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Could a Machine Be Conscious?

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Could a Machine Be Conscious? Could a Machine be Conscious? Key Stage 4 Programme – Spring 2014 Pupil Name ______________________ Page | 1 Timetable and Assignment Submission Timetable – Tutorials Tutorial Date Time Location Wadham College, 1 (Launch Trip) Thursday 27 th February 9.30-16.00 University of Oxford 2 Wednesday 5 th March 14.00-16.00 Wembley High 3 Wednesday 12 th March 14.00-16.00 Wembley High 4 Wednesday 19 th March 14.00-16.00 Wembley High 5 Wednesday 2nd April 14.00-16.00 Wembley High 6 (Graduation Trip) Fortnight commencing 12 th May 14.00-16.00 University of Sussex Timetable – Homework Assignments Homework Assignment Description Due Date Tutorial 1 Tutorial 2 Tutorial 3 Tutorial 4 Tutorial 5 Assignment Submission – Lateness and Plagiarism Lateness Submission after midnight on Wednesday 23 rd April 10 marks deducted Plagiarism Some plagiarism 10 marks deducted Moderate plagiarism 20 marks deducted Extreme plagiarism Automatic fail Assignment Submission – Virtual Learning Environment VLE username VLE password Please remember the following key details... • You are able log into the VLE either through the link on our website ( www.thebrilliantclub.org ) or going directly to the VLE site at ( vle.thebrilliantclub.org ). • When you submit your final assignment, please remember that you need to do so through the ‘My Activities’ tab and not as an attachment to a message. Page | 2 The Brilliant Club KS4 Programme – Spring 2014 – Pupil Feedback Report Grade Marks What this means 1st 70+ Performing to an excellent standard at AS-Level 2:1 60-69 Performing to a good standard at AS-Level 2:2 50-59 Performing to an excellent standard at GCSE 3rd 40-49 Performing to a good standard at GCSE Fail 0-39 Performing below a good standard at GCSE Did not submit DNS No assignment received by The Brilliant Club • Lateness Any lateness 10 marks deducted Plagiarism Some plagiarism 10 marks deducted Moderate plagiarism 20 marks deducted Extreme plagiarism Automatic fail • Name of PhD Tutor Mr Alex Kaiserman Title of Assignment Is the Turing Test a good test for consciousness? If not, what is? Name of Pupil Name of School ORIGINAL MARK / 100 FINAL MARK / 100 DEDUCTED MARKS FINAL GRADE • Page | 3 Contents Course Rationale Page 5 Mark Scheme Page 6 Glossary of Keywords Page 7 Tutorial 1 – The Turing Test Page 8 • Exit Slip (Example) Page 11 • Exit Slip Page 12 • Homework Page 13 Tutorial 2 – The Chinese Room Page 15 • Homework 1 Page 18 • Exit Slip Page 19 • Homework 2 Page 20 Tutorial 3 – The Hard Problems Page 21 • Homework Page 23 • Exit Slip Page 24 Tutorial 4 – The Future of Artificial Intelligence Page 25 • Exit Slip Page 29 • Homework – Essay draft Page 30 Tutorial 5 – Writing a Top- Notch Philosophy Essay Page 31 Page | 4 Course Rationale This course is centred around the question: ‘Could a machine be conscious?’ We’ve built machines that can beat human experts at chess, driving cars, stock market trading, and many other activities. But could we ever build a machine that is conscious ? What would such a machine be like? • Tutorial 1 starts with the father of computer science, Alan Turing, and his Turing Test for consciousness. • Tutorial 2 looks at a famous objection to the Turing Test from philosopher John Searle, called ‘The Chinese Room’, which aims to show that even computers which can simulate human behaviour exactly aren’t conscious. • Tutorial 3 delves into the murky world of phenomenal consciousness – the ‘what-it-is-likeness’ of experience – and analyzes such wacky philosophers’ inventions as philosophical zombies, spectrum inversion, and Mary the scientist in her black-and-white-room. • Tutorial 5 is all about the future of Artificial Intelligence. We’ll worry about the Singularity – the moment when machines become better at making machines than we are, and technological advancements that would have taken decades happen in the blink of an eye. Along the way, you’ll pick up a toolkit of philosophical skills and concepts – necessary vs. sufficient conditions, category mistakes, logical fallacies, objections and replies – that will help you in all walks of life in getting your point across and weeding out weaknesses in the arguments of others. You’ll write a philosophical essay on the adequacy of the Turing Test. You’ll learn to think critically and imaginatively about the world around you, asking questions no-one else would have thought of. And, of course, you’ll see some pretty cool robots. Page | 5 Mark Scheme Key Skill 1st 2.2 3rd £ Pupils display a detailed £ Pupils show good knowledge £ Pupils successfully identify knowledge and understanding of a and understanding of relevant one or more debates, and number of different specific debates, which is limited in display a rudimentary debates relevant to the question. either breadth or depth. understanding of them. £ Pupils have a sophisticated £ Pupils are able to identify £ Pupils attempt to present understanding of the available positions within a debate. There positions or arguments, with positions within certain debates, are some attempts to some inaccuracies. Knowledge and the points on which they agree reconstruct key arguments, with £ There is limited use of and disagree, and the standard some exegetical flaws. There are philosophical terminology. Understanding arguments used to support them. some successful attempts to £ There are consistently successful compare and/or contrast attempts to use philosophical different positions. terminology, e.g. £ Philosophical terminology is necessary/sufficient conditions, used, but either infrequently or, phenomenal consciousness, etc. in places, inappropriately. £ There is evidence of independent research into the question. £ Pupils can effectively identify £ Pupils can identify positions £ There is some attempt to positions within the logical space within the logical space of a identify rival positions in a of a debate, describe them, and debate and show some debate. explain their significance (e.g. understanding of the points on £ Pupils present and express avoid problems with this position, which they agree or disagree. dissatisfaction with one or allow one to preserve this £ There is some attempt to more arguments, and make intuition, etc.). criticize arguments for a limited use of analytical £ Pupils can identify flaws in an position, which is limited in techniques to defend the argument and demonstrate its either scope or persuasiveness. verdict. Critical Analysis and limitations using a range of critical £ Pupils present their own £ There is an attempt to state techniques (deriving false position. There is some attempt one’s own position, and Self-Reflection conclusions from premises, to explain its advantages. Some compare it to others. producing counterexamples, etc.) comparisons are made with £ Pupils present and explain their other positions, with some flaws own position. They explain how in understanding. There is some their position avoids any problems attempt to consider objections identified with other positions. to or limitations of the view, They consider objections and which are either unsatisfactorily provide replies. Where or incompletely answered. appropriate, they acknowledge the limitations of their position. £ Pupils present a clear, coherent, £ Pupils clearly answer the £ The question is clearly and complete answer to the question asked. There is some answered, but either question asked. There is no or evidence of ambiguity or of inconsistently, ambiguously, little evidence of ambiguity or making different claims at or incompletely. inconsistency. different points in the essay. £ Pupils demonstrate an ability £ Pupils present a sustained, £ Pupils make points, arguments to structure their thoughts compelling, fluent case for their or present examples which are into paragraphs and position. clearly directed towards sections. £ The essay is effectively structured defending their position. Some £ Points are made and Philosophical – points are organized into arguments are either un- defended, with some paragraphs or sections, there is an compelling or miss their mark. success. There is limited use Argumentation introduction and conclusion, there There are some flaws in of examples to illustrate are few tangents or discontinuities spelling/grammar/fluency which points. Some connections in the argument. don’t compromise the are made between different £ A full range of argumentative coherence of the writing. debates. There are some techniques are effectively £ There is limited evidence of flaws in employed – strong authorial voice, philosophical argumentative spelling/grammar/fluency use of examples and thought techniques. which can occasionally experiments, anticipating and comprise coherence. replying to objections, considering and criticizing rival positions. Page | 6 Glossary of Keywords Artificial Intelligence : Intelligence in man-made things, like robots. Behaviour : Movements and actions that things perform. Ergo: Therefore. Machine : Something built by humans to perform a certain function, e.g. a washing machine. Machine Learning : The practice of making machines which can teach themselves a task. Necessary Condition : X is a necessary condition for Y if Y cannot happen without X. Neural Basis : The state of your brain that brings about a certain experience. Philosophical Zombie: A being that is physically exactly like an ordinary human being, but which has no conscious experiences. Simulation : Imitating the behaviour of something in a different kind of way. Singularity : The moment when machines become better than humans
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