ultimately is implies survival, and that survival is the ultimate interpretant for biological signs. Future orientation itself is just a necessary part of functionality. This justifies the opening quote.

References

Collier, John 2008a. Information in biological systems. In: Adriaans, Pieter; van Benthem, Johan (eds) Philosophy of Information. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 763-787.

— 2008b. Simulating autonomous anticipation: the importance of Dubois’ conjecture. Biosystems 91: 346-354.

Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. : An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press.