089 STC 21 E | Original: English | 21 May 2021 089 STC 21 E

SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC)

Sunday 16 May 2021

By videoconference

089 STC 21 E | Original: English | 21 May 2021 089 STC 21 E

ATTENDANCE LIST

OFFICERS OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE Chairperson Kevan JONES (United Kingdom) Vice-Chairperson Njall Trausti FRIDBERTSSON (Iceland) General Rapporteur Nusrat GHANI (United Kingdom) Special Rapporteur Karl-Heinz BRUNNER (Germany)

NATO PA BUREAU MEMBERS President Gerald E. CONNOLLY (United States) Treasurer Wolfgang HELLMICH (Germany) Secretary General Ruxandra POPA

MEMBER DELEGATIONS Albania Myslim MURRIZI Belgium Els AMPE Leo PIETERS Bulgaria Hristo Georgiev GADZHEV Canada Ziad ABOULTAIF Leona ALLESLEV (Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security) Michel BOUDRIAS Jane CORDY Cheryl GALLANT Dan MAZIER Croatia Stjepan KOVAC Czech Republic Josef HAJEK Denmark Mads FUGLEDE Estonia Ants LAANEOTS Andres METSOJA France Christian CAMBON Philippe MICHEL-KLEISBAUER (Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security) Germany Dagmar FREITAG Jürgen HARDT Greece Manousos Konstantinos VOLOUDAKIS Hungary Agnes VADAI (Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security) Andrea VARGA-DAMM Italy Andrea CANGINI Fabrizio ORTIS Latvia Ojars Eriks KALNINS Ivans KLEMENTJEVS Lithuania Tomas BICIUNAS Luxembourg Nancy ARENDT KEMP Sven CLEMENT (Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security) Montenegro Danilo SARANOVIC North Macedonia Ilija NIKOLOVSKI Norway Sverre MYRLI

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Poland Przemyslaw CZARNECKI Mariusz GROMKO Romania Sorin-Dan MOLDOVAN Slovakia Juraj KRUPA Slovenia Andrej CERNIGOJ Spain Xavier CASTELLANA Begona NASARRE Juan VÁZQUEZ Turkey Hisyar OZSOY Kamil Okyay SINDIR (Vice-Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security) Taner YILDIZ United Kingdom Stuart ANDERSON Harriett BALDWIN United States Jack BERGMAN Dina TITUS ASSOCIATE DELEGATIONS Azerbaijan Elshan MUSAYEV Sweden Kenneth G. FORSLUND Switzerland Pierre-Alain Roger FRIDEZ Thomas MINDER Ukraine Galyna MYKHAILIUK

REGIONAL PARTNER AND MEDITERRANEAN Algeria Abdelhak BENBOULAID PARLIAMENTARY OBSERVERS Assembly of Kosovo Driton HYSENI Kazakhstan Erlik TAIZHANOV

Speaker Dr Tarja CRONBERG, Distinguished Associate Fellow, European Security Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT Steffen SACHS Director, Science and Technology Committee Sarah-Claude FILION Coordinator, Science and Technology Committee Sophia MASON Research Assistant Jacob ROSS Research Assistant

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Opening remarks by Kevan JONES (United Kingdom), Chairperson of the Science and Technology Committee

1. After welcoming attending parliamentarians and thanking the Swedish delegation for hosting the meeting, Kevan Jones (UK), Chairperson of the Science and Technology Committee (STC), declared the Committee meeting open.

2. Mr. Jones proceeded by laying out the structure of the meeting and introducing the speaker as well as the rapporteurs. He then familiarised attendees with the KUDO platform and gave some technical recommendations regarding requests to speak and sound settings.

Adoption of the draft Agenda [076 STC 21 E]

3. The draft Agenda [076 STC 21 E] was adopted unanimously.

Adoption of the Summary of the meeting of the Science and Technology Committee held on Friday 20 and Saturday 21 November 2020 [204 STC 20 E]

4. The Summary [204 STC 20 E] was adopted unanimously.

Consideration of the preliminary draft General Report on Enhancing NATO S&T Cooperation with Asian Partners [023 STC 21 E] presented by Nusrat GHANI (United Kingdom), General Rapporteur

5. After sharing her personal motivation for drafting the report, Nusrat Ghani (UK), General Rapporteur, stressed that NATO’s partnerships with likeminded nations are crucial for the Alliance. Ms Ghani emphasised that the importance of Science & Technology (S&T) cooperation for NATO’s relations with partners is underappreciated. In this context she highlighted the valuable role of NATO’s Science and Technology Organisation (STO).

6. S&T cooperation is crucial for the development of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs), including artificial intelligence, biotechnology, or space technology. As the Asia Pacific region is emerging as the global hub for S&T and also of global economic and strategic importance, not least due to the rise of China, the Committee’s General Report is focused on NATO’s S&T cooperation with Asian partners.

7. Ms Ghani then concentrated her remarks on Japan, which had recently been invited as an Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP) to the STO. Other than Japan, she mentioned South Korea and Singapore as potentially promising partners for NATO, also mentioning the STC’s visit to Singapore in 2019.

8. Ms Ghani finished her presentation with an overview of the draft report’s preliminary conclusions. She welcomed NATO’s Science and Technology Board’s (STB) decision to invite Japan as an EOP before expressing her hope that the STO network could also be used to promote the participation of women in the sciences. Ms Ghani invited attendees to promote dialogue between their respective governments and Asian partner countries on S&T topics.

9. In the ensuing Q&A Sven Clement (LU) inquired about intellectual property rights protection. He reminded his colleagues that Allied countries had repeatedly encountered problems with China, respectively Chinese companies in this regard. Galyna Mykhailiuk (UA) argued that the updated Committee report could mention potential benefits through S&T cooperation programmes for NATO’s partner countries and to reinforce the report’s

3 089 STC 21 E recommendation for a stronger participation of women in the S&T field. Ms Mykhailiuk also suggested that the Rapporteur could refer to the STC 2020 report on hypersonic weapons in the update.

10. Mr Jones expressed his conviction that a broadened cooperation with South Korea, especially on 5G technologies, held great promise for the Alliance. Finally, Philippe Michel-Kleisbauer (FR) invited Ms Ghani to get involved in the preparation of the Committee’s trip to Japan, planned for 2022.

11. Ms Ghani welcomed the remarks, underlining that her former role as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Aviation and Maritime in the United Kingdom’s Department for Transport would especially qualify her to contribute to S&T cooperation in the maritime realm. She argued that Western countries had taken their technological dominance for granted for too long and that cooperation with Asian partner countries was a welcomed shift in that sense. Ms Ghani shared Mr Clement’s view on the importance of protecting property rights. She called for equal partnerships with regards to technological cooperation. She thanked Ms Mykhailiuk for her remarks, promising that she would carefully review the proposals.

Presentation by Dr Tarja CRONBERG (SIPRI), Distinguished Associate Fellow, European Security Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), on Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Nuclear Diplomacy for Arms Control

12. After thanking the Swedish delegation for organising the session, Mr Jones handed the floor to Kenneth G. Forslund (SE), Deputy Head of the Swedish Delegation, who introduced the speaker, Dr Tarja Cronberg.

13. Ms Cronberg started her presentation by providing a brief academic and political background, and particularly her recent involvement in the negotiations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The speaker then reminded the Committee of the genesis and history of the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme. She underlined that the goal of the negotiations, international control of the Iranian programme and the avoidance of a military confrontation, remained the same as when the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) began taking diplomatic steps towards Iran. Ms Cronberg shed light on the transformations of the negotiations process. The period following the JCPOA’s entering into force in July 2015 enabled renew investments and trade all the while Iran was careful to comply with the limitations agreed on its nuclear programme, according to Ms Cronberg. However, the maximum pressure policy towards Iran following the exit of the Trump administration from the deal isolated Iran from the international community. The Iranians replied by gradually exceeding the limits of the JCPOA, thereby signalling that the measures they had implemented in compliance with the agreement are reversible.

14. With the change of the U.S administration political will to negotiate is back. For the time being, negotiations are between the P4+1 and Iran with the U.S. delegation on the sidelines, the speaker said. However, while there is political will on both sides, the negotiations face a classical problem in nuclear diplomacy, namely who goes first: The Iranians have demanded that the U.S. should remove the sanctions first. The U.S. has required that Iran returns to the approved limits of the JCPOA first. The issue is being addressed by two working groups which seek a stepwise procedure to balance the situation. The second challenge is the issue of “sunset” clauses as some of the limitations of the JCPOA will expire within a short period of time. The original vision was that when the time approaches these clauses could be renegotiated in good faith. Whether or not these questions will be referred to later negotiations or be taken up in Vienna is not clear, Ms Cronberg informed the Committee. Another controversial issue are Iran’s ballistic missiles. Regional issues will be referred to a different forum, although there is no indication as of yet where, she explained. Regional states,

4 089 STC 21 E particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, have been excluded from the JCPOA negotiations and several acts of sabotage have occurred, ostensibly to spoil the negotiations, the speaker noted.

15. The greatest hindrance for an agreement is domestic politics, particularly within two key countries, the United States and Iran, Ms Cronberg suggested. In the U.S., the Republicans and conservative hardliners continue to strongly criticise the JCPOA for various reasons. In Iran, the conservatives in the Iranian parliament have tried to block the negotiations by issuing a deadline for sanctions relief. Pundits interpret this move as also linked to the upcoming presidential elections in Iran. Both the U.S. and Iran need the JCPOA, but it is too early to forecast the outcome of the negotiations, Ms Cronberg said. She finished her presentation by stressing that the JCPAO is not only about the Iranian nuclear programme but also about the credibility of nuclear diplomacy and the ability to reach, through negotiations, an agreement that prevents a state obtaining nuclear weapons. The alternative to nuclear diplomacy is the military option, which the JCPOA so far has prevented, she concluded.

16. In the following Q&A, Mr Clement asked Ms Cronberg about the implications of a potential failure of the negotiations. Ziad Aboultaif (CA) expressed concern that the Iranian regime wants to develop a nuclear arsenal. He also asked if the West, and the international community, can be certain that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons. The Chairperson, Kevan Jones, inquired about Iran’s missile programme and about Russia’s and Israel’s respective roles in the negotiations.

17. Ms Cronberg said she is convinced that Iran is committed to remain party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While Iran seems intent on mastering nuclear weapons technology it does not want to have a nuclear arsenal of its own, the speaker suggested. In case the JCPOA talks failed she expected new negotiations to unfold in a different format. Russia has been very active in the nuclear discussions, she said. Moscow has commercial interests as it wants to get involved with Iran’s civil nuclear sector and in conventional arms sales to Iran. Finally, the speaker expressed her concern about parts of the Israeli government who were trying to sabotage the ongoing talks, making reference to the recent explosions that took place in an Iranian nuclear facility.

Consideration of the preliminary draft Special Report on Space and Security – NATO’s Role [025 STC 21 E] presented by Karl-Heinz BRUNNER (Germany), Special Rapporteur

18. Special Rapporteur Karl-Heinz Brunner (DE) provided a brief overview of current developments in space technology, focusing of course on security-related developments. He highlighted that the Allies, and the world as a whole, are increasingly dependent on space-based hardware and related services. He also underlined the importance of space for NATO. Although space has officially been declared the Alliance’s fifth operational domain only in 2019, it has already been an “enabling domain” for Allied operations for many years, he underlined. He mentioned secure communications, geolocation, and precision targeting as examples.

19. The Rapporteur identified three main reasons why NATO's increased attention to space is overdue. First, while increasingly crucial for operations, as noted in a previous NATO PA report, Allied space assets are threatened by increasing numbers of anti-satellite weapon systems. Second, the sheer numbers of satellites launched into orbit – whether of civilian or military nature, private or public – have already created congested orbits and increase the risk of accidents. Third, the existing international legal framework regulating space activities is no longer adequate, as identified by another NATO PA report.

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20. The Rapporteur reminded the Committee of the importance of space for commercial and scientific purposes and stressed that space-based assets are important both for Allied security but also for the prosperity of Western societies. NATO’s role in space is limited today, among others because it does not have space assets of its own, Mr Brunner explained. However, he said that the Alliance could make a significant contribution in coordinating the security-related aspects of space policy among NATO member states. NATO could position itself as a forum for the exchange of information on interoperability or technical standards. In the future, this would perhaps enable the development of joint capabilities - initially within the Alliance and later possibly also with interested partner countries. Mr Brunner concluded his presentation by saying that space offers unimagined opportunities, but also poses some risks. He called upon his colleagues to explore the former and avoid the latter. Space is a "global commons" - which requires cooperation, not confrontation between all space-faring nations, he stressed.

21. Mr Clement underscored the increasing importance of satellite communications, also as an alternative to cable communications. The Luxemburg member stressed the growing number of actors, particularly private companies, and the rapidly increasing number of satellite launches. He inquired about the heightened risks of collisions in orbit and how these risks could be mitigated. Njall Trausti Fridbertsson (IS) broached the role of satellites for navigation and geolocation, particularly in the High North and the northern Atlantic. He noted that satellites are now also being launched from northern Europe and wondered whether European and North American GPS systems could be combined in the future. Ms Mykhailiuk shared the view of the Rapporteur that cooperation, not confrontation, is needed in space. She remarked that partnerships are important to realise this goal and also to adapt the existing international legal framework governing space activities. She suggested that the Rapporteur may further evaluate China’s space efforts, also with regard to its investments in European states, and also Russia’s activities in space. She offered to contribute to the latter subject. Finally, Mr Michel-Kleisbauer thanked Mr Brunner and the German delegation for the organisation of the virtual visit to Germany and the cooperation on the discussed report.

22. Mr Brunner expressed appreciation for the comments and questions he received. He iterated that, like Mr Clement and other members, everything needs to be done to prevent an arms race in space. The international community needs a rules-based order for space, he said. Steps in this direction could initially be undertaken on a bilateral basis which would potentially lead to multilateral agreements. He thanked Ms Mykhailiuk and said he would welcome her contribution to the preliminary draft report. He also approved of Mr Clement’s suggestion and Mr Fridbertsson’s remarks that earth-bound cable communications should be gradually replaced by more satellite communications in the northern Atlantic region. Mr Jones thanked the Special Rapporteur for a very informative report and said he particularly appreciated the call for modernising the outdated legal framework for space.

Consideration of the preliminary draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security on Biological Weapons: Technological Progress and the Spectre of Bioterrorism in the Post-Covid-19 Era [024 STCTTC 21 E] presented by Leona ALLESLEV (Canada), Rapporteur

23. Leona Alleslev (CA) introduced her preliminary draft report by placing the debate on biological weapons within the broader context of the recent COVID-19 pandemic. She pointed out that the pandemic generated broad public attention to questions related to societal resilience against pathogens.

24. Ms Alleslev then proceeded to highlighting the rapid progress that biotechnology and related emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are making and the opportunities they offer. As an example, she reminded Committee members of the opportunities these

6 089 STC 21 E technologies provide for the detection, containment, and defeat of biological threats. However, she cautioned that these technologies could also be used for harmful purposes in the future, as decreasing costs and easier access via public sources may facilitate the proliferation of biological agents to non-state actors.

25. Turning to NATO’s role, Ms Alleslev noted that the main responsibility for preparing against biological attacks and preventing bioterrorism lies with individual member states. However, the Alliance has a role to play as well, she argued, as NATO develops biodefence and deterrence policies and supports national biodefence efforts through multiple platforms. Moreover, The Alliance’s ability to respond to biological threats is underpinned by its Science and Technology network. The Rapporteur argued that Allied states should use the heightened awareness of biological threats to good use and review, and where necessary, update existing biodefence policies and capabilities. The Canadian member also warned that the cornerstone of global efforts to prevent and protect against the use of biological weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), faces multiple challenges to its implementation and is no longer adequate to meet today’s biothreats. The convention’s shortcomings include difficulties in ensuring compliance with its core obligations; the lack of an implementing body; and inadequate funding. Moreover, due to the fast pace of technological innovation the treaty is also ill-equipped to address the security applications of rapidly developing scientific research, she stressed.

26. Ms Alleslev finished her presentation citing several conclusions of her preliminary draft report, including the recommendation to move robust biodefence higher up on the security agendas of NATO and of individual Allies as well as the re-examination of existing biodefence capabilities. Finally, she pointed out that 2021 seemed to be a good moment to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, with the Review Conference scheduled later this year.

27. Gerald E. Connolly (US), President of the NATO PA, welcomed Ms Alleslev’s work and encouraged Committee members to examine lessons learned from the pandemic. He said that the Sub-Committee on Technological Trends and Security (STCTTS) can play an important role in this process.

28. Fabrizio Ortis (IT) briefly shared a few Italian experiences of the pandemic. He suggested that the update of the report could include a proposal on how to generate increased confidence in government action in the face of pandemic risks. Cheryl Gallant (CA) asked how NATO could help improve research on vaccines that could be used against viruses developed by potential aggressors. Andrea Varga-Damm (HU) voiced concern that COVID- 19 had weakened Allied societies and that some officials might use a future pandemic to impose measures that could have a lasting impact on civil liberties. Finally, Ms Mykhailiuk proposed to include lessons learned regarding the resistance against disinformation surrounding the vaccination process in Section 4 of the report.

29. Ms Alleslev thanked for the comments and acknowledged the importance for the Committee to assess the longer-term sociological aspects of the pandemic, including the loss of trust in state institutions. She suggested that the Committee should take a closer look on challenges such as disinformation and include lessons learned in during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Future activities of the Science and Technology Committee and the Sub-Committee on Technological Trends and Security

30. Mr Jones briefed the Committee on pending activities of the STC for the remainder of 2021. He informed about the visit to France, planned for 2 July. Considering the continued

7 089 STC 21 E uncertainties linked to the pandemic situation, the Committee, together with the French delegation, decided to organise the visit virtually.

31. Mr Jones then briefed attendees on recent exchanges with Japanese representatives, who had decided to postpone a STC visit to the country to 2022. As Japan had been currently caught in the fourth wave of the pandemic and foreign visitors were excluded from other major events such as the 2021 Summer Olympics, the postponement was deemed the safest option. Mr Jones indicated, however, that the STCTTS was looking into alternatives for a visit in 2021.

32. Prompted by the invitation of the Chair on possible future Committee report topics Ms Alleslev noted that creativity has always been a critical element of warfare and the preparation of armed forces for possible future violent conflicts. She stressed the importance of Allies challenging assumptions of how violent conflict can evolve and work toward “flexibility” to adapt to changing nature of conflict. Mr Jones agreed with Ms Alleslev and said that the Committee will discuss this further.

Any other business

33. Mr Jones then reminded the Committee of a vacant position of Vice-Chair of the STC. He then welcomed and introduced Dina Titus (US), new member of the US delegation. Referring to Ms Titus’ background in science and her renowned expertise in research on nuclear power, Mr Jones proposed to name her as Vice-Chairperson ad interim until the Annual Session. No objections were registered, and Ms Titus was named Vice- Chairperson ad interim.

34. Finally, Mr Jones informed members of the Committee that a pilot project on a STC-related cooperation with students from different universities was currently planned. The Committee Director provided a brief overview of the planned project, announcing that more detailed information will be available soon.

Date and place of the next meeting

35. Mr Jones informed members of the Committee that the next meeting will take place in Lisbon during the Annual session, scheduled from 8 – 11 October 2021.

Closing remarks

36. Before closing the meeting, Mr Jones thanked attending members for the constructive discussion, the Swedish delegation for hosting the session, and interpreters for allowing smooth communication. Finally, he thanked NATO PA staff for their work on reports and the organisation of the 2021 Spring Session.

37. Mr Jones closed the meeting at 17:15.

A recording of the meeting is available on the NATO PA YouTube Channel here. ______