German Arms Exports and the Militari- Sation of Arab States' Foreign Policies
NO. 6 JANUARY 2021 Introduction
German Arms Exports and the Militari- sation of Arab States’ Foreign Policies Yannik Hüllinghorst and Stephan Roll
Measured in terms of licenses issued, Arab states will again be among the main recipi- ents of German military equipment exports in 2020. This continues a trend that has been evident since the early 2000s and especially since 2010, all despite Germany’s recently extended ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia. From 2018 to 2020, the value of export licences for the five most important Arab buyer countries has decreased compared to the previous period. However, their share of total export licences is still over 25 percent. In view of regional developments, this is problematic. The foreign policies of the biggest customers have changed in recent years as they become less predictable and more willing to use military means to assert their interests. Military equipment exports could thus contribute to further escalation of the numerous inter- state conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, thereby posing great risks to Ger- many and the EU. Against the backdrop of Germany and the EU’s own export guide- lines, it is therefore advised to halt exports of military products to these countries.
On December 10, the German government quarter of the total sold. Among “Third announced that it would extend the arms countries”, which are neither NATO mem- export ban imposed on Saudi Arabia in bers nor NATO member equivalents, the 2018 by one year. Nevertheless, in 2020, share of these five countries accounts for Arab states are again among the main re- as much as 52 percent of all German sales cipients of German military equipment of military products. Only export licences deliveries. Most recently, Germany author- for small arms have decreased during the ised the export of antiaircraft cannon tanks last six years significantly. At the same to Qatar and patrol boats to Egypt. This time, German-made goods account for only continues a trend that began at the start of a fraction of all the arms purchased by these the millennium and has intensified since countries. According to the Stockholm In- 2010 (see diagram, p. 2). Between 2018 and ternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2020, Egypt, Algeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia the Middle East is one of the world’s largest and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pur- importers of weapons. Saudi Arabia alone chased around 4.7 billion euros worth of accounted for 12 percent of all global arms German military equipment, about one imports between 2015 and 2019.
Diagram
Changes to the Foreign and reinforced this development. Egypt, too, Regional Policies of Arab States loosened its ties with the US, with which it had maintained a close military partnership These Arab states’ rearmament goes hand since the 1980s. Particularly since the 2013 in hand with changes to their foreign poli- coup, Egypt has focused on diversifying its cies. While the Gulf monarchies and Egypt, foreign relations and shaping its alliance as dependent allies of the US, closely co- policy more independently. In regional con- ordinated foreign policy decisions with flicts, Cairo seeks less to close ranks with Washington up until 2010, they began to the US or the EU and instead stands firmly break from this course in the wake of the by the side of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. so-called “Arab Spring”. Saudi Arabia and Such increasingly proactive foreign poli- the UAE established themselves as “leaders cies are accompanied by militarisation, of the counter-revolution”, for example, which is expressed not least in the fact that by suppressing the protest movement in these countries’ military means are being Bahrain, supporting the military coup in used to assert interests more regularly than Egypt and fighting the rise of parties and before. The UAE and Qatar have been sup- groups close to the Muslim Brotherhood, porting militias in Libya since 2011, and which were, in turn, offensively supported since the beginning of the second Libyan by Qatar. Throughout this period, neither civil war in 2014, the UAE has been directly side coordinated their respective actions involved in military activities there. Egypt, with Washington. In Saudi Arabia’s case, in turn, has also been involved in this con- the West’s rapprochement with Iran in flict since 2015 at the latest, by granting the context of the 2015 nuclear agreement military aid to the Libyan National Army
SWP Comment 6 January 2021
2 (LNA) as well as by launching isolated Regional Tensions and airstrikes. In the early years of the Syrian German Licensing Procedures civil war, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar supported various rebel groups there, con- Although German politicians criticise the tributing significantly to the escalation fact that Arab states are increasingly inter- of military conflict and the radicalisation vening militarily or supporting armed mili- of the insurgency. Saudi Arabia also inter- tias, this is not reflected in Berlin’s arms vened in the Yemeni civil war in 2015, export practices. On the contrary: despite heading a military coalition of friendly the concerned states’ increasing willingness states, including the UAE. Initially receiving to apply military force – even in violation hesitant support from some Western gov- of international law – German authorisa- ernments, Saudi Arabia has since become tions of military equipment exports thereto increasingly isolated internationally in the have remained high since 2011. fight against the Iranian-backed Houthi Considering the German government’s movement, as it is responsible for a high conventions surrounding such exports, this number of casualties among the Yemeni development is remarkable. Here, guide- civilian population. In 2017, a military con- lines for military equipment exports name frontation almost broke out between Saudi “regional tensions” as a decisive criterion Arabia and the UAE on the one side and for exclusion. The same applies to the Com- Qatar on the other. Until the beginning of mon Position of the European Council on this year they were locked in a type of cold arms exports adopted in 2008, which ex- war, which their recent rapprochement is plicitly states that “Member States are deter- unlikely to have completely resolved, im- mined to prevent the export of military plying that the arms race between the two technology and equipment which might sides is expected to continue. be used for [...] international aggression or Regional foreign policies threaten to contribute to regional instability” (Pream- become even more militarised in the ble, para. 4). At least in regard to weapons future. In view of the unresolved conflict of war, German regulations, which were between Egypt and Ethiopia over water rewritten in June 2019, are even stricter. from the Nile, there is speculation that Accordingly, arms export licenses should Cairo could increase its military involve- be denied to countries “involved in armed ment within its southern neighbourhood. conflict or where such conflict is imminent, In order to exert influence in the Horn of where there is a threat of an outbreak of Africa, Egypt could try to establish a mili- armed conflict, or where existing tensions tary base in the region, similar to the UAE, and conflicts would be triggered, main- which already maintains bases in Eritrea tained or exacerbated by the export [...], and the autonomous region of Somaliland. unless a case under Article 51 of the UN In recent years, Algeria has pursued a policy Charter applies” (Political Principles of the of strict non-intervention, but in early Federal Government for the Export of War November 2020 it amended its constitution Weapons and Other Military Equipment, to allow its military to be deployed exter- Section III, para. 7). nally for – broadly defined – multinational With this in mind, even the potential peacekeeping missions. According to some of escalating conflict should be sufficient analysts, this could be a first step by Algiers reason enough to halt German exports of to intervene in the Libyan civil war. At the military equipment. However, these pro- same time, Algeria’s tensions with neigh- visions seem to play only a minor role, if bouring Morocco could increase, especially any, when it comes to licensing procedures after the US recognised Rabat’s sovereignty for exports of military products destined for over Western Sahara. the aforementioned Arab countries. Thus, regional factors are not the reason for the significantly more restrictive approach to
SWP Comment 6 January 2021
3 licensing practices of small arms exports. highly controversial today. Such assess- Rather, such exports have generally been ments also largely ignore the fact that indi- severely restricted in recent years. Accord- vidual recipients of German exports are ing to the Principles on Small Arms issued enemies of one another – as became clear in 2015, the main reason for this was that in the case of the Qatar blockade – or that their proliferation is difficult to control. military equipment is not only used defen- Moreover, even temporary halts on arms sively but also offensively in extraterritorial exports have been justified not due to con- regional conflicts. cerns about regional instability, but due It cannot be ruled out that German to poor human rights records in importing weapons and military products fuel armed © Stiftung Wissenschaft countries. This was the case in 2013 with conflicts in the region and thus contribute und Politik, 2021 Egypt, when civilian massacres occurred in to the destabilisation of Europe’s immedi- All rights reserved the wake of the military coup, and in 2018 ate neighbourhood. The probability of this with Saudi Arabia, after dissident Jamal occurring is even higher in view of the for- This Comment reflects Khashoggi was murdered by a state hit- eign policy changes among the main im- the authors’ views. squad. The fact that patrol boats originally porting countries described above. Apart The online version of intended for Saudi Arabia are now being from the fact that exports of military equip- this publication contains delivered to Egypt, a country with a simi- ment to countries involved in armed con- functioning links to other larly problematic human rights record, also flicts are hardly compatible with Germany’s SWP texts and other relevant demonstrates a certain inconsistency in the own export principles, it is in Germany’s sources. application of Germany’s export principles. fundamental interest to prevent such a de- SWP Comments are subject velopment. After all, the deaths of numer- to internal peer review, fact- ous civilians in the Middle East and renewed checking and copy-editing. Implications for German displacement of refugees to Europe would For further information on Export Policy not be the least of the consequences. The our quality control pro- extension of the export ban on Saudi Ara- cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- In view of regional developments, the Ger- bia should therefore be taken as an oppor- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ man government should fundamentally tunity to fundamentally rethink the licens- quality-management-for- review its military equipment export policy ing policy toward the other Arab states at swp-publications/ toward Arab states. So far, it has only given hand. Halting the export of military equip- vague indications of its political calcula- ment and especially weapons of war to SWP tions in individual cases, for example in these countries seems to be the logical con- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik connection with exports to the Gulf States, sequence in view of regional developments. German Institute for which were occasionally justified by the International and threat posed by Iran. Corresponding argu- Security Affairs ments on the topic of arms exports have also come from the academic community Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin in the past. According to some, the targeted Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 armament of individual states is intended Fax +49 30 880 07-100 to create a deterrent effect that could ulti- www.swp-berlin.org mately contribute to greater regional sta- [email protected] bility. Another argument is that arms exports can be used to strengthen bilateral ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2021C06 relations with the importing country, thus opening the door to greater foreign policy (English version of influence. However, neither of these argu- SWP-Aktuell 103/2020) ments have been sufficiently empirically substantiated and are therefore regarded as
Yannik Hüllinghorst was an Intern in the Middle East and Africa Research Division at SWP. Dr Stephan Roll is Head of the Middle East and Africa Research Division at SWP.
SWP Comment 6 January 2021
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