FOUNDATIONS for PEACE: Incorporating Perspectives from Georgia Into Strategies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACE: Incorporating perspectives from Georgia into strategies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Saferworld briefing for Labour Party ‘Britain in the World’ policy commission

24 February 2009

The present crisis in Georgia is an unresolved conflict with profound implications for the country, the region and Europe at large. Tackling its causes and working towards enduring solutions should therefore be a top priority for Britain and Europe. Finding a solution will be politically complex and demands coordinated action, especially among western European countries.

The UK is well placed to help build a consensus around policies for ensuring peace if it is attentive to the following complexities and perspectives that make up the conflict dynamic.

This briefing is based on Saferworld’s experience of working on the ground in Georgia and the wider region, and is in three parts:

1. Understanding the nature of the conflict 2. The fall-out from the conflict 3. Shaping policies for peace and the contribution of the UK

1. Understanding the nature of the conflict

The August violence between Georgia, Russia and the breakaway territories has damaged stability well beyond the contested areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia:

• The conflict not only created a humanitarian crisis, but continues to have a significant impact on economic, political and social stability in the country and the wider region.

• Ordinary people – Georgian, Abkhaz, Ossetian and other minority groups – feel insecure and apprehensive about the future.

• The underlying causes of conflict have not been addressed and have become even more complex following the violence.

As a result, Georgia and the wider region remain in a fragile condition and there is real potential for crisis scenarios to re-emerge. Through the August violence, local, national, regional and international disputes have come together to create a crisis that is undermining European security and the institutions mandated to oversee it.

Finding an enduring solution will require a deeper appreciation of the conflict dynamics and not, as is sometimes the case, simplifying its significance to (for instance) an East–West conflict alone. Georgia’s conflict with Abkhazia differs from that with South Ossetia and requires to be addressed separately. Georgia’s clash with Russia is another dimension to the same conflict, distinct from local concerns. Consequently, international responses to the conflict that place emphasis on ‘high level’ politics, whilst neglecting to take sufficient account

1 of the concerns of people locally, will fail. Community attitudes will play a central role in future conflict dynamics, but communities also are a part of the long term solution.

2. The fall-out from the conflict

Building strategies to mitigate and resolve the conflict requires a deeper appreciation of its dynamics and impacts.

2.1 Impact on Georgians in general The events of August have had a profound effect on Georgian society, creating a sense of anxiety throughout the country. Most feel confused and powerless over events. This is especially true in regions outside Tbilisi and amongst the significant minority groups who have less opportunity to inform national debates and lack leaders to voice local concerns. A minority of Georgians understand that they are now living in a ‘new reality’ (but struggle in knowing how to process these changing circumstances) while the majority, in shock, are in denial over what happened and the implications it brings.

Critically, civil society lacks a framework to debate and shape future peace and security, and there is an absence of credible information to inform it. The media is perceived as untrustworthy by growing numbers of the public, and civil society leaders have expressed frustration at the limited democratic space available to express alternative views. There is also an absence of mechanisms to inform or influence the decisions of national and international actors. For example, a large proportion of the population still buy into the narrative presented by the Georgian media – that a Georgian victory took place. However over time, the gap between public attitudes to the conflict and the manner the Government of Georgia is explaining and managing the crisis is widening and becoming problematic.

2.2 Impact on Georgian-controlled communities bordering Abkhazia and South Ossetia Despite the advances made after Russian withdrawal and the introduction of European monitors, communities living along the boundaries of the breakaway territories feel particularly unsafe and confused over the security mechanisms intended to protect them. Many IDPs from these ‘stabilised’ regions have yet to feel sufficiently safe return to return home. As a result, affected communities do not fully understand the role and actions of the various security actors, doubt their security needs will be met and, as a consequence, feel unsafe and abandoned.

2.3 Impact on the population in the breakaway territories In contrast, those living in Abkhazia feel comparatively safer. The situation in South Ossetia is however far worse, with communities continuing to feel deep insecurity, but without the reassurance of internationally-mandated monitors.

It was not long since public opinion viewed the spread of Western European influence as something potentially positive and superior to what the Russian Federation was offering. This situation has turned totally round. Russian intervention in what was considered locally as Georgian aggression is now being welcomed, with Russia seen as ‘a more reliable friend’. As a result, follow-up western responses are viewed suspiciously and come across as partial, siding with the Georgian Government (and its territorial policies) and not giving these communities the opportunity to represent their case as ‘victims’ of aggression.

2.4 Impact on the wider region August 2008 created insecurity across the wider region. Knock-on effects were especially found in Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also as far as Ukraine and Moldova. The South Caucasus countries are confronted with difficult foreign policy choices – neither wants (nor can afford) to compromise its relationship with either Moscow or Tbilisi. On the other hand, both seem to have received additional impetus to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Nagorno- Karabakh – probably with Russian mediation.

2 During the conflict in August, Russian-Ukrainian relations were strained by President Yuschenko’s unequivocal solidarity with the Georgian leadership, attempts to restrict the freedom of operation of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol, and Ukraine’s earlier arms supplies to Georgia. This has also put considerable strain on Ukraine’s domestic politics and the issue of arms supplies particularly continues to haunt its leadership domestically as well as in its relations with Russia.

2.5 Impact on international security institutions Another impact of the crisis centres on multinational efforts to provide monitoring, prevent conflict and keep peace. The fact the conflict escalated to the level it did reflected badly on existing security and peacekeeping mechanisms, undermining their legitimacy and demonstrating limitations in meeting the needs of affected communities.

Retracing the events that led to the escalation of conflict (and the signs were clear well before the August outbreak) poses serious questions over the manner international actors responded to the way the Georgian Government, de facto authorities and the Russian military were approaching security in the breakaway territories. International decision-makers were not responsive to indicators of worsening conflict dynamics and international assistance was not sufficiently grounded in a shared understanding of the root-causes of conflict.

Within Georgia, policy decisions about the separatist regions and how to achieve peace were limited to a small group of people, with little evidence of external scrutiny and as a result may not have been best placed to ensure future peace and stability in the country.

3. Shaping policies for peace and the contribution of the UK .

The above concerns should be reflected in policies designed to contribute to genuine peace in Georgia and the wider region. There is currently a hardening of attitudes taking place between parties and little or no contact between communities in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The idea of a solution, necessarily requiring trade-offs, is not emerging anywhere. To turn this situation around, a number of factors should be taken into account:

3.1 Learn from the past before establishing new security regimes in Georgia To prevent a recurrence of violence in Georgia and the wider region, a vital first step is making existing approaches to conflict prevention more effective. We have arrived at a crucial juncture for revising approaches to prevent further conflict. There is therefore an urgent need to ensure that the strategies and programmes of all actors learn from the deficiencies of the past so that more accountable measures are put in place to monitor and bolster security, address the immediate safety concerns of affected communities, and create conditions for sustained peace. Failure to do so will undermine the ability of international donors – including the British Government – to pursue stability, recovery and long-term development in Georgia and the wider region. Any delay in establishing a new security regime will only lead to a disintegration of security and the emergence of insurrectionary and / or criminal tactics.

Although there is no comprehensive agreement on what the new security mechanisms will be, current arrangements are disproportionately focusing on meeting higher-level political objectives around Georgia’s territorial integrity and addressing the war’s East-West dynamics rather than meeting the immediate security and justice needs of affected communities.

3.2 Involve people As mentioned above, people feel cut off and isolated from many of the big decisions being made around them. This feeling of isolation and powerlessness may exacerbate existing grievances and tensions, often in contexts where such tensions are already running high. The international community must get better at consulting and communicating – not only because these grievances present an additional risk to future disputes, but because to neglect them is often to overlook many of the underlying causes driving conflict.

There is also a need to support a comprehensive rethinking of the conflict within Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and increase participation and ownership of conflict prevention

3 and resolution processes. This should involve reflection by members of the public and civil society, and especially between them and their authorities.

More generally, communities must have a stake in their own security. International security and peace keeping institutions, as well as the authorities on all sides, must be sensitive to and inclusive of the public and make mechanisms for security more accountable to those they are intended for.

3.3 Rethink the role of Europe’s institutions dedicated to security and peace By extension, the conflict in Georgia raised serious questions about the framework being used to provide peace in the wider European region. For example, Georgian membership of NATO may or may not be appropriate for the country, but care must be taken to ensure that the prospect of membership doesn’t itself become a regional driver for conflict. The Georgian public should also be included in such a decision-making process through public debate, the room for which is questionable at the present time. Indeed, the uncritical promotion within Georgian society of NATO accession as a panacea to Georgia’s security challenges risks reducing the space for discussion of the underlying issues that need to be first dealt with. The creation of unrealistic and unachievable expectations around the benefits of NATO accession could play a role in fuelling future internal instability.

Georgia’s accession to NATO is a political decision as well as a military one and, as such, should be grounded in the realities of regional politics – including the role of the Russian Federation within them. As NATO expansion causes concern to Russia, it risks escalating tensions further and contributing to a deterioration of regional stability. August’s violence has also presented the OSCE with serious questions over the effectiveness of its approach and its ability to respond in such politicised contexts. There is a need for both of these institutions to rethink their conflict prevention strategies in light of the Georgian conflict – a process the UK should be at the forefront of.

3.4 Managing Georgia/Russia relations August’s violence underlined the increasingly assertive policy Russia has taken towards Georgia and the wider region over the last few years. It also confirmed that the ongoing conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia could not have been, and will not be, resolved without Russian participation. Political, economic and social links between Russia and both Abkhazia and South Ossetia have grown stronger in recent years. Conversely, links between these regions and Georgia have grown weaker. Overt attempts from Georgia to try and increase its influence and support within these areas are likely to antagonise tensions further. Russia has ‘managed’ domestic public opinion very effectively, with the result that it has enjoyed domestic support for its policy towards the Saakashvili government over the last few years – support which grew after the August conflict. Georgia has acted similarly. The seriously damaged relationship means that it is, and will remain, especially important to encourage both countries to participate in whatever international fora are available for discussion.

Conclusion

The UK is well placed to play an important role in supporting a peaceful and secure future for Georgia and the wider region – both bilaterally and, especially, through its active leadership within the EU, NATO and OSCE. However, when formulating its approach and policies, the UK should be careful not to emphasise international aspects of the conflict at the expense of addressing other more local dynamics. Taking into account the considerations presented above will help ensure that the UK’s efforts most effectively contribute to peace and security in Georgia, the wider region, and internationally.