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Hot Topics Hu Jintao: Develop Forestry Economy, Achieve Green Growth and Address Climate Change

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Hot Topics Hu Jintao: Develop Forestry Economy, Achieve Green Growth and Address Climate Change September 30, 2011 Issue 7 of 2011 Publisher: CCICED Secretariat Feedback Link ● Hot Topics ■ Hu Jintao: Develop forestry "Forestry cooperation in APEC enjoys economy, achieve green growth and huge potential and great prospect," Hu said, noting that the Asia-Pacific region has the address climate change richest and unique forest ecosystem in the world and accounts for more than half of the China aims to increase its total area of world's forest area. 1 forest by 40 million hectares in the next decade, as compared with that in 2005, Hu said China will continue to provide President Hu Jintao made the remarks at the the developing members of APEC with first APEC Meeting of Ministers Responsible assistance within its capacity through the for Forestry in held in Beijing on September Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest 6, 2011. Management and Rehabilitation (APFNET). Hu put forward a three-point proposal on advancing forestry development and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Firstly, Hu said APEC members should strengthen forestry cooperation by integrating forestry development into the general plan of economic and social development. He called for APEC members to increase funding and technological input to upgrade the volume and quality of forest resources. Secondly, Hu said APEC members should properly handle the relations between development, protection, industry and ecology while tapping various functions of Hu said China will continue to accelerate forests. He emphasized the need to protect the pace of forestry development. It is bio-diversity, increase carbon absorption by working to increase the country's total forest forest and safeguard eco-security in the inventory by 1.3 billion cubic meters from region and the world. 2005 to 2020. Thirdly, Hu said APEC members should "China is ready to make new deepen regional forestry cooperation. He contributions to green growth and called for APEC members to continue high-level dialogues on forestry, step up sustainable growth," Hu said in a speech at policy coordination and technological the opening ceremony. cooperation and eliminate green trade barriers. mechanism should be established and social supervision should be proceeded. China raised the proposal of holding the APEC meeting of ministers responsible for The meeting discussed the suggestions forestry at the 18th informal APEC leaders on further strengthening environmental meeting in Yokohama, Japan last year. The protection. It was stressed that it is necessary proposal was embraced with enthusiasm by to put pollution control and ecological other APEC members. conservation at a more important place and practically address striking environmental problems that threaten public health and The theme of the first APEC forestry 2 ministerial meeting is "enhanced regional affect scientific development. At present, we cooperation for green growth and should do the following major activities: sustainable forestry development." (Source: www.china.org.cn) i. strictly carry out EIA system; ii. practically strengthen prevention and control of heavy metal ■ The State Council studies and pollution; arranges the key work on iii. carry out strict environmental environmental protection management on chemicals; iv. enhance rural environmental Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council protection; chaired an executive meeting of the State v. speed up the development of Council on September 7 to listen to the environment monitoring and briefings on environmental protection of the early warning system, improve Bohai Sea, and study and arrange key work emergency response mechanism for environmental protection. for environmental pollution accidents and the capacity in emergency management, and The environmental protection situation practically prevent of the Bohai Sea was analyzed at the meeting environmental risks; and the following objectives of the next few vi. improve environment law and years were identified: ensuring ecological policy system. In view of the security of the Bohai Sea, reducing total problems reflected by various discharge of pollutants, and striving for the environmental events that have overall improvement of coastal marine water occurred recently, we should quality of the Bohai Sea and the harmony develop and amend relevant laws between man and the sea. and regulations as soon as possible, provide more To this end, the following steps are to be comprehensive and effective legal followed: first, to strengthen planning and guarantee for environmental guidance to optimize industrial structure protection. (Source: and layout; second, more effort should be www.xinhuanet.com) made in pollution control to effectively control pollution sources; third, measures are to be taken to protect and restore ■ China releases the energy saving ecosystems of the Bohai Sea. Ecological red and emission reduction targets of the lines in sensitive and key marine areas are to “12th Five-Year Plan” period defined; fourth, risk control is to be enhanced to effectively prevent marine China recently released the environment disasters; fifth, there is a need Comprehensive Program on Energy-Saving to enhance the sense of responsibility and and Emission Reduction during the “12th legal awareness of local governments and Five-Year Plan” Period. enterprises to carry out the responsibility of marine environment protection; sixth, we should enhance publicity and education. An The Comprehensive Program specifies open and transparent information releasing that by the end of 2015, the energy consumption per 10,000 Yuan GDP will country will not exceed 23.476 million ton decrease to 0.869 ton coal equivalent and 20.864 million ton respectively, down by (according to the price of 2005), down by 8% compared with 25.517 million ton and 16% compared with 1.034 ton coal 22.678 million ton in 2010. The total emission equivalent in 2010 and 32% compared with will not exceed 2.38 million ton for ammonia 1.276 ton coal equivalent in 2005. It is nitrogen and 20.462 million ton for NOx, planned that China will save 670 million ton down by 10% compared with that of 2010 coal equivalent during the “12th Five-Year (2.644 million ton of ammonia nitrogen and Plan” period. It is expected that by 2015, 22.736 ton NOx). (Source: www.gov.cn) COD discharge and SO2 emission of the 3 ● CCICED Activities ■ CCICED holds its fourth joint working meeting of the Secretariat The meeting decided that the fifth joint and the Chief Advisors in Beijing working meeting of the Secretariat and the Chief Advisors will be held in the middle of September. The fourth joint working meeting of the Secretariat and the Chief Advisors was held on August 1 in Beijing. Mr. Shen Guofang, ■ The Workshop on priority areas of the Chinese Chief Advisor and Academician policy research of CCICED Phase V of Chinese Academy of Engineering and Dr. holds in Beijing Hanson, the International Chief Advisor, co-chaired the meeting. Mr. Ren Yong, The Workshop on priority areas of Assistant Secretary General of CCICED and policy research of CCICED Phase V was Deputy Director General of MEP held on August 3 in Beijing. Mr. Li Ganjie, Department of Human Resources CCICED Secretary General and Vice Management and Institutional Arrangement Minister of MEP addressed the meeting. Mr. and Ms. Fang Li, Assistant Secretary Ren Yong, Assistant Secretary General of General of CCICED and Deputy Director CCICED and Deputy Director General of General of Foreign Economic Cooperation MEP Department of Human Resources Center (FECO), MEP attended the meeting. Management and Institutional Arrangement and Ms. Fang Li, Assistant Secretary The meeting mainly discussed the General of CCICED and Deputy Director progress and the existing issues of each Task General of FECO, MEP chaired the meeting Force and Special Policy Study, the draft respectively. Over 20 people including Report on the review of CCICED, and the officials, experts and scholars from MEP priority research areas of Phase V of Department of Planning and Finance, CCICED. It is requested that the Chief Department of Policies, Laws and Advisor’s Support Group: i. closely track the Regulations, Department of Pollution progress of each Task Force, read the first Control, Department of Science & draft report of each Task Force in advance, Technology and Standard, Peking University, prepare the framework of policy Tsinghua University, Renmin University, recommendations for 2011 Annual General Beijing Normal University, China University Meeting; and ii. continue to explore and of Political Science and Law, Environmental deepen the main research fields of CCICED Development Center of MEP, Chinese Phase V. Focus should be given to the Academy of Environmental Planning, Policy drafting and finalizing of the Report on the Research Centre for Environment and Review of CCICED. The Secretariat and the Economy of MEP and China-ASEAN Chief Advisor’s Supporting Group should Environmental Cooperation Center of MEP provide necessary assistance and support to attended the meeting. the International Chief Advisor who writes the Report. Mr. Zhu Guangyao, Executive Vice management system of China that adapts to Chairperson of China’s Ecological the new situation, as well as the strategic Civilization Research and Promotion role of environmental protection in Association and former Secretary General of facilitating the transformation of economic CCICED introduced the basic situation of development. CCICED policy research. Mr. Shen Guofang, CCICED Chinese Chief Advisor and When summarizing
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