DOCSLIB.ORG

The 2009 Elections in Israel

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The 2009 Elections in Israel Mediterranean Politics | Middle East The 2009 Elections in Israel Mario Sznajder decisions necessary for restoring peace. This vicious Department of Political Science, circle needs to be broken in both directions. As a Panorama Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace result of the failed attempt in the 1990s to create a The Hebrew University of Jerusalem more majoritarian system by electing the Prime Min- ister directly, the tendency to personalise the political The fragmentation of the Israeli political system, tech- system has increased to the point where many vote nically based on a highly proportional representative for leaders – and not for parties – in a system in which 2010 parliamentarian structure with a threshold of only 2%, the parties control everything, including the election has produced another stalemate. The roots of the prob- of the leaders. This has created a kind of negative Med. lem lie in the institutional structure of the Israeli politi- populism whose main characteristic is that each cal system, as well as in the kind of challenges con- leader (or main candidate), as was the case with fronted by every coalition government of the country. Livni, Netanyahu and Barak in the last election, has Israel’s institutional structure with its strongly propor- to invest much more time and energy defending him- tional representative system was a product of the pre- self against attacks, rather than proposing action 182 state need to integrate various groups of immigrants plans to resolve the country’s major problems. into the nation-building and state-building process. Since Israel acquired independence, David Ben Gu- rion, the founding father of the state, and most of his the Political background followers, unsuccessfully tried to make the system more majoritarian, subdividing the country into voting dis- The long-term pattern shows that participation in the tricts, raising the thresholds and using various formu- Israeli elections has declined steadily from 80% two lae. The last and most important attempt in the 1990s, decades ago to percentages slightly above 60% in separating the election of the Prime Minister from the the first decade of the 21st century. election of parliament members, ended in utter failure: The corruption and personal scandals affecting cen- Israel returned to the old system with a slightly higher tral political personalities such as the Primer Minister threshold that helps to diminish the number of parties Ehud Olmert, have contributed to politicians losing in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament), and facilitates the prestige and a low voter turnout. government coalition building process. Ehud Olmert’s resignation led to primary elections The real dilemma of the Israeli political system is that within his party, Kadima, won by his Foreign Affairs its highly proportional representative structure, which Minister Tzipi Livni. Benajmin Netanyahu, the leader generates unstable multi-party coalitions, means it is of the Likud party, was seen as the most probable unable to take the decisions needed to forward the winner of the Israeli election. Ehud Barak, as Minister peace process, particularly regarding Palestine, in of Defence, was struggling to retain the leadership such matters as dismantling settlements in the West of the Labour Party, which in 2008 was losing elec- Bank, sharing Jerusalem as a two-state capital and toral appeal, according to the polls. The elections in the return of Palestinian refugees. And the tensions fact came as a result of Barak’s pressure on Olmert and instability generated by the intense Arab-Israeli to resign and his threat that if Olmert did not step conflict preclude the conditions needed to reform the down, the Labour Party would abandon the ruling political system, and create one capable of taking the coalition and call elections anyway. The international financial crisis, which had signifi- These were the factors that eventually led to Opera- cant repercussions in Israel during the months lead- tion Cast Lead, launched by Israel against Gaza at ing to the elections, was seen as one of the main the end of December 2008. It would be unfair to say political issues. The incumbent Finance Minister, that this military operation was decided instrumen- Kadima’s Roni Bar-On, was the target of much tally by the incumbent government, which included criticism, especially from the Netanyahu camp. His two of the main candidates to govern the country, reputation as a neo-liberal financial wizard was dam- Livni and Barak, to improve their chances at the elec- aged by his failure to take the measures necessary tions. Nevertheless, we could conclude that for these to prevent the crisis hitting Israel and by his late leaders and their political formations it was virtually reaction to the pension fund problem. impossible to face an election while Hamas was step- ping up its attacks against the civilian population in southern Israel. The Likud could easily claim that its The members of the coalition leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, was the only candidate government knew that none able to confront Hamas with a firm hand and put an Panorama could face the election without end to the crisis, while the government was present- ed as indecisive and weak. having seriously addressed the This leads to a very paradoxical conclusion: one of issue of the continuous rocket the main factors in the Israeli elections was, in fact, and mortar firing from Gaza Hamas. By increasing pressure on the incumbent Israeli government they were provoking an Israeli 2010 military reaction with all the electoral result changes Med. Relations between Israel and the ruling power in Gaza, that this might produce. Moreover, by strongly resist- Hamas, were never good, but rapidly worsened fol- ing the Israeli attack, or not, and exposing the Pales- lowing the end of the ceasefire between the two sides, tinian civilian population to the military invasion, with on 19 December 2008. Even before that date, armed all the terrible consequences these attitudes would groups from Hamas and other extremist Palestinian entail, Hamas and the other extremist groups in Gaza, organisations harassed the Israeli population of the were playing into the hands of the Israeli radical right, 183 Negev areas that border Gaza with the constant firing personified on this occasion by Avigdor Lieberman of small Kassam rockets and mortar shells. In 2008, and his political party, Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel our the Palestinians began firing longer range and more Home) founded by and traditionally representing im- destructive rockets, hitting the city of Ashkelon on migrants from the former Soviet Union, but now at- several occasions. Israel reacted to these attacks by tracting all those radicalised to the extreme right by targeting the launchers and attacking sites thought the security crisis. to be ammunition depots or military bases. The violence escalated to new heights in the midst of the electoral campaign. The members of the coa- the Electoral Campaign lition government knew that none could face the elec- tion without having seriously addressed the issue of The attitude to this process could be best described the continuous rocket and mortar firing from Gaza. as one of boredom and disinterest. The economic All attempts to solve this problem by way of the Gaza crisis would not allow for increased expenses on two blockade failed, thanks to hundreds of tunnels dug accounts. Firstly, in times of crisis and increasing un- by Palestinians under their border with Egypt, through employment it was almost impossible to privately raise which they received regular supplies, including weap- the necessary funds. Austerity became a natural part ons and explosives. Attempts to reach a new cease- of the campaign for all 33 parties participating in the fire agreement between Hamas and Israel, through elections. Secondly, the corruption scandals affecting Egyptian mediation, also failed. The Likud leader used Olmert and other politicians generated a demand for the Gaza border situation to attack the government a new style of transparent politics that centred not of Olmert, Livni and Barak, claiming they were incom- only on personal honesty, but also public modesty. petent and unable to solve the crisis. In Israel, the This point was very well understood and exploited by lessons of the Second Lebanon War in 2006 have Tzipi Livni, who has not yet served as Prime Minister been learnt; with Gaza the army was ready to act. and could publicly deliver a perfectly clean record and relatively modest lifestyle. She expressed these gan: “no citizenship without loyalty”, meaning loyalty attributes through her message: “the new style of to Israel as a Jewish State. He claimed that the Arab politics”, in some way following Obama’s line for his population of Israel – Israeli citizens of Palestinian presidential campaign. The electoral campaign was nationality – constituted a fifth column and should be interrupted for three weeks during the Israeli military disenfranchised if they did not declare and prove their onslaught in Gaza. loyalty to Israel. The second point stressed secular- The resumption of the campaign in mid-January 2009, ity and attacked the position of the Israeli ultra-Or- weeks before the elections, did nothing to reignite thodox parties, demanding an opening of the criteria the public’s interest. The balance seemed to swing that determines who is a Jew. This is a very attractive towards Ehud Barak and the Labour party, according point for immigrants – and also secular Israelis – who to the polls, although this was delusive. Barak, con- would like to have civil matters settled outside the sidered by the public to be the best possible Defence rabbinical courts and be allowed civil marriage. The Minister given the current circumstances, could not third point is a peace plan with the Palestinians based rid himself of the effects of his previous period as on a territorial-demographic exchange in which Is- Panorama Prime Minister, from 1999 to 2001, which badly dam- rael would keep the major concentrations of settle- aged his reputation as a political leader, but reas- ments in the West Bank while receiving in exchange serted his military know-how and capacity.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Israel's National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict
    Leap of Faith: Israel’s National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict Middle East Report N°147 | 21 November 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iv I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Religious Zionism: From Ascendance to Fragmentation ................................................ 5 A. 1973: A Turning Point ................................................................................................ 5 B. 1980s and 1990s: Polarisation ................................................................................... 7 C. The Gaza Disengagement and its Aftermath ............................................................. 11 III. Settling the Land .............................................................................................................. 14 A. Bargaining with the State: The Kookists ................................................................... 15 B. Defying the State: The Hilltop Youth ........................................................................ 17 IV. From the Hills to the State ..............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Lost Decade of the Israeli Peace Camp
    The Lost Decade of the Israeli Peace Camp By Ksenia Svetlova Now that Israeli annexation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank is a commonplace notion, it seems almost impossible that just twelve years ago, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) were making significant progress in the US-sponsored bilateral peace negotiations. Since then, the stalemate in the talks has become the new normal, under three consecutive governments headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. The Palestinians, led by Mahmoud Abbas and his government, have been cast as “diplomatic terrorists” for asking the international community for help. The Israeli peace camp has been subjected to a vicious smear campaign that has shaken its self-esteem and ruined its chances of winning over the public. This systematic smearing of Israeli and Palestinian two-staters has paid off. In the April 2019 elections, Israel’s progressive Meretz party teetered on the edge of the electoral barrier while Labor, once the ruling party, gained only six mandates (5% of the votes). The centrist Blue and White, a party led by ex-army chief Benny Gantz, carefully avoided any mention of loaded terms such as “the two-state solution” or “evacuation of settlements”, only calling vaguely to “advance peace” – as part of Israel’s new political vocabulary, which no longer includes “occupation” or even “the West Bank”. Despite offering no clear alternative to the peace option it managed to successfully derail, the Israeli right under Netanyahu has been in power for over a decade in a row, since 2009. Israel’s left-wing parties are fighting to survive; the Palestinians are continuing their fruitless efforts to engage the international community; and the horrid reality of a single state, in which different groups have different political and civil rights, seems just around the corner.
    [Show full text]
  • How Palestinians Can Burst Israel's Political Bubble
    Al-Shabaka Policy Brief Policy Al-Shabaka March 2018 WHEN LEFT IS RIGHT: HOW PALESTINIANS CAN BURST ISRAEL’S POLITICAL BUBBLE By Amjad Iraqi Overview the allies holding up his fragile rule, from the ultra- orthodox Jewish parties to his personal rivals within Although no indictments have been issued yet, Israelis Likud. “King Bibi,” however, survived them all. A are speculating whether the latest developments in skilled politician, he has been adept at managing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s corruption Israel’s notoriously volatile coalition system, and [email protected] scandals finally mark the beginning of his political has remained in power with three consecutive demise. The second-longest serving prime minister governments over nine years – each more right wing after David Ben-Gurion, Netanyahu has had a than the last.2 profound impact on Israel’s political scene since the 1990s. It is therefore troubling, especially to Netanyahu directly influenced the country’s media Palestinians, that if these corruption cases are the landscape by shaping the editorial stance of Israel harbinger of Netanyahu’s downfall, they will have Hayom (the nation’s gratis, most-read newspaper, had nothing to do with the more egregious crimes for funded by American billionaire Sheldon Adelson), which he is responsible, and for which he – and future and used the Communications Ministry to threaten Israeli leaders – have yet to be held accountable. and harass media outlets that were critical of him. Despite crises and condemnations throughout This policy brief analyzes Israel’s political his career – including mass Israeli protests for transformations under Netanyahu and maps out the socioeconomic justice in 2011 and, more recently, current leadership contenders from a Palestinian weekly protests against widespread government perspective.1 It argues that Israel’s insular political corruption – Netanyahu withstood public pressures discourse, and the increasing alignment of Israeli to step down.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel: Background and U.S
    Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Updated September 20, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44245 SUMMARY R44245 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief September 20, 2019 The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations: Jim Zanotti Israel’s ability to address threats. Israel relies on a number of strengths—including Specialist in Middle regional conventional military superiority—to manage potential threats to its security, Eastern Affairs including evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability. Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel’s leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel’s security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)— signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations. Some Members of Congress criticize various Israeli actions and U.S. policies regarding Israel. In recent months, U.S. officials have expressed some security- related concerns about China-Israel commercial activity. Iran and the region. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In April 2018, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu presented historical information about Iran’s nuclear program that Israeli intelligence apparently seized from an Iranian archive.
    [Show full text]
  • 2016 Annual Report
    Research. Debate. Impact. 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1 Table of Contents Message from the President and the Chairman of the Board 4 Sixth Meeting of IDI's International Advisory Council 8 The Center for Democratic Values and Institutions 11 The Center for Religion, Nation and State 23 The Center for Governance and the Economy 29 The Center for Security and Democracy 35 The Guttman Center for Surveys and Public Policy Research 41 IDI in the Media 47 Our Team 50 Our Leaders 51 Our Partners 52 Financials 53 Message from the President and the Chairman of the Board Dear Friends, 2016 was a year of change and upheaval throughout the jobs available to Haredim. The government adopted most of democratic world. Set against the tumult of Brexit and the the recommendations and is now in the process of allocating US elections, Israel seemed at times like an island of stability. a half-billion-shekel budget in line with these proposals. This However, under the surface, Israeli society is changing, and IDI success story illustrates the potential of turning relatively small took on a leading role in identifying those changes and working philanthropic investments into large-scale transformational with policymakers to address them. change by affecting policy and legislation on the basis of outstanding applied research. As the report that follows lays out, 2016 was a year rich in activity and achievements. In this letter, we have chosen to single Several new scholars joined our team in 2016. Ms. Daphna out the impact one program had on government policy in the Aviram-Nitzan, former director of research for the Israel employment area.
    [Show full text]
  • Privatizing Religion: the Transformation of Israel's
    Privatizing religion: The transformation of Israel’s Religious- Zionist community BY Yair ETTINGER The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. This paper is part of a series on Imagining Israel’s Future, made possible by support from the Morningstar Philanthropic Fund. The views expressed in this report are those of its author and do not represent the views of the Morningstar Philanthropic Fund, their officers, or employees. Copyright © 2017 Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S.A. www.brookings.edu Table of Contents 1 The Author 2 Acknowlegements 3 Introduction 4 The Religious Zionist tribe 5 Bennett, the Jewish Home, and religious privatization 7 New disputes 10 Implications 12 Conclusion: The Bennett era 14 The Center for Middle East Policy 1 | Privatizing religion: The transformation of Israel’s Religious-Zionist community The Author air Ettinger has served as a journalist with Haaretz since 1997. His work primarily fo- cuses on the internal dynamics and process- Yes within Haredi communities. Previously, he cov- ered issues relating to Palestinian citizens of Israel and was a foreign affairs correspondent in Paris. Et- tinger studied Middle Eastern affairs at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is currently writing a book on Jewish Modern Orthodoxy.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel: Growing Pains at 60
    Viewpoints Special Edition Israel: Growing Pains at 60 The Middle East Institute Washington, DC Middle East Institute The mission of the Middle East Institute is to promote knowledge of the Middle East in Amer- ica and strengthen understanding of the United States by the people and governments of the region. For more than 60 years, MEI has dealt with the momentous events in the Middle East — from the birth of the state of Israel to the invasion of Iraq. Today, MEI is a foremost authority on contemporary Middle East issues. It pro- vides a vital forum for honest and open debate that attracts politicians, scholars, government officials, and policy experts from the US, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. MEI enjoys wide access to political and business leaders in countries throughout the region. Along with information exchanges, facilities for research, objective analysis, and thoughtful commentary, MEI’s programs and publications help counter simplistic notions about the Middle East and America. We are at the forefront of private sector public diplomacy. Viewpoints are another MEI service to audiences interested in learning more about the complexities of issues affecting the Middle East and US rela- tions with the region. To learn more about the Middle East Institute, visit our website at http://www.mideasti.org The maps on pages 96-103 are copyright The Foundation for Middle East Peace. Our thanks to the Foundation for graciously allowing the inclusion of the maps in this publication. Cover photo in the top row, middle is © Tom Spender/IRIN, as is the photo in the bottom row, extreme left.
    [Show full text]
  • Ian S. Lustick
    MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 3, FALL 2008 ABANDONING THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND “THE MIDDLE EASTERN MUCK” Ian S. Lustick Dr. Lustick is the Bess W. Heyman Chair of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and the author of Trapped in the War on Terror. ionists arrived in Palestine in the the question of whether Israel and Israelis 1880s, and within several de- can remain in the Middle East without cades the movement’s leadership becoming part of it. Zrealized it faced a terrible pre- At first, Zionist settlers, land buyers, dicament. To create a permanent Jewish propagandists and emissaries negotiating political presence in the Middle East, with the Great Powers sought to avoid the Zionism needed peace. But day-to-day intractable and demoralizing subject of experience and their own nationalist Arab opposition to Zionism. Publicly, ideology gave Zionist leaders no reason to movement representatives promulgated expect Muslim Middle Easterners, and false images of Arab acceptance of especially the inhabitants of Palestine, to Zionism or of Palestinian Arab opportuni- greet the building of the Jewish National ties to secure a better life thanks to the Home with anything but intransigent and creation of the Jewish National Home. violent opposition. The solution to this Privately, they recognized the unbridgeable predicament was the Iron Wall — the gulf between their image of the country’s systematic but calibrated use of force to future and the images and interests of the teach Arabs that Israel, the Jewish “state- overwhelming majority of its inhabitants.1 on-the-way,” was ineradicable, regardless With no solution of their own to the “Arab of whether it was perceived by them to be problem,” they demanded that Britain and just.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Ultra-Orthodox Political Parties in Israeli Democracy
    Luke Howson University of Liverpool The Role of Ultra-Orthodox Political Parties in Israeli Democracy Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy By Luke Howson July 2014 Committee: Clive Jones, BA (Hons) MA, PhD Prof Jon Tonge, PhD 1 Luke Howson University of Liverpool © 2014 Luke Howson All Rights Reserved 2 Luke Howson University of Liverpool Abstract This thesis focuses on the role of ultra-orthodox party Shas within the Israeli state as a means to explore wider themes and divisions in Israeli society. Without underestimating the significance of security and conflict within the structure of the Israeli state, in this thesis the Arab–Jewish relationship is viewed as just one important cleavage within the Israeli state. Instead of focusing on this single cleavage, this thesis explores the complex structure of cleavages at the heart of the Israeli political system. It introduces the concept of a ‘cleavage pyramid’, whereby divisions are of different saliency to different groups. At the top of the pyramid is division between Arabs and Jews, but one rung down from this are the intra-Jewish divisions, be they religious, ethnic or political in nature. In the case of Shas, the religious and ethnic elements are the most salient. The secular–religious divide is a key fault line in Israel and one in which ultra-orthodox parties like Shas are at the forefront. They and their politically secular counterparts form a key division in Israel, and an exploration of Shas is an insightful means of exploring this division further, its history and causes, and how these groups interact politically.
    [Show full text]
  • Journalist Switches from Livni to Meretz
    Journalist Switches from Livni to Meretz Larry Derfner writes this about himself: “Politically, I would describe myself as an ultra-liberal Zionist; as journalist Bradley Burston put it, I’m ‘probably as far left as a centrist can be’.” His once impressive career as a journalist has largely been derailed by his outspoken views, plus the recent contraction in print journalism. Derfner has changed his mind from supporting Tzipi Livni’s new HaTenuah party to Meretz, because he sees Meretz as uniquely courageous in pressing for peace. This endorsement is welcome news, and I agree that the failure to advance a peace process in the current situation is Israel’s fault; Netanyahu’s government clearly prefers expanding settlements to negotiating peace. But I see his larger assertion, laying the entire blame for the conflict with the Palestinians at Israel’s feet, as unnecessarily combative and not entirely accurate. Despite Palestinian frustrations and disappointments with the political decisions and negotiating strategy of Ehud Barak in 1999 and 2000, nobody forced the Palestinians to launch their counterproductive Second Intifada. (Mahmoud Abbas has candidly admitted that this return to violence was catastrophic for his people; Suha Arafat has just been quoted confessing her husband’s decision to begin the Intifada.) Although the unilateral nature of Ariel Sharon’s “Disengagement” policy set the stage for the rise of Hamas in Gaza, nobody forced a 44% plurality of Palestinian voters to support Hamas in the election of 2006. And although one can legitimately find fault with the extent of Israel’s blockade of Gaza, nobody forced Palestinian fighters to attack Israeli towns repeatedly from that quarter since those events.
    [Show full text]
  • Settlement Snafu | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds Settlement Snafu by David Makovsky Mar 16, 2010 ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Makovsky David Makovsky is the Ziegler distinguished fellow at The Washington Institute and director of the Koret Project on Arab-Israel Relations. Articles & Testimony he embarrassment over Israel's announcement of 1,600 new housing units during U.S. Vice President Joe T Biden's visit has been elevated to an outright controversy with the public rebuke issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. On Thursday, Biden affirmed that the U.S.-Israel relationship is "impervious to any shifts in either country," and that "[n]o matter what challenges we face, this bond will endure." Just a day later, however, according to State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley, Clinton told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by phone that "the Israeli government needed to demonstrate not just through words, but through specific actions, that they are committed to this relationship [italics added] and to the peace process." The secretary proceeded to amplify her rebuke through a series of TV interviews. The United States is justifiably upset over the incident. But its alliance with Israel is crucial for both sides. An Israel that is weakened in its relationship with the United States will not be strong enough to take risks for peace. Moreover, the United States looks bad when a statement by its own vice president on Thursday is being put into serious question by the State Department spokesman on Friday. Fortunately, the U.S.-Israel relationship still has a solid core. There have been almost a dozen separate high-level visits to each country in just the last two months, as the two countries are cooperating extremely closely in their efforts to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel and Overseas: Israeli Election Primer 2015 (As Of, January 27, 2015) Elections • in Israel, Elections for the Knesset A
    Israel and Overseas: Israeli Election Primer 2015 (As of, January 27, 2015) Elections In Israel, elections for the Knesset are held at least every four years. As is frequently the case, the outgoing government coalition collapsed due to disagreements between the parties. As a result, the Knesset fell significantly short of seeing out its full four year term. Knesset elections in Israel will now be held on March 17, 2015, slightly over two years since the last time that this occurred. The Basics of the Israeli Electoral System All Israeli citizens above the age of 18 and currently in the country are eligible to vote. Voters simply select one political party. Votes are tallied and each party is then basically awarded the same percentage of Knesset seats as the percentage of votes that it received. So a party that wins 10% of total votes, receives 10% of the seats in the Knesset (In other words, they would win 12, out of a total of 120 seats). To discourage small parties, the law was recently amended and now the votes of any party that does not win at least 3.25% of the total (probably around 130,000 votes) are completely discarded and that party will not receive any seats. (Until recently, the “electoral threshold,” as it is known, was only 2%). For the upcoming elections, by January 29, each party must submit a numbered list of its candidates, which cannot later be altered. So a party that receives 10 seats will send to the Knesset the top 10 people listed on its pre-submitted list.
    [Show full text]