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2014 Exploring the Laffer Curve: Behavioral Responses to Taxation Samuel B. Kazman
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Exploring the Laffer Curve: Behavioral Responses to Taxation
By: Samuel Kazman
Economics Department Thesis advisor: Nathalie Mathieu-Bolh College of Arts and Sciences Honors Thesis Spring 2014 2
Table of Contents
I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………… Page 3 II. Literature Review ……………………………………………………………………..... Page 7 III. Theoretical Background …………………………..………………………………….. Page 19 IV. Methodology ………………..………………………………………………………... Page 25 V. Regressions ……………………………………………………………………………. Page 33 VI. Discussion …………..…………………………………………………………….….. Page 57 VII. Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………... Page 63 Appendix ……………………………………………………………………………....…. Page 68
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I. Introduction: Arthur Laffer was not the first person to study the relationship between tax rates and tax
revenues. This relationship has been debated ever since taxes were first instated to raise
government revenue, but he is given credit for coining the widely known theoretical concept of
the Laffer curve, which is shown in figure (1).
Figure 1
The Laffer curve provides a graphical representation of the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues where the tax rates of 0% and 100% provide no revenue and every other rate generates some revenue. On this curve, tax revenue increases with the tax rate until a certain point. After this point is reached, any further increase in the tax rate decreases the government’s 4
revenue. To this day, economists disagree on the overall effect of tax reforms on tax revenues
and on the shape or even the presence of the Laffer curve.
In order to understand the Laffer curve theory, it is necessary to understand how tax
revenue is created. Tax revenue is a function of the tax rate times the tax base. Government
revenue can decrease after a tax increase if the tax base falls by a large enough margin. Whether
tax increases increase or decrease tax revenue relates to how individuals and firms respond to tax
changes since their reactions alter the size of the tax base. However, the estimation of their
responses to various taxes imposed by the U.S. government (the income tax, the corporate profits
tax, etc.), has proved to be a contentious challenge. The debate over the Laffer curve and
behavioral responses to taxation has extremely important ramifications on the policy measures
regarding taxation that the government could adopt. It is crucial that government officials be able
to predict the effects of a given tax reform on tax revenue so that it can accomplish the desired
goals after enactment. This estimation is of great importance during a period of high deficits
because the government needs to raise more revenue, and increased taxation is often seen as a
viable way to accomplish this goal. Opponents of tax increases often cite the logic employed by
the Laffer curve by saying that an increase in tax rates lowers or only causes a small increase in
tax revenue because people avoid taxation, which lowers the tax base. They also say that the
revenue effects of tax cuts are minimal. For example, the senate minority leader Mitch
McConnell stated that there is “no evidence whatsoever that the Bush tax cuts actually
diminished revenue” 1. Proponents of increasing taxes acknowledge that individuals might take actions to decrease the amount of taxes they pay, but they still say that significant tax revenue can still be received through tax rate increases.
1 http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/07/mcconnell_no_evidence_whatsoev.html 5
This thesis attempts to contribute to this tax responsiveness literature, which studies how individuals respond to taxation. Many different estimates of behavioral responses to taxation have been made in the past thirty years. There are large differences between these estimates in terms of the magnitude of the responsiveness of taxpayers. The tax responsiveness literature has generally measured how changes in the income tax rate affect taxable income to isolate behavioral responses to tax rate changes. They seek to calculate an elasticity that shows how taxable income changes when income tax rates are raised or lowered. I do not measure behavioral responses directly. Instead I focus on estimating the Laffer curve. This involves measuring the revenue effects of tax rate changes, which encompasses the results of a behavioral response to taxation. To better understand the link between tax revenues and tax rates, I also seek to show that tax rates other than the income tax rate can have an effect on income tax revenue.
People earn income in a variety of different forms that are all taxed at different rates. If the tax rate on a certain form of income increases, there is an incentive to switch income to a different form that is taxed at a lower rate to avoid paying additional taxes.
Many scholars have explored this issue, but I create a comprehensive model that incorporates a variety of factors that could affect income tax revenue. My research seeks to show that income tax revenue is a function of the income tax rate and multiple other tax rates as well.
This draws on the theory that income switching between different forms of income occurs when tax rates are changed. These reactions occur because an individual’s optimal economic decision after an income tax change involves microeconomic incentives to switch income to a different form to take advantage of different tax rates. After providing an intuition for the Laffer curve using standard microeconomics, I use data to investigate whether the Laffer curve accurately reflects the link between tax rates and tax revenue. The data set I use encompasses forty eight 6 years of tax return data from 1948 to 2009 to analyze general trends in tax responsiveness over a variety of tax rate changes. Most other scholars choose to look at individual rate change episodes, but I choose to analyze many years to assess tax responsiveness in the long run.
Performing research on individual rate change episodes might produce results that do not describe the overall trends in the ways people respond to tax rate changes. There could be factors present that affect a person’s decision making during a certain period of time that are not apparent in other years. An economic expansion, for example, could make people more willing to accept a tax rate increase without any income switching response.
The structure of this paper involves five distinct steps. First, a literature review is conducted to examine previous research that can offer insight onto my own methods. The literature review helps me identify distinct methodologies, data sets, and a variety of other factors that are taken into account to strengthen the research I carry out. Second, I present a simple theoretical model to explain how a utility maximizing individual’s reaction to tax rate changes can alter tax revenue. The third section outlines the methodology for the research conducted, including the process of data treatment as well as building the regressions used to model tax responsiveness. In the fourth section I test the Laffer curve theory, build regression equations, present the results of the regressions, and provide interpretations of each equation.
The last section offers a discussion of the results of the research along with the ramifications of the findings.
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II. Literature Review:
There has been extensive research conducted on individuals’ behavioral responses to
taxation and the ramifications on tax revenue with a wide variety of results that lead to opposite
policy conclusions. It is important to use the valuable conclusions of these studies to guide and
shape my own research.
The value of studying behavioral responses to tax rate changes is supported by the theory
that there is a dead weight loss whenever individuals are taxed. Giertz (2008) provides a
summary of the various ways that tax changes can induce a response from an individual. He shows that in response to a tax change, a person can alter her or his behavior by changing personal consumption or leisure. This reaction alters an individual’s tax liability. Changing the timing of income receipt also enables a person to take advantage of a favorable tax change. One example involves receiving income before a scheduled tax increase. Lowering an individual’s tax burden while keeping income constant takes place when someone either illegally evades taxes or legally avoids taxes. Tax evasion occurs when income is not reported to the government while tax avoidance occurs when an individual receives income in a form that gets favorable tax treatment. The administration and compliance policies of the government are additional factors that affect behavioral responses to tax rates because they shape the ability of people to evade or avoid taxes.
There are many different ways to assess the ramifications of tax rate changes. The analyses carried out by Diamond (2005) and Romer and Romer (2007) take a broad perspective
by looking at the macroeconomic effects of tax policy changes on the whole economy. Diamond
creates a model to simulate the effects of permanently extending the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts on 8 employment, investment, and output. Romer and Romer conduct an analysis of the political narrative surrounding tax change episodes to tie tax changes to movements in output. These papers attempt to answer the question, “are tax increases or decreases good for the economy?”, but their main focus is not on isolating the effects of tax changes on government revenue.
There is a broad literature that is devoted to estimating the effect of a change in the net- of-tax-rate on taxable income. The net-of-tax-rate is the percent of income an individual keeps after taxes are deducted. In these studies, the main focus is to discern what effects tax changes have on taxable income, which directly affects government revenue. Some authors, such as
Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1981) argue that decreasing tax rates might actually increase government revenue. Unlike most other scholars they predict the direct revenue effects of a tax change, and they create these predictions by using a time-series model. Goolsbee (1999) and
Saez (2004) measure the effects of net-of-tax-rate changes on taxable income and do not come to the same conclusion as Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1981). Although Saez (2004) does not study the same time period, Goolsbee (1999) shows that during the same period studied by Canto,
Joines, and Laffer (1981), the taxpayer response to changing tax rates was not significant.
Goolsbee (1999) also uses a difference in differences method instead of a time series regression.
The difference in differences method compares the percent change in taxable income between two different groups of taxpayers who pay separate marginal tax rates.
Feldstein (1995) points out that tax revenue can be affected by a multitude of factors other than just a tax rate itself. An individual’s ability to change his or her form of compensation, defer compensation, take fringe benefits, and many other factors could be part of the equation.
Altering labor supply is one of the most fundamental ways that an individual can react to tax rate changes that would have an impact on tax revenue. Gordon and Slemrod (1998) provide an 9 interesting take on tax revenue fluctuations by asking the question “are ‘real’ responses to taxes simply income shifting between corporate and personal tax bases”. They bring up the issue that as tax rates change, individuals can shift their income to a different form that is taxed at a preferable rate instead of outright tax evasion or other behavioral responses. These authors address the central issue of income switching that I incorporate into my own analyses.
During the period Gordon and Slemrod (1998) study, the income tax rate falls below the corporate tax rate, which could induce income switching behavior. The authors find convincing evidence that income switching behavior occurs between corporate and personal income tax bases. They show that a one percentage point increase in corporate income taxes relative to personal income taxes raises reported personal income by 3.2 %. This result is highly significant and points to the fact that reported income increases of a certain type could be a result of shifting income out of another form. This theory provides another essential underpinning for the research conducted for this paper in an effort to explain changes to income tax revenue in relation to other tax rates.
Gordon and Slemrod (1998) find evidence that individuals respond to incentives to switch income between corporate and personal tax bases. When the marginal income tax rate is lower than the marginal corporate tax rate, individuals who have the ability change the way in which their corporations file taxes so that the company’s income is subject to a lower tax rate.
Corporate, income, and capital gains taxes are the main ways in which the federal government raises revenue, with a small portion raised by excise taxes. It is possible that individuals react to changes in all three of these tax rates when they make decisions about which form to report their income in. Therefore, when calculating revenue that is received by the federal government for a 10 certain type of tax, it could be important to include tax rates on multiple forms of income in explaining government revenue movements.
Looking into reactions to changes in tax rates other than the income tax rate is important for understanding how total government revenue changes when different taxes change. Auerbach and Poterba (1988) look into behavioral responses to capital gains tax rate changes. This form of income differs from wage income in that people who receive capital gains income can easily change the timing of their income receipt while wage income is more constant from year to year.
Auerbach and Poterba find that impending capital gains tax changes affect the timing of capital gains income receipts. If capital gains taxes are set to increase for example, there would be an increase in the amount of capital gains income that is declared before the increase. They show that there is a significant short term elasticity, but there is an insignificant elasticity in the long term.
Although some people might react to changes in tax rates, this is not true for the whole population. Certain individuals only receive income in one form, wage income for example, and therefore do not have the ability to switch income to a different form. Additionally, not all those who receive income in different forms can switch willingly between them. Labor supply reactions could also differ after a tax rate change. If the income tax rate increases proportionally for someone who earns $30,000 and someone who earns $1,000,000, the person with the higher income could sacrifice some of their income for increased leisure. On the other hand, the poorer person might not have that option since they might need all of their income to cover basic expenses and could not allot extra leisure time. 11
The literature addressing behavioral responses of individuals to tax rates has generally
found that higher income individuals have stronger reactions to tax rate changes. Goolsbee
(1999) analyzes the responses of high income earners to various tax rate changes while Saez
(2004) notes that only the top 1% of earners respond to tax rate changes from 1960-2000.
Feldstein (1995) and Lindsey (1987) also find the highest responsiveness rates with income
earners at the top of the marginal tax rate scale. This evidence leads to the conclusion that when
studying tax rate responsiveness, higher income earners should be focused on. Those who are in
the top quintile hold a disproportionate share of the stock and bonds in the U.S. so they are more
likely to report capital gains income. Higher income individuals also have more tools at their
disposal to take part in tax avoidance or outright tax evasion. If an individual earns $1,000,000
per year then he or she has a strong incentive to avoid a higher tax rate on income earned over
$400,000. For the purpose of this paper, only data on high income earners is used to isolate the
most prevalent forms of tax responsiveness.
In order to study individual responses to tax rate changes, tax return data needs to be
analyzed to assess the necessary trends. IRS data is generally the most widely cited source used
by scholars to analyze tax responsiveness. The data on tax returns from before 1960 is not as
complete as modern data because there is no data on individual level tax returns. Goolsbee
(1999) addresses this problem by analyzing annual histograms on Statistics of Income produced by the IRS, which give the total income reported for several income classes. The data he uses is cross sectional, which measures many subjects over one period of time. Since Feldstein (1995) analyzes more modern tax rate change episodes, he has access to a set of panel data, which tracks the same individuals before and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This data has an advantage in that Feldstein can study the same group of people, which lets him isolate that group’s 12
responsiveness. Panel data has been used under the assumption that it can control for non-tax
related changes in reported income but Saez (2004) says that it might not control for changing
income inequality. He shows however that while some scholars choose repeated cross sectional
data, that panel data can be more useful for the study of income mobility. Canto et al. (1981)
provide a different approach by creating a model that can incorporate time series data.
Previous scholars have assessed the results of behavioral responses to tax rate changes by
estimating a Laffer curve. Canto et al. (1981) provide a theoretical model of a Laffer curve to
prove that there is a tax rate that maximizes government revenue and any tax rate above that
would decrease revenue. Although they do not provide a model based on data to create a Laffer curve for the U.S., others have done so. Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) estimate a Laffer curve for the U.S. using a neoclassical growth model while Hsing (1996) uses a quadratic regression to model the Laffer curve. Like these scholars, I try to create a Laffer curve model to represent the revenue implications of tax rate changes in the U.S. Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) make the point that the revenue maximizing tax rate is not often a goal sought by governments because it is not the rate at, which welfare is maximized. Raising the tax rate to the revenue maximizing rate could have harmful effects on the economy. Because of this, the authors argue that governments should set the tax rate below the revenue maximizing point in order to improve overall well- being. The empirical literature, however, generally calculates elasticities to measure behavioral responsiveness to tax rates instead of a Laffer curve. Goolsbee (1999), Feldstein (1995), Lindsey
(1987), and many others calculate the elasticity of taxable income related to the net-of-tax rate.
Goolsbee (1999) points to the importance of this tool because it shows the dead weight loss of a
certain tax and its revenue implications. He also mentions that the conventional Laffer curve
does not exist in an easily determinable form because of our marginal tax rate structure. 13
For the conventional Laffer curve to exist, our tax rate structure would have to be flat.
When the tax rate is changed and a flat tax rate is imposed, every dollar that an individual earns is taxed at the new rate. This could incite a behavioral response where an individual works less under the new tax rate if she or he deems it to be unfairly high. With a progressive tax rate structure people face different incentives with respect to the schedule of tax rates. If the top marginal tax rate is raised, individuals have an incentive to avoid the increased tax on income subject to the higher marginal rate. However, an individual does not change her or his behavior regarding income that is subject to a lower rate that was not changed during the tax reform.
Therefore any labor supply response is limited to the labor used to earn income subject to the tax rate being changed. Behavioral responses under a progressive tax rate structure would only resemble those under a flat tax rate structure if all marginal tax rates changed proportionately during a tax reform. This does not mean that the Laffer curve does not exist, but it shows the value of calculating elasticities given the American tax structure.
The methods that others have used to measure individual responsiveness to tax rate changes have varied widely over the past twenty five years. They can vary depending on the time period that a scholar chooses to analyze and they also vary depending on the type of technology available with computers being the most important technology. Canto et al. (1981) build a time- series model and fit it to the data surrounding tax rate changes to create elasticity estimates.
Lindsey (1987) uses two separate cross sections of data and uses a difference-in-differences method of study to create elasticities. He does this by comparing individuals in two different time periods that he ranks by adjusted gross income. The regression equations that are calculated are specified in the log-log functional form because this functional form generates elasticities for the independent variables. Feldstein (1999) compares changes in taxable income to changes in 14 the net-of-tax-rate using a difference-in-differences calculation similar to Lindsey’s except that he uses panel data and not cross sectional data. Goolsbee (1999) makes difference-in-difference calculations as well, but he has to revert back to separate cross sectional samples since he does not have any panel data available. He also uses log-log equations to estimate the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates. Saez (2004) takes an approach more similar to Canto by creating a time-series model while using the log-log functional form to gain elasticity estimates.
Like Saez (2004), Goolsbee (1999), and Feldstein (1995) I also use a log-log functional form to try to explain the revenue implications of tax rate changes. He notes that serial correlation is a problem with this approach and that Newey-West standard errors need to be computed to mitigate this issue.
The literature that estimates the elasticities of taxable income related to net-of-tax-rates has produced a wide variety of results with greatly varying policy implications. In articles where the marginal income tax has been the point of focus, the work of Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein
(1995) is noted for the high elasticities that are reported from their analyses of tax rate changes in the 1980’s. In general, Lindsey finds elasticities of 1.6-1.8 with the highest estimates ranging up to 2.5 for the highest income earners. Feldstein’s study produces similarly high elasticity estimates that range from 1.04 to 3.05. Although the largest elasticities relate to the responses of top income earners, elasticities that are this high have severe policy ramifications. A consequence of these findings is that higher income earners were on the right side of the Laffer curve during this period when a tax increase (decrease) would decrease (increase) government revenue. Feldstein predicted that the 1993 tax increase would only slightly increase revenue and that the treasury could experience losses for high income taxpayers. These two influential articles support the conclusions of Canto et al. (1981) that “increases in tax rates could as well reduce as 15 increase government tax revenues.” The tax cuts that occurred during the 1980’s seemingly created a win-win situation for the public and for the government. People got taxed at a lower rate while the government got more tax revenue.
Recent literature, however, has not supported the conclusions made by Feldstein and
Lindsey. Goolsbee’s (1999) goal is to mimic the work of Lindsey and Feldstein whose work he categorizes with others studying the 1980’s tax cuts. He names this literature “New Tax
Responsiveness” literature or NTR and says that the authors contributing to this body of research support the Laffer curve theory and claim that there is little or no revenue to be gained by raising taxes. Goolsbee points out that comparing high income people to lower income individuals with the difference-in-differences calculation could lead to biased elasticity estimates. Yet, he states that his work is not a critique but an extension of the methodology of NTR scholars to other tax changes to see if the same elasticities are present in different time periods. Goolsbee studies five tax rate changes from 1920 to 1966 and his results show that the findings of NTR literature are not typical. He produces elasticity estimates generally ranging from 0.2 to 0.7 while sometimes finding negative elasticities.
Saez (2004) also produces results that would support the elasticity estimates that
Goolsbee (1999) finds. He points out that only comparing data comprising the years directly before and after a tax change could reveal a short term elasticity when a long term elasticity might actually be different. Also income inequality increased greatly during the 1980’s, which could have biased the elasticity estimates of high income earners upward. Saez (2004) introduces a time trend in his regressions to control for income inequality and produces elasticity estimates generally ranging from 0.6-0.7. These findings show that the high elasticities found for the
1980’s tax reforms are most likely not indicative of general elasticity estimates since they might 16
be inflated due to an increased share of income accruing to wealthy income earners. Table (1)
provides a summary of the papers that estimate elasticities as well as the paper by Canto, Joines,
and Laffer (1981) that predicts future tax revenue. This table represents the evidence that other
scholars have uncovered about the presence of a Laffer curve in the U.S.
Table 1: Literature Summary
Article Data Findings Dependent Variable: Income Tax Revenue Key Independent Variable: Summary of Results: Through their regression simulation, the authors find Canto, Income Tax Rates that in the years following 1964, decreasing tax rates could raise tax revenue. Joines, Laffer Years Covered: 1951-1964 This points to the presence of the Laffer curve during this time period and (1981) Unit of Analysis: Group (all implies that the U.S. was on the right side of this curve. taxpayers in time series data sets) Dependent Variable: Taxable Income Summary of Results: The author obtains elasticity estimates of 1.6 to 1.8 for Key Independent Variable: the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the top marginal tax rate. Top marginal income tax Lindsey Lindsey finds the greatest responsiveness to tax rate changes in high income rate (1987) earners. He shows that the U.S. is on the right side of the Laffer curve during Years Covered: 1980-1984 this time period because the tax cuts are associated with an increase in tax Unit of Analysis : Group (all revenue. taxpayers in cross sectional data sets)
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Article Data Findings Dependent Variable: Taxable Income Years Covered: 1985 and Summary of Results: Feldstein creates elasticity estimates of 1.04 to 3.05 for 1988 the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal tax rate. He also Feldstein Key Independent Variable: finds increased tax rate responsiveness in high income earners. These (1995) Top marginal income tax elasticities show that the U.S. is on the right side of the Laffer curve during rate this time period. The author predicts that the 1993 tax increases should only Unit of Analysis: Group marginally increase tax revenue. (taxpayers in the specific panel data set) Dependent Variable: Taxable Income Summary of Results: Goolsbee creates elasticity estimates of 0.0 to 0.7 for the Key Independent Variable: elasticity of taxable income with respect to the top marginal tax rate. These Top marginal income tax findings do not show any evidence of a Laffer curve in the U.S. during these rate Goolsbee time periods. These elasticities show that the percentage decrease in taxable Years Covered: 1922-1926, (1999) income after a tax increase will not be as large as a one percent increase in 1931-1938, 1948-1952, the tax rate. This shows that tax revenue will still increase if tax rates increase. 1962-1966 Goolsbee discounts the notion that lowering tax rates could increase tax Unit of Analysis: Group (all revenue. taxpayers in cross sectional data sets) Dependent Variable: Income share of top decile of income earners Summary of Results: Saez produces long-term elasticity estimates of 0.6-0.7 (multiple groups of for the elasticity of the top 1% income share with respect to the top marginal income shares were used) tax rate. He only finds tax rate responsiveness in the top 1% of income Key Independent earners. These findings also do not show evidence of the Laffer curve because Variables: Top marginal Saez (2004) the elasticities are less than one. The elasticities that Saez calculates show tax rates, Time trends to that the percentage decrease in the top 1% income share after a tax increase control for exogenous will not be as large as a one percent increase in the tax rate. This shows that factors that affect taxable tax revenue will still increase if tax rates increase. Saez does not find evidence income that there are negative revenue effects of tax rate increases. Years Covered: 1960-2000 Unit of Analysis: Individual (tax unit)
This table shows that there is conflicting evidence regarding behavioral responses to
taxation in the U.S. Feldstein (1995), Lindsey (1987), and Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1981) show
that tax increases can have a negative effect on tax revenue. This points to the presence of a
Laffer curve during the time periods that these scholars study. Goolsbee (1999) and Saez (2004), 18 however, come to quite different conclusions. They find that tax rates are positively related to tax revenues, which does not support the Laffer curve theory. My research modeling the Laffer curve is meant to add clarity to the debate about the revenue effects of tax rate changes.
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III. Theoretical Background: Before directly estimating the Laffer curve, we need to understand behavioral responses
to taxation, which potentially explain the shape of the curve. It is important to first take a step
back and asses how individuals make decisions regarding consumption and leisure. This
provides a theoretical basis that explains why individuals change their behavior when a tax rate
is raised or lowered. Taxation distorts the optimal choices of an individual when after tax prices
change. This distortion can manifest itself in two ways. Taxes on labor income can change an
individual’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure in the present. Also,
capital gains taxation can alter an individual’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption
in the present and consumption in the future. Therefore, microeconomic theory supports Laffer’s idea that changes in the tax base occur in response to tax changes. In the following analyses I show why individuals respond to changes in taxes on both labor and capital income. I assume that interest rates and wages are fixed to isolate the effects of tax rate changes.
Microeconomic theory represents the standard choice of individuals between consumption and leisure. Rational individuals strive to maximize their utility, which is a function of these two variables. Graphically an individual’s optimal choice between leisure and consumption occurs when the indifference curve representing individual preferences is tangent to the budget constraint. It denotes the fact that the choice of the individual is both on the highest
possible indifference curve and affordable. At the optimum, this point represents the marginal
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. This equals the rate at, which the market
trades leisure for consumption, the negative of the after tax wage, which is presented in equation
(1). U L represents the marginal utility of leisure, U C represents the marginal utility of consumption, and ŵ is the after tax wage. 20